G.R. No.

157472 September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA, Respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M.
Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 2002 2 and December
18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.

On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as
follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on
his body which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank. 4

On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October
8, 2002.5

However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide"
and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.
The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide,
with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta." 7

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-
arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would
be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the
amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty. 8

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged
that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court,
and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was
terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of
Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled
that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be
sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for
Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the same;
that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could
be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," the
crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he
alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial manner
in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of
the law and existing jurisprudence.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the
information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy.
Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the
killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of
the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the
respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would be placed
in double jeopardy.

In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and
granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.

Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case.
Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the
crime of homicide stands.13

In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to
murder.

On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM
HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE
LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the
public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that
"disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta
to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of
rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming
that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment
which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.

Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide
filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same
offense would place him in double jeopardy.

Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration,
he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for
Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of
the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the
Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein
petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy,
i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information;
that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.

Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion
to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the
proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not
dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.

In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to
Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment
was without his express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the
charge of Homicide.

The parties filed their respective Memoranda.

Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal
questions.17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation
of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also
involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the
Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being
tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the
trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in
the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --

Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his
express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same
offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his express
consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to
placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18

is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

xxx

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not
be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.

with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information.

First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110.
For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:

The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:

1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;

3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another
preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new information;
and

4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or to
an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge, hence
substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be made over
the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn, the accused
could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the
new information involves a different offense which does not include or is not necessarily
included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is
sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 20

In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.

While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of
the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the
same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide"
to "Murder" as purely formal.21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused
has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have
would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the
crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, 23 we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after petitioner
had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only
formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.

Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge
from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the
Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.

Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may
prosper, to wit:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first.24

As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof;
or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.26

Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide
without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.

Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional

dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it
must have the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the
proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --

If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial.

and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:

SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is
wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which
he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of
the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not
apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.28

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered
the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was
the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and
writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does
not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy,
as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.

A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his
realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the
killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original Information
for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

G.R. No. L-32557 October 23, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. REYES as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Fourth Judicial
District, and FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction, questions as alleged grave
abuse of discretion, the order 1 dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes
of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-
170-NE, entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's
verbal motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the year "1969" as
alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964 ". Respondent Judge anchored his denial of
the verbal motion on, to wit:

After a careful study of both memoranda in support and against the said motion, this
Court finds and so hold that the amendment to the information cannot be made without
prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused in the above-entitled case.

WHEREFORE, the motion to amend the information is hereby denied in accordance

with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Placido Opemia et al.,
98 Phil. 698. ...

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner also assails the order of respondent Court, dated September 14, 1970, 3 denying its motion
for reconsideration 4 of the July 10, 1970 order.

This court issued a preliminary injunction on September 24, 1970. 5

Pertinent facts of record are:

Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against private respondent Francisco
Estrella and three others, as Criminal Case No. 6799, in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, pertinent portion as follows:

The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing, Florentino

Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft,
committed as follows:

That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San Jose, province of Nueva
Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Narciso Mananing being the driver of complainant Maria Ignacio- Francisco,
Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinafter described was
found and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier stationed at
Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all conspiring together, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1) Bedford truck with
Chassis No. 153559, with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964,
to the damage and prejudice of the owner, Maria Ignacio-Francisco in the amount of
P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. 6

On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted into city) Nueva Ecija,
filed an information (Crim. Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Court, charging private
respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, with qualified theft, as follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Narciso Mananing Florentino Alcantara,
Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as
follows:

That on or about the month of August, 1969 in the City of San Jose, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Narciso Mananing being then the driver of Bedford truck bearing Plate No. T-
35049, Series of 1964, with Chassis No. 153559, and with a Motor No. 2/54/5/6 owned
by Maria Ignacio-Francisco, conspiring and confederating together with his co-accused
namely: Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra, and with intent
to gain, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the said Bedford truck valued at Twenty Three
Thousand Pesos ( P23,000.00) Philippine Currency and dismantled the same without
the consent of the said owner and to her damage and prejudice of the said sum of
P23,000.00. 7

On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty
During the arraignment, respondent-Judge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco
Estrella. The court interpreter was directed to translate the information into Tagalog for the benefit of
the accused. The prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the information, if
indeed it was really erroneous. From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the
scheduled trial of the case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. 8

On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally moved that
it be allowed to amend the information 9 so as to change the date of the commission of the offense
from "August 1969" to "August 1964." 10 Private respondent Francisco Estrella, having come to the
trial court ready to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously
objected to the verbal motion. 11

Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to amend, and instead, required
the prosecution to present its first witness, to determine whether the sought amendment in the
information would constitute a change of substance affecting the rights of the accused or merely of
form. 12

Florentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a prosecution witness, testified that
the offense was committed in 1964. The defense refused to cross-examine witness Alcantara, asked
respondent Court to strike off the testimony of Alcantara because it referred to an offense not
mentioned in the information, and asked for a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution's verbal
motion to amend the information. 13

Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the defense to submit memoranda. The contested
order of July 22, 1970, denying the prosecution's verbal motion to amend information on the ground
that said amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused was issued by respondent
Court. 14

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned contested order alleged that time was
not material ingredient of the offense of qualified theft and claimed that the case of Placido Opemia,
et al., 98 Phil. 698, relied upon by the trial court for its denial of the motion to amend information, was
not applicable to the case. 15

The respondent Court, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, in its order of September
14, 1970, 16 stating that the prosecution's honest mistake in the information filed cannot prevail over
the substantial rights of the accused based on constitutional provisions. Hence this petition.

The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the respondent Court abused its discretion
when it refused an amendment to the information filed in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV 170-NE, to
change the date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964", on
the ground it would constitute an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by
the Constitution.

Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or information in a criminal case where the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded, as in this case, may be amended only as to all
matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights of the accused.

As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to change the time of the alleged
commission of crime from 1969 to 1964 (period of five years) would prejudice the substantial rights of
the accused after his arraignment and plea, this Court ruled in the case of People vs. Placido
Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, that:

In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947, and not
on June 18, 1952, as alleged in the information. The period of almost five years
between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but be
led to believe that another theft different from that committed by the co-defendants in
1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused, who
came to Court prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by
them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by
evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The variance is certainly
unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of
 the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense of which they were not
charged.

In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was investigated for an offense allegedly
committed in August of 1964. Then, he was charged for an offense allegedly committed in August of
1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires to put him on trial for the
alleged 1964 offense. This cannot legally be done.

The petitioner's argument that the time or date of the commission of the offense is not a material
ingredient of the crime of qualified theft cannot be given much weight in this case because the
disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation in the
commission of one and the same offense. While it has been held that except when time is a material
ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this
Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may be careless about fixing the
date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation
so indefinite as to amount to the same thing. 17 The prosecution is given the chance to allege an
approximation of time of the commission of the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it
does not mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given approximate date so
as to surprise and prejudice the accused.

What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake in the placing of the date of the
alleged crime in the information filed. During the arraignment and plea of private respondent
Francisco Estrella on January 28, 1970, the prosecution had all the chances to realize and rectify its
mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused was set for May 21, 1970. Petitioner therefore, had
more than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally, petitioner verbally moved to
amend the information only at the start of the trial. To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the
accused and prejudice his substantial rights.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated July 10, 1970 and September 14, 1970, by respondent
Judge are hereby AFFIRMED, the preliminary injunction issued on September 24, 1970 dissolved,
and this petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez,* Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO (Chairman), J., concurring:

I concur, but I believe this decision cannot bar another prosecution of private respondent under
another information charging theft committed in 1964.

G.R. No. 201572 July 9, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAEL DELFIN, Appellant.

PEREZ, J.:

This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 April 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said Decision, the CA affirmed, with modification, the conviction of
herein appellant Rael Delfin for murder under Article 248(1) of Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

The antecedents:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old fisherman from
Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home.

Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant was formally charged
with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.3 The information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
ofthis Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
with the said weapon one EMILIO ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon
the victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate death. CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz (Joan) and a certain Dr.
Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).

Joan is an eyewitness tothe gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of the victim. The
substance of her testimony is as follows:5

1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing outside Emilio’s house at R.
Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas City. From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking over the
telephone at a store just across his house. Also at the store during that time was the appellant
who was seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.

2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately after going inside the house,
Joan heard the sound of a gunshot. Joan rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio shot in
the head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the appellant, now holding a gun, firing
another shot at Emilio.

3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous misunderstanding between Emilio and the
appellant; neither did she observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word spoken between
Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.

Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who examined post
mortemthe corpse of Emilio. He issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-00,6 which revealed that
Emilio died as a consequence of two (2) gunshotwounds: one that penetrated the left side of his head
and another that penetrated his chest. Dr. Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.
The defense, for its part, relied onthe testimonies of the appellant7 and a certain Rene Villanueva
(Rene).8

Appellant offered the alibithat he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the date and time of the
supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27
September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant also testified that
he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other individuals—one of which was Rene.

Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However, Rene later admitted
thathe, the appellant and their other companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26
September 2000—not the 27th ; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000—not the
28th . Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant were already in
Navotas City.

On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision9 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense of murder under Article 248(1) of the RPC.10 Based on its assessment and evaluation of
the evidence on record, the RTC was convinced that it was the appellant who killed Emilio and who
did so with the use of treachery. Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant tosuffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetuaand to pay civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and another ₱50,000.00 as consequential
damages.

Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision with the CA.

On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant. The CA,
however, deleted the award of ₱50,000.00 consequential damages and replaced it with an award of
₱50,000.00 moral damages.11 Hence, this appeal.

