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How and to what extent do people take into account the intentions of others?
Alessandro Duranti sets out to answer this question, showing that the role of
intentions in human interaction is variable across cultures and contexts.
Through careful analysis of data collected over three decades in US and
Pacific societies, Duranti demonstrates that, in some communities, social
actors avoid intentional discourse, focusing on the consequences of actions
rather than on their alleged original goals. In other cases, he argues, people do
speculate about their own intentions or guess the intentions of others, includ-
ing in some societies where it was previously assumed they avoid doing so.
To account for such variation, Duranti proposes an “intentional continuum,”
a concept that draws from phenomenology and the detailed analysis of face-
to-face interaction.
A combination of new essays and classic re-evaluations, the book draws
together findings from anthropology, linguistics, and philosophy to offer a
penetrating account of the role of intentions in defining human action.
Alessandro Duranti
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107652033
© Alessandro Duranti 2015
1 Rethinking anti-intentionalism 1
1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Reopening a dialogue that never took off 2
1.2 Self and other 5
1.3 Ethnopragmatics 6
1.4 Themes, issues, and intellectual connections 7
1.5 Title and expectations 8
2 Intentions in speaking and acting: the Standard Theory and its foes 11
2.0 Introduction 11
2.1 The Standard Theory: Grice, Austin, and Searle 11
2.1.1 The speech act of promising 12
2.1.2 Searle’s five types of speech acts and the notion of “direction of fit” 14
2.1.3 Searle’s model of intentionality 16
2.1.4 Searle’s notions of Network and Background: capturing implicit cultural
knowledge 17
2.2 The role of intention in defining “action” 19
2.2.1 Unintended consequences and the practical engagement with the world 20
2.3 Michelle Rosaldo’s critique of speech act theory 22
2.4 Brentano’s and Husserl’s use of intentions 25
2.5 Criticism of Husserl’s use of intentionality as the foundation of meaning-making 27
2.5.1 Husserl’s “passive synthesis” and “streaming living present” in the
unpublished manuscripts 29
2.6 A different theorist of speech as action: Ludwig Wittgenstein 30
2.7 The meaning of intention and intending 31
2.7.1 Translating intention: an exercise in Samoan ethnopragmatics 33
2.8 Not giving up on intentions 38
2.9 Alternative “western” ways 40
v
vi Contents
3.2 A brief introduction to the Samoan fono as a speech event and a social drama 48
3.3 Unintended consequences: Loa’s case, April 7, 1979 51
3.3.1 Loa’s defense 60
3.3.2 The relevance of positional roles 62
3.4 Absolute liability, cultural preference, and empirical evidence 63
3.4.1 Causes, reasons, and sources 64
3.5 Conclusions 67
2.1 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward the same
Object (G) through two different intentional acts: looking
and worrying. page 26
3.1 Orators (on the left) and a chief (on the right) during a fono
(photo by A. Duranti, Falefā, `Upolu, Western Samoa, 1988) 49
3.2 Map of section of Anoama`a East where Falefā is located, in
the Atua district, of which Lufilufi is considered the capital and
historical center (adapted from Krämer 1902: 704–705) 52
3.3 Three types of fono in Falefā, each defined by the number
of participating subvillages (from Duranti 1981a: 40) 54
4.1 Title page of 1887 edition of the Tusi Paia, the Samoan translation
of the Bible, a collaborative effort by George Pratt, Henry Nisbet,
and others 83
5.1 Truth as correspondence between mind and world 105
5.2 Interpretation as correspondence between a proposition and
a state-of-affairs 105
5.3 Two possible relations between a proposition and the
state-of-affairs it describes 107
5.4 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward the same Object (G)
through different intentional acts, e.g., admiration, fear 108
6.1 Walter Capps speaking to a group of supporters in Paso Robles,
California, November 15, 1995, saying “How do I know that?” 139
6.2 Walter Capps speaking in San Luis Obispo, November 15, 1995,
saying “How do we know we’re gonna win?” 141
6.3 Walter Capps speaking at Hancock College, Santa Maria,
November 15, 1995, saying “I think the reason
we’re gonna win . . .” 143
6.4 Walter Capps speaking on the campus of the University of
California, Santa Barbara, November 15, 1995, saying
“this super-charged political rhetoric that . . .” 149
9.1 The same Subject (A) is directed toward the same Object (G) at
time t1 in the intentional act of admiration and at time t2 in the
intentional act of fear 191
ix
x List of figures
First, among my intellectual partners, comes Elinor Ochs. The few papers we
co-authored do not do justice to the many ways in which our work is inter-
twined and interdependent. Whether or not we are aware of it, we keep
thinking-with and thinking-along one another even when we do not talk about
what we are reading or writing, which is rare. Our life journey together has
always been rich in discoveries and rewarding in surprises.
On most Saturday mornings I go on a bike ride along the beach with my
friend Chuck Goodwin. We always stop at the same café in Venice and discuss
as many topics as we can fit within an hour or so, including the just observed
intentionality and intersubjectivity of bikers and pedestrians on the bike path.
I am very grateful to Chuck for his interactive listening and generous intellect.
Over the last few years I have been fortunate to teach with Jason Throop
with whom I share a love for philosophy. Our seminar on intersubjectivity has
allowed us to read or reread some of our favorite authors and discuss them with
anthropology students whose questions and comments keep us honest in our
interpretations and speculations.
My interest in creativity and collaboration, two topics that intersect with
intentionality and deserve a book of their own, has been nourished by my
interactions with Kenny Burrell, the Director of the UCLA Jazz Program and
legendary guitar master, and with all the other extraordinary musicians who
have come to make music and talk about it in the course “The Culture of Jazz
Aesthetics” that Kenny and I have taught four times since 2002.
I have also greatly benefited from sitting in two of John McCumber’s
courses at UCLA. The exposure to his deep knowledge of European continen-
tal philosophy has enriched my understanding of the roots of some of the
problems I have been writing about, some of which I discuss in this book.
The transcripts of the Samoan recordings are the product of many collabor-
ations across time and space, starting in Samoa in 1978–1979 and continuing
over the years in Samoa (in 1981, 1988, 1999, 2000) as well as in the US. Most
recently, I have relied on email to ask for help and advice from my friend Rev.
Fa`atau`oloa Mauala and his two daughters Oikoumeni and Rossana, who
have been most generous with their time and their insights. Ultimately,
xi
xii Acknowledgments
however, the Samoan utterances and their translations that you will find in this
book are my responsibility. I have done my best to be faithful to what people
said and how they have said it in the recordings. And I have tried to incorpor-
ate as much as possible of the cultural glosses that the people of Falefā or
Samoans in the US offered while listening to the recordings with me or on their
own. But any linguistic token is always open to yet another interpretation and
I am sure that even more variants from those I heard are possible in both the
transcription and the translation offered in this book. Since all of the original
data presented here are now digitized as either audio or video files, it might be
possible for others in the future to continue where I have left off in the
interpretive process.
The project on the successful 1995–1996 political campaign of Walter
Capps (1934–1997) was made possible by the collaborative support of his
extended family and members of his campaign staff. More specific acknow-
ledgments are found in Chapter 6.
I am very thankful to Rachel George, who read with care and a critical spirit
several drafts of each chapter, always asking challenging questions while
helping me make my style as accessible as possible. I also benefited tremen-
dously from comments on earlier drafts of one or more chapters by Ken Cook,
Anna Corwin, Hadi Deeb, and Dan Zahavi. Alice Mandell and Josiah Chappel
carefully inspected the original biblical texts in Hebrew and Greek respectively
to help me understand certain lexical choices made by the missionaries in
translating the Old and New Testament into Samoan. The staff at the Mitchell
Library, New South Wales, helped me identify and let me have full access to
the original letters and other manuscripts by George Pratt, Henry Nisbet, and
other missionaries who went to Samoa in the eighteenth century and wrote in
their journals or to one another about their Bible translation work.
Many other people have contributed to this book by making me aware of
issues and different perspectives. Among them I am particularly grateful to Don
Brenneis, Penny Brown, Mike Cole, Aurora Donzelli, Steve Feld, Bill Hanks,
Larry Hyman, Marco Iacoboni, Elizabeth Keating, Steve Levinson, Marcyliena
Morgan, Sherry Ortner, Mariella Pandolfi, Justin Richland, Joel Robbins, Alan
Rumsey, Manny Schegloff, Bambi Schieffelin, Bradd Shore, Teun van Dijk, and
Scott Waugh. A special recognition goes to two very original thinkers and
fearless intellectual explorers who are, together with their mother, my dearest
supporters: David Ochs Keenan and Marco Leonard Ochs Duranti.
Finally, I am grateful to the staff members in the office of the deans of the
UCLA College of Letters and Science whose help in running the division of
social sciences has made it possible for me to continue to be engaged in my
own research and writing over the last five years.
This book is dedicated to the memory of my parents, Rossana Biccheri and
Ivio Duranti, who supported me in every enterprise, including my intellectual
pursuits, always with unconditional love and visible signs of appreciation.
1 Rethinking anti-intentionalism
1.0 Introduction
In this book I revisit the anthropological critique of analytic philosophers’
theories of meaning and action based on speakers’ intentions. On the basis of
the empirical investigation of oral communication, face-to-face interaction,
and written texts, I argue that both anthropologists and analytic philosophers
overstated their case and that the salience of intentions cannot be decided once
and for all because it actually varies across cultural contexts. As we will see,
in some cases speakers avoid any kind of discourse about intentions, focusing
on the consequences of actions rather than on their alleged original goals.
But in other cases, speculation about intentions is present even in societies
where people have been said to avoid reading the mind of others. My goal
is to support an ethnographic and interactional perspective on intentions as
cognitive, emotional, and embodied dispositions always embedded in an
intersubjective world of experience. To provide such a perspective, I review
previous arguments made by linguistic anthropologists and return to some of
the fundamental concepts and claims of speech act theory as elaborated
by John Searle over the last half century. In addition to relying on the data
from three research projects – one in Samoa and two in the US – I also draw
from a number of theoretical perspectives, including Edmund Husserl’s
phenomenology, in which both intentionality and intersubjectivity play a key
role. The transcripts and written texts I analyze in some detail in the chapters to
follow will demonstrate that language – broadly defined – is a great resource
for us to understand how particular speakers conceptualize, perform, and
understand social action. Whether or not they believe or act as if intentions
matter, by using language social agents inhabit a world of others that is
constraining, empowering, and inevitable. It is our task as analysts of human
endeavors to examine which linguistic expressions make a difference in
defining actions and assigning responsibility. Sometimes our previously
conceived analytical categories provide us with a useful framework to make
sense of new information. Other times, the fit is not there. An anthropological
perspective must honor the universal without forgetting the particular.
1
2 Rethinking anti-intentionalism
which they have access (e.g., the genre or the lexical choices they are expected
to use to convey their opinion). More generally, the data presented in several
of the chapters of this book suggest that there are cultural preferences for
engaging in particular interpretations of speech acts.1 I use “cultural” here to
cover both the (typically unconscious) dispositions acquired by individuals
over the course of socialization processes – what Bourdieu (1977, 1990) tried
to capture with the use of the term habitus – and the means (verbal or
otherwise) through which humans express to others and to themselves what
they are (or were) up to.
1.3 Ethnopragmatics
Some twenty years ago I used the word “ethnopragmatics” to promote a
blending of ethnography and pragmatics for studying the ways in which
language is both constituted by and constitutive of social interaction and the
social order (Duranti 1993b, 1994). That approach was born out of my
intellectual engagement with Samoan ways of speaking, an engagement that
has continued over time in almost everything I have studied, including
improvisation, as shown by my comparison of Samoan orators and American
jazz musicians (Duranti 2008b). It should not be surprising, then, that there is
plenty of Samoan ethnopragmatics in this book, whether I look at matai (chiefs
and orators) arguing in a fono or I examine the Samoan translation of Bible
stories. The Samoan examples are important for me among other reasons
because I believe that there is no other way of doing anthropology than starting
from the anthropology of a particular place and a particular group of people
who cannot but speak to one another in particular ways, for which they are
accountable practically, morally, and aesthetically (Duranti 2004). This belief
can translate to different methods of data collection. In my case, over the last
thirty-five years I have favored the audio or audio-visual recording of what
people say to one another not just on one occasion but over some extended
period of time.2 This means that the Samoan as well as the English speakers
who are quoted in this book are anything but anonymous characters, even
when only initials of their names or pseudonyms are used. In most cases, they
are people I knew personally or interacted with on a number of occasions,
often for years or decades. It is the combination of these shared experiences
with the recordings of spontaneous interactions across all kinds of situations
that I use to make my claims. I certainly do not consider my method of inquiry
the best or the only one that others, including my students, should adopt.
At the same time, it is important to understand the differences among the
methods currently available in the study of human interaction.
Psychologists, economists, and game theorists have their clever experiments
to test their hypotheses. Philosophers have their argumentative styles filtered
through an ancient hermeneutical tradition. Ethnographers have their very
personal experience of participating in the flow of social life they are trying
Themes, issues, and intellectual connections 7
2.0 Introduction
The anthropological critique of the use of intentions for explaining human
action focuses on a small group of authors, who helped establish what could
be considered the “Standard Theory” of interpretation in linguistics, the
philosophy of language, and the cognitive sciences in the twentieth century.
In this chapter, I review the Standard Theory, with special attention to
Searle’s use of intentions in his model of linguistic as well as non-linguistic
acts, Rosaldo’s criticism, and other authors’ earlier accounts and criticism of
intentionality as a key feature of meaning. I also return to the question of the
universality of the notion of intention by reviewing the history of the term
and then engaging in a cross-linguistic analysis that will reveal hidden
aspects of the semantic field covered in English by intention, intent, and
intending.
11
12 Intentions in speaking and acting
Austin makes this point in order to clarify that, even though we might
informally speak of a “false” promise, being a performative, “I promise
to . . .” cannot be defined in terms of truth or falsehood – at most with “bad
faith.” Instead, “I promise” entails “I ought” (1962: 51) and as such it is part of
a whole set of acts, “commissives,” which “commit the speaker to a certain
course of action” (Austin 1962: 156).
Searle ([1965] 1971) combines Austin’s informal account of the act of
promising with Grice’s definition of non-natural meaning. In so doing, Searle
makes intentions a key aspect of promising (and, more generally, of speaking),
as shown in conditions 6, 7, and 8. This is shown in (1) below, which
reproduces the main points of Searle’s description of the conditions of
satisfaction for a promise.
(1) Given that a speaker S utters a sentence T in the presence of a hearer H,
then, in the utterance of T, S sincerely (and non-defectively) promises that
p to H if and only if:
1. Normal input and output conditions obtain.
2. S expresses that p in the utterance of T.
3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S.
4. H would prefer S’s doing A to his not doing A, and S believes H would
prefer his doing A to his not doing A.
5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the normal course of
events.
6. S intends to do A. [. . .] (6 * S intends that the utterance of T will make
him responsible for intending to do A) [. . .]
7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under an obligation to
do A.
8. S intends that the utterance of T will produce in H a belief that conditions
(6) and (7) obtain by means of the recognition of the intention to produce
that belief, and he intends this recognition to be achieved by means of
the recognition of the sentence as one conventionally used to produce
such beliefs. (Searle 1971: 48–51, passim)
In the 1965 article, Searle expands on each of these conditions, for example
clarifying that by “normal input and output conditions” he is referring to the
fact that the speaker must be intelligible and the hearer must be able to
understand what is being said (Searle 1971: 48). But he also avoids discussion
of the vast literature on promises since Aristotle and all the way to Hume and
14 Intentions in speaking and acting
beyond. Thus, there is no mention of the fact that the speech act of promising
does not bind unconditionally or absolutely (Scanlon 1990: 214) and it might
be used for acts that cannot be promises, such as I promise not to bore you
with my talk, which Raymond Hickey (1986) interprets as a wish turned
into an “optative” (for the relevance of these issues in political speeches,
see Hill 2000; Duranti 2007: chapter 7). In contemporary usage, the verb
promise can also refer to an act in the past, like when speakers use it to
vow for the truth of something they just said (A: I have no time on Tuesday.
B: Really? A: I promise).
For Searle, the act of promising is achieved by an act of recognition of
the intention (condition 8) but it is also an act that entails responsibility
(see condition 6*) and obligation (see condition 7) – whether contractual
and/or moral (as we shall see below, in Searle’s 1983 theory of intentionality,
responsibility is explicitly separated from intentionality).
The importance of intentions and their relevance to any meaningful act grew
over time. In the earlier classification of speech acts (Searle 1976: 4), intention
is identified as one particular type of “psychological state” shared by
commissives like “promises, vows, threats and pledges.” As such, intention
is contrasted with desire, that covers “requests, orders, commands, askings,
prayers, pleadings, beggings and entreaties” and pleasure that is shared by
congratulations, felicitations, and welcomes (Searle 1976: 4). As we shall see,
later, when writing about intentionality for all kinds of acts, not just the ones
realized through speech, Searle uses a more general notion of intention, which
he borrows from Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, without however
engaging in a discussion of these authors’ specific points or contributions
(see §2.4). This lack of intellectual engagement with previous treatments
of the subject he is discussing is not unusual for Searle and is particularly
conspicuous in the case of the phenomenological tradition (see Chapter 10).
2.1.2 Searle’s five types of speech acts and the notion of “direction of fit”
One key element of the speech act model that Searle exported to his model of
intentionality is “direction of fit,” an expression that had been used by Austin
but Searle modifies to capture the relative weight that language or the
(real or imaginary) world have on each other. To understand how this works
in Searle’s model of speech acts first and later in his general model of
intentionality, we need to start from the fact that for him there are five and
only five possible types of speech acts:
1. Representatives (or assertives)
2. Directives
3. Commissives
The Standard Theory 15
4. Expressives, and
5. Declarations.
The concept of the direction of fit further distinguishes among these five types
(Searle 1976). Representatives, which include descriptions (it’s raining) as
well as acts like accusations and complaints, are speech acts that have a word-
to-world direction of fit, that is, the “words” or linguistic expressions describe
an already existing state of affairs (Searle 1976: 3–4). For example, for Searle
when I say it’s raining, I am using English to inform you of something that is
supposed to be independent of my will, desire, or imagination. On the other
hand, utterances with the illocutionary force of requests, commands, vows, and
promises have a world-to-word direction of fit. In these cases I am trying to
make the world adapt (that is, change) to the kind of world that my words
describe. Thus, in requesting students to write a paper on a given subject, I am
using language to make other people do something they might not have
otherwise done. The “world,” that is, theirs and mine, will change as a result
of my linguistic act of requesting a term paper.
For Searle, there are also speech acts that have a double direction of fit and
other ones that have no direction of fit. Belonging to the first group are
so-called declarations, that is, acts that make the world adapt to the description
of a state of affairs. “The performance of a declaration brings about a fit by the
very fact of its successful performance” (Searle 1976: 14). Acts that have no
direction of fit are the so-called “expressives,” like apologies and excuses.
In performing an expressive, the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match
the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of the expressed prop-
osition is presupposed. Thus, for example, when I apologize for having stepped on your
toe, it is not my purpose either to claim that your toe was stepped on or to get it
stepped on. (Searle 1976: 12)
The direction of fit has some potential relevance to an anthropological theory
of language because it deals with whether language is trying to catch up with
the way the world is or it tries to change the world. As such, the concept of
the direction of fit is a potential link with linguistic relativity, understood as the
influence that the lexicon or the grammar of a language has on the ways in
which its speakers view the world (Whorf 1956; Lucy 1992a, 1992b). A main
difference between Searle’s model and a model inspired by Whorf’s writings is
that for Searle only certain types of speech acts do have the effect of changing
the world (e.g., commands, vows) whereas for Whorf (and most linguistic
anthropologists) the speakers’ view as well as their surrounding social world
can be affected by linguistic taxonomies and the use of certain expressions in
all kinds of linguistic acts, including assertions and expressives. Thus, for
example, Stephen Levinson and his research team at the Max Planck Institute
for Psycholinguistics looked for and found some (Whorfian) effects on how
16 Intentions in speaking and acting
languages represent space and spatial relations (e.g., Levinson 1997, 2003).
One could also easily argue against the idea that “expressives” (see above)
have no direction of fit. The example of apologies Searle gives in the quote
above is misleading. When I apologize for having stepped on your toes I am
actually trying to affect your feelings or disposition toward me as well as
toward any discomfort you might have in your foot. I am reassuring you that it
was not an act of aggression on my part and that I might be blamed for
being distracted or clumsy but I should not be blamed for being a mean-
spirited person.
Searle (1983) used the concept of direction of fit to distinguish between
intentional states like believing, seeing, and listening, which have the mind-to-
world direction of fit, and intentional states like wishes, desires, or “intention
to do something” (e.g., raising my arm, going to the garage, driving to school),
which have the world-to-mind direction of fit. This dichotomy means that for
Searle either the world out there causes something in me (like when I perceive
something) or I cause something to happen in the world (in the case of actions
that I perform or that I ask someone else to perform).5
Hobbs 1990), Searle (1983) did not use the notion of plan, but his distinction
between “prior intentions” and “intentions in action” (Searle 1983: 84–85)
could be interpreted as a way of dealing with different levels of planning. To
the extent to which prior intentions are conscious and tend to cover a “whole
action,” they seem to imply “a plan” – even a vague one – to do something,
whereas the intentions-in-action, which are used by Searle for unconscious
and often subsidiary acts, imply more spontaneous ways of acting.8
Most analysts of spontaneous human interactions would find Searle’s
examples not only sketchy and stereotypical but also empirically inadequate
as accounts of what people actually do. Take the “action” of going from home
to the office. This would be defined by a (general) prior intention – that covers
the whole action – and by a series of intentions in actions. Some of these
intentions in action could be performed automatically and unreflectively, but
some other ones might be performed with great care, that is, while paying
close attention to what is being done and how (such a possible distinction, as
far I can tell, is not included in the model). For example, the intention in action
of getting the car out of the garage – which would be part of getting to the road
in order to drive to the office – might itself have an embedded intention in
action to drive in such a way as to avoid hitting anyone or anything that might
happen to be on the side of the car or behind it. The way in which the
neighbors or their guests parked their car in the street or the traffic of the other
moving cars on the street in front of our house will also affect how we perform
the intention in action of driving out of our garage and onto the street. It would
seem that at any given time something that is a sub-activity of a higher goal
(or “prior action”) might become a major activity in its own right, worthy
of attention. Furthermore, how does Searle’s model allow for unforeseen
circumstances generating new intentions in action? How do we know whether
such intentions in action are unconscious or not? Drawing on Heidegger’s
famous discussion of “equipment” (Zeug) in Being and Time, we could say
that any tool we routinely use in a habitual manner can suddenly come to the
forefront of our concern when it malfunctions or when it is missing (Heidegger
1962: 95–107). As he expanded his theory to include any kind of human
action regardless of whether language was used, Searle (1983) tried to account
for this type of implicit or embodied knowledge through his notions of
“Network” and “Background.”
for human action to occur at all. Searle gives the example of someone who has
“the intention to run for President of the United States.” He points out that
this “intention” is related (or “refers”) to other intentions, which, in turn, have
other conditions of satisfaction, each with its own set of beliefs and desires.
This means that “in any real life situation, the beliefs and desires [associated
with one particular intentional state] are only part of a larger complex of still
other psychological states; there will be subsidiary intentions as well as hopes
and fears, anxieties and anticipations, feelings of frustration and satisfaction”
(Searle 1983: 141). This is what he calls the “Network of other beliefs and
desires” (1983: 141). Similarly there is knowledge that we have of our world
that is similar to and yet different from “belief” in the sense in which the
word is used by Searle and most analytic philosophers. This knowledge is
necessary and yet not explicit. To characterize it, Searle (1983: 143) uses the
term “preintentional.” The totality of this type of information (which is both
“knowing-that” and “knowing-how”) constitutes the “Background,” a domain
for which rules, in any traditional sense, cannot be evoked to explain how
people know what they know.
Echoing descriptions of expertise found in Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus
(1980),9 Searle gives the example of learning how to ski. Even though the
instructor gives a set of explicit instructions, which Searle considers examples
of “representations” (see endnote 13), over time, “the skier gets better; he no
longer needs to remind himself of the instructions, he just goes out and skis”
(Searle 1983: 150). The mentioning of Heidegger’s notion of “equipment”
a few pages later (1983: 154) would suggest that this might be a place where
Searle is reaching out for a different type of explanation, one in which practice
wins over mental “representations.” After all, Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1980)
model of expertise is informed by Heidegger’s view of tools (in Being and
Time) as having the primary property of being “ready-at-hand” (that is, entities
whose existence is primarily defined by their use) instead of “present-at-hand”
(that is, entities that are just there for us to reflect on them without engaging
with them in the ways in which we engage with tools or with other human
beings). In Being and Time, humans are described as existing in a different
way from the ways in which things and tools exist. Humans are first and
foremost thrown into a world that occupies them with moods and concerns
before they can have “representations” or “essences.” We are first “there”
(“da”) and then we think and reflect about what we are doing and which
categories can describe who we are and what we are dealing with. Such
a pragmatic engagement is explicitly evoked by Searle with an unusual
reference to tools understood in “a Heideggerian vein” (1983: 154), that is,
as “the referential totality of ready-to-hand equipment” (1983: 154).10 For a
few pages Searle’s unique blend of mentalism and analytic philosophy seems
to let the voices of alternative philosophies leak through. But it is only
The role of intention in defining “action” 19
reference”). Thus, for Searle, Oedipus married his mother does not describe
“the action” because for him “action,” as we saw, is what the actor intended to
do (Searle 1983: 101–102), and we know that Oedipus could not intend
to marry his mother when he married Jocasta because he did not know that
she was his mother. This is the same as saying that an act or series of acts
counts as an “action,” in Searle’s sense of the term, if and only if it turns out
to be performed as it was “represented” in the intention(s) of the person who
performed it.13
Since Searle’s model is not set up to explain events that are not included
(or “represented”) in the mind of the social actor in terms of “prior intentions,”
it is not surprising that Searle wants to keep intention and responsibility quite
distinct and independent (Searle 1983: 103), even though responsibility did
play a role in his earlier definition of the speech act of promising, as shown in
(1) above, and he seemed to accept it as equivalent to a speaker’s commitment
(e.g., Searle 1991: 100, in response to Alston 1991). This means that Searle’s
model of action as developed in his 1983 book does not cover “unintended”
actions, a set of circumstances that, as discussed below, are instead of great
interest to social scientists. In the case of Oedipus Rex, for example, the model
would not have much to say about the fact that the entire city of Thebes
must suffer because of what Oedipus did even though, as Oedipus himself
says in Oedipus at Colonus, scene IV, he did not know that he was marrying
his mother (and she did not know that he was her son). Similarly, albeit in
less tragic ways, Searle’s theory does not have much to say about a case
I discuss in Chapter 3 where a Samoan orator is blamed for the unintended
consequences of having announced a visit by the newly reelected MP that
never happened – a visit that was anticipated as including gifts for the
members of the village council.
and Time (e.g., Giddens 1979: 54).14 As shown in the following quote, for
Giddens “intentionality” does not imply that people are conscious of what
we might call the telos of their actions.
The reflexive monitoring of conduct refers to the intentional or purposive character of
human behaviour: it emphasises “intentionality” as a process. Such intentionality is a
routine feature of human conduct, and does not imply that actors have definite goals
consciously held in mind during the course of their activities. That the latter is unusual,
in fact, is indicated in ordinary English usage by the distinction between meaning or
intending to do something, and doing something “purposefully,” the latter implying an
uncommon degree of mental application given to the pursuit of an aim. When lay actors
inquire about each other’s intentions in respect of particular acts, they abstract from a
continuing process of routine monitoring whereby they relate their activity to one
another and to the object-world. (Giddens 1979: 56)
completely missed Rosaldo’s main points, namely, that it was wrong to build a
theory about how utterances can be (or become) social acts solely or almost
exclusively on speakers’ sincerity and intentions. Social life and language,
Rosaldo argued (and tried to show through some examples of Ilongot speech
acts and their interpretations), build off each other in ways that draw from and
simultaneously reconstitute the social order, people’s views of it, and local
speaking styles. Whether or not a given utterance would count as a promise
would depend on the social relations between the parties involved. For certain
people promises might be ill conceived or inappropriate. Here is the gist of her
argument in her own words:
What Searle forgets, and yet to me seems clear, is that the good intentions that a promise
brings are things we only offer certain kinds of people, and at certain times. Introspec-
tion suggests, for example, that promises to one’s child are typically didactic and
tendentious. A promise to, or from, a candidate for public office is apt to prove neither
sincere nor insincere but in equal measure suspicious, significant, and grand. Sincere
promises to my colleagues are typically no more than that: sincere commitments. To a
high administrator, my promises may seem peculiar. And I cannot escape a sense of
awkwardness in imagining a promise to my spouse. There are, in short, quite complex
social “rules” that circumscribe the happy “promise” – although our ideology of
promising leads one to focus not on these but on the “‘inner” orientations and commit-
ments of the speaking self. Moreover, it would appear that Searle, by focusing on the
promise as a paradigmatic act of speech, himself falls victim to folk views that locate
social meaning first in private persons – and slight the sense of situational constraint
(who promises to whom, and where, and how) that operates in subtle but important
ways in promising, and in yet more salient ways in the case of a directive, like
“commanding,” or such apparently expressive acts as “congratulating,” “greeting,”
and “bidding farewell.” The centrality of promising supports a theory where conditions
on the happiness of a speech act look primarily not to context, but to beliefs and
attitudes pertaining to the speaker’s private self. (Rosaldo 1982: 211–212)
Unfortunately, instead of realizing – or admitting – that Rosaldo’s argument
was also an attack on his model of the relationship between person and
context, Searle interpreted it exclusively as a counterexample to disprove the
universality of promising as a speech act.
When I published a taxonomy of the five basic types of speech acts (Searle, 1979 [same
as Searle 1976]), one anthropologist (Rosaldo, 1982) objected that in the tribe that she
studied, they did not make very many promises, and, anyway, how did I think I could
get away with making such a general claim on the basis of such limited data? But the
answer, of course, is that I was not offering a general empirical hypothesis but a
conceptual analysis. These are the possible types of speech acts given to us by the
nature of human language. The fact that some tribe does not have the institution of
promising is no more relevant than the fact that there are no tigers at the South Pole is
relevant to a taxonomy of animal types. I am discussing the logical structure of
language and getting the categorization of possible types of speech acts. (Searle
2006: 26–27)
Brentano’s and Husserl’s use of intentions 25
This is “crosstalk,” to use the term made famous by the homonymous BBC
documentary by John Gumperz about cross-cultural miscommunication.
Searle completely missed Rosaldo’s theoretical objections just like she had
implicitly given up on modifying Searle’s formal model of communication.
The lack of attention to the cultural context made any real dialogue impossible
for Rosaldo as well as for the rest of us who were considering similar issues.
There is no question that Searle’s speech act theory was light on context, as
shown in (1) above by his use of expressions like “normal input and output
conditions” (condition 1) and “the normal course of events” (condition 5).
What is normal in one situation is not normal in another. What is normal in a
given situation in one community might not be normal in another community.
Social scientists could have accepted the limitation of Searle’s vague descrip-
tions and work to “fill in the blanks.” But that is not the way it went. Rosaldo
and others, myself included, opted for holding Searle accountable for what we
considered at the time a “western” psychologizing of Austin’s original insights
about what makes a speech act work or misfire15 (see also §10.2.2). The focus
on speakers having to be sincere and on the need to have certain intentions,
which, in turn, had to be recognized by the hearers, struck many of us at the
time as too inward oriented as a theory of social action, placing the responsi-
bility for both encoding and decoding on the speakers having certain beliefs,
feelings, and goals, as well as the will and ability to express those beliefs and
feelings.
At the time we did not realize that we were in part reproducing a much
earlier confrontation about the use of intentions in the definition of meaningful
human experience. It was a confrontation between two major protagonists
of twentieth-century German philosophy, Edmund Husserl and Martin
Heidegger.16
Subject A Object G
Figure 2.1 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward the same Object
(G) through two different intentional acts: looking and worrying.
its long and twisted trunk or about the way the sun shines through the slightly
moving leaves; and/or we can worry about it, if the gardener has just told us
that the tree needs to be chopped down. In each case the tree does not change.
In fact, we keep assuming that it is the same tree over time even though
our sensations differ from one moment to the next because the light changes,
we change location, or our eyes keep moving (Husserl 1931: §§41–43; see also
Pritchard 1961; Pelaprat and Cole 2011). The notion of intention for Husserl
is meant to capture the manifold ways in which we as human beings can relate
to or be directed towards objects or events in the external world or in our own
mental world, giving them particular meanings.
As members of society, we do our noticing and interpreting in an unre-
flective manner, while engaged in what Husserl calls “the natural standpoint”
(Husserl 1931: §30).18 To get to the bottom of such a meaning-giving
process, we need to “bracket” this “natural” (or rather “cultural”), taken-
for-granted way of being in the world through a momentary “suspension” or
epoché (Husserl 1931: §§31–32) of our everyday assumptions, including
the assumption of the reality of the world around us and its materiality
(this “suspension” is meant to be more radical and thus more revealing than
the Cartesian doubt). Through the epoché Husserl (1931) performs a number
of “reductions” of our mental activity that reveal the fundamental role of our
consciousness in meaning-making, thereby isolating the “pure Ego” as the
“residuum” of such reduction and the “essence” (noema) of any intentional
experience.
Husserl’s and Heidegger’s ideas (Throop and Murphy 2002), even though his
notion of habitus20 can also be traced back to other sources (Hanks 2005).
An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and its institutions. If the
technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess.
In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible
by the fact that I can speak the language in question. (Wittgenstein 1958: §337)
gets more challenging because it is more difficult to separate the “mental” from
the physical or the emotional (the mind–body divide is not lexically encoded in
the same ways across languages). To provide an example of such challenges,
in the next section I explore whether one may be able to convey the notion
of “intention” or “intending” in a non Indo-European language, Samoan.
who had accompanied me to the village where the exchange is taking place,
contradicts me by saying ‘no, not much fighting’ (/leai lē misa tele/). Rather
than giving up, in line 279 I reassert my position this time with /e malosi le
lima/ literally ‘the hand is strong.’ This is a colloquial metonymical expression
used to characterize people who easily get into physical fights.35 Chief T’s
laughter in line 280 is probably due to the fact that he is both amused and
surprised by the fact that I knew such a colloquial expression and used it at the
right time. Chief F partly accepts my claim by providing a different framing
for it. His utterance in line 281 repeats the same predicate (malosi ‘strong’)
and the same syntactic structure (Verb þ Subject) of my turn in line 279. This
is an elegant rhetorical move whereby he rephrases what I said in terms of
Samoan temperament. It is the loto (here pronounced /loko/) that is strong, not
(only) the hand. Possible translations include ‘the will is strong’ or ‘the spirit
is strong.’
All of these uses have characteristics that differentiate loto from the English
intention and intend:
1. rather than referring to planned actions, they often express dispositions or
inclinations that allow for different resolutions or manifestations;
2. they may or may not express ways of being of which a person is conscious;
3. they tend to have an affective, emotional meaning; and
4. they tend to imply embodied attitudes or practices (i.e. they are usually
expressed and interpreted as a combination of verbal and kinesic
behavior).
Do these observations about the lack of a close translation of the English
terms intention or intend imply that Samoans do not have the notion of
intention in the specific English sense? This is a question that should be
approached empirically. For one thing, we know that individuals or groups
of speakers can and do adopt new words with new meanings that eventually
make it into the repertoire of the larger speech community (Morgan 2014). For
The meaning of intention and intending 37
example, Samoan borrowed words like time (Samoan taimi) and duty (Samoan
tiute) from English and natura ‘nature’ from Latin36 (see Chapter 4 for a brief
discussion of loanwords and lexical innovations introduced in the Samoan
translation of the Bible). Languages can also use existing words for a new
meaning. This is what I think the Bible translators chose to do when they
translated intent or semantically related words like purpose. Something similar
seems to have also happened in the juridical domain of the western-inspired
Samoan court or the new Samoan Constitution. Thus, in 2000, I found in a
newspaper article the word loto used in a context that suggests the attempt to
convey English intent or intention. The article appeared on p. 5 of The Weekly
Samoa Post, April 17, 2000. It was inside a report on a much publicized
murder case that involved two government ministers accused of having
convinced the son of one of them to cold-bloodedly execute another minister.
