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SECOND DIVISION
[A. C. No. 5305. March 17, 2003]
MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges
the respondent, Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a
lawful order of this Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel
Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.[1] The decretal portion of our
resolution in Atienza reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Respondents dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was
found guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his
incumbency as presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in government
service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors of
the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special
Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a
proviso to the effect that nothing therein should be construed as establishing
an employer-employee relationship between LWUA and respondent, the
inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to circumvent our order barring
respondent from appointment to a government agency. Petitioner points out
in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights and privileges as a regular
employee, to wit:[3]
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with
accessories, as evidenced by the covering Property Issue Slips with
respondent signing as Accountable Employee;[4]
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of
Authorized Travel kept by LWUAs General Services Division[5] and Report of
Travel accomplished by respondent himself;[6]
3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as
brought to light by written instructions personally signed by respondent;[7]
4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various
provinces;[8]
5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as
the Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) Committee, among others, with receipt of corresponding
honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement Vouchers;[9]
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by
the minutes of such meetings;[10] and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct,
gross misconduct, and willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and
show that respondent is unfit to be a member of the Bar.
In his comment,[11] respondent admits the existence of the Legal
Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy Contract. However,
he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to
a consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and
therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular
issued by the Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be
submitted to the Commission for approval. With respect to his designation as
the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water District,
respondent reasons out that the same is not a reappointment, which is
prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said designation is not an organic
appointment to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to respondent,
the CSC need not pass approval upon his temporary designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water
District Board, especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA,
assumed such functions merely by virtue of a designation and only in
addition to their regular duties. In any event, says respondent, his
designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special
Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has never

been renewed since then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties,
respondent admits receiving the cellular phone unit but insists that he
merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA Board of
Trustees Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found that
respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and
fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.
There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, created by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
198.[12] As such, our ruling in the Atienza case, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which
categorically prohibits respondents appointment to any position in any
government-owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and
extends to LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioners
allegations.[13] Instead, he offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to exculpate himself from the
charge against him. However, it does not escape our attention that the very
Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court provides
that the duties enumerated in the consultancy contract are mainly
advisory in nature.[14]
Without belaboring the definition of advisory,[15] it appears obvious to us
that the tasks and duties that respondent performed pursuant to the
consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be deemed
merely advisory in nature.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees
nor does he issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a
seat in such vital LWUA committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also,
respondents continuous receipt of honoraria for sitting as a member of
certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT Committee, belies his claim
that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on record clearly
shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-95[16] refers to payments of honoraria to officials/employees
in consideration of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondents acceptance of his 1998
Productivity Incentive Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26,
Series of 1999, of the LWUA,[17] which governed the release of the
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PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only to officials and employees
(permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed
duties and functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual
employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply, [18] there is a
difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is
governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose
appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on
Appointment and other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and
functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise
of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and
spirit of this Courts decree in Atienza.
The lawyers primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
law and legal processes.[19] That duty in its irreducible minimum entails
obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to this
Courts order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of government, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special
consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a contractual
employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving compensation
and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the Courts
authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. It
is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between
Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper administration of
justice. Such defiance not only erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes
public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that respondent is no
ordinary lawyer. Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very
well aware of the standards of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. His propensity to try to get away with an indiscretion becomes
apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal consultancy contract
with the LWUA.Perhaps realizing its own mistake, LWUA terminated said
contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give him a special
consultancy. This travesty could not be long hidden from public awareness,
hence the instant complaint for disbarment filed by petitioner. Given the
factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar Discipline, we have no
hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the Board of Governors,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be fined and suspended
from the practice of law. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.01,
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
 SPETHICS 3
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deceitful conduct. For violating the Code as well as transgressing his oath as
an officer of the court, his suspension for one (1) year and a fine of ten
thousand (P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is
found liable for having willfully violated a lawfu l order of this Court
in our decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706,
entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to
pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar conduct shall be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Bar Confidant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal records of
respondent as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision
is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in
1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to
fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in
the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at
Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the
Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San
Jose Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena
refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971,
Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following
month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night
in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her
boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had
sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused
his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said
that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still
another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did
not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started
telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur.
He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in
Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her
(Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant,
she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise
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Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not
really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church
wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He
secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage
license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed
his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured
her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their
child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to
Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on
April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also
attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there
was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact
her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of
money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him
there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he
had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-
hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported
the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured
medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and
that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he
repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that
promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been
accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child
before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his
opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging
on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character.
He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member
of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7
C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child
became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was
the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of
immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with
the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral
conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
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This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality
still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the
flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and
morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one
of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so
inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a
thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People
vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the
following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to
fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth
of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another
woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to
hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have
an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez,
Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See
Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that
they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila,
and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to
their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs.
Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous
marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion
Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the
mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished
his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade
her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his
perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar
(Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
 SPETHICS 6
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(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana
congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA
sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975,
She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz,
pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
(Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19
SCRA 439). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that
he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having SO ORDERED.
sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage
between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You
are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you
along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin,
for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always
be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil.
586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous
relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman
separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who
became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases.
This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil.
1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with
Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They
indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual,

tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to
impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between
the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in
writing to him with impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence

of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint
for disbarment against Villanueva.

THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 6116 - August 1, 2012]
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
v.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to
give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees
the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda
Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the estate
of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan). Their agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August
11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed commission
notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total
estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a
letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after
respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%.
He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which respondent
ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high
moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his
legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also
accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the
required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case
on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He
disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that
Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in
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his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for the corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.6ςrνll
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer
this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and
Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1)
year from the active practice of law, for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-
4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October 28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty
to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above
standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the
execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997
letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's
commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly,
respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits
a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not
obtain in the case at bar.
 SPETHICS 8
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Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned SO ORDERED.
his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four
children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral
fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The
settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that
respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to

have been sufficiently established. A "business" requires some form of
investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can
be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single
person without showing that such service is made available to other
persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that
respondent is engaged in the business of lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his

actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal,
or committed under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain
here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is

found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of

respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then
Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo
charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and
acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint was
forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant
to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days from notice.
Complainant complied and submitted to the Commission on 27
September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was
declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required complainant to
submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16 December
1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of
the 16 December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another
hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989
was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and
second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as
complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set
aside the order of default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled
were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the
Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled". In an
order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the parties
(respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and
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explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a
formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen (15) days from
notice. Neither party responded and nothing was heard from either party
since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the
Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court its
report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him that any
further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely,
and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent
should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and
out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple
lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova
left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself
married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova.
Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a
sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time
failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an
apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate
from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del
Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home from
beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of
his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon
returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her
daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her
(complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and
had taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and
his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
 SPETHICS 10
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corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as
children. a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly
disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual relations with the
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live
complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have maintained
with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give
for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.
support to his legitimate family.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2)
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from
years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in
complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had been
full view of the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his
reconciled with each other.
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between another woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not young daughter to live with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show
practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The
that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has
On the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for
and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that
membership in the Bar in good standing.
he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States,
held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law
... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is
important to note that the lack of moral character that we here refer to
as essential is not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel, the
respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single,
21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him
a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was particularly morally
repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and
thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he
had himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 8698 August 31, 2016
MANUEL B. BERNALDEZ, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. WILMA DONNA C. ANQUILO-GARCIA, Respondent
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For resolution is the complaint1 dated August 2, 2010 filed by Manuel B.
Bernaldez (complainant) charging respondent Atty. Wilma Donna C.
Anquilo-Garcia (Atty. Anquilo-Garcia) with gross misconduct, deceit,
violation of Lawyer's Oath, and abuse of authority as notary public.
Antecedent Facts
In his complaint, the complainant alleges that during the 2010 National
and Local Elections, Atty. Anquilo-Garcia coerced and threatened
registered voters in the Municipality of Biri, Northern Samar to sign blank
and ready-made affidavits stating that they were illiterate/disabled
voters when in fact, they were not and that they needed assistors in
voting. 2
According to the complainant, the scheme was employed by Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia to ensure the victory of her husband,' Jaime Garcia, Jr.
(Garcia Jr.), who was running for Mayor in Biri, Northern Samar.3
Moreover, the complainant avers that the affiants never appeared before
Atty. Anquilo-Garcia nor was it possible for her to go to Catarman,
Northern Samar which is 50 kilometers away by land and sea from Biri,
Northern Samar to execute the affidavits on the election day itself.4
On September 1, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution5 directing Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia to submit her Comment within 10 days from receipt
thereof. In her comment,6 Atty. Anquilo-Garcia denied having prepared
ready-made affidavits and contended that what she prepared and
notarized were affidavits of affiants who sought her help and services as
notary public so that they may be allowed to vote with assistors because
of difficulty in reading and/or some physical disability.7
Moreover, she asserted that the affiants personally appeared before her
on May 10, 2010 in Biri, Northern Samar and voluntarily executed the
affidavits without being threatened, intimidated and paid. She alleged
that the affidavits attached to the complaint were manufactured and/or
SPETHICS 11
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falsified in order to suit the allegations of the complainant, her husband
Garcia Jr.'s opposing candidate for the mayoralty. The same affidavits
were also used as exhibits in the election protest filed by the
complainant against Garcia Jr. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catarman, Northern Samar, docketed as Election Protest (E.P.) Case No.
38.8
In the Resolution9 dated December 6, 2010, the Court referred the
instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of
the record.
On December 1, 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
issued a notice requiring both parties to appear for a mandatory
conference.10
On March 22, 2012, the IBP-CBD issued an Order11 declaring the
mandatory conference closed and terminated. Both parties were then
required to file their respective verified position papers within a period of
10 days from receipt thereof.
On June 28, 2013, before the case was resolved, the complainant filed
his Affidavit of Withdrawal12 of the complaint stating that he is desisting
from pursuing the instant disbarment case. He stated that the filing of
the instant case was merely due to misapprehension of facts and
misunderstanding of the incidents.
Resolutions of the IBP
On April 29, 2015, Commissioner Giovanne T. Lim (Commissioner Lim)
issued his Report and Recommendation13recommending that the instant
case against Atty. Anquilo-Garcia be dismissed without prejudice.
Commissioner Lim stated that since the alleged irregularities perpetrated
by Atty. Anquilo-Garcia are the subject of the election protest filed by
the complainant before the RTC and made subject of this disbarment
case, it is premature to rule on the administrative liability of Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia pending resolution of the election protest. 14
As to the withdrawal of the complaint, Commissioner Lim held that in
disbarment cases, the desistance or withdrawal on. the part of the
complainant is not sufficient to terminate the administrative proceedings.
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution15 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Lim after finding the same to be supported by the
evidence on record and applicable laws.

