THIRD DIVISION

November 8, 2017

G.R. No. 204288

DEMEX RATTANCRAFT, INC. AND NARCISO T. DELA

MERCED,Petitioners

vs.

ROSALIO A. LERON, Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

To justify the dismissal of an employee based on abandonment of

work, there must be a showing of overt acts clearly evidencing the

employee's intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assailing the February 9, 2012 Decision2 and

October 25, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G,R. SP

1
No. 109077. The assailed judgments reversed the Resolutions of

the National Labor Relations Commission, which found that

respondent Rosalio A. Leron's (Leron) dismissal was for a just

cause.

In 1980, Leron was hired as a weaver by Demex Rattancraft, Inc.

(Demex), a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing

handcrafted rattan products for local sale and export.4 Narciso T.

Dela Merced was Demex's president.5

Leron was paid on a piece-rate basis6 and his services were

contracted through job orders.7 He worked from Monday to

Saturday. However, there were times when he was required to

work on Sundays.8 Leron received his wages at the end of every

week but he never received standard benefits such as 13th month

pay, service incentive leave, rest day pay, holiday pay, and

overtime pay.9

Sometime in June 2006, Leron was dismissed by Demex's foreman,

Marcelo Viray (Viray), and Demex's personnel manager, Nora

Francisco (Francisco).1âwphi1 Both accused him of instigating a

campaign to remove Viray as the company's foreman.10 Before

Leron was dismissed from service, he was given a memorandum

stating that the dining chair he had previously weaved11 for export

2
to Japan was rejected. For this reason, Demex expressed that it

would no longer avail of his services.12

On June 28, 2006, Leron did not report for work.13 The next day, he

filed a complaint against Demex for illegal dismissal before the

Labor Arbiter of Quezon City. This case was docketed as NLRC

NCR Case No. 00-06-05490-06.14

Meanwhile, Demex construed Leron 's failure to report to work as

an absence without leave. On July 3, 2006, Dcmex sent Leron a

notice requiring him to return to work on July 5, 2006. This was

personally served to Leron by one (1) of his co-employees. On July

7, 2006, Demex sent another notice to Leron requiring him to report

to work.15Despite having received these two (2) notices, Leron did

not resume his post. On July 12, 2006, Leron received a third notice

from Demex informing him of its decision to terminate his services

on the ground of abandonment.16

On August 3, 2006, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal

case without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.17 Leron

refiled his complaint before the Labor Arbiter of San Fernando City,

Pampanga. This case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB

II109-10461-06.18

3
In his Decision19 dated July 30, 2007, Labor Arbiter Leandro M. Jose

(Labor Arbiter Jose) dismissed the complaint holding that Leron's

termination from employment was valid. However, Demex was

ordered to pay 13th month pay amounting to ₱5,833.00.20

Leron appealed Labor Arbiter Jose's July 30, 2007 Decision before

the National Labor Relations Commission. This was docketed as

LAC No. 06- 002057-08.21

On January 30, 2009, the National Labor Relations Commission

rendered a Resolution22 affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter

Jose but awarded Leron ₱5,000.00 as nominal damages for

Demex's non-compliance with procedural due process.23 The

National Labor Relations Commission declared that Leron's

absence was a valid ground to terminate him from

employment.24 Leron moved for reconsideration but his motion was

denied in the Resolution dated March 16, 2009.25

Leron filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court26 before the Cou11 of Appeals assailing the Resolutions of

the National Labor Relations Commission.27

In its Dccision28 dated February 9, 2012, the Court of Appeals found

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor

4
Relations Commission when it declared that Leron abandoned his

work. According to the Court of Appeals, Demex failed to establish

the elements constituting abandonment. There was no clear

intention on the part of Leron to sever the employer-employee

relationship because he filed an illegal dismissal case immediately

after he was dismissed by Viray and Francisco. Aside from this, the

Court of Appeals ascribed bad faith on Demex and held that its act

of sending return-to-work notices was merely an afterthought.29

Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions of the National Labor

Relations Commission were reversed and set aside. Demex was

ordered to pay Leron accrued backwages and separation pay in

lieu of reinstatement due to the strained relations between the

parties.30 The Court of Appeals also deleted the award of nominal

damages. The dispositive portion of its Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, the petition is Granted. The assailed

Resolutions, dated January 30, 2009 and March 16,

2009, of the Public Respondent National Labor

Relations Commission, in NLRC LAC

NO. 06-002057-08 are hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring Petitioner's

dismissal illegal, thus:

5
 1. Private Respondent Demex is ordered to

pay Petitioner backwages, separation pay

and ₱5,833.00 as proportionate 13th month

pay for the year 2006.

2. The awarded nominal damages in the

amount of ₱5,000.00 is deleted.

This case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the

computation of Petitioner's accrued backwages and

separation pay.

SO ORDERED.31 (Emphasis in the original)

Demex moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied in the

Resolution32 dated October 25, 2012.

On December 21, 2012, Demex filed a Petition for Review

on Certiorari before this Court assailing the February 9, 2012

Decision and October 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of

Appeals.33Respondent filed his Comment34 on April 16, 2013 to

which petitioners filed their Reply on May 21, 2013.35

6
In the Resolution36 dated June 17, 2013, this Court gave due course

to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective

memoranda.