In the article, loto was used in the context of the phrase le moliaga o le fasioti
tagata ma le loto i ai, which could be translated in English as ‘the accusation
of killing a person (or persons) with the intent (loto) to (do) it.’
In the 2008 Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, which is
available on the internet in both Samoan and English, the word “intentionally”
is used in the English text of Article 5. The corresponding Samoan text of Article
5 is provided in example (4) below, accompanied by my interlinear gloss. This
example shows that the Samoan text utilizes a modification of the term provided
in Pratt’s dictionary, namely, fa`amoemoe, even though here the word is
modified with the suffix –ina, which gives it a passive-like meaning.
with similar questions shared at the time the assumption that interpretive
practices are culture specific and fundamentally incommensurable. In rejecting
the notion of intention as used by (mostly English-speaking) speech act
theorists and some cognitive scientists, such a relativist stance either rejects
altogether the idea that intentionality is a relevant factor in human action or
takes an agnostic position. The dissatisfaction with the analyses of social acts
based on intentions (Heritage 1990/91), the difficulty of finding an adequate
translation for the English intention in languages like Samoan, and the fact that
in a number of societies members avoid engaging in explicit mind-reading
(see Chapters 3 and 8) might lead some researchers to avoid talking about
intentions altogether. This result would, however, be unfortunate, especially
for cross-cultural comparison. Regardless of the type of data collected
(e.g. introspection, interviews, audio-visual recordings of spontaneous inter-
actions, written texts of various kinds, results of experiments), all researchers
need concepts that are general enough to be used across situations. We need to
avoid producing analyses that appear ad hoc. One solution is to characterize
intentionality as a graded phenomenon, subject to recognition, oblivion, or
manipulation. The notion of an “intentional continuum,” which I will propose
in Chapter 11, is a more radical solution for a number of reasons, including
the fact that it allows for ideology to play a role at the metadiscursive level.
We can then, for example, distinguish between forms of social organization
that recognize the “intentions” of some social actors – in particular social roles
within particular social occasions – but not of others.
To claim that intentionality is graded also means to question or even reject
the dichotomy accepted by many authors, Searle included (see above), between
two different types of intentionality, one roughly corresponding to Brentano’s
and Husserl’s notion – as the “aboutness” of our mental activities (which Searle
writes “Intentionality” with the capital “I”) – and the other (“intentionality”
with the small “i”) coinciding with the ordinary use of the verb intend in
English in utterances like I intend to take you out for dinner (e.g., Chisholm
1957, 1967; Dreyfus 1982; Fisette 1999; Searle 1983; Voltolini and Calabi
2009). Although linguistic encoding should not be seen as definitive evidence
of the relevance of the concept of intentionality in a given speech community, it
should not be ignored either. The language (as a code) and discourse (as a
practice) of intentionality provides us with important hints about the local
possible understandings of human experience, which we expect to be related
to particular forms of social organization as well as daily preoccupations,
including the exploration, reproduction, and evaluations of moral and aesthetic
values. Whether or not an individual’s goals, ends, or purposes in doing
(or saying) something will be recognized or considered relevant to the inter-
pretation of that individual’s actions might depend on a number of emotional
dispositions, social arrangements, and interactional practices that will have to
40 Intentions in speaking and acting
the role that improvisation plays not only in the art forms where it is
recognized and practiced (e.g., improv theater and many musical genres
around the world), but in everyday life (Sawyer 2001; Duranti and Black
2012). I will explore this perspective in Chapter 10, where I use a phenomeno-
logical understanding of intersubjectivity to question the sharp distinction
between I-intentions and we-intentions. Even in actions that appear strictly
controlled by an individual, other human beings may play a role, even when
they are not physically present.
3 The avoidance of intentional discourse:
a Samoan case study
3.0 Introduction
In this chapter I return to a case study first presented in a paper I delivered at
the 1983 Meetings of the American Anthropological Association, later distrib-
uted as a technical report (Duranti 1984) and then slightly revised as a journal
article (Duranti 1988), and as a chapter of an edited book (Duranti 1993b).
What I present here is a revision of the original paper that takes advantage of
some additional inspection of the Samoan data collected in 1978–1979 and
frames the issues in the broader context of this book.
Overall, the data presented in this chapter support previous claims that
Samoan interpretive practices are fundamentally non- or even anti-
introspective and as such tend to privilege a reading of a person’s actions in
terms of their effects on social relations and on the public face of particular
institutions, groups, and positional roles. Samoan epistemology, that is, shows
similarities with a pragmatist interpretation of human action whereby the truth
of a statement tends to be evaluated in terms of its effects. Even when people
seem to be searching for causes, reasons, or sources (māfua) of wrongful
behavior, discussions about “causes” usually have a brief discourse life as
they tend to be quickly dismissed or ignored by the participants in the
interaction (see §3.4.1 and Chapter 5). For example, we will see that even
though lying is considered by the matai or ‘titled holders’ a violation of trust
and something to condemn, it usually does not evoke a discussion about what
the liar was trying to achieve by not telling the truth, with the exception of
stereotypical explanations such as being under the influence of alcohol regard-
less of whether there was empirical evidence that alcohol was involved. This
suggests that in Samoa, even though there is language that could be used for
speculating about one’s emotions and motivations (see Gerber 1985), there is a
cultural dispreference for engaging in such discursive practices and a recourse
to typifications of standard cause-and-effect connections as opposed to an
individual-specific analysis that might reveal unexpected and potentially unset-
tling results. This is particularly true in political or juridical arenas like the
Samoan fono where the style of speaking (or speech genre) used is designed to
43
44 The avoidance of intentional discourse
ethnographer (see Chapter 4), but the translations (in German) sometimes miss
the specific meaning of the Samoan expression. Thus, in “The Song of the Bad
Girl” (‘O le pese o le teine leaga), the word musu is used to describe the fact
that the “bad girl” (teine leaga) is resisting the advances of the man who sings
the song. In this case, Krämer translates at one point musu with the German
Ablehnen ‘refusal, rejection’ (or ‘refusing, rejecting’) and another time with
Ausweichen ‘evasion’ (or ‘evading, dodging’). Both translations are adequate
if they are meant to capture the fact that the male singer is treating the girl’s
behavior as something that he expects and, in fact, is used to (`ua masani ai)
(Krämer 1903: 347). But when translating a story about a stubborn heroine,
Sina, who tells her parents that she refuses to consider the marriage proposals
of high-status men,2 Krämer (1902: 136) renders musu with the negative of
wollen ‘want’ (Krämer 1902: 133; see also Krämer 1902: 204, and the English
translation in Krämer 1994: 166). The generic verb wollen and its English
counterpart want cannot quite convey the force of a mood that should not be
questioned or speculated about.3
Beyond the common problems of translations (a focus of Chapter 4), this
brief discussion of the meaning of musu reveals an aspect of Samoan ethno-
psychology that is particularly relevant for the topic of this chapter and, more
generally, for the book as a whole. As will be made evident from the case to be
discussed below, Samoans have strong feelings about responsibility and obli-
gations. Individuals and groups may be criticized, punished, or expelled from a
community for not having matched the expectations associated with their
positional role in society, but they will not be forced to explain themselves
in terms of their motivations or intentions.4 At times, they may be asked to
mention what they did do – this is a concern with “truth” which I will discuss
in Chapter 5 – but little talk and time will be spent examining an individual’s
actions beyond what is known from public behavior and consistent with the
community’s conventional wisdom about human nature in general.
so-called “baby talk.” This claim was based on the observation that in the 18,000
pages of handwritten transcripts of household interactions with children that
Elinor and Martha had audio-recorded in Samoa, there was no trace of the
special lexicon, morphological modifications, or simplified syntactic construc-
tions that are commonly found in the speech of mothers and other caregivers to
children in the US and other places where “baby talk” had been documented
(Ferguson 1964, 1977). In addition, when compared with previous studies of
language acquisition and adult–child discourse in the US, the data recorded in
1978–1979 revealed some other intriguing differences. While Samoan care-
givers were like those in the US in responding to children’s intelligible utter-
ances in a topic-relevant manner (e.g., agreeing, disagreeing, continuing to
discuss a particular topic), they were different in one particular type of discourse
activity: they did not “expand” children’s utterances, that is, they did not try to
put in words possible guesses of what a child might have tried to say while
producing an incomplete or unclear utterance. Samoan adults and older children
did not do what the adult speaker does in example (1):
(1) (Examples of “expansions” of a child’s utterances; from a recording made on
May 29, 1990 by then UCLA student Debbie Heick)
Ochs (1982) presented the absence of such verbal exchanges in the data
collected in Samoa as empirical evidence of a lack of concern for a child’s
intentions in doing something or causing something to happen.
Expansions are interpretations of children’s intentions and reflect middle-class Anglo
caregivers’ assumptions that children can and do control and guide their actions towards
some goal. Further, they manifest middle-class caregivers’ perceptions of very small
children as social persons . . . traditional Samoan caregivers do not share all of these
assumptions. Infants and very young children are generally not treated (1) as socially
responsive beings (cooperative); and (2) as being in control of their actions. (Ochs 1982: 91)
This argument was reframed in a broader comparative perspective in an article
that Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin wrote in 1981 while we were at ANU
(Ochs and Schieffelin 1984).6
Figure 3.1 Orators (on the left) and a chief (on the right) during a fono
(photo by A. Duranti, Falefā, `Upolu, Western Samoa, 1988)
Samoa, it is not surprising that Margaret Mead (1930) saw the fono as
emblematic of much of Samoan adult life.
Although only matai are allowed to speak in the fono I observed and
recorded, these events are rather “public” for a number of reasons. The first
is that there are more than a few matai present – anything from fifteen to thirty
in meetings I attended. The second reason is that fono take place in daylight
and in houses that have either no walls or wide and open windows (see
Figure 3.1), which makes the interaction partly visible and audible to people
in the vicinity, especially to the younger and untitled people (taulele`a) who
may be sitting in another section of the same house or in an adjacent space or
construction, ready to serve food or take orders. And thirdly, speakers’ verbal
(and non verbal) acts during a fono can be the object of later discussions or
conversations within and outside the confines of the meetings, thereby reach-
ing people who were not physically present at the time.
From the point of view of its relation to the flow of social life in the
community, fono are typically embedded in what we might call, following
Victor Turner’s (1974) terminology, a larger “social drama.” This term helps
us capture the fact that a fono is a highly antagonistic arena in which different
groups and individuals try to control one another’s actions and in so doing work
at maintaining a position of authority, defending their reputation, or acquiring
50 The avoidance of intentional discourse
more prestige and influence in the community. While stressing the need to
get along and “take care of the relationship” (see below), speakers tend to be
cautious. Thus, they project a humble persona and stay as vague as possible in
their assessments of the problem at hand. At the same time, a speaker may
choose to be forceful and direct in his phrasing and volume of his voice. This
may happen because someone is exercising his prerogative to play a particular
role in the proceedings or because of contingencies that make someone feel
entitled to explicitly accuse someone or defend himself or others.
A Samoan orator can gain prestige and material gratification by speaking on
behalf or in support of a powerful or wealthy party (e.g., a high chief, a
government official, a wealthy guest), but he may also get in trouble and risk
retaliation if the party he represents does something wrong or does not satisfy
the expectations of the other matai. This means that, from the point of view of
the responsibility for what is being said, in Samoa there are contexts in which it
is hard to keep the distinction expressed by Ervin Goffman (1981) through the
roles of “animator” (the one who speaks), “author” (the one who creates the
“text”), and “principal” (the one whose ideas, wishes, etc. are being represented)
(see Chapter 10).9 In a fono, key elements of any accusation or claim involving
such roles are the relationship between the speaker and the party the speaker
represents. The accused’s own understanding of the events or his personal
intentions (or his motivations) may not be mentioned at all in the discussion.
Within a fono, participants do not usually invoke good will as an excuse for
something that went wrong. Even though at times they might claim lack of
knowledge or question the authority of someone to bring a charge or mention a
breach of social norms, there is a tendency, even in making an accusation, to
focus on the consequences or effects of actions. This was noted by Shore, who
wrote:
[W]hen I questioned informants about the relative seriousness of different misdeeds,
their tendency was to base their evaluations on the results for the actor of the action
rather than on any intrinsic quality of the act. (Shore 1982: 182)
between the nominal authority of the high ‘chiefs’ (ali`i) – which in the village
of Falefā are collectively referred to as `Āiga (literally ‘families’)11 – and the
larger group constituted by the lower-ranking orators (tulāfale) or speech-
makers (failāuga) whose role was meant to be limited to that of advisors. De
facto, however, the two matua at the time of my first stay in Falefā (in
1978–1979) played a major role in all fono decisions, while the high chiefs
were often physically absent from deliberations or not visibly invested in their
outcome. The aloofness of the holder of the high chief title Lealaisalanoa, for
example, follows a cultural model of the publicly displayed disposition or
stance of a high chief.
Given the fact that each member of the fono as an assembly of matai is the
representative of one or more branches of an extended family (`āiga), special
attention must be paid to what Goffman (1955) called “the face” of the
participants, all of whom are considered worthy of respect (fa`aaloalo)
(Milner 1961; Duranti 1992b). Although typically several members of the
assembly may take the floor on any given issue, their opinion is often left
vague or ambiguous as they deliver speeches full of metaphors and proverbs
that express support for traditional values like getting along or caring for each
other (fealofani), protecting the dignity (mamalu) of the high chiefs, and
respecting the traditional ways of living (fa`asāmoa), while searching for the
truth (sa`ili le mea tonu) or taking care of the relationship (teuteu le vā)
between individuals, families, or villages.
Most typically, the matai gathered in a fono try to deal with the conse-
quences of one of them having partaken in a particular social act that was not
fulfilled, e.g., a public commitment to doing something, or which had an
unfortunate outcome, e.g., a political defeat or a loss of face. In what follows,
I will illustrate how this actually works by analyzing a series of verbal
exchanges within one of the fono I recorded in 1979.
South Pacific
Savaii Ocean
Malua APIA
Faleolo
Upolu
Lufilufi
Falefa
Falevao
A T
U
A
0 25 50 75 100 km
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
Figure 3.2 Map of section of Anoama`a East where Falefā is located, in the
Atua district, of which Lufilufi is considered the capital and historical center
(adapted from Krämer 1902: 704–705)
that having three candidates from Falefā would split the votes and let the
incumbent (from Lufilufi) win. Example (1) shows how the point was sum-
marized in the opening speech of the senior orator Moe`ono, one of the
candidates, who also acted as the chairman in the meeting.
Unintended consequences 53
(1) (Fono, January 25, 1979; brief section of Senior Orator Moe`ono’s
introductory speech about the situation)
Subvillages :
1. Sagapolu
2. Saleapaga
fono falefā
fono falelima 3. Gaga ¢emalae
fono falefitu 4. Sanonu
5. Falevao
6. Sauago
7. Saletele
Figure 3.3 Three types of fono in Falefā, each defined by the number of
participating subvillages (from Duranti 1981a: 40)
Despite the apparently reasonable argument that either one or maximum two
candidates should run against the incumbent, three Falefā matai, the two senior
orators (Iuli and Moe`ono) and the chief Savea Sione, stayed in the race and,
predictably, none of them garnered sufficient votes to win the seat in the
Samoan parliament: the incumbent, Fa`amatuā`inu (from Lufilufi), was thus
reelected. I have discussed some of the details of this political scenario
elsewhere (Duranti 1981a, 1990: 476–478). In what follows I will concentrate
on an issue that was raised in a fono held two months after the election and was
connected to the election and was partly affected by the opinions expressed in
examples (1) and (2).
At the fono on April 7, 1979, there were two topics officially introduced in
the beginning part of the meeting (see Duranti 1994 for a discussion of the
difficulty of getting the potentially controversial agenda clarified in the
opening speech). One had to do with the two subvillages of Sauago and
Saletele, in Fagaloa Bay, the residents of which were accused of lackluster
participation in the so-called fono falefitu, that is, ‘meeting (fono) of the seven
(fitu)’ (see Figure 3.3).16
The second topic was about a suit that the young chief Savea Sione had filed
against the MP Fa`amatuā`inu. Moe`ono tried to convince him to drop the suit
because it would affect the relationship (vā) between Falefā, where the meeting
was taking place, and the MP’s village, Lufilufi. The discussion of the first
topic was very animated and confrontational, ending with an apparent recon-
ciliation between Moe`ono, who brought the charges, and the two senior
representatives from the villages in Fagaloa Bay. The second topic was less
confrontational but with no definitive resolution. In fact, the matai agreed to
meet again after nine days (on April 16) at which point they would know what
Chief Savea had decided. On the same day, they would all go to the nearby
village of Lufilufi to meet with the MP on his own ground in hopes of
straightening the situation once and for all (see §3.4).
After the discussion of these two controversial topics, one of the two senior
orators, Iuli, introduced a new agenda item. He proposed to fine the orator Loa
for having announced, a few weeks earlier, that the newly reelected district
Unintended consequences 55
As shown above, Iuli lays out his arguments right away for his request for a
fine to be imposed: Loa created a situation that was a humiliation (luma) for
56 The avoidance of intentional discourse
the village. The matai were ridiculed (/ka`uvalea/, lit. ‘called stupid’) by
having to wait for hours for gifts that did not materialize. In describing what
he sees as Loa’s too casual attitude, Iuli uses the verb nofonofo (here pro-
nounced /gofogofo/), a reduplication of nofo ‘sit’ that implies a prolonged and
repeated action or, rather, in this case, the prolonged absence of action.
According to Iuli, Loa just “sat and sat” instead of getting up and going to
buy some food himself to distribute to the matai who had been waiting for the
MP to come with gifts. In expanding his argument, Iuli adds that Loa and the
MP are related.17 This statement could have two meanings. One is made
explicit, namely, that Loa had more direct access to the MP and thus more
opportunities to get clarification on whether he was going to come or not. The
other is implicit, namely, that, given his family connections, Loa is even more
responsible – the practical logic here being that one is supposed to help family
members and, if necessary, make up for their faults.
(4) (Fono April 7, 1979)
In a last and dramatic part of his speech, Iuli goes as far as proposing a heavy
fine (a whole cow and 100 Samoan dollars) and even expelling Loa (/alu `ese
ma le gu`u/ ‘go away from the village’).
After Iuli has concluded his accusatory speech, Teva, a chief from Fagaloa
(see Figures 3.2 and 3.3), briefly takes the floor to announce that he needs to
leave in order to catch the bus. Before getting up, he provides his opinion on
the case. Referring to Iuli’s speech, he says that either a fine or forgiveness
would be acceptable. This is a respectful way of acknowledging Iuli’s
concern while simultaneously mentioning an option that might avoid the
complications associated with establishing a fine and making sure that some-
one pays it – Teva does not even mention the more severe punishment of
expelling Loa from the village. As Teva is leaving, the orator Fa`aonu`u, who
Unintended consequences 57
was not present when the events recounted by Iuli took place, takes the floor.
He asks for clarification. Is Iuli saying that Loa lied to the village (/`ua fai se
pepelo i lo kākou gu`u/ lit. ‘has a lie been said to our village’)? What did Loa
do? Iuli immediately responds to Fa`aonu`u’s request providing a second and
more detailed narrative account of Loa’s actions including the consequences
for everyone else. It starts with Loa summoning the matai with the news that
the newly reelected MP will deliver (momoli) presents – a conventional
gesture by a newly elected representative. Iuli says that Loa’s announcement
prompts the arrival of matai from all seven subvillages or falefitu (here
pronounced /falefiku/) (see Figure 3.3). After having gathered (line 3470),
the matai become fed up (fiu) with waiting for the MP (line 3473) who does
not show up (line 3474). In the meantime, Loa is described again as sitting
around (/gofogofo/) and then as strolling (savalivalia`i) and going around
(fealualua`i) (lines 3475–3478), two other repetitive and heedless actions that
are meant to demonstrate that Loa does not worry (popole) about what is
happening (/e le popole i le mea lea/). In this second and expanded narrative,
Iuli underscores the gravity of the situation created by Loa by providing
details that are designed to elicit sympathy for those who are waiting,
including the untitled men (taulele`a) who had baked some food (suāvai)
to accompany what the MP was expected to bring (e.g., canned meat and
fish, and a cooked pig), and the matai who came all the way from Fagaloa
Bay (line 3479). In this case, the road (`āuala) is described as ‘difficult’ (/
faigakā/) for the orators and chiefs, who are not directly mentioned but
evoked through the use of the honorific terms maliu and afio, two verbs that
respectively index actions by orators and chiefs.
(5) (Fono April 7, 1979)
3466 Iuli; `o le fā`aliga, lau kōfā . . .
‘as for evidence,18 your honor. . .’19
3467 `o Loa `ua sau kala`i le kākou gu`u
‘Loa came to boast to our village’
3468 e fogo- ma pokopoko
‘to meet- and gather together’
3469 la`a sau le faipule- e `amai20 oga momoli . . .
‘the MP will come- to bring his treat (of food) . . .’
3470 ia` oga- pokopoko lea o le kākou falefiku,
‘so our seven subvillages gather,’
3471 leai se isi e o`o iā Fagaloa ma Falevao
‘there is no one who stays behind in Fagaloa and Falevao’
3472 ma kagaka `uma o le kākou- gofoaala . . .
‘and all the people of our- subvillages’ . . .
3473 pokopoko `ua fiu `ua alu legā aso `o kakali
‘gathered together (we are) fed up, the day has gone still
waiting’
58 The avoidance of intentional discourse
Iuli then takes the floor again and backs down by declaring that there will
not be a fine if the rest of the village does not want to impose it. Moe`ono takes
the floor again. This time he first takes the opportunity to scold the orator
Fa`aonu`u for expressing his opinion regarding one of the cases that was
discussed earlier and which had to do with a chief, Savea Sione, who is from
Fa`aonu`u’s own subvillage. This is framed as a lesson in political etiquette
(with Moe`ono telling the lower-ranking Fa`anu`u how to behave in a fono),
but it can also be read as a complaint or even a warning given that during the
earlier part of the meeting Fa`aonu`u had expressed an opinion that went
against Moe`ono’s own request that Savea withdraw his suit against the MP
Fa`amatua`inu, that is, the same person who never showed up with the food for
the matai in Falefā. Then Moe`ono returns to Loa’s case, in direct disagree-
ment with Iuli, who is roughly his equal, puts aside the argument made by Iuli
that Loa is responsible because he and the MP are related, and focuses on what
he thinks Loa should have done, namely, first ask the MP or someone else
from his village to come to Falefā (referred to as ‘the seaward village’) and
then to stop continuing to say that the MP was going to come.
(6) (Fono April 7, 1979; speaker: Senior Orator Moe`ono)
Moe`ono is also the first to implicitly blame the MP himself by saying that he
is just ‘a little kid who went to school with foreigners’ (/`o le kamaikiki sā
a`oga i ō pālagi/) who therefore does not know anything about the tradition
(/ga ke lē iloa gi agagu`u/), which implies that he does not know how to behave
(and be generous). Moe`ono concludes by proposing to wait until they all go to
meet with the MP and the other matai in Lufilufi. That will be the time to bring
up the issue.
How to interpret these exchanges and the arguments presented so far? In
my earlier discussions of the case (e.g., Duranti 1988), I pointed out that,
contrary to what one would expect in a western judiciary context, Iuli’s
accusation and the responses by the other matai are almost exclusively
focused on the consequences of Loa’s announcement of a visit by the MP
that did not materialize and his apparent lack of concern for the situation
that his reported speech had created. None of the matai who speak, includ-
ing Loa himself, say that Loa should not be accountable for reporting what
60 The avoidance of intentional discourse
the MP had told him. If the MP’s reported words are treated as a “promise,”
as apparently made explicit in Moe`ono’s speech to the MP nine days later –
see example (12) below – it is striking that the discussion never comes
down to saying that the MP violated his promise and for making him
responsible for the embarrassment the lack of fulfillment created. Despite
the centrality of the speaker’s intention in the conditions of satisfaction for
the speech act of promising as described by Searle (see §2.1.1), the MP’s
intentions are not mentioned or questioned during the April 7, 1979
meeting. No one wonders whether the MP meant what he said, but it is
Loa and not the MP who is said to have caused the inconvenience of
important people and contributed to their public loss of face. Even
Moe`ono, who, as we saw in (6) above, dismisses Iuli’s contention that
the family relationship between Loa and the MP is an aggravating circum-
stance, does not challenge Iuli’s accusation by bringing up the fact that Loa
might not have known that the MP was not going to come and therefore that
Loa was not responsible. Even though here, as in the two earlier cases
discussed on that day, Moe`ono is critical or even disdainful of the MP, he
agrees with Iuli that Loa did something wrong (sesē): Loa did not stop
delivering the MP’s message (/`a e le ku`ua e Loa ia le fā`aliga a le Faipule/)
once he realized that the MP was not coming.
3626 Loa; `ia `ae pei o:- `ou ke lē olegia lo kākou gu`u. . . .
‘well but I do not deceive our village. . . .’
3627 Iuli, (. . .) e lē- e lē iā ke a`u fo`i segā kūlaga,
‘Iuli . . . it’s not- that sort of action is not me,’
3628 `ou ke kaufa`avalea po `o le ā se isi kūlaga, . . .
‘(that) I try to fool (people) or something else . . .’
[. . .]
3636 `ua po`o iai gi kuagia o le faipule
‘the MP might have had other commitments’
3637 `ua mafua ai oga lē kaugu`u mai. . . .
‘that explained why he did not arrive . . .’
3638 `a `o ia ā ga sa- ga saugoa mai
‘but it was he who said (to me)’
3639 `ou ke sau e fofoga lo kākou gu`u. . . .
‘I come to summon our village’
3640 e lē fa`apea lā `ou ke faku fua se kalapelo. . . .
‘it is not the case that I made up a lie for no reason.’
Loa also provides a brief narrative account of himself going to the (public)
phone to make a call to find out the reason (māfua) why no one was coming
and adds that he had the inclination (agāga) to bring something to eat for the
matai waiting for the MP but arrived too late: the matai had already had the
food cooked in the oven (suāvai) for the day (line 3657). Loa concludes with a
general statement about his respect for the village – which here means for the
other matai – and a note of caution as to whether the issue makes sense. These
remarks should be interpreted in the context of an accusation that focuses on
the embarrassment that Loa’s actions or lack thereof caused among the matai
in the village. Reaffirming his respect for the assembly and its members is a
way for Loa to reassure his audience that he cares about the consequences of
his actions. Loa’s self-defense shows that Loa is trying to address both his
responsibility for what happened and the truth of his announcement that the
MP was going to come.
When we examine his narrative, we see that there are few factual details. For
example, he says that he came to make the phone call – the phone booth was
relatively far from his house and close to the house where the fono is taking
place – to find out why the MP was not coming. But in the telling he switches
from the singular ‘I came’ (/go`u sau/) to the plural ‘the two of us came’ (/mā
ōmai/) without mentioning who the other person was. Then he never says
whether he actually made the phone call and reached anyone (I do know that at
that time the phone was often out of order so it is possible that he was not able
to complete the call). The nature of verbal interaction in the fono, which favors
long turns-at-talk as opposed to question–answer sequences, does not favor the
62 The avoidance of intentional discourse
display of the details that might seem necessary to get a fuller account of what
actually happened (I will return to this point in Chapter 5).
Loa also has a responsibility toward the MP Fa`amatuā`inu, who holds the
highest government office in the district. As a lower-ranking orator and a
member of the council of matai in Falefā, Loa is expected to support and
help Fa`amatuā`inu. Loa’s kin relation with the MP can only add to such an
expectation. In fact, the kind of situation in which Loa finds himself,
namely, being blamed for something that should be seen as someone else’s
fault, is not uncommon. Lower-ranking orators might be blamed for
Absolute liability 63
The verb māfua in line 87 and its derivation māfua`aga contain the word fua,
which means ‘fruit, flower, bloom,’ suggesting a semantic blurring between
‘reason, cause’ on the one hand and ‘origin, source’ on the other.23 This is a
temporal interpretation of causation that follows the same logic captured by the
Latin phrase post hoc ergo propter hoc, meaning that an event following
another is seen as caused by it. There are also in Samoan spatial metaphors
for representing reasons and causes as shown by the use of such terms as ala
‘path’ and `auala ‘road’ (see Milner 1966: 31). An example of the use of
`auala ‘road’ meaning something close to our ‘reason’ is given in the next
excerpt, in (11). Here `auala might express what in English could be conveyed
Absolute liability 65
with the colloquial phrase ‘how we got there.’ The context is an earlier part of
the same April 7 meeting discussed so far, and the orator Loa is being scolded
by Senior Orator Moe`ono for not making sure that the news of the convoca-
tion of the meeting be delivered (pagi) in time to the subvillages of Sauago and
Sauatele to come to a fono falefitu (see Figure 3.3 above).
(11) (Fono April 7, 1979; during the opening speech the senior orator Moe`ono
inquires about the absence of the matai representing the two nearby
subvillages of Saletele and Sauago in Fagaloa Bay)
examples (10) and (11) show us that Samoans are indeed concerned with the
origin or cause of certain states-of-affairs especially when they have negative
consequences. In (11) we see the orator Loa interpreting Moe`ono’s scolding
as an indirect request for him (Loa) to provide a justification for the failed
communication between subvillages. At the same time Loa’s response shows
reluctance to either offer or find the ‘reason’ (literally ‘the road’ in line 788) for
the current state-of-affairs. This is not unusual. In the fono most speakers tend
to stay as vague as possible when uttering statements that could be interpreted
as accusations. Even though, as shown above, in the fono there may be concern
for reasons, causes, and explanations, the discussions of such reasons or causes
are not very elaborate. They tend to be formulated in terms of generic or
stereotypical behavior, like, for example, being under the influence of alcohol
and thus not in control of one’s behavior. For example, in the April 16,
1979 meeting held in the village of Lufilufi, Moe`ono confronts the MP
66 The avoidance of intentional discourse
strategy, “say the least,” which can be understood as a way to avoid the
problem of having to blame, accuse, or rebuke someone whom you are
expected to honor (see Duranti 1994: 116–121). Similarly, in the case dis-
cussed in this chapter, we saw that once he is accused by the senior orator Iuli,
the lower-ranking Loa finds himself in a difficult situation. He needs to defend
himself, but he has to do it in a way that does not directly challenge Iuli’s
authority and judgment.
These observations suggest that, in uncovering Samoan ethnotheories of
self, relationships, and social agency, the issue is not just whether Samoans
have words that hint at or entail individual will or planning, which they do, but
(a) in what contexts something corresponding to an individual intention is
made explicit and relevant and (b) whether the expressions used in such cases
correspond to the speech-act types described in the literature on English and
often implicitly assumed to be universal. To test this line of argumentation, in
Chapter 4 I will explore in some detail whether we could say that there is a
Samoan speech act corresponding to the English promise.
3.5 Conclusions
Overall, the data discussed in this chapter support the view previously argued
by a number of ethnographers that Samoans are more eager to act upon
conventions, consequences, and cultural expectations about what a certain
type of person (e.g., with a particular status or role) would or should do in a
given context than they are to rely upon an explicit reconstruction of what an
individual’s intentions or unexpressed goals might have been. The Samoan
matai in the fono I examined in this chapter avoided speculations about
intentions – or about motivations (Mead 1928) – as shown by the fact that
inquiries regarding why someone did something are rare and quite limited in
scope. More generally, I still feel confident saying that the Samoan speakers in
my recordings display a discursive dispreference for introspection and for
non-generi, that is, individual-specific psychological explanations of past
behaviors.
Given that human action, and speech as one type of such action, is goal
oriented, Samoans, like any other people in the world, must and do interpret
each other’s doings as having certain ends with respect to which those doings
must be evaluated and dealt with. The problem – for us, and, perhaps at times,
for them as well – lies in the extent to which, in interpreting each other’s
behavior, Samoans display a concern for an actor’s alleged subjective reality.
The fact that a society can carry on a great deal of complex social interaction
with little concern for people’s inner thoughts about what should be done and
with a much more obvious concern for the public, displayed, performative
aspect of language is, in my opinion, an important fact which any theoretical
68 The avoidance of intentional discourse
To breed an animal with the right to make promises – is not this the
paradoxical problem nature has set itself with regard to man? And is it not
man’s true problem?
(Friederich Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals, Second Essay)
[Morality] has, at least politically, no more to support itself than the good will
to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to be
forgiven, to make promises and to keep them.
(Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition)
69
70 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
explain the social meaning of human actions. Thus, meaning of actions was
more likely to be seen in terms of contexts and observable or perceived
consequences of certain behaviors. The theoretical issue then for Rosaldo
was not so much the universality of the notion of promise (a claim that had
never been made by either Austin or Searle), but with the epistemological or
even ontological implications of the conceptual apparatus through which
speech acts were being described by analytic philosophers and, ultimately,
made sense of by speakers within particular speech communities.
I argue . . . that the act of “promising” is alien to the Ilongot repertory of kinds of
speech. More immediately relevant, however, is the question as to why, and with what
consequences, the act of promising has been used as a paradigm in theories presently
available. To think of promising is, I would claim, to focus on the sincerity and integrity
of the one who speaks. Unlike such things as greetings that we often speak because, it
seems, “one must,” a promise would appear to come, authentically, from inside out. It is
a public testimony to commitments we sincerely undertake, born of a genuine human
need to “contract” social bonds, an altruism that makes us want to publicize our plans.
Thus the promise leads us to think of meaning as a thing derived from inner life.
A world of promises appears as one where privacy, not community, is what gives rise
to talk. (Rosaldo 1982: 211)
To La Pérouse’s astonishment, the next day five or six Samoan canoes came out to trade
with the French.1 Full of supplies La Pérouse brushed them off, firing a cannon near the
canoes to splash but not actually harm the occupants . . . La Pérouse then left.
The next vessel to stop at Tutuila appears to have been the Pandora (Gilson 1970: 67).
The Pandora’s tender repulsed a Samoan night attack on June 22, 1791, causing “terrible
havoc” and the death of several Samoans . . . Following this conflict . . . trade relations
took on a more positive tone. George Bass, the next European to trade at the island,
described the Samoans as “friendly and receptive” . . . (Borofsky and Howard 1989: 263)
Minimally speaking, these accounts suggest that Europeans and Samoans had
different expectations about what constituted a reasonable amount of time to
mourn, retaliate, resume interaction, or display respect for one another’s feelings
about the consequences of a recent tragic event. From a cross-cultural perspec-
tive, Europeans’ surprise at the timing of the Samoans’ acts of forgiveness (or
apparent forgetfulness) reminds us that, as pointed out by Bourdieu (1977) in his
discussion of gift-exchanges, the temporality of all kinds of act sequences,
including commitments and their fulfillments, should not be taken for granted
and is likely to be subject to cross-cultural variation. We might thus hypothesize
that for certain societies, including Samoa at the time of European contact, the
temporal span of promises, which goes from a few minutes to years or decades, is
so long as to seem unlikely or unreasonable. This hypothesis has an economic
corollary associated with the control that an individual has to satisfy the promise.
If we believe David Hume’s thesis in A Treatise of Human Nature that “the
obligation of promises is an invention for the interest of society” (Hume 1985:
576) and that it is meant to solve the problem of “the transference of property and
possession by consent” beyond the immediate and face-to-face “barter of com-
modities” (Hume 1985: 572), we might want to consider the type of society
where promises make sense. This was indeed one of the points made by Rosaldo
(1982) about the Ilongots. In Samoa, to a large extent still today, the extended
family (`āiga) has ultimate control over property, from pieces of land and its
products to precious artifacts like fine mats (`ie toga) exchanged for labor. Even
though at any given time a matai, as the holder of a family title, has some
authority to make decisions for the family as a whole, such authority is limited
in scope, including its temporal unfolding. From this point of view, the very idea
of promises as ways to exert some control over future action – an idea that is also
found in Hannah Arendt’s (1998: 243–247) discussion of promises – is contin-
gent on the type of socio-economic order of the community.