Ruling of the Court
To begin with, it must be stressed that administrative proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis and they belong to a class of their own.
They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of its officers.16 The instant administrative case is,
thus, distinct from and may proceed independently of the election case.
E.P. Case No. 38 refers to an election contest involving fraud or
irregularities committed in the conduct of the elections, while the present
disbarment case seeks to discipline Atty. Anquilo-Garcia as a lawyer for
her alleged gross misconduct, deceit, violation of her oath as a lawyer,
and abuse of authority as notary public. Thus, there is no need to await
the final resolution of the election protest filed by the complainant before
the instant disbarment case may be acted upon.
Likewise, the fact that the complainant filed a withdrawal of the
complaint during the pendency of this case is of no moment. In Ventura
v. Atty. Samson,17 the Court held that the complainant's affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of abating the administrative
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law
and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern.18
The Court now resolves the substantive matters surrounding the case.
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required
is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant."19 Here, the complainant failed to show by clear
preponderance of evidence that Atty. Anquilo-Garcia coerced any
registered voters in the Municipality of Biri, Northern Samar to sign the
alleged blank and ready-made affidavits. Apparently, the affidavits
presented by the complainant point to other persons responsible in the
employment of force, intimidation or threat upon the voters in the
Municipality.20
With regard, however, to the charge of abuse of authority as notary
public, the Court finds that the affidavits prepared by Atty. Anquilo-
Garcia were notarized without the personal presence of the affiants, in
violation of the notarial law which the Court cannot countenance.
The complaint clearly established that Atty. Anquilo-Garcia notarized the
subject affidavits without having the affiants personally appear before
her as required by law. The Court, likewise, finds no merit with her
defense that the headings of the affidavits which indicated Municipality of
Biri, and in some Catarman, Northern Samar as the place of execution
were just simple and harmless clerical and typographical errors.
SPETHICS 12
Canon 1
A cursory perusal of the affidavits of the concerned registered voters of
the Municipality of Biri sufficiently shows that these affidavits were
merely handed to them at the polling precincts on election day, bearing
already the signature and notarial seal of Atty. Anquilo-Garcia.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers commissioned as
notaries public that the affiants must personally appear before them.
Rule IV, Section 2(b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reads:
Section 2. Prohibitions -
xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.1âwphi1
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are reminded that their
functions should not be trivialized and they must discharge their powers
and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and
fidelity. They must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most
importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of
illegal transactions. 21
Atty. Anquilo-Garcia's failure to perform her duty as a notary public
undermines the integrity of a notary public and degrades the function of
notarization.1âwphi1 Thus, she should be liable for such negligence, not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.22
In Gonzales v. Atty. Ramos,23 the Court imposed a penalty of suspension
from the practice of law against respondent lawyer for a period of one
(1) year and disqualified hi from appointment as notary public for two
(2) years for notaruzing a Deed of Sale without the presence of affiants.
The same was adopted by the Court in te recent case of Agbulos v. Atty.
Viray24 wherein the notary public was meted out the same penalty for
preparing an affidavit and notarizing it without the affiant’s personal
appearance.
Under the facts and circumstances of the case and jurisprudence, Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia's notarial commission should not only be suspended but
she must also be suspended from the practice of law.25
Considering, however, the absence of bad faith on the part of Atty.
Anquilo-Garcia and that this is her first infraction after her long years of
membership in the Bar, the Court finds that the less severe penalties of
 SPETHICS 13
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suspension for six (6) months in the practice of law and disqualification
from reappointment as notary public for a period of one (1) year are
proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE; premises considered, the Court RESOLVES to:

(i) NOTE the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-547 dated June 20,
2015 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and dismissing the complaint against Atty.
Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia without prejudice;
(ii) NOTE the Letter dated April 14, 2016 of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline transmitting the documents
pertaining to this case;
(iii) REVOKE the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Wilma Donna
C. Anquilo-Garcia for breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice;
and DISQUALIFY her from reappointment as notary public for a period
of ONE (1) YEAR; and
(iv) SUSPEND Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective immediately for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Wilma Donna C. Anquilo-Garcia's
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
April 7, 1922
In Re MARCELINO LONTOK
MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of
Marcelino Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands,
because of having been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The
respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and
bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor-
General Harrison.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This judgement was affirmed on
appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case
before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February
9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following
tenor:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine
Organic Act on August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case
of Marcelino Lontok convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to
imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which
sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme
Court is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be
guilty of any misconduct.
The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the
Attorney-General relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok,
provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21) That conviction of the crime
of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law,
cannot be doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the
pardon by the Governor-General. On the one hand, it is contended by
the Government that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the
crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is
SPETHICS 14
Canon 1
contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offense for
which he was convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked
upon as guilty of it.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on
the right of a court of disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On
close examination, however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in
the decisions is more apparent than real, and arises from differences in
the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based.
Where preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a
conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a
pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any
proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 Cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State
[1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343). But where proceedings to disbar an
attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved in a
transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been
held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment
proceedings, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute
proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is
not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law. (People vs.
Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900],186 Ill., 122;
Nelson vs. Com. [1908],128 Ky., 779; Case of In re ———— [1881],86
N.Y., 563.)
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly
in point. The petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law in
the United States courts, without first taking an oath to the effect that he
had never voluntarily given aid to any government hostile to the United
States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems, had been a
member of the Conferate Congress, during the secession of the South,
but had been pardons by the President of the United States. It was held,
buy a divided court, that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of
law for the offense named would be to enforce a punishment for the
offense, notwithstanding the pardon which the court had no right to do;
and the opinion of the court, in part, said:
 SPETHICS 15
Canon 1

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense

and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.

There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore

offices forfeited, or property or interest vested in others in
consequence of the conviction and judgement.

Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting

justices, in the Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the
court, we feel ourselves under obligation to follow the rule laid down by
the majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more grace
when we recall that according to the article 130 of the Penal Code, one
of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by
pardon. We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based
solely on the judgement of conviction for a crime of which the
respondent has been pardoned, We must also remember that the motion
for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for crime of
which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the
pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature
to a parole. It may be mentioned however, in this connection, that if
Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition
of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to
disbarment.

It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be

granted, and that the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be
taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So
ordered.

EN BANC
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO
Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar,
admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the
Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death.
Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on
June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent
was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958.
The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim
in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying
that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule
127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting
the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the
authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil.
293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason
of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without
doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In
re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means
an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex
rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-
429.
SPETHICS 16
Canon 1
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon
extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on
disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok
case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter
pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court
decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's
name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before
us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon
granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio
decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely.
In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343;
and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the
record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis
for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when
offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and
could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a
conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force
as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of
this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction
which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland,
4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there
cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval
in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
 SPETHICS 17
Canon 1

rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional,

and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not
reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full
pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with
rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable

here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in
defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its
having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official
position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the
use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up

to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission
of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the
risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263,
27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the

nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been
convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of
lawyers.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 439 September 30, 1982
IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES
ESCOLIN, J.:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the
practice of law and the inclusion of his name in the roll of attorneys.
The records disclose that the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental in
a decision promulgated on September 30, 1955 found petitioner guilty of
falsification of public document, penalized under Article 117 of the
Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence
ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties to the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the
court found that petitioner, as a member of the bar and in his capacity
as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de
Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced
heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court, finding that the document
was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of conviction; and
upon finality thereof, petitioner commenced service of the sentence.
Thereafter, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the criminal case,
instituted before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner.
The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961. 1
On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted
petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" and restored him "to full
civil and political rights. 2
Since August 23, 1968, petitioner had repeatedly sought readmission to
the practice of law, the first of which was denied by this Court in a
minute resolution dated August 30, 1968.
SPETHICS 18
Canon 1
On February 27, 1970, petitioner reiterated his plea, but consideration
thereof was deferred "until after the integration of the bar has been
effected." 3
On December 12, 1977, he filed another petition, attaching thereto
copies, among others, of the following documents, to wit: the resolution
of the Negros Oriental Bar Association signed by 78 members thereof,
indorsing his plea for reinstatement 4 ; the certificate of the mayor of the
municipality of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, where petitioner has been
residing, to the effect that the latter "is a person of exemplary moral
character, a peace-loving and law-abiding citizen 5a certification of
Governor William B. Villegas of Negros Oriental, attesting to the fact that
since the grant of absolute pardon to petitioner, "he has comported
himself as a morally straight and respectable citizen and that he has
been active and has cooperated in civic and social undertakings, sincere
and honest in his desire to lead a decent and dignified life" 6 ; the
certification of Dean Eduardo G. Flores of the College of Law, Siliman
University, vouching to petitioner's "honest, upright and moral life ... and
because of his conduct he has earned the sympathy of the people of the
community and regained the confidence of the people and of his other
associates: 7 the statement of Atty. Alexander G. Amor, former president
of the Negros Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
certifying "that Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces ... is a person of good moral
character, whose integrity is beyond question" 8 ; and the clearance
certificates issued by Judge Romeo R. Solis of the City Court of
Dumaguete, Provincial Fiscal Andrew S. Namukatkat of Negros Oriental,
and City Fiscal Pablo E. Cabahug of Dumaguete City, to the effect that
petitioner "is a person of good moral character" and that since his
release from the national penitentiary he "has never been accused or
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude." 9
When asked to comment, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through
its then president, Atty. Marcelo D. Fernan, favorably indorsed
petitioner's request for reinstatement.
On February 13, 1978, Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, complainant in the
original disbarment proceedings, filed an opposition to the petitions for
reinstatement; and this was followed by a telegram of Nicanor Vailoces,
barangay captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros, Oriental, addressed to his
Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and referred to this Court,

