City of Manila v.

IAC

FACTS:

Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of the
North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo, from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. Full
payment of the rental therefor amounts to P50.00 and no other document was executed to embody such lease. The
burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery does not reflect the term of duration of the lease in favor
of the Sto. Domingos.

Administrative Order No. 5 of the City Mayor of Manilaprescribes uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing
of documents pertaining to and for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots. Subject lot was leased to the
bereaved family for 5 years only.

On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery authorized the exhumation and removal of
the remains, placing the bones and skull in sack and kept the same in the depositoryof the cemetery. Thereafter,
the lot in question was rented out to another lessee.

The plaintiffs went to the cemetery on All Souls Day and found out that the resting place of their dear departed did
not anymore bear the stone marker which theyplaced on the tomb.

Hence, this case.

The trial courtrendered its decisionordering the defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another single
lot within the North Cemetery for a period of 43years 4 months and 11 days; to searchfor the remains of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Are the operations and functions of a public cemetery a proprietary function?

HELD:

Yes. The operations and functions of a public cemetery are proprietary function. Under Philippine laws, the City of
Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised
by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be
sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on
the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial,
public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the
community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27,
1903 and January 7, 1904. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health
Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains,
and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The
City of Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and
plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is,
therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its
proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of
the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between
them.Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no
penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract.

Ceferino Inciong v.Hon. Eufemio Domingo

FACTS:

Philippine Sugar Commission failed to pay real estate taxes due on its sugar refinery situated at Brgy. Caloocan,
Balayan, Batangas. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas scheduled the sale of said refinery at public auction. To
restrain the sale, PHILSUCOM filed a petition for prohibition in the Court of Appeals against the Provincial Treasurer
and Provincial Assessor of Balayan, Batangas.

Meanwhile, Barangay Caloocan thru petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a Motion for Intervention alleging that
Barangay Caloocan is an indispensable party in the case as it has a 10% share of the property tax sought to be
collected from PHILSUCOM.

PHILSUCOM and the Municipal Treasurer of Balayan, Batangas entered into an Amnesty Compromise Agreement
pursuant to Executive Order No. 42. The agreement was submitted to the Court of Appeals and the case was
accordingly dismissed.

PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer. Out of this amount, the Municipal
Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its share 10% or a total of P719,988.75.

Consequently, Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a case for payment of attorney's fees against the Province of Batangas,
Municipality of Balayan and Barangay Caloocan.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Atty. Ceferino Inciong.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

May Atty. Inciong be awarded the Atty’s fees at 10% ?

HELD:

Yes. Atty Inciong may be awarded the atty’s fees at 10%. As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General,
the position of respondent Chairman of the COA disallowing payment of attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino
Inciong is not proper in the light of the following considerations.

(1) The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by the
Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioner's
employment (Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447).
(2) The Decision dated August 9, 1989 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court, Balayan, Batangas in Civil Case No. 1878,
directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney's fees to petitioner, has become final and executory and is binding
upon Barangay Caloocan (Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 75).

(3) COA Circular No. 86-255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover attorney's fees under the
final and executory Decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court.

In its Comment, the respondent, thru the COA Legal Office states that PHILSUCOM paid the amount of
P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer under the Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, the
Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its share the amount of P719,988.75. This allocation is
erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay Caloocan should only share from the
basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid because the other half should go to the Special
Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share of Barangay Caloocan
should be P359,994.38 only.

Thus, payment of attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong must be in an amount equivalent to 10% of
P359,994.38.

Province of Cebu v.Hon. IAC

FACTS:

Incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila. Vice-GovernorPriscillano Almendras and
3members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province. The deed
of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted
in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The document was prepared and notarized by a private
lawyer, and was later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.

Accordingly the lots donated were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its
public improvement projects. 1 year period was given within which to dispose the donated lots.

Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in
donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was
less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.

Some taxpayers and Atty. Garcia fileda suit to declare the donation illegal, null and void.

Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's
Lien.

Petitioner Province of Cebu opposed stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental
expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees.

HELD:

Yes. Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees. Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is presumed to be
acting under authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to
appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed
on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. (Republic v. Philippine
Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an attorney is employed by an unauthorized
person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented
by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such
acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan Lua v. O'
Brien, 55 Phil. 53). The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officials in allowing respondent Atty.
Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to believe his services were still
necessary.

We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to
which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply
to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the
general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect
to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):

The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable
obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim.
The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the
unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the
municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation specified
in the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and
reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the
true measure of recovery.

Pilar v. Sangguniang Bayan ng Dansol, Pangasinan

FACTS:

Petitioner Expedito Pilar was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan. The Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No.
1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and P16,044.00 per annum
respectively. The said resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such
position is entitled to an annual salary of P16,044.00.

Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary.
The proper provincial and national officials endorsed compliance with Circular 9-A of the Joint Commission on Local
Government and Personnel Administration in giving the revised rate of salary for petitioner.

The Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as the salary of the
petitioner. Thereafter, it was increased to P774.00 per month.
Another resolution appropriating the amount of P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries of the petitioner was
enacted. The resolution was vetoed by the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the petitioner of a petition
for a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner is entitled to payment of damages.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner is entitled to payment of damages. We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to damages and
attorney’s fees because the facts show that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his lawful salary which
was unduly denied him for three (3) years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy petitioner’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New Civil Code).

That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for the miserable plight
of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the
Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of
discretion" as contended by respondents, respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an
arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from
which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in
complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government
that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence,
by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for
exemplary or corrective damages.

Rama v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall of the appointments
of 14 municipal employeeson the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were midnight
appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution.

While the matter was pending before the CSC, employees: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza Oriazel, filed
with the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries alleging thatpetitioner withheld the payment of their salaries and
benefits.aw 1ibrary

The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees, for lack of merit. It
upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC
Field Office in Lucena City.
ISSUE:

Whether the appointment of the 14 employees were valid.

Yes. The appointment of the 14 employees were valid. The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the
matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he
cited to justify his action was that these were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under Article VII, Section
15 of the Constitution. However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of
fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said
appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing
appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief,
"midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.

It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointee’s assumption of the
position in the civil service, "he acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and hearing"
Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed appointment
acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the
Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal,
unless there is valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.