Petitioners filed their Memorandum37 on August 23, 2013 while

respondent filed his Memorandum38 on January 8, 2014.

Petitioners justify respondent's dismissal from employment on the

ground of abandonment. They point out that respondent's

unauthorized absences, non-compliance with the return-to-work

notices, and alleged act of crumpling the first return-to-work notice

are indicators of his intention to sever his employment.39 Petitioners

add that the return-to-work notices were not sent to respondent as

an afterthought because they only discovered the existence of the

first illegal dismissal case after they sent the first notice.40

On the other hand, respondent argues that his act of filing an illegal

dismissal case negates the charge of abandonment. He points out

that he had already filed the illegal dismissal complaint against

petitioners before he was given a return-to-work notice. Petitioners

"were very much aware"41 of the case and had actively participated

in the proceedings. Respondent also argues that he cannot be

faulted for his refusal to return to work. The filing of case for illegal

7
dismissal caused a strained relationship between him and

petitioners.42

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not

respondent Rosalio A. Leron was validly dismissed from

employment by petitioners Demex Rattancraft, Inc. and Narciso T.

Dela Merced on the ground of abandonment of work.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review brought

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.43 This Court, not being a trier of

facts, would no longer disturb the lower court's factual findings

when supported by substantial evidence.44

The determination of whether or not an employee is guilty of

abandonment is a factual matter. It involves a review on the

probative value of the evidence presented by each party and the

correctness of the lower courts' assessments.45 The Court of

Appeals' finding that respondent did not abandon his work would

generally be binding upon the parties and this Court.46 However, an

exception should be made in this case considering that there is a

variance in the findings of the Court of Appeals and the National

Labor Relations Commission.47

8
Article 297 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the

dismissal of an employee:

Article 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer

may terminate an employment for any of the following

causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the

employee of the lawful orders of his employer or

representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his

duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust

reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized

representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee

against the person of his employer or any immediate

member of his family or his duly authorized

representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

9
Although abandonment of work is not expressly enumerated as a

just cause under Article 297 of the Labor Code, jurisprudence has

recognized it as a form of or akin to neglect of duty.48

Abandonment of work has been construed as "a clear and

deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any

intention of returning back."49 To justify the dismissal of an

employee on this ground, two (2) elements must concur, namely:

"(a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or

justifiable reason; and, (b) a clear intention to sever the

employer-employee relationship."50

Mere failure to report to work is insufficient to support a charge of

abandonment. The employer must adduce clear evidence of the

employee's "deliberate, unjustified refusal . . . to resume his [or her]

employment,'' which is manifested through the employee's overt

acts.51

Set against these parameters, this Court finds that the Court of

Appeals did not err in holding that the National Labor Relations

Commission gravely abused its discretion in upholding

respondent's dismissal from service.

10
In affirming the findings of the Labor Arbiter and in declaring that

the petitioners discharged the burden of proof,52 the National Labor

Relations Commission relied on petitioners' evidence. Petitioners

presented (1) the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the employee who

served the first return-to-work notice; (2) the second return-to-work

notice dated July 7, 2006; and (3) the termination notice addressed

to respondent.53 The National Labor Relations Commission

declared:

In the instant case, we agree with the finding of the

Labor Arbiter that the respondents were able to

discharge their burden of proving the validity of the

dismissal of the complainant. As borne by the records,

the complainant stopped reporting for work beginning

June 28, 200[6]. Although he claims that he was not

allowed to work on that day, he admitted having

received the notices sent by the respondents for him to

go back to work. He also failed to justify or offer good

reason for ignoring such return[-]to[-]work notices. Thus,

the respondents promptly acted in considering him

[Absent Without Leave], which is a just ground for his

dismissal.54

11
The National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse

of discretion in holding that respondent's absence from work is a

valid ground for his dismissal.

Petitioners' evidence does not clearly establish a case of

abandonment. Petitioners failed to prove the second element of

abandonment, which is regarded by this Court as the more decisive

factor.55

Intent to sever the employer-employee relationship can be proven

through the overt acts of an employee. However, this intent "cannot

be lightly inferred or legally presumed from certain ambivalent

acts."56The overt acts, after being considered as a whole, must

clearly show the employee's objective of discontinuing his or her

employment.57

Petitioners point to respondent's absences, non-compliance with

the return-to-work notices, and his alleged act of crumpling the first

return-to-work notice as indicators of abandonment.58 These acts

still fail to convincingly show respondent's clear and unequivocal

intention to sever his employment.

Respondent filed an illegal dismissal case against petitioners on

June 29, 2006, the day after he was unceremoniously dismissed by

12
his superiors on June 28, 2006.59 Petitioners deny respondent's

arbitrary dismissal60 and claim that respondent abandoned his work

starting June 28, 2006.61

Petitioners' narrative would mean that respondent instituted an

illegal dismissal complaint right after his first day of absence. This is

illogical. There was no unequivocal intent to abandon. Respondent

even pursued the illegal dismissal case after it was dismissed

without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.62

Respondent's non-compliance with the return-to-work notices and

his alleged act of cn1mpling the first return-to-work notice are

equivocal acts that fail to show a clear intention to sever his

employment. Strained relations caused by being legitimately

disappointed after being unfairly treated could explain the

employee's hesitation to report back immediately. If any, his

actuations only explain that he has a grievance, not that he wanted

to abandon his work entirely.