opposing petitioner's readmission to the bar "on grounds of his non-
reformation, immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed
lawyer."
Anent these oppositions, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through
Atty. Fernan, made the following observations:
By resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 24, 1978, the
following matters have been referred to the Integrated Bar for
comment:
(1) The opposition of complainant Ledesma de Jesus-Paras to
respondent's petition and supplementary petition for reinstatement in
the roll of attorneys; and
(2) The telegram dated February 16, 1978 of Nicanor Vailoces,
Barangay Captain of Domolog, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, addressed to
his Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos, requesting the Office of the
President to oppose the petition of Quinciano Vailoces for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys on grounds stated therein.
It may be recalled that on January 17, 1978, the Board of Governors
of the Integrated Bar transmitted to the Honorable Supreme Court
for its favorable consideration the above stated petition for
reinstatement.
Subsequent to its being served with a copy of the resolution of the
Supreme Court, the Integrated Bar received a petition dated
February 14, 1978 signed by 'the people of the Municipality of
Bindoy, Province of Negros Oriental' vehemently opposing the
reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces in the Roll of Attorneys. On October 5,
1978 the President of the Integrated Bar wrote to Mr. Vailoces asking
him to comment on the above mentioned petitions and telegram.
This Office is now in receipt of Mr. Vailoces' comment dated
November 3, 1978, which is being forwarded herewith to the
Honorable Supreme Court together with other pertinent papers.
It is believed that Mr. Vailoces' comment is a satisfactory answer to
the adverse allegations and charges which have been referred to
SPETHICS 19
Canon 1
him. The charges of immorality (publicly maintaining a querida) and
gambling are general statements devoid of particular allegations of
fact and may well be disregarded. Then, too, the Municipal Mayor of
Bindoy, Negros Oriental - namely, Mr. Jesus A. Mana-ay - who tops
the list of persons who have signed the February 14, 1978 petition
vehemently opposing the reinstatement of Mr. Vailoces, appears to
be the very same official who on October 25, 1977 issued a
Certification to the effect that Mr. Vailoces 'is personally known to me
as a person of exemplary character, a peace loving and law abiding
citizen' and that 'he is cooperative in all our civic and social activities
and that he is one of our respectable citizens in our community.' That
this official should now sign a petition containing statements exactly
opposite in thrust and tenor is very intriguing, to say the least, and it
is not altogether difficult to believe Mr. Vailoces' imputations of
politics in the conduct of Mayor Mana-ay.
As for the opposition of Mrs. Ledesma de Jesus-Paras, the alleged
absence of remorse on the part of Mr. Vailoces, and his alleged
belligerence and display of open defiance and hostility, etc. are
matters so subjective in character that her general allegations and
charges in this regard cannot be properly considered. It is significant
that Mr. Vailoces in his comment states: "If she is indeed that much
desperately so in need of cash assistance, considering really that she
is an old woman being recently widowed the second time, for her
satisfaction and as a gesture of goodwill, I am willing to assist her
but only with a modest amount because I am only a small farmer
with still three college students to support."
Regarding the telegram dated February 16, 1978 of one Nicanor
Vailoces stating as grounds for denial of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces'
petition for reinstatement the alleged 'grounds of non-reformation,
immoral conduct and pretensions of being a licensed lawyer by
soliciting cases,' there is such a lack of specificity and particularity in
such statement of grounds that one is at a loss as to how a person in
the place of Mr. Quinciano D. Vailoces could properly defend himself
against such charges.
Thus, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines reaffirmed its indorsement of
petitioner's "reinstatement in the rolls of attorneys."
 SPETHICS 20
Canon 1

This Court likewise referred the oppositions interposed by Mrs. Ledesma Indeed, there is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an
de Jesus-Paras and Nicanor Vailoces to the Solicitor General for irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the lawyer's oath.
investigation and recommendation; and on August 4, 1982, the latter,
after conducting an investigation, submitted his report, recommending WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered
that "Quinciano D. Vailoces be reinstated in the roll of attorneys upon reinstated in the roll of attorneys.
taking his oath anew of the corresponding oath of office."
SO ORDERED.
The Court sustains the conclusion of the Solicitor General that petitioner
has sufficiently proven himself fit to be readmitted to the practice of law.
True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does
not of itself warrant his reinstatement.

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to

reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had
been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except
that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an
original evidence [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 815]

The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is whether

applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which that
phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and
proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an
attorney ... [7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client, Sept. 41, p. 816].

Petitioner's conduct after disbarment can stand searching scrutiny. He

has regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well
as of the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros Oriental Chapter, the
testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros
Oriental as well as the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings in the
community attest to his moral reform and rehabilitation and justify his
reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years of age, has reached the twilight
of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a
period of 21 years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.

Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges

with all his honor ... that if reinstated in the roll of attorneys he will
surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily."
 SPETHICS 21
Canon 1