In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he was tried and convicted.
He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as
alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November 2000" and the one actually
established during the trial i.e., 27 September 2000. Appellant protests that the failure of the
information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be
properly informed of the charge against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an
intelligent defense thereon.

Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibiover and above the version of the prosecution.

Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against him.

OUR RULING

We deny the appeal.

Variance In the Date of the

Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information

We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and convicted,
notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as alleged inthe information
and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to
allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court
merelyrequires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be
approximated:12

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.– A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the

name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have beencommitted on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied).

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an
information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial
would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution.13 In such cases, the erroneous
allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial 14 or
may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information. 15

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of the
offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such
discrepancy is so greatthat it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no
longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the
information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck
down for being violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
Such was this Court’s ruling in the case of People v. Opemia. 16

In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952 was filed against four
(4) accused. After all of the accused entered a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution
adduced evidence to the effect that the purported theft was committed in July of 1947. The
prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the information to make it conform to the
evidence with respect to the date of theft. The trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed
the information altogether. The dispute reaching us in due course, we sustained the trial court’s
dismissal of the information:

The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the commission of the
crime charged from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned trial
Judge said:

"It is a cardinal rule in criminalprocedure that the precise time at which an offense was committed
need not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the
information or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section 10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is
to apprise the accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was committed in order to
enable him to prepare his defense and thus avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that
the carabao was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The
period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that one
cannot help but beled to believe that another theft different from that committed by the Defendantsin
1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression the accused, who came to court
prepared to face a charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly
caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense
committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair tothem, for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to
defend themselves. Moreover, they cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not
charged.

"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendanthas entered his plea, the
information or complaint may be amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done
without prejudice tothe rights of the Defendant(Rule 196, section 13). An amendment that would
change the date of the commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.
The difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such an
error is ruled out by the fact that the difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in the
last two digits of the year.It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with material facts
constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
Defendants."

His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as referring to
substance and not merely to form. But even supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the
Defendants had pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if it would not
prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the court did not make good use of that
discretion in disallowing the amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced
thereby would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court "it
violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and
deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves." 17 (Emphasis supplied).

In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but the general rule.

Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there is no mistaking that
both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e.,
the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused may have been caught off-
guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence pointing to commission of the murder on 27
September 2000, considering that all documentary attachments to the information (such as the
Resolution18 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn
Statement19 of Joan) all referred to the murder as having been committed on that date. Indeed,
appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial and was even able to concoct an intelligent
alibiin direct refutation thereof.

What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in the
information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its
supporting documents point to the murder ashaving been committed on the 27th of September2000,
the information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed.20 Such an error
is evidently not fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.

Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was tried and convicted, as
valid.

Appellant’s Defense of Alibi

Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant’s insistence on the credibility of his alibi.1avvphi1 On this point,
we quote with approval the following discourse of the CA, which we find to be consistent with time-
honored jurisprudence:21

Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weightis given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case. 22

As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution witness, Joan, was clear, candid,
straightforward, positive and credible, as against the denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She positively
identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. x x x.

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if positive and credible, is
sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder.23 Considering that Joan’s account of
how the [appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is, thus, no compelling
reason to disturb the trial court’s reliance on her testimony.

As to the [appellant’s] defense ofdenial and alibi, the same are unavailing and worthless in the face of
the positive identification by the prosecution’s witness x x x.

x x x. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven that the [accused] was at some
other place at the time the crime was committed and that it was physicallyimpossible for him to be at
the locus criminisat the time [the offense was committed].24 x x x.

At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his committing the crime as even, Rene,
the witness who was supposed to corroborate his alibi, admitted that theywent back home at 4:00
o’clock in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already at Navotas City at the time the
incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly possible for him to be present at the crime scene despite his
allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on all the foregoing evidence, he is, without a doubt, the
perpetrator of the crime.

Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the appellant, we find it to
befully justified by the evidence on record. Again, we approve of the CA’s observations on this matter:

Concededly, the [appellant’s] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected
and deliberate. Before the attack was made, [Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the
phone. He was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to defend himself. By all
indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to evade the gunshots, to defend himself, or to
retaliate. For this reason, the [RTC] correctly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the
offense as Murder.25

All in all, we find no error inthe conviction of the appellant.

Recoverable Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence,26 we increase the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages
payable by the appellant from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.

