Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on
the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

 The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing
in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with
the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is
held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary,
3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any
act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the
law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting
of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation
and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
 customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.]
, p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging
in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve
actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members
or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging
in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact
that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or
more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863,
870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work
will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles
are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends
in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent
decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the
need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making"
and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision
and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated
concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must
stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively
little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a
vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in
the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context
and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either
a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at
the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it
is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some
large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs
of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal
research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action,
or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This
can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational

corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced
in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign
country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers.
In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow
the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who
fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject
study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning:
(1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area
linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a
unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-
state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not
only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder
— in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through
participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry
that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been
found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the
groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both
to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial,
social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise
 the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and
risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used

directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools
provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to
illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar
facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive
of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is
not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues,
including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an
increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also
gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees
as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked
in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod
worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked
with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a
legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of
advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability
and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved
in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V.
Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No.
2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
 After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as
far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p.
13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score
national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation
policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting
and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt
restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T.
Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms

and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or
more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities
of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails
to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners,
they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal
of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the
framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in

which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
 be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority
to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it
is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages:
(1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for
five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from
the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True
I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition
of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is
a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power
is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court
would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man.
Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,

Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A.
Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7cralaw
virtualaw library

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and
“the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten.”9cralaw virtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10 Not
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles
virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted
as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.
While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold
this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the
rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library

We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences
of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia
facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge,
he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after
receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES

AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks
judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that respondent was administratively charged by his sister-in-law, complainant
Isidra Ting-Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent
to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery."2 The particular charges are:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and
her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it
involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent
the following acts or omissions:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear
that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for
the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later
sold to Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by,
Felicisima and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to
transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina. The
forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment
was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy.
and Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24,
October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the
effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses
Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With
the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and
Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from
the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the
reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to
release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would
be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented
evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the
money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an
employee.3

In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court found merit in the complaint and, thus, held
respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1
and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the practice
of law:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

x x x x5

Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid
Resolution, which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution 7 dated June 29, 2004.

Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second
Motion for Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack of merit in the Resolution 9 dated
November 9, 2004, stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be entertained."

On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that
compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court in that his
disbarment be lifted. The same was, however, expunged from the records in a Resolution11
dated June 13, 2006.

Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga 12
and former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,13 reiterating his pleas for compassion and
mercy. However, these letters were similarly expunged from the records in a Resolution 14 dated
September 5, 2006, considering the previous directive that no further pleadings will be further
entertained in this case. These were followed by numerous submissions either seeking his
reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of
which were either expunged from the records17 or denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant
Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.

The Court's Ruling

"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in
moral character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice." 19redarclaw

"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the Iawver
has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to
the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement."20redarclaw

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. There 'must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or

legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 22
(emphases and underscoring supplied)
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds that the instant petition is not
meritorious.

While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004,
respondent's present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required
in the first guideline above.

The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of
the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should
be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus the Court will grant it
only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential
and promise are indispensable."23redarclaw

In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has presented is a
Certification24 dated June 5, 2015 signed by Reverend Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative Pastor
of the Buenavista Evangelical Church in General Trias, Cavite, which generally states that
respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has been "assisting the poor and indigent
litigants in our community," and that "he has been very active in spreading the [w]ords and
gospel of the Almighty God[,] being an active member of the Couples of Christ FFL." Aside from
these bare statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or
activities by which respondent had rendered free legal services to indigents or had ministered to
the members of his community or church, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form of
consistency in his supposed desire to reform.

The other testimonials which respondent submits, particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr.,
who stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner, [respondent] is humble, simple, and respectful
to fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding Judge," and that "[h]e used to give free
legal advice and assisted indigent litigants in their court cases," 25 and that of Atty. Manuel
Medina, retired City Prosecutor of Cavite, who stated that "[d]uring my years as Prosecutor x x x
I always met him in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say in all honesty and
candor that he was an exemplary officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared in
handling his court cases,"26 all relate to conduct or attributions prior to respondent's disbarment;
hence, these are incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes consistent
improvement subsequent to his disbarment.

In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his previous Motion for Reconsideration 27 filed on
May 20, 2004 which he now incorporates in support of his present petition,28 is equally
insufficient to conclude that he has already reformed. This is because all these testimonials
were executed in May 2004.29 Thus, they can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions
a mere month removed from his disbarment on April 14, 2004.

More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent's disbarment was his
fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was
presented to show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show
remorse for his previous faults. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for Estafa
Through Falsification of Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the
same was based on lack of probable cause.30 Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that he
was actually innocent of the administrative charges against him, since the parameters and
considerations of an administrative case are evidently different from that in a criminal case. As
in this case, the lack of probable cause against respondent as found by the prosecutor does not
negate his administrative liability already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that
respondent "merely rendered legal services to the Ting siblings" 31 does not mean that he
rendered the same in accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.

To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition to demonstrate his potential for public
service, or that he - now being 68 years of age32 - still has productive years ahead of him that
can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth
guidelines were neither complied with.

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or
reputational in cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and
esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in considering [a lawyer's] application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity."33
Ultimately, with the above discussed guidelines not complied with, the Court has to be objective
and, therefore, denies the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine
Bar.

Factual Background

In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice
of law on the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple
actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception
before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed
on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally
recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate
action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and
from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense
of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of
justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of
the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court
procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that
he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of
incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of
the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated

December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board
of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio
Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon
8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent
should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion3 praying
that his license to practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court
En Bancresolved to deny the petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and
Mercy4 asking the Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained
that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment. He also
attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager
of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that one of the
charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s
compassion and mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his
lesson; but at the same time, questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He
appended to his appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership dues,7 MCLE
compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by
a Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En
Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others
that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never
been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter
Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted
regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was
also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing
repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and
vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and
energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years
of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful,
dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal
proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in
accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, the respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011,
July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16
On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating
his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll
on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with
chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed
that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to
Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on
Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to
be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind.
Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a
member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18
evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish,
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When
exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those
who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred
attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the applicant
shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had
demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to
the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free
legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through
the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and
President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and
claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision.
According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to
reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity
of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and
deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to
his character reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he
has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of
Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs
in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of
Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown
by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved
moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to
reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The
Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution
by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind."
Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he
was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the
disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that
he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred
lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of
malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in
court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court
considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after
his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and
acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is
sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found
guilty of gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v.
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to
delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of
law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review
by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already
reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature
and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his

guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-
denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also
failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus
entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law,
the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and
rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement
was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent
from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence
Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen
Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive
portion of the subject Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory
evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has
made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.

Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.2

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy 3
which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution 4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or
on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) 5 seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the
present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in
the Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the same petition was
endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court
to look into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal

acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.9
(Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.10

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant
Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached
pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in
Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother
until her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/
Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. 13
Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas
College during the School Year 2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-
civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P.
Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer;19 (6) Certification
from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T.
Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the
Office of the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka
ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior
Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent
has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human
Resource Management Officer attested that he has no pending administrative case.27 He is not
known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011. 28

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30 His parish priest,
Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the
doctrines of the Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.32 Records
further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, 33 as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support 34 to
his children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was
disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High
School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000
as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service
Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications presented,
the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 37 years of
age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of
its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1âwphi1 He is,

however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the
rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law
are continuing requirements.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo

L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

April 12, 2016

A.C. No. 10781

[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2764]

COBALT RESOURCES, INC., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD AGUADO, Respondent.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
lawyer's oath.

The Antecedents

In its Complaint,1 CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing
the mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG),
hi-jacked its delivery van which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that
Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery van, and his companions were all
forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at the Country Hill and Golf Club; that
Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who immediately
reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-
CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device installed in the
cellular phones, Angeles and the PNPCIDU tracked down the location of the cellular phones to
be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with
Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1)
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate
No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that when the PNP-CIDU approached
the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased by the police officers and was
arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception area of Pegasus Bar was not
arrested as none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime; that the
PNP-CIDU searched the vehicles and found the cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID)
showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty.
Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the mark PASG.

CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order when
it flagged down the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant
team leader and authorized the armed men to seize CRI’s cellular phones; that the PASG issued
a certification stating that the mission order was fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his
picture and name which showed that he was a PASG legal consultant; and that this ID was
likewise fake as evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI
concluded that it was Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the
crime as he was the one who conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution;
and that it was he who recruited the armed men who actually executed the hijacking.

Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery3 and Carnapping4 were filed against Atty.
Aguado and several others.

The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to
do so.

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

In his Conference Brief,5 Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010,
at about 11:00 to 12:00 in the afternoon,"6 his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was
carnapped along Scout Mandarin while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the incident
to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened by relatives informing him that
his name was on the front page of several tabloids in a story connecting him to the alleged
hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the ID found hanging in his carnapped
vehicle.

In its Report and Recommendation,7 dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) found Atty. Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in
falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team
Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that he be suspended for two (2)
years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty. Aguado’s purported participation in the alleged
hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the CBD,
as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent
committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission
Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years.8
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration9 praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the
IBP-CBD be set aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be
issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the
falsification of public documents was sufficiently established and, as the CBD knew, he
masterminded the hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.

On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for Reconsideration10 of the March 20, 2013
Resolution praying that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He
averred that the charges of usurpation of authority and falsification filed against him had been
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City; that he could not be presumed to
be the author of the falsification because he was never in possession of the falsified ID and
mission order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted
that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution of the robbery and
carnapping charges against him.

In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both motions
and affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for review12
before the Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty of
disbarment for his falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for his involvement in the
hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.

Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying for the
dismissal of the complaint.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate

and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of
each other.13 A finding of guilt in the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability
in the administrative case.14 In the same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is also a respondent in an administrative case,
does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum of evidence required
is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.15 "In administrative
cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant."16 Preponderance
of evidence means "evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto."17

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in
possession of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order
identifying him as the Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty.
Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the basis of an ID found
hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,18 his counsel, Atty. Letecia Amon (Atty. Amon), during
the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID and mission
order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:
ATTY. HARON:

Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called
mission order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.

ATTY. AMON:

I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

I’m showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"….

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Machine copy.

ATTY. HARON:

This is the copy.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Take a look, is that a machine copy?

ATTY. HARON:

Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of
the team by mission order.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking
whether that document is authentic or not.

ATTY. AMON:

Yes, Your Honor, as written here.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Yes, he is the one.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order
were found inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.
ATTY. AMON:

Of which he is the owner, yes.

ATTY. HARON:

Admitted also, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the
PASG are genuine and duly executed. I’m showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your
Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H" which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

What is your proposal Atty. Haron?

x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]

Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado’s

participation in the crime as follows:

xxx

2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng

nasabing ‘hijacking’. Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang
gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala
na ang gagawin naming paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong
operasyon ng PASG.

3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na
nakatalaga sa Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.

4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa
akin ng kung pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay
bibgyan niya ng "budget" upang ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng ‘seizure
operations.’

5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay

pinapanatag niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si
Atty. Aguado ang magbibigay ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta
siya sa PASG Malacañang para ma-flag down ang delivery van".

6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming
abogado. Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.

7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard.

Nalaman ko kay James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako
kay Eliseo De Rosas alias Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na
Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon
ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may
warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.

8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon

Street kung saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na
Mitsubishi L-300 ng Cobalt.

9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming
ginawang pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing
delivery van sa Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo
kaming nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.

Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak
naming ang ruta ng delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng ‘meeting’ kay Atty.
Aguado.

10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting
kami. Ang mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy.
Noong kami ay nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at
sila ay nagusap.

11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano
ang kanilang napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order
si Atty. Aguado. Si Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang
i-flag down ang delivery van ng Cobalt.

12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James,
Nonoy at Joe Almonte sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay
tumawag si Atty. Aguado na nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya
naka-puwesto. Kaya’t kaming apat ay sumunod sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa
Starbucks ay nandoon nga si Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.

13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may
plakang UNO-68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar
kung saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay
sinabihan na gagawin namin ang operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng
Pebrero, Biernes).

Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner
Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery
van ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert
ang mga nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street upang
siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na ipa-flagdown.

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

14. Kaya’t kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa
nasabing Petron Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation
dahil kulang sa tao si Atty. Aguado.

15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald’s
Quezon Avenue noong ika-1 ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay
dumating na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap
sa labas ng Smoking Area samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.

16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si
Atty. Aguado kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang
feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty.
Aguado.

17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas-8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-
maya lamang ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw
tuloy ang operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty.
Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto
naman daw ang mga papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.

18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na
daw ang operation kinabukasan (ika-5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng
umaga ay kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.

19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron
Gasoline Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo.
Bandang alas-8:30 ng umaga ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na
may plakang ZDW 764 at may kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."

Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko
na sakay ng nasabing Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba
bagkus ay nagpakarga lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal
ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod namang umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.

20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa
Petron upang ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking
cellphone at sinabi ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734."
Sumagot si James, "ok nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa area."

21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng
delivery van upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling
nagtungo sa Benitez Street.

Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na
kulay blue-green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang
armado at nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan.
Mayroon din akong napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van
ngunit hindi ko na nabilang ang dami nila.
 22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana
nito. Sinabi ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige.
Timbrehan mo lang sila pag malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod ."
Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.

23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng
delivery van. Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang
puti, yang puti." Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng
nakasumbrero ang delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na itabi ito sa
gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang
mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante
at agad silang pinosasan.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as
charged in the complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents
found in his possession, as certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by the
PASG, were used to facilitate the commission of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document
is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."21 Atty. Aguado failed to rebut the allegations.
Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado
presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also failed to show
any ill motive on the part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only
in February 2010.

Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:

He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the
hijacking was staged by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a
perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm
sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his
sworn statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the
same in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement before the police
authorities expecially because he supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant, even if the report on the time of the
carnapping incident would have been properly made, the hijacking took place much earlier and
therefore the same does not negate the commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the
reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no eyewitness
account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed.22

The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions,23 and
granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers as instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.24 As officers of the
courts and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social
responsibility and so mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.25 They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.26

Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his
bounden duties as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting
standards demanded of him, he proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As
vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or omission which might diminish the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.27

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the
supreme penalty of disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying
documents. In Brennisen v. Atty. Contawi, 28 the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a
special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty.
Pe, Jr.,29 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who authored the
falsification of an inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered
STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made part of his
personal records; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016

THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,

REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the
respondent attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building
and other structures were the objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of
appeal, the parties agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the
notice of appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August 31,
2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite
receiving the respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the
agreement; hence, at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately
demolished.

The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante
(Pante), to bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross
misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order
from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court,
positing that he thereby abused his legal knowledge.

Antecedents

Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry
Ogas;1 that on June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons issued
by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by the respondent; that based on the
allegations of the complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon
Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and all persons staying with and/or acting on her behalf,
including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed ownership of the land where
the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale
executed between him and one Pedro Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by
declaring the respondent to have the better right of possession; and that the MTC further
declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice to the respondent
exercising his option to appropriate the building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil
Code.3

As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC
after the defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate
and surrender the premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the
writ of demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O.
Ocasla, accompanied by the respondent and elements of the Philippine National Police,
implemented the writ of execution and writ of demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by
demolishing the church building and the pastoral house of the CSP-PLC.4

Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that
the dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who
had taken advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures
sans the demolition order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery
and malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.

In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was
backed up by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered
into a compromise agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and
promised to voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in consideration of
P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not
vacate the premises even within the grace period given to them;7 that he then moved for the
execution of the judgment, and his motion was granted by the MTC;8 that the sheriffs report
dated November 21, 20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of
execution to remove or demolish its structures on the premises; that he consequently sought
from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of demolition. 10

The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition;
that the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation
was peaceful, and that Pante and the other members of the church personally observed the
conduct of the demolition; and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no
defiance of the lawful order of the court.11

The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled
materials to ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the
complaint for his disbarment should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Court

The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly
and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service. Provided, however,
That all charges against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges
of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them,
shall be filed with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall
immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the
Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)

Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an
attorney may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified
complaint of any person.

Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the
complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to
the IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed,
or may require the reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney.
After the referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the
complaint, subject to the review by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to
the IBP and resolve the charge without delay. This happens particularly when the charge is
patently frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite the
respondent attorney.

The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative
complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal
profession with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the
Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B14
to eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative
complaints against attorneys, thus:

Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of

attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified
complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the
government service, whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents,
and whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official
functions. If the complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be
filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith
transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.

xxxx

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in

other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation, [bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the
Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due
process is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by
the mere evaluation of the documents attached to the pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever the
referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other authorized office or individual must
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this investigation is a
mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons
because it serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation
of the pleadings can determine.16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided
on the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct
of formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the
investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset
should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court
should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is
warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to
the IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate
his denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are
sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the
demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.

Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19,
2013.18 In the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the
sheriffs dutifully discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the
execution proceedings was by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. R-1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members
of the congregation, who did not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the
conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present
to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking
away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the
defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and
undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The
respondent paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on
received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of
the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter reneged on their part of the agreement without
returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal remedies to
enforce the judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to
exercise his option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements
introduced by the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to
him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act
of taking the materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of
appropriating them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial
assistance was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
Inc.,21 the mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was
disavowing knowledge of or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was
categorically declaring that the complaint had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest
at the expense of the congregation. The sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the
inanity of the complaint, and the ill motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against the
respondent. The proper outcome for such a complaint is its immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon
Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to
comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar
Matter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of
this Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under
process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that
he inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the
following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano),
MCLE's Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118
of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.]
850 for the following compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its
January 14, 2009 meeting.1

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive
Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE
Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman,
informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance
Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively,
on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE
Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE
Governing Board noted that respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the
Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to
furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required
respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.

In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not
receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why
his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a
formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice
sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and
prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in
Camiguin except for himself.

Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing
law for about 50 years. He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in
February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy
my silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of
the results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues
which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
in the national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President
against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme
Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the
SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the
2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the
Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus
the SC declaring the case moot and academic;

Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as
GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior
member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and
Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus
Election Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the
Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of
Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from
the MCLE;

x x x x6

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo;
(2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas,
Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a
reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE
compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the
MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground
of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof.
Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012.
The OBC reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from
compliance) pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the
applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a
certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements
necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their
pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has
no record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a
pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the
dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also
reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar
who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also
provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance
fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the
Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported
that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed against
respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption
number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be
expunged from the records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC
stated that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes
of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and
considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty
of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended
that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing
Board.

The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with
the MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 8 The First
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period
was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April
2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010,
2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for
the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four
compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption
only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for
exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for
exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's
application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet
the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However,
the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The
MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof.
Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin
Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration was sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice
Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter
No. 850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed
after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for
exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012 10 to the MCLE Office
asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to
send it to the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November
2013 letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption.
The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August
2013. Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this
Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country,
the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and
that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP)
Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the
receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR

PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE
requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with
the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case
the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13
9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would
only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance
for the First Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the
requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after
the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up
the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now
wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption
when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing
Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he
could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he
intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods.
Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying with the
MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial
of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it
received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period
when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings,
he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption.
However, after he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took
respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of
the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE
Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of
the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE
Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board
of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the
Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from
directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We
agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension
because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full
compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the
MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the
IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully complied
with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as
the matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November
2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance
Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the
IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 EN BANC

January 26, 2016

A.C. No. 10952

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution1 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation2 of the Investigating Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty.
Salvado) from the practice of law.

The Complaint:

On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for disbarment against Atty.
Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty.
Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a
lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending
business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his
business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various
clients and investors.

Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not
place his reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in his
business. This initial investment yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus the
promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant claimed that he was again
induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with promises of high rates of return.

As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the
total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. All checks were
drawn from PSBank Account number 040331-00087-9, fully described as follows:

Check Number Date Issued Amount

0060144 August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00

0060147 September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00
0060190 September 29, 2011 P60,000.00
0060194 October 16, 2011 P90,000.00
0060206 October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00
0060191 October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00
0060195 November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00

Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks
were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly
communicated with him, assuring him that he would not abscond from his obligations and that he
was just having difficulty liquidating his assets and collecting from his own creditors. Complainant
was even informed by Atty. Salvado that he owned real properties that could serve as payment
for his obligations. As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls
and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common friends also proved futile. This
prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.

On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado,
directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash
value of the first two (2) PSBank checks, within seven (7) days from receipt of the said notice.6
Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to receive the said notice when Atty. Divina's messenger
attempted to serve it on him.

Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services of Atty. Divina, who, with
his filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's house to personally serve the
demand letter. A certain "Mark" who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was
no longer residing there and had been staying in the province already.

As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly
alighted from his vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of the house.
Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his debt and invited
complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant refused the invitation and instead
told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his vehicle where his companions were.
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on "something"
to pay his obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.

Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.

For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted a violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his
depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only refused to comply with his obligation, but
also used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal prosecution. He had obviously instructed
his household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to reject any correspondence sent to him.
This resort to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain as a member of the
Bar.

The Defense of the Respondent

On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer,7 denying that he told complainant that he had
previously entered into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in
some other businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado
asserted that he never enticed complainant to invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's
earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an investment. He further stated that
during their initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still needed additional
investments; that it was Atty. Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and that
complainant was fully aware that the money invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his
clients and/or borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the return of investment and accrued interest
when due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks issued to complainant- could be
delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or renewal of their
respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely intended as security or
evidence of investment.

Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request
complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This
arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his house
and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.

The Reply of Complainant

On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply,8 pointing out that Atty. Salvado did not deny
receiving money from him by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed to have admitted that
he had issued several postdated checks which were eventually dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim
that it was complainant himself who prodded him about making investments must be brushed
aside for being self-serving and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed made
offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily refused knowing fully well that he could not
fund the checks that he would be issuing when they become due. If it were true that the checks
were issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document evidencing
such agreement. His failure to present such document, if one existed at all, only proved that the
subject checks were issued as payment for complainant's investment.9

Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was never meant to harass
him. Despite the dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute with Atty. Salvado who
left him with no choice after he refused to communicate with him properly.
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory conference briefs and
position papers.1âwphi1 Atty. Salvado insisted that he had acted in all honesty and good faith in
his dealings with the complainant. He also emphasized that the title to his house and lot in
Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been transferred in the name of complainant after
he executed a deed of sale as an expression of his "desire and willingness to settle whatever is
due to the complainant."10

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner

On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to
cover the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public
confidence in the legal profession.

The IBP-BOG Resolution

On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification
as to the period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty. Salvado's suspension
from six (6) months to two (2) years.

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition for review before this Court
was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate
action with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain
finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.11

The Court's Ruling

The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been lured
by Atty. Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of yielding high interests, which
he believed because he was a lawyer who was expected to protect his public image at all times.
Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had
invested by virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He insisted that the checks that he issued in
favor of complainant were in the form of security or evidence of investment. It followed, according
to Atty. Salvado, that he must be considered to have never ensured the payment of the checks
upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor of the subject checks was "purely
a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he himself was a victim
of failed lending transactions xxx."12

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in part.

First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only
due to the unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the
coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on
representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen.13 A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is
expected to make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For
the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's being beguiled to part with his money
and believe Atty. Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior worthy of
belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person like the complainant would not find the
profession of the person on whose businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply
put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or another, influenced
complainant's decision to invest.

Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the
dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of
bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court ruled that the gravamen of the offense
punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.

Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty.
Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the
primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could
be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel,15 the Court
wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring
lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as
a member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with
complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the
court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade
payment of his obligations.1âwphi1 Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his creditor, Atty.
Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands. He even tried to make the complainant
believe that he was no longer residing at his given address. These acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court. The subsequent offers he had made and the eventual sale of his properties
to the complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the Investigating Commissioner's
reliance on jurisprudence stating that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of
their own and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases, including violations of B.P.
22.

Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is the respondent's fitness
to remain as a member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no material bearing on other judicial
actions which the parties may choose to file against each other.16

All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty
commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 and Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS
him from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the
personal records of the respondent. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-
BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference
was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said
conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation "unknown at the given
address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit
their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The
Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against
complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda
Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed as IS No.
074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true
and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation
(Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house
located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original stockholders
of Clarion were as follows:

Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
 Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named

stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law partner.Clarion’s
total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its purpose of purchasing
the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of
₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of
₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said
amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed
of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for ₱78,000,000.00 only.
Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.

On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez
by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to
complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma.
Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet
(GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed
shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of
assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he learned
from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant and
threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go
after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares
in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this was reflected in
Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means, complainant
and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale sometimein August
2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for
the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued
at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one
who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds
thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the fraudulent
means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s money.
Complainant was duty bound to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and
beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents, however, misappropriated and converted
the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its
factual averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and
admissions, among other things, of Atty. Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked
her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the
affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the
sale of the property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco Del
Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and
handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
however, were paid.

