G.R. No. 196045
No shares of stock, however, were actually
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is
not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall thus be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may
at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the
citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basic principles of government.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision,2 dated 22 September 2010, and Resolution,3 dated 11 March 2011, of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the
Omnibus Order,4 dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant No. 01-118.
THE FACTS
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of Investigation (NBJ) Special
Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan)filed a Sworn Application for a
Search Warrant5 before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose of
conducting a search of the office premises of respondents Amador Pastrana
and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate Center, Valero Street, Makati
City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he received confidential information that
respondents were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some
of their employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they would
convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of
stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer
for the payment thereof.
purchased. Instead, the money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to
respondent Pastrana's personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to
investors-clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10% to the cost
of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator Gaerlan averred that the
scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799 or the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC).6
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan attached the
affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the complainants from Saudi
Arabia;7 the affidavits of respondents' former employees who actually called
clients abroad;8 the articles of incorporation of domestic corporations used
by respondents in their scheme;9 and the sketch of the place sought to be
searched .10
On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador, Jr.) of the
RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant No. 01-118, viz:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Search Warrant No. 01-118 For: Viol
8799 (The Securities Regulation Co
-versus- Estafa (Art. 315, RPC)
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD of
1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati
City
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under
oath the applicant NBI [Special Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN
and his witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO, that there is
probable cause to believe that AMADOR PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have
in their possession/control located in [an] office premises located at 1908 88
Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as shown in the application for d. Official receipts;
search warrant the following documents, articles and items, to wit:
e. Credit advise;
Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients abroad; list of
brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all these f. Fax messages;
companies[,] local and abroad; sales agreements with clients; copies of
official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies g. Clients message slips;
of credit advise from the banks; clients['] message slips; company brochures;
letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of personal assets of Amador h. Company brochures;
Pastrana; list of clients and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC. i. Letterheads; and

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned. j. Envelopes.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the 2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
day of the premises above-described and forewith seize and take possession
thereof and bring said documents, articles and items to the undersigned to
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
be dealt with as the law directs.
4. Lease contracts; and
The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their search within
the validity of the warrant.
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this Date.11
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search Warrant No. 01-118
because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses, one for violation
Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the Securities
of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance
and Exchange Commission (SEC)proceeded to respondents' office to search
contravened the basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search
the same. The search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Denna,
warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause in
Chief Security Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88
connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant No. 01-118
Corporate Center. Pursuant to the Return,12 dated 2 April 2001, and the
failed to describe with specificity the objects to be seized.14
Inventory Sheet13 attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were able to seize
the following:
On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to quash the
search warrant, respondent Abad moved for the inhibition of Judge
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:
Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of three (3) months without
action on the motion to quash clearly showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion
a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients; to passing judgment on his own search warrant.15

b. List of brokers and 201 files;

c. Sales agreements;
In an Order,16 dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr. voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 58.
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the search
warrant was null and void because it violated the requirement that a search
warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. It added
that the SRC alone punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo
divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and that
even estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious settings. The RTC
further opined that the search warrant and the application thereto as well as
the inventory submitted thereafter were all wanting in particularization.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on March 26, 2001 is hereby
QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All documents, articles and items seized are
hereby ordered to be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items
seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in evidence and
cannot be used in any proceeding for whatever purpose. The petition to cite
respondent SEC and NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General elevated an
appeal before the CA.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. It declared that Search "Warrant No. 01-118 clearly violated Section 4,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specific offense, because the application failed to
specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type
of estafa was committed by respondents. The appellate court observed that
the application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or their
corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, contrary to
petitioner's allegation that respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC
which makes unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or
broker capacity without the requisite SEC registration.
The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed to pass the
test of particularity. It reasoned that the inclusion of the phrase "other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration
with the SEC" rendered the warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all
records of respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the
implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to what
property should be seized. The CA disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
Omnibus Order dated May 10, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58,
Makati City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in
its resolution, dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI AGENT GAERLAN'S
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118
SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME
OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.
II.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED
THEREIN WHICH SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE OF ACTING
AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE
IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF THE ENUMERATION OF
ITEMS DID NOT INTEND TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS
TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE "SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED
IN VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION WITH THE SEC."19
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so
intertwined that the punishable acts defined in one of them can be
considered as including or are necessarily included in the other; that
operating and acting as stockbrokers without the requisite license infringe
Section 28.1 of the SRC; that these specific acts of defrauding another by
falsely pretending to possess power or qualification of being a stockbroker
similarly constitute estafa under Article 315 of the RPC; and that both Section
28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of the RPC penalize the act of
misrepresentation, an element common to both offenses; thus, the issuance
of a single search warrant did not violate the "one specific offense rule."20
Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not a general
warrant because the items listed therein show a reasonable nexus to the
offense of acting as stockbrokers without the required license from the SEC;
that the statement "and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" did not render the warrant
void; and that the words "and other" only intend to emphasize that no
technical description could be given to the items subject of the search
warrant because of the very nature of the offense.21
In their comment,22 respondents counter that the lower court was correct in
ruling that the subject warrant was issued in connection with more than one
specific offense; that estafa and violation of the SRC could not be considered
as one crime because the former is punished under the RPC while the latter is
punished under a special law; that there are many violations cited in the SRC
that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation of R.A. No.