Samoan translations that had been proposed of the English term promise suggest
that Samoan might have a different idea about what it means to promise. In this
chapter I return to my original claim in order to refine it through a more detailed
analysis of the expressions that have been offered as translations of the act of
promising. In addition to the data I collected in Samoa, I will rely more than
anywhere else in this book on written texts, which include two Samoan–English
dictionaries, the first complete Samoan translation of the Old and New
Testaments, which appeared in print in the 1880s,2 and other texts collected
and originally translated in German, also at the end of the nineteenth century, by
Oskar Stuebel (1846–1921), the German consul-general in Western Samoa
(Scarr 2013: 136, 159), and Augustin Krämer (1865–1941), a German Navy
medical officer who developed in Samoa a passion for ethnology and over a
period of several years was able to collect a considerable amount of precious
information about Samoan society and culture, including legends, myths,
genealogies, and descriptions of social events, customs, and artifacts (Krämer
1902, 1903).3 On the basis of my investigation of these texts, I will refine my
earlier and cursory discussion of the act of promising and propose that, although
it seems to exist as a possible speech act, it was probably not a native Samoan
concept when the missionaries arrived in the 1830s. Its appearance within the
Samoan repertoire of speech acts is likely to have occurred in the context of the
translation of the Bible into Samoan, a process of translation-as-acculturation
documented for other societies by a number of anthropologists, including
Bambi B. Schieffelin (1996, 2007) for the Bosavi (Kaluli) of Papua New Guinea
in the twentieth century, Webb Keane (2007) for Sumba, Indonesia, in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and William Hanks (2010) for the Yucatec
Maya in the second half of the sixteenth century. As we shall see, this hypothesis
is based on the following evidence:
As we shall see, in some cases the two dictionaries provide very similar
translations. In other cases, they offer different insights and cover a different
set of vocabulary items.
Both Pratt and Milner translate promise with the Samoan word folafola, the
only minor difference between the two dictionaries being the spelling: Pratt
spells the word folofola and Milner spells it fōlafola, using a macron on the
first vowel to mark o as a long vowel (phonemically /oo/, phonetically [oː]).
The different transcription of the same word is not surprising given the
different attention given to vowel length by the two authors. To avoid confus-
ing readers, I will hereafter use only the spelling folafola (without the macron
to mark the first long vowel) in my discussion of the term, unless I am quoting
from Milner’s dictionary or other sources that mark the long vowel.4
When we go to the Samoan–English part of Pratt’s dictionary, and we look
up folafola, we find the following English glosses: “FOLAFOLA, v. 1. To
spread out. 2. To unfold, to preach. 3. To promise” (Pratt 1893: 162). In
addition, Pratt gives a similar set of glosses to the non-reduplicated form fola:
“1. To spread out, as mats to sleep on. 2. To unfold, as the hand. 3. To promise;
redup. FOLAFOLA; pl. FOFOLA; pass. FOLASIA” (Pratt 1893: 161–162).
We also find both fola and folafola as parts of compounds. One is con-
structed with the causative prefix fa`a-, namely, (a) fa`afola ‘to open up, to
spread out, as a cloth, or the fingers,’ and (b) fa`amāfolafola ‘to spread out, to
unfold’ and also ‘to explain’ (Pratt 1893: 122). Another compound is māfola, a
verb meaning “1. To be spread out. 2. To be extensive, to be wide. 3. To be
plain, to be perspicuous, of a speech.” Pratt also lists the reduplicated form
māfolafola with no gloss (but Milner translates it as ‘be flat’).
In the Samoan–English part of Milner’s dictionary we find similar glosses
for fōlafola and its nominalization, fōlafolaga.
fōlafola. v. 1. Announce (publicly). Sā __ e le faife`au le fa`amanatuga mo lea Aso Sā:
The pastor __d a communion-service for that Sunday. 2. Acknowledge (a gift) by
public announcement (Samoan custom). `Ua __ i fafo meaalofa a le nu`u: The presents
from the village were __ d outside (the house). 3. Promise. Na `ou __ `i ai le lima
pauni: I __d him 5 pounds. fōlafolaga n. 1. Announcement. __ a le faife`au: The
pastor’s __. 2. Acknowledgment. __ o meaalofa: __s of presents. 3. Promise. `O lau __
`iate a`u: Your __ to me. (Milner 1966: 68)
As shown below, Milner, unlike Pratt, does not translate fola, with ‘promise.’
fola v. 1. Strew. __ le fale `i `ili`ili: __ the floor of the house with pebbles. 2. Spread. n.
Floor. `Ua ufitia le __ `i le `ili`ili: The floor is covered with pebbles. (Milner 1966: 68)
out, laying out objects, it is not too far to spreading information. Two examples
are provided in (1) and (2) below from the transcripts of conversational
interactions I recorded in Samoa.
(1) (Dinner # 3; 1988)
T; o`u alaku lā o`u moe
‘I went there (and) slept’
leai ma gisi-
‘There was no one- (else)’
folafola ou fala o`u moe.
spread myþPl mat I sleep
‘(I) spread out my mats (and) I slept’
Sk; agapō?
‘Last night?’
Cook Islands (known at the time as Hervey Islands), where Christian missions
had already been established, who could act as culture- and language-brokers.
As elsewhere in Polynesia, one of the first tasks in establishing a mission in
Samoa was the production of Christian texts and the simultaneous introduction
of literacy. By the time six more LMS missionaries arrived in 1836, in addition
to a spelling book and a book of hymns, the entire Gospel according to
Matthew had already been translated into Samoan (Murray 1888: 40). As
elsewhere in the Pacific, in Samoa also the translators were following rules
established by the British and Foreign Bible Society. Here is a passage in
which Rev. Archibald W. Murray narrates some aspects of the process of the
translation and the revision.
We, with our native pundits, used to sit about nine hours daily, except on Saturdays,
when we took half a holiday to recruit a little and prepare for the Sabbath services.
Whether at home at our own stations or elsewhere there was always a demand for
preaching when the Sabbath came round. Our sittings extended over two, three, and
sometimes four, or even five weeks, according to the length or difficulty of the book we
had in hand, but we used to feel that three weeks were about long enough for a
continuous sitting. We were pretty well furnished with critical helps, and versions were
of service to us. The Septuagint, the Vulgate, and our South Sea versions which had
preceded our own – the Hawaiian, the Tahitian, the Rarotongan, and the Tongan –
always were on our table. Boothroyd’s English version also, and of course the author-
ised version, and English commentaries, were all laid under contribution. (Murray
1888: 43)
Murray’s account is supported by other sources, including correspondence
between Rev. George Pratt and Rev. Henry Nisbet that I was able to review.5
Nisbet’s journal (1836–1876) – available in microfilm (Mitchell Library,
Sydney) – also contains a day-by-day description of his study of Latin, Greek,
and Classical Hebrew at the Turvey Congregational Academy.
From these accounts we learn that each new translation was based on the
“authorised version” (in English) and a number of original texts or older
translations – Murray (1888) mentions the Textus Receptus, the Vulgate, and
the Septuagint – as well as previous translations in other Polynesian languages,
all of which are closely related and thus exhibit lexical and morpho-syntactic
similarities. These similarities among Polynesian languages made it possible
for the British missionaries in Samoa (and elsewhere) to employ native
speakers (the “native pundits” in the above quote) from other island communi-
ties (e.g., from Tahiti) who had already been converted, had acquired literacy,
and had done translation work in a closely related language.
According to Murray (1888: 45), the first translation of the New Testament
into Samoan was completed in 1850. The translation of the Old Testament was
started then and completed within five years. A first revision was done by two
other missionaries, Henry Nisbet and George Pratt. A second revision was
82 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
done between 1867 and 1870 by Pratt, Murray, Turner, and Whitmee (Murray
1888: 48). By the 1880s Samoans had access to bound copies of one single
volume containing both the Old and New Testaments. In my investigations
I have drawn from an 1884 edition reprinted by The Bible Society in the South
Pacific (n.d.) and an 1887 edition that is now available as an electronic file at
http://books.google.it/books/about/O_le_tusi_paia_o_le_Feagaiga_Tuai_ma_le.
html?id=aDs7AAAAcAAJ&redir_esc=y. The examples cited in the rest of this
chapter are identical in the two editions.
Pratt (1817–1894) is an important actor in this challenging, lengthy, and
complex activity. He was a biblical scholar who spent forty years in Samoa
(1839–1879) and was described as “a very accomplished speaker of the
vernacular” (Newell 1911b). Pratt’s Samoan–English dictionary was first
published in 1862 and then revised by him in two subsequent editions, in
1876 and 1893,6 which include a grammar of Samoan. After Pratt’s death, in
1892, J. E. Newell, who is the author of a grammar of English written in
Samoan (Newell 1891) and had access to Pratt’s original manuscripts, pre-
pared a fourth and last edition.7 In the preface to his 1911 revision of Pratt’s
dictionary (dated “Samoa, March 1910”), Newell writes that Pratt was also “an
ardent student of Hebrew and Arabic.” That Pratt had a remarkable linguistic
knowledge is confirmed by a number of sources, including Richard Lovett’s
(1899) history of the London Missionary Society, where he quotes a letter
from “an old colleague and friend, S[amuel] J[ames] Whitmee,” who wrote:
The translation, and then the revision of the Samoan Bible, was the great work of
[Pratt’s] life. To this he devoted almost daily attention for many years, with the result
that the Samoans have a Bible which, as a classic, is, and will be to them, very much
what the Authorized Version has been in England. His Hebrew Old Testament and his
Greek New Testament were among his most cherished companions, whether he was at
home or traveling. He had also a very perfect knowledge of the Samoan language, and
spoke it like one of the natives of a generation now passed away, before the language
had suffered from modern corruptions. He was also familiar with the classic traditions
of the people, and could illustrate and give points to his speech by such telling
references and allusions, that it was always a treat to the natives to hear Palati [Samoan
for the name Pratt] speak. He had no uninterested hearers. He accordingly had little
patience with missionaries who were contented with an imperfect knowledge of the
language of the people to whom they preached, or who were given to careless speech.
(Lovett 1899: 388–389)
As I suggest in §4.4.1 below, Pratt’s (and other missionaries’) knowledge of
Greek and Classical Hebrew will become important for making sense of some
of the lexical choices made in the Samoan translations of what is rendered with
promise in the King James Bible.
One of the challenges for Pratt and his co-workers – as for others before and
after them8 – was to find Samoan lexical counterparts for the multitude of
referents, concepts, and practices found in the Bible. In some cases, the
Challenges in the translation of the Bible into Samoan 83
Figure 4.1 Title page of 1887 edition of the Tusi Paia, the Samoan translation
of the Bible, a collaborative effort by George Pratt, Henry Nisbet, and others
84 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
The word agaga was regularly used for the expression Holy Spirit or Holy
Ghost (Agaga Pa`ia) and sometimes for soul, including cases where soul is
contrasted with body as shown above in the passage in (5), and flesh in (6).
Their respective translations are provided below in (9) and (10).
The extent to which one believes that this meaning of agaga, like the meaning
‘promise’ of folafola, is a semantic innovation depends on the interpretation of
the native use of agaaga and its base aga, which has been the subject of
considerable debate among students of Samoan culture and society, especially
in the context of the relation between aga and another term, amio ‘behavior’
(Shore 1982, 1983; Love 1983; Freeman 1984, 1985; Mageo 1992). One issue
is whether the semantic difference between aga and amio could or should be
captured in terms of dichotomies such as culture vs. nature, social vs. personal,
and positively vs. negatively valued action, a position held by Shore (1982)
and criticized by others (e.g., Love 1983; Freeman 1984, 1985; Mageo 1989),
or it should be understood as a contrast between an inner, psychological
being (aga) and an outer self or social ways of being (amio), as suggested
by Love (1983). Putting aside the problematic interpretation of the aga/amio
dichotomy as corresponding to culture/nature, I think there is empirical
evidence that aga refers to forms of behavior that are seen as characteristic
Challenges in the translation of the Bible into Samoan 87
Another suggestion about the transformation of aga (and agaga) into the
Christian ‘soul’ was made by Bradd Shore in his response to Love’s criticism
of Shore’s cultural interpretation of aga and amio in his 1982 book Sala`ilua:
A Samoan Mystery. Shore (1983: 154) proposed that aga as the center of the
social self (of Samoan culture) becomes in the Bible “the Western, private,
psychological self” of Christianity.
Regardless of whether we agree or not with the details of these claims, these
few examples of semantic innovations remind us that languages are malleable,
and new meanings can be added to existing words and expressions, sometimes
replacing or obfuscating the original meaning, other times coexisting with it,
not always in an overall coherent fashion (see Keane 2007: 132–146). This is
what might have happened to folafola.
second, in Samoan, from the Tusi Paia, the third is my own word-by-word
English gloss of the Samoan text).
(11) (Hebrews 10:23)
. . . for he is faithful that promised;
. . . auā e faamaoni o ia ua folafola mai
because Pres faithful Pred he Perf folafola Dx
The “common” (i.e., non-honorific) verb fai ‘say’ (but also ‘do, make, have’)
and the noun `upu ‘word’ are used for mortals and, as shown in (15), where
God is speaking to Solomon, for God’s quoted direct speech, showing that
God’s speech is made to follow the pragmatic rule according to which speakers
should not use an honorific form in talking about themselves. Verbs of saying
are typically combined with deictic particles like mai or atu indicating the
directionality of the act, i.e., who is saying what to whom (Platt 1982).
90 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
These two translations of promise – one with folafola and the other with verbs
of saying (or nouns, like `upu ‘word,’ referring to acts of speaking) – are also
found in the previously mentioned manual written in Samoan by Rev. J. E.
Newell (and published in London by the London Missionary Society in 1891)
for teaching English grammar to Samoans. Newell translates promise with
folafola as well as with two verbs of saying, ta`u (‘to tell, to mention’ in Pratt
1893: 281; Newell 1911a: 295) and fai mai (see above) (Newell 1911a: 126).
I found no examples of ta`u used for promise in the Samoan Bible, but see the
compound ta`utino discussed below.
I also searched for all the uses of folafola in the Tusi Paia and found that a
relatively frequent meaning of this word in the New Testament is ‘preach,’
which can be made sense of as a metaphorical extension of ‘spreading the
Word’ or the ‘Good News’ (tala lelei), as in ma ua folafolaina foi le tala lelei i
e matitiva ‘and the poor have the gospel preached to them’ – Matthew 11:5). In
the Old Testament, preaching is tāla`i (spelled tala’i), a word that Pratt (1893:
296) translates as ‘to proclaim’ and Milner (1966: 234) as ‘to propagate’ as
well as ‘boast’ and ‘brag.’ The same verb can be used in a nominalization for
‘the one who preaches’ as an alternative to the term failāuga (‘speechmaker’)
mentioned above.
I propose that to make sense of these differences between the Samoan Old
and New Testaments we need to take into consideration the original Hebrew
and Greek texts.13 Before doing so, however, we need to establish that the
missionaries were in fact examining the original texts.
According to Murray (1888: 46), Rev. George Pratt and Rev. Henry
Nisbett were the two people who were put in charge of gathering all the
materials previously produced by the translation team of missionaries and
native speakers and editing a “final revision” (of what will turn out to be
the first complete edition) of the Samoan Bible.14 I believe that there is
sufficient evidence to support the thesis that Pratt and Nisbet not only
knew Classical Hebrew and Ancient Greek, but were in fact systematic-
ally consulting various versions and early translations of the original
texts.
Murray himself, for example, mentions that Pratt had helped Rev. W. G.
Lawes in translating the Bible into Niuean (another Polynesian language)
(Murray 1888: 56) and then quotes Lawes (1888: 58), who lists a number of
“originals” that he had consulted, including Van der Hooght’s Hebrew Bible,
various critical versions in Greek and English, as well as the Textus Receptus
and the Septuagint, which were both popular at the time. I also learned from
reading Nisbet’s journals that in preparation for his missionary work, together
with the other members of the London Missionary Society, he had been sent to
be trained in Latin, Ancient Greek, and Hebrew, and was expected to practice
in those languages by translating from the Bible.15 Direct evidence of the
attention paid to the original texts by the missionaries from the London
Missionary Society is found in Pratt’s correspondence with Nisbet from the
late 1860s (now at the Memorial Library in Sydney, see endnote 5) where he
mentions the Polyglott (a text that contains the Bible texts in various languages
including Hebrew and Greek) and gives lists of words and phrases for which
he is considering changes for the revised Samoan translation.16 In those lists
we find mentions of Greek terms such as πάντοτε (pantote) ‘always, all the
time’ translated with the Samoan so`o (spelled soo by Pratt and in the Tusi
Paia).
Given this background, a possible explanation for the fact that folafola
corresponding to promise in the King James Bible is rarely found in the
Samoan version of the Old Testament is that Pratt, Nisbet, and the other
missionaries in charge of the translation were trying to capture the meaning
of the original text, where there was no Hebrew word closely corresponding
to promise. The choice of the Samoan verbs of saying mentioned earlier
makes sense given that the most common root used in the Hebrew text for
the cases of promise in the King James is dbr ‘to speak.’ In the Old
Testament, that is, God does not “promise,” he “speaks.” This is consistent
with the more recent English translation of the Five Books of Moses done
92 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
by Robert Alter (2004), where the LORD does not promise, as shown in
Alter’s translation of Deuteronomy 28:3, previously shown in example (13),
here reproduced as (13’) with Alter’s translation followed by the relevant
Samoan translation:
(13’) (Deuteronomy 27:3)
. . . as the LORD God of your fathers has spoken to you. (Alter 2004:
1008–1009)
Pei ona fetalai mai ai e Ieova o le Atua o ou tama ia te oe.
As Comp speak Dx pro Erg Jehovah Pred Art God of your father to you
‘as Jehova, the Lord of your fathers, said to you [sing.]’ (my back translation)
One particularly telling example and additional evidence for the attention to
the Hebrew text is the Samoan translation of Ezekiel 13:22, which in the King
James Bible includes the phrase “that he should not return from his wicked
way, by promising him life” (emphasis mine). In this case the Samoan text
does not have anything corresponding to “by promising.” It turns out that the
original Hebrew text does not either.
Unlike Classical Hebrew, Ancient Greek, the lingua franca in which the
New Testament had been written, had the noun ἐπαγγελία ‘promise’ and the
verb ἐπαγγέλλομαι, of which promise (as a noun or as a verb) in the King
James Bible constitutes a literal translation. As we saw earlier, the Samoan
translation of the New Testament (O le Feagaiga Fou) has sixty-three cases of
Samoan folafola matching all but two of the total sixty-five cases in which the
Greek text has ἐπαγγελία or the corresponding verb form. The Samoan text
does not have folafola in six cases. Of these, three do not have promise in
Greek.
A search among the 110 Samoan texts collected by Oskar Stuebel (1896)
yielded two cases of folafola that are translated by Stuebel with the German
verb versprechen ‘promise.’ This at first seems to confirm that in the late
nineteenth century folafola was understood as corresponding to ‘promising’
also in non-Christian texts about Samoan customs, legends, and history.
However, a careful reading of the narrative context of these occurrences of
the term folafola suggests an alternative interpretation, whereby folafola could
be adequately translated with one of the other meanings discussed above, that
is, ‘put out,’ ‘announce,’ or maybe ‘offer,’ rather than ‘promise.’ I will here
discuss one of these two examples.
The text in question (entitled by Stuebel In welchen Fällen Land veräussert
werden konnte) is given as an example of cases (Fällen) in which a piece of
land (Land) might be transferred (veräussert) from one family to another (an
unusual situation given the typically inalienable relation between land and
titles in the Samoan descent system). The narrative is about a matai, who,
having found himself without enough food to properly welcome a visit (from
another village) by his sister or his sister’s son, goes to ask and obtains help
from another matai who gives him one of his animals (in the original German
translation, this is contextually understood to be a pig). After the traveling
party has left, the matai who had benefited from the generosity of the other
matai, after discussing it with his own extended family, goes to visit the one
who had helped him and offers him an outrigger (vaa) or, alternatively, a piece
(fasi) of land (fanua). The other matai rejects the boat and accepts instead the
offer of the piece of land for his own children’s benefit.
94 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
Even though the use of either German versprechen (or English promise)
for the second folafola found in this text makes sense, alternative transla-
tions are also possible and reasonable, including ‘offer,’ which was used
for the first instance of folafola in the story, as well as ‘put out, lay
out, announce, declare.’ In fact, if folafola was meant to correspond to
The case of the word māvaega 95
something akin to ‘promise’ (or the German versprechen), why not trans-
late it as such in the first instance when the speech act is performed?
Instead, it seems that folafola is turned into the verb for ‘promise’ (ver-
sprochen hast ‘you have promised’) in the metapragmatic account offered
at the end of the passage, which is a recasting of the action performed by
the chief who has come to compensate for the gift he had received in a
moment of need.
Māvaega is the nominalization – produced with the same –ga suffix found
in the noun folafolaga in example (2) – of the verb māvae ‘to be left, inherited’
and also ‘(be) apart, separate.’ As a noun, māvae also means a ‘crack.’ Māvae
itself is, in turn, a compound made of the verb vae or vavae meaning ‘divide,
separate’ and ‘cut’ (Milner 1966: 308). The connection among vae, māvae, and
māvaega is revealed by the meaning of māvaega as ‘farewell, departing
words’ (Milner 1966: 142), that is, something that happens at a moment of
separation. This is the reason for Milner’s translation of māvaega as an orally
delivered ‘will’ in the sense of a ‘parting promise.’ It is used to refer to a
chief’s legacy or, as explained in Krämer ([1902] 1994: 663), “an official
decree when [matai] feel their end is near, i.e. they officially state who is to be
their successor in name and title and what privileges the other children will
inherit.” This also shows that māvaega at least in its original sense could not
really be a promise because the person who is performing the act does so
before departing from this world and as such his decree or wish will have to be
realized by others (see Krämer [1903] 1995: 110). The conditions of
satisfaction for the act of promising as described by Searle do not apply
because the speaker will not be able to fulfill the commitment.
capital and said that I was not but I had been later seen driving back from the
capital, I would be accused of pepelo without being given a chance to explain
my actions on the basis of changed circumstances – this speech act was often
accompanied by a smile, implying a certain pleasure for having been able to
catch me lying.
A Samoan concern with finding the truth was recorded in the nineteenth
century by the European missionaries and other visitors. In his Nineteen Years
in Polynesia: Missionary Life, Travels, and Researches in the Islands of the
Pacific (1861), the missionary George Turner recounts an episode that illus-
trates this concern by describing a stratagem for finding out who did a given
(bad) deed (in this case a theft).
On looking out one afternoon, I saw all the grown-up people of the village coming and
sitting down before the door. They all looked very demure, and I wondered what was
up. Presently one of the old men commenced speechifying. “We have been talking
about your horse which has got a lame foot, and which is supposed to have been stoned
by some one. We wish to know who has done it, but all deny, and we cannot find out. It
is our custom when anything is concealed, for all to assemble and take an oath. That is
our plan. Will you please to hand out a Bible, and let us all swear here, that we may
know who is the guilty party?” It was their custom thus to assemble, and each laying his
hand on the sacred stone, or shell, or cup, which might be considered the representative
of the god, to implore vengeance and speedy death, if he touched the stone and told a
lie. Of course I thanked them for their respect for my nag Tom, but told them that such
imprecations were wrong, and that the simple yea or nay in such a case was quite
sufficient. They were satisfied, and by and by it appeared that the horse was lame not for
a stone, but from rheumatism. (Turner 1861: 24)
We do not know the possible outcome of the proposal made by the people
mentioned in this episode, but further evidence of old Samoan stratagems to
uncover the culprit of a theft is found in one of the texts collected by Stuebel
(1896: 130, 217): O le tauto faasamoa ‘the Samoan oath.’ The custom is also
described in Krämer (1995: II, 106), who might have lifted it from Stuebel and
Turner. Milner (1966: 257–258) also mentions the same Samoan practice for
fact finding in translating the verb tautō and its nominalization tautōga ‘oath’
(as a noun). The use of this lexical item and its compounds fa`atautō (with the
causative prefix fa`a-) and fa’atautōina (with both the causative prefix fa`a-
and the so-called “transitive” suffix –ina) are shown to be used for the taking
of an oath by an official (this is also the verb I mentioned earlier for the
marriage vows). Here and in all of the examples that I found in the older
secular texts, commitments, regardless of the English translations we might
agree upon, have one common characteristic: they are made in public, with
multiple parties as witnesses. The word promise in English, of course, can
have this public usage, like when politicians make promises to the voters (Hill
2000). But the English promise also has a possible use that is more private, as
demonstrated by expressions like I promised myself, which describes an act
98 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
that happened as part of an interior dialogue. Has the use of folafola extended
to such speech acts? Given that I could not find examples of such a use of
folafola in either the data I collected or elsewhere, I asked two young Samoan
friends (via email) whether one could say in Samoan “I promised myself
I would stop smoking” and similar utterances. They answered that it is possible
and each gave me a different translation. It is relevant for our discussion that
one person used folafola20 but the other did not accept it as an appropriate
translation because she interpreted folafola as ‘declare,’ as opposed to ‘prom-
ise.’ She proposed instead to use the word tautō,21 which I mentioned above as
meaning ‘oath.’ Even though one must be careful when generalizing on the
responses of two speakers, the fact that two bilingual speakers (who, I should
add, grew up in the same household) could have different intuitions about how
to render ‘I promised to myself’ suggests that folafola is far from solidly
established as the Samoan translation of English promise even though such a
meaning is found in the Bible, which was translated in the nineteenth century,
and in Milner’s dictionary (1966). It is thus possible that the innovation
constituted by the use of folafola for ‘promise’ may still be in progress.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter I have taken on the challenge of corroborating my earlier claim
that there is no special word corresponding to the English promise in Samoan
by engaging in a detailed analysis of two terms, folafola and māvaega, that
have been proposed as a translation of the English promise in dictionaries, in
the Samoan translation of the Bible, and by the Samoan speakers who helped
me translate my recordings of Samoan speech in spontaneous interaction.
I have shown that the basic, prototypical meaning of folafola is that of a
physical action roughly corresponding to the English ‘(to) put,’ ‘lay,’ ‘spread
out,’ and that by metaphorical extension it can be used to mean ‘(to) spread,
lay out information,’ ‘spread the word,’ ‘announce,’ ‘declare,’ and even
‘explain.’ On the basis of my review of texts produced or collected in the
second half of the nineteenth century, namely, the Samoan Bible or Tusi Paia
and Stuebel’s and Krämer’s volumes dedicated to Samoan legends, stories,
beliefs, and various cultural practices, I have hypothesized that the notion of
promise was at first introduced into Samoan in the process of translating the
Christian Scriptures and especially the New Testament, where folafola is
frequently used to translate expressions meaning ‘promise’ in the original
Greek text (and rendered with the English promise in the King James Bible).
The data gathered and analyzed in this chapter suggest a potential scenario
of historical change for the lexical item folafola, which went from meaning
‘spread out, distribute’ to ‘announce’ (a native activity) and later to ‘preach,’
an unknown activity in pre-Christian Polynesia, and ultimately to ‘promise,’
Conclusions 99
probably in the process of looking for a native Samoan term that could render
the many occurences of ‘promise’ in the Bible, especially in the New Testa-
ment. This proposed reconstructed semantic change is summarized below in
terms of four stages.
Stage 1: folafola means ‘lay out, spread out,’ especially flat and flexible
things such as mats or goods.
Stage 2: ‘spread out’ ! ‘distribute,’ a native metaphorical extension out of
several traditional practices, including the display on the floor of
the house or in the ceremonial ground (malae), what one group is
giving to another, and the distribution of the kava drink (`ava)
during ceremonial or formal occasions.
Stage 3: ‘spread out (goods)’ ! ‘spread information, announce,’ e.g., during
ceremonial exchanges where someone will let those outside the
house know what has been given or during a kava ceremony where
the person who is in charge of ‘distributing’ the kava is also the one
who ‘announces’ who is getting the next serving or ‘cup’ (ipu).
Stage 4a: ‘spread information, announce’ ! ‘preach,’ in the Christian sense
of announcing the arrival of the “Good News” (Tala Lelei) and
spreading the Christian faith.
Stage 4b: (potentially simultaneous with 4a): ‘announce, declare’ ! ‘prom-
ise,’ especially to refer to God’s promises to his prophets and to the
people of Israel.
The metaphorical extension of folafola to describe a personally felt commit-
ment to a future action most typically between two parties seems to be
consistent with other semantic innovations introduced by the missionaries,
including the notions of ‘soul’ understood as the inner, spiritual, immaterial
aspect of human life and experience.
Despite the widespread use of folafola to render promise in the New
Testament, it is possible that this word may still not have the full illocutionary
force of the speech act of promising in contemporary Samoa. For example, the
current vow at a marriage ceremony is the expression ou te folafola ma
ta`utino atu, a complex phrase that includes the verb ta`utino, a compound
made out of ta`u ‘speak, say’ and tino ‘body,’ translated as ‘declare plainly’ by
Pratt (1893: 289) or ‘speak out, speak frankly’ by Milner (1966: 250). The
whole phrase would then literally mean something closer to ‘I announce and
declare’ or ‘I announce and frankly say.’ This suggests that, for such an
important occasion, folafola is not considered sufficient for conveying a
spouse life-long commitment.
Overall, the data analyzed in this chapter support the view presented else-
where in this book that the linguistic expression of a private intention to
commit to doing something in the future might not fit with the traditional
100 Promising in the Samoan translation of the Bible
5.0 Introduction1
In the previous chapters I have reviewed the anthropological critique of the use
of intentions in speech act theory and presented some data that further question
the universality of a theory of human action mostly, if not exclusively, founded
on intentions. My move to reduce or at least contain the role of an individual’s
intentions in social theory should not be understood as a return to behaviorism
or a flat rejection of cognitive theories that rely on the reconstruction of
rational inferential processes. Rather, my intellectual engagement with the
literature, on the one hand, and with analysis of spontaneous verbal exchanges,
on the other, has been motivated by the need to show that in some situations
participants do not seem to invoke intentions as much as a certain type of folk
psychology might lead us to expect. Furthermore, a historical and cross-
linguistic perspective also shows that the disembodied notion of intention
found in the philosophical literature is not a universal. These data raise the
issue of whether a rethinking of intentionality in anthropology might affect the
ways in which we write about culture. Once we start to examine this issue, we
realize that it is difficult to talk about intentionality without also rethinking the
notion of truth that is adopted in ethnographic accounts.
101
102 Intentionality and truth, revisited
To say that an assertion “is true” signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in
itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, “lets” the entity “be seen” . . . (Heidegger
1962: 261)
In the 1980s this type of “continental” critique had been absorbed and reformu-
lated by French poststructuralists and deconstructivists and as such had also
entered the anthropological discourse, partly through the work of Bourdieu,
Gibson, and a few others. Among various proposals for new methods, like, for
example, “dialogical anthropology” (Tedlock 1983), the questioning of the
essence of truth – and of “essence” more generally – soon became a rethinking
of the mission of the anthropologist as a searcher of truth. This meant that in
the 1980s and early 1990s the very practice of ethnography, the building block
of the entire discipline, was being questioned, reanalyzed, or recontextualized.
This soul-searching produced a considerable body of self-reflexive writings,
including a series of articles, monographs, and edited collections dedicated to
participant observation, fieldnotes, and the practices through which anthropo-
logical descriptions are produced and made authoritative (e.g., Rabinow 1977;
Sperber 1985; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Clifford 1988; Geertz 1988; De Vita
1990; Sanjek 1990; Fox 1991). During that period, we witnessed an epistemo-
logical revolution, in which the observers became the observed and the modes
and goals of the enterprise – a supposedly objective or at least detached
comparison of different ways of being “human” – came under attack (e.g.,
Fabian 1983; R. Rosaldo 1989; Abu-Lughod 1991; Sheper-Hughes 1993).
Whether or not one agreed with the meta-statements and ontological questions
brought about or inspired by this new wave of critical anthropology, it became
problematic for many fieldworkers to continue to carry out their research in the
traditional way. For some, but not all, the solution was to get away from
studying the Other and turn to study their own society.
It was in the middle of such a crisis of anthropological thinking that linguists
in anthropology departments abandoned their own intellectual ghettos and
moved beyond the important but limiting roles as teachers of phonemic
analysis, collectors of lengthy native texts, or guardians of the still poorly
understood (and never clearly formulated) “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” (Hill and
104 Intentionality and truth, revisited
Mannheim 1992; Lucy 1992b). In the course of this paradigm shift (see
Duranti 2003a), the linguists’ subjects graduated from “informants” to talking
social agents whose conversation-actions could be recorded in the same way in
which their postures could be (but usually had not been) photographed or
filmed. Although these techniques and the analytical procedures that accom-
panied them did not make participants’ verbal contributions easily interpret-
able or our ethnographic accounts more objective in any naïve sense of the
term (Duranti 2006b), they made them – at least in the spirit in which linguistic
anthropologists were working – more open to further inquiry. By routinely
recording native discourse, we discovered that participants were “naturally”
inclined, to borrow Michael Moerman’s (1988) apt metaphor, to talk their
culture not only in interviews, but also in their everyday talk. In the midst of all
kinds of social situations, people could be heard (and sometimes seen) making
sense of their own behavior to themselves and to each other through accounts
of past, present, and future actions. In one contribution after another, linguistic
anthropologists showed that a theory of culture (or of “the cultural” as some
started to say) can be expressed not only in the symbolic oppositions found in
local taxonomies and ritual performances – and sometimes captured in state-
ments given in open-ended interviews – but also in the words and turns
exchanged among people while teasing, arguing, instructing, gossiping,
joking, or telling and co-telling narratives of personal experience (e.g., Bren-
neis 1984; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Briggs 1986; Haviland 1977, 1986,
1989; Besnier 1989, 2009; Ochs, Smith, and Taylor 1989; Schieffelin 1990;
Watson-Gegeo and White 1990). It was in this intellectual climate that I was
exploring the relevance of dominant conceptualizations of intentionality and
truth for the production of anthropological knowledge.
Proposition State-of-affairs
Figure 5.2 Interpretation as correspondence between a proposition and a state
of affairs
expressed by the predicate (are tools, have four sides, and take up space) are
contained or rather entailed by the (denotational) meaning of the subject.
These are also propositions that are not based on experience. The majority of
the propositions expressed through our everyday talk, however, are not of
this kind. They tend to be based on experience. They are contingent truths
like, for example, the mayor of Los Angeles is a man, the French president is
a socialist, most Americans buy foreign-made cars, etc. By reading (or
hearing) such statements we do not immediately know whether they are true.
They are not necessarily true. Since there is nothing intrinsic to the concept
of mayor that entails the gender identity of the person who holds that office,
before we can ascertain the truth of such statements we need to obtain some
additional information that is not contained in the meaning of the subject
noun phrase.
Whether we are dealing with analytic (a priori) truth or with contingent
truth, this view of meaning assumes two sets (and kinds) of entities: (1) states-
of-affairs (in particular worlds) and (2) their representations. When the two
match or there is a (positive) correspondence between them, we can say that
the proposition expresses a true proposition. If we use propositions, we can say
that there are only two possible relations between a proposition and a given
state of affairs (see Figure 5.3).
When we look at actual social interactions, such a binary view of truth may
be useful as an approximation or starting hypothesis, and in some cases as a
bare summary of some final resolution or judgment, but it cannot adequately
account for how people make sense of what is happening or what is being said.
Truth is typically a social matter because of the ways in which people work
around it and through it. This is so not simply because we need conventions
and public criteria for the assessment of truth, but because in social life truth
itself becomes an instrument, a mediating concept living in particular practices,
through which important social work gets done. This at least is the kind of
“truth” that ethnographers are more likely to encounter in their mingling with
others, in their professional accounts and recounts of what happened last night
or a hundred years ago, when our subjects’ great-grandfathers (or someone of
their generation) ruled the country, or the village. The truth discussed in public
arenas, for instance, is debatable not only because there are parties representing
and pushing for different versions of it, but also because it is through the
confrontation of different versions of truth that a collectively acceptable reality
is searched for, one where divisions and differences will not be resolved for
ever but can momentarily rest, until the next social drama (in Turner’s [1974]
sense) breaks out. As Lamont Lindstrom (1992) argued in his work about
debates in Tanna (Vanuatu), anthropological inquiry shows that truth is not
just a goal in such public confrontations; it is a criterion through which power
is both defined and claimed.