5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale of
the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale
had already been farmed out to different corporations established by complainant and her
sister.

6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money
of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco,
on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of
Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for representing
conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the
legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to
the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the
transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the
allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and
confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where
he intended to live with his long-time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators and
stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent
changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and
that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal
documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes
property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States
for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel,
and the complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid
the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to the request on
the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result, almost 100%
of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers
and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel
and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were in
constant communication with him; that all these representations, however, turned out to be false
when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale were
coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise
learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the complainant
and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed
the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged
communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that
complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion,
but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some matters, but these were all
under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as legal
counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as
a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he admitted
that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were
prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were
performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a
lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests because it was not a "former
client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove,
the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer,
the complainant should have established, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client
relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts
by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled that "the fact that
one of the witnesses for the defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit
was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts
of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This was
likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not covered by
the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty.
Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of
the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of desistance
executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted by the CBD as
it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing
on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records
would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.11 The
circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and shareholder of
Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the said corporation, the articles
of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a
stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua.
Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his
shares in favor of complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report
stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership
to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued
the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged
communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in
violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings
and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary
action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis
involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval in his
professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of
Jimenez.

As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of
the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity as
Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and friend,
Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty
extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought
advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own
words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14

Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez,
stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty.
Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the
companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the
documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These documents
were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in
2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty.
Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the
sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty.
Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he could go home. When he
filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous
kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes
against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent
the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the
best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act
or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of
his character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe law, on the part of the public.

Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply
the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.16 To
be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness17
while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to
the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law,
but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the public’s faith in
the legal profession.19 "To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to
state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering that, of all
classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that
they live by the law."20

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty.
He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed
his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding
its corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted
to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional
capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done
for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders
of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to
the deeds of assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as
corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on
contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion,
it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to
advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued
the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to
cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series
of grave legal infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to

complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents.
If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that lawyers are
constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the Court would, in effect,
sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity
to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client
must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his dealings.
Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court."
Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice."
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act
as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are
expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23

From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR,
namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith candor,
fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged
Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of
privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."24 "The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideallybe imbued with the highest level of
trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard isto avoid
representing conflicting interests…"25 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients
are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger a violation
of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in
this wise:

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client,
it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s
conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing
for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is
whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no moment
that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is
enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients
and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect
the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between
an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and
representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship
does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny
of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she
was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, considering
its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal
counsel and that complainant sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers of
shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This was only successful in showing that Atty.
Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained
as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly engaged
the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she
communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint lacking
in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed
narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties. Atty.
Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the complainant,
was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s
evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty. Francisco couched in
general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer.
This could have given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional relationship.
She also failed to appear during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even
updating her residential address on record. Her participation in the investigation of the case
apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by
preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case;
(b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.27

Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the
members of Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s
children and complainant. He could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were
performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty.
Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence
presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty.
Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty.
Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the
Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and

it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective
client. xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,
an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being
present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice,
the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails
to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco
in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty.
Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed.
All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from respondent
in various occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP,
there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty.
Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was
any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It
cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies,
failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred
or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake
untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice
and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law for
six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING
that a commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more
severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished
to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that
the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered
the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondent for “unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days
from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the
status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5
setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on
November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when respondent filed his
verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be
reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning;
otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the documents on file. The
Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the
morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions 9 of the
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8,
2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her
legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal
services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11

On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to
the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a
loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having
trust and confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without
interest. A promissory note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On
November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount
of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the
high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the
service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the
fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent
was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When
asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to
handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the
trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra
Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were
not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point
of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.” 16 Complainant
obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount
of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of
P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant
prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance.
Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally
checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was
not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him
to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to
include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that the
defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a
message from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon
reading the same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included.
On the same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the
reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was
also told that oral arguments on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her

counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he
received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never
replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998
to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise
admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered
the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction
was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the said amount was
suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental expenses in
the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed
with the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant
who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said
that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in
the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that
another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the
nature of her cause of action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the
applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.
Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in
the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations
long before she met him. While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents
involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was
never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City,
finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found
respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to
return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting
to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a
motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG
that an information charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a
corresponding order for his arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration
but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1)
year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee
received from complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
respect to respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies
the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The
Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to
the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that
the filing fees for her case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to
feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be
incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily
related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee,
when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that
would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than
willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only
expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith
expected of all members of the legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes
on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.”28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should
be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own
use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts
from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the
authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the
excess money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of
the trust reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client. 31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00 as “representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the
case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that
he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme
penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be
used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his client’s trust
but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the
entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their
utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his
claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The
absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this
juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of
the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent
was not only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that
he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not
borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.” In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan
of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only given
P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by promissory notes and
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidence reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses
raised by respondent, was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the
rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out
of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his
inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.
Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our
legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to
the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. 32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found
guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant
presented insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level
of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients
are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the
violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is
a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant
against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court
cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was
the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity
of the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof
were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made
exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of respondent
that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of whether it was the
validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions raised,
respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully
that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with
each other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties
involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest
confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is
abused or violated the entire profession suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient
punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue
discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment. 38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant
in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer
to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s
professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether
the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only
concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each
other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative
cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil
cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases,
only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla
but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible. 42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately
related to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00 which respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the
handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These
were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s
deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable
for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases filed against
him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by “purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have
proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the
practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of
P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P.
Navarro (Navarro) and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release
of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also
included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late husband to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the rentals due for the
retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for
the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting
of title against PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the
proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the expenses to be advanced by
Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero,
supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s
services to handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the property in consideration of
30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from
Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the
property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would
not have spent for the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10%
per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate mortgage over a property located in Barangay
Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed that
respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan as well as the
interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce,
Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with Navarro about securing a "Tolling
Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third
MOA, except that the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in
Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against
an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the
third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-
meter parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.

However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a
total of ₱900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon.
In September 2006, the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When
complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September
and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.

In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero
terminated the services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial
foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that
the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for
estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high
interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his
son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the
identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-
meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that
it was Yulo who convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him
that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company,
Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and he agreed because he needed
the money. He alleged that their business transactions were secured by real estate mortgages
and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he mortgaged to
Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because
the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro
was valuable and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was
unable to continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push through because Presbitero did not help him.
Respondent also denied that he was hiding from complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for
September to December 2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that
complainants were aware that he could no longer open a current account and they were the ones
who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further alleged that he already
started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated before it could be completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under
suspension. In response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006
and learned of his suspension only in May 2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-
CBD found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from
Presbitero which he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found
that based on the documents presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in
obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that respondent either promised or agreed to pay the
very high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and her husband
regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property
to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents
also showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to
secure loans by promising her a 10% commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo
would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he obtained from Navarro and
Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he borrowed in three months
except for his claim that the price of sugar went down.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the
postdated checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them
that it would be his wife or son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that
respondent had not been transparent in liquidating the money he received in connection with
Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the registration of
Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

 (3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged
to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received
from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were
not clear whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise
found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended
penalty from disbarment to suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of
Governors likewise ordered respondent to return the amount of his unpaid obligation to
complainants.

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead
imposed upon respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high
interest rate on the loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer
pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate
was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter
property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000, showing
that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation
that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise
Presbitero as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed
that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they even
suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree with
the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In
fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to Navarro.
Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to
Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to
accounts in respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have
ruled that conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity.2 The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity.
Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-
client relationship. However, respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a
loan. It was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the value of the property he
mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a
Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot as additional
collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect
to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of
the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were
exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he
prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar to
his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that
respondent paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.4 We
agree with the IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed
out that respondent received various amounts from complainants but he could not account for all
of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent
received ₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes
but he could not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid
₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid
₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not substantiate
his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had been less than diligent
in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who
had since passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent
spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from
Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from
his client, Presbitero.1âwphi1 Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.5

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the
time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his
son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued
by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The
interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge
of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see
no reason to deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the
penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession.7 Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure
undue gains for himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot
sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid
obligation to complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his client,
Presbitero, that were not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.9 Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability.10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file
against each other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
purpose involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his client.13
Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must return the
full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero,
amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this
order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016

ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR S.

ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in
advancing and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a
serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him
liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the
legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the
defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the
Province of Isabela.1 Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent
handled the trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As
expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their
appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the
complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their
appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. 2

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially
in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee
in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a
probable worth of P3,391,600.00.3

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.4

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent
had violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law for one year. 5

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-829,6
whereby it adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his recommendation
of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, "
and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
disregard of the notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the damage
suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently
discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued
with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with
the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause
with utmost diligence, care and devotion.7 To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the
client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be diligent in
handling the former's legal affairs.8 As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the
client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the
case.9 The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration
in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in
that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession
of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the
members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his
irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession.11 He should always
bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.12 He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it
the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general. 13

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension
or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official
oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the
members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.14 Based on all the
circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-
month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,15 the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the
offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of
the IBP aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO
guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016

ANGELITO RAMISCAL AND MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, v. ATTY. EDGAR S.

ORRO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in
advancing and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a
serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him
liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the
legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the
defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the
Province of Isabela.1 Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent
handled the trial of the case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor. As
expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), and they ultimately filed their
appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the
complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their
appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. 2

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the
Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their
neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially
in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee
in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a
probable worth of P3,391,600.00.3

Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate
evaluation, report and recommendation.4
 Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent
had violated Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
recommended his suspension from the practice law for one year.5

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-829,6
whereby it adopted the report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his recommendation
of the penalty by increasing the period of suspension to two years, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A, "
and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility aggravated by his
disregard of the notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the damage
suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP's findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently
discharge his duties as the lawyer of the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's
Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued
with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with
the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause
 with utmost diligence, care and devotion.7 To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the
client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be diligent in
handling the former's legal affairs.8 As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the
client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the
case.9 The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of
his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up
their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein.
Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he
reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration
in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He
further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse
result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against
their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling
them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in
that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions
manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession
of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the
members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the
IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his
irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He thereby exposed a
character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession.11 He should always
bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the
highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. 12 He should
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it
the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general.13

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension
or disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official
oath and is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity that must characterize the
members of the Bar in the performance of their professional duties.14 Based on all the
circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-
month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,15 the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the
offense charged and established because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of
the IBP aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO
guilty of violating Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all
 courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE
ORO CITY,1 respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO SR., J.:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission
more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for
resolution before this Court.

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck
prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City.

The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11,
1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:

Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until January
9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the
Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987
and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the
Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.

b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.2

...

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

 1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.

2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.

3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.

5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from
Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this administrative case.

6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.

and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the premises.3

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this office, the
following data appear:

1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in the
following years:

a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985

b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987

c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989

2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos

submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:

a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980

c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980

d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission

e. November to December 1980-no entry

f. January to February 1981 - no entry

g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission

h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission

 i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984

j. July to December 1983 - no entry

k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986

l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986

4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name Atty.
Anthony Santos after December 1985.

5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos
was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.4

In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against
him. He also submitted a certification 5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there
was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as
the submitted notarized documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the
respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper
party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas
Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for
Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in
favor of the plaintiffs.6

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort
to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative
complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals
(CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.7

In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that
the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the
complainant’s insistence, the matter was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon
in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro
City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9

In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the
following recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation
of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission
of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon
expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice
of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present
commission, if any, be revoked.10

According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense,
while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary
public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged
that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro
nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he
presented no evidence, particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.

On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record Books
available in the notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that
the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains items on the Name, Date
Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry appearing
was made on December 1982."

If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose so (at least,
for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did he present a
certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing
that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of
appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be
prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together
with the oath of office of the notary public.11

Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the complainant,
that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a
notary public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of record was on January 9,
1984.12

The Procedural Issues

Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.

On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds
for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar.
The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he
should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the
Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members
of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the
new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140
of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents
have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.

Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.

The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer

The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant
prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed
when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus,
the respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member
of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:

Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken
by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of
and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government service: Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly
charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. 14

The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court
in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme
Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may
refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided
in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon
the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated
by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact
and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation
for the final action of the Supreme Court.

It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself,
and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a
judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action. 15

Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member
of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule
mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court,
the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.17

The Substantive Issues

The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable
Therefor

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos
v. Cordero:18

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost
by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges
or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if
guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.19

However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases

against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20
which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an

administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or
any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly
unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator. If the
recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a
 lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be
administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.

2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from
receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation
before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so,
within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the
gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be
dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed
within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action
must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was
intended to harass the respondent.

In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of
the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily from the
service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or
disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not occur a year before
the respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing
resolution.

A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The Judiciary

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the
judiciary.22 In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate
forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not
be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient
that the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the
offense.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be continuing in order
for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge
was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts
committed while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the
funds of his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as
a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s subsequent
appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of
his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used
as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to
his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:

...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of
moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path.
No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a
magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and
official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ...27

The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by substantial
evidence.28 The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous
indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the
latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent
was exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the
indiscretion continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.

The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests
this power of control and regulation in this Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but
a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30

Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If

Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.31 Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution.32

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a
mere casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents
without the requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public documents." 34 For such reprehensible
conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.35

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when
he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary
action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he
is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." 37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less
than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.38

The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record

The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39 Neither did he claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was no proper
recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983,
as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.40

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert
the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.41

The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so
notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred
or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which
include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 42 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be
no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings
of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43

An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good
standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does
not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his admission to
practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. 45

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from
and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In
re Almacen:47

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. ....48

In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s
recommendation that the charge for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the
ground that the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct
was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found
guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that her paramour
was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after
the illicit affair ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe.51

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint
against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-
four years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were
otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law
as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of
the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial
Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the
seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial
documents.

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the
institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer
who notarizes documents without the requisite authority therefor.

At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The
Respondent’s Liability

Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required
by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar.52 By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards;53 he
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial
commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate
to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls
for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering that the complaint
against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained
of;56 that there was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been
adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement
benefits.57 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents

without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013

(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)

LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).1

Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the
advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended
to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan,
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to different owners.
Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited
from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge
Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons. 2

Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:

1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;

2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;

3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;

4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;

5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;

6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and

7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were
in need of funds for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help
complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed
from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4

About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale,
complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all
seven titles.5

On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in
court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the
fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6

In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the
supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed
in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have
the supposed owners summoned.7

Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice to their being re-filed.8

Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious
owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied.9

Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several
documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly
signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these
documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of
the parcels and announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the
seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales. 12

Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed
their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case
was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.

In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and
that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the
broker for the seven parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty
percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had
been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his
disbarment.13

In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004, 14 IBP Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months.

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of
Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to
disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP.
The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere
photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who supposedly executed such documents were
neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for
sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.

The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were
conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7,
2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss
American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to
respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00. His company,
however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld payment upon his
realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon
respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.

Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras. 19 He testified that Heinze introduced
him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid
for the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the
annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the
cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to produce
Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.

Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants. 20
He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several
parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to
purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).

Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint. 21

On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper.
Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who,
respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and
was "bent on prejudicing"22 him.

Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to
Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.

In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of
Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and
Recommendation based on matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’
Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if
such questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper.23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed
submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.

In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on
account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven
(7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7)
owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have
been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly
made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public
announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of
Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name
"Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.

In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found
respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent
was absent in most of the hearings without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the
CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.

On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 adopting the Report of
Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. 28

Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension
of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted
respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme
Court warned respondent that no further extension will be given. Despite this, respondent filed
two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and the second on
November 3, 2011 – both of which were denied by the Court.

Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011
a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was
denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting
his disbarment.

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that
respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for
himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the
complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s
offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the
highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of
him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to
prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it.
Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the
supreme penalty of disbarment.

Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of
the following grounds:

deceit;

malpractice;

gross misconduct in office;

grossly immoral conduct;

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

violation of the lawyer's oath;

willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and

willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross

misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of
examples:

In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a
spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for
having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking
advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land
covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious.

In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted
to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in
Moran v. Moron:32

Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious
misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form
of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great
caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a
reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33

Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34

As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence

adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto."36

Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining
preponderance of evidence:

All the facts and circumstances of the case;

The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony;

The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may ultimately appear in the trial; and

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent

committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so
through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:

respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject
parcels;

respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in
kind – of the subject parcels;

such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and

respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted
with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed
owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of
proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and
Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact
that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.

In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not
fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the
allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang
had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and
that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment.
In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia
Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the
name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who
alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez 38 where a party resorts to
bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the
determination that he committed the violation is sustained.

It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven
parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their
identities and existence, much less produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding
Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature,
they remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which
support these claims.

At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of
complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as
inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not
have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her name does not appear on the parcels’
TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible owners. 40 Similarly,
he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs. 41 However,
respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs
indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging
this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as
fraudulent.

Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving
allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy
of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and because
"[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for whatever purpose;" 43 (2) how
complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could
not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and
recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of
value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of
his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there
was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn income.45
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on
conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a
"balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of
threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This
evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the
slightest proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis
to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of
evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that
respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and
that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers
are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill
of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for
himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a
sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more
detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in
these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight.
Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself
from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal
despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the
Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves
none of this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of
Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is
DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014

MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against
respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave
misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23
June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real
Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for collection of
sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.

Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in
September 1999 without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that
the agreement had not been signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with
a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period
within which it could not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted

three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s allegations against
respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring
respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presence of complainant and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However,
complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only
copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered
owner” was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action,
because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a “Build Operate and
Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its
owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which
complainant was represented as the property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against complainant was not the representation of
herself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor found that
complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage
contract over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared
and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the lessees would sign it and
that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant, however,
reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized,
complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned nothing about it.
Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case pending
before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus
notified of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs
submitted by complainant as additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily
gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of the
document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized
in the principal’s place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2)
five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds
of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an
unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned
Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached
to complainant’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion.
 THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her
disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her. He
accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the
three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon
187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended
that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months.9

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 She maintained that the additional documents submitted by complainant
were inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the procedural requisites under
Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice). 13 Moreover, the
Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which was
prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was
not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner
should have expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving them due course.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and
emotional problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of
her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward
the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the
IBP’s findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y.
Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio –
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment Complaint against respondent. 15

THE COURT’S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’
submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose
of some procedural matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the
respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasoned as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.” There could be no
dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore,
is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly
for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions
against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records inadmissible
in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion
of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between
the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of
appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth
records as evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on
Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question, said
public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into consideration in
the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the
other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a

supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading
only serves to bolster or adds something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up
new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. 19 Accordingly, it cannot be said
that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her
charges against respondent is that the latter notarized incomplete documents, as shown by the
SPAs and lease agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally
barred from submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she
committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.

The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a
notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case, respondent
fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent
any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 22 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant

sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore
the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to demand
that a document be signed in his or her presence.26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood.29

Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. 30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice
to accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a
notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law and
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath
as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective
immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is
hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of
the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015

DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN
E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr.
Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig
(Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-
1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila,
which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 3
Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that
he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to
marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any
impediment to their marriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar
Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the
divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their
son.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to
get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail
informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she
came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her
once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo
requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the
annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an
upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently
seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was
incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and
that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then
consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to
separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a
property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may
provide them.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing
an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted
that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12,
1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on
June 23, 1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr.
Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July
1984 in the USA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous
marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved
her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of
legitimacy to their relationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their
home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship
with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law
firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not
reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his
firm in January 2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he
was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty.
Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to
August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already
submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the
IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from
notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17,
200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued
a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying
Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a
grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest
degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and
personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his
proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching
professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the
community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets
of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a
prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable
institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community. 29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty.
Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant
evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which adopted and
approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge
of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said
that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never
concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had
always been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would
warrant their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of
this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order
to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character
is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This
must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” 34 (Citation
omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member
of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis ours)
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly

immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not
only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church
in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing
Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four
children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to
Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved
their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican
Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so
enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry
her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court
in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both
Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot
marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral
values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical
conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez
knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.
Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he
resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their
son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty.
Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in
itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding
of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to
Gomez.

“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’” 37
In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery
out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be
decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield
its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that
he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted.
Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction
against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the
evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the
purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers,
the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the
latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it
does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all,
only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not
prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer’s Oath
and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated
by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN,

Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty.
Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as
an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the
legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members
of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to
1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996,
despite being already married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically
involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married
to Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
 e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004
until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC. 3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD
by representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair
with him, when in truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.4cralawrednad

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to
2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However, despite
being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham
Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case,
and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.3cralawrednad

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando
Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the
dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in
assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with
plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's
classmates and officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the
OGCC premises itself.6cralawrednad

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was
summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which
included an investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final
Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees
recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this
Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7cralawrednad

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even
attempted to conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F.
Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in
Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by
the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate
Inquiry.8cralawrednad

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019.9cralawrednad

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L.
Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College,
where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing
grades.10cralawrednad

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan,
required respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in
support of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from
procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the
allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition
entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus, should
be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages
attached to the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as
well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established.
Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-
serving and deserved scant consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the
complaint were deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even
general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), 15 respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." 16cralawrednad

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.

(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which
respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, 18
praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously scheduled
hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and eventually
denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order,
complainant's Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be
complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case
was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the
respective subpoenas21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the
hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said motion, respondent
informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore eyes"
and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes are
being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a
certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion,
arguing that based on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for hearing on
the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of respondent
to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in
the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's
motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses. 23cralawrednad
Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG
Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn
W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had
recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email
messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their
familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which contained references to his
daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend
and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite
still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party
sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at
that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him
his students during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's
preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office
sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had broken up with respondent upon
learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her telephone
conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from
this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007,
respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their
affidavits since their testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his
petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory

conference/hearing was terminated and the parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was considered submitted
for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),24
pertaining to respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally
request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's claim that he
had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date,
the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with Comments), 25cralawred submitting
the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated
January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant

thereafter filed two Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting
his verified position paper and that any decision or judgment would have to be based solely on
complainant's Verified Position Paper.28cralawrednad

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered
a Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross
misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of
the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code 30 and/or RA 301931
as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information,
Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to
present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support his allegations in the
petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's
assertion that respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations
with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving
the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were
deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and
BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer
he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and
recommendation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an
officer of the court and member of the bar. this Commissioner respectfully recommends that
Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a STERN
WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms
prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility." 33
 Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 34 adopting and
approving, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As
modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution,
Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby
DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 35 dated July 3, 2013,
to which complainant was required to submit his comment.36cralawrednad

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June
28, 2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on
complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed
his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).39cralawrednad

Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration

with Leave40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition 41
dated September 20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's
motion for reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of
this case to this Court on November 11, 2014.43cralawrednad

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which
would warrant his disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors'
resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the
evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the
Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and
honored fraternity.45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings

against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the
Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under
Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the
court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it docs not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof
according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of
the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent.46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which
respondent has been found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to
have not only failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but
have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the
complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. 47cralawrednad

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege
to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v.
Arnobit.48 We ruled:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required
to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral
standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him.
To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules
of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in
his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court
disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on
marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid
second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We
said:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.'" In
various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons
his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne
him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as
well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to
establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not
sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition
contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically
deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own
position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain
uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer
he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV, Section 2 thereof
clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that
respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01
and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had
a pending case for graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human
Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as
contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer the
penalty of disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is
believed that a case for graft and corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan.''53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant
failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that
complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not substantiated by any
evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments for "lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report,

viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in
attempt to mislead this Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said
allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic)
chose to take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not present in the country and not
being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In
doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and
Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty
from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has
been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an
officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has violated
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP,
which intention was more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting
documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's
Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath
which he took before admission to the Bar, which states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; [will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will
not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any menial
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian
Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of
Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were
consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of
the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he
married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In
1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan
City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which
was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the
time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35
years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and
Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against
him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and
thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint
against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was
motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth.

In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law
despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the
facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of
the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the
same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase
"with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even
if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the
sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño
claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to
retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on
the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide.
The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the
crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum.
The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his
acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment
or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations
Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting
Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the
victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be
a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to
have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early
morning of June 3, 1993.

The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the
earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon,
supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-
importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks
who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural
display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate over
reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred
for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño
alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that
the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He
further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and
thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his
wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for
bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He
alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.