8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes of estafa which could be
committed through at least 10 modes, each one of them having elements
distinct from those of the other modes.
Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not expressly
indicate that the documents, articles, and items sought to be seized
thereunder are subjects of the offense, stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense; that it is a general warrant because it
enumerates every conceivable document that may be found in an office
setting; that, as a result, it is entirely possible that in the course of the search
for the articles and documents generally listed in the search warrant, those
used and intended for legitimate purposes may be included in the seizure;
that the concluding sentence in the subject warrant "and other showing that
these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with the SEC"
is a characteristic of a general warrant; and that it allows the raiding team
unbridled latitude in determining by themselves what items or documents
are evidence of the imputation that respondents and the corporations they
represent are violating their registration with the SEC.23
In its reply,24 petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant may be
properly evaluated by examining both the warrant itself and the application
on which it was based; that the acts alleged in the application clearly
constitute a transgression of Section 28.1 of the SRC; and that the nature of
the offense for which a search warrant is issued is determined based on the
factual recital of the elements of the subject crime therein and not the formal
designation of the crime itself in its caption.
THE COURT'S RULING
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right
to personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and
seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property,
and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such
usurpations when attempted.25
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to
wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno (Stonehill),26 the Court
stressed two points which must be considered in the issuance of a search
warrant, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.27Moreover, in Stonehill, on
account of the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the search warrants involved in that case, the Court deemed it fit to amend
the former Rules of Court by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
The search warrant must be
issued for one specific offense.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is
that it must be issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must
be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a
scatter-shot warrant.28 In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is
defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.29
In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search warrants which
were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As
a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved
in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It
would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code," - as alleged in the aforementioned
applications - without reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the socalled general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.30
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez,31 the Court further
ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily
determine whether an offense exists to justify the issuance or quashal of the
search warrant because the personal properties that may be subject of the
search warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific offense"
requirement of probable cause. The only way to determine whether a
warrant should issue in connection with one specific offense is to juxtapose
the facts and circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements of
the offense that are alleged to support the search warrant.
xx xx
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable
cause. Since the primary objective of applying for a search warrant is to
obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense for
which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant
must satisfy himself that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes
the facts and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which the
warrant is sought and issued. x x x32
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation of R.A. No.
8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)."33 First,
violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable
acts under the said law such as manipulation of security prices,34 insider
trading,35 acting as dealer or broker without being registered with the
SEC,36 use of unregistered exchange,37 use of unregistered clearing
agency,38 and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members,
brokers, and dealers39 among others. Even the charge of "estafa under
Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three ways of committing the
said crime: (1) with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of
false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means. The
three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to two, i.e., (1) by means of
abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of deceit. For these reasons alone, it
can be easily discerned that Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.
Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search
warrants issued for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or the then Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972. In Olaes v. People,40 even though the search warrant merely
stated that it was issued in connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the
Court did not nullify the same for it was clear in the body that it was issued
for the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
connection with Violation of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that
[t]here is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias
Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, [have] in their
possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.
Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed,
there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant
also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.41 (emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dichoso,42 the search warrant was also for violation of R.A. No.
6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were violated. The Court
upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question was issued for
more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant
is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this
theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for
illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with
dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.43 (emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit,44 the search warrant was captioned: For
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), the Court held
that while "illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section I of P .D.
No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3
thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the
various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related
offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."45
The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its
failure to specify what particular provision of the SRC did respondents
allegedly violate, Search Warrant No. 01-118 also covered estafa under the
RPC. Even the application for the search warrant merely stated:
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees scattered
throughout their numerous companies call prospective clients abroad and
convince them to buy shares of stocks in a certain company likewise based
abroad. Once the client is convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or she is
advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the money supposedly intended for
the purchase of the stocks. The transfer is made to the account of the
company which contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same is
immediately withdrawn and brought to the treasury department of the
particular company. The money is then counted and eventually allocated to
the following: 42% to Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming
clients (those with small accounts and who already threatened the company
with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of sales and 8% goes to marketing. No
allocation is ever made to buy the shares of stocks.46
Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first and foremost a
codification of various rules and regulations governing securities. Thus,
unlike, the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and
possession of illegal drugs, the offenses punishable under the SRC could not
be lumped together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what
particular provision of the SRC was violated.
Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No. 01-118,
petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation of Section 28.1 of
the SRC, which reads, "No person shall engage in the business of buying or
selling securities in the Philippines as a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman,
or an associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as such
with the Commission." However, despite this belated attempt to pinpoint a
provision of the SRC which respondents allegedly violated, Search Warrant
No. 01-118 still remains null and void. The allegations in the application for
search warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers
without prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to be
held liable for violation of Section 28.l of the SRC. It is even worthy to note
that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's Comment on the Motion to
Quash,47 dated 5 April 2002.
In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was
specified in the application for search warrant, there could have been no
finding of probable cause in connection with that offense. In People v. Hon.
Estrada,48 the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the
best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue
is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged - for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case -
and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who
could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured
at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason
therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring
stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to
give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his
home and personalities.49 (emphasis supplied)
Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that
respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or dealers.1âшphi1 Such
circumstance only reinforces the view that at the time of the application, the
NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge
respondents with.
Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the issuance of a single
search warrant does not violate the one-specific-offense rule, the two
offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa, an offense
may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.50
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b)
that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the
offended party or third person.51 On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC
penalizes the act of performing dealer or broker functions without
registration with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another and causing
damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation are not essential
elements. Thus, a person who is found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of
the SRC may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same
manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may be
held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in because violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC is ma/um prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to
prove criminal intent, whereas estafa is ma/um in se, in the prosecution of
which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.
Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA
(Columbia)52 and Laud v. People (Laud)53 even militate against petitioner.
In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant which covers several
counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-offense
rule, viz:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and
the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of
pirated videotapes is not to be confused with the number of offenses
charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule.54
In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it was issued
only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder, albeit for six (6) counts.
In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state
one specific offense. It included violation of the SRC which, as previously
discussed, covers several penal provisions and estafa, which could be
committed in a number of ways.
Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for
more than one specific offense.
Reasonable particularity of the
description of the things to be
seized
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the
things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the
warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent
them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. It is not, however, required that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for
doubt on the part of the searching authorities.55
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,56 it was pointed out that one of the
tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized
under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.57
In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be
the subject of a search warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the
offense; or (iii) those used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.58
Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed to state the
specific offense alleged committed by respondents. Consequently, it could
not have been possible for the issuing judge as well as the applicant for the
search warrant to determine that the items sought to be seized are
connected to any crime. Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was
issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the
documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant failed the
test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing,
thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the transactions of respondents,
whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their actual registration
with the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search Warrant
No. 01-118 was indeed issued for violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC; the
same could well-nigh pertain to the corporations' certificate of registration
with the SEC and not just to respondents' lack of registration to act as
brokers or dealers.
In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for
more than one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the
things sought for seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010 Decision and 11

March 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2,
2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for
alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019),
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's
Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which
nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a
certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman
and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because
he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged
before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended
the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III
under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the
assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the
latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article
1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to
PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of
the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to
show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person
and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his
voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he
was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed
against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of
which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22,
2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a
private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT
HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT
THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN
COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether
herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in
violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he
was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is
no public officer who was charged in the Information and, as such,
prosecution against respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any
public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there
was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however,
does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer
has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment
for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done
by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the
act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means
that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution
or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done,
or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual
actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of
two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot
conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or
more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of
conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not
remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found
guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the
Information filed against respondent, which is deemed hypothetically
admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with
Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the
State and the legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private
persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a
private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-
Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v.
Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as
construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally,
conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known
to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not
outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is
committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy
assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of
conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a
penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together
with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are
liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all,
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same
as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one
is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others,
done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case
where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate
liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party
created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court
shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of
aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy
if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and
execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of
any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the
common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective criminal
liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a
patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before
the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove
or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent
Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before
the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the
present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the
SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the
Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as
G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court
denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This
Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now
argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the
instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this
Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional
liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No.
28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests
the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of
an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives
bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not
to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to
have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the
sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance
is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent
court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to
question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the
government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the
person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would
mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based
on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of
one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are
mere incidents in the main case and the main case has already been pending
for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no
means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition
of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No.
28090.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 205823, August 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. REGIE BREIS Y ALVARADO AND
GARY YUMOL Y TUAZON,*Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 26 June 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision2 dated 14
February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City (trial court)
in Criminal Case No. 30409-R.
The Facts
Appellants Regie Breis y Alvarado (Breis) and Gary Yumol y Tuazon (Yumol)
were charged with violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
That in the afternoon of February 10, 2010, at Gov. Pack Road, this City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control
marijuana with a recorded net weight of 8,181 grams of dried marijuana
leaves/fruiting tops wrapped in plastic and further wrapped with brown
packaging tape and placed inside a brown box, without the authority of law
and knowing fully well that said dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops are
dangerous drugs, in violation of the afore-cited provisions of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW to Sec. 11 of RA 9165.3
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued, where the
prosecution presented witnesses Intelligence Officers 1 Elizer Mangili (IO1
Mangili) and Ryan Peralta (IO1 Peralta) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR); while the defense
presented the testimonies of appellants.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Around 3:00 o'clock PM of February 10, 2009 (sic), an informant went to the
PDEA-CAR field office at Melvin Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City and
offered the information that the accused were bound to transport a box of
marijuana from Baguio City to Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Mangili gathered
that the accused have been frequently traveling from Pampanga to Baguio to
get marijuana bricks from their supplier at La Trinidad, Benguet. Mangili
referred the informant to Senior PDEJA Officer Tacio for further interview
and then the matter was referred to the PDEA Officer-in-Charge Edgar Apalla,
who after careful evaluation, ordered Agent Tacio to form a team for the
entrapment of the accused.
Agent Tacio created a team composed of Mangili and Peralta as arresting
officer and seizing officer, respectively, and briefed them on the operations
to be conducted. Tacio disclosed to the team that the accused were to
transport by a public transport bus from Baguio City to Dau, Pampanga bricks
of marijuana packed in a carton and that the departure from Baguio was
scheduled at around 5:00 o'clock PM of that day. The accused Breis would be
in a white t-shirt with "Starbucks" logo and dark jeans while accused Yumol
would be wearing a black t-shirt with a white print and blue jeans. Both the
accused were described as standing about 5 feet and 5 inches, thin, and dark
complexion.