basis of their assertion therein that they had not signed the affidavit of
waiver/withdrawal.8 They thereby further charged him with dishonesty
EN BANC
for concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as
A.C. No. 11099, September 27, 2016
a state prosecutor. They averred that he was disqualified for the position
because he had already been 70 years old at the time of his
LILY FLORES-SALADO, MINDA FLORES LURA, AND FE V.
appointment,9 having been born on June 26, 1936; that they submitted
FLORES, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA,
as proof: (1) the residence certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo
JR. Respondent.
Villanueva, Jr.," whom they claimed was the respondent himself, stating
June 26, 1936 as his birthdate;10 (2) the deed of extrajudicial partition of
DECISION
the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing that the respondent was 14
years old when he signed the document as "Isabelo Villanueva";11 (3)
BERSAMIN, J.:
the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South
Disbarment proceedings based on falsification or forgery of public
Cotabato12 showing that he was 26 years old when he got married on
documents should not be the occasion to establish the falsification or
December 24, 1961; and (4) the affidavits respectively executed by his
forgery. Such bases should first be duly and competently established
siblings, Francisca V. Flores13and Tarcela V. Sajulan.14
either in criminal or civil proceedings appropriate for that purpose.
The respondent denied the charges, and imputed ill-motives to the
The Case
complainants in filing the disbarment complaint against him.15 He
contended that the complainants did not present sufficient proof showing
We hereby consider and resolve the disbarment complaint lodged against
that he had falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal; and asserted that
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a public document
the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the
concerning realty, and for allegedly concealing his true age m order to
compromise agreement entered into by him and his siblings, including
secure his appointment as state prosecutor.
Francisca, the complainants' mother;16 and that he had been born on
November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate.17
Antecedents
IBP Report and Recommendation
Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores-Lura, Anacorito Flores, Angel Flores, Jr.,
and Fe Flores presented their adverse claim1 on the parcel of land
After due hearing, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez of the IBP
situated in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte and registered under Transfer
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) submitted his report and
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7919 of the Registry of Deeds of Agusan del
recommendation18 finding the respondent liable for gross misconduct in
Norte under the names of Spouses Roman Villanueva, Jr. and Rosario L.
relation to the forged the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, and
Alipao.2 The Register of Deeds annotated the adverse claim on January
recommended his two-year suspension from the practice of law.
23, 2007 as Entry No. 67251.3 On December 27, 2007, an affidavit of
Commissioner Fernandez dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation
waiver/withdrawal, which appeared to have been signed by them,4 was
to the respondent's age because his birth certificate prevailed over the
also annotated on TCT No. 7919 as Entry No. 72573.5 On March 26,
documents submitted by the complainants.19
2008, the Register of Deeds canceled TCT No. 7919,6 and issued two
new TCTs in the name of the respondent.7chanrobleslaw
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XX-2013-27820 adopting the report and recommendation of
On October 29, 2009, complainants Lily Flores-Salado, Minda Flores
Commissioner Fernandez, viz.:
Lura, and Fe Flores lodged their complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-278
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al. vs.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent was guilty of gross misconduct when he
falsified an Affidavit of Waiver/Withdrawal by reason of which TCT Nos.
RT-8320 and 8381 in his name were issued, Atty. Roman A. Villanueva,
Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years. However, the charge of falsifying his age to qualify as DOJ
Prosecutor is hereby Dismissed for lack of merit.21 (Bold emphasis in the
original)
The pat1ies respectively sought reconsideration.22 On June 6, 2015, the
IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for
reconsideration but granted that of the complainants, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XXI-2015-417
CBD Case No. 10-2684
Lily Salado, et al.
Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr.
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there
being no cogent reason to reverse the findings and resolution subject of
the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration.
RESOLVED FUTHER, to GRANT the Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration, considering Respondent's gross dishonesty by making
himself younger when he applied as Public Prosecutor in the Department
of Justice. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-278, dated March 20, 2013, is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification, increasing the penalty imposed
on Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. to Suspension from the practice of
law for three (3) years.23 (Bold emphasis in the original)
SPETHICS 22
Canon 1
Issue
Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross
misconduct and gross dishonesty?
Ruling of the Court
We reverse the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors considering that the charges were not competently
substantiated.
I
Falsification must be proved in the
appropriate criminal or civil proceeding,
not in the disbarment proceeding
The complainants support their allegations of falsification by presenting
the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal itself and its annotation on TCT No.
7919; and by denying their having signed the same. However, such
proof was inadequate to establish that the respondent had been the
author of the alleged falsification of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.
We emphasize that allegations of falsification or forgery must be
competently proved because falsification or forgery cannot be
presumed.24 As such, the allegations should first be established and
determined in appropriate proceedings,25cralawred like in criminal or civil
cases, for it is only by such proceedings that the last word on the falsity
or forgery can be uttered by a court of law with the legal competence to
do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the occasion to determine the
issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be
addressed and determined therein is whether or not the respondent
attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the
dispensation of justice.26 Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether
or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior determination
thereof in the appropriate proceeding.
Moreover, the complainants have hereby challenged the due execution
and authenticity of the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal, a notarized
document.27 In view of this, the complainants' mere denial of having
signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the

positive value of it as a notarized document.28 It is settled that
notarization converts a private document into a public document,
whereby the document becomes entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face.29 The notarized document then has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and to overcome the presumed regularity of its execution,
whoever alleges the contrary should present evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.30chanrobleslaw
II
The birth certificate is the best evidence
of the respondent's date of birth
The complainants have also charged the respondent with dishonesty for
having concealed his true age in order to secure his appointment as a
state prosecutor. They have presented in support of the charge the
residence certificate issued in the name of one "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.";
an extrajudicial settlement signed by one "Isabelo Villanueva"; the
certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato
showing that the respondent was 26 years old when he got married in
1961; and the affidavits of the respondent's two siblings.
In contrast, the respondent submitted his certificate of birth that
indicated his birthdate as "November 29, 1943."
Still, the complainants doubted the veracity of the respondent's bit1h
certificate on the ground of its having been belatedly registered at his
own instance.
The Court nonetheless finds for the respondent.
Firstly, as previously emphasized, the allegation of the falsity of the
affidavit of waiver/withdrawal should first be determined in the
appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in this proceeding for
disbarment. Consequently, we desist from definitively ruling on the
weight of the evidence presented by the complainants.
Secondly, a birth certificate consists of entries related to the fact of birth
in public records, and is made in the performance of duty by the local
civil registrar as a public officer.31 It is thus treated as the prima
facie evidence of the fact of one's birth, and can be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As such, the birth
certificate submitted by the respondent was decisive on the date of his
SPETHICS 23
Canon 1
birth in the absence of clearer and more convincing contrary evidence.
Thirdly, the veracity of the respondent's birth certificate cannot be
successfully assailed on the basis alone of its being belatedly entered in
the local civil registry. This is because the State expressly allows the late
registration of births not only at the instance of the father, mother, or
guardian in case the person whose birth is to be registered is under 18
years of age, but also at the instance of the person himself when already
of age.33c
To accord with such policy of the State, the fact of late registration of the
respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries
made in his birth certificate.
And, finally, it is fitting to state that the complainants bore the burden of
proof in this disbarment proceeding against the respondent. They must
establish their charges of falsification and dishonesty by convincing and
satisfactory proof.34 Surmises, suspicion and conjectures are not bases of
finding his culpability.35 The foregoing disquisitions on the falsification
show that the complainants did not discharge their burden of proof
thereon. They also did not convincingly establish that the respondent
had willfully adjusted his true age to secure his appointment as a state
prosecutor. Indeed, the appointment happened on February 22,
200636 but his late registration of his birth occurred on July 3, 2006. 37 If
the intention for the late registration was to make it appear that he still
met the age requirement for public prosecutors, he should have effected
the late registration prior to the appointment, not several months
subsequently. In addition, he submitted a "Voter Certification" showing
him to be a registered voter of Balagtas (Bigaa), Bulacan on September
20, 2003, and to have been born on November 29, 1943.38Under the
circumstances, that he had intentionally adjusted his birthdate to enable
himself to meet the age requirement for the position of state prosecutor
three years later became plainly improbable.
III
Disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers
in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices
having administrative supervision over them
 SPETHICS 24
Canon 1

The Court finds the need to clarify that although it may entertain a
disbarment or suspension complaint brought against a lawyer employed
in the government service whether or not the complaint pertained to an
act or conduct unrelated to the discharge of his official functions,39 the
investigation should be carried out by the agency or office having
administrative supervision over him or her when the allegations of the
complaint relate to the qualifications of the respondent to be appointed
to the public office.