On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying
Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the
Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No.
10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973
and A.C. No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-
2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the
IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this
Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x
x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are
mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a
vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion
or exclusion as the cases are reached.7

In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of
HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances
show the presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when
the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and
started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from
the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned
around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but
Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and
opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while
Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness,
Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the
street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD
correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did
not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the
death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and
political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13
did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not
mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were
also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority
conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons
and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity
of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or
reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the
law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that
shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty
against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his

receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016

ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment by reason of
dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the
amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a
respected member of the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question.3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient
fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and
repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26,
2006 recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision 10 dated October 30, 2008 finding
respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as
fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay:
(1) the sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with interest pegged at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint;
(2) filing fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00
plus appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing.11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal,
Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. 12 In a Decision13 dated March 13,
2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became
final and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior
to September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the
amount of the check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to
accommodate a friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally
benefit from the proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no
means by which to pay for the amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant
threatened him and used his unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage.18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011,19 referred this administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
issued a Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty
of a crime involving moral turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22,
involved moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed
the said offense. Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his
conviction of the said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration
of justice or that he is no longer of good moral character" 22 which justifies either his suspension
or disbarment.23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24 adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation
dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found guilty
of a crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted,
and modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a
lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.27cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in
relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by
[BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to
prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with
insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime
against public order to be abated.

xxxx

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did
not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and
exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the
Constitution and obey the laws.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and
good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground
for disciplinary action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude,
had been indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final.
Consequently, respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR,
as aptly found by the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed
by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon
v. De Taza,33 the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to
respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v.
Moya II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent
also breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view
of the foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years
for the same violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in
this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege
burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. 36 Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
legal profession as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED BY ITS

PRESIDENT, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-
DIAZ, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment Hied by the Philippine Association of
Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July
17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE,
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1chanrobleslaw

PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11 th
National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National
Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11 th PACE national convention was
submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12 th PACE national convention in
Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz
ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the last day of the
convention or on March 31, 2007, the outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed
and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of P30,000.00 as term-end
bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report
for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a
matter of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz; 3 and
that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president,
Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the
finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4chanrobleslaw

In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11 th
national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly
audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was
"fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE accounts;" 5 that she also filed the
Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report,
together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and
witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-election as PACE national
treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for
Board Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the
P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous
board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven
Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.

On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the said term-
end bonus.8chanrobleslaw

Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an exchange of
pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the protagonists were directed to
submit their respective position papers. Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner Fernandez).9chanrobleslaw

The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered
documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation reports for the two
aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged
the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention. 10 As to the
sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be better resolved through an audit
rather than in disbarment proceedings. Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the
position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as a
lawyer. Thus, according to him, she should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of
PACE instead of a disbarment case.11chanrobleslaw

As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections even though
she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified, Commissioner
Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the "certificate of candidacy," was never
offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew that her bid for re-election would be a
useless exercise since she would not be able to assume office if she won. 13chanrobleslaw

Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz's assertion that she never sponsored the
appropriation of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007
was a collegial action among the Board of Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of
the view that her participation in the passage of the questioned board resolution was not
connected to her being a lawyer.14chanrobleslaw

On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the
complaint against Atty. Diaz.15chanrobleslaw

On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21, 2013,
granting the complainant's motion for reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its earlier
resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one (1) year. 17chanrobleslaw

The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz' liquidation of PACE funds;
(ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her
entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted
a "triple - whammy" of questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule
1.01 of the CPR.chanrobleslaw

The Court's Ruling

This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.

Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a
right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.

One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings
is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers
are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct
of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and
the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. 19

Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good
moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers
must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their
clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.20chanrobleslaw

It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which
society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she
is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good
moral character from members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble
profession.21chanrobleslaw

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including
her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but
by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the
questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to
be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1,

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

This decision shall be immediately executory.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to all courts of
the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent's personal
records as a member of the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine
Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 1 2 and Rule 1.013 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies. He resigned from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke’s
Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI),
another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for “updating
purposes”. The GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and
President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18,
2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule
1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President
of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received any notice
of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has never
accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the
Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply
with SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for
voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in
good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting
held on March 3, 2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13,
2008, she sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed
of Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he
would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at
the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s
positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s
Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s
signature.

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors
and officers of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso
de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a
defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this
Court held that “when the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in
court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.”11 During the mandatory preliminary
conference, however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was
dismissed as to Guarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment. She stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any
unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.

In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of
the CPR and thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three
months. It noted that based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder
of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof
that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank
accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or
designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not
legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon
and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the
company. The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin presented were of
no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and
these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in toto the CBD
Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014
Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure,
rather than seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. As Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed
his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath.”21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that
there is no indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits
that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that she
made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that
Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the
instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that
Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false
information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer
in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s action in submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of
law.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective
upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008
filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the
lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client
informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement,
respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed
by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6
complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.7
On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of
appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment
of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007,
Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal9
before the RTC.10

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not
disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007
purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results
of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he
discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of
Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his
appeal had long been dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was
complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that
resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed
to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was
blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision.16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted
out against him.18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-

founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the
issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and
delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand.19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that
the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was
respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about
the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there is still an available relief left
for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly
updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to
wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and
loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly
keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to
inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007
when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent
in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary
period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment.24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied.
In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused
undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent
clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal
or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s
inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence as well
as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect
should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to
keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified
court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that
makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v.
Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal
moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with
others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is
the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but
a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the
status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In
Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely
and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v.
Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his
client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In
Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney
in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of
disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his

client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case
had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the
latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the
bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to
his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

March 11, 2014

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY

JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held
liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the
judges and the Judiciary.

AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton
Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all
members of the Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their promulgation of the
decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land,
Inc.

Antecedents

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along Epifanio
Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the
project’s location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area
for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack
Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which
ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it
enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a
fence to deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition
for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig
City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On July
24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed
use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition for corporate rehabilitation was
approved.4

On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing
its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial
of the prayer for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an
application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from
proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5

After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration.

On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment.
AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial reconsideration
of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve
and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth
Division, which included Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.6

On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting
the petition of WWRAI.7

AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.8

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspired with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra
Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of
the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI,
and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for
its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must
be supported by at least substantial evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service,
the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.11

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204,
Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any
case submitted to him for decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to
have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken
the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly means "sure knowledge,
conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must not only
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by
the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith
and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that
will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision.14 In other words, the judge
was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment.15
Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the
law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable.17

But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer
knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made in
administrative investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public
prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious – only a superior court acting by virtue of
either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such
determination and declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative hearing officer
may be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by
law elsewhere in the appellate court.

Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through
an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by
disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting judges
instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified
Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose
and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we emphatically held that
the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and undermined the
independence of the Judiciary, to wit:

It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take
respondent Justices to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule
of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his unworthy
cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of administrative
investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence of the
Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither
complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them,
instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in
its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The complaint herein is actually
the second one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the
performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first complaint entitled Re: Verified
Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon.
Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI accused respondent
Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed
the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the propriety of the interlocutory orders issued
by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately observed:

A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations disclosed that
the acts complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices
and the propriety of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the exercise of
their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed
by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary
proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and,
thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by their erroneous orders or judgments.

xxxx

In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the questioned
order of the respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently,
a decision on the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA
Justices in this administrative proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the subject
decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon
proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or
hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case.
Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that
respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering
an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and
partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his
duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to the evaluation of the
Court in the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.

Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from
the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their
efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)

This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the complaint herein
containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended to
intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial functions.

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an
outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges
against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their
work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative
case AMALI or its representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought
against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do so in order to uphold the
dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary.
AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the
judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even if the latter were
sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to reward
them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial
officers.

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer
for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public
duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer justice area function of
sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized commentator on public
offices and public officers has written:20

It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been
injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the
officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to
the individual to be performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous in its
consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.

A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule.
Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have
a controversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court was created,
and he was selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to
do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society,
and that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be
accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or
improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The
judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do
justice as between individuals, he may be called to account by the State in such form and before
such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty to the
individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible."21

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior
Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had
authorized Usita to file the present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against
respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless
administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his

official transactions;

(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,

including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court
not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;

(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by

virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to
bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)

Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines:22

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In
its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative
or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language
in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such
a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the
authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within
its legal signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted
by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be
no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves
and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate
Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo
R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice
President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc.
who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative complaint against respondent Associate
Justices to show cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be punished for
indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and
for interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10681 February 3, 2015

SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S. CONCEPCION, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified Complaint1 filed by complainants
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda; collectively
complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross
misconduct for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).

The Facts

In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from 19972 until August 2008,3 respondent
served as their retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent handled many of their
cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a
pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to materialize.4

Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from their failed business venture,
respondent, on March 23, 2006, called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which he
promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who,
believing that respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum
to respondent. She thereby issued three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s name:6

Check No. Date Amount Payee

0000561925 03-23-06 ₱750,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561926 03-23-06 ₱850,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
0000561927 03-23-06 ₱900,000.00 Elmer dela Rosa
Total: ₱2,500,000.00

Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of paper containing: (a) photocopies of the
checks; and (b) an acknowledgment that he received the originals of the checksand that he
agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.7 In the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were personally encashed by
respondent.8
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to return the money, he failed to pay
complainants. Thus, in April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but respondent
merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to
respondent, which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008, complainants, through their new
counsel, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to respondent.12 In his
Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any money from the complainants. Instead, respondent
claimed that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his other clients, was the real debtor.
Complainants brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a settlement.14

On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-
complaint15 charging respondent with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule prohibits
lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the latter’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice.16

In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that
Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that complainants had been attempting to collect
from Nault and that he was engaged for that specific purpose.19

In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that they extended the loan to respondent alone,
as evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name. They categorically denied knowing Nault
and pointed out that it defies common sense for them to extend an unsecured loan in the amount
of ₱2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know. Complainants also submitted a copy of the
Answer to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault filed as third-party defendant in a related
collection case instituted by the complainants against respondent.22 In said pleading, Nault
explicitly denied knowing complainants and alleged thatit was respondent who incurred the
subject loan from them.23

On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-
2883.25 In the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to appear during the scheduled
mandatory conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated and the parties were directed to
submit their respective position papers.27 Respondent, however, did not submit any.

The IBP Report and Recommendation

On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr. (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the
CPR which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7 which
states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies
and properties of his client that may come into his possession.29

The Investigating Commissioner observed that the checks were issued in respondent’s name and
that he personally received and encashed them. Annex "E"30 of the Verified Complaint shows
that respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3) EastWest Bank checks and agreed to
return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5)
days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the real debtor was found to be implausible.
The Investigating Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was not the one who
obtained the loan, he would have responded to complainants’ demand letter; however, he did
not.32 He also observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly signed appeared to have
been prepared by respondent himself.34 Finally, the Investigating Commissioner cited Nault’s
Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which categorically states that he does not even know the
complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained the loan from them.35

In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent’s actions degraded the
integrity of the legal profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR.
Respondent’s failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect
to the IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent
be disbarred and that he be ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to complainants, with stipulated
interest.37

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and by the applicable
laws and rule, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No. XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the
penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the practice of law and ordered the
return of the ₱2,500,000.00 to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.

Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No. XX-2013-617 which was, however,

denied in Resolution No. XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.

The Issue Before the Court

The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its recommended penalty and its directive
to return the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.

I.

Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from complainants is amply supported by

substantial evidence. As the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued three (3)
EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to ₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41
Also, Annex "E"42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent acknowledged receipt of the
checks and agreed to pay the complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five percent
(5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal sides of the checks likewise show that
respondent personally encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With respondent’s
direct transactional involvement and the actual benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any
credible indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that respondent was indeedthe one
who borrowed the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had failed to
return, despite their insistent pleas.

Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly inspires belief. While respondent
submitted a document purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the complainants,
Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint, categorically denied knowing the complainants and
incurring the same obligation.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants, it would be illogical for them to extend a
₱2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or security to a person they do not even know. On the
other hand, complainants were able to submit documents showing respondent’s receipt of the
checks and their encashment, as well as his agreement to return the ₱2,500,000.00 plus interest.
This is bolstered by the fact that the loan transaction was entered into during the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship between him and complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a greater
influence over the latter in view of the trust and confidence inherently imbued in such relationship.

Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his
client unless the client’s interests are fully protected:

CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his clients that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money
to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client."

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty. Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared
that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:

Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent advice.

A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It
comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence. The canon presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on
her obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)

As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money from complainants who were his clients and
whose interests, by the lack of any security on the loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their
trust and confidence in respondent, complainants relied solely on the former’s word that he will
return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However, respondent abused the same and
reneged on his obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly,
there is no quibble that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads:
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.Thus, he should be equally held
administratively liable on this score.

That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s
return directive.

II.

The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.50

In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of law for two (2) years after borrowing
₱900,000.00 from her client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and representing
conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater amount involved in this case and respondent's
continuous refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of
law for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.

The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's Resolution insofar as it orders respondent
to return to complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal interest thereon. It is settled
that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court
is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.52 In such cases, the Court's only
concern is the determination of respondent's administrative liability; it should not involve his civil
liability for money received from his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement. In this case, respondent received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a
loan from complainants and not in consideration of his professional services. Hence, the IBP's
recommended return of the aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case,
and thus cannot be sustained.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule
16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. This Decision is immediately executory upon receipt.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013

FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,

PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
November 23, 20091 and the February 11, 20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita
de Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.

The Facts

Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman)
engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as defense counsel in
the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong) for annulment of contract and
recovery of possession with damages involving a parcel of land in Parañaque City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or less.
Petitioner’s legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court. 3 Spouses de
Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending
before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were
substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman, Arleen
de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).4

On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees 5 before the
RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the deceased Spouses de
Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the subject land if the complaint filed
against them by Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he had successfully
represented them, respondents refused his written demand for payment of the contracted
attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent
of the value of the subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the
ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed after the
judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this Court, had long become final and
executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering that the motion was filed too
late, it had already lost jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be amended
or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment
rendered if his claim for attorney’s fees would still be included.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues

This petition is anchored on the following grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO

DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS
LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION
DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEY’S
FEES.6nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally agreed to pay
him 25% of the market value of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover attorney’s
fees can be filed and entertained by the court before and after the judgment becomes final.
Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon
which an action can be commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil
Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred
by prescription.7

For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, it could no
longer be granted. In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it awarded the
amount of ?10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Respondents further assert that the law, specifically
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees under a written agreement.
The alleged understanding between their deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never
put in writing. They also aver that they did not have any knowledge or information about the
existence of an oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the respondents
believe that the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive and unconscionable. 8

The Court’s Ruling

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the denial of his motion to determine attorney’s fees
by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for
review under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because this
case involves an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits direct resort to
this Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.9 In this case,
petitioner should have first elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent
jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions for certiorari.10 Even so, this
principle is not absolute and admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is
demanded by the broader interest of justice.11

Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization
of an improper remedy with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the
rules of procedure must give way to serve the higher ends of justice. The strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits. 12
Thus, this Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as having been filed under Rule 65.

With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner.

In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts of
attorney’s fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary
concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from
each other, as further explained below:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment
of the subject is necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by
way of attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or
defending, through counsel, his cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not
his lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s fee
which a client pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the latter’s services. The
losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not bound
by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his
lawyer. The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by
the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.

The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms
part of his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may,
however, agree that whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award
shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court
upon proper motion may require the losing party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the
prevailing party.

The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a
prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a
lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never
rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor
of the winning party who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both
fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules governing the determination
of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]

In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is
demanding payment from respondents for having successfully handled the civil case filed by
Chong against Spouses de Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the RTC in the amount of
P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and
this Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for
damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to be paid
directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to
grant petitioner’s motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a double award of
attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and
executory decision or variance in judgment.

The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorney’s fees for
professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for professional
services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is
instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR
Certified Case No. 0466, private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be filed
before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its earlier decision had been
reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s fees may be
asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or
in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Attorney’s fees
cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees only arises
when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be
held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees
may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will
be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before the judgment
in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his
claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he
made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential,
instead of filing it ahead of the award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may
file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher
tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the
foregoing pronouncements of this Court. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which is permitted
by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned motion to
determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.

The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory on
October 31, 2007. There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to Determine Attorney’s
Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11) months from
the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner claims to have had an oral contract of
attorney’s fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the Civil Code16 allows him a period
of six (6) years within which to file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered.
Respondents never asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused
petitioner’s legal representation. For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began to run only
from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the
case of Anido v. Negado:17

In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in the complaint that petitioners refused to
sign the contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the complaint only on
November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause of action arising from the breach of
the oral contract between him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the six-year
prescriptive period within which to file an action based on such oral contract under Article 1145
of the Civil Code had already lapsed.

As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from the
time petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal services and to acknowledge that
they had engaged his services for the settlement of their parents’ estate within which to
file his complaint for collection of legal fees for the services which he rendered in their
favor. [Emphases supplied]

At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed
his claim well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the RTC
for the determination of the correct amount of attorney’s fees. Such a procedural route,
however, would only contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the controversy as any
ruling by the trial court on the matter would still be open for questioning before the CA and this
Court. In the interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply
resolve the matter at this level. The Court has previously exercised its discretion in the same
way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:18

In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his client, and the
intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that there be evidence to prove
the amount of fees and the extent and value of the services rendered, taking into account the
facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore, the determination of the attorney’s fees on
quantum meruit is remanded to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just and
equitable to now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both attorneys in order that the
resolution of “a comparatively simple controversy,” as Justice Regalado put it in Traders
Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be needlessly prolonged,
by taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent data as
are extant in the records.19 [Emphasis supplied]

With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s
considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be based on quantum
meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining
an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client
from running away with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and also
avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.20

Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for determining the
proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c) The importance of the subject matter;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

d) The skill demanded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered

case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to
which he belongs;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents’ deceased parents in the civil
case for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages. He successfully
represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a
lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003, petitioner filed a notice of death and
a motion for substitution of parties with entry of appearance and motion to resolve the case
before this Court.21 As a consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the
place of their parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.

As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de Guzman
and respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was not an easy
task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for such a long period of time, considering the
heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the research and preparation
of pleadings, the gathering of documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal
work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner
devoted much time and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable
amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by
him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner clearly deserves to be awarded
reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be
paid his professional fee based on quantum meruit.

The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as
a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A layer is as much
entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the
client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a
lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just
fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his
client he himself would not get his due.22

The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's
fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable
amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the market value of the property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to
Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum
meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market value of the parcel of
land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of payment.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN

OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA,
Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph Ador
Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).

The Facts

Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad
Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw virtualaw library

Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar)
and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named complainants and the
son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw library

In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties were
represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of
Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F.
Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other
heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating counsel; and
(c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed
administrator of Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order 5 dated
September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent filed an
Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw library

Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the
Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; 7 and (b) Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his
clients, the Heirs of Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving
spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s
appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered
his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose
such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as
required under the Rules.10cralaw virtualaw library

For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he never
appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed out that the
records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while
the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only
accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record
could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances
thereat were free of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from
the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Likewise, he
consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he
had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that
no information was disclosed to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. 14
Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator,
rather than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he
formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions,
respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his limited
appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.

The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), respondent was found
guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen as the records of the case
show that he never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express
conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was
already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the
Code.20cralaw virtualaw library

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section
20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not
acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any
knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.”21 Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment
too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. 22cralaw
virtualaw library

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report
in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
641), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules but imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725
dated January 3, 2013.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but
reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties
in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court
explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.”
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library

Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent
represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed
by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof,
the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for
having committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to
represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in
violation of the above-stated rule.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in
the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the
latter’s opponent in the same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of
the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence
since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if
the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.31cralaw virtualaw library

Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator
than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render
the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule
15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all
concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in
his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the
Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written consent before
consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in
settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for respondent’s
violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction is warranted.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was increased from
severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of
any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors’ modification; as such, it
contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically mandates that “[t]he
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the reasons on which it is based.”34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the
Court is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement to
announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its decision in
disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which the same is based is
akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their decisions. The reasons for handing down
a penalty occupy no lesser station than any other portion of the ratio.35cralaw virtualaw library

In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors:
first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is undisputed that respondent merely
accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June
16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed
that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar
whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and
in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants
admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did
he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence,
the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio.
Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented
parties whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for

unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant
Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella
Asuncion Pollo (Bella).

The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1
She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated
August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No.
95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several
corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy
Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and
Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita
Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred
that respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply
with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s
properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other
proceeds or benefits coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7
She added that respondent mortgaged a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of
54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject
Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized
her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10 Accordingly, she demanded that
respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her
favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11
In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or after she had already
instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the
subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and
raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca
had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust
agreement. He also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in
1993 and 1995 without a complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and
instituted various suits covering the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the
complaint, and further prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of
counterclaim.15

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-
1484 for the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order
to weed out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus,
recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to

withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative
case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which
provides that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same." Separately, the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum
shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed
independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the
good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the
demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful
acts of mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was
found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the
above-stated penalty was recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves
an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on
the factual circumstances of each case.

Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case
largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is
clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise
agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged
disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to
complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she takes as an invocation of her rights under the
subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the subject property without
the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the
subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the Court’s determination,for that
matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca
even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of
a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even adds that respondent
"had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has no basis
in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of
the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the
finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent
dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have
exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself
even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger
the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the
trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a
member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser
extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty
of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as
the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012

ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for which he previously appeared
as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio
(Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case
No. 27776 for direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar
Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of
action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y
Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder, in which case
Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s
manner of prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in
a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty.
Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed
manifest bias in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the
Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial
Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling
the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005.
On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a
motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for
frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the
findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense from frustrated murder to less
serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while
still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings
and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s decision in
Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse
(Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor
of Lanticse’s father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for
more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA
7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual entrapment operation. The
footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty.
Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive
portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month
and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and
twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;

(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and

(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.

SO ORDERED.2

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor
from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon
case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his
appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any
relationship between himself and the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as "self-serving"
and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and
is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount
to a crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his
capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling
under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty.
Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is
presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has made himself familiar
with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact
that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to

Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.

As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more
than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the
word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the
accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that
the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast
doubt on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.

As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was he ever involved in said
case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The findings in
a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been
presented relating to the alleged extortion case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge
in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty
of REPRIMAND.

Respectfully submitted.3

In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from
the practice of law for six months. In another Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board
of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two
years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 1 March 2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations
in the second and third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides
that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed" and on Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy."

We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only
be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in
the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation
as collaborating counsel was limited only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will
do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4

An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or

counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.

xxxx

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client
as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer
from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy,
on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights
of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the
attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by
emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that
there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty.
Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an
attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a
day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President
of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies
against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the accusation and
dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a
member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do
not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7

We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt
of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct
the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:

Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in government service.

xxxx

It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is
no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public
record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary
evidence of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself
admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude
is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9
Section 27, Rule 138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.10

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11

we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:

1. the offender is a public officer;

 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer
with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do; and

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with
the performance of his official duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept
a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty
in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender
takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public.
It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the
original)

Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio
merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final conviction of the crime of
direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138.
Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are
constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa
is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of
the Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer,
is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice of
law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the
Court Administration for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses
Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate
of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their
agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay
him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the
total estate or about ₱ 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July 16, 1997
that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's
fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required
of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two
children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused
respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery
and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his
July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding
sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-
2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August
11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment
of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent
has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating
to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases
which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13
Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's
Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1âwphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money
to a single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a
consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of
lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under
scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the
case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA-LOZADA,

Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
“Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada”3 suspending Atty. Lozada for
violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a
final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for
reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07
entitled “Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.,” where complainant was one of the
respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and
her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant
submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended
from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which
suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the
complaint against him.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto
Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his
reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 &
1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension
from the practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead
that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period
of suspension.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill.”14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt
that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of
her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose
that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007
were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada
appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated
in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she,
therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed
to inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if
she can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her
husband whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that
she is first and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the
Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice
of law:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a
helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that
Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she
was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness
of her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16
citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice
of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband
as counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.
While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative
principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less
severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of

violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period
of six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of
the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that
we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant

Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera
committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
dishonor of several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court.
The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in
relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is
acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to
Atty. De Vera.3cralawred

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
P20,000.00 per month until fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De
Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary
Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City. 5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check
No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two
more checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7cralawred

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in
the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check
No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she
paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks
"bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks
for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was
closed.9cralawred

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations,
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred
The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding
probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11cralawred

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.12cralawred

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint. 13cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and
Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe'
Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus,
they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while
Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her
P195,000.00 per site.16cralawred

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time, Teresita
had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the
funds required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell
site.19cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita
approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan.
The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband
regarding the loan.20cralawred

Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister.21 She only lent Teresita
another check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]" 22cralawred

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for
value. The checks were not meant to be deposited.23cralawred

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points
out that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation
since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint. 24cralawred

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative
complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as
a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant." 25cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare
allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and
that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute
deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]" 28cralawred

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29
Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Order."30.