In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay exemplary damages in the amount
₱30,000.00.27
The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the
amount of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; (2) that the amount of moral
damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in
addition to civil indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject to
interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 213598

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
MERCELITA1 ARENAS y BONZO @ MERLY, Accused-Appellant

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision2 dated January 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 05533, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lingayen Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. L-8966. The RTC found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information3 dated August 9, 2010, the appellant was charged as follows:

That on or about August 6, 2010 in the evening, in Brgy. Poblacion, Sual, Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully sell two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of Metamphetamine (sic) Hydrochoride (Shabu), a
prohibited drug, in exchange for ₱2,000.00 marked money to PO3 Benedict Julius B. Rimando, acting
as poseur-buyer, and was likewise in possession, with intent to sell, one (1) heat-sealed plastic
sachet of methamphetamine Hydrochoride (Shabu) without lawful authority to possess and sell the
same.

Contrary to Art. II, Section 5 of RA 9165.4

Upon her arraignment5 on August 25, 2010, she pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Pre-trial
and trial thereafter ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Benedict Julius B. Rimando (PO3 Rimando), PO2
Alex Aficial, Jr. (PO2 Aficial), Police Senior Inspector Myrna Malojo (PSI Malojo ), PO2 Catherine
Viray (PO2 Viray), Barangay Kagawad Dioniso S. Gulen, Police Inspector Ma. Theresa Amor Manuel,
and Police Senior Inspector Leo S. Llamas (PSI Llamas).

The prosecution evidence established that sometime in July 2010, the Chief of Police (COP) of the
Sual Police Station, Sual, Pangasinan, PSI Llamas, started conducting a surveillance on the alleged
illegal drug-selling activities of appellant. At 6:00 p.m. of August 6, 2010, he called on PO3 Rimando,
PO2 Aficia1, SPO2 Gulen, POI Viray and SPOl Editha Castro to an emergency conference and
instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant who agreed to deliver the items in front
of Las Brisas Subdivision, along the National Highway in Poblacion Sual, Pangasinan. During the
briefing, the appellant was described as a woman of about 4 to 5 feet tall and between 45 to 50 years
old. PO3 Rimando was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given two (2) ₱1000 bills to be used
for the operation, which were photocopied and entered into the police blotter. PO2 Aficial had earlier
coordinated with the PDEA of the intended buy bust.6

At 6:30 p.m., the team walked to the area which was about 150 meters away from their station. PO3
Rimando and PO2 Aficial stood at the side of the highway beside the subdivision as earlier instructed
by PSI Llamas while the other team members were positioned strategically. After 5 minutes of
waiting, appellant came near PO3 Rimando who told the former in Ilocano dialect that he was
instructed to pick up the items and asked the appellant whether she had the items to which the latter
answered in the affirmative. PO3 Rimando then handed appellant the two marked ₱1000.00 bills and
the latter gave him the two (2) small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO3
Rimando signaled PO2 Aficial, who was two meters away from him, to come over and they
introduced themselves as police officers. PO3 Rimando conducted a routine body search on
appellant and he was able to recover from her the marked money and another small plastic sachet
she was holding in her left hand.7

Appellant was brought to the Sual Police Station where PO3 Rimando marked the two plastic sachets
subject of the buy-bust with "BJB-1" and "BJB-2," and the one plastic sachet recovered from appellant
with "BJB-3." He prepared and signed the confiscation receipt of the seized items in the presence of a
barangay kagawad, a Department of Justice (DOJ) Prosecutor, and an ABS-CBN reporter, who all
affixed their signatures in the Confiscation Receipt, as well as the appellant. 8 PO2 Viray took pictures
of the seized items, marked money as well as the signing of the receipt inside the police station. 9 PO3
Rimando brought the seized items as well as the Request for Laboratory Examination 10 prepared by
PSI Llamas to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Lingayen, Pangasinan.

PSI Myrna Malojo, a forensic chemist, personally received from PO3 Rimando the letter request and
the seized items.11 The laboratory results showed a positive result for methamphetamine hyrochloride
or shabu, and having a weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07 grams and 0.05 grams, respectively, which
findings were contained in PSI Malojo’s initial12 and confirmatory13 reports. PSI Malojo sealed the
seized items and placed her own markings thereon and turned them to the evidence custodian. 14 She
identified in court the items she examined as the same items she received from PO3 Rimando 15 and
the latter also identified the subject items as the same items he recovered from the appellant during
the buy-bust operation.16

Appellant denied the charges alleging that at 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. of August 6, 2010, she was with a
certain Mina grilling barbecue at a video bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision; that after a while,
Mina's boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked with Mina. When PSI Llamas left, Mina asked her to
deliver a letter to a certain Renee who owed her money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who would
bring her to Renee. When she met Renee, she handed her the letter from Mina and Renee gave her
a sealed envelope. Upon her return to the bar, she gave the envelope to Mina who was drinking beer
with PSI Llamas. She then asked permission to go home as she would still cook dinner but Mina told
her to grill more barbecues. As she insisted in going home, PSI Llamas placed his right arm around
her neck and called someone on his cellphone. She tried to remove PSI Llamas' arm around her neck
when a police car arrived and brought her to the police station where she was forced to say
something about the shabu which she had no knowledge of and she was later detained. 17
In rebuttal, PSI Llamas denied knowing Mina and going to the videoke bar on August 6, 201 O; that
he only met the appellant at the police station and was not the one who arrested her. 18 In her sur-
rebuttal, appellant claimed that she had known PSI Llamas for about 3 weeks prior to her arrest and
insisted that he was the one who arrested her.