The Reconstructionist model of interpretation 107
True
Proposition State-of-affairs
False
Figure 5.3 Two possible relations between a proposition and the state-of-
affairs it describes
108 Intentionality and truth, revisited
Subject A Object G
Figure 5.4 The same Subject (A) can be directed toward the same Object (G)
through different intentional acts, e.g., admiration, fear
between a basic folk psychology that sees human behavior and hence social
action as produced by mental beliefs and attitudes (Greenwood 1991) and a
more experiential, interactional, and ultimately ambiguous notion of humanity
(in the sense of “being-human”), a notion that is not reducible to individual
states of mind and/or propositions about them.
In the rest of this chapter I will address some of these issues, with particular
emphasis on those that arise when we widen the context of inquiry and start
thinking in terms of the larger human practices in which acts of intentionality
and judgments of truth-value are embedded. My review of these problems is
by no means exhaustive of the issues implied in past and current theories of
truth and intentionality. It should thus be taken as an attempt to clarify or in
some cases simply bring together for the purpose of reflection a number of
objections and proposals that have recently been made within a number of
fields concerned with what might be thought of as “interpretation-in-practice,”
with linguistic anthropology being one of such fields but not necessarily the
only or most important one. As a way of organizing what is a rather intricate
set of issues, I focus on four dimensions of the interpretive process that are
often ignored or underestimated in the reconstructivist and dualistic model of
interpretation:
1. the medium (or code) through which symbolic acts (representations
included) are performed;
2. the audience or co-participants in the interaction which produces
symbolic acts;
3. the cultural context, local theories included, which gives meaning to the
symbolic acts by locating them within larger or related activities and
conceptions;
4. the actions constituted through symbolic mediation.
Problems with goals, plans, and intentions-to-do 109
It is hard to find here the (also) Marxist notion of praxis as both subjective and
historical and the notion of labor as a collective, joint activity, which will play
a role in Leont’ev’s (1981) theory of the phylogeny of human consciousness.
110 Intentionality and truth, revisited
Marx’s rebellion against crude materialism strangely aligns him here with
those who explain human praxis, interpretive processes included, in terms of
individual conscious acts (cf. Dumont 1977 for an anthropological critique of
Marx’s view of the individual). For cognitive psychology, the next step is
often inevitable: the reduction of the sociocultural context in terms of those
features that can be represented in the subject’s mind and through individual
cognitive categories. In this tradition, which characterizes most of so-called
“cognitive models” of human action, the predominant starting point is the
western notion of person as unit of analysis. Grounded in the western rational-
ist tradition, interpretation is understood as a process which focuses on an
individual’s mind as the meaning-making organism and on an individual’s acts
as the reflections or consequences of his states of mind (see Bilmes 1986 and
Heritage 1990/91 for a criticism of this tradition from an ethnomethodological
and conversation analytical viewpoint). It is in this context that we must
evaluate the fundamental role of individual intentions in contemporary philo-
sophical and psychological theories of communication. For speech act theory,
for instance, to understand the meaning of someone’s words means to
understand his or her intentions as expressed through conventional signs
(e.g., a common language) (Grice 1957; Searle 1969, 1983). As mentioned
in Chapter 2, for Dennett (1987) the assumption of intentionality in a system is
the only way of making predictions and explaining that system’s behavior in
rational terms. Such a view is appealing for its apparent simplicity, but it runs
into serious problems as soon as we leave the logic of western folk psychology
and take on a cross-cultural perspective. The reconstructionist view of inter-
pretation is but a corollary of the western universalist perspective criticized by
Dumont (1964, 1970, 1977). In the dominant western ideology – deeply rooted
in Descartes’ dualism – the individual actor is the main agent of social insti-
tutions and the point of reference for a universal ethics. We can guess what is
in another’s mind because it is assumed that our beliefs, wants, and feelings, as
well as the notions (and practices) of good and evil are (or should be) the
same as those of others. We are then left with the empirical question of
whether such concepts can be used to understand non-universalist social
systems, e.g., India’s caste system, which prescribes to each individual his
or her own specific place, duties, and rights based only on membership in a
particular group. Hence, the importance of studies that examine such non-
egalitarian and non-universalistic social systems as they experience pressure
from inside (e.g., from groups advocating women’s rights) or from outside
(through pressure brought about by a global flow of information). As anthro-
pologists we need to pay special attention to the socio-historical limitations
and constraints that shape the meanings of actors’ actions and hence, in a
sense, fashion their subjective intentionality. One way of understanding the
role of such constraints is to consider how individual intentionality is affected
Code-related limits on speaker’s intentions 111
It is strange how frequently one has the illusion of free knowledge, in the light of which
one may manipulate conduct at will, only to discover in the test that one is
being impelled by strict loyalty to forms of behavior that one can feel with the utmost
nicety and can state only in the vaguest and most approximate fashion. (Sapir [1927]
1963: 549)
The individual motives and intentions of a speaker can take meaningful effects only
within limits imposed by current grammatical possibilities on the one hand, and within
the limits of the conditions of socioverbal intercourse that predominate in his group on
the other . . . No matter what the intentions of the speaker means to carry out, no matter
what errors he may commit, no matter how he analyzes forms or mixes them or
combines them, he will not create a new pattern in language and he will not create a
new tendency in socioverbal intercourse. His subjective intentions will bear a creative
character only to the extent that there is something in them that coincides with
tendencies in the socioverbal intercourse of speakers that are in process of formation,
of generation; and these tendencies are dependent upon socioeconomic factors.
(Vološinov 1973: 143)
In a highly stratified society like the Samoa of the late 1970s when I recorded
the above speech, it would have been risky for an orator to even suggest that
someone of higher rank might have misbehaved and deserve punishment. In
this case, Loa, by holding a matai title that belongs to a family from the
subvillage of Sanonu, is expected to deliver the first speech,2 which includes
the announcement of the agenda of the fono. However, in the passage above
one of the two people he mentions is someone who holds the title of Alai`a-Sā,
one of the four highest chiefs (ali`i) in the village. It could be argued, as I have
in the past (Duranti 1994), that narrative minimization in this case protects Loa
from future retaliation for saying the wrong thing or being disrespectful. As we
saw in Chapter 3, such retaliation was not out of the range of possibilities for
Loa himself.
If we accept the premise that Loa had reasons to be careful in what he said
and in how he would say it, we can easily interpret what he did in (2) as the
product of his own intentions, which became realized through the use of a
particular set of linguistic resources he had access to by being a Samoan
speaker and a skillful speechmaker. One of these resources is the utterance
/oga `o le aso (o) le kākou pāloka/, ‘because’ (or ‘on account of’) ‘our
(inclusive) election’ in line 4. This is, syntactically speaking, an elliptical
sentence. It lacks a predicate that would further specify what happened on
election day, or that something did happen then. It follows a syntactic pattern
found elsewhere in the fono speeches. Pragmatically speaking, one could say
that Loa can get away with the vagueness of this verbless utterance simply
because everyone present at the meeting that day probably knows already what
the two “partners” are being accused of – in addition to the likely circulation of
information through informal channels, there had been a fono a week earlier
when their behavior had been discussed but without the two defendants being
present. In this account, Loa is a speaker who can choose to say what he knows
to be appropriate to the context and not say what he knows to be inappropriate
and dangerous. Loa is the agent, and the language he chooses is the medium,
that is, the instrument for realizing the goal of mentioning the agenda in the
culturally proper way and the safest possible way he can think of.
But there is also a way of interpreting what is reproduced in (2) as an
attempt to redistribute the agency behind the utterances and their overall
illocutionary force (see Besnier 1989 for a similar claim within the context
116 Intentionality and truth, revisited
for this shift because after the opening lāuga, which can be one or as many as
the subvillages represented in the meeting, the conventions of the lāuga are
partly abandoned and instead of mentioning lists of matai titles or unquestion-
able truth, details of actual events might be mentioned, high-ranking individ-
uals might be criticized or scolded, and speakers’ statements might be directly
questioned. Even during this part of the fono, however, the convention of long
turns at talk combined with the authority of the individual speakers who
represent extended families and sometimes important lineages makes it diffi-
cult to confront someone regarding a particular claim or to bring out possible
contradictions. In order for this to happen, the oratorical genre needs to be
broken. This is what happens in the following excerpt from a dramatic moment
in a fono where a young orator (holding the matai title “Vaitoto”) and a high
chief (holding the title “Alai`a-Sā”)3 have been accused of publicly insulting
the other members of the council on the day of the national election. In (3)
below we see the powerful senior orator (matua) Moe`ono Kolio interrupt the
younger and lower-ranking defendant Vaitoto in an attempt to induce the latter
to either admit responsibility or accuse someone else. The speechmaking
format is broken and the exchange becomes confrontational. Eventually, the
orator Tapusoa will ease the tension by returning to a speech style that is closer
to the traditional lāuga.
(3) (March 17, 1979: the junior orator Vaitoto has denied any wrongdoing while
saying that he will accept the decision of the council to fine him; he is almost
done with his speech, when Moe`ono interrupts him)
related to the retrospective, typically post hoc nature of any act of interpret-
ation (see Wittgenstein 1958). Without others to carry on our messages, to
complete them, expand them, revise them, etc., we would not be able to
communicate; ultimately, we would not be able to know what we are talking
about. Current and past debates within the humanities and social sciences on
the need to have usually repressed voices heard falls within this perspective.
The related proliferation of fields like feminist anthropology, cultural studies,
ethnic studies, and gender and sexuality studies are also attempts at getting the
path clear for certain groups to be able to “hear themselves” through their own
ears instead of having to be translated by a mainstream, dominating audience,
however defined, that imposed the hegemonic discourse of the past.
That the audience counts is of course a commonplace notion to those who
have been studying the details of everyday encounters. As demonstrated by
conversation analysts, even the simplest routine, e.g. starting a telephone
conversation, is based on a rapidly unfolding joint activity that has normative
expectations, preferences, and structural constraints but cannot be completely
predicted and must thus rely on both parties to cooperate toward a formulation
that “works” (Schegloff 1986). Any of our words, phrases, and utterances, not
to speak of larger units, contains several possible “next moves.” Addressees
are co-authors not only when they join in and help us figure out what we
“really” mean (e.g., when the addressee is a teacher, a therapist, or any kind of
socially recognized “expert”), but also when they are not present. This is the
“Internalized Other” of G. H. Mead’s constructivist psychology (cf. Mead
1934; Mehan 1981), which can, in turn, surface as the “voices” expressed
through direct, indirect, or quasi-direct speech (Vološinov 1973; Bakhtin
1981). The work of the linguist and discourse analyst in these cases is to look
at the techniques used by speakers to index multiple, alternative audiences.
Such devices as code-switching as well as prosodic features of utterances
(Blom and Gumperz 1972; Gumperz 1982, 1992; Woolard 2004) can convey
important information as to who is the primary audience of a given message
(Brenneis 1978). But what these different devices do should not be explained
simply in terms of intended meaning. Some of them are rather like nets which
are thrown out in the interactional sea to catch the fish that happens to be slow
or unfortunate. What has been described as typical of African American verbal
dueling, where an utterance is not an insult until the recipient interprets it as
such (Kochman 1983; Labov 1972; Mitchell-Kernan 1972), may very well be
the ideological recognition, through the institution of a particular verbal genre,
“signifying” – or what used to be called “sounding,” or “playing the dozens” –
of a practice that may explain a much wider range of interactions than we
might be willing to accept (Morgan 1989, 1996). What we need is a model of
communication that takes the emergent, interactive nature of the process into
consideration while at the same time capturing the local, culture- or even
120 Intentionality and truth, revisited
heterogeneity,” that is, the problem of utterances that have different but equally
acceptable interpretations according to the audience and conventions we take
into consideration.
These issues also tie intentionality to responsibility. Much of legal and
political debates center in fact around issues of responsibility and as such
constitute a group’s attempt at defining the factors relevant to making a given
interpretation legitimate (e.g., Gluckman 1972). This is a typical arena for
power struggles and for exerting social control. Much of the work that is being
done by those in power to control information and outcome is focused on the
criteria for bringing out evidence rather than on the “facts.” If a group succeeds
at making the criteria acceptable, the details of a crime or even the identity of
the offender may be seen as a relatively unimportant matter. This possibility is
both recognized and actualized in Samoan political arenas, where, as discussed
in Chapter 3, an orator may get into trouble for the actions of a chief (or a high-
ranking government official), if the orator did not act to prevent him from the
wrongdoing or did not try to remedy the chief’s misconduct or failure to fulfill
expectations. It might not be accidental, then, that the Samoan word for
meaning (uiga) is the same as that for deed, action. The local practice of
interpretation is one in which the interpreters look at the actions and ignore the
actor’s intentions (Shore 1982). In Samoan, one cannot say “I didn’t mean it”
(Duranti 1988: 17) and during our fieldwork in the late 1970s some of the
younger transcribers used to mock the use of “sorry” in English as an excuse
for a mistake. Eve Danziger (2006) also reported that the Mopan Maya
consider “I didn’t mean it” inappropriate as a defense of wrongdoing.
apology, declaration about a personal feeling), but it is also possible that the
ambiguity or vagueness of an act’s pragmatic force be routinely exploited by
speakers and their audience, both consciously and unconsciously. The test of
explicit performative verbs of the type I promise you . . . or I blame you . . . or
I accuse you . . . , I apologize for saying . . . is usually not available in
spontaneous interaction, and the conditions for deciding once and for all the
illocutionary force of a given speech act are not a discrete number or independ-
ent of the parties’ interests.
The addressee’s knowledge and expectations as well as the nature of the
encounter are crucial features in determining the kind of act that is being
performed. Take for instance the difference between an accusation and a
complaint. At first, the former seems to imply not only a violation of a social
code, but also the expectation of some legally or otherwise induced conse-
quences (for instance, a payment), whereas the latter does not seem to
have the same implications. Concentrating on the speaker’s attitude or the
responsibilities of the party about whom the accusation or complaint is being
made provides, however, a very limited view of the factors that play a part in
the distinction between accusation and complaint. There are definitely many
other elements potentially at work. The social identity of the speaker and his
or her rights are also very important. The question as to whether a given
utterance is a complaint or an accusation cannot be resolved once and for all
at the time of speaking, given that part of the reasons for such an utterance
might precisely be the testing of the very conditions that would make it into
an accusation (as opposed to a complaint). This is what routinely happens in
political contexts. It is thus what with Giddens (1979) we can call the
“duality” of social structure in general and of speech in particular that
undermines philosophical speculations about out-of-context speech act
types. There are “rules” (e.g., of syntax, semantics, pragmatics) for the
interpretation of speech acts, which make communication and social action
possible and unavoidable (e.g., one feels the social pressure to answer a
question or respond to an invitation), but the use of speech also makes
possible the reproduction of the system as well as the constitution of new
contexts or interpretations.
But narrative fiction is not the only context in which we suspend our ordinary
standards for truth finding. There are situations where the interaction seems to
be structured in such a way as to make it difficult for participants to fully
challenge the veracity of what is being said or “get to the bottom” of the claims
and counterclaims that have been made. One such context is political oratory.
One common way of characterizing the problems with truth assessment in
political debates is to simply say that “politicians lie” or cannot “be trusted.”
But such an analysis turns out to obscure the very conditions that make it
difficult to get a satisfactory answer regarding the truth of a candidate’s claim.
In the next section I will suggest that one such condition is the exchange
system that is conventionally adopted for debates, including the long turns
during which time a candidate can have the floor without being immediately
challenged for the veracity of his or her claims.
Seastrand; and, as far as my friend (uh- p-) Professor Walter Capps –hh
uh– I’m amazed that you’ve stated on several occasions in this
meeting that you’ve never-been-to-Washington. I’m gonna
have to go into my files and look at The Santa Barbara
News-Press because I think that they reported that you even
went into the Oval Office. of the President himself. Your– uh
one of your family members has or works there with (such
Ste–) George Stepanopolous’ office. and so uh I was given the
impression on reading that article that when you go to
Washington, you meet the President. So anyway it’s
interesting but it’s an election time. [. . .]
Seastrand is here pointing out that Capps cannot claim that he has not been to
Washington because, according to the newspaper The Santa Barbara News-
Press, he visited the President in the White House. A careful reading of Capps’
statements reveals that for him “Washington” stands for “government” and he
is not literally claiming that he has never traveled to Washington but that he
has never been an elected official. This is made clear by the discourse context
and by the self-correction “never served there.” (“I’ve never been to Washing-
ton– never served there.”)
I would like to suggest that in a conversational interaction it would not be
difficult for Capps to try to correct Seastrand’s interpretation and for hearers or
viewers to get a chance to make up their mind about whether what is being said is
true or false, but, as shown in excerpt (6) below, the turn-taking rules defined by
the moderator are not designed to allow for interruptions or immediate rebuttal.
(6) (Debate in San Luis Obispo, August 15, 1996)
somethin’ like that. . . . and I’d also like to ask the candidates to
kind of hold down on their . . . criticism of each other . . .
cause we really just want the facts here. as they used to say “we
want the facts ma’am and that’s all.” So- . . . uh- . . . we’ll pick
out one of the questions here. Let’s see. [. . .]
These rules force candidates to wait for their turn to rebut what someone else
said. This means that, when they do get another chance to talk, candidates have
to decide whether they are going to give up some of the time they have to
correct a point that listeners might have already forgotten, to examine a point
or detail of what was said that might make them look fussy or even defensive.
In some cases, such a chance to make corrections or provide a counterexample
might never come. This is the case in the debate I introduced above. After
incumbent Seastrand is done with the long turn from which I took excerpt (5),
the moderator takes the microphone and closes the debate.
This point ties the discussion of truth with a point I made earlier about
intentions: in both cases, we are forced to expand the communication model
assumed in the classic treatment of intentionality and truth. We cannot simply
talk about Speaker, Message, and Referent. The potential or actual role played
by the audience in constructing a sequence of interaction (Goodwin and
Goodwin 1987, 1992) is essential for explaining the multifunctionality of such
linguistic devices as evidentials, dubitative forms, hedges, affect particles, etc.
What speakers seem to be doing in these cases is to exploit truth rather than use
it as the ultimate criterion for interpretation. When we look at verbal inter-
actions that deal with controversial issues (whether in informal gossip or in
formal court interaction), we realize that affect is built into the message
precisely by the manipulation of the relative epistemic status of what is being
said (Besnier 1990, 2009; Haviland 1977; Ochs and Schieffelin 1989).
Speakers may hint at possible (embarrassing, threatening, unexpected) truths.
They may describe a world or a situation that is only half true or characters that
are only half real. The audience is often expected to do the rest of the job by
either accepting or denouncing the potential descriptions of the world more or
less vaguely suggested – but not necessarily asserted – by the speaker. The
goal in everyday interaction is not simply to move the audience, as suggested
by traditional rhetoric, but to move with the audience, that is, to make the
audience at least partly responsible for what is being asserted or implied.
Sometimes the speaker’s political or moral success is judged not so much on
his or her ability to make the audience see the truth, but rather on his or her
skills in making truth irrelevant.
Another dimension closely related to affect is the relative position or attitude
displayed or hinted at by a social actor in performing a given act (whether
verbal or otherwise) – what some authors call “stance” (Biber 1988; Biber and
Finegan 1989; Du Bois 2007; Berger 2009; Jaffe 2009). Reported speech – in
130 Intentionality and truth, revisited
actions into what they are, including polite requests and excuses, narrative
accounts of the past, and plans for the future.
Does this mean that truth ceases to be important or relevant for a theory of
interpretation? Not necessarily. Rather, what we learn from looking at actual
language use is that truth is often embedded in or functional with respect to
other dimensions of human understanding and human praxis. After all, argu-
ments – whether public or familial – are often centered on issues of truth
(Duranti 1990; Haviland 1989; Hill and Irvine 1993; Lindstrom 1992). But the
truth of social action has a different flavor from the truth of logical connect-
ives. In social life, truth cannot be taken as a given, either as a static property of
objects or events or as a property of their relations. Rather, it must be thought
of as a process, which requires action to be realized. This is a view that seemed
natural to pragmatists like William James:
Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its veridity is in fact
an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. (James
[1910] 1963: 89)
This conception is also common in anthropologists’ attempts to capture a
contextual, emergent notion of truth that feels to them different from the
“western” conceptualization with which they were educated. For example,
Lawrence Rosen’s (1985) characterization of the Moroccan concept of truth
in statements about relationships should please old and new pragmatists:
It is, again, like a price mentioned in the market, which is not “true” in any sense until
the parties make it applicable to their circumstance. Similarly, in Moroccan social life, a
statement about relationships has no truth value until something more happens, until
that utterance receives some validation . . . By characterizing all unvalidated utterances
as having no truth value leeway is granted for the negotiation of one’s personal
attachments. (Rosen 1985: 57)
What we are told by Rosen and others who have investigated these issues in
the field is that the process whereby members of a given society produce
acceptable versions of reality is embedded in local theories of what constitutes
an acceptable account and who is entitled to tell the facts and assess their value
and consequences (Lindstrom 1992). When words are used to define truthful
statements, we need to remember that, being deeds, the combination of words
in meaningful ensembles is but an attempt to both portray and shape the world.
It is not by accident that Austin’s view of words as actions was pre-announced
in Bronislaw Malinowski’s discussion of language as action in the second
volume of Coral Gardens and their Magic (1935). In looking for a reality that
matches the linguistic descriptions members of a given culture provide
(whether willingly or inadvertently), ethnographers are also seekers of truth
and as such they might fall prey to the correspondence or agreement theory of
truth. At the same time, this discovery process often forces us to recognize that
Conclusions 133
truth changes and multiple truths are possible if the spatio-temporal and
historical context changes. This is one way of interpreting Geertz’s (1973)
notion-practice of thick description. To that, dimensions of power relations
have been added through the study of Foucault’s (1973, 1980, 1988, 2001)
writings about the technology of self and the practices that legitimize where
truth should be found, e.g., in the institutional recognition of a person as law-
abiding, moral, healthy, or clean.
5.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have reviewed a number of dimensions of human communi-
cation that raise doubts about the ways in which intentionality and truth have
been used in explaining action and interpretation. My discussion has been
organized around four fundamental aspects of interpretive processes, namely,
(a) the medium (or code) through which representations are constituted, (b) the
co-participants (e.g., audience) in the performance/interaction, (c) the cultural
context, and (d) the actions constituted through representation. I suggested that
the very notion of “code” needs to be reconsidered so as to allow for the
interactional complexity documented in recent studies of language use and
language socialization. The specific properties of the code as a dynamic set of
discourse patterns and strategies afford (in Gibson’s sense) particular inten-
tional states and matching between encoded messages and possible (socio-
economic) worlds. Different media or different genres of speaking may also be
imbued with different truths or different ways of accessing information about
the world. A question that would be interesting to pursue is the extent to which
different media/codes/genres carry within them, in a fossilized form, as it were,
certain collective or private intentions and certain truths. Previous almost
exclusive interest in the speaker’s point of view has been expanded to include
the study of the role played by the addressee or audience in any kind of
communicative act. One of the devices through which contingent cultural
interpretations are made possible is through the embedding of activities within
larger ones and through the interpenetration (Cicourel 1992; Leach 1972) or
intertextuality (Kristeva 1986) of speech genres and speech activities (viz. the
ability of one symbolic form or message to index another form or message in a
different spatio-temporal domain). The very distinction between foreground
and background information, for instance, is a potential weapon in acts of
social struggle whereby a given version of reality is complemented or
threatened by another. Finally, the multiplicity of goals typical of any semiotic
act when matched with co-occurring codes and embedded in larger activities
argues for a different status of intentionality and truth across socio-cultural
domains (e.g., domestic, political, ritual, etc.). If any act of representation is
a social act, the assignment of intentionality and the assessment of the
134 Intentionality and truth, revisited
135
136 Speaker intentions and the role of the audience
saying may discover that they cannot control the ways in which the audience
interprets their utterances. The audience, in turn, may not be concerned with
what the speaker actually meant.
I want to show that Capps is surprised by the fact that the rhetorical question
“and how do I know that?” and the statement “I can see it in your faces” are
interpreted by the audience to be funny, even though, as shown in Figure 6.1,
he is actually smiling while delivering the rhetorical question (“and how do
I know that?”). The humorous interpretation by the audience is thus at first
apparently endorsed by Capps himself who is smiling with satisfaction at their
When the audience has a different take 139
support – the clapping and cheers that greet his second pseudo-announcement
(“we will win this time”) – but quickly moves on to his planned next point: the
claim that he would be a good representative in the US Congress because he
knows the people of the 22nd district. When we examine the next stretch of
talk, we find a narrative of personal experience full of old memories and
nostalgia, as shown by the coda: “You are . . . the people with whom we’ve
lived our lives,” which constitutes a move away from the light mood estab-
lished by the laughter that accompanied his rhetorical question. An additional
sign of the fact that Capps is trying to reduce the force and potential implica-
tions of the audience response is his metanarrative statement (Babcock 1977)
“I mean that totally,” which he produces just before transitioning to the
personal narrative. “I mean that totally” makes sense only if we assume that
he is not fully (i.e., not “totally”) satisfied with how the audience thinks he
means it. Here is the passage all the way to the climactic end of the personal
narrative:
140 Speaker intentions and the role of the audience
Figure 6.2. Walter Capps speaking in San Luis Obispo, November 15, 1995,
saying “How do we know we’re gonna win?” – see example (3)
142 Speaker intentions and the role of the audience
The restrained, serious “key” of the San Luis Obispo speech is particularly
striking given that after the Paso Robles speech, while he was going around
shaking hands with members of the audience, at least two of them encouraged
Capps to “keep up the humor” in his speeches. One possible explanation of
such a switch of interpretive key (Hymes 1972a) is that Capps had learned
from the Paso Robles performance that if he did not want the audience to
decide for him what was funny and what was serious, he ought to keep his own
joking under control. In San Luis Obispo, he never smiled throughout any of
his statements or rhetorical questions and the audience did not interject any
laughter.
One might argue, however, that the San Luis Obispo speech is not a good
indicator of how Capps conceptualized the rhetorical question “how do I know
that (I’m gonna win)?” precisely because of the overall lack of humor through-
out the speech (the audience will eventually produce some laughter after the
speech is over, when Capps, prompted by his wife, speaks again to acknow-
ledge some of the people in the audience). Given this possible objection to
what to make of the San Luis Obispo speech, the version delivered at his third
stop, at Hancock College, is potentially more revealing. On this occasion,
speaking inside a classroom where he had been invited by the instructor of a
political science course, Capps returns to a more informal tone without reading
from a text and does not shy away from humor. In fact, he starts out his speech
with what will become one of his favorite jokes throughout the campaign – the
“seventy-five minutes joke”:
(4) (November 15, 1995; Hancock College)
W. Capps; I’m- uh- I’m very happy to be here today and:- . . . uh- see the
problem with this is that I’m- I’m so used to this format . . .
that I ma- I may go on here for- . . . you know seventy five
minutes because-
Woman; ((laughter)) ha-ha-ha!
W. Capps; because the classes in Santa Barbara are an hour and fifteen
minutes. but, ((clears throat)) [. . .]
Even though Capps continues with a narrative that has a humorous punch
line (analyzed in Duranti 2003b), when he gets to the line about his confidence
in a victory (“we’re gonna win . . . we(‘ll) win”), he leaves out the “how do
I know that?” question altogether, thus removing the piece of talk that had
been followed by laughter in Paso Robles. In this context, the narrative of
belonging is also slightly altered, probably to fit the occasion where there are
mostly young people (the students in the political science course). The emo-
tional tone of the earlier version (in Paso Robles) is gone and the point about
knowing the people of the district is made explicit (“we belong here”.) In fact,
the people are talked about in the third person: “we know the people. So well
When the audience has a different take 143
that I know I can represent. their views in- in Washington.” This further
removes the possibility of the empathetic bond established in Paso Robles
with the senior citizens.
(5) (November 14, 1996; Hancock College, Santa Maria)
W. Capps; the second announcement is- . . . and I- I have total confidence
on this one, we’re gonna win. . . // we(’ll) win.
Audience; ((clapping))
W. Capps; and: uh, I think the reason we’re going to win is-.. becau::se
I understand the people. of the twenty-second district, . . . uh
I know their views, . . . I know what they want . . . uh- a
representative to do. in Washington. and I’m committed to
doing that because I’ve- we have- . . . lived our- lives with- . . .
these people- I’ve been here for- thirty one years as a professor
at- UCSB, . . . our children were born and raised here- so
um- . . . you know- we-uh, we belong here ((CL)) and we- and
uhm- . . . and-uh . . . we- we know the people. so well that
I know I can represent. their views in- in Washington.
The skipping of the planned question suggests that, by the third speech of the
day, Capps had found a way to have some control over the potential implica-
tions of his words. The insertion of humor earlier on in the speech had to be
balanced by the removal of verbal material that could be interpreted as a
continuation of that humor.
does not want to accept. His attempt at fixing the problem by reframing his
own words (“I’m not being mean here”) is greeted with even more laughter,
confirming the audience’s reading of his earlier words as purposely critical and
of his added disclaimer as sarcastic.
(6) (November 14, 1995, Paso Robles)
W. Capps; now, you know when you run for office, . . . it isn’t just like
applying for a job¼I mean you have to- you’ve gotta beat the
uh- . . . you’ve gotta beat the other candidate. . . . and this is
what I say about her . . . she doesn’t represent . . .// the
majority
Woman; no. she doesn’t.
W. Capps; she does not represent the majority . . . viewpoint. of the
people of the 22nd district. . . .
in fact, I don’t think she represents anybody. // in the 22nd
district.
Audience; ((laughs)) hehehe! hahaha!
W. Capps; (???) I’m not- . . . I’m not being mean here,
//I’m not at all being mean.
Audience; ((laughter)) hehehe. //haha
What leads the audience to laugh on both occasions? The first laughter is
probably produced by the contrastive pair of statements shown in (7) – a well-
known technique also used to evoke applause (Atkinson 1984: chapter 3):
(7)
A. she does not represent the majority . . . viewpoint. of the people of the
22nd district. . . .
B. in fact, I don’t think she represents anybody. // in the 22nd district.
does not see his criticism as straightforward and definitely not as innocent. His
first attempt to fix the problem is the disclaimer “I’m not being mean” which
evokes additional laughter. And his repetition of the disclaimer with the
additional “at all” (“I’m not being mean here. I’m not at all being mean”) does
not solve the problem. A bit later, as shown in (8), Capps tries to regain the
high moral ground by claiming restraint during the first year of Seastrand’s
tenure in the House. However, the addition of the hypothetical “whether
anyone believes this or not” and the emphasized repetition “I mean I really
wanted her to do well” give away his fear of not sounding sincere even to a
group of supporters.
At the next stop, in San Luis Obispo, Capps sticks closer to the written speech,
avoiding introducing personal statements and going instead straight into a
series of rhetorical questions about her performance. This time there is a
metapragmatic cue (“I’ll just have to ask you”) that lets the audience know
that they are expected to participate in a question–answer drill that evokes the
“call and response” format found in many African American church sermons.
(9) (November 14, 1995, San Luis Obispo)
W. Capps; the reason I know we can beat my opponent is because our
opponent next fall does not represent the people of the twenty-
second district. of California.
I’ll just have to ask you,
does our representative represent the seniors of the twenty-
second district?
Audience; NO::!
W. Capps; does she represent . . . the students of the twenty-second
district?
Audience; NO::!
W. Capps; does she represent the children, of the twenty-second district?
Audience; NO::!
W. Capps; does she represent the women, of the twenty-second district?
Audience; NO::!
W. Capps; does she represent the people who care for the environment of
the twenty-second district?
Audience; NO::!
When the audience has a different take 147
W. Capps; does she represent the people who believe in local government
of the twenty-second district?.
Audience; NO::!
W. Capps; who does she represent? she- she campaigned- I heard it.
I heard it. she campaigned- she campaigned on the theme a
leadership- leadership that listens. well I can tell you the voice
to which she pays the most attention. and the voice- to which
she pays the most attention is the voice of Newt Gingrich.
Audience; YEAH!
W. Capps; and we didn’t elect-
Audience; boo:::!
W. Capps; we didn’t elect Newt Gingrich. We didn’t elect Newt
Gingrich. We elected a representative
Audience; (b)oo::!
W. Capps; and we need to hold the representative to the charge that the
representative has been given.
In this exchange Capps lets the audience co-author the criticism in a systematic
and orderly way that he can control. He will follow the same strategy on the
campus of his own university (UCSB) but will change it at Hancock College,
where the audience included people who could not be counted on as support-
ers. In this context, instead of inviting the audience to answer the rhetorical
questions about who Seastrand represents, Capps takes off from Seastrand’s
slogan “Leadership that listens” to ask a series of questions that he answers
himself, simultaneously avoiding a test of the audience loyalty.
(10) (November 14, 1996; Hancock College, Santa Maria)
W. Capps; I’ve been asking myself, has she listened to the seniors . . . in
our community? I don’t think so. . .
has she listened to the people who want to protect the
environment, . . . in our community?
I don’t think so. . . .
has she listened to the people who are advocates of education?
that one kills me because- [. . .]
This is a much more mitigated form of criticism, with the personalized “I don’t
think so” instead of the well-timed collective shout “NO!!!” obtained in San
Luis Obispo. Furthermore, Seastrand’s actions with respect to certain initiatives
like her alleged record on education are presented as having a direct impact on
Capps himself as a believer in education (“that one kills me because- . . .”). By
presenting himself as a victim of Seastrand’s voting record and beliefs, Capps
puts himself in the same category of the students he is trying to attract to his side.
A different form of mitigation of the attack is used by Capps on the campus
of UCSB, where the audience, which comprises some of his own students, is
148 Speaker intentions and the role of the audience
very supportive, making him seem more at ease and willing to insert new parts
in his speech. In this context, standing at a microphone on a platform (where a
rock band had just finished performing) and without the help of any notes,
Capps launches into a new story about his own inability to be “critical,” which
ends with Seastrand becoming the butt of an obviously planned joke.
(11) (November 14, 1996; University of California, Santa Barbara)
W. Capps; uh, uh but what I’ve been telling people is that running for-
running for office is not . . . quite like just applying for a
job¼you know, not, just that- that you’re qualified . . . and you
get the job. I mean it- to run for office really means . . . that
you have to beat your opponents. and the only way that this
can become successful, . . . is if I beat Andrea Seastrand in
November.
Audience; ((clapping, // cheers))
W. Capps; well, . . . people who- . . . people who know me well . . . know
that . . . I have had some difficulty in the past in being critical
of other people¼because it goes against my nature. uh-
((clears throat)) uhm last time around I would say things like-
. . . you know¼I’ve heard it said that- . . . that Andrea
Seastrand is a: . . . very warm- . . . human being, . . . but
I looked up warm . . . in the dictionary . . . and it said “not too
hot.” . . .
Audience; ((laughter)) haha//hahaha!
W. Capps; now- see- that’s about- that’s about as far as- . . . as I can go
with- . . . critique because . . . I think one of the things we want
to fight in our- resist in our culture is this- this invective- this-
. . . this super- charged political rhetoric that- [. . .]
This excerpt and the ones above give us a glimpse of what I saw as a recurring
pattern, namely, Capps’ hard work at finding a way of criticizing his main
opponent in ways that could be approved by his audience without making him
feel uncomfortable with the implications that such attacks would have on his
own persona. Although Capps, perhaps due to his academic background,
tended to verbalize some of the challenges that he was facing, I believe that
his dilemmas and struggles are the same as the ones faced by any candidate for
public office.