When the briefing was through, the team proceeded to the Genesis Bus
terminal at Governor Pack Road, Baguio City at around 4:30 o'clock PM. Due
to time constraints, the PDEA team chose not to secure any warrant nor
coordinate with the nearest police station.
Upon reaching the bus terminal, Mangili asked the bus conductor to identify
the bus which would leave at 5:00 o'clock PM. Mangili was directed to
Genesis bus with plate number TXX 890. Thus, pretending to be passengers,
Mangili and Peralta boarded the bus and they observed two male individuals
whose physical appearances fitted the descriptions given by the informant.
Both agents likewise saw a box placed in between the legs of accused Breis.

Mangili sat behind the accused while Peralta, stood near where the accused
were seated. In order to have a clearer view of the box tucked in between
the feet of accused Breis if the same fit the box described by informant,
Mangili took the seat opposite where the accused were seated and saw that
the box was with the markings "Ginebra San Miguel" and which was
described by the informant. Mangili then casually asked accused Yumol who
owned the "Ginebra San Miguel" box, the accused replied that it was theirs.
Accused Yumol suddenly stood up and tried to leave but before he could do
so, Peralta blocked his way while Mangili confronted accused Breis and asked
what was contained in the box. Instead of answering, Breis shoved Mangili
and tried to flee but Mangili was able to block his way as he was much larger
than the accused Yumol (sic). Mangili ordered him to sit down.
Agent Peralta then summoned the back-up officers to help secure the bus
and subdue the accused. After introducing themselves as PDEA agents,
Mangili asked the accused Breis to open the box but Breis ignored the
request which made Mangili lift and open the box. He took one brick and
discovered it was marijuana. The "Ginebra San Miguel" box yielded three
more bricks of marijuana. Mangili then marked the items on site.
Agent Peralta then informed the accused that they were being arrested for
violation of Rep. Act No. 9165 and then he read their constitutional rights in
Pilipino to them.
Thereafter, the team returned to the PDEA-CAR office of Melvin Jones,
Baguio City for documentation such as the preparation of the affidavits of
Agents Mangili and Peralta, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report of both
accused, Request for Physical Exam and Request for Laboratory Exam.
Inventory likewise was done around 7:43 o'clock PM on February 10, 2010 at
the said PDEA-CAR office.
After the documentation and inventory, the accused were brought to the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) and Medico-Legal
Certificates were issued showing that the accused had no external signs of
physical injuries at the time of their examination. Chemistry Report No. D-08-
2010 indicates that the confiscated items from the accused yielded positive
to (sic) the presence of marijuana, a dangerous drugs (sic).4
Version of the Defense
The defense's version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court, is as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Accused, both construction workers, left Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga for
Baguio at around 6:00 o'clock AM of February 9, 2010 to visit a certain Edwin
Garcia, an acquaintance and a resident of Loakan, Baguio City. Edwin Garcia
had offered the accused to be upholsterers in his upholstery business way
back in December of 2008.
At around 11:00 o'clock AM, the accused arrived in Baguio City and because
they did not know the exact address and contact number of Edwin Garcia,
they took a chance and decided to take a cab to Loakan. However, they
failed to find Garcia's house despite asking the residents of Loakan. So, they
decided to go back to the Genesis bus terminal and go back home to
Pampanga.
Upon reaching the terminal, they ate and took the 4:30 o'clock PM bus for
Pampanga. They were already boarded when accused Yumol stepped out to
buy a bottle of water. Thereafter, Mangili went near accused Breis and
uttered something inaudible, and thinking that the seat he was occupying
was Mangili's, accused Breis stood up to give up his seat but instead Mangili
pushed him and accused Breis asked what seems to be the problem. Mangili
then asked if he owns the box under the seat in front of his, Breis replied in
the negative. Mangili then opened the box, got one of the bricks contained
therein, sliced the same and saw that it was marijuana. Accused Breis,
infuriated, retorted that the accusation is baseless and malicious.
Mangili then summoned his companions and they dragged accused Breis
outside the bus when suddenly, accused Yumol arrived and inquired what
the commotion was all about. The group then asked if he (Yumol) was a
companion of accused Breis and when he answered positively, Yumol was
likewise apprehended.
Both the accused were then brought to the PDEA Office and were forced to
admit ownership of the box of marijuana, but they refused and thus they
were hit with the bricks of marijuana. One of the agents even squeezed the
scrotum of accused Yumol in the hope that he will admit ownership over the
box of marijuana.5
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's version, upholding the
presumption of regularity in favor of the PDEA agents and finding no evil or
ill-motive on their part. On the other hand, the trial court found appellants'
defense of frame-up too incredible and outlandishly preposterous. The trial
court also held that the warrantless search and seizure and the warrantless
arrest of appellants were valid. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:6redarclaw
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Regie Breis y
Alvarado and Gary Yumol y Tuazon GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt and
they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
each to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00.