Both parties failed to file their position papers.31cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The
Investigating Commissioner ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the
loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is
contrary to the ordinary experience.

...

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent
incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter
as security for the payment of the loans.

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious
misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . .
worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A
check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has
the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks
in violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

...

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also
for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke
her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following
provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation 36

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is

recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of
law.37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the
Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated September 17, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion
for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties' respective
motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent,

there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
.subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the
original)
cralawlawlibrary
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and
approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged
by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan.
She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the
criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately
intertwined with the criminal acts complained of." 44cralawred

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing
worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for
issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for
payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against
respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised
against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment
charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not
have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid
that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22.
We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes
serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment"; 47 it is serious or
gross when it is flagrant.48cralawred

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined
and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in
circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the
practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

...

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was
penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his
Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from
Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her
liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show
checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for
P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that
there was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved
the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only. 54 Mary Jane merely claimed that
she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita and Atty. De
Vera.55cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending"
her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is
presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for
value that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him.'"57cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint 1 for disbarment dated April 16,
2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O.
Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint 2 for damages
against his own brother, Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together
with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-
774058-12/07/09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10, 2008."4
Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and
that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Compliance, not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a
separate case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a
copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning
him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was
incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss
[your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max
Noble, as shown in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial
stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you], x
x x daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that
Maximino "x x x has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner
not befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging
enormous amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted
services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well
as a Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted,
Maximino filed the instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7,
the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 850 9
and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission
of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate
Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo
when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted
that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of
guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or
annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer
over a case x x x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended
the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information
would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to
warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication
between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed
to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando,
warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration17
which was however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the
warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on

certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint
against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession. 21
Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner
beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the
Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and
"satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession. 25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however,
the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to
malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules.
Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which
should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the
event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a
member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware
that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly
improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,

constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. 27 While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members
of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando
transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that
his failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for
damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his
violation shall only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof
from the records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and
STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant)

against Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant
claimed that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a
different complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato
Jadulco. In effect, there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil
action, in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free
patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy
to the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without
a copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming
that there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented
the occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land
to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which
were filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty
of his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval
Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a
government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of
dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against
him. Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case
No. [B-] 1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was
the certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9,
2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil
Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming
opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon
filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed
against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge
Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from
the service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and
Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government
institution. However, respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT
College of Law; and thus, this issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his
designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary, and he had not received any salary except
honorarium. Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there were no
objections, he proceeded to perform the functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted
an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the administrative case against him, who
interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5

on 20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20
February 2008. All these submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the
parties and denied each other's allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner
Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before
the IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the
IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross
misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found
that respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by
complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty
and grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint
filed by complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's
client; (2) for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by
OCT No. 1730 which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals;
and (3) for accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of
Eastern Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory
penalty of prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a
judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for one year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP
Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
Respondent guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion" 10
and accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married
man died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a
"dissertation of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the
administrative case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the
resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself
with vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v.
Larong,13 we stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the
parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant
claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of
Fortunato Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in
the complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato
Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of
Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with
the RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was
the certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or
after the filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of
Endorsement did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other
words, there is no truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-
1118 was brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was
issued prior to the filing of the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x
x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of
the free patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a
copy of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish
complainant's counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to
file with the Court of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title
so she and her counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact
demanding an examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls
outside the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that
respondent himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds
certifications do not prove that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents
merely confirm that OCT No. 1730 does not exist in their official
records.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a
deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman
Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing
parties who are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs
the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths
and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on
the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis
and conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are
bare allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the
proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the
MCTC and reversed by the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete
evidence proving her grave accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed
against the judge, and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal

Trial Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-
Culaba, Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a
judge, one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
any government office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being
disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College
of Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached
to his designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of
his designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and
approval from the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case
against him (as a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only
temporary does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the
OBC and MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from
reemployment in a government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous
administrative case did not object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should
have declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of
such positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a
public office imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she
continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to
comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which
merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a
certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to
the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2)
using improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross
misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment
or suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct

and accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that
the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015

MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA,

JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO,
Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for
allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which
enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
clients.

The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into
two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of Romulo M.
Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called
the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel
N. Lukban.

In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a total
monthly compensation and honorarium of P6,000.

On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which
authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the complainant at
that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration and Finance, to apply for
a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch, Camarines Norte in favor of the
complainant.

On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan application
because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were allegedly
not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of the complainant, as members
of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the complainant was having
financial difficulties.

On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial
capacity to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which was
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order
which nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as
members of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to
RBP to inform the latter of the SEC Order.

On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC
Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's legal counsel, herein
respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became
aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.

On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000.

On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage.

On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.

On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing to exhibit candor,
fairness, and loyalty.

Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, respondent
argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot
represent the complainant in this disbarment case because they were not duly authorized by the
Board of Directors to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered by
the prohibition on conflict of interest which applies only to the legal counsel of complainant.
Respondent argued that he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did
not serve as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest
when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage because all the documents
and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public
records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have taken advantage of his position as
the mere corporate secretary of the complainant.

On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation 2
finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and recommending that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least one year. The Investigating
Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage
filed by his former client, the complainant herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash
vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained
legal services. According to the Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk
respondent's claim that the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The
Investigating Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's representatives to
file this administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.

On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704
which affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.

The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when
he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by
complainant against RBP.

We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of
Governors. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."

This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on
representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the
rationale for the prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the
strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the
fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the
loss thereof.
Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence of conflict of
interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through
their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. 10
It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former client in a controversy that is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared
for the former client.11 This rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse interests.12 What a
lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to
it after consultation.14chanrobleslaw

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented conflicting
interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the
complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP.

The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by

complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, the cash
vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former client. And
respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former client against RBP. This
makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests since respondent failed to show
any written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full disclosure of
the facts representing conflicting interests.15chanrobleslaw

We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure
the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in
the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against the interest of the complainant, his
former client.

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and information in
connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the complainant were public records. In
Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the
continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by
the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)

Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former client
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)

In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge
thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)

This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate
to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910],
31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client is irrelevant
in determining the existence of conflict of interest.

Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for disbarment is imbued
with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person." Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel
N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint
for disbarment even without authority from the Board of Directors of the complainant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-
2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C.

CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings
of the contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity
of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is
also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes
it from any other calling. In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the
mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the
lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987
before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1

Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter
referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients,
which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as
incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services,
the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's
name, and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their
dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the assets
of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law
Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization
and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.2

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter

referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private
respondent Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33.4

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,

Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja
G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each
other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other coconut
levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-
owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of
UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand,
corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately
3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their

codefendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to

clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
 D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became
holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed under their
respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded Amended
Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as
such, they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares
of stock.

4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in

1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate
business purposes not related to the allegations of the expanded Amended
Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.6

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.7

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment
to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-
Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991
in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of
petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their respective
shareholdings.9

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by

private respondent Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-
defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by the
PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent
Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence
of the PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10

It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners'
contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33,
nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-
stockholder. 11

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

 ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the
client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice.
But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts
until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and
that Roco has apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the
lack of cause against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power
both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these
proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA
lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as
party defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded
the same treatment accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA
lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the
PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit. 12

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by
the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting

petitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as
nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law of agency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not

considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and,
therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
 1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or
had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken

to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not
constitute a substantial distinction as would make the classification
reasonable under the equal protection clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue

preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection
clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding

that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege

includes the identity of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to

the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but
extend to other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not

requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to the constitutional right
of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18,
1991 resolution which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's
resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No.
33 grants him a favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the
identity of his client, giving him an advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners
in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has
been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their
principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment) protected, because they are
evidence of nominee status. 13

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in
excluding him as party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had
therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his principal. 15

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them
to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness
to cut a deal with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the
complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992
is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the
client for whom they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice.
But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated. The
ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts
until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
"Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the
PCGG wanted to establish through the ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint;
that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons; some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these
ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.
Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to these
subscription payments of these corporations who are now the petitioners in this
case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our
claim that some of the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late
 President Marcos. Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of
these assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our claim
that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos. Fifth,
that most of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do we say
that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at
the time of incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not
only that, they have no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next,
actually all their addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really have
no address on records. These are some of the principal things that we would ask
of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves. 16

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-
defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients
and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent
PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third
Amended Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another
hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein
lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire, 17 and mandato (contract of
agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name, but
gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-
client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent
or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his
client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely
different from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also occupies
what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Court 21
and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting
and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is
required by reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis that abstinence
from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
24

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him
from any other professional in society. This conception is entrenched and
embodies centuries of established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford,26
the U. S. Supreme Court held:

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more
 honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or
governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice; and it is the duty of the
court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment
or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing it. 27

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel,
without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of
the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any

communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course
of, or with a view to, professional employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his
employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and
at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules
of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should
restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer
is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of
attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation
 of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and
not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several
constitutional and policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of
the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to
choose between legal representation without effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to
either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of
disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be
curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against
another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent
upon the degree of confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a
situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily
follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not as
a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 31

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He cannot
be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important
exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name
would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to
divulge the name of her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so
closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In
Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed his attorney in confidence that he had
been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that end. In her
testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the votes correctly, but
averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer was
cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the
lower court's contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the
case, and under the exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in
those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the
gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge
and Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by
Sandino on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names.
The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts
and circumstances of the case, held:

A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged
where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists
that disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal
activity for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While
in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects
federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the
attorney-client privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal
advisors must be removed; hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In furtherance of
this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are, in
exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications. 36

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance,
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the
New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name
of his client because this would expose the latter to civil litigation.

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned
by respondent corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
brought action both against defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in
the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow revealed that the lawyer came to
know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company,
prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second
cab. The state supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his
professional capacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had
hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases
is clearly the attorney for the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to
report an occurrence contemplating that it would be used in an action or claim
against him. 38

xxx xxx xxx

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional
advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or
contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And
whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it was the ground
of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .

It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to
the attorney in this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking
to use the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the
present action pending against him as service of the summons on him has not
been effected. The objections on which the court reserved decision are sustained.
39

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by a lower
court to disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of
the court's request was to determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were
connected with the purchase of properties involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought
the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of
his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that
he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made
progress in establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation. As already
suggested, such testimony by the witness would compel him to disclose not only
that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the result of communications
made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they
were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no
case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions
to which it related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against
his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing
the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes
understated. The clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and
sought advice from Baird on the hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then
being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers
delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously assessed as the tax due,
and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a check
for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but without
naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other
clients involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition
was filed for the enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients
he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could
not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to the
government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with no
government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general
rule. Here money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby
admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more
years in the past. The names of the clients are useful to the government for but
one purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it
may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary nature of
the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or
penalties are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it
may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are the
reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be done. 43

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and
it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be
privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the
ambit of the privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client confidences. 46

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure
of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in
issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects
the subject matter or the substance (without which there would be not attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was
duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their
clients covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment
covering their client's shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to
convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of
committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the
privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within
the exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be
illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the
hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a
shield for an illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against
the client in the second example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case
against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not within the professional character of
a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second has been
stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same policy grounds for which the
attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a
hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it
related, when such information could be made the basis of a suit against his client." 49
"Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment, relating to the
subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in
which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection
as privileged communications."50 Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within
the privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which would sustain a charge except that revealing the
name of the client would open up other privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject matter
itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is
consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting
freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. This exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the
exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not
depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name
in circumstances such as the one which exists in the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing
expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will not countenance. When
the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer, such
retainer is obviously protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant
case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn
requires them to invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals much
about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus between
name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information
revealed directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and
distinctly privileged. A lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to
charges of violating a principle which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability
for negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality,
loyalty, competence, diligence as well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect
their rights to make decisions have been zealously sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and
McCloy v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the petitioner law firm that it
breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a deal for the
agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no
harm to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context
comprise a special breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation
and damages, and found in favor of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v.
Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee
lawyer was fired shortly before the end of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the lawyer was fired for cause after he sought
to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement negotiations were at a
critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client
to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that
"Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no
attorney's fees at all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and
lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during
the relationship, but extends even after the termination of the relationship. 57

Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which
the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting
goddess, demanding of her votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not
prepared to accept respondents' position without denigrating the noble profession that is
lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to
realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so
deep in the stream of life — so share its passions its battles, its despair, its
triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all. What a subject is this
in which we are united — this abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic
mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have
been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of
the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be
won with sustained and lonely passion — only to be won by straining all the
faculties by which man is likened to God.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under
pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case
clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein
petitioners and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through
the use of coconut levy funds the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that through insidious means
and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing
roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted
to establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners
acted as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions,
etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of
public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the
Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to
submit to the PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective
shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a crime."

III

In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private
respondent was dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he
acted merely as a nominee but also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and
circumstances "as the interest of truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of the
principal."59

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and
nominee, a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to
state that petitioners have likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also
in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming
that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate lawyering."60 Being "similarly
situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other conditions
and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently
from petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their
decision to sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his
promise to disclose the identities of the clients in question. However, respondents failed
to show — and absolute nothing exists in the records of the case at bar — that private
respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the
undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and
the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special
treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a
"bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the undertaking. Instead,
as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose, two
of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients
which petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients
to whom both petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them
were partners at ACCRA, and were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for
the alleged questioned transactions.61

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in
the respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr.
Roco was treated as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial distinctions based on real differences. No such
substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal
protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against
uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 62
Those who fall within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges
granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.

. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of

legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was
noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the
rest.63

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners
for their exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents
Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.64 It is
grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from prosecution without allowing
the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only touches upon
the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a
fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-

client confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should
wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in
confidence before they can raise their objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses.
They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have
made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and
they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-
incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of
attorney-client confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full
course in the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of
further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the
identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them when this
Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an
unjust situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and
palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be
allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we
will not sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against
self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent

Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C.
Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayuduni as parties-
defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET,
Respondents.

Solicitor General for Petitioner.

Rolando A. Suarez and Associates for public respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public
Land Subdivision Survey in 1976. His application was approved and an original certificate of title
was issued in his favor. In 1985, however, the Director of Lands filed an action for the
cancellation of Paredes’ patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated as a
school site. The trial court nullified said patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained
the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Sansaet served as counsel
of Paredes in that case.

The Tanodbayan recommended the criminal prosecution of Paredes for violation of Section 3(a)
of Republic Act No. 3019 in that he used his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence
the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent. Again, Sansaet
was Paredes’ counsel of record therein. A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents, claiming that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his co-respondents, simulated and certified as true
copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and transcripts of
stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge.

To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, Sansaet claimed that he filed
falsified documents upon the inducement of Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his
discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases. The proposal for the discharge of
Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman, reasoning that the confession of
Sansaet falls under the privileged communication between him and his client, Paredes, which
may be objected to if presented in the trial. Thus, the three criminal cases were filed in the
Sandiganbayan. A motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of Sansaet
as a state witness.

The issues are (1) whether the projected testimony of Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege, and (2) whether he is eligible for discharge as a particeps
 criminis.

A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. The Sandiganbayan
believes that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that Sansaet is set to testify
on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.

But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date
when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, the privileged confidentiality applies only to a crime already committed, but does
not attach to a crime which a client intends to commit in the future, for purposes of which he
seeks the lawyer’s advice.

The testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications
made to him by Paredes at the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator
in the commission of the crime of falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada foisted upon the
authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client
may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.

The Court is reasonably convinced that the requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as a state
witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charge,
and the prosecution is faced with the task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus
no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case; hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Sansaet.

The Sandiganbayan should have taken a holistic view of all facts and issues herein in disposing
of the matter of whether to allow Sansaet to testify as a state witness, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT; NOT CONFINED TO VERBAL OR WRITTEN
COMMUNICATION. — In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was
taken, there is no particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a
client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by
the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FUTURE CRIMES, NOT COVERED. — A distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes
intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of
a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. For the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered
is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation
to either a crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in
the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the
former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s
consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime
which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks
the lawyer’s advice. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime
already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are
privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily
existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. (Emphasis supplied.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present cases, the testimony sought to be
elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the active or
passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal
charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential
communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the
crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes
of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. It
is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the
objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of
evidence and practice in the noble profession of law. The Court is reasonably convinced, and so
holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness are
present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE MUST BE FOR A LAWFUL PURPOSE. — In order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of
an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed out to
the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client
for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to
divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in
the interest of justice.

5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED AS STATE WITNESS; FACT OF

FILING OF SEPARATE INFORMATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED IMMATERIAL WHERE
CASES WERE JOINED AND CONSOLIDATED. — A reservation is raised over the fact that the
three private respondents here stand charged in three separate informations. It will be recalled
that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal
charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution
was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed
against each of the three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of
falsification. This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations
in this case by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit; "Assuming no
substantive impediment exists to block "Sansaet’s discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharge even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three
cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents,
or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes,
Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment
that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint
defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law,
persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants." As
likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a
consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a
single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of
action involved had originally been joined in a single action.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "JOINT," CONSTRUED. — Indeed, the former provision of the Rules
referring to the situation" (w)hen two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence, the word "joint" was added to indicate the
identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith
substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means
"common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or more," or "done or produced
by two or more working together," or "shared by or affecting two or more." Had it been intended
that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the Rules could
have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining
in the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all,
the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED MUST NOT APPEAR TO BE THE MOST GUILTY; IN
CONSPIRACY, THE ACTUAL AND INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED SERVES AS
CRITERIA. — In a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed
on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he
"does not appear to be the most guilty," not that he must be the least guilty as is so often
erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held
guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness. In People v.
Ocimar, Et Al., the Court agreed with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on
the discharge of an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually
responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his
discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT OR DENIAL THEREOF MUST BE BASED NOT SOLELY ON THE
ISSUE OF APPLICABILITY OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE. — This Court is not unaware
of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may proposed that an
accused be discharged as a state witness but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It
 must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised and the
disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issue herein discussed, and not merely
on the sole issues of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied
petitioner’s motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a
witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of its
preceding disposition. 1

The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk
of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-
Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial
Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.

The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free
patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of
title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur.

However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action 2 for the cancellation of respondent
Paredes’ patent and certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a
school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment 3
nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent Paredes had obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent Sansaet
served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case. 4

Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury 5 was filed against respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. 6 On
November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed by the Deputy Minister of
Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the
proceedings were terminated. 7 In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise
represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.

Nonetheless, respondent Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence
and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he
had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the third time, respondent
Sansaet was Paredes’ counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution 8 recommending the criminal
prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-
respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of its legal significance in this case, we
quote some of his allegations in that motion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit
Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of
facts and the same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the
court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order,
certificate of arraignment and the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for
respondent herein . . ." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a
motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted in respondent court’s resolution of
August 1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the ground of prescription.

On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation
of the three respondents herein for falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as
true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and
transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the
perjury charge. 13 These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes’ motion for
reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order
to support his contention that the same would constitute double jeopardy.

In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment
was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with
that perjury case; and a certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in
his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon was suspended pending the
review of the case by the Department of Justice. 14

Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and
repudiated the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, 15 respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to
have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy
by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court after he had
been arraigned therein.

For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary
investigation were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of
respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed
that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to
pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a
motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge
of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative
legal position:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As
counsel for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory
and the evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or
confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the
lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further
controversy, he decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against
each of the herein respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the
three private respondents here as the accused therein, were filed in the graft court. However,
the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as
provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent
Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification
of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.

Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private
respondents in their opposition to the prosecution’s motion, resolved to deny the desired
discharge on this ratiocination:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer
relationship existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after
the period alleged in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the
case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to
accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty.
Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged." 19

Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the controversy was
elevated to this Court by the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.

The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is
eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.

As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship
which existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods,
the facts surrounding the case and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no
reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against
accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter’s consent." 21

The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases,
as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to
the rule. For a clearer understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some
distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes
to Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his
counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the
falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more,
than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such
falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any
communication," without distinction or qualification. 22

In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no
particular mode by which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.
The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his
attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other
means. 23

Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject
matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed fact that said
documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24
Also, the acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being
falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his
house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.

2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the
criminal act for which the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past
crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been committed and consummated.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is
true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-
client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in
the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the
client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client
privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends
to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made
by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)

3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are
the communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at
the time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about
to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan
by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in
the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are
outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of

falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is
well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to
the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client
for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to
divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in
the interest of justice." 27

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because
of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules
of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

II

On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether

respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal
prosecution in order to testify for the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a
contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon this second aspect and the relief
sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the petition at bar. We
shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.

1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or
not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from
resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence
have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will
be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration thereof to resolve
the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28

2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in
three separate informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents
against all the respondents herein. That resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order to
obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of the three respondents
here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.

This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case
by the following discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet’s discharge as state witness, he

can, nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the
three cases were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents,
or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes,
Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment
that he was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the
consolidated and joint trial has the effect of making the three accused, co-accused or joint
defendants, especially considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law,
persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint defendants."cralaw
virtua1aw library

As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been
a consolidation of the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became
a single action in which a single judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of
action involved had originally been joined in a single action. 29

Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation" (w)hen two or more persons
are charged with the commission of a certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence the
word "joint" was added to indicate the identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all
together charged therewith substantially in the same manner in point of commission and time.
The word "joint" means "common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of two or
more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or "shared by or affecting two or
more. 30 Had it been intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the
same information, the Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in
consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the present case and the problems that may
arise from amending the information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved by
consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.

2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule
is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed
on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he
"does not appear to be the most guilty," 31 not that he must be the least guilty 32 as is so often
erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an accused who was held
guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.

To be sure, in People v. Ramirez, Et. Al. 33 we find this obiter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded
the others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit
any of the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the
perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally
guilty."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, prior thereto, in People v. Roxas, Et Al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others
in three separate informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses
against their confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 35
one of the co-conspirators was discharged from the information charging him and two others
with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most guilty as, being a poor
and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with the
bank and which led to the commission of the crime.

On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as
guilty as his co-accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most
guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts
committed by the accused to be discharged compared to those of his co-accused, and not
merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.

Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found expression in
People v. Ocimar, Et Al., 36 which we quote in extenso:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the
discharge of a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a
conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could
satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused
Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite
the presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused
except Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in
the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact
the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second, without his
testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of
the crime Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party
without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming
that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the
law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will
be sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet
one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
 x x x

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of
an accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation
in the commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with
the other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on
the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that
Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the
government is clearly warranted." (Emphasis ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal
offense is based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into
concerted physical action although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised
Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is
considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same
penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.

Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on
the discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such
as the need for giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial
experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty
that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria
which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental policy.

III

The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated
by the Sandiganbayan.

Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution
is faced with the formidable task of establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who
steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is thus no other direct
evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent
has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed
the substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.

His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses,
identified in the basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge
Ciriaco C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Provincial
Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private
complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking
their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and
Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ariño.

On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any
time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify as a state witness.

This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution
may propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the
merits of the proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized,
however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and the disposition taken on a
holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue of the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second Division 37 and the reconstitution thereof. In an
inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated June 14, 1995, as required by this
Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof 39
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice
Narciso T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M.
Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the
Second Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted
by the Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave
of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the
questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecution’s motion to discharge accused Generoso
Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of
the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof."
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the
impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by
petitioner be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014

DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

x-----------------------x

Adm. Case No. 10299

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate
conduct tending to influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a public official. The
Joint Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III
recommended that respondent beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action,
otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said
ruling on 16 April 2013.2

The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the
filing of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett
and Joseph R. Tecson.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys")
werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal
sale and use of dangerous drugs.3 In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the
charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.4

Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the
evaluation of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up"
allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the House Committee on
Illegal Drugs to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing
that respondenthad prepared the release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5

Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent
had admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and
unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should
be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of the bar.6

For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that
respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and
sending it to a high-ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government
prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9

Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10
On 27 February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action
had been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for
consolidation, as well as for investigation, report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S
VERSION

In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against
his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate
release of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together with
their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his clients.12 Sheer
faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft
the release order. Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of
Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the
drafted release order was not signed by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of
paper with no effect at all."14

FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER

The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-
complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced
to prove the charges.