6.4 Conclusions
In examining the speeches recorded during the first day of the 1995–1996
campaign for the US Congress by Democratic candidate Walter Capps,
I identified a number of exchanges where we can see Capps at work trying
to control the audience’s reactions to his utterances. This is made particularly
difficult in moments when a candidate finds himself without a script and starts
Conclusions 149
to improvise on a theme that he has planned to address. We have seen that the
audience is anything but a passive recipient of made-up slogans, jokes, or
criticism. Audience members may react in ways that are surprising to the
speaker because they reveal meanings that the speaker had not foreseen. This
type of situation creates a difficult moral dilemma for political candidates,
especially when the audience reaction suggests that they approve what they are
hearing the candidates say. Speakers must decide whether to go along with the
audience and capitalize on their unexpected reaction or try to keep control over
the meaning of their own words. In our case, we saw how one candidate edited
his own speech and reformulated his stances with respect to a number of key
issues in his speech to retain some control over his own message and present
himself as a type of person who could be critical without sounding “mean.”
This type of struggle between the speaker’s voice and the audience voice is
fought at many different levels at once, involving specific sequences of acts,
specific grammatical and narrative frames, and, in our case, specific cultural
expectations about what it means to be a political candidate for the US
Congress in the last decade of the twentieth century. Above all, however, this
150 Speaker intentions and the role of the audience
struggle fought over the right balance between pleasing others and asserting
oneself reminds us of the fact that as political candidates refine their message
to meet the challenges of a political campaign, they are often making claims or
promises whose meanings or implications are not fully worked out until they
are made public.
In the next chapter, Teun van Dijk will claim that the audience-as-co-author
model, which underlies the discussion in this chapter, has nothing to do with
intentions, but I think it does. When dealing with their audience’s reaction to
their words, political candidates are forced to rethink their message and thus
reshape what they are saying. At the same time, when confronting an audience,
as well as their opponents, political candidates are also forced to reflect on
what they really mean. This is, in fact, a publicly and privately played out
process of self-discovery. Responsibility does seem to play a role in defining
(social) action because it encourages and even obliges speakers to investigate
the truth conditions of what they are saying. The public quality of political life
reproduces a type of ethnomethodological experiment (Garfinkel 1967)
whereby the unspoken assumptions are pushed to the foreground and people
are confronted with consequences of their utterances that they might have
ignored under different circumstances. Running for office is thus a bit like
having dialogues in public with lots of people who play the role of Socrates,
challenging you to reconsider what you just said or believed and showing you,
in the end, that you are an imperfect human being struggling for coherence and
cut out from the light of reason.
7 A dialogue on intentions
7.0 Introduction
This chapter reproduces a continuous series of fairly long email messages
initiated by discourse analyst and cognitive scientist Teun van Dijk, who wrote
to me on November 1, 2004 to ask me “a theoretical question,” as he put it,
about my position on the role of intentions in discourse. A number of factors,
including electronic mail as a medium for unedited and informal exchanges as
well as the long-term professional relationship between the two of us (over
several decades van Dijk has involved me in a number of his editorial
projects), made possible what I hope readers will appreciate as a frank
exchange of ideas and positions that is rarely found in the more polished and
peer-reviewed journal articles or chapters of edited volumes. I have also
included toward the end of this chapter a message by my colleague Jason
Throop, whom I invited to join the discussion. His response to the exchanges
I had forwarded to him captures his own original ways of thinking about
intentions and anticipates some of the themes found in the following chapters,
themes that since 2010 have been incorporated into our jointly taught seminar
on the culture of intersubjectivity at UCLA.
In reproducing this exchange of emails as a chapter of this book, I have
resisted the urge to provide here a summary of the entire discussion for the
simple reason that almost each message contains some attempt to clarify both
the points of agreement and those of disagreement. I believe that any add-
itional, post hoc summary of mine could not do justice to the friendly tension
of the arguments whose main value is both the genuineness of the claims
contained in it. Hence, with minimal cuts (of greetings at the beginning and the
end of each message) and a few added references, here is what we wrote to
each other over a few days, in the fall of 2004.
151
152 A dialogue on intentions
differences in ALL our data, of any culture. Intentions are only ONE aspect of
the whole complex process of speaking, acting, and interacting. Of course,
there are social and cultural conventions. But where are these? What is their
precise nature? Obviously, these are also sociocognitive: shared by members
of a community. How “shared”? Well, as forms of knowledge or beliefs, and
hence (also) as forms of cognition. And with other knowledge and social
beliefs, these conventions thus are able to influence the (personal) intentions
of individual speakers in concrete situations. I see no other way how sociocul-
tural notions such as norms, values, conventions can influence discourse or
action without this cognitive connection. There is no magic device (black box
etc.) that links society, culture, or interaction with talk or text – the only way
we can explain this in terms that are more or less empirically founded is
through some kind of brain-based ‘cognitive’ processes. Hence, we need
BOTH dimensions in the analysis, and any reduction in any one direction
would be theoretically unproductive.
Of course – as you say – audiences do interpret discourses often independ-
ently of the intentions of the actor(s), e.g., on the basis of contextually relevant
conventions. But what is the precise nature of these “interpretations”? As
suggested – are these more social, more observable, more relevant than the
action interpretations (intentions) of the actors? Why?
Also “western” legal principles take both views. On the one hand, usually an
infraction will count as such, whether or not a person intended to do so or not.
Also racist or sexist discourses will count as such, whether or not the speaker
intended them as such or not. Why? Because also the speaker is supposed to
know the conventions and intend and produce a discourse or action in this
way. On the other hand, the law distinguishes clearly between murder and
manslaughter, and hence whether or not an act was voluntary, intentional,
planned, controlled, could have been avoided, etc.
It is of course interesting, as you say, that not in all cultures one finds
evidence that people can know the mind of others. Of course, this is as such no
more proof that intentions do not exist, no more than the intuitive (folk)
distinctions we (or our philosophers) make in “our” culture. There are many
notions in cognitive theory that have or have not a correspondent “folk”
equivalent (beginning with the distinction between short-term and long-term
memory – where we only have the folk notion of “memory”). The question is
how to account for discourse and action generally, not only in terms of how
participants describe it. There is little doubt in my mind (!) that although in
some cultures there is no explicit way of describing intentions, or that dis-
courses or acts are attributed to some kind of “joint production,” we need some
kind of notion that is the “meaning” equivalent of an activity as assigned to this
activity also by the actors, and not only by the recipients or observers, etc. One
may use such vague notions as intentions, purposes, or goals, as long as one
November 2: from van Dijk to Duranti 157
knows theoretically what they are (e.g., mental models, with such and such a
structure, etc.).
I also would find it very surprising that in other cultures people would have
not any form of “introspection” in the sense of (a) “wanting” or “planning” to
do/say something, and (b) assuming that others do more or less the same thing.
In sum, there must be some idea about “other minds” in order for any
interaction to be possible. There are many proofs for that, and the most obvious
one is that of the presupposition of (culturally shared or previously communi-
cated knowledge): in all languages and all cultures speakers need to make
explicit all they know, but assume that the recipients already know a lot. This
is one way in which speakers already have a hypothesis about the beliefs and
hence the minds of others. Of course, this may be described and conceptual-
ized in many ways, also in our own culture, but the fundamental processes of
communication and interaction are the same.
Of course, as suggested, this does not mean – as is the case in our own legal
and normative system – that sometimes “good” intentions, etc. do not count (as
excuses, legitimations, etc.) in some cultures. But that is no proof that people
have no intentions.
Of course, it is also true that people do not always know how their discourse
will come across, be interpreted, etc. Of course not. Recipients will form mental
models based on the discourse structures PLUS their own personal and socially
shared beliefs, and hence production models will of course be different from
reception models. Again, this is a good reason to study misunderstandings, etc.,
but this is no proof that speakers do not have intentions. On the contrary –
a debate or conflict precisely presupposed such different interpretations of the
discourse, and hence also that of the speaker/actor, that is, the intentions.
True too that the everyday and philosophical terminology is confusing. In
the philosophy of action, there is a distinction between intentions and pur-
poses. An intention is the representation of the act itself, e.g., menacing or
kissing someone. The purpose is the representation of the state of affairs
(consequences) one wants to bring about by means of the act: e.g., that
someone will do or not do something.
True too that people may “do” things sometimes without intentions, pur-
poses, etc. (“without thinking”). These, however, are not usually described as
actions but as “doings,” e.g., when one has no control over one’s action
(because of drugs, sleep, etc.). Or when someone forces you to “do” some-
thing. Hence the degrees of diminshed responsibility provided by the law.
The notion of “audience as co-author” is a metaphor that has little to do with
intention. Of course an actor may take into account, and will usually take into
account, what recipients or co-authors want or believe. This will be part of the
construction of “intentions” (mental models of action). And if actions are co-
produced then this also is the case: there will be an explicit pre-agreement (and
158 A dialogue on intentions
negotiation etc.) about “what will be done together,” and this intention may be
shared like any meaning. The problem in that case is more a question of how to
coordinate the action – as is the case in conversation.
An intention is of course embedded in its situation (although this is again a
metaphor), but the point is that these two notions can be combined only when
a situation is not something “objective” or “real” etc., unless interpreted and
represented (constructed etc.) by participants or social members. For situ-
ations to be able to influence discourse and other social actions they first need
to be (subjectively) interpreted – and hence represented. And it is this
representation (model) of the situation that influences intentions and hence
actions.
In other words, however one formulates the issues, in my view they come
down to the same thing. Whether you call them meanings, or interpretations, or
intentions, or representations, or constructs, etc. – they are all personal or
socially shared mental models of some kind, and any discourse or act is
intended or understood by relating them with such “entities.”
True finally what you say: there is still a lot to be done, and I wished that
neither in the cognitivistic, nor in the sociocultural-interactionist direction,
people would ban the ideas of the others. I think we can learn a lot from each
other, and I think a serious theory of socially and culturally situated discourse
and interaction needs both.
i.e., members’ rationalizations about their own doings (and I would insist
that we should apply this measure to some of the explanations used in the
literature on intentionality). I would even go a step further and say that just
like it is in certain members’ interest to have an intentionalist theory of
meaning, it is in certain members’ interest to have an anti-intentionalist
view of interpretation or an anti-personalist view of meaning. Such a view
allows people to ignore what some other people (e.g., children, servants,
lower-ranking individuals, outsiders) think, feel, or (in our vernacular
sense) “intend.” Highly hierarchical systems, like the military in the US,
seem to be this way and so might be the case with some stratified societies
studied by anthropologists. One of the ways in which power relations
display themselves and become active is precisely by reclaiming or ignor-
ing the will, desires, and feelings of others – and these are all terms that
somehow figure or are relevant to some version of what cognitive scientists
seem to refer to when they use the term “intentionality” (the comparative
perspective is complicated by the fact that we seem to also have examples
of egalitarian anti-intentionalist communities, e.g., the Kaluli of Mt. Bosavi,
in PNG, studied by Bambi Schieffelin). Finally, it is true that in the western
philosophical tradition, we have different perspectives as well, Plato vs.
Aristotle, . . . Husserl vs. Heidegger, Carnap vs. Wittgenstein, etc. And
authors change over time as well or rather they bring out hidden dimen-
sions, see Husserl’s Logical Investigation vs. his Cartesian Meditations or
the Crisis of the European Sciences.
One could say that one should be careful about how to use ethno-
graphic accounts because most anthropologists tend to favor the native’s
point of view and the natives can be wrong. Granted. But there is another
side of the native’s point of view, namely, that other people’s perspective
on something that we take for granted can make us rethink about our own
conceptualization and understanding of our reality (that’s the old idea that
anthropologists make the strange familiar and the familiar strange). It’s
not that the Other is always right and We are always wrong or that they
are better than we are at knowing themselves and what goes on in their
mind(s) – this would be some kind of romantic or politically correct version
of cultural anthropology (and actually a very understandable reaction-
antidote to the superiority complex of some members of our respective
societies). Rather, the ethnographic perspective (a form of cultural relativ-
ism, but of the best kind in my view) is that we should stop assuming tout
court that Our view is the objective, universal view and Others’ view is the
particular, native, emic view. We have our own reasons to believe what we
believe and our own problems clearing our vision (e.g., we still haven’t
figured out why acupuncture works). For one thing, people around the
world are not THAT DIFFERENT. It really depends on how we talk about
162 A dialogue on intentions
it and what we are looking for. We can find lots of similarities and therefore
we can also find evidence of the fact that intentional states of course do
matter even for the people who do not seem to care much about them or do
not even have a language to talk about them. People around the world seem
to have a term for what we call “lie,” which is a form of recognition of the
fact that someone is saying something different from what they believe-
know (although the set of situations that would define “lying” vary cross
culturally and cross-contextually).
3. This might be the right time for me to say that I never said that “intentions
do not exist” or that “they never matter.” I might have said, though, that (i)
I am not sure what “intentions” are, by which I mean that I am not always
sure what people mean when they use the term and a clarification would
help a lot in the discussion, (ii) there are situations in which intentions
matter less (e.g., for sure in certain institutional settings), and (iii) people
around the world vary in terms of their concern for reconstructing the
intentions of a speaker-actor; and (iv) there are, at least in some cases,
alternative accounts to the intentionalist account of a given action and
therefore, (v) pace Dennett, the intentionalist stance might not be the best
solution under all circumstances.
4. I’m afraid I do not agree with the idea that intentions are representations.
Maybe we do not agree with the meaning of representations, or I just don’t
understand what you mean, in which case you’ll have a chance to teach me,
but I think of representations as things that stand for something else. For
example, I can have a material representation of a room, e.g., a map, or
I can have a mental representation of a room (I can remember some of its
features from memory or from imagining something that does not exist in
reality – I could even visualize it) – this type of representation has a lot to
do with temporality as described by Husserl. Language represents in very
imperfect and yet quite efficient ways through symbols and icons. I can
represent through language by providing descriptions or by symbolically
embodying my feelings, attitudes, sensations, etc. through particular lin-
guistic acts, often relying on other media and conventional resources (e.g.,
gestures, material artifacts, etc.). But I can’t quite think of intentions as
anything remotely similar to these cases. Intentions would be something
closer to an experience or to an act. I can see that a cognitive perspective
would want to try to “represent” intentions (which is different from saying
that they ARE representations), although, in some cases, it would be quite
difficult to do, except in some simple way, e.g. creating abstract predicates
that use ordinary language but are meant to be not-language-specific, e.g.,
the primitive notions of “INTEND” or “BELIEVE” or “ENVY.”
5. Mental models. I touched a bit on this notion earlier. Models can be fun to
play with. And I agree that there are personal-biographical aspects of
November 9: from van Dijk to Duranti 163
I have no reply to those who deny the existence of “minds,” and hence do
not talk about such things as knowledge, beliefs, wishes, thoughts, etc. as
mental phenomena. I would only be able to say that I am sure that radical
antimentalism is inconsistent and contrary to compelling human experi-
ences (thought, feelings, beliefs) and to massive evidence of many kinds.
I don’t think it is very fruitful to discuss such a position – which in my
view is as silly as denying “society,” e.g., by radical mentalists who would
say that all social things are mental constructs (which in a way they are)
and nothing else. In sum, the question is, as you say: It depends on the
issue or problem or goal of research whether a more cognitive or more
interactional (or more societal) approach – or a combination, is more
interesting or fruitful. For the study of, e.g., racism or sexism one obvi-
ously needs all dimensions. For a study of strategies of self-presentation,
one would need a cognitive and interactional perspective, and for a study
of the power of the news media, one would rather take a societal and less a
cognitive and interactional perspective, even when locally news is pro-
duced by (interacting) journalists, and although the power of the news
media also depends on the knowledge, beliefs, prejudices, and ideologies
they help (re)produce in society.
8. Yes, there are different kinds of models: personal and social ones, more or
less abstract or more concrete (analog etc.) ones etc. I use the notion only
as it is used in current cognitive psychology, namely as subjective repre-
sentations of specific events (acts, situations) in episodic memory, i.e., as
some kind of experiences – involving both personal and social aspects but
as unique (and hence changing, dynamic) “interpretations” of events. One
never forms exactly the same mental model of an event, and no two
persons ever have exactly the same model of an event: their experiences
always will also depend on unique life histories.
9. Although I use the general label “cognitive,” obviously that description
covers a huge domain (that of the cognitive sciences), which is as
diverse as, if not even more complicated than, that of interaction, and
involves such diverse areas of study as cognitive processing of lan-
guage and discourse, the study of knowledge, beliefs and ideologies,
memory, thought, problem solving, the study of metaphor, and so on –
and many (sub)disciplines, such as psycholinguistics, AI, cognitive and
social psychology, hermeneutics, epistemology, etc. etc. So, yes, I
would know more or less what I would be examining or leaving out
when doing a “cognitive” analysis – and obviously cannot do every-
thing at the same time. My book on ideology (van Dijk 1998) (and the
new one on context [van Dijk 2008]) are examples – although only a
first step: in the future to be followed by more detailed (also empirical)
studies.
166 A dialogue on intentions
h. for the study of the role of context (and various context factors) defined
as subjective interpretation (mental models) of relevant aspects of the
social situation, and hence as interface between situation and societal
structures on the one hand, and discourse structures on the other. In
other words: there is no DIRECT link between situation/society and
structures of text or talk without the intermediating role of subjective
definitions/interpretations (models) of communicative situations. Thus,
also social (macro) structure is only relevant for discourse when it is
“made” relevant by participants, that is, through their subjective, but
socially constrained, interpretation. In other words, also the theory of
“relevance” has such a sociocognitive basis;
i. to explain (and not only to describe) interaction, in the sense that
participants are only able to act relevantly (coherently, etc.) with
respect to previous acts of others if they understand these acts, i.e.
represent them subjectively, and use this subjective representation as
one of the conditions for their own current, ongoing action – besides
general knowledge about norms, etc., actions and their possible
consequences.
This is only a selection of possible topics. It can be extended at will. I believe
that none of these topics can be “better” formulated or understood in inter-
actional terms, although many of them also have interactional dimensions.
E.g., contexts (as subjective interpretations of ongoing communicative situ-
ations) are produced, negotiated, etc. by interaction.
Of all these topics and issues, I am personally most interested in those at the
interface of discourse, cognition, and society (involving both micro – inter-
actional – as well as macro dimensions), such as the (re)production of racism,
the role of knowledge and ideology in discourse (and vice versa), etc.
[Duranti forwarded the above exchange with van Dijk to a number of
graduate students and postdoctoral fellows in the Department of Anthropology
at UCLA. Jason Throop responded with the following message.]
7.6 November 16, 2004: from Throop to Duranti (and van Dijk)
Personally, I have always felt that the concept of intentionality should be
rigorously restricted to its most basic Husserlian sense – the directedness of
a constituting consciousness toward its objects so constituted. Otherwise, as
you have so perceptively noted in both your Cultural Anthropology article
[Duranti 1993a and see Chapter 5 of this book] and again here in the context of
this dialogue, what individual thinkers mean by the term is decidedly unclear,
even at the best of times. Are individuals referring to plans, goals, desires,
motives, acts of willing, agency? Are they referring to a stance toward the
168 A dialogue on intentions
(Here, Schutz is drawing explicitly from Husserl’s insights into the phenom-
enology of internal-time consciousness and the phenomenological reduction.)
Advancing a distinction between “objective” and “subjective” meaning, he
asserts that whereas the former (which he claims Weberian interpretive soci-
ology is restricted to investigating) is concerned with attending to the phenom-
ena of the external social world as they are presented to an actor as pre-given
“indications of the consciousness of other people,” the latter is predicated upon
an orientation to those processes through which the constitution of these
“external” indications of the consciousness of another being are dynamically
achieved. It is important to note the difference here between what may be
prevalent commonsense renderings of “intended meaning” and Schutz’s per-
spective, however, since for him “intended meaning” is necessarily subjective
meaning, but not necessarily overtly consciousness meaning. As he puts it,
[W]hen we speak of subjective meaning in the social world, we are referring to the
constituting process in the consciousness of the person who produced that which is
objectively meaningful. We are therefore referring to his “intended meaning,” whether
he himself is aware of these constituting processes or not. (Schutz 1967: 37)
align or dis-align in very complex ways, and how all of this raises interesting
questions as to the possible variety of ways in which interlocutors may
highlight, impute, background, disavow, ignore, and/or contest the “inten-
tional” nature of their own and others’ experienced activity.
And of course, all of what I have said so far has not (at least explicitly)
touched upon questions of privileging particular methodological or analytic
approaches, concerns relating to the degree of methodological privacy that is
associated with such states/processes, issues concerning whether or not inten-
tions can be considered “representations,” problems tied to reconciling actors’
vs. (scientific) observers’ rationalizations for explaining action, ideas concern-
ing the ways in which other “non-intentionally” based explanatory frames can
be brought to bear in interpreting social action, or issues of power relations and
how they may serve to pattern attentiveness to, or the ready display of, a
particular actor’s motives/intentions.
7.7 November 16, 2004: from van Dijk to Throop and Duranti
Since “intentions” and similar notions are obviously too complex, and yes, too
vague, to be satisfactorily dealt with in an informal email message, let me just
briefly comment with a few points:
1. I can only agree that the notion of “intention” (from Husserl to Searle, via
Schütz, and others) is very ambiguous. In order to be useful in a more or
less explicit theory of discourse, we must, indeed, severely restrict it. The
same is true for such vague general terms as “meaning” or “understand-
ing,” among others.
2. Yes, intentions, however defined, are part of a complex of related notions,
such as purposes, motives, plans, aims, objectives, targets, and, indeed,
meanings, all of them related to action or agency.
3. Yes, this relation, indeed, is – among others – one of temporality: inten-
tions etc. are usually conceived of as “preceding” acts. More specifically,
they may be construed as “causes of,” or more appropriately, “reasons” for
action, in the sense that they make acts “rational,” “reasonable,” and hence
understandable.
4. Among the many analytical, theoretical distinctions that need to be made,
however, is that between actions as a combination of intention þ doing
(behavior, conduct), and all the temporarily and rationally “preparing”
notions such as motives, purposes, aims, etc. that are invoked (before,
during, or after the action) by agents or attributed by co-agents or obser-
vers, to explain, justify, or understand actions.
5. This means that one can in principle engage in actions by intentionally
doing something (moving a pencil etc.) but without any further purpose,
172 A dialogue on intentions
motive, etc. In real life, however, most actions have a complex and fuzzy
set of more or less conscious aims, purposes, goals, etc. Sometimes, and
informally, these various “conditions” of action are also described as
“meanings” or “reasons,” in the sense of what we mean BY an action,
what we want to accomplish or “get done” BY (as a consequence of) an
action. For these latter notions we may need a host of further descriptions
and analyses, ranging from cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis to
shared sociocultural beliefs of various kinds. There is nothing mysterious
about them – they only need careful, systematic analysis in terms of some
theory.
6. Intentions, however, do not in this way “explain” etc. actions, but merely
distinguish actions from unconscious etc. doings or bodily events. In other
words, they are the conscious basis or counterpart that constitutes human
action, as distinct from, e.g., conditioned reflexes, or activities engaged in
under drugs, hypnosis, or force. Intentions are thus essentially definable in
terms of self-control over activities.
7. This also has moral, cultural, and legal consequences at least in many
communities: If I misbehave without control over my conduct (when
forced, drugged, sleeping, etc.) I usually am not found guilty. This is not
true for the other notions (motives, goals, etc.): one may not be guilty of
“premeditated” murder, but at least of manslaughter. Hence, all the other
notions are forms of “pre-meditation.” Intentions on the other hand frac-
tionally precede but further practically co-occur with an act. They control
the process of being engaged in activity.
8. Intentions in this sense are also described as the agent’s “meaning” of the
doing itself – and not of the whole action and its consequences. Like the
speaker-meaning of a word. Hence the usual observer’s question when an
act is ambiguous: “What do you mean?,” which may be glossed as “What
was your intention when engaging in this conduct?”
9. All this is mere analytic philosophy of action, but hardly empirical theory.
Since we are dealing with mental objects of some kind, we had therefore
better devise a proper cognitive theory for these states and processes. In
such a theory, intentions are (part of) mental models, represented in
episodic memory, and hence part of our everyday experiences. These
mental models control discourse and other actions and provide the
speaker’s “meaning” for them. Others may interpret our doings (as our
word-sounds) and attribute meanings to them by constructing their own
mental models. (See van Dijk and Kintsch, Strategies of Discourse Com-
prehension, 1983, and a host of later work in cognitive psychology for
details.)
10. Obviously mental models are not just constituted by current experiences
but also by previous ones, as well as by general, socially or culturally
Conclusions 173
shared beliefs. This is why and how we are able to understand words and
acts in terms of similar mental models. However, as such, mental models
are contextually unique, subjective, etc. They are tokens, not types. We
can never have the same intention twice. NB. These models are NOT the
same as the cultural models of Shore etc. – which are socially shared, etc.
There is much more, but (at this late hour;-)) I don’t have much more to say.
Some of this is consistent with what Jason says. Some of this tries to go
beyond the philosophical confusion of a host of related notions, by devising a
more explicit, more analytical theory of it. Whatever the exact nature of
intentions as defined, I have no doubt that an explicit theory of action and
agency needs at least a notion like this – a notion that not only should account
for pretty strong intuitions, but also for a range of phenomena and data in
different cultures as referred to above (reasons vs. meanings of action, being
guilty or not guilty of some doings, etc.). That not all cultures have a notion
like “intention” does not as such warrant that we should not have it in a theory,
as is also true for a theory of atoms or molecules as components of matter.
So what do we need to advance?
a. Comparative cultural studies of concepts and uses of words such as inten-
tions, goals, etc.;
b. systematic analysis of spontaneous discourse using these notions in differ-
ent communities;
c. more theoretical analysis distinguishing these various forms of “premedi-
tation” of action;
d. a detailed theory of the structures of mental models for action;
e. a theory of the relationship between mental models for action and actual
conduct (how to translate mental intentions into the complex “bodywork”
of doings);
f. experiments to test this theory;
g. brain observations to find out the neurobiological basis of intentions and
related notions, etc.
Lots of work. At the moment I only take one of these options: devising a
theory of context as mental models that will do some of the control of
discourse/interaction, and hence needs intentions and “premeditations” to
make discursive conduct rational or reasonable or meaningful.
7.8 Conclusions
The discussion went on for a few more days, but the contributions I have
reproduced above constitute the exchanges that more closely and consistently
focus on some of the core issues of this book. In fact, the ideas and arguments
174 A dialogue on intentions
8.0 Introduction1
Starting in the late 1980s, a number of developmental psychologists and
philosophers (e.g., Astington, Harris, and Olson 1988; Carruthers and Smith
1996) recast the issue of the role of intentions in interpreting people’s actions,
words included, in terms of the so-called “theory of mind,” a term originally
introduced by David Premack and Guy Woodruff (1978) in their work on
primates’ cognition. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, linguistic
and cultural anthropologists entered this tradition of studies not so much to
claim cross-cultural differences in the capacity to read other minds, which they
took to be a human universal, but in the need and willingness that members of
different communities express and demonstrate to engage in introspection or in
guessing what others might be thinking, wishing, or feeling. As shown in the
following quote by Joel Robbins and Alan Rumsey, the doubts that Michelle
Rosaldo and I, and others, had raised in the 1980s about whether we need to
involve individual intentions to interpret human action were reframed as issues
of ideological control.
While it may seem at first blush as if the work on intentional communication and
“theory of mind” that we have referred to in the last two paragraphs is completely at
odds with the anthropological critique of personalist/intentionalist theories of meaning,
this is not necessarily the case. For even if it is true that the capacity for inferring the
mental states of others is a generically human one, and plays a part in communication
everywhere, it does not follow that all language ideologies will give it equal promin-
ence, or even allow it to be openly recognized or actualized in speech. (Robbins and
Rumsey 2008: 414)
175
176 Opacity of other minds
Unfortunately, Gerber ends up undermining her own claim. Not only does she
admit in the passage above that she was given explanations that “frequently
had nothing whatever to do with emotions,” but, in a more damaging way for
her criticism of Mead’s position, in the next paragraph she confirms what
Mead and, later, Shore had written, namely, that Samoans simply do not
believe one can know what another person thinks.
What prevented my informants from answering the first question was not lack of
interest in motivation, but a belief about knowledge. Samoans frequently say, with
the full force of self-evident conventional wisdom, “we cannot know what is in another
person’s depths,” or “we cannot tell what another person is thinking.” Given this idea, it
becomes very difficult to state with assurance what another person’s motives in fact are,
especially since the question “why” is apparently interpreted as calling for nothing but
the truth. As a consequence, the only possible answer to this question about matters
internal to another person is “I don’t know.” (Gerber 1985: 133)
actions. In (1) Chief Tevaseu uses it to explain why an older orator from the
village next to his – whose name is not mentioned here but implied by the
discourse context – might have said some inappropriate words during the prior
exchange (see Duranti 1994: 94–97).
(1) (Fono April 7, 1979; Chief Tevaseu is wrapping up his conciliatory speech)
1599 Teva; ia` po`o lea fo`i se `upu
‘so if there are any (wrong) words’
1600 `ua- . . . mākau mai ai `oulua Makua ma- `Āiga-
‘(which) have been noticed (by) you two senior orators and
the chiefs’
1601 ma lo kākou gu`u, (. . .)
and (the rest of) our village, . . .
1602 ia` e le iloa e le kagaka loga sesē. SAYING
‘well, a person doesn’t know his own mistakes.’
1603 (1.0)
1604 Loa; mālie!
‘nicely (said)!’
1605 Teva; (e) vagagā lava le Akua,
‘except the Lord,’
1606 `o lo`o iai le kogu. (. . .)
who has the truth . . .
principle. For example, Robbins (2008) suggests a general tendency among the
Urapmin to think of people’s minds as “private places” and calls this phenom-
enon “psychic privacy.” Stasch (2008) suggests that the opacity doctrine may
be linked to an egalitarian ethos. This particular generalization, however, does
not hold cross-culturally given that opacity doctrine phenomena have been
documented in highly stratified societies like Samoa (Ochs 1982; Duranti
1988). A more promising line of explanation is Stasch’s observations
regarding the potential relationship between opacity of mind and local attitudes
toward authority and responsibility, two dimensions rich with political and
ethical implications that can potentially have universal application.
For example, Rumsey (2008: 465) tells us that the Ku Waru are not reluctant to
read others’ minds in courtship situations or when describing sexual attraction.
They also seem comfortable with the idea of being able to spot deception on
the basis of observations of others’ behavior. Among the Korowai, according
to Stasch (2008: 448), it is recognized that people may think silently. But this
recognition comes with the suspicion that silent contemplation may hide
malevolent intentions – I will return to this finding below because it offers
some important hints about how introspection is perceived.
The documentation of the adoption of the various Christian practices of
confession also suggests that they are not completely rejected as inappropriate
by some of the same groups that have been said to exhibit the opacity doctrine.
In fact, in Rumsey’s article we learn that, prior to the introduction of Christian
confession, the Ku Waru (as well as the Melpa and other groups in Papua New
Guinea) had their own indigenous practice of group confession that was used
in preparation for war or during war activities – a practice that was connected
to the belief that “pent-up anger and concealed wrong-doing can cause bodily
illness” (Rumsey 2008: 460). We also learn from Robbins that the Urapmin
people at first embraced the practice of public confession and claimed that they
were “able to see in the minds of others” (Robbins 2008: 425).
These inconsistencies suggest that our research strategies should be revised
so that we can be in a better position to document whether the same group of
people who seem reluctant to engage in speculating about what goes on in their
own mind or in the minds of others might, in fact, exhibit mind-reading
behavior under certain circumstances.
Having been socialized in a sub-discipline, linguistic anthropology, where
recording what people normally do is expected, I am always surprised that so
many of my colleagues, including sociocultural anthropologists, do not do that
as much or at all. The recording of what people spontaneously do should be
routine, especially now that digital recorders are so cheap and small and our
“subjects” use them too, thereby allowing for an ecological validity that was
not quite there a few decades ago. Armed with the hypothesis that the natives
have a way of thinking about what we can know about others that is different
from what is usually assumed in “western” theories of meaning, ethnographers
should be able to search for naturally occurring situations in which the same
reluctance to read other minds might manifest itself spontaneously, that is,
without any outsider’s prompting.
with a wide range of other verbs or adjectives to form predicates that express
physiological needs such as ‘be hungry’ (fia`ai, lit. ‘wish, want, like, need to
eat’) or ‘be thirsty’ (fia inu, lit. ‘wish, want, like, need to drink’), as well as
attitude or personal characteristics.
The reading of others’ needs and wants might be part of the cultural script of
particular situations, like when guests are around. As pointed out by Adam
Harr (2013: 319), “Hospitality . . . demands that hosts actively look after
guests’ needs without those needs being openly expressed. I quickly learned
that if my eyes flitted to a bowl of food for even a moment, it would be offered
to me immediately.” This is a kind of anticipation that in a place like Samoa
might be also motivated and explained by means of social hierarchy. Younger
and lower-status individuals are expected to anticipate what older and higher-
status people might need or want, regardless of whether a wish has been
expressed. In addition, the attribution of wishes can be used strategically to
compel others to offer food or services. This is shown in example (3) below,
taken from a videotaped interaction among four Samoan women who have
been cleaning a communal house belonging to their church congregation.
While M is instructing her son to go and get two spoons from the people in
the next house, T attributes a want of bread to Vaega (Vg), another woman in
the group. Immediately following T’s utterance, Vaega reinforces the request
by attributing the same wish to Vaetolu (here/Vaekolu/), the oldest of the four.
(3) (“Women of the Congregation”; August 1988)
The modal verb fia is also used in all kinds of compounds that express desires
that are seen as antisocial or reproachable. These are negative traits of some-
one’s personality that can be inferred from the way a person behaves with
others or in front of others. Their encoding by means of a fia-compound carries
a negative connotation and implies that such ways of being should have been
repressed.
One example of this type of negative attribute is found in (4) below, where
the expression fia tama matua, lit. ‘wish, want, like, need to be old (matua)
boy (tama)’ describes someone who acts in such a way that presupposes that
he feels more important than he really is given his age.
Examining spontaneous interaction 183
One could argue that this is an example of reading another person’s mind.
I would not disagree with that conclusion but I would also suggest that if we
want to invoke “mind-reading,” we need to acknowledge that it is a limited
case of mind-reading because it is based on expectations grounded in know-
ledge of a particular type of person. The women know that Falafala tends to act
in a certain way. Her likelihood of wanting to come to see them and gossip is
not that different from other highly predictable events, including that her
children will report what they have seen – this is what children are expected
to do – or that certain people will go to church on Sunday. This is a type of
inference that is based on repeated, generalizable, and even routinized behav-
ior. The person whose wants are being assessed is being treated as a type more
than as an individual. The case is similar to the situation in which we guess that
someone might be wanting to eat simply because that person is in our house at
dinner time and there is smell of cooked food coming out of our kitchen.
The next example is a more direct challenge to the opacity of mind claim
about Pacific societies like Samoa. It is taken from an exchange during a
family dinner that I video-recorded in the same village where the other
interactions reproduced in (1)–(4) took place. In (5), six-year-old Onosa`i
(a pseudonym), the youngest girl in the family, has been begging her mother
to give her a bigger piece of banana (see Duranti 1994: 154 for the earlier part
of the interaction). Little Onosa`i’s actions are witnessed by her older siblings,
including her nine-year-old sister, Roma (a pseudonym), who first verbally
displays her disapproval of such selfishness (in line 516) and then ascribes to
her younger sister the specific wish not only to get a bigger piece but “the very
big one” (or “biggest”) (in line 519).
What is important in this example is that little O has not said that she wants the
biggest piece. She has merely rejected, rather forcefully, the pieces that her
mother has tried to give her. For this reason R’s statement that O wants the
Examining spontaneous interaction 185
biggest piece available must count as an inference about what O is thinking but
not saying.
These two examples demonstrate that some kind of mind-reading obviously
goes on in Samoa, as in any other place in the Pacific or elsewhere in the
world, and that in some situations mind-reading is also made explicit through
language. In this case we have a nine-year-old girl voicing her interpretation of
the (morally “bad”) intentions of her younger sister. This means that the public
reading of intentions constitutes an explicit condemnation expressed through
moral indignation in line 516 (‘I’m so disgusted at the behavior of this little
one!’). This contextual information is important because R’s utterance in line
519 could be read as a potential counterexample to Ochs’ (1982) claim –
discussed in Chapter 3 – that Samoans do not expand children’s unclear
utterances or engage in clarification sequences. Older sister R is de facto
guessing what little O wants. This could be explained in a number of ways.