Both the accused are immediately ORDERED TO BE TRANSFERRED to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.7
The lone assignment of error in the Brief for the Accused-Appellants is as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8
In their appeal, appellants argued that the PDEA agents did not comply with
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165, and that the prosecution failed
to establish the chain of custody over the seized items.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied. Further, the
Court of Appeals found no break in the custody of the seized items that
might compromise their evidentiary integrity. The appellate court also
upheld the legality of the warrantless search and arrest of appellants. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the appealed Decision
dated February 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
In the present appeal, appellants and appellee adopted their respective
briefs10 filed before the Court of Appeals as their supplemental
briefs.11redarclaw
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Procedure on Seizure and Custody of Drugs
Appellants argue that the procedure on seizure and custody of drugs,
specified in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165, was not complied
with. In support of this contention, appellants state that: (1) the PDEA agents
did not immediately conduct the inventory at the place where the items were
seized, and did so only at the PDEA-CAR field office;12 and (2) the
representatives from the media, barangay and Department of Justice (DOJ)
were present during the inventory conducted at the field office, but not at
the place of the seizure during actual confiscation.13redarclaw
Appellants are mistaken. The PDEA agents who apprehended appellants did
not deviate from the procedure prescribed by law and regulations. Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 provides the procedure to be followed in
the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This is implemented by Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which reads:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory'
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; x x x. (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
Appellants insist that the PDEA agents should have conducted the inventory
at the place where the drugs were seized. However, the IRR clearly provides
that in case of warrantless seizures, the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team. The physical inventory and photograph were conducted
at the PDEA-CAR field office, a fact that appellants themselves
acknowledge14 and testified to by IO1 Mangili15 and IO1 Peralta.16redarclaw
The requirement of the presence of a representative from the media and the
DOJ, and any elected public official during the physical inventory and
photograph was also complied with. The representatives from the media and
the DOJ and an elected barangay official were present at the inventory
conducted at the PDEA-CAR field office, as evidenced by their signatures17 on
the Inventory of Seized Item18 and photographs taken during the
inventory.19 In fact, this is not contested by appellants.20redarclaw
Hence, we find no deviation from the procedure prescribed by Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR.
Chain of Custody Established
What IO1 Mangili did in the bus upon seizure of the drugs was to mark the
same, which is not to be confused with taking the physical inventory.
Marking is not a requirement of RA 9165 or its IRR, but has been held to be
an initial stage in the chain of custody:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged the practical value of the process
of marking the confiscated contraband and considered it as an initial stage in
the chain of custody - a process preliminary and preparatory to the physical
inventory and photograph requirements in Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious
and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers
from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 [of
Republic act No. 9165] and on allegations of robbery or theft.
"Marking" is the placing by the apprehending officer of some distinguishing
signs with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure
that the dangerous drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous
drugs subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station or at some other practicable venue rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule
requires that the "marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are
the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence — should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator
(2) immediately upon confiscation.
"Immediate confiscation" has no exact definition. Indeed, marking upon
immediate confiscation has been interpreted as to even include marking at
the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. In this case,
the dangerous drugs taken from accused-appellants were marked in his
presence immediately upon confiscation at the very venue of his
arrest.21 (Citations omitted)
Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction.22 What assumes primary importance in drug cases is the
prosecution's proof, to the point of moral certainty, that the prohibited drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item
recovered from his possession.23redarclaw
Appellants argue that the prosecution was not able to establish the chain of
custody over the seized drugs:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The irregularities in the handling procedure of the seized items are manifold.
There is no indication what steps were taken after the seizure, whether the
items were turned over to the investigator or to the desk officer before SPO4
Abordo allegedly delivered it to the crime laboratory.
How can the trial court rule that the integrity of the corpus delicti was
preserved when in fact, the prosecution failed to identify who was in
possession of the marijuana from the place of the seizure; to whom the same
was turned over; and how it came to the custody of SPO4 Abordo who
allegedly delivered the seized items at (sic) the laboratory. Nor was there any
prosecution's evidence showing the identity of the person who had the
custody and safekeeping of the drug after its examination and pending
presentation in court.24
Appellants' argument fails to impress.
The links that the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to the
chain of custody are the following: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.25redarclaw
In this case, the prosecution adequately established the unbroken chain of
custody over the marijuana seized from appellants.
The records show that the seized drugs were marked immediately upon
confiscation by IO1 Mangili with his initials and signature, the date, and the
letters A, B, C or D to distinguish the bricks, in the presence of
appellants.26redarclaw
The seized drugs were brought, together with appellants, to the PDEA-CAR
field office. IO1 Mangili acted in both capacities of apprehending officer and
investigating officer. IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta testified that they conducted
the investigation and the inventory.27redarclaw
IO1 Mangili and IO1 Peralta also testified that it was their evidence custodian,
Senior Police Officer 4 Abordo (SP04 Abordo), who brought the seized drugs
to the Crime Laboratory for examination.28 A thorough review of the records
reveals that the Request for Laboratory Exam29 shows that the seized drugs
were delivered on 10 February 2010 by SP04 Abordo and received by Police
Officer 2 Florendo and Police Senior Inspector Rowena Fajardo Canlas (PSI
Canlas). PSI Canlas was the forensic chemist who conducted the examination
on the seized drugs and signed Chemistry Report No. D-08-201030 (chemistry
report).