Petitioners also failed to comply with procedural due process,

particularly the twin-notice rule. They admitted that after sending

two (2) return-to-work notices, they sent a notice to respondent

informing him of his dismissal.63

13
Valid termination requires the employer to send an initial notice to

the employee, stating the specific grounds or causes for dismissal

and directing the submission of a written explanation answering the

charges. After considering the employee's answer, the employer

must give another notice informing the employee of the employer's

findings and reason for termination.64 These are the operative acts

that terminate an employer-employee relationship. In Kams

International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,65 this

Court explained:

Furthermore, it must be stressed that abandonment of

work does not per se sever the employer-employee

relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which

is in turn a just cause for termination of

employment. The operative act that will ultimately put

an end to this relationship is the dismissal of the

employee after complying with the procedure

prescribed by law.66 (Emphasis supplied)

The employer has the burden of proving that an employee's

dismissal from service was for a just or authorized cause.67 Having

failed to clearly establish that respondent abandoned his work, this

14
Court denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals' finding

that respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 9, 2012

Decision and October 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals

in CA G.R. SP NO. 109077 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN SAMUEL R. MARTIRES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

15
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer

of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in

the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the

case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s

Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 7-29.

2
Id. at 30-40. The Decision was penned by then Associate Justice

Noel G Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F.

16
Barza and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Ninth Division, Court of

Appeals, Manila.

3
Id. at 41-42. The Resolution was penned by then Associate

Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices

Romeo f. Barza and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Former Ninth

Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4
Id. at 31.

5
Id. at 10.

6
Id. at 31.

7
Id. at l2.

8
Id. at 31.

9
Id.

10
Id.

11
Id.

12
Id. at 263.

13
Id. at 13.

14
Id. at 101-101 A.

17
15
Id. at 13-14.

16
Id. at 14.

17
Id. at 32.

18
Id. at 102-102-A.

19
Id, at 89-95.

20
Id. at 94-95.

21
Id. at 84.

22
Id. at 84-87. The attached Resolution is incomplete. The

Resolution dated January 30, 2009 was penned by Commissioner

Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner

Lourdes C. Javier and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III of the

Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission.

23
Id. at 86.

24
Id. at 85-86.

25
Id. at 96-97. The Resolution was penned by Commissioner Pablo

C. Espiritu, Jr. and concurred in by Commissioner Gregorio O.

Bilog III.

18
26
Id. at 30.

27
Id. at 15.

28
Id. at 30-40.

29
Id. at 35-38.

30
Id. at 38-39.

31
Id. at 39.

32
Id. at 41-42.

33
Id. at 7-29.

34
Id. at 209-213.

35
Id. at 2 l 5-221.

36
Id. at 222-222-A.

37
Id, at 224-241.

38
Id. at 246-262.

39
Id. at 227-236.

40
Id. at 232-235.

19
41
Id. at 256. .

42
Id. at 253-257.

43
RULES OF COUR'J', Rule 45, sec. 1.

44
Pascual v. Burgos, G.R, No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA

189, 204 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

45
Id. at 206.

46
Id. at 204-205.

47
Id. at 205-206 citing Medina v. Asistio. Jr., 269 Phil. 225 (1990)

[Per J. Bidin, Third Division].

48
Stanley Fine Furniture v. Gallano, 748 Phil. 624, 638 (2014) [Per J.

Leonen, Second Division].

49
Flores v. Nuestro, 243 Phil. 712, 715 (1988) [Per J. Yap, Second

Division] citing Capital Garment Corporation v. Ople, 202 Phil. 797

(1982) [Per J. De Castro, Second Division].

50
Pare v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 288, 292

(1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

51
Id.

20
52
Rollo, pp. 85-86.

53
Id. at 93-94. The Labor Arbiter Decision mentioned "July 7, 2008"

but meant "July 7, 2006."

54
Id. at 85-86.

55
Pare v. National Labor Relations Commission, 376 Phil. 288, 292

(1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

56
Karns International, Inc. v, National Labor Relations

Commission, 373 Phil. 950, 958 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second

Division] citing De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor, and/or Milagros

Chuakay and William Go v. National Labor Relations

Commission,364 Phil. 91 (1999) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].

57
Id.

58
Rollo, pp. 227-236.

59
Id. at 13 and 31.

60
Id. at l7.

61
Id. At 13.

62
Id. at 32.

21
63
Id. at 226-228.

64
King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac, 553 Phil. 108, 115-117

(2007) [Per J. Velasco, Second Division].

65
373 Phil. 950 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

66
Id. at 959.

67
See Polymedic General Hospital v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 219 Phil. 385 (1985) [Per J. Relova, First

Division]; Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission, 369 Phil.

557, 565 (1999) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].

22