One is that, at nine, older sister R might be engaging in a type of interpretive
action that adults usually avoid. This explanation would go along with the
hypothesis that Samoan children are more likely than adults to publicly engage
in this type of mind-reading and only later would “grow into” or more fully
adopt a cultural dispreference for clarification and explicit mind-reading.
Another hypothesis is that older sister R is stepping in on behalf of her parents
to control and reprimand younger sister O’s improper behavior. The mind-
reading in this case, as in the other cases mentioned above, is based on sister
O’s visible actions. Such actions display a stance or disposition that calls for an
immediate corrective action.
All of this means that (i) a certain amount of figuring out what others are up
to is always going on and is necessary for people to manage their daily life; (ii)
whether or not this type of mental activity should always be glossed as
“reading other minds” depends on the specific situation as well as on our
theory of human action, including our view of intersubjectivity; (iii) conscious
and explicit reading of other minds is one of the possible routes to understand-
ing a situation retrospectively and prospectively; (iv) communities (and indi-
viduals) vary in the extent to which reading other minds is recognized,
verbalized, and justified.
Because of its unique research conditions and interests, anthropological
fieldwork can help us refine each of these generalizations. In particular, it
can clarify the role of ideology in how people see and practice introspection.
Although explicitly reflecting upon one’s own thoughts and feelings as well as
upon the thoughts and feelings of others is considered necessary if not
innocuous by most philosophers, anthropologists have shown that such activ-
ities are seen as highly suspicious by ordinary people in the Pacific (and
elsewhere). For example, Stasch (2008) tells us that in those cases in which
introspection is acknowledged among the Korowai it is cast as a morally
186 Opacity of other minds
dubious activity. This is an important hint because it can help us explain why
people feel uncomfortable about trying to speculate about others’ thoughts and
desires. Our asking people to tell us what they imagine that others are thinking
might be like asking them to spy for us. The ethnographer’s curiosity might
imply that there is something wrong or devious that needs to be uncovered.
A number of ethnographic accounts show that the very act of bringing out in
public one’s speculations on the mental activity of others makes speakers
worry about potential retaliation. Hence, from a sociocultural point of view,
the phenomenon of the opacity doctrine might be seen as a defense strategy
against the accountability that comes with making claims about what others
think or want. It is perhaps not by accident that the three Samoan examples
briefly discussed above involve moral indignation. It could turn out that the
opacity doctrine hides or at least implies a pan-human preoccupation with
reducing one’s accountability. The study of the conditions that might increase
or decrease such a concern is a worthwhile research project.
9 Intentions and their modifications:
a lesson from Husserl
9.0 Introduction1
In this chapter I return to Husserl’s notion of intention, which I briefly
introduced in Chapter 2 (§2.4), and combine it with his notion of “modifica-
tion” to describe the role that directing novices’ attention plays in socialization.
I also use Husserl’s conceptual apparatus to hypothesize that, even though
children and novices have ways to modify their habitual way of being and the
ability to assume what Husserl called a “theoretical attitude,” the accumulation
of earlier intentional and phenomenal modifications into a well-established
habitus might prevent certain changes and thus certain types of learning from
occurring.
187
188 Intentions and their modifications
bears a family resemblance with other terms also used by Husserl, including
Wandlung, Abwandlung, and Änderung – combined with a number of adjec-
tives that express different experiences as well as different theoretical points of
view. The English translations of his writings render these various combin-
ations with such terms as “intentional modification,” “phenomenal modifica-
tion” (Husserl 1970b), “phenomenological modification” (Husserl 1989),
“noetic modification,” “logico-categorical modification” (Husserl 1931),
“retentional modification” (Husserl 1991, 2001), and “modification of atten-
tiveness” (Husserl 2001), among others.
In this chapter, I bring together Husserl’s theoretical apparatus with some
insights from developmental pragmatics and language socialization ([Ochs]
Keenan and Schieffelin 1976; Ochs and Schieffelin 1984). A number of
studies from these two closely related traditions have shown that adults and
experts are routinely engaged in getting children and novices to see and hear
what is culturally relevant. I propose to rethink the acculturation of attention in
terms of Husserl’s notions of intention and modification. I will argue that
socialization can be conceptualized as a series of attempts to shape children’s
and novices’ phenomenal world through a series of “modifications” of what
they see, touch, smell, hear, or taste. In some cases, the modification is more
complex, consisting of a change of perspective whereby a person moves out of
what Husserl called “the natural attitude” to assume a “theoretical attitude.”
I will show that both adults and children are capable, under certain circum-
stances, of making these more radical modifications of their way of being in
the world.
reading in our study, we might be barely aware of the books that are on our
desk even though they are in front of us and within our peripheral vision. But
as we decide that we need to consult one of those books, we start to relate to
them in a different way. As we attentively and quickly glance at the books, we
match each one against the memory that we have of the book that we are trying
to find. We find ourselves quickly examining each book in terms of the color of
its cover or in terms of its thickness. We also consider its place on the desk and
its proximity to other books to assess their content or relevance to our current
needs. We might also stop and think about the fact that one of those books is
the one that is overdue at the university library and that another one is the book
that someone gave us for our birthday and we haven’t read yet. We might
notice the picture on the front cover of one of the books and think that it is
poorly designed. We might pull one of them out, hold it in our hands and
wonder what made it into a book that so many people buy but very few read.
Throughout these moments, as our gaze moves from one book to the next and
our hands grab one to then place it back where it was or put it aside for a future
occasion, it is not just our attention that is continuously shifting. The way we
are disposed toward what we see or touch also shifts. At any given moment,
each of those books is the same object that was in front of us a few seconds
earlier; in other words, that is, our perception of it as a physical object has not
changed (for example, its color, weight, or smell has not changed in any
perceivable way), but our consideration of it, the way we direct our attention
to it has changed. These shifts in our ways of thinking of, feeling about, or
coming in contact with the same object is what Husserl called “intentional
modifications” (Husserl 1931, 1989). A modification in our consciousness –
often accompanied by or realized through a modification of our embodiment –
may affect entities that were in the background and suddenly become the
object of our attention (e.g., the book that was lying on our desk and now is
examined to see whether it is the book we want to consult) as well as entities
that we attend to in a different way (e.g., the cover of a book may change from
source of information about its contents to target of an evaluation about its
design).
The concept of intentional modification is important because it makes
evident the role that human subjects play in meaning-making through inten-
tionality. It is in this sense that Husserl (1931, 1970b, 1989) uses the verb
“constitute” as well as its nominal and adjectival derivations (e.g., “consti-
tution,” “constitutive,” “constituting”). Our way of relating to entities in the
world, whether real or imaginary, does not “create” them out of nothing, but it
“constitutes” them, that is, it “objectivates” them – makes them acquire
objectivity – through distinct intentional acts, with distinct meanings (Soko-
lowski 1964: 46). As briefly discussed in Chapter 5, we can attend to the same
“object” or “referent” as something (or someone) that we need, want, admire,
Intentional modifications 191
feel curious about, despise, miss, judge, are repelled by, feel comfortable with,
and so on (see Figure 5.4).
When the type of intentional act we entertain toward something or someone
changes, e.g., from admiration to fear, from disapproval to approval, from
seeing it as something alien to seeing it as a member of a familiar group, we are
experiencing an intentional modification, that is, the “phenomenon” – in the
sense of what it appears to be for us – changes as a result of our way of relating
to it. We can schematically represent this event with a time variable t next to
the two intentional acts schematically represented in Figure 9.1.5
Some classic examples of this type of change in the domain of vision are
provided by Gestalt psychology and have been discussed by other philoso-
phers, among them Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his Philosophical Investigations,
he used the example of the picture in Figure 9.2 (“the duck-rabbit” picture) to
discuss the concept of “aspect seeing” or “seeing as . . .” This is a kind of
seeing that is different from mere perception.
I might have been looking at the picture in Figure 9.2 for years and only seen a
rabbit. Suddenly I see a duck or, rather, I see it as a duck. The “it” as a picture
Subject A Object G
Figure 9.1 The same Subject (A) is directed toward the same Object (G) at
time t1 in the intentional act of admiration and at time t2 in the intentional
act of fear
(corresponding to what Husserl, following Aristotle, calls the “hyle”) has not
changed but what I see it as has changed. Wittgenstein compares the ability of
“seeing an aspect” to having a “musical ear” (1958: 214) and to “experiencing the
meaning of a word.” In all these cases, we are relying on an ability to go beyond
mere perception. The similarity between Wittgenstein’s “aspect seeing” and
Husserl’s intentional modification finds support in a terminological convergence.
At one point, to express what he means by “aspect seeing,” Wittgenstein uses the
German word Einstellung – translated as “attitude” by G. E. M. Anscombe (see
below). He says that to “see as” is the same as to have an “attitude” toward
something. For example, to see “an animal pierced by an arrow” is the same as
saying that “this is my attitude to the figure” (“dies ist meine Einstellung zur
Figur”) (Wittgenstein 1958: 205). Husserl also used Einstellung in his 1913
Ideas (English translation in Husserl 1931) to describe the way in which we relate
to the world, e.g., in his notion of natürliche Einstellung “natural attitude” (see
below). Both authors were trying to capture how meaning-giving consists of a
change in attitude or disposition toward something.
Below I will give some examples of the ways in which language can be used
to get novices to modify their attitude toward something. In this case, the
intentional modifications that are being promoted do not concern vision but
aural perception. Drawing from the world of music education, instead of
discussing cases of “seeing as,” I will discuss cases of “hearing as.” The cases
in question will also give us an opportunity to appreciate the range of modifi-
cations that language is expected to encourage in order to socialize students to
a professional way of hearing.
The discussion of music is here partly motivated by the fact that it was very
important for Husserl’s theory of time consciousness (Husserl 1991). Stimu-
lated by the work of Franz Brentano and of his thesis advisor Carl Stumpf, who
wrote on the psychology of music and sounds and to whom Logische Unter-
suchungen is dedicated, Husserl tried to answer the question of how we arrive
from a succession of tones to hearing a melody. The succession must be united
in our consciousness but, as Husserl wrote, “[w]e obviously do not have the
tones all at once” (Husserl 1991: 22). The problem of how we hear a melody
became a model for understanding not only “temporal objects” like tones, that
is, objects that have duration, but also the very constitution of time in our
consciousness, what Henri Bergson (1908) had called “la durée.”
Figure 9.3 George Bohannon (on the right) interacting with the students in his
Jazz Combo Class on February 10, 2003, saying “Hearing what J. J. has
played on his tune” – see example (1)
The students here are told that they have to attend to the music of great players
like J. J. Johnson and others in such a way as to detect what they are doing in
their solos, that is, when they stop following the original melody and impro-
vise, creating new melodic lines (and more). This kind of advice is commonly
directed to younger players in the jazz community, as documented by Paul
Berliner (1994), among others.9 What I am interested in underscoring here is
that this type of attending to jazz recordings constitutes a change in the ways in
which one may otherwise attend to the recorded sounds. Bohannon’s choice of
two distinct verbs, hear and listen, within a stretch of discourse that seems to
be focused on the need for one particular activity (to learn from the ways in
which recorded artists perform their solos), calls for reflection. Whereas
“listening” (as in “listening to . . . some of the other great trombone players”)
is here reserved for the willful disposition to pay attention to how certain
musicians play, “hearing” (as in “hearing good solos”) seems to refer to the
ability to differentiate among those sounds and absorb them. The contrast is
captured in the difference between expressions like “I’m listening but I can’t
hear it” and “I’m hearing it but I am not listening.” In the first case I am
making an effort but I cannot get to the phenomenon I am looking for. In the
Intentional modifications 195
SF; that’s Tain ((motions with his hands as if playing the drums)) . . .
(listen to how-) the way he plays . . . he’s in- interactive with them.
Figure 9.4 While listening to the song “Cain and Abel” with his students, on
April 23, 2003, Sherman Ferguson points out that the drummer in the recording,
Jeff “Tain” Watts, is “interactive with [the other players]” – see example (2)
196 Intentions and their modifications
GB; [. . .] It’s a good idea when you know when . . . ((the bass player))
Aaron is playing to- . . . bring it down ((in volume)) you know ’cause
he’s not amplified but he’s pulling. real well. [. . .] we don’t wanna
drown him out. so the contrasts are really what’s- . . . what’s so-
important. when everything is right here ((motions with hand)) [. . .]
it’s like- when you’re in a room full of people and everybody’s talking
and you don’t hear- you can’t hear anything. but you hear a lot of
chatter but there’s no definition. [. . .] but soon as- you drop it down a
notch. Then, you know that he- he’s speaking and you’re
accompanying him. and then y- you know- even if-. there’s more
chance of doing some interplay together you know, . . . [. . .] be
aware of that.
In this case Bohannon is telling the student drummer in his class to adjust his
playing by (a) listening to the sound that the band is producing as a whole,
(b) evaluating his own contribution to that sound (e.g., whether it is too loud),
(c) listening to a particular instrument (in this case the bass), and (d) evaluating
whether that instrument is being heard not only by the potential audience but
by the other members of the band. Implicit in these recommendations are
certain assumptions about the expected role that each instrument has, e.g., the
role of the bass lines to provide the rhythmic and harmonic foundations on
which the horn players can improvise (Monson 1996), but the important
point in each of these three cases is that the students are being encouraged to
attend to the music of others as well as to their own music in new ways. These
are activity-specific ways of paying attention. For Husserl, attention
The “natural attitude” 197
considered so not because they are different from us, but because they are
different from the ways we expect a “person” to be. The concept of the
“natural attitude” captures the practical, moral, and aesthetic stance that we
ordinarily take toward the surrounding world, human beings included.
Husserl also points out that as human beings we do have the capacity to step
out of the “natural attitude.” When we do step out, we have the possibility of
taking on other attitudes. One class of such other attitudes is what Husserl
called the “theoretical attitude.” As we shall see, to shift to this attitude we also
need to engage in particular kinds of modifications.
WC; [. . .] I got tenure before that. . . . I think that’s when I became full
professor.
FM; Seventy-three.
WC; oh something like that.
(7 sec.)
WC; It’s a very nice ride over here.
FM; Yeah.
WC; m:[::
FM; [This is the best. I love this ride.
From the point of view of its illocutionary force (Austin 1962), that is, in terms
of what the speaker is conventionally aiming at, Capps’ utterance “It’s a very
nice ride over here” is an assertion and, more specifically, an assessment.14 If
we look at it from the point of view of its placement in a sequence of turns, as
we have learned to do from conversation analysts, this type of speech act calls
for a response by the co-participants, with the preferred response being
agreement either immediately followed by or in the form of a second assess-
ment (Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1987; Goodwin and Goodwin 1992). FM
follows this script perfectly by first agreeing with Capps’ assessment (“Yeah”)
and then by producing a second assessment in the form of an “upgrade”
(Pomerantz 1984: 65): “This is the best.”15
Capps’ initial assessment takes as an object of evaluation the so far
unspoken-about but perceptually available sensorial environment or, rather,
makes the sensorial environment (in this case, what is seen from the driver’s
point of view – see Figure 9.5) into an object of evaluation. With his assess-
ment of the experience of the “ride,” Capps moves out of the practical
200 Intentions and their modifications
Figure 9.5 While driving, Walter Capps turns slightly to the left to look
at the side of the road
relationship with the road and the surrounding. They are no longer understood
and utilized as a means to an end, or as “affordances,” in Jerome Gibson’s
(1986) terms.16 That is, they are no longer or not only what allows Capps to
easily drive to his destination, the town of Lompoc, where he will join a state
senator and some Democratic supporters. The orientation toward such a
practical goal and the practical relationship with the equipment (e.g., the car)
and the built environment (e.g., the paved road) is in this segment momentarily
abandoned in favor of the recognition and evaluation of the experience itself,
which includes the pleasure one gets from looking at the place through which
one is driving. The road itself and what defines it as a road, including the
“nature things” on the sides (i.e., trees, bushes, the skyline), are recognized as
having a value of their own, independent of their practical utilization. For all of
this to happen, Capps first and then FM must engage in a modification of their
attitude toward their surroundings. The change from the “natural” to the
“theoretical” attitude is thus both expressed and realized (or “performed”)
through language, that is, in this case, English grammar and vocabulary.
The linguistic shape of Capps’ assessment (“It is a very nice ride over here”)
objectifies the pleasure of the ride (which otherwise could have remained a
The “theoretical attitude” 201
expect language to play an important role in these shifts. One place to look for
cases in which children’s attention is being oriented in such a way is directives.
Transcripts of verbal interactions between children and adults in the litera-
ture on language acquisition and language socialization are full of directives, a
class of speech acts that includes “imperatives” such as English Come here!
Go there! Give it to me! Stop! (e.g., Ervin-Tripp 1976; Ervin-Tripp and
Gordon 1986; Clancy 1985; Rumsey 2003; Wootton 1997: chapter 3). In these
transcripts, parents and children are shown to be involved in “request
sequences” of varying length and complexity. By the time they go to school,
where they are instructed on how to sit, stand, talk, read, and write, young
children have had a protracted experience of being the targets of requests.
However, not all requests are the same from the point of view of the attitudes
that they instantiate. For example, a request for information like the one in (a)
requires a different kind of attitude from the request for information in (b):
a. What’s that? (Bloom 1970: 113)
b. That machine scare you? Hm? (Peters and Boggs 1986: 90)
In (a), the child is asked to focus on a given object as identified by the deictic
term that and to respond by providing a description, a requirement that can be
satisfied by the use of a linguistic expression, often a single word. In (b), the
child is also asked to focus on a particular object characterized through an
expression that contains both a deictic (that) and a common noun (machine).
But this time the child must do something different from providing a descrip-
tion. She must provide information on whether the object caused (or is causing
now, not clear because of the verb morphology) a particular emotion (fear). In
order to answer, the child must engage in an evaluation of what is going on.
Even though this does not mean that the child must have an awareness of the
reflexive quality of the act, the “attitude” – in Husserl’s sense of Einstellung
(see above) – that is required for understanding and answering (b) is different
from the “attitude” that is required for understanding and answering (a). In
addition, the request in (b) provides a model for self-reflection.17 In implying a
child’s ability to both reflect and report on her emotional state, the request
provides a model for what is reportable, in this case emotional states caused by
encounters with machines.
All of this means that over time, in being directed, children are not only
oriented to attend to objects or to perform certain actions on them, they are also
exposed to ways of reflecting on their own experience of such objects and
more generally on their life experiences. This in turn entails an ability to move
from the “natural attitude” of the here-and-now to the “theoretical attitude” of
evaluating the type of ongoing activity or the type of person that such an
activity entails or invokes. In some cases, the “theoretical attitude” appears in
situations in which children challenge or resist a particular request that is being
The “theoretical attitude” 203
made from them. It is, in other words, while they are being confrontational or
argumentative that children also practice or experiment with stepping back
from the here-and-now to provide a typification of it.
To illustrate how children can engage in this kind of behavior and support
the claim that it can be an occasion for engaging in “theoretical” action, I have
chosen to reexamine an interaction between a Samoan mother and her child
discussed by Martha Platt (1986). The example comes from a large corpus of
transcripts of family interactions originally recorded in 1978–1979 by Elinor
Ochs and Martha Platt in a (then Western) Samoan community as part of a
longitudinal study sponsored by the National Science Foundation in which
I also participated (see Duranti 1994: 20–26).
Example (5) below corresponds to example (5) in Platt (1986: 135–136).
The layout of the example has been altered to be consistent with the format of
the other examples in this chapter and the orthography for representing
Samoan speech has been slightly changed to conform to (consistent) standard
Samoan orthography. The English glosses in (5) have been left as in Platt’s
original example. A few minor revisions are suggested in the discussion that
follows. Scene: Niulala (Niu), who is three-and-a-half years old, is inside the
house with his mother (whose name is here given in the abbreviated form
“Ak”), his younger brother, Fineaso (Fine), and another small child, To`o. Ak
is in the central room of the house and Niulala and To`o are in a side room.
Throughout the whole interaction Ak remains seated while the children move
back and forth between the side and center rooms.
(5) (Western Samoa, 1979)
Niu: uhh.
Fine: ((laughs)) uhh.
((Niulala and Fineaso are running around the house))
Ak: se Niulala, (.) Figeaso
‘Please! Niulala, Fineaso!’
Niu: ei!
‘hey!’
Fine: o!
Ak: sau lā `oe mai ska masi ē!
‘Come here now and give me a cracker!’
The interaction starts with Ak (who is seated) asking a small child (presumably
from a neighbor family) who is in the next room, To`o, to bring her a cracker.
To`o complies and gives her the cracker, which she breaks in two, giving one
piece back to him. Then Ak makes the same request to her (older) son,
Niulala,18 who instead refuses with a straight ‘No!’ (leai). When she asks
him why (ai se ā?), her son replies: laga ke `ai`ū, which Platt, probably trying
to stay close to a gloss given by a Samoan native speaker, translates as
‘because I’m selfish.’ A more literal translation would be ‘because I am
unwilling to share food,’ as suggested by the fact that the word translated as
‘selfish’ in the example, `ai`ū, includes the verb `ai ‘eat’ (Milner 1966: 10). At
this point the mother asks ‘Are you being selfish towards me?’ (ke `ai`ü iā
a`u?) or, more literally, ‘Are you being unwilling to share food with me?’
After receiving no answer to her question and seeing that instead of complying
with her request Niulala has started to run around the house with To`o, she
uses another directive: ‘Come here now and give me a cracker’ (sau lā `oe mai
ska masi ē).
As is always the case with communicative events, there are potentially many
different ways of discussing this verbal exchange. Platt, for example, chose to
highlight the mother’s use of the affective marker /ska/ (from /siþka/19), the
combination of an affective article (/si/) and an affective first person possessive
(/ka/) (pronounced /ta/ in other contexts, see Appendix B) that is meant to
make the listener feel sorry for the speaker (see also Ochs 1986; Ochs and
Schieffelin 1989). The mother first uses the affective form /ska/ with To`o but
does not use it with her son Niulala. After Niulala refuses to give her his
cracker, she uses the /ska/ with him as well (as shown in the last line of
example 5).
Another way of analyzing this example is from the point of view of
Niulala’s defiant behavior. By bringing up a description of himself as someone
who is unwilling to share his food with his own mother, Niulala is testing his
mother’s patience and simultaneously asserting his own will. Within an inter-
action that is ostensibly about exchange and sharing, a common locus of
socialization in Samoa and elsewhere (e.g., Schieffelin 1990), we see language
The “theoretical attitude” 205
being used also to reflect on and actually constitute the type of moral persons
that participants are. Niulala’s verbal actions in example (5) are a clear case of
what Samoans themselves would characterize as “cheeky behavior” (tautala-
laitiiti) (Milner 1966: 257; Ochs 1988: 154).
As described by Ochs (1988; Ochs and Izquierdo 2010), Samoan children
are socialized (and expected) to respect the local hierarchy by being attentive
to and cooperative with older people, including their older siblings and their
parents. If they do not comply, they are subject to shame or punishment.
However, there are always exceptions to this amply documented cultural
preference for being cooperative and respectful. As recently remarked by Ochs
and Izquierdo, “adults supported occasional cheekiness, noting that later in life
untitled youth are sometimes called on to be ‘bad’ in ways unbecoming to
older titled persons” (Ochs and Izquierdo 2010: 397).
In what follows, I want to focus on what Niulala’s response entails from the
point of view of his “attitude” toward what he has being asked to do, that is, to
share his cracker with his mother. First, it should not be difficult to see that
Niulala’s explanation for his refusal to comply with the request qualifies as an
example of what Husserl called “the theoretical attitude.” In the response
reproduced here below in example (5)’, Niulala provides his mother (and
whoever else happens to be listening, e.g., the researcher who is tape recording
the interaction and taking notes) with a typification of his own behavior.
(5)’ (Two-turn exchange between Mother, Ak, and son, Niu)
Ak; ai se ā?
‘why?’
Niu; laga ke `ai`ū.
‘because I’m selfish.’
Niulala is here able to “step out” of the flow of ongoing events and the world
they constitute, which is in this case the “lifeworld” of kids running around the
house eating crackers, parents making requests for them to do something, and
kids complying or refusing to comply. Niulala’s stepping out is as good an
example of “theoretical attitude” as we will ever find.
Second, when we look at Niulala’s utterance from the point of view of his
sequential placement, we realize that it is the second pair part of an adjacency
pair consisting, grammatically, of a question and an answer (Schegloff and
Sacks 1973).
(5)’’
in the ground surface (Goodwin 1994: 613–614), they are being socialized to
see the ground in new terms, according to a profession-specific categorization
scheme. Similarly, when jazz students are asked to identity the “interactive”
character of someone’s playing (see discussion of example 2 above), they are
also being socialized to hear music (whether recorded or live) according to a
jazz-specific category system, which includes emic paradigmatic oppositions
such as interactive vs. non-interactive or emic gradient differences, e.g., from
“more” interactive to “less” interactive. In addition, since, as shown in
example (3) above, the fact that one is “listening” must be demonstrated by
the way one plays (Black 2008), any kind of categorization scheme must be
activated and reproduced through specific actions, which in turn contribute to
the constitution of particular kinds of moral persons (Day 2000; Duranti and
Burrell 2004).
Language socialization research has shown that caregivers (of different ages
depending on the social and cultural organization of families and communities)
organize children’s attention to particular linguistic sounds, acts, and routines
(Ochs and Schieffelin 1984; Schieffelin and Ochs 1986b). Children and
novices are constantly being “oriented” through talk and other semiotic
resources toward specific tasks and specific Others, with noticeable cross-
cultural differences (e.g., Ochs and Schieffelin 1984: 297). Children are told
to call out to certain people (e.g., Demuth 1986: 58–59; Watson-Gegeo and
Gegeo 1986; Ochs 1988) or to ask certain kinds of questions of others (e.g.,
Schieffelin 1986). They are also teased and instigated to defend themselves
against present or future threats posed by imagined or real others (e.g., Eisen-
berg 1986; Schieffelin 1990). Language use, therefore, starts within a locally
available set of activities where the child is monitored and directed to move
and speak in certain ways. This means that when, later in life, children or
adults participate in new activities, they have already had considerable experi-
ence speaking, acting, thinking, and feeling in specific ways; they have, in
Bourdieu’s terms, acquired a “habitus.”20
Language socialization experts have argued that these earlier experiences
may affect a person’s ability to change in the ways required by a new environ-
ment or a new activity (e.g., the classroom, the playground, the shop) (see
Heath 1982, 1983; Kulick and Schieffelin 2004; Ochs, Solomon, and Sterponi
2005).
By relying on Husserl’s notion of modification, we can hypothesize that at
least some of the problems encountered not only by students, but also by
educators (or therapists, as in the case discussed by Ochs, Solomon, and
Sterponi 2005) in adapting to new ways of being may be due to the accumu-
lated effects of modifications experienced earlier in life which make it difficult
if not impossible to retrieve earlier, pre-modificational ways of being. As
infants, we can assume body postures that are no longer possible when we
208 Intentions and their modifications
grow older. As young children, we can develop a musical ear that is harder to
achieve later in life as shown by the positive correlation between early expos-
ure to music training and perfect pitch (Pressing 1984; Sacks 2007). After
years of socialization, the way we do things has come to feel as if it is the only
possible way (Dortier 2002: 5; Duranti and Black 2012: 446). We cannot
imagine another way of being and our mind and body just cannot “go there.”
What we have been socialized to think, feel, and do has become part of what
Husserl called “the natural attitude.” In addition to suggesting that we shoud
read Husserl’s use of “natural” as corresponding to what anthropologists call
the “cultural,” I have proposed that we adopt Husserl’s concept of modification
as an analytical tool for the documentation and theorization of how the process
of “naturalization” is realized in the lives of children and novices across
situations and communities.
10 A sense of the other: from intentionality
to intersubjectivity
10.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine in some detail Searle’s (1990) notion of “collective
intentionality” and the distinction he makes between I-Intentions and we-
Intentions to argue that, contrary to what is nonchalantly claimed by Searle
himself, collective intentionality is not synomymous with and cannot replace
the phenomenological notion of intersubjectivity, which is, in turn, a funda-
mental quality of all kinds of human experiences, including the apparently
most individual or private. By reexamining some of Searle’s examples and
providing some new ones taken from my own research on jazz instruction and
jazz performance, I show that, under closer scrutiny, Searle’s notion of col-
lective intentionality provides a limited and sometimes flawed understanding
of how people carry out tasks that involve coordination and collaboration with
others, including those tasks that might not seem to qualify as collective.
Searle’s realization that the notion of intentionality he presented in his
1983 book needed to be expanded to take into consideration that there is
something more than individual actions and individual intentions could be
seen as an answer to the anthropological critique of his model (see Chapter 2).
But the dichotomy he proposes between individual and collective intentions
turns out to be both theoretically and empirically problematic. In the final part
of this chapter I suggest that an alternative and better model of both individual
and collective action can be built by integrating a phenomenological under-
standing of intersubjectivity with the empirical study of how people learn to
and eventually succeed at coordinating their actions in complex joint activities
such as playing in a jazz band.
The theoretical perspective I am favoring in this chapter is built on the
assumption that the world of the individual is always a social world. We
anticipate the actions of others and need to coordinate with them on a regular
basis whether or not we are engaged in activities that are culturally recognized
as “collective” or “joint.” Conversely, even those situations that require a high
level of coordination and can qualify as collective in Searle’s sense of the term,
e.g., playing in a band, require individuals to alternate between attending to
209
210 A sense of the other
their own actions and those of others in situation- and culture-specific ways
that can result in smooth interaction.
his 1983 model of prior intentions and intentions in action. As shown in the
following passage, Searle had discovered “collective intentional behavior.”
It seems obvious that there really is collective intentional behavior as distinct from
individual intentional behavior. You can see this by watching a football team execute a
pass play or hear it by listening to an orchestra. Better still, you can experience it by
actually engaging in some group activity in which your own actions are a part of the
group action. (Searle 1990: 401)
Miller, who accept the role of the other in most actions, that is, even in actions
performed by single agents:
Most of our actions are social in the wide sense that they conceptually presuppose the
existence of other agents and of various social institutions. Of actions that are social in
this sense, some are performed by single agents. The rest are either performed jointly by
several agents or performed by collective agents. (Tuomela and Miller 1988: 369)
For Searle, it is “collective behavior” (as opposed to individual behavior) that
calls for recognition of what he calls “a sense of ‘the other’.” This experience
of the other is “pre-intentional,” which I understand as meaning a type of
experience that is not subject to (what he calls) “representations.”
[I]t seems to me that the capacity to engage in collective behavior requires something
like a pre-intentional sense of “the other” as an actual or potential agent like oneself in
cooperative activities. (Searle 1990: 413)
Here Searle seems to be saying that to be able to participate in collective
intentionality we need to be potentially connected. The use of the term “pre-
intentional” also suggests that this connection would be made possible by a
way of being with others that is unsaid, non-conscious, and undetected by our
rational thought. The question is: Where is this region of being? Where is
human connectedness recognized but not (yet) cognized? Searle’s answer is
“the Background.” As we saw in Chapter 2 (§2.1.4), the Background is the
conceptual as well as practical knowledge acquired by individuals as members
of a given society. The Background is what allows us “to stir” (when we are
making a sauce with someone else) or “play football” (Searle 1990: 413).
fellow human being. These are “all real things which at any given moment are
anticipated together or cogiven only in the background” (Husserl 1973: 33)
and include “human and animal subjects as subjects in the world . . . products
of culture, useful things, works of art, and the like” (Husserl 1973: 34). This is
the domain of “passive synthesis” (Husserl 1973, 2001), that is, a wide range
of experiences in which consciousness is absorbing information and perceiv-
ing entities in the surrounding world (Umwelt) but is not actively attending to
them. It is in this experiential domain that one would expect to find those who
are “potential members of a cooperative activity” (Searle 1990: 414).
Given such a manifest interest in the presence of others in our everyday
world, it is at first difficult to explain Searle’s avoidance in the 1990 essay of
the vast phenomenological literature on intersubjectivity. One justification for
such a noticeable absence, however, was made explicit sixteen years later in a
terse statement, in which Searle revealed that he had found the term “inter-
subjectivity” and the existing literature unclear and therefore of “no use.”
I have never seen a clear explanation of the concept of intersubjectivity, and I will have
no use for the notion. But I will use “collective intentionality” to try to describe the
intentionalistic component of society; and I suspect that if intersubjectivity is a legitim-
ate notion at all, it must amount to collective intentionality. (Searle 2006: 16)
Over the years that followed his 1990 introduction of the concept of collective
intentionality, Searle continued to criticize phenomenological approaches
(Searle 2000), discouraged any phenomenological reading of his work,7 and
went as far as explicitly denouncing some of “the weaknesses of
phenomenology” in his “Reply to Dreyfus” (Searle 2001/2b: 282). This was
unfortunate not only because Searle (and his many readers) could have actually
benefited from an explicit engagement with prior work on intersubjectivity, but
also, and perhaps more importantly, because those who found inspiration in his
concept of collective intentionality took it as equivalent to intersubjectivity,
even though it was not (see below and Duranti 2010).
Searle’s dismissal of phenomenology may be a casualty of the long, unsolv-
able, and unwinnable debate with his Berkeley colleague Herbert Dreyfus (see
Dreyfus 1991, 1993, 2001/2; Searle 2000).8 In an apparent attempt to bring
closure to what he perceived as unjustified attacks by Dreyfus,9 Searle claimed
that Dreyfus’ interpretation of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty had
shown that “they do not have much to contribute to the topics of the logical
structure of intentionality or the logical structure of social and institutional
reality” (Searle 2001/2b: 284). This is a preposterous and defensive assertion
that is hard to make sense of. As already shown in Chapter 9 and in the few
among the many available quotes from Husserl’s discussion of the “horizon,”
phenomenologists have provided innumerable insights into all the issues that
Searle is trying to address, including, of course, the relationship between Self
Searle’s notion of “collective intentionality” 217
and Others. I will give some examples in the rest of this chapter that show how
one might learn about collective action by combining phenomenology with the
empirical investigation of spontaneous human interaction. But first we need to
get a better sense of the ways in which Searle distinguishes between individual
and collective intentions. To this aim, I will here examine the most detailed
example of collective intentionality that Searle provides in the 1990 essay.
I will show that, by leaving out key dimensions of what it means to be together
in a public space, Searle misses the subtle distinction between intersubjectivity
and planned behavior.
The answer given by Searle is that in the first case each person has an intention
that can be expressed without reference to the other whereas in the second case
each individual “I intend” is derivative of a “we-intend” and therefore only in
the second case do we have collective behavior and collective intentionality.
On close examination, we discover that there are some aspects of the two
sets of actions that complicate the distinction drawn by Searle and at the same
time raise some questions about the conceptualization of what constitutes
“collective behavior.”
There is no question that the example is meant to illustrate in a simple and
unambiguous way the difference between the behavior of a group of people
who simply happen to be in the park at the same time and a group that shares a
reason (or motive) to be there, whose members had a chance to practice their
218 A sense of the other
to perform all kinds of acts, including cutting someone off or knocking him
down, which under different circumstances would be considered so aggres-
sive as to warrant restraint and even police intervention. Searle seems to take
all of this for granted by concentrating on the collaboration among members
of the same team, but the people who confront each other on the field during
a game adopt and display attitudes that violate all kinds of rules of etiquette.
The collaboration in the in-group is countered by the systematic lack of
collaboration toward the out-group, all of which is made possible by the
rules of the game.
We might then have identified a paradox in one of the three basic concepts
of social-institutional reality (Searle 2006: 16). The notion of collective inten-
tionality is designed to capture what ties people to institutions and allows them
to be involved in joint activities.12 But a closer examination of the situations in
which such “shared intentionality” is supposed to occur shows that it produces
a type of person with strong affiliation only with the goal of certain others.
What is an increase of sociality toward some members turns out to be a
reduction of sociality toward others. The “we” of the members of a team is
extentionally different from the “we” of the two teams who are playing on the
field. The members of a team use an “inclusive-we” when talking to the
members of their team but an “exclusive-we” (meaning “you are not included
in our ‘we’”) when talking with the members of the other team.
