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James Brady
A Descending Crescent and a Turning Wheel

“Two people fanatically at odds”, “out of date maps” and “incorrect Census returns” were

the phrases used by W.H. Auden to describe the partition process of India and Pakistan.1 Given

the chaotic situation, low levels of development, and bewildering diversity, many commentators

predicted the nascent states would soon become autocratic.2 They were only half right. In the two

decades after Independence, India established itself as an unlikely democracy while Pakistan

slowly descended into military rule. While these contrasting trajectories were far from inevitable,

pre-partition factors created a sense of insecurity within Pakistan that made military rule more

likely. Pakistani political leadership often exacerbated this underlying disposition while Indian

politicians tended to provide a more steadying hand to their new nation. Although less important,

differences in the role of the military, secularism and cold war politics also contributed to the

divergent outcomes.

The formation of an Indian nation had many early detractors. “there is not, and never was

an India, or even any country of India possessing […] any sort of unity, physical, political, social

or religious”.3 Yet when this inconceivable state came into being, it had many advantages over

the state of Pakistan. Due to the politics of partition, India largely inherited the organs of state

from the British Raj, such as the competent Indian Civil Service.4 India also inherited the

diplomatic relations of the Raj and was automatically accepted into international organizations.5

The new Indian nation certainly had a staggering amount of diversity, however Congress had

always embraced this as a source of strength. Indeed this open-mindedness, as well as its long

reputation of independence activism, made Congress a relevant political force across the

country.6 India was also fortunate to receive the implicit help of Lord Mountbatten in coaxing the
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reluctant princely states to join the Union. Although this process was occasionally messy, it

proceeded rather smoothly overall.7

If India had difficult formation problems, Pakistan’s were even more precipitous. Jinnah

described his own country as “a shadow and a husk - a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten

Pakistan”8. The new nation of Pakistan was quite weak economically. Per-capita income of

Pakistan was 40 percent lower than its Indian counterpart. Pakistan also had a highly unfortunate

geographic position. Claiming to represent Muslims across all of India, it was confined to the

northeastern and northwestern corners, separated by over 1000 miles. Furthermore, Pakistan

inherited the chaotic frontier with an irredentist Afghanistan in addition to the newly perilous

border with India. 9 These artificial borders forced millions of mohajirs to migrate to their new

“homeland”, a process made more difficult considering the weak bureaucracy Pakistan inherited.

Eventually, 1 in 10 members of this new nation were new arrivals.10 This created a sense of

rootlessness and exacerbated tensions with existing communities, particularly in Sindh.11

Lacking the charm offensive provided by Lord Mountbatten, and offering a generally inferior

strategic position, Pakistan struggled in its early relations with princely states. The invasion of

Baluchistan set an early hostile tone, to say nothing of the existential crisis in Kashmir.11

India’s advantages during the partition process created conditions that allowed for its

political leadership to put it further on the path to democracy. As mentioned earlier, the Congress

Party’s experience with Independence and widespread popularity gave it a great deal of

legitimacy during India’s early years. The Congress Party used this power to approve a new

constitution in relatively short order.12 Although it dominated the Indian political scene, the

Congress Party went out of its way to create a broader mandate by including respected

opposition politicians such as Ambedkar.13 Having established the rules of the game, Nehru and
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the Congress Party took advantage of the elite bureaucracy they inherited and staged the largest

democratic exercise the world had ever seen. Widespread illiteracy and a general inexperience

with voting makes the high turnout of over 60% even more remarkable.14 Nehru avoided the

common pitfall of inexperienced democracies, rewarding cronies with state largesse.15 Instead he

demonstrated political maturity by focusing his efforts on scientific development across the

country.16

Unfortunately for Pakistan, its precarious position made it more difficult to transition to

democracy and its political leadership was not able to overcome that deficit. The Muslim league

had some success cobbling together coalitions for the Muslim reserved seats in the 1946 election,

but these alliances quickly fell apart after Independence.17 The one figure uniting the country,

Jinnah, tragically died in in 1948.18 Although he was not on the verge of solving Pakistan’s

myriad of problems, his death stands in stark contrast to Nehru who was able to guide his

country for years after independence. Pakistan’s new leaders had a difficult time following in his

footsteps. Many of them were mohajirs and lacked both a political base and deep connection to

their new country.19 The process of writing a constitution and holding elections therefore took

much longer in Pakistan than in India. The few politically dominant actors that did exist in

Pakistan, Punjabi landowners, tried to impose a sense of unity on the country by revolving West

Pakistan around Punjab and imposing Urdu on East Pakistan. However these actions backfired

and only made provincialism a stronger force in politics. Ultimately Islam was the only true

force that united this disparate nation.20 In the midst of various provincial disputes, including a

death during a parliamentary altercation, Ayub Khan’s close ally Iskander Mirza declared martial

law. Mirza suspended democracy in order to save it, but Khan soon maneuvered his way into the

presidency himself.21
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The army played an important role in reinforcing the trajectories of India as a democracy

and Pakistan as an autocratic state, albeit not as much as the previously mentioned factors.