Accordingly, any questions pertaining to the qualifications of the

respondent to be appointed as a state prosecutor should be directed to
the Secretary of Justice who had administrative supervision over him
under the law,40 and not to this Court in the guise of the disbarment
complaint. The complaint for disbarment is sui generis, and the
proceeding thereon should focus only on the qualification and fitness of
the respondent lawyer to continue membership in the
Bar.41chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint against

Atty. Roman A. Villanueva, Jr. for lack of factual and legal merit.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9464, August 24, 2016
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK, PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS
MARCO I. AVANCEÑA, Complainant, v. ATTY. REBECCA S.
FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A complaint for disbarment based on the respondent attorney's alleged
moral turpitude cannot prosper after the criminal cases charging him
with offenses involving moral turpitude were dismissed by the competent
trial courts. The rule regarding this ground for disbarment requires the
respondent attorney's conviction of the offense involving moral turpitude
by final judgment.
Antecedents
On March 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a
letter from the attorney for complainant Intradent Zahnetchnik
Philippines, Inc. informing about several criminal cases filed and pending
against respondent Rebecca Francisco-Simbillo. The criminal cases had
been filed by the complainant to charge the respondent with estafa and
qualified theft in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City
(docketed as I.S. No. XV-12-INV-11-J-03189), and with violation of
Article 291 of the Revised Penal Code in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City (docketed as I.S. No. XV-03-INV-11-J-08553). The
complainant pointed out that the charges for estafa and qualified theft
involved moral turpitude.1chanrobleslaw
At the time, the results of the 2011 Bar Examinations had just been
released, and the respondent was among those who had passed. She
was in due course formally notified by the OBC of the letter of the
complainant, and thereby required to file her comment within 15 days
from notice. The OBC also informed her that she could join the mass
oath taking for the new lawyers, but she would not be allowed to enroll
her name in the Roll of Attorneys until the charges against her had been
cleared.2 Upon the advice of the OBC, she had the other option to sign
the Roll of Attorneys subject to the condition that the letter of the
complainant would be automatically converted to a disbarment complaint
SPETHICS 25
Canon 1
against her. Choosing the latter, she signed the Roll of Attorneys on May
3, 2012.3chanrobleslaw
In her comment, the respondent stated that she had been employed by
the complainant for four years; that her employment had lasted until she
was illegally dismissed; that she instituted a labor case against the
complainant; that the criminal charges filed against her were intended to
malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force her to desist from
pursuing the labor case; and that at the time of the filing of her
comment, the criminal complaints brought against her were still pending
determination of probable cause by the respective Offices of the City
Prosecutor.4chanrobleslaw
On June 8, 2012, the respondent filed a manifestation stating that the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had already dismissed the
criminal charge docketed as XV-12-INV-11-J-03189.5
The complainant immediately countered that although the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Parañaque City had dismissed its complaint
for estafa and qualified theft, it had timely brought an appeal to the
Department of Justice (DOJ); and that the criminal case against the
respondent should still be considered as pending.6chanrobleslaw
On February 18, 2015, the respondent filed a motion seeking the
resolution of this disbarment case, alleging that the DOJ had denied the
complainant's appeal in respect of XV-12-INV-11-J-03189; and that as to
the criminal charge docketed as XV-03-INV-11-J-08553, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City had filed an information against her in the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City, but Branch 33 of that court had
eventually dismissed the information upon the Prosecution's motion for
the withdrawal of the information with leave of court.7chanrobleslaw
Issue
May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper?
Ruling of the Court
We rule in favor of the respondent.
 SPETHICS 26
Canon 1

We observe that this administrative case started as a complaint to WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this disbarment case against
prevent the respondent from being admitted to the Philippine Bar on the respondent Arty. Rebecca S. Francisco-Simbillo.
ground of the existence of criminal charges brought against her for
crimes involving moral turpitude. Indeed, Section 2, Rule 138 of SO ORDERED.
the Rules of Court requires that any applicant for admission to the Bar
must show that no charges against him or her for crimes involving moral
turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
However, this administrative case has since been converted to one for
disbarment but without the complainant, which has all the while
continued to actively participate herein, alleging any ground for finding
the respondent administratively liable except those already averred in its
letter to the OBC. The complainant has not also shown that there were
other criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed against the
respondent.

Under Section 27,8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be
disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct;
(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the
lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a
case without authority so to do. In fine, in order to hold the lawyer
amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her having committed a
crime involving moral turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a
pending case involving moral turpitude against him or her, because
Section 27 of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been
found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude.