Seen in this way, in introducing the notion of collective intentionality Searle
(1990) avoids discussing a problem that was debated among phenomenologists
half a century earlier, when Sartre (1943) objected to both Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s views of intersubjectivity because he saw the we-relationship as
inherently (or essentially) confrontational and conflictual and thus something
more than taking the point of view of others (Husserl’s position) or always
already being-with or being-along others (Heidegger’s position) (see Zahavi
2001b for an assessment of these positions).
doing things, but also on the possibilities made available by the presence of
people and things in the environment we inhabit. On most days I do not need
to remember the rule about driving on the right side because it comes
“naturally” to me to stay on the side of the road with the cars that go in
the same direction. I just need to concentrate on not crossing the visible line
in the middle of the road and avoid the cars coming toward me, which are
conveniently moving along the other side of the road. My “driving on the
right” is everyone else’s, as much as my, accomplishment. It is also made
possible and guided by the shape of the road, the white lines marking the
lanes, and the actions of the other motorists in and by means of their vehicles,
which are built in such a way as to allow for certain courses of actions and
reactions in time and space.
One way in which anthropology becomes particularly relevant in all of this
is that the people involved in the activities in question (and their communities
at large) may not recognize such a distribution of knowledge and action. For
example, it is not uncommon around the world that the contribution of certain
people will be ignored in certain contexts and therefore what is de facto a
collaboration (e.g., between a politician and his or her team of writers) turns
out to be seen as the work and achievement of only one individual.14 But we
do not need to go too far to find representations of activities in which
individuals do take into consideration, anticipate, or adjust to the actions of
others and in so doing participate in a collectivity and give evidence of such
participation.
interactions unless we are operating at such a general and abstract level that
details never matter. Much of the debate between Searle and Dreyfus has been
about the notion of causation (i.e., do intentions cause behavior?) and about
whether we need to have a rule in our mind (regardless of whether we think of
it) when we behave in a certain way. Do we need to have the rule “drive on the
right side” when we are in the US, France, or Italy but have a different rule,
that is, “drive on the left side,” when we are in the UK or Australia? Dreyfus,
who follows Heidegger’s description of tool-use, argues that “the rule” sur-
faces in human consciousness or talk only when our routine course of action is
interrupted or put in jeopardy. Thus, Americans would think about the rule
“drive on the left” when they go to the UK or Australia and, vice versa, people
who are used to driving in the UK or Australia would have to think about the
rule “drive on the right,” at least for the first few days.
Both Searle and Dreyfus seem to forget that rules do not exist in a vacuum
or only in the mind. When one is in London or Sydney, it is common to find
reminders on the pavement to look right when crossing the street. The fact
that there are no such reminders in Los Angeles or Rome is instructive of an
asymmetry in intersubjective stance: in some places people try to imagine
what a stranger is likely to do and show some concern about it (since when,
how, and why are all interesting questions for a potentially interesting
project).
No matter how important, the focus on rules and rule-following – a favorite
target of criticism by Wittgenstein (1958) – has in fact distracted us from at
least one other fundamental and equally important property of human thinking,
feeling, and acting in the world, namely, our flexibility and adaptability to new
situations (see the discussion of the notion of modification in Chapter 9). In the
next section, I will tackle these issues from the point of view of spontaneity
and a related dimension of all human action: improvisation.
Melvoin; When I play I try to get will and intention completely out of
the picture. Will and intention is what we’re practicing. Like to
learn how you play your ax and you ab- you absorb certain
intellectual things and you work on them and apply your mind
and intend to do certain things, but the performance,
particularly of improvisation. . . . is . . . uh . . . thoughtless. And
should be.
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990) characterized such creative moments as a
“flow,” a concept that Keith Sawyer (2001) used to explain what makes
possible certain types of musical coordination among jazz musicians. The goal
of the artists, in this case musicians, is to reach a particular type of relation
between the body (e.g., the hands playing, the eyes looking at the written
music or the other musicians) and the mind (which is processing the infor-
mation and anticipating what is coming up next) that is reminiscent of a
number of religious practices including Zen Buddhism or of physical activities
related to religious practices like yoga.
As pointed out by Jean-François Dortier, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus can
help us understand the origin of such “spontaneity”:
The habitus is in the first place the product of an apprenticeship that has become
unconscious and is understood therefore as a seemingly natural attitude freely
evolving in a given context. Thus, musicians can freely improvise at the piano only
after having spent a long time practicing their scales, acquiring the rules of compo-
sition and harmony. It is only after having internalized musical codes and constraints
(the “structured structures”) that a pianist can then compose, create, invent, and
226 A sense of the other
transmit her music (the “structuring structures”). Authors, composers, artists thus
live their creations as due to a freedom to create, to pure inspiration, because they
are no longer aware of the codes and the styles that they have deeply internalized.
Such is the case for music as well as, in general, for language, writing, and thinking.
We believe them all to be free and disembodied, whereas they are the product of
deeply rooted constraints and structures. (Dortier 2002: 5, translation from Duranti
and Black 2012: 446)
Like athletes and other people who routinely train their body to do certain
things, musicians over time become more aware than most people of the fact
that their body (e.g., their fingers, mouth) typically needs to act before they can
think about what to do next. They train their body to move according to a
certain pattern in order to “feel” the rhythm (e.g., see Phillips-Silver and
Trainor 2007). Professional musicians make this knowledge explicit when
they teach younger or less experienced players. In the Latin Jazz Ensemble
class I videorecorded at UCLA, especially at the beginning of the academic
year, the instructor-bandleader Bobby Rodriguez wanted to get the students to
play a given passage with a distinct “Latin feel,” sometimes consisting of a
particular way of accenting, sustaining, or suddenly terminating certain notes
or passages and particular ways of playing “along” other players so as to create
sonically interesting contrasts. One of his teaching strategies was to ask the
students a question that identified or implied a problem in the tempo, rhythm,
or coordination among players: “Do you tap your foot when you play?” Other
times he tried to get the students to appreciate the importance of a particular
routine practice by engaging in storytelling. In (9) below, Rodriguez frames his
recommendation to get the body into the right tempo within a mini-narrative
about playing with some “hip cats” who were reading the score and tapping
their feet at the same time. The practical implication here is: “if hip guys do it,
you can do it too.”
(9) (Latin Jazz Ensemble Course, UCLA, February 12, 2004; Bobby Rodriguez
instructor)
Rodriguez; I was sitting in a room the other day with some really like hip
cats . . . and every one of them that was reading was going
like this ((taps his right foot in tempo lifting front of foot four
times then starts to talk but keeps tapping with the same
tempo)) I don’t know why . . . younger people don’t think this
is like important because it IS . . . this is very important to
just get your ((as shown in Figure 10.1, the movements of
his left arm and left foot complete the utterance by
demonstrating what he means)) and this ((points with left
hand down toward the left foot that is still tapping)) has
nothing to do with ((lifts up his hand and brings trumpet up in
front of his mouth as if he was going to start playing)) what’s
Spontaneity and improvisation 227
One of Rodriguez’ teaching strategies is to get the students to acquire the sense
of timing by making them act it out. The implicit theory here is that the
embodiment of a collectively shared steady tempo will make it possible for
the mouth or fingers of each player to be part of the ensemble, even though
everyone is doing something different.
This type of demonstration provides us with a model-in-theory (as articu-
lated by the instructor) and a model-in-practice (as demonstrated by the
instructor or one of the more experienced players) of how, in participating in
a collective activity, individual players are expected to enter a particular type
of mental and embodied zone where certain tasks (or subgoals) can become
“automatic” and thus feel effortless (see the above quote from Dortier 2002).
Figure 10.1 Dr. Bobby Rodriguez, trumpet player, conductor and instructor,
demonstrates with left hand and left foot how to keep time while playing –
see example (9)
228 A sense of the other
experiences of the world because there are others out there who look and seem
to act like me but have distinct lives. They can and do perceive the same object
I perceive from different sides. And I can see the object from their point of
view if I go in their place. This possibility of “trading places” (Husserl 1989:
177) simultaneously recognizes their transcendence and the sameness of the
object through time and space:
The things posited by others are also mine: in empathy I participate in the other’s
positing. E.g., I identify the thing I have over and against me in the mode of appearance
α with the thing posited by the other in the mode of appearance β. To this belongs the
possibility of substitution by means of trading places. Each person has, at the same
place in space, “the same” appearances of the same things – if, as we might suppose, all
have the same sensibility. And on this account, even the “view” of a thing is Objecti-
fied. Each person has, from the same place in space and with the same lighting, the
same view of, for example, a landscape. But never can the other, at exactly the same
time as me (in the originary content of lived experience attributed to him) have the exact
same appearance as I have. My appearances belong to me, his to him. (Husserl 1989:
177; emphasis mine)
This does not mean that there is no difference between the experience of one
individual acting alone and a number of people acting together, but that the
difference is not as sharp a dichotomy as Searle suggests with the distinction
between individual and collective intentionality.
The recognition of the communal quality of life experiences is important
because, among other things, it allows for correction (Husserl 1970a: 163), that
is, for the adjustment of my perception to that of others. From the point of view
of phenomenology, when there is a problem in understanding, people can and
will move out of the “natural attitude” – what Schutz in the quote below
glosses as “my simple and direct awareness of the other person” – and
consciously engage in an act of interpretation or reinterpretation.
For instance, I may ask, “Have I understood you correctly?” “Don’t you mean
something else?” “What do you mean by such and such action?” These are typical
of the questions that I am forced to ask every day in my relations with other people.
The moment I raise such questions, I have abandoned my simple and direct aware-
ness of the other person, my immediate grasp of him in all his subjective
particularity. I have abandoned the living intentionality of our confrontation. The
light in which I am looking at him is now a different one: my attention has shifted
to those deeper layers that up to now had been unobserved and taken for granted.
I no longer experience my fellow man in the sense of sharing his life with him;
instead I “think about him.” But now I am acting like a social scientist.” (Schutz
1967: 140–141)
The possibility of such shifting – what Husserl captured with his notions of
modifications (see Chapter 9) – is an aspect of human flexibility that is
cultivated in jazz improvisation (see above) as well as other art forms. It allows
individuals to adjust to particular circumstances and learn new ways of seeing,
Conclusions 231
hearing, and speaking, albeit not without struggle and with certain limitations
(Ochs, Solomon, and Sterponi 2005). The flexibility of our intersubjective
engagement in and with the world, in turn, makes possible social adaptability,
which, however, comes with a price. The very possibility of seeing the world
from the point of view of an Other, who, in turn, constitutes us as objects of his
or her perception and evaluation, makes us vulnerable. In making the world a
shared field of perception aiming at a shared or exchangeable understanding,
intersubjectivity also makes it into a world of mutual monitoring. As pointed
out by a number of philosophers and social theorists, such monitoring has a
dark side. Being able to empathize, exchange places, and understand each
other also feeds social conformity, lack of authenticity,16 the acceptance of the
locally sanctioned prestige – what Gramsci (1971, 1975) called “hegemony” –
and, ultimately, the reproduction of the status quo.
Given all of these possible and very real effects of our intersubjective
engagement with the world of others, it should not be surprising that, as
discussed in other chapters in this book, in some places in the Pacific, includ-
ing Samoa, and possibly elsewhere in the world, some people may try to avoid
revealing too much about their own thoughts and feelings – children certainly
learned that at the dinner table (Ochs and Taylor 1995) – or speculating about
those of others (see the discussion of the “opacity of mind” in Chapter 8).
10.8 Conclusions
This chapter, which started with the appraisal of Searle’s notion of collective
intentionality (and “we-intentions”) as distinct from individual intentionality,
ended up with the discovery of the intersubjective side of any type of human
act, whether or not the individual actor (or the observer) conceptualizes what is
being thought, felt, or done as a “social” phenomenon. It should not then be
surprising that driving the car through traffic is something that we are able to
do because of a series of skills, habits, instruments, and affordances that make
it possible for our mind and body to coordinate with people and things around.
We are helped and guided by the road, the lanes, the traffic lights, the road
signs, and the ways in which automobiles are built. This is to say that our
actions are typically embedded in an artifact-filled environment that minimally
constrains and more often suggests to us ways of moving in the built or in the
natural environment. A phenomenological understanding of our involvement
not only with tools – which are made by others and are often used for others –
but with any object of perception recognizes co-presence and anticipation of
human interactions even when we are not purposely or consciously preparing
for a future “collective” activity of the type described by Searle (1990).
These observations bring out the fact that, however useful for thinking about
collaboration, Searle’s notion of collective intentionality may underestimate
232 A sense of the other
the common distribution of tasks and coordination that are not only necessary
but also constitutive of social life, as recognized by the researchers who
proposed approaches such as “distributed cognition” or “active externalism”
(see §10.3).
This discussion constitutes an interpretive “turn” with respect to the original
claim made by anthropologists that intentions are either inaccessible to certain
groups (e.g., certain Pacific communities) or not relevant to the ways in which
they interpret each other’s actions (see Chapters 2, 3, and 8). The original
anthropological critique has moved in new directions. Even when we restrict
our analysis to the misleadingly simple and obvious cases of collective inten-
tionality provided by Searle, like the “people in the park” discussed in this
chapter, the difference between “collective” and “individual” intentions can
easily be questioned or even vanish in light of what people ordinarily do when
in the presence of one another in a public place like a park. We are then faced
with the fact that some of the properties of “we-intentions,” like mutual
adaptation and mutual monitoring, seem to be occurring even among people
who are not seen as doing something “together.” Furthermore, we have found
that improvisation is a recurrent feature of human action, even when it seems
planned.
Some of the data I collected on jazz instruction and jazz performance gives
us an opportunity to hear musicians’ conceptualization of improvisation and
observe one of them while he socializes novices to be engaged in highly
coordinated collective behavior (e.g., playing in a band). Through the analysis
of what we might call “the embodiment of intentions” in playing with others,
we get a feel for how mind and body need to coordinate in the development of
a habitus that makes creativity possible within the constraints of a shared sense
of time and timing.
It is with these examples in mind that I introduced Husserl’s theory of
perception and showed that it is quite different from the individualistic theory
presented by Searle (1983). It is through perception that I introduced Husserl’s
notion of intersubjectivity, which starts from the assumption that Others are
not only always potentially “in play” but are de facto taken into account in any
kind of act, including the most basic ones like looking at a table.
We are thus reminded that, whether or not we accept Searle’s notion of “we-
intentions” as a “primitive” (logical) notion and thus distinct from an accumu-
lation of separate “I-intentions,” the Other is in fact always already there, a
point made most famously by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit ([1927]1993) but in
fact already present in Husserl, as shown by his earlier writings and lecture
notes (Zahavi 2001b). Different cultural traditions may or may not recognize
or encode in their language the wide range of our human ways of being-with-
others, but we know that they are there. Our intentions, together with our
language, are always in a world of others.
11 The intentional continuum
11.0 Introduction
In this concluding chapter I argue that, rather than discouraging any use of
“intentions,” the various cross-cultural, cross-linguistic, and historical analyses
presented in the prior chapters have shown the need to formulate a more
contextually rich and contextually sensitive notion of intentionality as a pan-
human capacity to attend to all kinds of real and imagined entities while giving
them meaning. I believe that some notion of intentionality – and thus some
notion of “intention” – is needed if we want to make sense of how people
orient themselves in the social world, anticipate the actions of others, and
follow their own instincts, intuitions, moods, needs, and desires. Rather than
just being another “language game” (Wittgenstein 1958), a discussion of
“intentions” – which includes a critical stance toward it – is important for an
anthropological understanding of human agency as constrained by existing
relations of power and yet sometimes resistant to long-established institutional
practices. One lesson of our interpretive journey has been that the reliance on
intentions and their apparent avoidance must always be contextualized. The
notion of “intentional continuum” will be here introduced as a way of making
sense of the contextual variability in intentional action that I documented in
this book.1
233
234 The intentional continuum
speech, extending the use of intentions to provide his own definition of what
counts as “action.”
For Grice speakers are accountable for saying something that is supposed to
be true and want their audience to recognize their intention that they mean it
that way. Austin wrote that for speakers to “mean a promise,” they had to
“have a certain intention” to keep their word (Austin 1962: 11). But what does
“intend” for Grice and “intention” for Austin mean? Not necessarily the same
thing. When Grice says that a speaker “must intend to induce” a certain belief
in an audience (see §2.1), he seems to say that the speaker wants the audience
to have that belief and to recognize that she wants them to have it. Some
empirical support for the connection between meaning and wanting is found in
French and Italian where to say “to mean” one literally says “want to say,” as
in je veux dire (in French) or voglio dire (in Italian), both of which can be
translated as either ‘I mean’ or ‘I want to say.’
For Austin, an intention could have the sense of a determination, will, or
commitment to doing something. This determination may vary depending on
the specific speech act. In the case of promises, intention may cover sincerity –
a commitment to be sincere – and the “good will” to follow up with an action
that satisfies the “obligation” established by the promise. Austin admitted that
there could be varying degrees of intentionality by saying that when commit-
ting to some future action by means of the the expression “I shall . . .” we could
add adverbs like “undoubtedly” or “probably” (Austin 1975: 77). This sug-
gests that “intention” here is understood as a positive disposition to some
future action.
When Searle went beyond speech to propose his more general theory of
intentionality, which included a theory of what constitutes “action,” he tried to
clarify his use of “intention” by drawing a distinction between (a) “intention”
as the description of one among a large repertoire of possible acts that can be
described in the English language together with wish, fear, hope, etc., and (b)
“Intention” (with a capital “I”) as the more general and foundational concept
corresponding to Brentano’s and Husserl’s sense of intentionality. This is the
very broad notion of intentionality as the “aboutness” of the acts of our
consciousness in relation to real or imaginary entities. But once Searle started
to use the categories “intentional” and “unintentional action,” he seemed to fall
back on a more ordinary use of the English intention, sometimes understood as
the conscious goal of an action and other times as an unconscious goal, which
can be made explicit upon reflection. This is at least how I read the two
hierarchically related types of intentions that he called, respectively, “prior
intentions” and “intentions in action.” The former cause the latter, which are,
in turn, means through which the (higher-level) “prior intention” can be
realized. Prior intentions may have as a scope fairly complex actions like
going to the office, buying a car, telling a story, as well as more simple actions
The meaning of intentions and their uses 235
like grabbing the handle of a cup, turning on the car’s engine, putting on a
jacket. “Intentions in action” cover what Artificial Intelligence scholars call
“sub-goals” or “simple goals” (Lin 1997), which are needed in order to
accomplish the higher goal defined by the prior intention.
For Searle, an event qualifies as an “action” (that is, as an “intentional
action”) by the actor only if it is within the scope of an intention. For example,
in Searle’s description of the case of the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
in Sarajevo by the anarchist Gavilo Princip, we are told that Princip’s (overall)
“prior intention” was to kill the Archduke in order to avenge Serbia, and this
“action” required a number of “intentions in action” (e.g., pulling the trigger of
the pistol). There were other events that followed the murder of the Archduke;
for example, World War I started, but such events do not qualify as Princip’s
“actions” because they were not included in his (prior) intention. World War
I would then be an “unintentional action” (Searle 1983: 98–100). The same
could be said about Oedipus marrying Jocasta. Since Oedipus did not know at
the time that Jocasta was his mother, despite the fact that “Oedipus married his
mother” is a true proposition, “marrying his mother” cannot be considered
Oedipus’ “action” because it was not in his (prior) intention, hence Searle’s
rejection of “descriptions” as ways to identify “actions” (see §2.2).
that Iuli’s charge against Loa had not been announced at the beginning of the
meeting during the first speech of the day when the ‘topics of the meeting’
(matā`upu o le fono) or ‘topics of the day’ (matā`upu o le aso) are announced
(see §5.5.1). We might then conclude that, from the point of view of the
council members, Loa’s “action” included the embarrassment his reported
speech had caused, even though from the point of view of speech act theory,
such embarrassment was a “perlocutionary effect” and from Searle’s point of
view it was an “unintended action” and as such did not qualify as his action.
How can we make sense of this case for an anthropological model of
human action? One answer to this question would be to say that Samoans
subscribe to the so-called “absolute liability” doctrine, according to which
people are judged on the basis of the consequences of their actions, regard-
less of their intentions. This is what Goldman (1993) critically imputes to
what Ochs and I wrote in the 1980s (see §3.4). But as I have shown in
§3.4.1, this hypothesis does not hold. Samoans do have terms for causes and
reasons, which the members of the village council use in discussing whether
certain individuals should be held responsible for certain actions. It is just
that they do not go into much detail in such cases, tending to stick to causes,
e.g., being drunk, that avoid getting into a person’s specific in-order-to
motives (Schutz 1967).
A second possible answer is to say that Loa’s actions are not evaluated in
terms of his intentions but in terms of Loa’s responsibility, as suggested by
Iuli’s speech where he complains that Loa did not do anything to remedy the
situation once he realized that the MP was not coming. This would be a
departure from Searle’s model because he thought that it is a “mistake to
suppose there is some connection, perhaps even identity, between intention
and responsibility” (Searle 1983: 103). However, a connection is recognized
by those legal systems in the West for which there are actions that one might
not have intended but might have foreseen, thereby implying that a person
might have known or thought that what he was doing might have caused harm
to others.
And what about the intentions of Loa’s accuser, Iuli? As we saw in
Chapter 3, during the discussion of Loa’s case, no one brought up possible
reasons for Iuli to be so adamant about the need to punish Loa or possible
goals of his accusation. Given Loa’s family connection with the MP, it is
possible that Loa had campaigned on the MP’s behalf and thus against the
three candidates from his own village, including Iuli. Whatever information
Iuli had access to and might have motivated his attack on Loa, the issue of
personal revenge was not mentioned during the meeting. In providing an
ethnographic analysis of the events, what Geertz (1973) called “thick descrip-
tion,” such details would matter, but the same reluctance to talk about inten-
tions that makes this case interesting from a comparative perspective would
The meaning of intentions and their uses 237
make it difficult for us to find textual evidence about Iuli’s ulterior motives,
especially in a public arena like the Samoan fono.
The fact that Loa could be accused at all, together with the fact that his
“intentions” in Searle’s sense of the term – that is, the limited goal of reporting
the news of the MP coming – were not taken into consideration suggests that,
in engaging in this type of cross-cultural analysis, we might find differences in
the very scope of what counts in evaluating a person’s actions and the
responsibility for those actions. In Loa’s case, Iuli and some of the other
members of the village council might have thought of Loa’s “action” as
something more than just “announcing” or “reporting” what the MP told
him. It could have been that the very fact of making the announcement about
the MP’s visit might have been seen as one move within a wider sequence of
actions, which might have had as a goal the accumulation of cultural capital
and personal prestige. For example, Loa might have been seen as using the
announcement as a strategy to claim a preferred relationship with the MP. It is
also possible that Iuli and others interpreted Loa’s action as an attempt to act or
appear as a political broker, someone who could assume the important role of
peacemaker after the tension created by the incumbent’s victory over Iuli and
the other two matai from Loa’s village (see §3.3). In this case, instead of being
irrelevant and inscrutable, as suggested by the doctrine of the “opacity of
mind” (see Robbins and Rumsey 2008 and my discussion in Chapter 8), Loa’s
“intentions,” understood as his individual goal in reporting the MP’s message,
might have been in everyone’s mind. In fact, the other members of the village
council might have been wondering why the MP told Loa about the visit
instead of communicating directly with one of the senior orators (Iuli or
Moe`ono). Claiming or implying a privileged relationship with a higher-status
person like the MP can be dangerous in such a status- and rank-conscious
society as Samoa. All of this might have become aggravating circumstances
once the MP and the gifts did not arrive.
What can we conclude from all of this? One lesson is that if we interpret
intentions as goals of actions, as Searle seems to be doing in his examples (see
above), we must allow for the fact that those goals are subject to local
understanding and therefore that the scope of the conditions of satisfaction
for an action will vary across cultural (including institutional) contexts. We
have thus at least two possibilities. We can say that certain social actors are
accountable for intentions that they might not have had, but others attribute to
them anyhow on the basis of their institutional role, as commonly recognized
in western legal systems, where an employer can be blamed and be financially
responsible for negligence in the actions of the employees, and in everyday
life, like when parents are blamed for their children’s actions. The second
possibility is to agree with those who believe that “the intention” of a given
action is more likely to be a post hoc process of justification based on the
238 The intentional continuum
words, the Samoan word loto covers a wide range of meanings that make
evident the affective element of human action and the ways in which cognitive,
emotional, and embodied dispositions participate in the constitution of the
moral character of a person (see also Mageo 1991, 2010). As always in cross-
cultural and cross-linguistic analysis, we may be tempted to imagine what it
would have been like to propose a theory of meaning (and action) that starts
from something like loto instead of intention. Alternatively, one could work
with English and other European languages (e.g., French, German) and ask
what kind of theory of human action could be built on notions that share a
family resemblance with “intention” but come with a different set of connota-
tions, like, for example, “will” and “volition,” two closely related concepts
whose history in the social sciences and humanities has been recently exam-
ined by Murphy and Throop (2010).
243
244 Appendix A
245
246 Appendix B
who are familiar with Samoan orthography that I am citing from a recording of
what people actually said. For example, I might write /e fogo ma pokopoko/ to
make it clear that the phrase that people would normally see written e fono ma
potopoto, meaning ‘to meet and gather,’ is taken from a transcript of a
recording where it was pronounced [e foŋo ma pokopoko].
Samoan vowels
Samoan has five vowels, which can be short or long, roughly corresponding to
the quality of the five vowels of a language like Spanish (for a more precise
phonetic analysis, see Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 25–28):
a, e, i, o, u
ā, ē, ī, ō, ū
The length is, however, phonologically distinctive, that is, in some cases it is
the determining factor distinguishing between two different words, e.g., sal-
amo [salamo] for (the English borrowing) ‘psalm’ vs. salamō [salamoː], with
the stress on the last syllable, for the verb ‘repent.’ Unfortuately, the macron on
long vowels is only occasionally used in the Bible and was abolished a long
time ago by the (then Western) Samoan Department of Education. This
sometimes creates confusion not only for foreigners trying to learn Samoan,
but, more importantly, among Samoan children reading texts like the Samoan
Bible that contain previously unheard long and complex words. The same
could be said about the use of the inverted apostrophe for the glottal stop (/ʔ/),
which is often omitted in writing in both word-initial and word-internal
position, e.g., the word for ‘boat’ is typically spelled vaa instead of va`a –
the glottal stop here corresponding to Proto-Polynesian *k, which is still
present in other Polynesian languages, e.g., in Maori where the word for ‘boat’
is waka.
Samoan consonants
Samoan has a total of thirteen consonants (Mosel and Hovdhaugen 1992: 20).
In written and ‘proper’ Samoan (see above), three of the consonants (k, h, and
r) are only found in borrowings from other languages, especially, but not only,
for the many proper names found in the Bible, e.g., Herota ‘Herod,’ Esera
‘Ezra,’ and Mareko ‘Mark.’ The sound /k/, however, is also found (in place of
/t/) in the ‘bad speech’ style (see above). Here is the entire set of the conson-
ants as represented in standard Samoan orthography:
f, g (for /ŋ/), h, k, l, m, n, p, r, s, t, v, ` (for /ʔ/)
Transcription conventions for Samoan 247
1 Rethinking anti-intentionalism
1 On the notion of “preference” in conversation, see Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks
(1977). For the notion of “local preference,” see Ochs (1996: 429–30), and for
“cultural preference,” see Chapter 3 and especially §3.4.
2 By mentioning “extended period” – a vague and relative concept – I mean to stress
the fact that ethnographers tend to be with the people they study for a period of time
that is much longer (sometimes weeks, other times months, and in many cases a year
or more) and more involving from a personal point of view than the occasional
encounter where a “fieldworker” may conduct an interview, administer a question-
naire, or record an event and then leave the site never to return or without finding out
much about the lives of the people he or she recorded.
2 Intentions in speaking and acting: the Standard Theory and its foes
1 It is important to acknowledge that Austin himself did not seem comfortable with the
label “analytic philosophy” for his kind of inquiry and considered the possibility of
calling it “linguistic phenomenology,” as he wrote in his “A Plea for Excuses”:
In view of the prevalence of the slogan “ordinary language,” and of such names as
“linguistic” or “analytic” philosophy or “the analysis of language,” one thing needs
specially emphasizing to counter misunderstandings. When we examine what we
should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again
not merely at words (or “meaning,” whatever they may be) but also at the realities we
use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen
our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason
I think it might be better to use, for this way of doing philosophy, some less
misleading name than those given above – for instance, “linguistic phenomenology,”
but that is rather a mouthful. (Austin 1970: 182)
2 On the history of the central role of the individual in society, see Sennett (1974) and
the references given by Rosen (1985).
3 A similar use of intention is found in the second volume of Husserl’s Logische
Untersuchungen:
The articulate sound-complex . . . first becomes a spoken word or communicative bit
of speech when a speaker produces it with the purpose [in der Absicht] of “expressing
himself about something” through its means; he must endow it with a sense [Sinn] in
248
Notes to pages 12–20 249
certain acts of mind, a sense he desires to share with his listeners. Such sharing
becomes a possibility if the listener also understands the speaker’s intention [Inten-
tion]. He does this inasmuch as he takes the speaker to be a person, who is not
uttering mere sounds but speaking to him. The person accompanies those sounds
with certain sense-giving acts, which the sounds reveal, and whose sense he wants
to communicate. (Husserl 1901: 32–33; English translation by J. N. Findlay in
Husserl 1970b: 276–277, here reproduced with some minor changes)
4 Additional references of this nature can be found in Bach (1990).
5 I am using “action” here in Searle’s (1983) sense of the word, that is, as synonym-
ous with “intentional action,” see below.
6 Searle clarifies his position on causality early on in the Intentionality book:
“Intentional states stand in causal relations to the neurophysiological (as well as,
of course standing in causal relations to other Intentional states), and . . . Intentional
states are realized in the neurophysiology of the brain” (Searle 1983: 15). A few
sentences later, Searle gives his view of the “mind–body problem.” “[T]here is no
such problem. The ‘mind–body problem’ is no more a real problem than the
‘stomach–digestion problem’” (Searle 1983: 15).
7 Searle does not address the issue of the mental representation or regulatory mech-
anisms by which variation is endemic at the level of intentions in action and thus not
predictable from the “prior intention.”
8 Given that they are supposed to be unconscious, one might be tempted to consider
such intentions in action as part of what Searle (1983) calls “the Background” (see
§2.1.4), but they are not, because the Background is meant to cover “preintentional”
stances and “preintentional skills” (1983: 144–145) that are not “represented” in the
mind, that is, they do not have corresponding “representations.”
9 This conjecture seems reasonable given that Searle and Dreyfus co-taught courses
in the Department of Philosophy at Berkeley. But the debate between the two
philosophers over the last two decades suggests that they might have been mis-
communicating about their respective goals, approaches, and methods (e.g., see
Dreyfus 1991, 1993, 2001/2; Searle 2000, 2001/2b).
10 The phrase does not seem to be an actual quote from Heidegger’s Being and Time
even though the terms given between quotes by Searle are found in Heidegger
(1962).
11 Cerbone (2000) argued that there are similarities between Searle and Heidegger, but
only discussed the two philosophers’ attitude with respect to the old issue of the
existence of the external world.
12 It was for this reason that I did not include intentionality in my definition of agency
(Duranti 2004).
13 Here is Searle’s attempt to explain his own way of using “representation”:
There is probably no more abused a term in the history of philosophy than
“representation,” and my use of this term differs both from its use in traditional
philosophy and from its use in contemporary cognitive psychology and artificial
intelligence. When I say, for example, that a belief is a representation I am most
emphatically not saying that a belief is a kind of picture, nor am I endorsing the
Tractatus account of meaning, nor am I saying that a belief re-presents something
that has been presented before, nor am I saying that a belief has a meaning, nor am
250 Notes to pages 21–29
I saying that it is a kind of thing from which one reads off its conditions of
satisfaction by scrutinizing it. The sense of “representation” in question is meant
to be entirely exhausted by the analogy with speech acts: the sense of “represent” in
which a belief represents its conditions of satisfaction is the same sense in which a
statement represents its conditions of satisfaction. To say that a belief is a repre-
sentation is simply to say that it has a propositional content and a psychological
mode, that its propositional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction
under certain aspects, that its psychological mode determines a direction of fit or its
propositional content, in a way that all of these notions . . . are explained by the
theory of speech acts . . . [representation] is just a shorthand for this constellation of
logical notions borrowed from the theory of speech acts. (Searle 1983: 11–12)
14 For an overt reading of Bourdieu’s theory in terms of Heidegger’s criticism of
Husserl’s theory of intentionality and the implicit focus on the Subject–Object
relation, see Dreyfus (1991: 204–205). For a more Husserlian interpretation of
Bourdieu’s writings, see Throop and Murphy (2002).
15 The idea of a “psychological turn” in Searle’s adoption of Austin’s perspective on speech
acts was common in the early 1980s among the anthropologists who were familiar with
speech act theory. One of them was the influential Clifford Geertz, to whom I had sent the
paper that I had presented at the 1983 Meetings of the American Anthropological
Association, together with an invitation to participate in a panel at the 1984 Annual
Meetings. To my surprise, Geertz answered me right away, generously praising my paper
and suggesting the phrase “socio-centric” as a possible name for the type of approach that
I was promoting, which he saw as closer to what Austin was trying to do than “Searle’s
psychologization of him.” I am grateful to Professor Karen Blu, Geertz’s widow, for
granting permission to reproduce the letter in its entirety (reproduced on p. 251).
16 For some textual and biographical details on the professional, intellectual, and
personal relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see, among others, Hopkins
(1993), Husserl (1997), Moran (2000a, 2000b: 226–233), Heidegger (2002), and
Kisiel and Sheehan (2007).
17 See Moran (2005: 17). Brentano had studied Scholastic theology as a seminarian
(Runggaldier 1989) and had absorbed Thomas Aquinas’ notion of “intentio” as some-
thing immanent – hence his use of the expression “intentional inexistence” – in the form
of a doubling or correlate of the external object in consciousness (Spiegelberg 1976).
18 Husserl (1913) used the phrase “die natürliche Einstellung” which was translated as
“the natural standpoint” by W. R. B. Gibson (Husserl 1931) and changed to “the
natural attitude” by later translators and interpreters (see, e.g., Husserl 1982).
Unfortunately, the psychological flavor of the English attitude made it unappealing
to anthropologists like Clifford Geertz (1973: 110n).
19 On the success of Heidegger’s philosophy in post-WWII France and his relationship
with French intellectuals and academics, see Janicaud (2001, 2002) and Kleinberg
(2005). For a discussion of Levinas’ role in introducing Husserl in France and the
reception of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s notions of intention and
intersubjectivity, see Moyn (2005: 21–62 and passim).
20 The Latin habitus is the translation of Aristotle’s hexis, a connection that is lost by
the earlier English translation of ‘habitus’ with ‘habit,’ e.g., in Thomas Aquinas’
([1225?–1274] 1947) discussion of human virtue as ‘habit’ (Latin habitus) (see
Summa Theologica, “Treatise on Habits”).
Notes to page 29 251
252 Notes to pages 29–35
21 For the list of the German edition of the Husserliana volumes, see http://hiw.
kuleuven.be/hua/editionspublications/husserliana-gesammeltewerke
22 Since the 1950s a growing number of authors have carefully examined Husserl’s
books and lecture notes to offer accounts of continuity and change in his interests and
theory, from the earlier analyses of numbers to the lectures on intersubjectivity.
Among the most recent contributions in English that cover Husserl’s entire career,
see Moran (2005), Mohanty (2008, 2011), and the essays in Smith and Smith (1995).
23 Earlier attempts to reclaim the relevance of Wittgenstein’s ideas for the field of
linguistic anthropology might have been too limited (Duranti 1985) or too late to
have any impact on the new generations (see Duranti 1997: 236–244 and passim;
Das 1998).
24 For a phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein’s use of “intention,” see Gier
(1981: 135–153).
25 For a critical appraisal of Apel’s position and premises, see, among others, Leilich
(1993) and De Mulder (1993).
26 This is a citation found in Nettleship (1889: 493), who quotes from Cicero’s Orator,
but the English translation is mine because Nettleship did not provide one.