On April 16, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision19 finding appellant guilty of the charged offenses, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution having established to a moial certainty the
guilt of accused MERCILITA ARENAS y BONZO @ ''Merly," this Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:

1. For violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, this Court hereby sentences said accused to LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, and to pay [a] fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00);

2. For violation of Section 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court hereby sentences said Accused to a
prison term of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years, and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.20

The RTC found that PO3 Rimando, who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation,
positively identified appellant as the one who sold and handed him the two plastic sachets of shabu in
the amount of ₱2,000.00 and the same person who received the marked money from him. It was also
proven that during appellant's arrest, PO3 Rimando recovered one more plastic sachet of shabu in
her possession, and he marked the three plastic sachets with his initials; and that every link in the
chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachets was also established. The RTC found that PO3
Rimando testified in a frank, spontaneous and straightforward manner and his credibility was not
crumpled on cross examination, and it rejected appellant's defenses of denial and frame up.

The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 3 8 dated 16 April 2012 is AFFIRMED. 21

Hence, this appeal filed by appellant. Both appellant and the Solicitor General manifested that they
are adopting their Briefs filed with the CA.

Appellant is now before us with the same issues raised before the CA, i.e., that the RTC gravely
erred: (1) in giving weight and credence to the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;
(2) in holding that there was a legitimate buy-bust operation; (3) in convicting appellant of the crimes
charged despite the failure to prove the elements of the alleged sale of shabu and the chain of
custody and the integrity of the allegedly seized items; and (4) in convicting appellant under an
Information which charges two offenses in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

We find no merit in the appeal.

For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.22 We
find all the elements necessary for appellant's conviction for illegal sale of shabu clearly established in
this case.

PO3 Rimando, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person whom he caught in
flagrante delicto selling white crystalline substance presumed to be shabu in the buy-bust operation
conducted by their police team; that upon appellant's receipt of the ₱2,000.00 buy-bust money from
PO3 Rimando, she handed to him the two sachets of white crystalline substance which when tested
yielded positive results for shabu. Appellant's delivery of the shabu to PO3 Rimando and her receipt
of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. The seized shabu and the
marked money were presented as evidence before the trial court.

Appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Ong23wherein the Court acquitted the appellants of the
charge of illegal sale of shabu for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime
charged is misplaced. The Court found therein that the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, showed that he was not privy to the sale transaction which transpired between the
confidential informant, who did not testify, and the appellant.

Here, while it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt with appellant regarding the sale
of shabu, it also appeared that PSI Llamas had designated PO3 Rimando as his representative in the
sale transaction with appellant. Notably, PO3 Rimando was instructed by PSI Llamas to wait at the
specified area where appellant would be the first to approach him for the sale of shabu,24 which
established the fact that appellant was already informed beforehand as to the person she was to deal
with regarding the sale of shabu. Indeed, appellant approached PO3 Rimando who was waiting at the
designated area and upon receipt from him of the payment of ₱2000.00, the former handed to the
latter the two sachets of shabu. The identity of appellant as the seller, as well as the object and
consideration for the sale transaction, had been proved by the testimony of PO3 Rimando, the buyer.

We also find appellant guilty of illegal possession of shabu. The essential requisites to establish
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused was in p0ssession of the dangerous drug,
(2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the dangerous drug.25 What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of possession of the
prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the police officer who actually recovered the
prohibited drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge of the possession. 26

In the instant case, PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct knowledge of the seizure and
confiscation of the shabu from the appellant, testified that he was also able to recover another plastic
sachet of shabu which appellant was holding with her left hand, which testimony was corroborated by
PO2 Aficial.27 As it was proved that appellant had freely and consciously possessed one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu without authority to do so, she can be found guilty of illegal possession of shabu.