However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted
the release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft
order to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any
similar action.15

RULING OF THE COURT

We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in
these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of
a member of the bar.17

As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac
v. Rayos:

The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not,
in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven x x x. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence
on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)

After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating
Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." We believe
that other provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-
peddling not limited to the regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where
respect for the rule of law is at all times demanded from a member of the bar.

During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated
that the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ
Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:

ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary
himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political
also so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic]
that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the
family was very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang
kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make
it convenient for signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it
over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si
Blancaflor.

xxxx

So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the
parents of Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in
the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap
naman kami, so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi
niya what can I do if I move on this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na
yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang
ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the
matter, those particular words, I will study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter
of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we
were discussing the case.19

Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;"
and that "because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father
was a Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my sister was a
Congresswoman of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not a
complete stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent
admitted that he was personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that
close.21

These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1)
he personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending
before the latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official
DOJ stationery despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought
to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any
act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the
people’s faith inthe judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To
that end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought
to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable,
fair and honest which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s
cause, is condemnable and unethical.22

Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not
state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." The
succeeding rule, Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness."

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law.23
A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to
remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these
exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would
not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.

In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month
suspension against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited
₱100,000.00 from complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in the case of her friend
Emerita Muñoz, who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was
a former court attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the
present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating
Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which
he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also
serves as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s bar records. The Court Administrator
is hereby directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013

HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San

Mateo, Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No.
1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages
filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant
Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges,
would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary
action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate

Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public
Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty.
Rodolfo Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.

x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance
and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed
his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records
without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance.
x x x Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that
failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.

Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010
stating among others, the following allegations:

xxxx

4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice
and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?

5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1 But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof
of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
again failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead,
respondent Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:

If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing
the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.

With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right
in your sala.5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing
to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7

Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had
not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong,
as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.

At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled
to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity
to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It
must be done within the confines of reason and common sense.9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent.
Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice
of law for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we
deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more
circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with
STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6332 April 17, 2012

IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND
145822

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Factual Background

This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent
Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 20031
(the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions involving respondent that were pending
before the Court.2 This motion is directed against the then ponente of the consolidated petitions,
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in part:

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully states:

1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice against
Urban Bank and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he will
be vindicated and the wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic]. What respondent is about
to relate however has, with all due respect, shaken his faith in the highest Court of the
land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can happen even in the august halls of the
Supreme Court, one can only wonder if there is still any hope for our justice system.

2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping accusation
against all the members of this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-lipped
in the face of the overwhelming evidence that has come to his knowledge regarding the
actuation of the ponente of this Honorable Division.

3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call from the
counsel for petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his cell phone number
09189137383) who very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order
from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by them, more than two weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various properties had expired. At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the purchasers of the properties. The
only step that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new titles in
favor of the purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending
incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but
he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty.
Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert
extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly
of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might again cause the
bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.

5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that Atty. Singson
was talking about, he asked Atty. Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that they had
received. The faxed "advance" copy that Atty. Singson provided him bore the fax number
and name of Atty. Singson’s law office. A copy thereof is hereto attached as Annex "A".

6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a supposed Motion
for Clarification was filed by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002, but he
was never furnished a copy thereof. He asked a messenger to immediately secure a copy
of the motion and thereafter confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His supposed
copy as indicated in the last page of the motion was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala
and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never respondent’s counsel and
was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners. Respondent’s copy, in other words, was
sent to his opponents.

7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving respondent an
opportunity to comment on the same. In contrast, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had been pending for almost a year and yet
petitioners’ motions for extension to file comment thereon [were] being granted left and
right.

8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an

Urgent Omnibus Motion (to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the said motion on 20 December
2002.

9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not actually granted petitioners’ Motion
for Clarification. They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this
Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda
of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from
the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente
himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners’
Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes
the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a
falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
 Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution
exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the
Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as
Annexes "B" and "C."

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and undeniable
fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002
Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED.

12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a special
interest in this case. Recently, he also found out that the ponente made a special request
to bring this case along with him when he transferred from the Third Division to the First
Division. Respondent has a copy of the Resolution of this Honorable Court granting such
request (hereto attached as Annex "D"). Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all the
foregoing circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred
here.

13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition of the
ponente from this case. This matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent is
now carefully considering his legal options for redress. It has taken him seven years to
seek vindication of his rights against petitioners, he is not about to relent at this point. In
the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and impartial resolution of this case if the
ponente does not inhibit himself.

14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente will do
well to heed such pronouncements.

15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real
position on the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted that in
order to obviate any further confusion on the matter, respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated 09 December 2002 (as well as the Supplement dated 19 November 2002) should
be resolved and this Honorable Court should confirm that the stay order contained in the
19 November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties already sold on execution. xxx
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit
two copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the First Division of this Court, which
he claimed to have anonymously received through the mail.3 He also attached a copy of the
Court’s internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case from the Third Division to the First
Division, upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latter’s alleged special interest in the
case.4

In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Peña and Atty.
Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to appear before the
Court on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session.5
The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session is explained
in the Court’s Resolution dated 03 March 2003.6 It states:

The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened
the executive session and then requested Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice
Vitug stated that the executive session was called because the Court is perturbed by some
statements made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña involving strictly confidential matters
which are purely internal to the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion."

Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson
attended the session.

The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of the documents he
used as annexes in his motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.

The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and apart from
the merits of the main case.

Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3) annexes attached to the motion to
inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and "D," questioned how the latter was able to secure copies of such
documents which are confidential to the Court and for the sole use of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, First Division and the Justices concerned.

Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First Division for
November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading "10 AC" on the left side
and what appear to be marginal notes on the right side of both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be
a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda of the First Division for November 13, 2002, with
marginal notes on the right side of pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the
resolution dated September 4, 2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to the First
Division (an internal resolution).

Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his statements taken during this executive session
were deemed under oath. Atty. Peña acceded thereto.

Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could possibly be the
source. Atty. Peña replied in the negative and added that he obtained those documents contained
in the annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his residence in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, sometime in the second or third week of January 2003; but failed to give the exact
date of his receipt. He said Annexes "B" and "C" were contained in one envelope while Annex "D"
was mailed in a separate envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court he
would do his best to locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that the
envelopes may no longer be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief
Justice that the Court would be in no position to know whether the envelopes he would later
produce would be the same envelopes he allegedly received. Atty. Peña further admitted that his
office did not stamp "Received" on the envelopes and the contents thereof; neither did he have
them recorded in a log book.

When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his motion to
inhibit when the same were coursed only through ordinary mail under unusual circumstances and
that respondent did not even bother to take note of the postal marks nor record the same in a log
book, Atty. Peña answered that he was 100% certain that those documents are authentic and he
assumed that they came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.

At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of Annexes "B",
"C" and "D", he should be willing to accept all the consequences if it turns out that there are no
such copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn out to be forged. Atty. Peña manifested
that he was willing to accept the consequences.

When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him conclude that
those photocopies are authentic, he replied in the negative, but he believed that they are official
documents of the Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of another resolution issued by the
Court when the same was faxed to him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.

Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he was not even
furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion for clarification, which was resolved. He found out that
his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners.

He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted upon even
without comment from him, and he admitted that under said circumstances, he made imputation
of bribery as a joke.

As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna
denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that
per verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiago’s copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex
"B" does not belong to any of the Justices of the First Division. It was also pointed out that each
of the Justices have their respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon.
The official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the
Court.

Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Peña and Atty. Singson to paragraphs
3 and 4 of respondent’s "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion, which contain the following allegations: "(Atty. Singson) very excitedly bragged that they
had been able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period
and the consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale.
Private respondent was aghast because by then, more than two weeks had lapsed since the
redemption period on the various properties had expired. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent (Atty. Peña) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order.
Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they
obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties involved."

For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated November 13,
2002 to Atty. Peña and expressed his belief that there was nothing wrong with it, as the resolution
was officially released and received by his office. He explained that his staff merely copied the
parties in the resolution of February 13, 2002 when the motion for clarification was prepared.
Hence, the respondent was inadvertently not sent a copy.

Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit,
reasoning that all he said was about the suspension of the redemption period which was the
subject of the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as false the allegation of Atty. Peña
that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the suspension of the redemption period
would be granted.

On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson
when on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he
has a new Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer categorically whether Atty.
Singson told him that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty. Peña could not make any candid or
forthright answer. He was evasive.

After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña consistently replied that his only source of the
documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno
Peña within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held in contempt
and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will not be able to satisfactorily explain to
Court why he made gratuitous allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its
members that tend to cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.

Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today his response
to the allegations of Atty. Peña, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondent’s motion
to inhibit.

The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m. and
resumed its regular session on the agenda.

In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT the motion
by counsel for petitioner praying that intervenor-movant Unimega Properties’ Holdings Corp. be
directed to furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion for reconsideration and intervention
and that they be granted an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file comment thereon
and require said intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days from
notice.

The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on
the motion for reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED.
(Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the Court’s Order, where he stated that:7

PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully submits the following
explanation in compliance with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March 2003:

1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a result
of the allegations he made in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s
Urgent Omnibus Motion" dated 30 January 2003. As this Honorable Court stated during
the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the Court were "perturbed" by some statements
respondent made in the motion.

2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements may have
caused the members of this Honorable Court. While such distress may have been the
unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the ponente, it was certainly not his
intended result.

3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that this
Honorable Court was most concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes
"B" and "C" of his motion (referring to the two copies of the Supplemental Agenda of the
First Division for 13 November 2002) and why respondent used those documents as basis
for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.

4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary mail at his
residence in Brgy. Ubay, Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second
week of January. The sender of the document was unknown to respondent because there
was no return address. Despite efforts to locate the envelope in which these documents
came, he was unable to do so.

5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence. Since he is often in

Manila on business, it is usually the househelp who gets to receive the mail. While he had
given instructions to be very careful in the handling of documents which arrive by
registered mail, the envelopes for Annexes "A" and "B" may have been misplaced or
disposed by the househelp because it did not bear the stamp "registered mail."

6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt their
authenticity. For why would anyone bother or go to the extent of manufacturing documents
for the benefit of someone who does not even know him? The documents contained a
detailed list of the incidents deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13 November 2002.
Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such information. Moreover, respondent
subsequently received another mail from apparently the same sender, this time containing
a pink copy of this Honorable Court’s 4 September 2002 Resolution (Annex "D", Urgent
Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to the First Division. The
receipt of this last document somehow confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the
copies of the Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of this Honorable
Court.

7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit was the
information relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their telephone conversation on 19
November 2002. As stated in respondent’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, while Atty. Singson
did not categorically claim that they had bribed the ponente to secure the 13 November
2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when respondent, in order to obtain
information, half-seriously remarked that this was the reason why the ponente had a brand
new car. Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they had to take extra-ordinary measures
to prevent the consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as the bank may again
close down. Indeed, one would normally be indignant upon being accused of bribery but
Atty. Singson even chuckled and instead justified their "extra-ordinary" efforts.

8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied admission
of bribery on the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have been sufficient basis
for a motion to inhibit. However, respondent did not have to look far for evidence. Atty.
Singson in not denying the allegation of bribery is considered an admission by silence,
under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him
the "advance copy" of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was solid
 evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain exactly when, from whom,
and how he was able to secure said advance copy. The records of this Honorable Court
disclosed that Atty. Singson’s official copy of the 13 November 2002 Resolution was sent
to him by registered mail only on 20 November 2002 (a copy of the daily mailing report is
hereto attached as Annex "A"). Why then was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19
November 2002 or a day before the resolution was released for mailing?

9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit. He only finally decided
to proceed when he received the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the
Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what Atty. Singson had earlier told him. Contrary
to the apparent impression of this Honorable Court, respondent’s motion is not primarily
anchored on anonymously received documents but on the word of petitioner’s counsel
himself. The copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative (albeit
extremely convincing) evidence.

10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the information
relayed by Atty. Singson and the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to
the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing so, respondent was compelled by a sense
of duty to inform this Honorable Court of any apparent irregularity that has come to his
knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep sense of respect.

11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to publicize the
incident and take legal action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent decided
that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable Court was the most appropriate channel to
ventilate his concerns. Respondent is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most
especially members of this Honorable Court. He had to file the Urgent Motion to Inhibit
because he sincerely believed, and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial
justice if the ponente did not recuse himself.

12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by this

Honorable Court leaked out and assures this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no
hand in securing them. Respondent just found himself in a position where he had to come
out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag that their
"extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit.
Respondent has devoted at least seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his
life and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle. Certainly, he cannot be expected
to simply raise his hands in surrender.

13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the 3 March 2003
hearing that Annex "C" of his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/"replica" of
the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73
and 81) on record with the first Division. With this, respondent rests his case. 8 (Emphasis
supplied)

On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July 2003,9
categorically denied having bragged to Atty. Peña and that he did not employ "extra efforts" to
obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court.10

After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court ordered
that a formal investigation be undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions
of Atty. Peña.11 The Court’s Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in the consolidated petitions, which
is the subject matter of this separate administrative case, reads:

On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the
ponente of the instant case. Respondent Peña attached to his Urgent Motion Annex "B", a copy
of pp. 61-62 of the First Division’s Agenda of 13 November 2002. Respondent Peña claimed that
Annex "B" bears the recommended actions, in handwritten notations, of a member of the Court
(First Division) on Item No. 175 of the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for
Clarification filed by petitioner on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex
"B" for Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution
on 13 November 2002 granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to Inhibit,
respondent Peña claimed that the Resolution of 13 November 2002 was forged because the
recommended and approved action of the Court was to simply note, and not to approve, the
Urgent Motion for Clarification.

Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:

"9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he
received sometime last week two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court had not actually granted petitioners’ Motion
for Clarification. They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this
Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT!

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda
of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from
the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente
himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners’
Motion for Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes
the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a
falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution
exists. The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the
Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as
Annexes "B" and "C".

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was
confirmatory of what Atty. Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact is
the Honorable members of this Division agreed that petitioner’s Motion for Clarification
would only be NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution
misrepresented that the same was GRANTED."

On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Peña and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for
petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine, among others, the authenticity of the annexes
to respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex "B". In the hearing, respondent
Peña affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and even manifested that he was willing to accept
the consequences if the annexes, including Annex "B", turned out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed respondent Peña that the
handwritten notations on Annex "B" did not belong to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to
whom the case was assigned and the apparent object of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to
Inhibit as the "ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution," stated that his
recommended action on Item No. 175(f) was "a & f, see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f),
see proposed resolution. In short, the handwritten notations on Annex "B", purportedly belonging
to a member of the Court, were forgeries. For ready reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2"
to this Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpio’s 13 November 2002 Agenda, and a
copy of Justice Carpio’s recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda,
respectively.

In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Peña to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt and subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to his Motion to
Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Peña did not give any explanation as to
why he attached "B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his Compliance, respondent Peña
did not mention at all Annex "B". Respondent Peña, however, stated that he "just found himself
in a position where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude
enough to brag that their ‘extra-ordinary’ efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had
bore fruit." In petitioner’s Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated that he
"categorically denied that he had bragged to PEÑA about the Resolution of this Honorable Court
dated November 13, 2002 and that extra efforts have been exerted to obtain the same."

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar Confidant to
conduct a formal investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña for submitting to the Court
a falsified document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of the confidential records of a member of
the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit that same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is directed to submit its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt
of this Resolution.12 (Emphasis supplied.)

During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Peña13 and Singson14 duly submitted their
respective Affidavits.

While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the consolidated
petitions – specifically, Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon
Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 – manifested before the Court other malicious
imputations allegedly made by Atty. Peña during the course of the proceedings in the said
petitions. They moved that these be considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for
contempt of court.15 The Court likewise referred this matter to the OBC.16

In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent Peña denied
having used abrasive, insulting and intemperate language in his pleadings; and argued that his
statements therein were privileged and could not be used as a basis for liability.17 He also
accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by
dividing themselves into separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818
and 145822) against the same Decision of the Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions
and prayers for relief.18

The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Peña and Atty. Singson appeared
and testified on matters that were the subject of the administrative cases.19 Several hearings
were also held with respect to the additional contempt charges raised by the De Leon Group.
Thereafter, respondent Peña filed his Memorandum.20

The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and made
recommendations on the matter (the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court does not
quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the OBC in administrative
investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty. Peña, despite the fact that the OBC Report
is confidential and internal, has obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally
claimed that this Court should apply to him the non-penalty of an admonition against him, as
recommended by the OBC.21

Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the consolidated
petitions22 from which this separate administrative case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the OBC report from her ponencia
in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice Carpio had given her by
allegedly recommending her to the Supreme Court.23 The specific allegation on the supposed
loyalty by one Member of the Court to another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is
too undignified to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his fears that Justice Sereno would
participate in any undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and
quote from the OBC Report the four charges of professional misconduct in connection with the
instant administrative case.

On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC found that
respondent Peña gave the impression that some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the
Court’s First Division in issuing the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. According to
respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, purportedly changed
the action of the First Division from simply "NOTING" the motion for clarification filed by Urban
Bank to "GRANTING" it altogether. The OBC opines that although respondent Peña may appear
to have been passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be
considered as malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based on what he
discovered from the internal documents of the Court that he had secured.24 Moreover, the OBC
ruled that respondent did not make a direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the
former’s remark about the latter having received a new Mercedes Benz was not made in the
presence of the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone conversation between him and
Atty. Singson.25 Respondent’s profound apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance by
the OBC, which suggests the imposition of a simple warning against any such future conduct.26

Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent supposedly
submitted falsified documents to this Court as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically
Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the agenda of the First Division on 13 November
2002 with some handwritten notes.27 It reasoned that the submission of falsified documents
partakes of the nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
but respondent Peña is not being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The OBC
noted the statement of the Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session that Annex
"B" does not exist in the records.28

On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall,
respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where he allegedly charged Atty.
Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena to gain a favorable resolution
to the benefit of his clients.29 The OBC suggests that respondent be acquitted of the charge of
using abrasive and disrespectful language against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers,
but nevertheless recommends that respondent be advised to refrain from using unnecessary
words or statements in the future.30

Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled
by respondent Peña against Urban Bank and the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit,
respondent accused the bank and its directors and officers of having violated the rule against
forum-shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to question
the unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals.31 However, since not all the parties to the
consolidated petitions participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that
separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank
and all of the concerned directors and officers, including their respective counsel, to defend
themselves and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their cause.32

Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following recommendations for
approval of this Court:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the following:

A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:

1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in his Motion
to Inhibit, etc., do not constitute malicious imputations as he was merely
expressing his concern of what he has discovered based on the documents
he has obtained. However, let this case serve as his FIRST WARNING,
being an officer of the court, to be more cautious, restraint and circumspect
with his dealings in the future with the Court and its Member.

2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and unfounded

joke against Honorable Justice Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due
respect and courtesy from no less than the member of the bar. Likewise,
Atty. Singson should also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing
with his opposing counsel to avoid misconception of facts.

B. On the charge of falsification:

1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on ground of

lack of legal basis. A charge of submitting falsified documents partakes of
the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of the Revised penal Code, and
the quantum of proof required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This is to avoid conflicting findings in the criminal
case. The administrative proceedings of the same act must await of the
outcome in the criminal case of falsification of document.

C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:

 1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited by Atty.
Peña in his pleadings previously filed in related cases, while it may appear
to be offending on the part of the complainant, but the same do not
categorically contain disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or
intemperate words that may tend to discredit the name of the complainant.
Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own knowledge and
discoveries which, to him, warranted to be brought to the attention of the
court for its information and consideration. He must be ADVISED however,
to refrain from using unnecessary words and statements which may not be
material in the resolution of the issued raised therein.

D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping

1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as embodied in

the Comment dated 22 August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a separate
administrative case against the petitioners and counsels in G.R. 145817,
G.R. No. 145818 and G.R. No. 145822;

2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said

comment dated 22 August 2003 for their information.

3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ &

ASSOCIATES, represented by ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA
ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ represented by ATTY.
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and
ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.33 (Emphasis supplied)

ISSUES

In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Court’s consideration are limited to the
following:

(a) whether respondent Peña made gratuitous allegations and imputations against
members of the Court;

(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly "falsified
documents" consisting of internal documents of the court;

(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges
leveled against him in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and

(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of forum
shopping.

OUR RULING

A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing against a
Member of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.

Respondent Peña is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and
wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his
statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling
effectively the same imputations in his subsequent pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a
Member of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and judicial officers.34 They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the court35 and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.36

While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of foul and abusive language.37 Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.38 A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.39

In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña insinuated that the then ponente of the case
had been "bribed" by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light
of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, suspending the period of redemption of the
levied properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:

4. Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending
incident with this Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could
not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about
bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother
to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not
afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank
Plaza in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.40
(Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court, respondent Peña
explained that his reference to the bribe was merely a "joke" in the course of a telephone
conversation between lawyers:

CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:

Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on [sic] when you made mention earlier of him
saying about Justice Carpio?

ATTY. SINGSON:

Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh."

CHIEF JUSTICE:
He said to you that?

ATTY. SINGSON:

Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. PEÑA:

First of all I would like to … everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got a stay order,
it is a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and then I gave that joke. That
was just a joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you see, he was the one who told me
they got a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio, that was what happened
…

CHIEF JUSTICE:

You mean you made a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

You Honor?

CHIEF JUSTICE;

You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)

ATTY. PEÑA:

He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.

CHIEF JUSTICE:

And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.

CHIEF JUSTICE;

That is correct, you are making it as a joke?

ATTY. PEÑA:

Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)

CHIEF JUSTICE:

If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice
Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is that also another joke?41 (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated petitions with
respect to the issuance of the 13 November 2003 Resolution. To respondent’s mind and based
on his interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which he anonymously received, the First
Division agreed only to simply note Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the
questioned Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the
Motion. Hence, respondent Peña attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to
simply "note" the Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent Peña, to Justice Carpio, who
had supposedly received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.

However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has
his own respective copy of the Agenda, where he can make his own handwritten notations on the
action for each item and case, but "[t]he official actions of the Court are contained in the duly
approved minutes and resolutions of the Court."42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by
respondent Peña, Justice Carpio had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban
Bank’s Motion for Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved
resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present. The ponente of the case had not
recommended that the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred to a
separate resolution, i.e., "a) & f) – See RES.," disposing of the said item (F) including item (A),
which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official
minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session,43 Justice Carpio submitted for the record his written
recommendation on the agenda item involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this was
his recommendation, and the minutes confirm the approval of this recommendation.44

The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had indeed
adopted the recommended and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and
granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is completely wrong for respondent
Peña to claim that the action had been issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on record,
and hence was done so with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to
immediately justify the imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member
of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of
bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave
accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by parties, much less by
counsel in pleadings or motions. These suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or
reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions as well.45

Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between Urban Bank’s
failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him an opportunity
to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt means by which the unfavorable
Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply
confined the issue to an alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any
controversy regarding his conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of
notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the bank in the consolidated petitions could have been
raised as a valid concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña insinuates ill motives
on the part of Members of the Court imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice
to be, in effect, a failure of the Court. This merits the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers
over him as a member of the Bar. To allege that bribery has been committed by members of the
judiciary, a complainant – especially, a lawyer – must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations,
insinuations or even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.

Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent
Peña appears to have been caught by surprise by his telephone conversation with Atty. Singson,
who informed him of the suspension of the redemption period by the Court and its issuance of a
Stay Order over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment of respondent would seem
natural, since he was caught unawares of Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification, which was the
subject matter of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself initiated
and made without provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it suggested that the bank had
obtained the Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.

Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the
reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as
basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating the veracity of Atty. Singson’s
revelations, respondent read too much into the declarations and the purported silence of opposing
counsel towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific
Member of the Court. Such conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls
utterly short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its dignity.

Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio,
Atty. Singson and the petitioners was a "joke" fails to convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious
about the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged insinuation of ill motives was
just a "joke" between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone conversation regarding the
case. Although the courts and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to
criticisms nor are they beyond the subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a
private conversation between two individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was
responsible for moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing that same
"joke" in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this Court. In general, courts will not act as overly
sensitive censors of all private conversations of lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to
the duty to afford proper respect and deference to the former. Nevertheless, this Court will not
shy away from exercising its disciplinary powers whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial
officers and bring such imputations themselves to the court’s attention through their own
pleadings or motions.

Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest, respondent has
never backed down since he first made the accusation in January 2003 and continually raises as
an issue in the consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio purportedly changed the agreed action
of the First Division when he issued the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even after the
Court in the 03 March 2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety
had attended the issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21 January
201046 and 22 August 2011,47 he repeatedly insists on the "anomalous/unusual circumstances"
surrounding the issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which was
allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he received.
Respondent Peña most recently capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly
committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics complaint against the latter, where he alleged that:

Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division
of this Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting "10AC" on the left side and marginal notes
on the right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this Honorable Court took up the matter of
the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this Honorable Court merely "N" or "Noted"
the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required
to comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to
secure an advance copy of the assailed 13 November 2002 Resolution), the matter brought out
in the Executive Session and the admission made by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable
Hilario Davide and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda
– 1st Division of this Honorable Court which was sent to respondent Peña was correct and that
the Motion for Clarification was merely "N" or "NOTED". However, the Honorable Justice Carpio
issued a Resolution "Granting" the Motion for Clarification.

Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002 Resolution in an
anomalous/falsified manner and in clear contravention of this Honorable Court’s Decision to
merely "Note" the same. A clear judicial administrative violation.48 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better of him.
Respondent has convinced himself of the veracity of his own malicious insinuations by his own
repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.

The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in the
presence of mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of
remorse.49 In this case, the "profound" apologies50 offered by respondent Peña for his
insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as seen by his later actions.
Although he expressed remorse for having caused the Court distress because of his
statements,51 he refuses to acknowledge any unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded
accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even
after the latter had recused himself from the case since 2003.

This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious attacks
against the integrity and impartiality of Members of this Court. Earlier in the proceedings of the
consolidated petitions, respondent assailed how retired Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias in
favor of the De Leon Group, when the latter’s petition in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a
second motion for reconsideration:52

It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioner’s counsel has
been making statement to the effect that they could get a favorable resolution from the Supreme
Court, on their second motion for reconsideration. In short, petitioners’ counsel is practically
saying that they are sure to get the Supreme Court to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration even if it violates the rules.53

1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he who penned
the challenged Resolution, which granted the second motion for reconsideration in violation of the
Rules. It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized the said Resolution. It was he who tried to
justify the violation of the Rules. It was from Justice Buena’s office that contents of the challenged
Resolution was apparently "leaked" to the petitioners’ counsel long before its promulgation.54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are herein
petitioners "very special" in the eyes of Justice Buena?55

It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his relationship with
Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-described facts and circumstances.56

Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the petition without any
explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. This was highly irregular by itself. But what made reinstatement more suspicious was
the fact that even before the release of the Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No. 145822,
the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to
reinstate their petition. Obviously, even before the release of the Resolution in question, Atty.
Vinluan already knew what Justice Buena’s resolution would be.57 (Emphasis supplied.)

In no less than six motions,58 he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
of prejudice based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and
officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed that Justice Panganiban went to
Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and officers, who consulted him on the legal issues
arising from criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed
"reliable source":

The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban Bank’s Arsenio
‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’ Borlongan) went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter
of fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or
Ted, before the bank’s closure. Respondent has also discovered, through a reliable source, that
Justice Panganiban was known to have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by
Borlongan and Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled cases, while the same was still
pending with the Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4) criminal cases filed the with
the MTC [Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against Borlongan, et al., for
"introducing falsified documents in a judicial proceeding". In the latter cases, it was even Justice
Panganiban who furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own ponencia)
to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his friends a legal basis in questioning the
issuance of the warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1
below).59 (Emphasis supplied.)

Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of "unmitigated partiality" against retired Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the latter resolved a separate case involving related
issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing parties:

3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled "Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M.

Peña, et al", are also the same petitioners in the above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos.
145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No.
162562. Under the circumstances, herein private respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the
extreme bias and prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly
be carried over to the above-entitled consolidated cases.60 (Emphasis supplied.)

Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of
bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical
tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court.61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior
can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating
circumstances. Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions
against judicial officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,62 the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when
the latter imputed devious motives and questioned the impartiality of members of the Court,
despite its earlier warnings:

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone
against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court,
but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial
system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded
in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot
be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. To be sure,
Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice of law after showing sincere remorse
and having renewed his belief and respect for the Court, almost eight years from the time the
penalty was imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Peña be indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law for his apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives
and partiality against members of the Court.

B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.

We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.

It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003,
expressed administrative concern over Atty. Peña’s behavior on three points: (1) his submission
of a falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court documents that are highly restricted
and confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.

Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex "B," had illegal access to
confidential court documents, and made improper use of them in the proceedings before this
Court. The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC based on the charge that respondent
Peña had submitted a falsified document to this Court.63 The charge of falsification stems from
his submission of an alleged copy of the Court’s Agenda64 (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to
a member of the Division handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit
reads:

10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official Agenda of the
First Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned
Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office of two
different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it is clearly
indicated that the members of the Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to
what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was released to
the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the
First Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists.
The real Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely
NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".65
(Emphasis supplied.)

During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña expressed his absolute
conviction that the document attached as Annex "B" was an exact copy of the Agenda of the then
ponente of the case.66 It was later discovered, however, that no such copy existed, either in the
latter’s records or in those of any other member of the Division concerned:

CHIEF JUSTICE:

We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was confirmed by the Office of
the Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that does not appear in the record, is not in
the record and that nobody, none of the members of the division has a copy of, that copy of Annex
B of your pleading does not come from anyone of the members of the division. That is the position
of the Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B,
specifically with that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his office, was not
based on the document in his office and that is also true to each of the members of this Division.67
(Emphasis supplied.)

The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña
submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was
a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent
misled the Court by presenting a document that was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the
assurances made in the same motion68 he made allegations that were false and submitted
documents that were not borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents
of Annex "B," which came to him through dubious means, he unquestioningly accepted their
genuineness and veracity. Despite the Court’s own explanation that Annex "B" does not exist, he
continues to insist on its existence.

Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the
legal profession.69 Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.70 As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform
the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions.71 Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them.72 In the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a
copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the
ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.

Respondent Peña would argue, however, that falsification – as a criminal act under the Revised
Penal Code – was not judicially established during the proceedings of the OBC investigation and,
thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison of the present administrative and
disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of falsification is misplaced.

The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is administrative

liability for the submission of a falsified document – namely Annex "B," which respondent Peña
claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of the ponente. The issue, then, is
whether he transgressed the ethical standards demanded of lawyers, by which they should be
truthful in their dealings with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not
include the determination of criminal liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with
respect to the use of falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes no definitive
pronouncement as to the guilt of respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the use of falsified documents.

In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of
the ponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported
copy was later found to have been inexistent in the court’s records. Regardless of whether or not
Annex "B" was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What is now
crucial is whether respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect
to the genuineness and authenticity of his submissions.

The assertion of respondent Peña that the typewritten contents of Annexes "B" and "C" appear
to be genuine and accurate is unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from liability. Although
Annex "C" was determined to be in the Court’s records,73 the bare similarity of its typewritten
contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him from disciplinary action. Although the
typewritten contents of the two Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the
right-hand side are different. Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from
two different members of the Division, one of them the then ponente of the case.

The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks – not on the
printed contents – which are allegedly contrary to the substance of the Court’s 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent Peña cannot claim the genuineness of
Annex "B" (which is not in the records), based on the apparent identity of its printed contents with
those of Annex "C" (which is in the records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and,
according to him, made by two different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent
failed to substantiate his assertion that Annex "B" and the notes made therein belonged to any
member of this Court.

More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Peña has not explained, to the Court’s
satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and confidential documents.

Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two copies of the
Agenda (Annexes "B" and "C") and the internal Resolution (Annex "D") in two separate envelopes
anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received them sometime during the second
or the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.74
He, however, failed to present the envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these
may have already been thrown away, since he had no system of recording incoming
communications in his home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his account of
the receipt of these restricted court documents.

The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex "D"), are internal
documents that are accessible only to court officers,75 who are bound by strict confidentiality. For
respondent Peña to have been able to secure originals or photocopies of the Court’s Agenda is
disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules of strict confidentiality in the Court.
Notably, the Agenda purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the
Court’s First Division for that day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his
pending case. This circumstance can hardly be considered as random, since the exact item (Item
No. 175) of concern for him – specifically, the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification –was what had been sent directly to his provincial home/office, and what he
conveniently acquired thereby.

The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally and
anonymously appeared in the provincial home/office of respondent Peña through ordinary mail.
Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that contained the documents, and that could
have led to the identification of their source were opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite
the grave importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the
Court would breach the rules of strict confidentiality76 to send to litigants or their counsel the
Court’s Agenda, together with handwritten notes and the internal resolutions of the Court, without
any prodding or consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and administrative
penalties.77 Respondent Peña’s account of having lost the envelopes appears too convenient an
excuse to assuage the Court’s skepticism towards this breach of confidentiality within its own
halls.

Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued access – as recent as 2010 – to other internal
and confidential records in the proceedings of this case. Despite the administrative proceedings
leveled against him for having "illicitly" obtained the confidential Agenda of the Court’s First
Division, he brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by surreptiously acquiring no less
than the confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he
himself is the subject.

In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010,78 respondent Peña prayed that the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in
its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he had mysteriously received. In support of this
motion, he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the confidential OBC Report.79 This OBC
Report has not been released to any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this
Court. Curiously, the attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of
the signed OBC Report, as it actually appears in the rollo of the administrative case.80
Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy
thereof.

Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report from the
Court’s own records already speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court
will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an administrative case for obtaining
confidential court records, he continued to have access to other internal documents of the Court.
His actions have established that he is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued
obstinacy in disregarding ethical standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records
deserves nothing less than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the profession.

Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña even tried to bolster his claim that the
then ponente of the case had a special interest in the case by attaching an internal resolution of
the Court.81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, the two consolidated
petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred from the Third Division to the First
Division, where Justice Carpio was subsequently assigned.82 How respondent Peña was again
able to secure this internal document is another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since
the resolution was sent by the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of Court,
the Raffle Committee and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of the parties. Similar
to the copies of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent Peña again purportedly received this
Internal Resolution by mail.83 What is more alarming in this instance is that he received not just
any photocopy of the Court’s Resolution, but a pink copy itself, the very same material used for
such internal resolutions in the Court’s records. As he himself admitted, respondent Peña could
not have gotten hold of the said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal
matter, without the assistance of a person who had access to the records of his case in the Court.

This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by respondent in
the subject Motion to Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding of the internal rules of the
Court.

Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement of other
Justices, the cases already assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to be transferred to the
Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves.84 Hence, in this case, Justice Carpio, similar to
other members of the Court at that time, did not lose his case assignments but brought them with
him when he transferred to the First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the
new Division are made by request from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of
the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a Division in which he is no longer
a member. Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is being
heavily criticized by respondent Peña was simple compliance with the established internal
procedures of the Court, and not attributable to any undue interest or malicious intention on the
part of the then ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent had raised "irresponsible
suspicions"85 against the integrity of the ponente without any understanding of the Supreme
Court’s processes in the transfer of cases.

Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court
records to call for the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of
Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired Justice violated the rules with respect to
a second motion for reconsideration when the latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group
in G.R. No. 145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to
his supposed association with the De Leon Group’s counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA
Law Office. To establish this special treatment, he attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by the Court due to failure to
pay the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:

10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several months alone,
seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the
required fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED upon the filing of a SECOND
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena willingly disregarded the Rules by
reinstating petitioners’ petition (De Leon Group Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in
order to be fair. At the very least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that
he is not biased in favor of herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however, because
those cases are not favored ones. Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well as the
resolutions dismissing the aforesaid seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached
hereto collectively as Annex "A".87

Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the Court’s
Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February
2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July 2001,
08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24
September 2001, 08 October 2001 and others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed
to specific cases which were dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It
was unclear if the cases were specifically assigned to Justice Buena or if respondent Peña
represented any of the parties therein.

Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to
other cases, which specifically dismissed or denied petitions on the failure of the parties to pay
necessary fees. This could not have just been mere coincidence again since it required some
legal understanding and familiarity with the cases in order to be able to sift through and identify
the kinds of cases, which were dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to
these cases were notified and given copies of the Court’s resolutions, what respondent Peña
obtained were the actual copies of the Minutes that included other items in the Court’s Agenda
and that were not released to the public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules, only the Minutes
pertinent to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties concerned.88 Yet, respondent
was able to attach wholesale Minutes of dozens of cases to his pleading.

Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent – totaling 58 pages
in all – are not the subject of the investigation of the administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 confirm in no uncertain terms his access
to internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but of other pending cases and that this
access has continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Peña would accuse
his fellow lawyers of allegedly having an "inside track" to members of the Court, when he in turn,
on record, had mysteriously easy access to confidential court documents. That internal
documents of the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise) would
suddenly find themselves in the hands of respondent Peña through registered mail is too
incredible for this Court to attribute any good faith on his part.

Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how respondent
Peña came upon these internal documents, it looks with disapproval upon his actions with respect
to those documents, which were supposedly sent to him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were
sent official judicial records that are confidential in nature and not easily accessible, the ethical
recourse for them would be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court
concerned for proper investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact,
respondent himself acknowledged that reporting the "leaked out" documents was a duty he owed
to the Court89 – more so in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously and through
dubious circumstances.

No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of the legal
profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of the "leaked" court documents, and nothing
more. Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the suspicious circumstances of his having
obtained confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to use the documents sent through
suspicious means to support his request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better
than to hinge his motions and pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even
verifying the authenticity of the contents by comparing them with sources of greater reliability and
credibility.

If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Division’s actions with respect to
the pending incidents in his case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him,
then he should have simply checked the records to verify the genuineness of the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is through officially released
resolutions and decisions that parties and their counsel are informed of and guided by the Court’s
actions on pending incidents, and not by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual
members of the Court. Respondent’s wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda purported to be
those of individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.

The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon
action of the Division and the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the
assertions of respondent Peña. He grounded the subject Motion to Inhibit on the fact that the
anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban
Bank should simply be noted,90 but it was instead granted by the Court. The Court, however,
made clear during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about
annotating the first item with "SEE RES" (See Resolution) and marking the rest of the incidents
with "N" (Noted). In fact, these annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted by
the ponente for that particular item.91 The Resolution identified in the first item governs and
contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents in the pending case.92 To be sure, what
governs as the final action of the Court en banc or in Division is the minutes of the proceedings,93
which lists the dispositions of the items taken up during the session, reviewed by the members,
and finally approved by the Chief Justice or the Division chairperson. Contrary to respondent’s
suspicions, the action taken by the Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately
reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court.

Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but himself, since he "allegedly," blindly and
mistakenly relied on "anonymously sent" unverified photocopies of the Court’s Agenda, in order
to support his call for the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he rely on the alleged
"bragging" of Atty. Singson – which the latter denies – to impute ill motive to judicial officers.
Whether Atty. Singson actually exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the suspension Order or
freely divulged it in their telephone conversation, respondent should have been more circumspect
in making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly or not) without any extrinsic evidence or proof to
back up his claim.

Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and
documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal
court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Peña
that this Court’s confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling into
respondent’s lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer
be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal
rules have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Peña
now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him.
It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to
the Revised Penal Code94 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Peña
benefitting from the same.95 Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment.

This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition of an indefinite
suspension. If taken together, these two violations already speak of respondent Peña’s inherent
unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although an indefinite suspension opens up the
possibility of future reinstatement after a clear showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in
the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the
compassion of the Court. Not only has respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the
persons occupying the Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery and wrongdoing, he has
also showed disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of
illegal access to internal Supreme Court documents.

C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion between members
of the Court and another counsel.

Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Pena’s allegations of collusion between
previous members of the Court and the counsel for the De Leon Group are unfounded and
contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his fellow lawyers. His actions reveal
a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and administratively punishable.

However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Peña,
the Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule on the third charge, as any possible
administrative liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.

D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of the present
allegations of administrative misconduct.

The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Peña against petitioners
and their respective counsel in his defense.96 However, this is already beyond the scope of the
subject matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled that he assailed the fact that Urban
Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R.
Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the
rulings of the appellate court affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.

Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other interested
parties did not participate in the investigation conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity
dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and
all parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.

The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or hearing
of separate administrative complaints97 against petitioners Urban Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa,
Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric
L. Lee, and their respective counsel of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro C.
Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be included in any future administrative action in
relation to these matters. On the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by
respondent Peña and therefore, is not a real and direct party to the case.

EPILOGUE

As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peña’s actions
in the administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy
in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the public and the Bar.

Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional
colleagues.98 They shall not, in their professional dealings, use language that is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.99 Lawyers shall use dignified language in their pleadings despite
the adversarial nature of our legal system.100 The use of intemperate language and unkind
ascriptions has no place in the dignity of a judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their
cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or
even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the
Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are
charged.102

It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent Peña has manifested a troubling history
of praying for the inhibition of several members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to
another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded accusations of partiality. A sampling
of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent
bid to shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:

1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;

2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;

3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;

4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;

5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;

6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;

7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;

8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;

9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;

10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;

11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);

12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;

13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T.
Carpio) dated 02 June 2008;

14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;

15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales
and Dante O. Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;

16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and
Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
 17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;

18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;

19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A.
Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;

20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and

21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose
Perez and Sereno).

The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and
sparse relations between the parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality
on mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent accused former Chief Justice
Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro
Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer.103 He moved for the inhibition
of Justice Sereno on the ground that she was "a close judicial ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn,
the latter, according to respondent, was antagonistic toward him during the Court’s 03 March 2003
Executive Session in this administrative case.104

Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Court’s Third Division
because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court
through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of
the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former President Fidel V. Ramos.105 He similarly
sought the inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with
former President Ramos.106 He likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion,
considering he is a law school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
who was then Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to
respondent Peña, "President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his
influence over the Honorable Justice Brion."107

Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban
Bank because of his decision in a related case108 and his prior appointment as Undersecretary
of Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent Peña impliedly prayed that his case be
specifically retained in the Court’s Third Division.109 Respondent’s peculiar request, which was
not included in his other motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura
inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division.
If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias against Justice Nachura alone, then it would
not matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member being
designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether. Respondent
Peña’s odd prayer in his motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he
perceived to be friendly to him, except for one member.

In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned against litigants’ contumacious practice in
successively asking for the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and
sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution
worthy of public trust and confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that
unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More
so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on
the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’
apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and
sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.

As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not
always be heeded. It is not always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain
cases to their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an instrument whereby a party
could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition
and re-raffle filed by respondent Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in
no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice, most especially in the highest tribunal of
the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons why this administrative case has
dragged on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court,
but it likewise delays the administration of justice.

Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving
the case than about making sure that the "wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices – in his perception – do
not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted interruptions caused by his
numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case languishing in this Court for
years and clogging its dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be
made an example so that litigants be reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of
procedure to favor their causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the rules of basic
courtesy in imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Peña has violated several canons of
professional and ethical conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His
conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action – in this Court, no less –
tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded
accusations against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to
obtain confidential and internal court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in
furtherance of his cause.

In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for
the inhibition of Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse
or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed in these proceedings that he has
fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be sanctioned
accordingly.1âwphi1

PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peña’s personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure
copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First
Division, attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal
Resolution dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex "D" of the same motion; (c) the Report
and Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant,
attached as Annex "5" of respondent Peña’s Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010;
and (d) the Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to
Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by
respondent Peña. She is further required to SUBMIT such an investigation report with
recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court personnel
possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting confidential and internal court
documents of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for
Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a
comment on the instant complaint.

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the
Court's Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint
against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion7 praying that respondent's
failure to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the
case be submitted for disposition.

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative
case was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against
Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show
Cause Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B
Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of
Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.

Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to
him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00
to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death
threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint
and be given time to file his answer to the complaint.

In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No.
2167.9

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt
of the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy
of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed
to furnish him a copy of the complaint.

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig
asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate
the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing
stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in
Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated
July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order
dated May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry
Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct
and present address of respondent.15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City
as his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned
with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao, Quezon City."16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City.17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May
16, 2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of
₱1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not
paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing
the comment required thereon.18

In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty.
Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST
and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b)
SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.20

However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be
located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao,
Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given
address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's
whereabouts, the warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several
notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of
the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and
recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.

On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.

RULING

A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence,
an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to
answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial

evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the
certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil
Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine,
Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of
the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan,
Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that
the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which
is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted
the second marriage with Alba.

The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
are admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by
respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondent’s defiant
stance against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring
him to file his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of
more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but
respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just
ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the
complaint against him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to
have not received a copy of the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against
him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped
respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending
before this Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.

The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this
case; accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a
copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of
service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses
of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter,
however conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse
seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondent’s
acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of
the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is
respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high
degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only
too deserving of reproof."26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy
of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the
practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,

SORSOGON CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a
law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases
against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the
complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for
the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-
6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1
Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca
also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC
"[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter
does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14,
2007,3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments
of counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts
in this province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on
his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this
Presiding Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This
is why he should not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings
in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of
a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical
practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED.
Relative to the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar
dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of
Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William
Arsenault is likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty.
Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required
Atty. Dealca to submit his comment.5

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February
14, 2007 order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to
due process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on
the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued against the accused; and that it should
be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary
for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid
and Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51,
Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph
H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to
him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation:10

xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca
filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm.
Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-
RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of
the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the complainants against court
officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that
respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid
& Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers
of the court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter
members that was adverse to the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused
[sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable
action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of
Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion
Publiciana and Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez.
OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph
D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge
Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph
H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this
ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403
entitled "Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation
and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided
and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending
before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the
judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT
dated March 7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA
ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No.
6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board
ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of
the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs.
Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated
Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in
Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by
Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides
for the dismissal of the cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the
respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the verified complaint is one executed by the
wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and
personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation against
respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of
his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank
of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary evidence from (a)
to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of the bar in
resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules
of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a

penalty of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the
decision be ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation11
finding Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that
Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit
Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation
and dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge
Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for
reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge
Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

I

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against
judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was
duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
personnel.15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of
vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving
court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or
self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise.
It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious
scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating
it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment,
considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against
judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from
decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was
thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a
substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim
of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof
by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18
The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration
of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis
clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against
his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and
uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them
from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper
administration of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must
nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative
and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any
good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could
not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious
time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity
to confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring
judges and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of
the case.23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated
in frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his
cause now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to
the Court.The minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the
Court.24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a
minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its
findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then
constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or
itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and
conclusions of the court a quo.26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the
Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees
them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised
are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and
is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records
that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance
with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal
basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.),
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section
14,29 Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that
resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold
that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision."
It pointed out that the constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision,
i.e., given due course to and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but
not where the petition was being refused due course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating
the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the petition and the
subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his
motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However,
IBP Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the
motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was
bereft of factual and legal bases.32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal
causes for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved upon them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon
them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently
state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
haveno materiality to the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the
courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned,
he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases
handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly
insinuated that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in
which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if
true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only
Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could
have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge
who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the
case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression.
Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular
trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge
Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would
undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear
or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such,
Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule
11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to
be ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39
we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more
severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend
Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS
and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03
and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING
that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts
in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014

[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]

AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a complain for disbarment1 on grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and
dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos (Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos
(Aida), and their children, Alistair R. Campos (Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).

Antecedents

Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.

In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a 936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos. Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a
title in Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student without an income and a capacity to buy the
property. In 2006, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28258 covering the property was issued
in Alistair’s name. Meanwhile, Alistair got married and his wife and child likewise resided in
Eliseo’s house until 2008.2

On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Branch 7, a Petition3 for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida
are psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. He claimed that
during the first few days of their marriage, he realized that he finds no gratification in engaging in
sexual intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a homosexual. He also averred that Aida
experienced severe pain when she delivered Alistair. Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to
bear children. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to Aida.

On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an Affidavit of Loss4 wherein he represented himself
as the owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost
the owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his files. On September 15, 2008, he caused
the annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds
of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and
likewise inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted Eliseo’s representations.
On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury8 against Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of
OCT No. P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such fact, but he still deliberately
and maliciously asserted a falsehood.

In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole owner of the property covered by
OCT No. P-28258. Eliseo continued:

That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be registered in the name of [Alistair], who
was still single, as I have some other properties (land) under my name;

That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a sister;

That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;

That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is now pending before the [RTC] of
Bayugan, I offered to my wife as a settlement to have our properties settled. One of [these
properties] is this lot, which I asked to be sold and its proceeds be divided between us. I have
learned that my wife refused to have that property sold claiming that I could not sell the house
and lot as it is in the name of our son, herein complainant Alistair R. Campos;

xxxx

That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the
Lot has long been in his actual, physical and personal possession, is utterly false, as the title was
previously in our possession in our files as the property is undersigned's own exclusive property.
xxx

That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to apply for a loan making the title of
the lot as collateral, I decided to file a petition for cancellation of the title under my son's name
Alistair R. Campos, and asked Mrs. Azucena A. Ortiz, to get a certified copy of the title from the
Register of Deeds to be used in the filing of a petition for cancellation of the title in my son’s name;

That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the Register of Deeds, that I have to execute
an affidavit of loss so that I can be given a certified copy. Since the title is not in my possession
after I left my residence and I cannot find it from my files, I let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of
loss and I signed it. I have also instructed her to [cause the annotation of the affidavit on the
certificate of title] to protect my interest as the real owner of the lot, to counter or stop my wife and
son from using the titles as collateral of a loan;

x x x x.10

Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of
probable cause Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo.11 The resolution, which dismissed
the complaint, in part, reads:

"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought was missing and could not be found
in his files, he did the proper actions to protect his rights thereto by executing an Affidavit of Loss.
x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a loan using the title as collateral
without his consent and to protect his right as owner of the property, he went to the Register of
Deeds to cancel his son’s ownership over the lot in question with the intent to revert back its
ownership in his name. However, when asked to produce a copy of its duplicate original, [Eliseo]
could not present the same as it was already lost and could not be retrieved from his files. To
prove its loss, an Affidavit of Loss was executed by [Eliseo] attesting to the fact of its unavailability.

x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo]
in executing the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt assertion of falsehood since there was a firm
belief that indeed, the title is not anymore found in his files. It could not be located and the title is
kept by [Alistair] who took sides with [Aida] who has plans to enjoy the benefits from the title using
it as a collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful
to Eliseo, the former could have informed the latter of the] whereabouts of the title and could have
sought permission from his father when he took the copy of the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not
informing [Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such Affidavit and neither can he be found
guilty of perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the same. x x x."12 (Citation omitted)

On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint13 for Legal Separation, Support and Separation of
Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a
homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect, contradicted the said confession when he admitted to
Alistair and Charmaine that he was then intimately involved with another woman. Aida likewise
claimed that Eliseo is temperamental and had stopped giving support to their family.