27 This is what Bratman later called “the planning theory of intention”: “The main idea
is to see intentions as elements of stable, partial plans of action concerning present
and future conduct” (Bratman 1999: 2). This is a theory of intentions in which
commitment plays a key role. For this reason, Bratman’s (1992) notion of “shared
co-operative activity” differs from Searle’s (1990) description of “collective inten-
tionality,” which I will discuss in Chapter 10.
28 This section is an expansion of an earlier discussion (Duranti 2006a: 33–35).
29 From transcript “The inspection” (1978). Here is the word-by-word gloss:
magaku `oe e makagā
think 2ndSg TA ugly
‘you think it’s ugly?’ or ‘you think it looks bad?’
31 Here is the Samoan text from the Tusi Paia (1887) with a word-by-word literal gloss:
Faauta, ou te manatu e fai se fale i le suafa o Ieova lo’u Atua
behold I Pres think to do a house in the name of Jehovah my Lord
32 The wide range of meanings of these compounds with loto, as well as the use of loto
in the Samoan translation of the Bible (see §2.7.1 and §4.3.1), do not fully support
Mageo’s interpretation of loto as “all too likely a source of anti-social behavior”
(Mageo 1989: 182). The evidence seems to be that loto is equally used for pro- and
antisocial dispositions.
Notes to pages 35–37 253
33 Pratt (1893: 191) gives the meaning ‘profound, thoughtful’ as the first translation,
followed by the translation ‘humble’ as a “[r]ecently adapted meaning.”
34 Here is the full exchange:
(“The watch” – F, P, and T are three Samoan chiefs; A ¼ A. Duranti)
[. . .]
266 F; lelei Sāmoa i Amelika.
‘Samoa is better than America.’
267 (0.5)
268 A; aiseā?
‘why?’
269 (1.0)
270 F; e lelei e lē- e lē kau. e lē misa.
‘It’s good it’s not- there is no war. There are no fights.’
271 (1.0)
272 A; misa kele i Falefā.
‘Lots of fighting in (the village of) Falefā.’
273 ?; ((unclear))
274 P; misa kele i Falefā?
‘Lots of fighting in Falefā?’
275 T; ((COUGH)) leai. lē misa tele.
‘No. (They) don’t fight a lot.’
276 F; lelei e lē fafaga le kagaka.
‘(it’s) good (we) don’t shoot people.’
277 T; ((LAUGH)) huhuhu
278 F; `a`o Sāmoa e leai.
‘but Samoans, (they) don’t.’
279 A; e malosi le lima.
‘the hand is strong.’ (¼ ‘they fight with their hands’)
280 T; ((LAUGH)) huhuhu
[
281 F; malosi le loko. (0.7) `ā? loto (pronounced /loko/)
‘the loto is strong, (0.7) huh?’
35 Another expression that follows the same syntactic and semantic pattern is e vave le
lima (lit.) ‘the hand is fast’ to mean that stealing goes on. For a discussion of other
Samoan intransitive expressions where there is no mention of a perceiving or acting
self, see Duranti (1985: 48).
36 Here is an example from a fono (on April 7, 1979) where natura (pronounced
/gakula/) is used in the metaphorical sense of ‘character’:
37 Samoan syntax requires a whole predicate (here created with the negation leai
preceded by the present habitual marker e) where English can do with a quantifier
(“no”) and a noun (“person”). Therefore the phrase e leai se tagata literally means
‘there is not a person.’ The rest of the sentence works like a relative clause or
modifier of the noun tagata ‘person.’ Thus, o le a aveesea lona ola can be translated
literally as ‘(who) will have his life taken away.’ As suggested by a number of
linguists (Milner 1962; Cook 1996), the passive sense of this sentence – even
though Samoan does not really have the passive voice – is given by the suffix –a
added to the compound verb `ave`ese, which combines `ave ‘take’ with `ese
‘away’ – in example (4) the glottal stop (`) is not marked due to the conventions
of the official orthography adopted in Samoa.
(lit. ‘house-seven’) being the largest and fono falefā (lit. ‘house-four’) being the
smallest and most frequent.
17 Gerber (1985: 137) mentions the salience of specific relationships, including those
with family members, for scenarios evoked by Samoan informants to describe
emotions.
18 I am here translating fā`aliga as ‘evidence,’ but there are alternative translations,
including ‘demonstration,’ or even ‘query’ understood as ‘request to show or clarify.’
19 The respectful address form lau tōfā (here pronounced /lau kōfā/) refers to the orator
Fa`aonu`u who has just spoken.
20 The expression /`amai/ is a frequent variant of `aumai ‘bring’ or ‘give (to me or us)’.
21 This is a weak argument according to fono conventions because it is contradicted by
the fact that when the senior orator Iuli had announced that he had another issue to
discuss with the assembly, Moe`ono had given his approval despite some initial
reservations.
22 This concern with truth is common in the fono proceedings (see also Chapter 5) and
will be made explicit at the end of the discussion by the high chief Lealaisalanoa
who speaks as a representative of `Āiga, that is, of all the chiefs (ali`i). He says that
the truth will come out when they will meet with the matai from the nearby village
of Lufilufi. At that time, if the MP says that he did not instruct Loa (/`ou ke le`i
fa`akogua se Loa/) to announce his coming with the gifts, then, Loa will be in
trouble (fa`alavelave).
(Fono, April 7, 1979; the High Chief Lealaisalanoa – here abbreviated
“Chief LS” – finally takes the floor)
3695 (5.0)
3696 Chief LS; ia` ai `ākogu:, . . .
‘well perhaps, . . .’
3697 `ua `uma lea makā`upu, . . .
‘that topic is over,’
3698 `ae fa`apegei `aua ā ge`i ku`ua se mea
‘and here it is do not leave out anything (that)’
3699 e le- le kogu ma sa`o kogu.
‘is not- not true and quite true.’
3700 ?Loa; mo`i.
‘true’
3701 Chief LS; lea lā la`a kākou feiloa`i ma Lufilufi
‘we are going to meet with Lufilufi’
3702 `ae `a:- pa`ū mai le susuga a Fa`amakuāigu . . .
‘and if His Honor Fa`amatuā`inu happens to say . . .’
3703 i luma:- o kākou gu`u,
‘in front- of our villages,’
3704 “`ou ke le`i fa`akogua se Loa.” . . .
‘“I did not instruct Loa” . . .’
3705 ?Loa; ((laughing softly)) haha.
3706 Chief LS; ia` uo`u iloa
‘then I will have known’
3707 `ua o`o loa le fa`alavelave iā ke `oe.
‘the trouble will have fallen on you.’
Notes to pages 64–82 257
3708 (1.5)
3709 Moe`ono; `o le kūlaga sa`o legā.
‘that is the right position/solution.’
3710 ?; sa`o lea.
‘that’s right.’
23 The Samoan word fua corresponds to similar roots in other Polynesian languages,
e.g., the Hawaiian hua ‘fruit, tuber, egg, produce, yield, ovum, seed, grain, off-
spring,’ see Pukui and Elbert (1986: 83). But the compounds and derivations are not
homogeneous across the historically related languages. Thus, Hawaiian built the
term for ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ out of another root, kumu, meaning ‘bottom, base,
foundation, root, etc.’ (Pukui and Elbert 1986: 182).
24 Here ‘two of us’ (exclusive) refers to Moe`ono and Iuli, the two ‘senior orators’
(matua).
7 In the 1911 edition Newell reorganized and enlarged Pratt’s grammar considerably,
adding a number of sections on verbs, poetry, proverbs, ceremonial speech, foreign
words (i.e., loanwords), and more.
8 For a more recent and dramatic account of a failed attempt at translating biblical
concepts and narratives in communities with no writing and no previous knowledge
of Christianity, see Everett (2008).
9 The 1969 revised translation, which was done by a group of Bible scholars from
several denominations, substituted Lokou (written with capital “L”), the loanword
modeled on the Greek word logos, with the Samoan native term `upu ‘word’ (spelled
Upu, with the capital “U” and without the apostrophe for the initial glottal stop) (see
Appendix B). Thus, the English text of The Gospel According to St. John 1:1 “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” in the
1969 edition of the Samoan Bible reads Sa i le amataga, le Upu, sa i le Atua le Upu, o
le Atua foi le Upu but in the 1884 and 1887 editions the Samoan text reads Sa i le
amataga le Lokou, sa i le Atua le Lokou, o le Atua foi le Lokou.
10 See the traditional story (fagogo) of Sinaalenaunau and Matilaalefau in Krämer
(1994: 170–173) and Krämer (1902: 137–138), where the character of the evil girl
Lautī snatched (se`i) Sina’s soul (agaga) and brought it to her parents wrapped in
lau`a`a, a word that Pratt (1893: 174) translated as “the fibrous substance which
grows round the base of the cocoa-nut leaf, the stipule.”
11 The search for any passage that included the morpheme “promis-” (in order to
capture both the noun promise and the verb forms including promising) generated
four “pages” or screens of texts starting at: http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
search.php?q=promis&hs=1
12 The verb fetalai is a respect vocabulary term (Milner 1961: 313) that can be used
when the referent of the subject of the clause is an orator – or someone who is acting
in the ways in which an orator would act in a given context (Duranti 1992c). When
used as a Samoan translation of “said” for phrases like “God said . . . ,” which are
frequent in the King James Bible, fetalai is typically followed by a deictic term
(Dx in the interlinear gloss) like mai, atu, or ane, indicating the directionality of the
act of telling (see Milner 1966). Thus, for example, in Genesis, when God makes
things, fetalai is followed by mai. But when God speaks to Adam and Eve, the
expression is fetalai atu. Platt (1982) provides a detailed discussion of the use of
these deictic particles in everyday talk to and by children.
13 Special thanks to Alice Mandell and Josiah Chappel for carefully checking, respect-
ively, the original Hebrew text of the Old Testament and the Greek text of the New
Testament in which the King James Bible has the word promise.
14 “And now steps were taken preparatory to a final revision and a new edition of the
entire Scriptures to be printed in one volume – the first was in four volumes, five,
indeed, for the Psalms were bound in a volume by themselves. And to prepare for
this final revision, as we then regarded it, the whole was divided into eight parts for
corrections and suggestions from individual brethren; and to secure uniformity as
far as possible we appointed two of our brethren, the Rev. George Pratt and the Rev.
Henry Nisbet, afterwards Dr. Nisbet, to go over the whole and give to the work the
finishing touch” (Murray 1888: 46).
15 For example, while at Turvey on April 2, 1837, Nisbet wrote: “Sat[urday] translated
a few verses of the Hebrew Bible.” On May 1, 1837: “Commenced our studies in
private at the present we are doing Campbell on the Gospels. Greek, Latin, &
Notes to pages 91–98 259
Hebrew.” Rev. Henry Nisbet, Journals and other papers, 1837–76, microfilm copy
of typescript of original journals and papers, Mitchell Library, New South Wales,
Australia. (It is hard at times to know whether some of the misspellings in the
typescript were in the original text or added by the transcriber; for example, the
beginning of the passage cited above reads “Sat stranslated a few verses . . .”)
16 According to Murray (1888: 48), the final revision was done between March
1867 and July 1870. This is confirmed by my own reading of the original corres-
pondence between Rev. George Pratt and Rev. Henry Nisbet available at the
Mitchell Library, New South Wales, Australia.
17 The suffix –ina might have been triggered by the presence of the first person
singular pronoun `ou, the present tense marker te in preverbal (clitic) position and
various pragmatic factors (Cook 1978, 1989, 1996).
18 In the original text, there is a typo and this word is spelled finagolo instead of
finagalo.
19 Like other Polynesian languages, Samoan distinguishes between an inclusive plural
‘we (all)’ (and ‘our’), tātou (typically pronounced /kākou/ in the fono I recorded)
that includes the addressee(s) and an exclusive one, mātou (often pronounced
/mākou/) that excludes the people one is talking to. In Christian prayers mātou is
typically used because the speaker is addressing God who is not part of the ‘we.’
20 The two examples that I provided are “I promised myself that I would stop
smoking” and “I promised myself that I would go and visit my parents more often.”
One set of Samoan translations is given below, with an interlinear gloss and a free
back translation (I kept the original orthography of the translations I received).
(a) Ou te folafola atu nei, o le a tu`u la`u ulaula
I TA promise Dx now, Fut stop my smoke
‘I promise now/here, my smoking will stop’
(b) Ou te folafola atu nei, o le a fai ma ou alu e asiasi I o`u matua
I TA promise Dx now Fut do and I go to visit Prep myþPl parent
‘I promise now/here, I will (change and) go to visit my parents’
21 Here is the second set of translations:
(a) Na ou tautō o le a taofi la’u ulaula.
Pst I oath Fut stop my smoking
(a)’ Na ou tautō o le a tu’u la’u ulaula.
Pst I oath Fut give-up my smoking
‘I promised myself that I would stop smoking.’
(b) Na ou tautō o le a fai ma ou alu e asi o’u matua
Pst I oath Fut do with I go to visit myþPl parents
‘I promised myself that I would go visit my parents more often.’
When I sent these examples to Kenneth Cook he pointed out that in all translations
the verb (whether folafola or tautō) is followed by the postverbal deictic particle
atu, which makes the predicate other- or outside-oriented (as opposed to the
postverbal particle mai), indicating that the act is not considered directed toward
the speaker herself or himself. One could then argue that it is treated as an
260 Notes to pages 101–137
original idea of following Walter Capps around during the campaign was born out of
conversations in 1994–1995 with his daughter Lisa, while she was a graduate student
at UCLA. After accepting a position in the department of psychology at UC Berkeley
in 1996, Lisa continued to be a fervent supporter of the project and a source of
insights on the impact of her father’s campaigning on herself and the other members
of the extended Capps family. Our conversations about the campaign, my project,
and how to make something valuable out of it continued even during her last year of
life, while she was fighting cancer. This chapter is dedicated to her and her father’s
memory.
3 I met Walter Capps in the summer of 1994 through his daughter Lisa (see previous
note). At the time of our first meeting, Capps was running his first campaign for
Congress, which he ended up losing to Republican Andrea Seastrand (a former
California Assemblywoman) by less than 1% of the vote. When, in the summer of
1995, he decided to run for the congressional seat again, he accepted my proposal to
let me follow him around with a video camera throughout the campaign. He was
intrigued by the idea of documenting the political process and comforted by the
prospect of having a fellow academic next to him while he engaged in this new
adventure, toward which he showed a mixture of fascination and disillusion. Over a
period of twelve months (November 1995–November 1996), I spent as much time as
I could driving up and down the Central Coast of California, recording Capps at
debates, rallies, fund-raising events, as well as in more intimate moments, while in
the car or at home with members of his family. By November 6, 1996, I had collected
a thick notebook of fieldnotes and more than fifty hours of video that documented
Capps’ interactions with staff, family members, journalists, opponents, and govern-
ment officials, including George Stephanopoulos, President Bill Clinton, and (then)
First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton. Throughout the campaign, Capps continued to
be a strong supporter of my project and never asked me to turn off the camera even
during the most private conversations. The few times I was not allowed to record
were due to the foreseen or visible reactions of other participants involved in the
interaction, not Capps’ own concern for privacy or secrecy. After a close and
nationally monitored race, Capps won the 1996 election and served in Congress
until October 28, 1997, when he suffered a fatal heart attack at Dulles Airport on his
way to Capitol Hill. His wife Lois, who had provided continuous emotional support
and political advice throughout both campaigns and had followed him in Washing-
ton, ran for the same seat and won. Since then, she has been reelected several times.
3 Like many languages in the world, Samoan does not have gender distinctions in the
pronoun system or in possessive adjectives. Thus, the third person possessive lona
(usually pronounced [loŋa] in my recordings and transcribed as loga in the examples
reproduced here) can mean either ‘his’ or ‘her.’ See Appendix B: Transcription
conventions for Samoan.
4 This view is described in very clear terms by one of Bradd Shore’s informants, who
said:
There is a Samoan saying: “E lē iloa se tagata lona sesē.” [A person does not know
his own error.] It means that if I go and do something wrong, I cannot know it is
wrong unless another person tells me that such and such a thing is wrong; stop
doing it. (Shore 1982: 176)
The Samoan expression as cited above is a variant of the one uttered by Chief Teva
and reproduced in example (6). Regarding the ergative marker e in front of the Agent
noun phrase found in (6), see Duranti (1994).
5 Here are two examples. In (a) the question is about the identity of the owner of a car
and in (b) the question is about whether the kava, a ceremonial drink, was prepared in
a particular way.
“Zeichen” does not correspond to what Peirce called “sign.” As made clear at the
beginning of the original passage where the expression translated as “sign qua sign”
appears (Husserl 1901: 40), for Husserl “Zeichen” can be something physical and
perceptible and without meaning – as used by him in the expression “sign-
appearance” (Zeichenerscheinung). For something that is perceivable and has
meaning, Husserl uses two other terms: “Anzeichen” and “Ausdruck,” translated
by J. N. Findlay as “indication” and “expression” respectively.
4 One of the anonymous reviewers of the article from which this chapter derives
suggested that the distinction between sounds as “brute physical datum” and sounds
with a sense (Sinn) is reminiscent of Grice’s (1957) distinction between “natural”
and “non-natural” meaning. But, in fact, Grice’s examples of “natural meaning,”
e.g., smoke means fire, are anything but “brute physical data” given that they are
themselves “signs,” as made explicit by Charles S. Peirce, who had called them
“symptoms” (see Peirce 1940).
5 For Husserl’s own schematic representation of time-consciousness, see Husserl
(1991) and also Dodd (2005).
6 The following three examples from the Jazz Combo Classes are taken from a large
corpus of video recordings of jazz classes, concerts, and interviews made at UCLA
over the last decade. I am very grateful to Kenny Burrell, Director of the Jazz
Program at UCLA, and the many jazz musicians and jazz students at UCLA and in
the Los Angeles area who agreed to be recorded while playing or talking inside or
outside of university settings. The jazz project was partly funded by the UCLA
Office of Instructional Development (OID) and small grants from the UCLA
Faculty Senate.
7 On this occasion the class has fewer students than usual. Other times there were
also a pianist and two saxophone players, one playing alto and the other
playing tenor.
8 See Applendix A for the transcription conventions used in this chapter.
9 This attention to recorded music as opposed to the written scores is related to a
number of characteristics in the history and culture of jazz aesthetics, including the
complex relationship between orality and writing (Prouty 2006; Duranti 2008b) and
the fact that the total “corpus” of jazz music is the discography of all jazz musicians
as opposed to the written scores (Williams 2001: 180).
10 The possible appeal of this notion for anthropology was unfortunately missed by
Clifford Geertz (1973: 110 n), who rejected it because of “its subjectivist connota-
tions.” I suspect that the translation of Einstellung into “attitude” had something to
do with Geertz’s reaction.
11 The term Sachenwelt in the same passage was later translated as “world of mere
things” by F. Kersten (Husserl 1982: 53).
12 Later on, in his “Vienna Lecture,” Husserl will refer to this process of changing
attitude as Umstellung, “reorientation” (Husserl 1970a: 280).
13 For a discussion of Capps’ campaign and his political person as performed through
talk, see Duranti (2006a) and Chapter 6, this volume.
14 As noted in a comment by one of the anonymous reviewers, this assessment is not a
compliment (or self-praise) because none of the participants have any “ownership”
claims to what is being referred to as “here.”
264 Notes to pages 199–211
15 Pomerantz (1984: 65) wrote: “One type of agreement is the upgrade. An upgraded
agreement is an assessment of the referent assessed in the prior that incorporates
upgraded evaluation terms relative to the prior. Two common techniques for
upgrading evaluations are:
1. A stronger evaluative term than the prior, given graded sets of descriptors, is
selected [. . .]
2. An intensifier modifying the prior evaluative descriptor is included [. . .]”
16 Other kinds of connections between Husserl’s and Gibson’s theory of perception
have been pointed out by Mulligan (1995) and Smith (1995).
17 On the distinction between a “model of” and a “model for,” see Geertz (1973:
93–94), Duranti (2005: 420–421).
18 For more information on the children in this family, see Ochs (1988: 43–44).
19 The morpheme-by-morpheme gloss /siþka/ is in the phonological register of the
original example, which is in the so-called “bad speech” (tautala leaga) as opposed
to the so-called “good speech” (tautala lelei), which would be /siþta/. Contrary to
what the names might suggest, the pronunciation with /k/ in place of /t/ is not an
“informal register” (pace Milner 1966), but the way of pronouncing Samoan in both
formal and informal situations that are not school- or church-related (Duranti and
Ochs 1986). See also Appendix B in this book.
20 For a discussion of the connection between Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and
Husserl’s theory, see Throop and Murphy (2002).
4 Cooperative behavior is of course more complex than this, but simplified descrip-
tion is one of the principles of the type of clear writing for which Searle is
renowned.
5 Searle made similar points in subsequent publications, including his more recent
Making the Social World, where he makes it explicit that his notion of collective
intentionality is consistent with “methodological individualism” (Searle 2010: 47).
6 The importance of the notion of “horizon” in Husserl’s first volume of Ideen
(Husserl 1913) might be missed by those who read the 1931 English translation
where the German word Horizont is often translated with synonyms like ‘sphere’ or
‘field’ instead of the English cognate horizon. For an understanding of the horizon
within “passive synthesis,” see Husserl (2001).
7 Here is an apparently straightforward but in fact contradictory statement by Searle
regarding his lack of knowledge of phenomenology, where he writes, in the same
sentence, that he never read anything by Husserl except that he did read Logical
Investigations, where, in the second volume, intentions and intentional acts play a
major role.
I am, by the way, always amazed to read how much my views are supposed to have
been influenced by authors in the phenomenological tradition, especially Husserl.
Nothing could be further from the truth. I have never read any Husserl save one piece,
his first “Logical Investigation” and I did not find it to be of much help. My theory of
intentionality came straight out of my theory of speech acts, itself of course influ-
enced by Frege, Wittgenstein and especially Austin. (Searle 2001/2a: 175)
8 The exchanges between the two Berkeley philosophers could provide rich material
for historians of science interested in how incommensurability is constructed
(Biagoli 1990, 1993: chapter 4).
9 “I have often wondered why Dreyfus devotes so much effort to attacking my views
since he is not sympathetic to the projects I am undertaking and has only an
imperfect grasp of the theories I advance. I now think I have figured out the answer.
Dreyfus senses that if I am right, much of the work of the tradition he admires is
rendered irrelevant. Not so much false as irrelevant” (Searle 2001/2b: 283–284).
10 Unlike other analytic philosophers and cognitive scientists, at first Searle did not
conceptualize collective intentionality as a plan. More recently, however, he has
acknowledged that: “the most important form of collective intentionality is collect-
ive intentions in planning and acting” (Searle 2010: 43).
11 Even though Searle (2010: 57) recognizes the existence of a continuum of “collect-
ive recognition and acceptance” of institutions and of cooperation, he ends up
claiming that “the existence of an institution does not require cooperation but
simply collective acceptance or recognition” (2010: 58), which suggests that the
collective in this case is not (and perhaps cannot be) conceived as along a
continuum.
12 “Collective intentional action is especially important in any theory of society. In
such cases, I am doing something only as part of our doing something. For example,
I am playing the violin part as part of our playing the symphony. I am pitching the
ball as part of our playing a baseball game. Collective intentionality is the inten-
tionality that is shared by different people, and just as there can be shared intentions
to do things, so there can be shared beliefs and shared desires. The church
266 Notes to pages 220–233
congregation, for example, reciting the Nicene Creed, is expressing a shared belief,
a common faith” (Searle 2006: 16).
13 A more extreme “extensionist” program is the “Actor-Network-Theory” (ANT),
which includes Bruno Latour’s major attack on the epistemological and ontological
assumptions of traditional sociological categories and theorizing (e.g., Latour 2005;
Latour, Harman, and Erdélyi 2011; Harman 2009; Law and Hassard 1999).
14 Erving Goffman’s (1981) production format and participation framework are two
sets of analytical categories devised to distinguish, respectively, among such roles
as author, animator, or principal and ratified (i.e., addressed and unaddressed
recipients) or unratified (i.e., overhearers, bystanders) participants. Stephen
Levinson (1988) and Judith Irvine (1996) discussed in detail the linguistic realiza-
tion of these categories and the issue of whether they are adequate to capture what
actually happens in speech events.
15 Ferguson’s statement was part of an extended discussion about Wiggins’ interpret-
ation of the jazz “standard” Body and Soul in front of the students in Kenny
Burrell’s and my class in the Fall of 2002. Sherman Ferguson (1944–2006) was
an accomplished percussionist who performed with many greats of jazz, including
Kenny Burrell, with whom he recorded and toured in Europe. After Billy Higgins
passed away in 2001, Ferguson replaced him as an instructor in the UCLA Jazz
Program. Gerald Wiggins (1922–2008), who was called “Wig” by his friends, was a
remarkable jazz pianist and organist. Kenny Burrell used to introduce him as “a
national treasure,” to underscore the tremendous knowledge and experience of the
jazz repertoire and its history that Wiggins embodied (for an extended interview
with Wiggins, see Bryant et al. 1998: chapter 15).
16 As part of his critical stance toward his mentor’s notion of intersubjectivity, in
Being and Time Heidegger described the intersubjectivity of everyday life, which he
called “being-with,” as responsible for an inauthentic existence. Heidegger’s neolo-
gism das Man (in which the impersonal form man is made into a noun, Man, not to
be confused with Mann ‘man’), translated in English as “the They” or “the One,”
was meant to capture the impersonal, inauthentic voice we are subjected to by being
part of society and wanting to be like everyone else. For Heidegger, authenticity can
be achieved only through the confrontation with our mortality and the experience of
anxiety or dread (Angst) that comes with such recognition. For a critical review of
Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl’s position, see Zahavi (2001a).
267
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Index
293
294 Index
Irvine, Judith, 132, 151–152, 254, 266 metaphorical extensions, 33–34, 66, 72–73,
Iuli, Sefo, 50, 53–61, 67, 74, 117, 235–237, 77–80, 90, 98–99
255, 256, 257 Miller, Kaarlo, 214–215
Izquierdo, Carolina, 205 Milner, George, 33–35, 37, 51, 64, 77–79, 87,
89–90, 96–99, 181, 204–205, 254,
Jackendoff, Ray, 153 257–258, 264
James, William, 40, 103, 132 mind-reading, 1, 3, 39–40, 63, 110, 120, 153,
Jefferson, Gail, 48, 248 156–158, 175–176, 179–185, 240,
Johnson, J. J., 193–194 242
mirror neurons, 223
ka ilo, see ta ilo missionaries, 71–73, 77, 80–84, 87–88, 91–92,
Kaluli, 76, 161 97
Kant, Immanuel, 103–105, 123–124 London Missionary Society, 80–82, 90–91
Keane, Webb, 76, 84, 88, 176 Moerman, Michael, 104
Keenan, Elinor, see Ochs, Elinor Moe`ono, Kolio, 50, 52–54, 58–59, 64–66, 80,
Krämer, Augustin, 44–45, 73, 76, 87–88, 95, 117–118, 237, 253, 256, 257
93–98, 245, 254, 257–258 Moll, Luis, 47
Moran, Dermot, 9, 29, 250, 252
Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition motivations, 44–45, 112, 168–169, 171–172,
(LCHC), 46–48, 159 176–177, 181, 217, 236–237, 254
language socialization, 188, 202, 207–208, Murphy, Keith, 29, 240, 250, 264
240, 254 Murray, Reverend Archibald, 81–82, 91, 257
Lapérouse, Count, 74 musu, 44–45, 176, 242, 254
Latin, 30–32, 37, 64, 73, 84, 105, 238, 250
Latour, Bruno, 40, 265–266 narrative, 41, 88, 93–94, 115, 124–125, 132,
lāuga, 79, 114, 116–117 139–140, 142
Lave, Jean, 47, 210, 219–220 natural attitude, 21, 27, 197–198, 202–203,
Lawes, Reverend W. G., 91 208, 230
Levinson, Stephen, 8, 15–16, 131, 254, 266 natural standpoint, see natural attitude
Levy, Robert, 240–241 Nettleship, Henry, 31, 252
lifeworld (Lebenswelt), 205, 220 Newell, J. E., 33, 82, 90, 257–258
Lindstrom, Lamont, 106, 132, 260 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 69
linguistic relativity, 16, 30, 41, 111 Nisbet, Reverend Henry, 81, 91, 257–259
listening, 192–197, 206–207, 249
Loa (short for Taofi`uailoa), 54–67, 74, 80, 95, observational level of explanation, 176
114–116, 178, 235–237, 255, 256 Ochs, Elinor, 38, 44–46, 63, 104, 112–113,
loanwords, 84, 246 129–130, 179, 185, 188, 203–205, 207,
loto, 33–37, 77, 85–86, 239–240, 252–253 210, 212, 231, 236, 240, 245, 248, 254,
Lovett, Richard, 82 261, 264
Luria, Alexander, 47 Oedipus Rex, 19–20
opacity of other minds, 40, 175–180, 186, 237,
Mageo, Jeannette Marie, 35, 44, 86–87, 240, 242
252 Ortner, Sherry, 20, 28, 242
Malinowski, Bronislaw, 132
Marx, Karl, 20–21, 109–110 passive synthesis, 29, 216, 265
māvaega, see promising: translations of Peirce, Charles, 40, 263
McCumber, John, 103 perlocutionary force, see speech act theory
Mead, George H., 119 phenomenal modifications, 29, 187–193,
Mead, Margaret, 38, 44–45, 49, 67, 176–178, 196–198, 206–208, 238
180–181, 206, 240, 254, 261–262 phenomenological modifications, 29, 198–202,
Mehan, Hugh, 48, 119 206, 238
mental models, 152, 157–160, 162–163, phenomenology, 1–2, 9, 25, 48, 187–188, 209,
165–167, 172–173 211, 216–217, 221, 238–239, 265
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 136, 216 Piaget, Jean, 160
metacommunication, 130 plan of action, see planning
296 Index
planning, 16–17, 31–32, 36, 67, 109, 152, 157, Schieffelin, Bambi B., 46, 76, 84, 104,
164, 167–168, 171, 217–218, 221–225, 112–113, 120, 129–130, 161, 176, 178,
232, 252, 265 188, 204, 207, 254
Platt, Martha, 44, 89, 203–204, 258 Schultz, Dr. E., 34
political campaign, 7, 125–126, 135–138, Schutz, Alfred, 168–170, 215, 229–230, 236,
260–261 254
Pope Benedict XVI, 122, 260 Searle, John, 1, 4, 6, 8–9, 11–26, 38–40, 69–71,
practice, 20, 28 73–74, 131, 152, 171, 209–219,
Pratt, Reverend George, xii, 33, 35, 37, 77–78, 221–222, 229–238, 249–250, 252,
81–82, 85, 87, 90–92, 99, 241, 253, 264–265
257–259 collective intentionality, 19, 209–218, 229,
present-at-hand, 18 231–232, 242, 264–265
professional vision, 206–207 debate with Hubert Dreyfus, 9, 216, 222,
promise, see promising 249, 265
promising, 60, 69–100, 258 I-intentions, 209, 213, 232, 239
debates about, 22–24, 69–71 intentions-in-action, 17, 213, 234–235
in speech act theory, 12–14, 20, 72–77, 234 network, 17–18
translations of, 65–66, 73, 80, 88–96, 98, prior intentions, 16–17, 20, 212–213, 223,
100, 259–260 234–235
Propp, Vladimir, 163 the Background, 17–18, 216, 229, 249
pure ego, 26–27 we-intentions, see Searle, John: collective
intentionality
ready-at-hand, 18 Seastrand, Andrea, 126–128, 144–148
reconstructivist model of interpretation, Shore, Bradd, 38, 44–45, 50, 86, 88, 120–121,
107–109 154, 173, 177, 181, 206, 240, 262
reflexivity, 21, 41 Sidner, Candace, 16, 214
Reinach, Adolf, 74 Skinner, B. F., 113
respect vocabulary, see Samoan respect Sophocles, 19
vocabulary soul, 35, 84–88, 99–100
responsibility, 38, 45, 61–63, 69, 73, 101, 121, Soviet psychology, 47, see also Vygotskian
129–130, 150, 157, 179, 236–237 perspectives
Richland, Justin, 63, 240 speech act theorists, see speech act theory
Robbins, Joel, 40, 175–176, 178–180, 211, speech act theory, 11, 110
237, 242 conditions of satisfaction, 12–14, 18–19, 60,
Rodriguez, Bobby, 226–227 69–72, 96, 131, 235, 237
Rosaldo, Michelle, 8, 11, 22–25, 30, 38, critiques of, 22–25, 210, 250
69–70, 72, 75, 103, 120, 175, 179, direction of fit, 14–16, 250
210–211, 264 felicity conditions, 11–12, 69, 71, 113, 131,
Rosen, Lawrence, 22, 120, 132, 179, 210, 248 233
Rumsey, Alan, 22, 40, 175–176, 179–180, 202, five types of speech acts, 14–16
211, 237, 242 commissives, 13–14, 69, 77
declarations, 15, 131
Sacks, Harvey, 48, 135, 199, 205, 248 directives, 14, 202
Samoa, 2, 43–68, 71–75, 113–118, 121, expressives, 15–16
176–178, 180–185, 203–206, 236–237, representatives, 14, 131
240–242, 253–262, 264 illocutionary force, 4, 15, 99, 115, 120,
Samoan constitution, 37–38 122–123, 199, 223, 240
Samoan dictionaries, 33–35, 77, 79, 82 perlocutionary force, 120, 122
Samoan translations of the Bible, see Bible: speech acts, see speech act theory
Tusi Paia (Samoan Bible) speech event, 48, 116, 255, 266
Samoan respect vocabulary, 89–90, 258 Sperber, Dan, 102–103
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 219 spirit, see soul
Saussure, Ferdinand de, 111 spontaneity, 41, 222–226
Sawyer, Keith, 42, 193, 225 Stalnaker, Robert C., 105
Schegloff, Emanuel, 48, 119, 137, 205, 248 stance, 113, 129–130, 137–138, 198, 240
Index 297
Stasch, Rupert, 176, 179–180, 185 Turner, Reverend George, 82, 84, 97
Strawson, Peter, 12 Turner, Victor, 49, 106
streaming living present, 29 turn-taking, 111, 118, 125–128
structural linguistics, 111 Turvey Congregational Academy, 81, 258
Stuebel, Oskar, 73, 76, 87, 93–94, 97–98, 245
Van der Hooght, Everardo, 91
ta ilo, 176, 181, 261–262 van Dijk, Teun, 2, 7, 150–174
tautō, see tautōga versprechen, see promising: translations of
tautōga, 77, 97–98, 259–260 voice, 119, 130, 149
Taylor, Charles, 32 Vološinov, V. N., 41, 47, 112–113, 119,
Tcherkézoff, Serge, 74 130
Tedlock, Dennis, 102–103 Vygotskian perspectives, 41, 46–47, 219
theoretical attitude, 187, 198, 201–203, Vygotsky, Lev S., 41, 47, 219
205–206
theory of mind, 5, 22, 175, 211 ways of speaking, 112
Throop, Jason, 29, 41, 44, 151, 167–174, 240, Weber, Max, 168–169
250, 264 we-intentions, see Searle, John: collective
Tomasello, Michael, 32, 212 intentionality
tradition, 73, 111, 113, 116, 118 Western Samoa, see Samoa
translations western theories, 28, 31–33, 40, 110, 120, 156,
of Bible into Samoan, see Bible: Tusi Paia 161, 179, 237–238
(Samoan Bible) Whitmee, Samuel James, 81–82
of intend, intention, 33–38 Whorf, Benjamin Lee, 15–16, 41, 103, 111,
of promise, see promising, translations of 131
Trevarthen, Colwyn, 239, 264 Whorfianism, see linguistic relativity
truth, 13, 15, 31, 43, 96–97, 101–109, Wiggins, Gerald, 224, 266
116–117, 123–126, 128–134, 256 Williams, John, 80
analytic truth, 105 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 3, 30, 105, 119, 153,
as correspondence, 104–106 161, 191–192, 196–197, 222, 233, 252,
logical truth, 105 260, 265
truth-functional view of interpretation,
123–125, 131 Zahavi, Dan, 131, 188, 219, 232, 238,
Tuomela, Raimo, 16, 212, 214–215 266