The chemistry report indicates that the "specimen submitted are retained in
this laboratory for future reference."31 Through subpoena32 upon PSI Canlas,
the marijuana was brought to court and marked during the preliminary
conference held on 7 April 2010.33redarclaw
Appellants contend that the prosecution's failure to discuss in detail each link
in the chain of custody negated the integrity of the evidence. This is
misplaced:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x It must be remembered that testimony about a perfect chain is not
always the standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain. As such, what is of importance is the preservation of the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. The integrity of the evidence is
presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered.34 (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mali,35 we held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug
itself. To sustain conviction, its identity must be established in that the
substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance
offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.36
In this case, the prosecution was able to show that the same drugs seized
and marked by IO1 Mangili were the same ones he identified at the
trial.37 Further, the records consistently show that the markings on the bricks
of marijuana consisted of the initials and signature of IO1 Mangili, the date
and A, B, C, or D, as evidenced by the photograph38 taken during the
inventory and the chemistry report describing the submitted specimen as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A-One (1) carton knot tied with gray plastic straw labeled GINEBRA SAN
MIGUEL with markings '02-10-2010 ELM and signature', containing four (4)
bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops each wrapped with plastic
and further wrapped with brown packaging tape with the following
markings and recorded net weights:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A-1 - [02-10-2010-A ELM and signature] = 2000.1 grams
A-2 = [02-10-2010-B ELM and signature] = 2158.3 grams
A-3 = [02-10-2010-C ELM and signature] = 2051.1 grams
A-4 = [02-10-2010-D ELM and signature] = 1971.5 grams39
(Emphasis supplied)
The presumption is that the PDEA agents performed their duties regularly.
There being no evidence showing bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence
has been tampered, we find that the prosecution sufficiently established the
chain of custody. Consequently, the corpus delicti was also established.
Warrantless Search and Seizure and Arrest
Although it was not raised as an error, it is imperative that we rule on the
validity of the warrantless search and seizure and the subsequent
warrantless arrest of appellants.
It is well settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a
valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. No less than the
Constitution guarantees this right -
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.40
Further, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.41 However, the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of exceptions, such as the search of moving
vehicles. In People v. Libnao,42 the Court held:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition
of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
a[n] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction.43
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.44 The
determination of probable cause must be resolved according to the facts of
each case.45redarclaw
The Court has ruled in several dangerous drug cases46 that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search.
In People v. Mariacos,47 the police received at dawn information that a
baggage of marijuna was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave for
the poblacion. There, the informant described the bag containing the
prohibited drugs. The Court held that the police had probable cause to
search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs.48redarclaw
In the present case, the vehicle that carried the prohibited drugs was about
to leave. The PDEA agents made a judgment call to act fast, as time was of
the essence. The team arrived at the terminal around 15 minutes49 before the
bus was scheduled to depart. Upon boarding the bus, IO1 Mangili and IO1
Peralta identified two men fitting the description given by the informant in
possession of a box described50 by the informant to contain marijuana.
Moreover, the PDEA agents had reasonable suspicion based on appellants'
behavior that the latter were probably committing a crime. IO1 Mangili
casually asked appellant Yumol who owned the box at their (appellants')
feet. After answering that it belonged to them (appellants), Yumol suddenly
stood up and tried to leave. IO1 Peralta prevented him from getting off the
bus. Then IO1 Mangili asked appellant Breis what was contained in the box.
Instead of answering, Breis shoved IO1 Mangili and tried to flee. It must be
noted that IO1 Mangili identified himself as a PDEA agent before either
appellant tried to leave the bus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Q And you wanted to confirm your suspicion by asking from Gary Yumol
who owns the box?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Gary Yumol, of course, did not give you any answer?
A He said that it is theirs.
Q Did you also talk to the companion of Gary Yumol?
A After Gary stood up suddenly I also spoke to Regie Breis.
Q And did he also give you any answer?
A He just pushed me and tried to leave the bus.
xxxx
Q Before you talked to Gary Yumol did you identify yourself as PDEA
agents?
A When I asked him who owns the box, I then identified myself.
Q Did you ask them if you can see the contents of the box?
A I told Regie to open the box but he did not want that's why I was the
one who opened it.
Q Gary Yumol according to you stood up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when he stood up, he was held by Agent Peralta?
A Yes, sir.
Q And Regie Breis also stood up after you talked to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was also held by Agent Peralta?
A I was the one who told him to sit down.
Q Before you told him to sit down did you introduce yourself as a
PDEA agent?
A Yes, sir.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants' act of standing up to leave the bus under different circumstances
may be natural; but it is not so in this case. In People v. Aminnudin,52 the
warrantless arrest of Aminnudin based on an informant's tip that he was
carrying marijuana was declared unconstitutional because there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. There, the Court found that "[t]o
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel."53redarclaw
In contrast to the instant case, appellants were attempting to get out of a
bus that was about to leave the terminal, and not one that had just arrived,
where the other passengers were, as can be expected, seated in preparation
for departure. It is unnatural for passengers to abruptly disembark from a
departing bus, leaving their belongings behind. Any reasonable observer
would be put on suspicion that such persons are probably up to no good. To
a trained law enforcement agent, it signaled the probability that appellants
were committing an offense and that the objects left behind might be
contraband or even dangerous articles.
Indeed, as observed by the PDEA agents, appellants were not simply
passengers carrying a box in a bus. They engaged in suspicious behavior
when they tried to flee after IO1 Mangili showed interest in their box and
identified himself as a PDEA agent. Worse, in his attempt at flight, Breis
pushed IO1 Mangili, already knowing that the latter was a PDEA agent. This
brazen act on the part of Breis only cemented the belief that appellants were
likely hiding a wrongdoing and avoiding capture by law enforcers.