The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody
of the seized shabu from the time they were recovered from appellant up to the time they were
presented in court. Section l(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, 28 which
implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of custody as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
It was established that after PO3 Rimando seized the three plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from appellant, he was in possession of the same from confiscation up to the
police station.29 He marked the three plastic sachets at the police station, which was only 150 meters
away from the scene,30 with "BJB-1", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3."31 He prepared the confiscation receipt in
the presence of a barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor and an ABS-CBN Reporter, who all affixed
their signatures therein, the appellant, PO1 Viray and P02 Aficial.32 PO1 Viray then took photographs
of the seized items, the preparation and signing of the confiscation receipt. PO3 Rimando then
brought the request for laboratory examination prepared by PSI Llamas of the seized items and
personally brought the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 33

PSI Malojo, the forensic chemist, personally received the said request and the three small heat-
sealed plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with markings from PO3
Rimando.34 After examining the items, PSI Malojo found them to be positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as shabu, which findings were embodied in her Initial
Laboratory Report and eventually, in her Final Chemistry Report. After her examination, PSI Maloj o
sealed the seized items and placed her own markings thereon, and turned them over to the evidence
custodian for safekeeping.35 During her testimony in court, PSI Malojo identified the items she
examined as the same items she received from PO3 Rimando. PO3 Rimando also identified in court
the subject items as the same items he recovered from the possession of appellant during the buy-
bust operation.36

We likewise agree with the CA that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses refer to minor details which did not relate to the crimes charged. The inconsistencies have
been sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses themselves. We quote with approval what the
CA said:

The alleged inconsistencies in the composition of the buy-bust team, in the identity and/or description
of accused-appellant, and in the markings on the seized items are collateral matters and not essential
elements of the crimes charged. Moreover, a scrutiny of these purported inconsistencies would show
that the same are not conflicting at all.

Although P02 Viray testified that she was at the office at the time P03 Rimando and P02 Aficial were
conducting the buy-bust operation, it does not necessarily mean that she was not part of the buy-bust
team. P02 Viray testified that before the conduct of the buy-bust operation, she was designated by
P03 Rimando to be the official photographer. She was told to take photographs after the subject
operation, a task that she performed when accused-appellant was brought to the police station. This
explains why P03 Rimando included her in his testimony as one of the members of the buy-bust
team.

Similarly the testimony of P02 Aficial that he was with P03 Rimando during the buy-bust operation is
not conflicting with P03 Rimando's enumeration of the member of the buy-bust team. P02 Aficial was
asked who was with [him] during the buy-bust operation and he merely answered the question of the
counsel for the defense. P02 Aficial was not asked who were the other members of the buy-bust
team. His answer was consistent with P03 Rimando's statement that when the latter gave the pre-
arranged signal, he approached P03 Rimando and they introduced themselves to accused-appellant
as police officers.

xxxx

As regards the source of the information on the description of accused-appellant which enabled the
poseur-buyer to identify her, the same is a trivial matter.1âwphi1 Whether the information came from
PSI Llamas or a confidential informant, the fact remains that a crime was committed by accused-
appellant in the presence of the police officers who were members of the buy-bust team and who had
the duty to immediately arrest her after the consummation of the transaction. The fact also remains
that the description about the seller matched accused-appellant.x x x

As to the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized items, the same are clearly
typographical errors. The transcript of PSI Malojo's testimony showed that she identified the markings
on the seized plastic sachets as "BJB-1'', "NJN-2" and "BJB-3." However, the follow-up question of
the prosecutor clarified that she was actually referring to "BJB-1 ", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3", to wit:

Q. I am showing you then Madam Witness three (3) plastic sachet (sic) will you go over the contain
(sic) to the one you are testifying "BJB-1" to "BJB-3" (sic)?

A. Yes, sir.

The universal practice is that exhibits or evidence are marked chronologically. It is highly unlikely that
the second sachet would be marked "NJN-2" when the first one was marked "BJB-1" and the third
one was marked "BJB-3". Notably, both Confiscation Receipt and Request for Laboratory
Examination showed that the seized items were marked "BJB-1 ", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3" consistent
with the testimony of P03 Rimando. It should also be noted that in the computer keyboard, the letters
"B" and "N" are beside each other. Hence, the only logical conclusion for the purported discrepancy is
that the stenographer inadvertently pressed the letter "N" instead of the letter "B. " 37

Anent the matter of the confiscation receipt bearing the date August 5, 2010 when the buy-bust
happened on August 6, 2010, P03 Rimando explained that he committed an error in placing the date
August 5 which should be August 6.38 Moreover, it was established by the testimony of Kagawad
Gulen that on August 6, 2010, he was called to witness the items confiscated from appellant and was
asked to sit beside P03 Rimando while the latter was preparing the confiscation receipt. 39 Gulen even
identified in court the confiscation receipt where his signature appeared. 40

Appellant's contention that the RTC erred in convicting him under an Information that charged two
offenses is not persuasive. Although the Information in this case charged two offenses which is a
violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[a]
complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses," nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or
information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as
many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out
separately the findings of fact and law in each offense." 41

Appellant's failure to raise that more than one offense was charged in the Information in a motion to
quash42 before she pleaded to the same is deemed a waiver.43 As appellant failed to file a motion to
quash the Information, she can be convicted of the crimes charged in the Information if proven.

We also find no merit in appellant's claim that she cannot be convicted of illegal possession of illegal
drugs as its possession is absorbed in the charge of illegal sale.