Within India, Nehru set an early precedent for civilian control. When K.M. Cariappa, India’s

first commander-in-chief, began offering his opinion on economic development, Nehru chastised

him from behind the scenes and later appointed him high commissioner to Australia to

permanently get rid of him. Very few Indian commanders have ever run for office, further

demonstrating the apolitical nature of the army.22 The case in Pakistan was clearly quite

different. The British administration “martial races” believed that the ethnic groups inhabiting

Pakistan were inherently superior soldiers. Pakistan therefore inherited a disproportionately large

military establishment from the British Raj. Given the unsuccessful nature of early Pakistani

politics and the lack of bureaucracy inherited from the British, the army was seen as the only

successful institution in Pakistan. The early success of martial law to quell the Ahmadi riots

demonstrated the political utility of political military intervention.23 When Ayub Khan became

president in 1958, the military became even more prominent. Because this development occurred

a decade into Pakistani history, I would argue the previously mentioned factors, pre-partition

disparities and political leadership, had a more formative impact on Pakistan’s early trajectory.

Like the involvement of the army, the Cold War had a prominent but subordinate impact

on Indian and Pakistani state formation. Following in the political tradition of the West and the

economic tradition of the Eastern bloc, India accepted aid from both superpowers in order to

speed up its own development.24 However geo-politically, India tried to stay as neutral as

possible and was a leader of the non-aligned movement. Pakistan, hobbled by a perceived Indian

menace, had no such luxury.25 After the withdrawal of the British, the United States needed new

allies in the region to protect the Persian Gulf. The alliance with the United States gave Pakistan
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badly needed military equipment, intended for immediate defense but in the long run needed for

the conquest of Kashmir. The US umbrella of protection greatly boosted the Pakistani military

establishment and allowed for a much more aggressive foreign policy, naturally aimed at India.

However this reliance on US aid also somewhat undercut Pakistan’s foreign policy because its

sudden withdrawal was so crippling, as demonstrated by the 1965 war.26

The relationship between State and religion plays a surprisingly minor role in the paths of

India and Pakistan. Secularism is a deeply embedded aspect of the Indian constitution and was a

longstanding tenant of Nehru.27 While Pakistan’s first constitution cannot claim as much, both

Jinnah and Ayub Khan were relatively secular leaders themselves.28 Khan went so far as to

denounce “the prostitution of Islam for political ends”.29 In both countries, these secular leaders

were able to pass reforms that protect the rights of women, despite the fierce protest of religious

conservatives.30,31 While Pakistan did declare itself an Islamic Republic, this designation was

later thrown out and it was arguably just lip service to appease religious leaders. Unfortunately

Pakistan would later abandon its commitment to secularism. But for the time being, the two

nations had remarkably similar paths.

India’s superior position in the post-partition subcontinent made it much easier to develop

a successful democratic tradition. However political leadership in both countries furthered these

trends. This need not have been the case and history has numerous examples of states developing

beyond how their heritage would predict. In many cases, democracy is not a black and white

dichotomy but rather a spectrum of civil liberties and legislative legitimacy. While Pakistan slid

towards the authoritarian side of this spectrum and India towards the democratic side, there is no

deep law preventing this from reversing. As modern countries adjust along this spectrum, the US

included, the lessons from early Indian and Pakistani history still provide valuable insights.
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Works Cited

1) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 29

2) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 11
3) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 3
4) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 746
5) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 166
6) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 93
7) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 47
8) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 31
9) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 66
10) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 101
11) Talbot, Ian A History of Modern South Asia p172
11) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 72
12) Guha, Ramachandra Democracy’s Biggest Gamble p 95
13) Guha, Ramachandra Democracy’s Biggest Gamble p 97
14) Guha, Ramachandra Democracy’s Biggest Gamble p 100
15) Jinnah presidential address paragraph 3
16) Roy, Srirupa Beyond Belief ch 3
17) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 169
18) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 164
19) Talbot, Ian Pakistan a Modern History p 92
20) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 73-75
21) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 97-101
22) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 748-750
23) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 58-60
24) Jaishanker, Dhruva Aid Wars:US-Soviet Competition in Pakistan Brookings
25) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 110
26) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 122
27) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 233
28) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 53
29) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 98
30) Jalal, Ayesha The Struggle for Pakistan p 111
31) Guha, Ramachandra India after Gandhi p 236