The act of Breis in physically pushing IO1 Mangili and attempting to flee
constitutes resistance defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Cjode
(RPC).54 Before a person can be held guilty of the crime of resistance or
disobedience to a person in authority, it must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused knew that the person he disobeyed or resisted is a
person in authority or the agent of such person who is actually engaged in
the performance of his official duties.55redarclaw
As a PDEA agent, IO1 Mangili is a law enforcement agent and as such is an
agent of a person in authority as defined in the RPC.56 IO1 Mangili was in the
act of investigating a lead, and possibly apprehending violators of RA 9165, in
accordance with the mandate of the PDEA.57 He announced his identity as
such agent to appellants. It may even be gleaned that knowing that IO1
Mangili was a PDEA agent was precisely the cause of the attempted flight of
appellants.
The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of persons in
authority when not serious in nature constitutes resistance or disobedience
under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC.58 This is
because the gravity of the disobedience to an order of a person in authority
or his agent is measured by the circumstances surrounding the act, the
motives prompting it and the real importance of the transgression, rather
than the source of the order disobeyed.59 The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of
such serious defiance to be considered direct assault, but is resistance
nonetheless.
The Court has held justified resistance to illegal or abusive acts of agents of
persons in authority. In Chan Fook,60 the Court quoted
Groizard:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who exceeds his power
can not be said to be in the exercise of the functions of his office. The law
that defines and establishes his powers does not protect him for anything
that has not been provided for.
The scope of the respective powers of public officers and their agents is
fixed. If they go beyond it and they violate any recognized rights of the
citizens, then the latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear and
manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with the excess, and should
not be greater than what is necessary to repel the aggression.
The invasion of the prerogatives or rights of another and the excess in the
functions of an office, are the sources that make for legitimate resistance,
especially, in so far as it is necessary for the defense of the persons or their
rights in the manner provided for in article 8 of the Penal Code.61
Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IO1 Mangili did not exceed his authority in the
performance of his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IO1 Mangili laid nary a
finger on Breis or Yumol. Neither did his presence in the bus constitute an
excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is open to the
public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a
person's dwelling. In fact, at that point in time, only the bus was being
searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and the search of moving
vehicles has been upheld.
Moreover, appellants are not in any position to claim protection of the right
against unreasonable searches as to the warrantless search of the bus. The
pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court (USSC) in Rakas v.
Illinois62 regarding the Fourth Amendment rights63 is
instructive:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, which, like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is
aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. And
since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the
Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's
protections.64 (Citations omitted)
It being established that IO1 Mangili was not in violation of Yumol's or Breis'
rights as he was searching the bus, there is no excess of authority, clear and
manifest or otherwise, for either Yumol or Breis to lawfully resist. Hence, the
act of Breis in pushing IO1 Mangili was an unlawful resistance to an agent of a
person in authority, contrary to Article 151 of the RPC.
Breis' commission of a crime in view of, and against IO1 Mangili, and
proclivity for resorting to acts of violence further justify the warrantless
search of appellants.
A further point. Appellants each attempted to alight from a departing bus,
leaving behind their belongings. They may be deemed to have abandoned
the box in their flight. A thing is considered abandoned and possession
thereof lost if the spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and
the animus revertendi (the intention of returning) is finally given up.65 That
appellants got up to leave a departing bus without bringing their box points
to the absence of both spes recuperandi and animus revertendi. Indeed,
although their flight was thwarted by the PDEA agents, both appellants
intended to leave the box behind without returning for it. Abandonment has
the effect of converting a thing into res nullius.66redarclaw
In the United States, abandoned articles, such as those thrown away, are
considered bona vacantia, and may be lawfully searched and seized by law
enforcement authorities.67 Put to question in Abel v. United States68 was the
admissibility of incriminating articles, which had been thrown away, that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation recovered without warrant. The USSC held
that the articles were abandoned and that there was nothing unlawful in the
government's appropriation of such abandoned property.69 In Hester v.
United States,70defendants and his associates ran away from officers, and in
the process discarded a jar and a jug. The USSC held no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred when officers examined the contents of the discarded
items without warrant.71 In California v. Hodari,12 police officers, without
warrant, pursued defendant who threw a rock of cocaine into an alley as he
was running. The USSC upheld the admissibility of the abandoned
cocaine.73redarclaw
Applied analogously, there is no objectionable warrantless search and
seizure of the box of marijuana abandoned in the bus by appellants.
Given the above discussion, it is readily apparent that the search in this case
is valid.
Having been found with prohibited drugs in their possession, appellants
were clearly committing a criminal offense in the presence of IO1 Mangili and
IO1 Peralta. The subsequent warrantless arrest falls under Section 5(a), Rule
113 of the Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxxx
Hence, the warrantless arrest of appellants is lawful.
Defenses of Denial and Frame-Up
Appellants' defenses of denial and frame-up were disbelieved by both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.74 We find no reason to deviate from this rule.
The defenses of denial and frame-up cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical assertions of the PDEA agents who were strangers to appellants
and against whom no ill-motive was established.75 Further, such defenses
failed to overcome the documentary and physical evidence presented by the
prosecution.