In People v. Lacerna,44We held:

The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where
the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not
covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use
by the seller.
Here, it was established that P03 Rimando was able to recover from appellant's possession another
plastic sachet of shabu which was not the subject of the illegal sale; thus, she could be separately
charged with illegal possession for the same.

We find that the RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.0045 for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

As to the crime of illegal possession, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱l0,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in
the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

xxxx

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:

(1) ...

(2) ... and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA,
LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

Clear from the foregoing, the quantity of the dangerous drugs is determinative of the penalty to be
imposed for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We note, however, that the quantity
of shabu found to be in appellant's possession was not indicated in the Information which is important
as the law provides for the graduation of penalties. We cannot just rely on the quantity established by
the prosecution, which the RTC did in imposing the penalty, without violating appellant's right to be
informed of the accusation against her. The RTC imposed the minimum penalty provided by law since
the quantity recovered from appellant's possession was less than 5 grams of shabu; however, it could
have been different if the quantity recovered from appellant was more than 5 grams where the
penalty imposable is imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a
fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00), or even the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00), because in this
case, the Court could not impose the penalty provided by law in view of the non-allegation of the true
quantity in the information.

By analogy, in theft cases,46 where the penalty is graduated according to the value of the thing stolen,
we ruled that when the prosecution failed to establish the amount of property taken by an
independent and reliable estimate, we may fix the value of the property taken based on attendant
circumstances or impose the minimum penalty. Since it was proved that appellant was in possession
of shabu but the quantity was not specified in the Information, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on her should be the minimum penalty corresponding to illegal possession of less than five
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu which is penalized with imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱300, 000. 00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00). 47

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of the imposable penalty shall not fall
below the minimum period set by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum period
allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should be within the range of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

One final note. Public prosecutors are reminded to carefully prepare the criminal complaint and
Information in accordance with the law so as not to adversely affect the dispensation of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 22,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION only insofar as to the penalty imposable for the crime of illegal possession so that
appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.

BERSAMIN, J.:

The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation through the criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his prosecution
for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the information sufficiently alleges facts and
omissions constituting an offense that includes the offense established to have been committed by
the accused.

The Case

Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006, whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA)1 affirmed .with modification his conviction for the illegal possession and control
of 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City had handed down
through its decision dated February 1, 2000,2 sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion
perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to
pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (₱750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment."

Antecedents

The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:

That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving
away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed
in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs, found in his possession and
control.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.

On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City (PNP) conducted a test-buy
operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-
buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC, Branch 72, Olongapo City
(Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s
residence located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City. 4 SPO4
Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo
Manalang of Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of Manansala’s house at around 5:30
a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the
information, which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a cabinet. Also
seized was the amount of ₱655.00 that included the two marked ₱50.00 bills bearing serial numbers
SNKJ812018 and SNMN426747 used during the test buy. 5

All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect,
along with his father, Jose Manansala, and Barangay Captain Manalang. 6 The certification listed the
following seized articles, to wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried marijuana leaves; (b)
rolling paper; and (c) money amounting to ₱655.00.

SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned
over the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m. of
October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas,
San Fernando, Pampanga for qualitative examination.

The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-94,7 to wit:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Spmn "A" – One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two (2) rectangular bricks of dried
suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops having a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755)
grams.

Spmn "B" – One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting
tops weighing 9.045 grams. x x x.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated drug in the above-stated
specimen. x x x.

FINDINGS:
 Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result for
MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:

Spmns "A" and "B" – contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug.8

Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994.9

On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the admission
of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited
drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under
Section 8 of the same law.10 But the RTC did not act on the motion.

Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized.

In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. His
version follows.

On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without
any warrant, and brought him to an office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on
Magsaysay Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and then detained him
when he refused to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. They turned down his request to be
brought to a hospital for the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of his
testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his captors and whoever had maltreated him,
except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at the trial. 11

Decision of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425, holding thus:

The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that accused willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly x x x engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing x x x falling
under the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of allegedly knowingly
selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven. The member
of the team who is alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the accused was
not presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the
surveillance conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a member of the team acting as
poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.

However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a member, was able to find
marijuana leaves in the custody, possession and control of the accused, in the course of the
enforcement of the search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused, which like alibi, is the weakest defense,
this Court is convinced that accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing,
for which the accused have been charged with. In light of these circumstances, this Court has no
option that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime proved. Since the date of the commission of
the crime as proved is October 19, 1994, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far as the
imposable penalty is concerned, will find application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY of Violation of Section 8, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty (₱750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the following issues, namely:

1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured by virtue of an invalid warrant,
was erroneous;

2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal possession of prohibited drug on the
misplaced and inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6425 was necessarily included in the offense in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425; and

3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and misrepresented facts and
evidences of substance and importance that, if weighed, assayed and considered were
enough to acquit the accused.13

On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming the conviction subject to
modification, viz:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred fifty thousand pesos (₱750,000.00)
with subsidiary imprisonment.

Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are hereby ordered transmitted to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he already assigned before the CA.

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in
selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of
marijuana dried leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs,
found in his possession and control."

The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,15 which provides:

Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any such transactions.

Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it. But instead of finding him guilty
of the crime charged after trial, the RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which states:

Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of
Section 20 hereof.

On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors committed by the RTC that the trial
court had erred in convicting him for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and
inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8 was
necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4.

The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his conviction for the illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana
under Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as follows:

xxxx

Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the
submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller
thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The element of sale
must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In the case before Us, the trial
court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused-
appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he
was found in possession of the same.

While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present
circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the
sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity
of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before Us, it has been
satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant
were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light, We find that
the court a quo committed no reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under
Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne
by the records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the lawful search conducted at
the house of the accused yielded a total of 764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the
PNP Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the prosecution witness and the
presentation of the corpus delicti, it is indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that
accused-appellant was the author of the same.16

xxxx

To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the conviction of
Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which the information did not allege, instead of for a violation
of Section 4, which the information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought against him.

For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has found an accused charged with the
illegal sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna,17 the Court held as prevailing the
doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the
seller was also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of marijuana not covered by
or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some
future dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that the illegal possession,
being an element of the illegal sale, was necessarily included in the illegal sale. The Court observed
thusly:

In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, as follows:
(1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had
sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it, the Court stressed
delivery, which implies prior possession of the prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never
be proven without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that possession is a
condition sine qua non.

It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is necessarily included in the illegal
sale of prohibited drugs, the Court will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.

From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases adjudicated, the elements of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.18

In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna, however, the involvement of a
single object in both the illegal sale as the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime
proved is indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the information to be the
subject of the illegal sale is considered competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused
for the illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is either deemed absorbed by or is
considered a necessary element of the illegal sale. On the other hand, any other illegal substance
found in the possession of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should be
prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging illegal possession; otherwise, the
fundamental right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him would be flagrantly violated.
It is true that there was an error in the information’s statement of the facts essential to properly
describe the offense being charged against Manansala as that of illegal possession of marijuana; and
that the error became known to the Prosecution, leading Prosecutor Manalansan to himself file the
motion for the admission of the amended information dated January 3, 1995. 19 In the motion,
Prosecutor Manalansan manifested that the information as filed charged a violation of Section 4; and
that during the preliminary investigation, he had concluded that Manansala should have been
charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of Section 4 as far as the 750 grams of
dried marijuana leaves seized from his possession during the implementation of Search Warrant No.
8-94 was concerned. The distinct and separate nature of the 750 grams of marijuana leaves from the
quantity of marijuana worth ₱100.00 that was the object of the test buy became all the more evident
in Prosecutor Manalansan’s letter dated December 28, 1994 addressed to City Prosecutor Prudencio
B. Jalandoni.20

There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana dried leaves had been seized
from the possession Manansala on October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search warrant, while the
attributed illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994 during the test buy conducted
to support the application of the search warrant. The letter specifically stated:

xxxx

3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the seizure on 19 October 1994 are
separate incidents giving rise to two distinct offenses;

4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the "sale of prohibited drugs" on 19
October 1994 because he was engaged in it before.1âwphi1 There is no evidence to show that
the accused was engaged in the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation
of drugs as provided under Section 4;

5. The two (2) ₱50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the accused was engaged in selling
the 750 grams of marijuana leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but cannot
qualify his possession of the 750 grams of the drugs.

xxxx

Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.

The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was "a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The
right of Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him enunciated
in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution21 was not violated simply because the information
had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to
be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and
similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As
such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that
when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged.22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an
offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 26, 2006;
and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite
the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus,
without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case
from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his
appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a
judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime
are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief
in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of
his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, 8 in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals
to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to
death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124. 10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the
Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should
he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day
period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his
petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the
order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.

Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367

Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not
disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified
penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and
"simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent)
and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a
corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes
the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if
the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to
a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence
obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization
of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the
Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging
one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act
but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365
starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting
C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These
cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where,
in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.
At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite
his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising
from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution
of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into
different crimes and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for
the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea
of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal
Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act
resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where
the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the
value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of
damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the
trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence
arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for
damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of
the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two
complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the
charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police
wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was
convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case
for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles
involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal
filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both
cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who
alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal
was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged
in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle
Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’
After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the
Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the
accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things
we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is
whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged
in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa;
or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits
that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the
order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga
case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated
the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669,
April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties,
will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under
either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should
the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the
single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC
has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is
prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there
will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is
tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects
of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty
for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime
by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article
365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in
this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has
been previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall
be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted
belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still
keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this
ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal
Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.