On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) an administrative complaint14 for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against
Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter conducted.

Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned administrative complaint against Eliseo, he

resigned from his judicial post on July 1, 2009.15

On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge
Casals) called the parties for a conference in his chamber. A scuffle ensued inside the chamber.
The police blotter filed promptly after the incident indicated that Eliseo choked Charmaine and
attempted to box but failed to hit Alistair.16

On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed the instant complaint for disbarment17 against
Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct
in (a) causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently
misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258; (c) falsely
declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that the owner’s
copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title is with Alistair; (d)
stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit admitting
to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and (e) choking and boxing
his children on September 14, 2009.

After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he
interposed the following defenses: (a) the complainants are engaged in forum shopping in view
of pending administrative and civil cases in all of which the issues of immorality and homosexuality
have already been raised;21 (b) the complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a consequence
of his refusal to provide a monthly support of Php60,000.00 to his wife and children;22 (c) he has
no extra-marital relation but he once told Alistair and Charmaine in jest that due to Aida’s infidelity,
he intends to live separately with another woman who may be more caring and loving than his
wife;23 and (d) to protect his rights and prevent the complainants from using as a collateral for a
loan the house and lot covered by OCT No. P-28258, he executed the Affidavit of Loss on
September 10, 2008 as a pre-requisite to his filing of an action in court for the registration of the
property in his name.24 Further, Eliseo refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the
scuffle which occurred on September 14, 2009 inside the chamber of the judge hearing the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. Eliseo insists that if Alistair and Charmaine’s claims
were true, they could have presented independent witnesses to corroborate their version of the
incident, and medical certificates to prove that they indeed sustained injuries. What follows is
Eliseo’s account of what had transpired:

[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the judge called the parties to his
chamber for a conference. [Aida] however was reluctant to go unless her children would join her.
The judge then called all of them to the chamber. Once there, the Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s]
proposal for settlement. While [Eliseo] was explaining to the judge, [Charmaine] reacted by raising
her voice uttering unprintable words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] requested her to calm down reminding
her that they were still in court. But she continued her tirade at [Eliseo] with greater intensity even
calling him a bad father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine had already been ejected
by the judge out of the court for lack of decorum and respect. The order for her removal arose
after she interrupted the court several times by shouting at [Eliseo]. When she was already outside
the court premises, she was even heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying that [Eliseo] should
watch out after the hearing as she was going to attack him. The prior incident (where she was
thrown out of court) made her angrier in the chamber. So when she continued with her unpleasant
and scandalous utterances by again interrupting [Eliseo] who was asked by the judge to talk about
his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo] walked to her and held her by her shoulder to put some sense
to her that she really had to calm down out of respect [for] the judge. There was no choking of
Charmaine. But, this sight of holding Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed differently by
[Alistair] who flung with force and recklessness a bag containing an unknown hard object to
[Eliseo]. [Eliseo] was hit and in pain. At this point, Charmaine suddenly held [Eliseo] from behind
so he could not defend himself from the onslaught of Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him.
[Eliseo] was forced to elbow Charmaine to break free from her hold. There was a brief exchange
of punches between Alistair and [Eliseo] before the Presiding Judge broke the fray. This incident
could not have happened if not for Charmaine’s own misdemeanor and initial provocation.25

Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener
Sansaet came to represent them. Eliseo appeared on his own behalf, with Atty. Alex Bacarro as
collaborating counsel.

During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations against him of (a) immorality and
psychological incapacity in having extra-marital affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in the
execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved anymore in the instant disbarment
complaint since they are already the subjects of other pending cases.26 He also expressed his
doubt that Alistair is his biological son.27 He also alleged that Aida, who had served for three
terms as a Provincial Board Member, had a lover, who was likewise a political figure.28 Aida
harbored the impression that Eliseo’s filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
caused the downfall of the former’s political career.29

The Report and Recommendation of the CBD

On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted
his Report and Recommendation30 to the IBP Board of Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr.
recommended the dismissal of the instant disbarment complaint against Eliseo for lack of
evidence. Commissioner Din, Jr. ratiocinated that:

The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not [Eliseo] committed serious misconduct
sufficient to cause his disbarment. The determination of [Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the
following: 1. whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest with regards to the statements he made in his
Petition for Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not [Eliseo] is guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether
or not the statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss concerning the certificate of title of the
Campos’ property were untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo] choked his daughter, Charmaine,
during the amicable settlement of the annulment case in the (sic) Judge Casal’s (sic) chambers.

The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or serious misconduct has been defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful and flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination
of a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or intentional
purpose (Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).

As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct has been held to be "a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification
for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty.
Paita-Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008).

In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral
character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification
for all members of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, August 20, 2008).

In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of [Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the
incongruence of his homosexuality and the extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for
annulment compared with the complainants’ allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that he has a
mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite
knowledge of the fact that the certificate of title was with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of
the subject property taken on their own is a valid ground to find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.

However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and every single allegation of the complainants
making the case at fore a battle of opposing narration of facts.

More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the complainants are insufficient to prove
their claim beyond the degree of evidence required of them by law to satisfy and overcome.
Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is upon the complainant and the Court
will exercise the disciplinary power only if the former establishes the case by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence."

xxxx

In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the complaint, no other evidence was presented
by the complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the statements made in the complaint, no
other corroborative or collaborating evidence documentary or testimonial from independent, third
person was presented to convince this Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof
that [Eliseo] is guilty of the allegations contained therein.31 (Citation omitted)

The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the
Extended Resolution issued on March 20, 2013, the Board suspended Eliseo from the practice of
law for two years. Thus:

[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds sufficient evidence to sustain
misconduct on the part of [Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing an Affidavit of Loss of Title to
Real Property which Title was in the name of Alistair, his son, and which was in the latter’s
possession, substantiated with annexes and affidavits. The same holds true for the alleged
choking incident in the Judge’s chamber which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G". [Eliseo]
also admitted his infidelity albeit he postulated the defense of homosexuality. All these, taken
together, fall short of the ethical standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.32

Issues

Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in:

I.

Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s name;

II.

Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT No. P-
28258;

III.

Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008 that
the owner's copy of OCT No. P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title
is with Alistair;

IV.
 Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a homosexual albeit
admitting to his children that he has an intimate relation with another woman; and

V.

Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.

This Court’s Ruling

Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside
the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this
Court is compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when he conducted himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar.

This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of Governors that Eliseo deserves to be
sanctioned for his unbecoming behavior.

In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a penalty of two years of suspension from the
practice of law, the IBP Board of Governors considered all the three charges of immorality,
dishonesty and misconduct against the former.

However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon
Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258
in Alistair’s name when the subject property actually belongs to the former. The charges of (a)
immorality in engaging in extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing the Affidavit of Loss
on September 10, 2008, were, on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after finding either the
evidence of the complainants as insufficient or the issues raised being already the subjects of
Eliseo’s pending Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are
anchored upon almost the same set of facts, except that in the former, the issue of occurence of
the scuffle on September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court does not intend to punish Eliseo
twice for the same acts especially since they pertain to his private life and were not actually
committed in connection with the performance of his functions as a magistrate before.

In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized what "automatic conversion of administrative

cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers" means,
viz:

This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution,
entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials
Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as
Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:

"Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics,
or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds
for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary
action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. x
x x. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution."

xxxx

Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and
show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned
as member of the Bar." xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to
give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of
the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic
conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed
against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere
operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted
with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals
and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.34 (Citations and emphasis
omitted)

The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a disbarment complaint against a
lawyer when an administrative case had been previously filed against him or her as a magistrate.
Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment complaint should have been consolidated with A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v. Caballero35 was promulgated by the
Court on August 5, 2009 subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint on April 6,
2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant
disbarment complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an addition to the latter.
Hence, this Court shall now resolve the said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.

In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It
bears stressing that not one of the parties had presented even one independent witness to prove
what transpired inside the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took
place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot be determined with much certainty.

While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as
self-defense on his part.36

While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s narration of the incident, and understands
that the successive acts of the parties during the tussle were committed at a time when passions
ran high, he shall not be excused for comporting himself in such an undignified manner.

Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession."
The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand, is instructive anent what constitutes
unbecoming conduct, viz:

Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."39

Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was to engage in a brawl with no less than his
own children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court shall not countenance crude social
behavior. Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people with high respect and is regarded as
a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled, and justice solemnly
dispensed.40 Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its sanctity and dignity.41
Although Alistair and Charmaine were not entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and
restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose conduct failed to show due respect for the court
and lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the legal profession.

Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the
hearing conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011 that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal
son.42 As a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing illegitimacy to Alistair in a
proceeding not instituted for that specific purpose is nothing short of defamation.

All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
conducted himself in a manner not befitting a member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with
his own children in the chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009 and recklessly
expressing his doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during the hearing before the CBD.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is
hereby imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6281 September 26, 2011

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D. Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda.1

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890
square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant
initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid
property. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During
the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as
counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular
accident.

In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand
Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent
demanded the additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of
a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus
twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.

Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement.
Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have
agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his
co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became
furious and their relationship became sore.

On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On
March 24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter
addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of
registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the same had
already been claimed by and released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate
of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority.
Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the
property equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the
owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been
agreed upon.

In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on respondent
over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand and angrily told complainant to
comply, and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay him.

On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse
claim on the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of his legal
services was 20% of the property and/or actual market value. To date, respondent has not
returned the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite repeated
demands to effect the same.

In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the appropriate penalty upon respondent,
complainant invokes the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.

Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and properties of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x

In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over to complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding repeated demands,
to complete payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the
property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent
market value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a sum of
PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378-square-meter portion and that he was ready and willing to
turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him completely the
aforesaid professional fee.

Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the
amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the current value of the subject lot.
He alleged that the agreement was not reduced into writing, because the parties believed each
other based on their mutual trust. He denied that he demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for
the preparation of a memorandum, since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount
being demanded by him.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-
2005-173,5 dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
adopting the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Pending the resolution of his motion
for reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for review6 with this Court. The Court, in a
Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated December 17, 2005, with modification
that respondent is ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within
fifteen days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present petition.

The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, which affirmed with modification
the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD. Respondent's claim for his unpaid
professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he
receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.

Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides:

Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and
shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and
he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur:
(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds, documents and papers;
and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a general lien
for the balance of the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the documents
and funds of the client which may come into the attorney's possession in the course of his
employment.10

In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such agreement for the payment of
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that their
agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of any agreement between the
complainant and the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the parties
only shows that respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the
respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would
entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence, respondent could not validly withhold the
title of his client absence a clear and justifiable claim.

Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by respondent
of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot
at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due or upon
demand.11

Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver
the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an alleged entitlement to
additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon
his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion
of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial
capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.

Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees
on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much
as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence
of a contract but recoverable by him from his client."12 The principle of quantum meruit applies if
a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. 13 In the present
case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the
respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the
respondent is already compensated by such agreement.

The Court notes that respondent did not inform complainant that he will be the one to secure the
owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to immediately inform complainant that the
title was already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas
City to get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised that the said title had
already been claimed by, and released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good
faith and fairness.14 By keeping secret with the client his acquisition of the title, respondent was
not fair in his dealing with his client. Respondent could have easily informed the complainant
immediately of his receipt of the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in order to save
his client the time and effort in going to the RD to get the title.

Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary
sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and approving with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the
complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day
period from notice given to respondent within which to return the title should be modified and,
instead, respondent should return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the
complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in
which the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the
engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he
is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement?

Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent)
with misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services.
She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her
in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the
respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had
gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her
that he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that
she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal
separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would
have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage;2 that she subsequently
withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he
refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case;3 that she had sent him a
letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever
amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed;4 that the respondent did
not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to
her;5 and that his constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative
complaint against him 6 in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British
fiancee sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that
based on his evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal
separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British
fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation,
with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8 that for
purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her
marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to
submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly
respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the
money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation
essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the
action for the annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that
he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is
noted that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand
letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005
(Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information
furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory
conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the
conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to
reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on
the same day, but required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days.
She did not submit the position paper in the end.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De
La Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for
legal separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was
sanctionable because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal
separation; that because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to
receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00
being the value of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that,
accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in
the last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of
the complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the
urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and
improper; and he opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent
against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:
 (1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which
he received for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned
believes that considering the degree of professional services he has extended, the
amount of P40,000.00 he received on March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for
the same.

(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of
marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.

(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and
for using offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right before the
Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to
avoid repetition of the said misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00
which the former received as payment for his services because it is excessive.

It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using
offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified
the recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
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RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A",
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for
showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby
WARNED and Ordered to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied
through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17

Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should
be held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to
return the attorney's fees paid.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but
modify the recommended penalty.

1.

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire
amount received from the client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite
professional competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He
required her to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his
appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.

On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as
his client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating
Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent
and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship.
The respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee
was agreed upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.

That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the
filing of the annulment case or legal separation?

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action
he is going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get
married. At that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain
Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely
assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in
order to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the
petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal
separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the marriage bond
still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one is not free to marry
another person.

A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in
the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of
their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds
are as follows:
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Sec. 2. Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of
any of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside

the Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one
of those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.

Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a
ground for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.

On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.

That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal
education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise,
he should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for
annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed
up with the basic provisions of the law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the
complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the
grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been
basic and expected of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes
of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal
separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for
which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the
complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They
did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared
a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to
have the action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a
hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He
thus transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know
that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services
performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good
faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a
reasonable compensation for such services.19

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and
the attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 20 The underlying theory is that
the retainer's agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the
arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid
agreement, his compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed.21 In
the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum
meruit, which means "as much as he deserved." 22 The determination of attorney's fees on the
basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able
to finish the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery
of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will
be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based
on the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is
reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
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Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion
of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for
the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also
for the purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession.25cralawred

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it
was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a
consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant.
He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant
because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal
separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the
petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his
means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already
received.

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as
acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of
having already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation
after having held conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00
of the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the
complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews towards
establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed
during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he
could not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c)
requiring her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3),
and the certificates of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette
Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal
separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not
really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare
the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney
who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his
professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty
toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned
according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to
the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement,
subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his
misrepresentation of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the
entire amount of P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.

2.

Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 26 This duty of lawyers is
further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8
specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."

The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers
to use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients.27 However, as
members of a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their
clients' cause, or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal
but that should not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In
maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in
his pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as
an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his
clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal
Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be
treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the
urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple
misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper
language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He
explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated
as a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse
the offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and
proper in responding to the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20,
2008 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that
Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional
competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper
language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall
be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30)
days from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the
date of this decision until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013

ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.

On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former head of the Records Department of
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 against
respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of
land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of Deeds of Marikina, with
an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation case, which she filed against her
husband in 1974, and the aforementioned property was her share in their property settlement.
Complainant stated that she also knew personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's
trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent. Estrella Kraus was always there
whenever she visited respondent in connection with her cases.

Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986, respondent suggested that she
(complainant) apply for a loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for sale to
interested buyers, and that her property be offered as collateral. Respondent assured complainant
that she would work out the speedy processing and release of the loan. Complainant agreed, but
since she had a balance on her loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of ₱27,000.00,
without any interest, to pay the said loan. When her title was released by the GSIS, complainant
entrusted it to respondent who would handle the preparation of documents for the loan and follow-
up the same, and complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose. From time to time,
complainant inquired about the application for the loan, but respondent always assured her that
she was still preparing the documents required by the bank. Because of her assurances,
complainant did not bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's words that she would
handle speedily the preparation of her application.

Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her property, she discovered that her
apartment was already demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were constructed on
her property, which she later learned was already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought
her property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately confronted respondent about what
she discovered, but respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After verification,
complainant learned that her property was sold on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale was acknowledged.3
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the same
to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4

Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in its favor nor appeared before
respondent to acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent manipulated the sale of her
property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee, Estrella D. Kraus, as the
instrument in the sale, and that her signature was forged, as she did not sign any deed selling her
property to anyone.

In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D. Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law
office, and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus (Spouses Kraus), were her clients.
Respondent denied that she suggested that complainant should apply for a loan from a bank to
construct townhouses. She said that it was the complainant, on the contrary, who requested her
(respondent) to look for somebody who could help her raise the money she needed to complete
the amortization of her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS and was about to be
foreclosed. Respondent stated that she was the one who introduced complainant to the Spouses
Kraus when they were both in her office. In the course of their conversation, complainant offered
the property, subject matter of this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses Kraus were
interested, and got the telephone number of complainant. Thereafter, complainant told
respondent that she accompanied the Spouses Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of
the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell
her that they had reached an agreement with complainant, and they requested respondent to
prepare the deed of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. Thereafter,
complainant and the Spouses Kraus went to respondent's office where complainant signed the
Deed of Sale after she received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00) from the Spouses
Kraus. Respondent alleged that complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the understanding
was that the complainant would, in the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage, and,
thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses
Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly
told respondent that she would inform respondent when the transaction was completed so that
the Deed of Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book. Thereafter, respondent claimed that she
had no knowledge of what transpired between complainant and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent
stated that she was never entrusted with complainant's certificate of title to her property in
Marikina (TCT No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant who negotiated the sale of her
property in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to respondent, complainant's
inaction for eight years to verify what happened to her property only meant that she had actually
sold the same, and that she concocted her story when she saw the prospect of her property had
she held on to it. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the case.

On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a Reply, 6 belying respondent's allegations and affirming
the veracity of her complaint.

On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18, 1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On November 8, 1999, the case was set for its
initial hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000 to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the
reception of respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events caused their postponement.

On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant.
The Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for the outright dismissal of the
complaint, and directed respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001. 9

The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to testify and bring the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated November 11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in the name of
complainant and the issuance of a new title to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the
Register of Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing held on July 29, 2003,
respondent's counsel presented a certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale
executed by Anita C. Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a parcel of land
in Marikina, could not be located from the general file of the registry and that the same may be
considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February 17, 2005, respondent was directed
by the Investigating Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit her memorandum.

Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP
on the ground that the criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of Manila, Branch
36, which estafa case was anchored on the same facts as the administrative case, had been
dismissed in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 94-138567. The RTC held
that the case for estafa could not prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno,
respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
considering the absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that would show that
Anita Peña's signature therein was forged and the transfer of the land was made through
fraudulent documents.

The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was whether or not there was clear and
preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and
Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c)
knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale.

On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP, submitted
his Report and Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust reposed upon her by
complainant by executing a bogus deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the spurious deed of sale. Commissioner
Sordan stated that there was no evidence showing that respondent actively conspired with any
party or actively participated in the forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless,
Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that her
signature on the said Deed of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.

Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be produced notwithstanding diligent search in
the National Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Commissioner Sordan stated that the interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness,
Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's duplicate certificate of title was
delivered to respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give credence to respondent's denial
that complainant handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No. N-61244 in November 1986 at
the GSIS, as Maura Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as Records Processor at the
GSIS, testified that she saw complainant give the said title to respondent.

Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the testimony of complainant that she gave respondent
her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral
in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it. 14 Yet,
respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner. 15 Later, complainant discovered
that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the
title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years,
complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her property,
if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on
assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan
application.16

Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land
to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244
with respect to the sale of the property described therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for
₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence
inside her office.19 However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she
notarized the instrument in her direct examination,20 but on cross-examination, she stated that
she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. 21 Estrella Kraus'
affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.

Respondent presented her former employee Basilio T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing
by complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale, and the notarization by respondent of the
said Deed. However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed
that his participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale was mere recording, but he later
affirmed that he saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23

Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken chain of circumstances, like respondent's
testimony that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale before her is proof of respondent's
deception. Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of sale showed her active role to
perpetuate a fraud to prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to
exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita
Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did not
participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to
make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register.

According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross violations of the law made respondent liable for
violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), 24 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and
her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the
notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually
disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464,
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of her
oath as a lawyer, Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's
notarial commission if still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from reappointment
as a Notary Public.

The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of the IBP insofar as respondent has
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees with the
sanction imposed.

The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was acquitted, as her guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each must be disposed
of according to the facts and the law applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections
128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence
is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of
evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.30

Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance
of a separate and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence
necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial evidence. An administrative case can
proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein, based on both prosecution
and defense evidence, the trial court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground
either that the prosecution failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that
no crime was committed.32

The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.34

In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave credence to complainant's testimony that
she gave respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her property as respondent
would apply for a bank loan in complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.

Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco, a former records processor in

complainant's office at the GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she saw
complainant give her title to respondent.35 Respondent admitted in her Answer36 that she
executed the Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus. The said Deed of Sale was
notarized by respondent as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in complainant's title, TCT No. N-
61244. As the Deed of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through no fault of the
complainant, nonetheless, the consequence thereof is failure of complainant to prove her
allegation that her signature therein was forged and that respondent defrauded complainant by
facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's
approval. However, complainant proved that respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,
when the Deed of Sale was executed.

The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, states that every notary public shall keep
a notarial register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, among others, and, when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep a
correct copy thereof as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in said records a brief
description of the substance thereof.39

A ground for revocation of a notary public's commission is failure of the notary to send the copy
of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of
the month next following or the failure of the notary to forward his notarial register, when filled, to
the proper clerk of court.40

In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila issued a Certification, 41 dated February 22,
1994, stating that respondent was duly appointed as a Notary Public for the City of Manila for the
year 1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986, when the Deed of Sale was executed and notarized by
her. Hence, a copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said Deed of Sale could not also be
found in the National Archives per the certification 42 of the Archives Division Chief Teresita R.
Ignacio for Director Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill her duty as notary public
to submit her notarial register for the month of November 1986 and a copy of the said Deed of
Sale that was notarized by her on the same month is cause for revocation of her commission
under Section 249 of the Notarial Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated
to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and
impressed with public interest.44

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended
for any deceit or dishonest act, thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in possession of complainant's copy of the
certificate of title (TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was respondent who
admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale, which complainant denied having executed or signed, the
important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's signature on the Deed of Sale and the
validity of the sale is the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale could not be
produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, as it could not be located in the general files
of the registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed of Sale may be considered
lost.45 Moreover, respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her Notarial
Report for the month of November 1986,46 including the said Deed of Sale, which was executed
on November 11, 1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined that it appears that
efforts were exerted to get rid of the copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from
getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting verification from an expert to prove
that her alleged signature on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to submit to
the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and
a copy of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that month, has far-reaching
implications and grave consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the veracity of the
said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed by the Investigating Commissioner and
reflected in the transcript of records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny that
she notarized the said Deed of Sale.

For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is disbarred from the practice of law. As a
member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law,
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still
existing, is perpetually REVOKED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the
Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE

VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust,
incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in
his handling of the election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections
for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this,
complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On
November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of
P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to
prepare and file the case but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera
(Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip)
and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were
done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature
affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin
to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the
ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by
Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading
to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a
mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits
personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that
the affidavits at hand were falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing;
and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his
non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the
particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order
to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for
the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty.
De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to
withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected
from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s

disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against
him by complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election
protest based on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of
Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was
Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He
added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As
he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in
view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case. 18 To
add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled “Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him
and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the
instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and
recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated
in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to
the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-
Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could
sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done on
November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest, showed
that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the
affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the
election protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 dated

February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing
the period of suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by
the records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6)
months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country
has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain
from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and
to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to
the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in
holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the
election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the
IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary
proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to first-hand observe
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on
the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution
dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but
another notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life, 31 and that he
had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation
in using the same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed
participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of
the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is
that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated
retraction of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus
Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a
mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the
documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to
represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation 34 or allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged
him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the
charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended
the lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in
court. In view of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same
here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses
intrinsically related to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt
thereof in his Answer before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in

Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby
can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed
against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying
the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will
be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia

Umaguing the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further
administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED. \
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO,

Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of
their clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without
need for reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to
their client that they will manage the case as if it were their own. The relationship between an
attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the
lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The
professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,

terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it
appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the
Appellant’s Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution 3 dated March 20, 2013. In its
delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo
had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.5cralawred

In the Complaint6 filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he
engaged Atty. Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled
“Spouses Roque v. Ramirez.”7 The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.8cralawred

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral
from a friend of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services
on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of
attorney’s fees.10 It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per
court appearance.11cralawred

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to
Ramirez.12 Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the
Appeal before the Court of Appeals.13cralawred

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in
2008.14 On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s
Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one
prepared.15cralawred

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant’s

Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary
for the brief.16cralawred

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there
was still no word from the Court of Appeals.17cralawred

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. 18 She
told him that the Court of Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his filiation
with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim.19 She also informed him that they
could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been
promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.20cralawred

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant’s Brief was filed
on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.21cralawred

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued
that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per
hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they
only had a 50% chance of winning the case.23 She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the
controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of
Ramirez had begged her to do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her
for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March
2009, he merely told her that he had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of
the unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because
her 8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her
contacts.26cralawred

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared
despite Atty. Margallo having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was reset to July
22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were directed to submit their position
papers.29cralawred

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her
actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt
with more severely.30 This was based on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the
reglementary period for filing an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer
wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her
client.31 Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss
of Ramirez’s statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.32cralawred

In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty.
Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the Resolution
dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for Reconsideration
and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2)
years.35cralawred

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court.36 She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her
client. She also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against
her.37cralawred

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallo’s Petition for
Review.38 In the Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirez’s Motion.
Atty. Margallo filed her Reply40 on October 6, 2014.