In light of the foregoing, appellants' conviction for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs is in order.
Penalty for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
The penalty for illegal possession of dangerous drugs is provided in Section
of RA 9165:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law/, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
7) 500 grams or more of marijuana;
xxxx
The penalty imposed upon appellants is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 26 June 2012 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04916, affirming the Decision
dated 14 February 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Baguio City in
Criminal Case No. 30409-R, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 133026 February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid
of Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady
whose love they once shared.1âwphi1.nêt
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and
without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest.
Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed
towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out
of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis
staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim
Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but
Dennis expired even before he could receive medical attention. According to
the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab
wound which penetrated the heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was
filed against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and
warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at
large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in
the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined
efforts of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto.
Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by
the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched
from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin
Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station
where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the
interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to
his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after
attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who
is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare
for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few
days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him heading for
Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities.
His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through
the testimony of Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis
Aquino standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned
by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached them and without any prior
warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned
lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She
recognized Edward and Gerry because the street was sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door
neighbor of Dennis, who testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening
of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together with a companion went to her
house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab
Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she
heard a Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for
cover while she anxiously waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter
Josephine who was out of the house for an errand for her. Soon enough she
heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because she said
her Kuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had
seen Gerry Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennisand she could remember Gerry very
well because of the mole below his nose.4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part
in the slaying of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in
Antipolo to help his common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their
first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when she was
discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported
the alibi of accused-appellant. However, she admitted that when she
registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993 or more than two (2) years
after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the child's father was
"unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria
Tomenio, his co-workers at the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who
testified that accused-appellant was fetched by a neighbor from the
restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that his wife
was having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police
officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art.
III, of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the
testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on
accused-appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a
group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility
towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion
that it was even accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be
allowed to air his appeal on national television for Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing
evidence to support his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the
evening of 16 October 1991. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin
was convicted of murder qualified by treachery9 and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis
Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages. The case against his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino
remained in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he
could be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his
alibi and admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime
on 16 October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving
birth on the 14th of that month, is not persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The
testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the
Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on
their passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa
flight, could not be relied upon inasmuch as he himself admitted that they
could not be sure of their passengers' real identities. The testimonies of
accused-appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14 October 1991
did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not categorically
state that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and
unavailing. Josephine Leong's identification of accused-appellant was given
in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to the
attacker's identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a
mole below his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for
Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to
them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for Clara, her naming of
accused-appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of spite, but
was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense
incriminating effect, were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his
attempt at jailbreak12 revealing a guilty conscience, hence, his persistent
effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped
confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on
video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form
part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to
media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.
Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily
sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its Decision13 -
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted
that he had stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had
shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview of accused
was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the
truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television
as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this
phenomenon in several cases,14 it is prudent that trial courts are reminded
that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions
and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an
offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system.1âwphi1.nêt
one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply
standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully
oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on
an unsuspecting victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had
no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly qualifies the killing to murder.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
GERRY GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the
heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to compensate
the decedent's heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and
mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by

an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques
and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where
it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession
was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.

A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all
media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type
of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly
examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a
difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We
have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.

With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question
that next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the
crime as murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is
G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C.
Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June
30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be entered acquitting him of
the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her
custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer
(SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of
the Central Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito),
Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order
from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a
Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a
case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso
checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team
members proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Police
Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a
tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.
They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5)
pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon
verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito
presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to
Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra
of Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and
Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as
follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house
of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He
was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed
their guns at him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back
inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came
out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated
July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal
instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City,
convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as
minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was
further ordered confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the
minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years
and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a
Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30,
2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court
to once more take a contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case,
focusing on his breached constitutional rights against unreasonable search
and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now
recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the evidence
presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the
defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a
boarding house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the
subject firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s
constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the
subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess
the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-Appeal,
together with the OSG’s position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in
mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general
rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive
justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or
excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for
reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually
a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier
decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we would
not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner
would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime
which he might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on
a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-
examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the
January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First
Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve
respondent’s second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard
on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the merits of the case, we
granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier
decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-
examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not
without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves
to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of
the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would
always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso
was arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution
claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in
Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing
Valeroso under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they
found the subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand,
insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After
serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of
the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a
cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint
appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give
more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been violated by the
arresting police officers; and if so, would render the confiscated firearm and
ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general
rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law enforcer can
validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of any
individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of
an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution
succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that "any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-
recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without
a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a
valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a
lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed
by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not
without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and
People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid
warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s
reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest
allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping
inside the boarding house of his children. He was awakened by the arresting
officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed
him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him
under the care of Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the
room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject
firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the
arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from
Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out
of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure,
the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no
way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be
used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of
Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed
weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances
obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the
desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as
an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being
harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach.
The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to
serve its purpose.47 In the case before us, search was made in the locked
cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate
control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as
an incident to a lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view
doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each
of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the
"plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s
children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued
against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification
for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police
officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to
pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of
official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are
stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights,
contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand.
There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of
Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the
required moral certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as
constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who
might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent
man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other
issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.58

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and
June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry
Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

SO ORDERED.