This court’s ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is “imbued with utmost trust and
confidence.”41 Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice,
but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by
either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and
attention remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent
litigant.42cralawred

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
clearly provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL
BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.cralawlawlibrary

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify
his absence in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted
for resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s failure to inform his client about the adverse
ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an
Appeal. This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence tantamount to
breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily,
a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.

....

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary

action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se
a violation.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
cralawlawlibrary

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to
act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There
was no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that
she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty.
Margallo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is
contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons,
she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their
authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is
information assymetry between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts
and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers

are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is
not usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal
provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies
of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between
the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and
remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually
does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers
the level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In
some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client,
therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it
is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we
observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a
period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found
guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.
Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the
pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer
who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in
court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant
Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that
we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be
no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.46 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended
penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-
year suspension. We read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of
professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a
current need in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
ensure a higher ethical standard for its members’ conduct is laudable. The negligence of
respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is
ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015

[Formerly CBD 09-2555]

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 10584

[Formerly CBD 10-2827]

ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of
Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4

against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying
that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.5

Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by
Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died
in 1990.6

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7
executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:

Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.9
(Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied)

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed
a Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary
restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13
which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence,
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.15

In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since
she was about four years old.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff,
isn’t it?

A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one of her
cousins.

....

Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].

THE COURT

: What’s the name of the mother?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.

Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t
it?
A : Of course.

Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.

You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you
requested to be marked as Exhibit B.

THE COURT

: Exhibit?

ATTY. CARINGAL

: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from
you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.

THE WITNESS

: Yes, sir.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.

A : Yes, sir.

Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal ethics because
it is not the issue in this case.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

....

Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been duly
notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7, book

number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A for the
defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal
heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not leave any
descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular
provision that you have drafted into this document . . . true or false?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that would impugn
the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was
only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that
has been the subject of my continuing objection from the very beginning.

THE COURT

: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically
opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late Mariano Turla,
your Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents,
your Honor.

THE COURT

: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]

ATTY. REY SANTOS

: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality and
impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.

THE COURT

: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be consistent with
the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?

THE WITNESS

: No, that is not true.

ATTY. CARINGAL

: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you have drafted
a document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.

THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.

....

ATTY. CARINGAL

Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten
or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?

THE WITNESS

: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled
[sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty.
Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty.
Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also alleged
that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano
Turla.22

Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of fact occurring before the
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing information
acquired during his professional relation with his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of
trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24

Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s
estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27

In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states
that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty.
Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that
Rufina Turla had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:

14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen years ago, he
is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac
Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There
is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes
the document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes
due the government;

14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in the Affidavit of
Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant,
xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit
that Rufina Turla had no other heir.33

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his
own benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were
supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly,
Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his
arguments.35

In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He explained that
the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and
that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38

As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not represent and was
not representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already dead.39 Further, "he [was]
representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that
Mariano Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla."41

Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not commit forum
shopping because the various cases filed had different issues.42

As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being held by his
client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos,
payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses of
administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal
had no standing to question.45

On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed that Article 262
of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was
registered.46

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47

It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death
certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.48
Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s
estate.49

With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that
the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law."50
Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved different
parties and prayed for different reliefs.51

However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty.
Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The Report and Recommendation53 of
the Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically
proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or
merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."

....

. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand
admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly states that he
was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.

And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s
daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted
that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she is not
only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate
presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was
also a rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same because of the
Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.

. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in
a position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the
only heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)

In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings and recommendations
of the Commission on Bar Discipline.

Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP Board of
Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.

This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal dated July 15,
2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:

RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—

....

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent
should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of
law is proper.

This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution.
However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from three (3) months to one (1) year.

Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.

....

Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client relationship.
Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order
to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty.
Salunat,60 this court explained what conflict of interest means:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.61
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would necessarily
refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu
Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the
Commission on Bar Discipline:

Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the
Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City admitted
as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is
entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the respondent
was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s estate.62 (Citation
omitted)

However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and
Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still,
respondent did not present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously
represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus,
the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.

Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent violated
Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states:

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.

In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:

Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that
the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the
estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to
be the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his
duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also
in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in
the original)

As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from being
honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68

This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013
and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the
authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.

The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987 Constitution:
ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

....

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority over

attorneys"70 and discussed:

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of
the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline
lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of
law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar
is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. . . .

. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.71 (Citations omitted)

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:

RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

....

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73
Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory,
consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline
of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist
this court with the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at
best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and
that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are
bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing."76 (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority
is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule
15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact
and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated
May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor
Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their

information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015

WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO,
ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY.
RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED
RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed
by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia
(Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao ), Lily Uy-
Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela),
Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty. Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule against conflict of interest.

The Facts

In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of which Attys.
Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were
partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty.
Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were
terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both parties.3

On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his
wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael
Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the same law office
which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case
against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR,5
to wit:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Valencia
Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but explained that their
association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to certain "arrangements."
According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of
the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and
the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own
professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other
lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. Respondents
claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. They averred that
complainant’s labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the
entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms
was handled by Atty. Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge of complainant’s labor
cases, as he started working for the firm after the termination thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela
confirmed that he indeed handled complainant’s labor cases but averred that it was terminated
on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He
likewise explained that he did not see the need to discuss complainant’s labor cases with the
other lawyers as the issue involved was very simple,11 and that the latter did not confide any
secret during the time the labor cases were pending that would have been used in the criminal
case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other lawyers were not aware of the details of
complainant’s labor cases nor did they know that he was the handling counsel for complainant
even after the said cases were closed and terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that they be
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.14
The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the respondents
acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict
of interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty. Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE
Farms, created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover,
the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.15

In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification. Instead of the penalty of
reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case with warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of Governors
granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, 2013
Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation,
with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest;
(2) dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela
from the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of complainant’s labor cases.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxxx

RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

xxxx

CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS TERMINATED.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest in this wise:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule
covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the
acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously
affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.20

As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a
former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.21 In
this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents represented conflicting
interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was
engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However,
after the termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the
filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As
the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure
to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to keep track of all cases
assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it
accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As an organization of individual lawyers
which, albeit engaged as a collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it
behooves the law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack
of coordination, as respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its clients’
secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the balance the lawyer-client
relationship’s primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such system been
institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the above-
mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement.
Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to
be administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty.
Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all respondents
stand in equal fault for the law firm’s deficient organization for which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and
Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are meted with the same penalty of
reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not altered by the fact
that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of
attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment.22

WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred
Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip
Dabao is DISMISSED in view of his death.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015

ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA

ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR,
Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012 filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach (complainant)
charging Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo (EJ Arroyo), Regional Trial Court
(RTC), San Jose City, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand
Fernando Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G.
Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San
Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.

On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily
recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of
his late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the son-in-law of the his former clerk of
court, Florecito V. Patrocinio.1

Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case among judges of the first
level courts within her administrative jurisdiction to determine who among them will be assigned
to try and decide the case.

The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino).

In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino set the case for hearing on 16 October
2012.

On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. 80.

In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order
of Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic)
himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this
court.3
In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with MCTC, San
Jose-Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to inhibit the Judge Begino; and 2) to re-raffle
and assign the case to another judge.

In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered
ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed Judge Begino to continue to
hear and decide the case. EJ Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses Muhlach's oral motion
failed to state'the grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge. It likewise did not explain why
doubts as to the impartiality of the court could exist.4

Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and on 19 October 2012, resolved,
among others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent Motion to Inhibit filed by counsel for the Spouses
Muhlach. He ruled, thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the Undersigned
Judge (Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this case.

The movants miserably failed to show what judicial actuations made by the Judge which may be
perceived that he has already predetermined the facts and issues involved in this case. If, the
judicial actuations they are referring to is in connection with the Order of the Judge denying their
Motion to Dismiss, the same is not sufficient for a Judge to inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case considering that the denial was based on law.

xxxx

All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief that the Judge and his sibling Agnes are political allies of
Mr. Fuentebella is unfounded, untrue and baseless.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to Inhibit the Honorable Presiding Judge Ricky C.
Begino and to Re-Raffle and Assign Case to Another Presiding Judge is hereby ordered
DENIED. The undersigned Judge will continue to hear and decide this case with the assurance
to all parties concerned that he will take his role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence without fear or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23 October 2012 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
(of the Orders dated 17 and 19 October 2012).

In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion filed by
Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando Felix
Monasterio. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO MUHLACH
and CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A Barangay,
San Juan, San Jose, Camarines Sur is hereby GRANTED. The Election Registration Board is
hereby ordered to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THE
LIST OF VOTERS OF PRECINCT NO. 10A BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN JOSE,
CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE THEIR REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK OF VOTERS and to ENTER THE ORDER OF EXCLUSION
therein; and thereafter, to PLACE THE RECORDS IN THE INACTIVE FILE, for lack of
residency requirement.7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo. He accused
EJ Arroyo of having issued the Order dated 16 October 2012 with abuse of authority and with
gross ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority
to reverse Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the
Supreme Court.

In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that immediately upon receipt of Judge Begino's order of
inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was improper or defective. She stressed that
the procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be substantially followed, citing
the resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August 1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC.9 She averred
that she was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 when she
issued the questioned order. Under the cited circular, the duty of the executive judge is to
appoint another trial judge under his/her supervision to handle the inhibited case or to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court. Considering that the inhibition order issued by Judge Begino
was "patently defective," she saw no point in referring the same to the Court, through the Office
of the Court Administrator, for evaluation "because in the first place, there was nothing for the
latter to evaluate."

EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of the names of
Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within ten days from its filing
as provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189.10 In view of the status of the Spouses
Muhlach, EJ Arroyo claimed that no judge would want to handle the case. Thus, when she
received a copy of Judge Begino's order of inhibition, she felt that it was her duty as executive
judge to ensure that the case is decided, as much as possible, within the period prescribed
under the law. She reasoned that if she were to approve Judge Begino's inhibition order which,
on its face, was defective, nothing would stop other judges from recusing themselves from the
case on flimsy grounds. She felt that it would result in an endless cycle leaving the case
unresolved.

EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the resolution
of Spec. Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino decided the case in favor of the
petitioners and ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the voters list, Spouses
Muhlach appealed the decision to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge
Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge
Begino. Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13
November 2012, after the instant complaint was filed on 7 November 2012. EJ Arroyo submits
that should Judge Paulite grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise because the
case would be assigned to Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge, there being only two
branches in RTC San Jose. She claimed that such scenario would lead her to inhibit from the
case because of the administrative complaint filed against her. Consequently, the case will be
referred to the nearest RTC and raffled among the judges in that jurisdiction. She opined that
other delaying tactics may be employed, and soon, it would already be elections day without the
case having decided.11

Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11 years and this is the first time that an
administrative case has been filed against her.

We find the charges of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion bereft of merit.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has
been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified
from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the
Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due
process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come
from a partial and biased judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the
trust and faith of the parties-litigants.

We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge
Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality
of the court. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound
discretion on the part of the judge, such should still comply with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid
reasons. In the subject order, the reason for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither
could it be determined from the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the motion was
done orally, in violation of Section 213 of the same rule.

When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a
way, returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or
take cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. As EJ Arroyo explained, she was
aware that she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is
vested only in the Supreme Court. It was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective."
Tersely put, EJ Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly
asked that the Order be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.

When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and admission on
his part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality expected from an impartial
magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by counsel for the
Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the
oral motion was defective. The assailed order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of
her administrative functions.

Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have
committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.14 Here, it was clearly
established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is decided
expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no showing that she was
moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may
be attributed to the complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition.

While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial functions, we
find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise be said that as a matter of
public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed
by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional
Trial Court, San Jose City, Camarines Sur for ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12, 2015

[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]

ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA

D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L.
NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA
M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B. ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose
Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and serious violations of the Canons of the Code
of Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Complainants
Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo, Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z.
Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F.
Bernardo, Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison
(collectively, complainants) were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the
public market ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T. Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted to
demolish the public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new "San Jose
Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition With
Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as Special
Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent’s sala.

Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the
determination of the propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality
were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa waived his right to present his evidence
and submitted the case for resolution.3

While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case, were all
allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500
members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the
motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta
D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony that day.6
Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses "were all
geared towards establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as "this
will be good for all and the progress and development of the municipality."7

After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating that "the Court is not inclined to
extend for seventeen (17) days the said TRO."8

At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a
call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court.9 According to
complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the
courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent suddenly explained that the
Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment.10

Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued,
berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification."12
They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants "confusing and misleading
questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and
favorable to the cause of their adversary."13

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the
causes, friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also alleged that all cases in the RTC before
respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political allies, supporters, and close friends
were decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives and supporters.15 Thus, complainants filed
the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he issued an
order/ruling against Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters.16

In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices thereat, for
investigation, report and recommendation." The case was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales
on 24 February 2014. This Court received his Report and Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June
2014.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.

Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality.
Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing evidence is
necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality.20 The circumstances detailed by petitioners
failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from
the mere fact that he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied petitioners
during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of
our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge group could have been accommodated
inside.21 With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while Julieta Toledo was giving her
testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.22

We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and
admonished their witnesses without basis or justification. According to the investigating justice,
respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes for the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible
reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July 2012 hearing, the investigating justice found
that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and making "abrasive and unnecessary
statements to her,"24 respondent also made the following"insulting, sometimes needlessly
lengthy statements"25 in open court:

1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, because he might

be mistreated by petitioners.26

2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila
alam ang kanilang ginagawa."27

3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na
gawa naman ng abogado niyo."28

4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’
is that not a violation to your lease contract that you are allowing somebody to occupy
your portion so that they can also engage in business? Is this not an additional earning on
your part and you are violating your lease contract? Is that not depriving the coffer of the
Municipal Government?"29 The investigating justice found that the foregoing statements
"definitely imperiled the respect and deference"30 rightly due to respondent’s position.

We agree.

As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary
remarks to petitioners’ witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the
mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,32
which reads:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court,33 viz:

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of
patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language.
He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise
and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.34

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2

INTEGRITY

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived
to be so inview of a reasonable observer.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.1âwphi1 The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of
impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance of impropriety.35 This is because
appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions. A judge — like
Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion.36

In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to
leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did
so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter
had an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not deny this in his Comment.37 It
was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why the mayor
left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not
only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance
of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any
appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal
behavior and everyday life.39

The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a
judge.1âwphi1 He gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners
cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent must have directly communicated with Mayor
Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the Mayor could no longer return
to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that. Thus,
respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the judiciary.

It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this Court has already found Respondent
Judge Jacinto liable for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed
over the phone. Judge Jacinto was found guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by
failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official receipts for all monies received by the latter.
In the foregoing case, respondent judge was fined in the sum of ₱11,000 and was warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in relation
to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming
conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of
not less than ₱1,000, but not exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4)
admonition with warning.42

Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction already, the Court finds that the
penalties of a fine in the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as recommended by
the investigating justice, are proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming
conduct and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015

[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. He
is FINED twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the
amount of ₱1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages in her collections. Her
withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative
Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the
same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute the
money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service.
He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount of ₱58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which should be
deducted from her retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal
charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.

SO ORDERED.

As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting presiding judge in both courts.

xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and
Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found
an unremitted amount of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from August 3, 2003 to
August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit
team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms
issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the
court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of ₱348,993.60 from January 1990
to August 2003. However, only ₱186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of
₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996 to
August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of ₱30,411. 70; and as of August 31,
2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of ₱1,864,304.27 which covered the collections
from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled
₱2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been
getting money from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of
fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her
collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade and the
latter issued a certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary
accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division,
Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip evidencing the turnover
of the ₱240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of
collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's salaries
were withheld effective August 2003 to the present.

In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde,
Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to ₱59,545.oo. However,
the Official Receipts issued to cover said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount
was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.

A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of
₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank
accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that
Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut started
borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He
transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay,
Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice
of borrowing money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded
Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also
found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21,
2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief
Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account at the
Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of maintaining an account
with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was opened at
Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF collections and
remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of ₱510.00. Mr.
Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of ₱430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred
a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred
a shortage of ₱430.00. She deposited the amount of ₱400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a
shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates, totalling
₱243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by any
official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded.
The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to
₱2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of ₱846,710.00 was unaccounted
for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own
doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him
money from the Fiduciary Fund collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she requested Judge
Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient.
However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos
further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador Briones, Court
Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion of
withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given
to Judge Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and
Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to ₱193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo were also
given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such as
"Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the
Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to .₱207,774.42.
However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts
totalling ₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP
Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of ₱846, 710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other hand,
Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of ₱58,100.oo which, as of
the time this case was submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained
unsettled. (Emphases supplied)

In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a
fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an
extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with
respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present
his side on the matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum,2 sought
reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally required
to comment on the findings of the audit team regarding the shortage in the court collections, he
was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut was able to present his
side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening of
the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on the findings of the
financial audit.

In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the
audit report and, upon the recommendation5 of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.6

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the
participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he
borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.7 The standard
of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant.8

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The
three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically
stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the court funds and executed certifications to that
effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money from the various
funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Aritao-
Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips9 where the back portions were signed either by Judge
Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the
funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge,"
"for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money
withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10 stating that his cash accountability as
of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by
the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had
borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9,
2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut
was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and for failing to resolve
101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times,
the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality,
decency and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability
lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He
knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper
administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other
court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his official
and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable
by dismissal from the service even on the first offense.15 For said reason, the respondent
deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never
condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even
tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.16

The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That,
however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of
Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service for the same offense. Clerk of Court
Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the service. And it would
send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one for the
magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences
of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative
sanction and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It
matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds
were used outside of official business."17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense
was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several
years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not
once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In the case of In Re: Report on
the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City,18
it was written:

For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave
misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter recounted
that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed ₱130,ooo to be able to purchase a car and
thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons ranging from the schooling needs
of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to repay the amounts "borrowed" is
immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5
of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan
from anyone except as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of
the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and
awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present
himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in violating
the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have warranted the maximum
penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed from the service
in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, finding
Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice
to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or
decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of
a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately
served on the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation 1 of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy
(Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14,
2013 Resolution,2 referring the complaint filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge
Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first
semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred
that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother,
Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu
City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position
as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but
several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion
Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a “court-noted
addict.”4 She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was present,
Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation
in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school
in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled “Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis”5(Lachica v.
Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving
payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had
issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the
findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by
her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in
the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio
in a case entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as Criminal Case No.
148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He
stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated;
that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that
Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case
of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her
sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally
attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted
a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court
employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams
were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and
legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative
cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and
some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal
publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he
told her to mend her ways, but she resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or
dispute his discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the
matter was not also brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the
local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis who was
a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that
Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of
the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who
determines the persons to be appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed
her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally
accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13,
2011. He claimed though that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail
and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes
explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary
receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to
remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the
cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge
Tormis could not be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the
performance of his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to
do with the filing of the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City
to continue her law studies elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and
judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in
class of her mother’s administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges
implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes,
the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still
premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in
nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded
her brother, Francis, as a “drug addict.”

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature
to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty.
Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of
Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated
that the conflicting allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved
based on the evidence on record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the
charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation,
report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice
Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were
conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’
cases in class where she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack
of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting
standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge
Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment
of what was just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his
everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage
scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated;
that the administrative case relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013;
that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail
bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was
unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his
being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the
Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous
pleadings. He added that the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public
knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that,
hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights,
freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the
present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should
have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts
could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate language during class
discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as
corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and
inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative
case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the
Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which
stated that “Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively
liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was
not in the exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his
judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when
the latter discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue
was still being investigated. She cited, as basis for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case,
Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported
by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the
procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the
bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by
any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the
peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be
meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely. 18

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks
against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they
cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They are simply not related to the discharge of his
official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much
less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any
comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
(Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22
where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts
and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010,
the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on
the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make
comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges
involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in
finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for
discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out
insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and
the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize
Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams
and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on
the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,”25 as Justice Diy put
it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project
Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found
guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit
the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his
words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the
level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct and in language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the
Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge
Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and
personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that
was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen,
are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the
dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the
exercise of his right to freedom of expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of
the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for
remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being a
judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily,
Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held
administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class
discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a
judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private
activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should
not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code
of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. A judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He
should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of
a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly
found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of
Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in
accordance with the rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed
grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio
case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure
set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to
act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail,
the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a
temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he
cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio
case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a),
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may
be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial
Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are
authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge
Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since
he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguio’s
payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court
where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City
were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since
the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge
assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any
irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not
backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of
not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4)
Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge
and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City,
Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana

(complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the
Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993,
where the respondent was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a company
then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of
SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave
Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by
the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over
SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most
of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative

meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e.,
a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she
arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted
to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the
rehabilitation plan for SCP.
 3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the
respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and
effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so
that there would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the
case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial

adviser and, at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and
development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is
also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP,

leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that
SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for
the creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and
delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his
appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend
the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules
(the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify
and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in
EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns
regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and
personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged
that the respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a
social networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge,
allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body
barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except
probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008,
referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she
crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did
so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also
submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of
judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that
the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On
the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and
non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives
the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason
for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold meetings
with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be
called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would
attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved
the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting
extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the
rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her
denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part
but due to lack of basis. Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor
EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed
her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s
rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted
his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest
of the complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a
subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules
specifically states that the court may decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other
documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and
substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper
in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd.
She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly, she
submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala9 should not be
applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting
"seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in
violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and 2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a
hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report
and Recommendation,15 Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly
meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the
rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority,
but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial
predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that
the respondent intentionally and deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely
relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing
irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including
SCP’s creditors. She also found satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary

bickering with SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective
of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what
would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the
standard of decorum expected of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were
uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court
and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for
which Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social
networking account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate
in the account) – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be
the trend – constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s
acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No.
100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation
of a management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with
the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence was
tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00.
She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety
and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable

Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be

NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City,
Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section
6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos

(Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety

with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more
severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross
ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the
charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross
incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action.
On the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in
her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain
Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered
the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence
of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless
about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack
of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s
bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the
accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith,
or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively
liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise
of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are,
at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available,
such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise
of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be
assailed instead through judicial remedies.24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The
truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the
complainant’s verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the
person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances
cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too,
failed to adduce proof indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of
one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially.
We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish with clear, solid, and
convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of
the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even
over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable.29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the
modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in
modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and effectively usurped the functions of a
rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated
by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the
law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It
must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the
modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate
his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee
without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be
so egregious as to amount to bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law,
as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-
company’s assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court should hear both
sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on
whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement
in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its
evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision,
found that the respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the
appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly
observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions.35 When a basic principle of law is involved and when an
error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable
for gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly
ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite
the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find
the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of
one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an
extension beyond this period only if it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the
debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for approving
or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the
petition.37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period
carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the
rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only
recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from
the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an
extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval
of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for
the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence
and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words
and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should
possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge should
be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep
his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore,
a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although
respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in
the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions
of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance
and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial
temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum
required by the Code and to use temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she]
should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable
observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind of
impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section
6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a
new medium through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.45 While
judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking
activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with
them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to
follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled
to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference
and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social
networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of
joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities,
whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections
1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance
of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-
shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear
in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his
or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of
the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge
makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the
general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore
to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption,
she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the
object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its
speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless
and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and
thus must accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of
morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal
lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct
when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the
same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not
exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section
10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the
following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable
for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to
temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.