The complainant did not allege, much less prove, that the respondent
had been convicted by final judgment of any criminal offense involving
moral turpitude. On the contrary, the criminal cases that were the sole
bases for the complaint for disbarment had already been dismissed after
due proceedings. Although the complainant might have availed itself of
the available remedies to review or reverse the dismissals, it behooves
the Court to terminate this case against her now considering that, as
indicated, the mere existence or pendency of the criminal charges for
crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment or
suspension of an attorney.9

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation
of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant")
stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a
public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge
for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint,
stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was
prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a
real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and
thereby disqualified to own real property in his name –
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr.
Donton, a Filipino.
SPETHICS 27
Canon 1
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to
prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of
title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of
the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier
had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed
that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and
due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the
cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to
the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of
Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before
the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would
already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also
said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family
and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for
reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as
the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02
of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which
will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and
obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary
action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen,
was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property
despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised
and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
SPETHICS 28
Canon 1
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his
oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from
the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually
permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent
Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after
nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH
DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in
this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between
the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein
petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an
extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of
reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity.
Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve
their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial
proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his
father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda
Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph
International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on
a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light,
power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of
daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land
preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending to such
other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this
purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house
there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City
with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments
and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August,
1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical
SPETHICS 29
Canon 1
removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation
which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan.
In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent
took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive
compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and
written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and
legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI,
Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No.
0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back
wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by
the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the
termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering
private respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty
for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the
Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth
Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for
lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues
for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed;
(2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back
wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not
he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by
private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts

received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the
same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there
was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General
recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent
sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in
RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to
submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's
resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February
12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings
of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the
labor arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the
action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of
the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an
action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and
therefore the only heir against his own father.9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations
were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special
considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and
private respondent had with each other, were personal matters
affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the
complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal
relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal
because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the
requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse
of discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter
who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by
petitioner of his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private
respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda
Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question
SPETHICS 30
Canon 1
the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only
questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private
respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the
corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section
16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide
that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of
an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the
Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable
means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall
be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the
interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a
case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other
than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who
heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not
impair the validity of the judgment,11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly
and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of
the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter
Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December
5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no
procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code
relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in
the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal
precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not
defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in
his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments.

The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural
niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process
dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized
cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor
Code enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly
terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c)
fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime
or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative;
and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to
the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof,
with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided
by law.15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued
employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his
and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the
other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his
work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public
respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor
arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not
illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases,
in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally
accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as
herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative
SPETHICS 31
Canon 1
agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial
review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this
point deserve acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from
October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as
abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner
was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the
anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of
Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical
bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22,
1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in
Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to
recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the
hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to
live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's
illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi
III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to
December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie
(Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social Legislation, 1989
edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328),
the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from
which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to
work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid
cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . .
Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not
want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his
residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and
strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to
show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a
letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to
assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was
unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no
intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of
petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which
required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private
respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former
admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even
advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again.
The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for
recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending
physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of
malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and
unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is
required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment.22
SPETHICS 32
Canon 1
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner
unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the
law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is
why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to
go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the
sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all
times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every
aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely
not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite
successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production
during the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner
during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when
petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and
minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private
respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying
that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his
functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's
personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties
as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the
farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no
formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein
for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence
would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably
among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet
uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement
in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an
employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his
salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the
end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became
convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he
considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason,

no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent,
whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere
gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none
of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984
that private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or
allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been
saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez
taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him,
"(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges
with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his
job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after the latter
abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial
abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent
undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital
and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work,
petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of
various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the
last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant
and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered
and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as
expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner
contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without
deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as
farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of
abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two
elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such
intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
SPETHICS 33
Canon 1
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure
of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from
work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not
without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As
to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates
by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given
credence as even after January, 1983, when private respondent
supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at
the farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his
position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly
evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment
from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm
equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod
through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex
Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and
oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of,
relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a
father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands
for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these
transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums
involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to
just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by
someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor,
and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had
abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to
oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or expected
of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer
can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to
perform work-related tasks:

It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically
stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident
of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL,
am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited
planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS'
ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am
entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and
in my name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to
sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts
or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my
said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to
turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the
receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to
have been terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore,
petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the
stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax
reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the
SPETHICS 34
Canon 1
complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has
abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as
witness for private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner
supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We
perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the
presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to
serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. Private
respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration
Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine
and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether
denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is
no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he
continued to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The
change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the
receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be
determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar
circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the
nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's
welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary
and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's
alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary
resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after
the latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no
abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services
rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were
not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out
of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation
without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire
to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a

ground for termination by the employee of his employment38 does not
square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation
by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor
Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition,
argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer
seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation
obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner
on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor
cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last
known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify
a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the
reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
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Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly
report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of
work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying
therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their
dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of
employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance
and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no
question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was
never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent
controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no
notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the
certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for
Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the
employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it
nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the
employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of
the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the
employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While
it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements
of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance
the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the
effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in
favor of the employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case,
the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense
of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow
showed that he failed to notify the Department of Labor and
Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as
required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid

termination by an employer was not complied with. This however,
would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid
cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed
on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due
process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC,
170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an
employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded re-
employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of
the rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the
employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the
present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without
due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not
abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding
the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles
an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and,
instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private
respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the
fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office,
as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the
employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain
terms the right of every worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to
this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the
relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
SPETHICS 36
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backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however,
on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said
provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain
events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of
granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment
of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is
therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and
just share of what the law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's
ratiocination, to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was
withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188
SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173
SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to
reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and
the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company which
no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive
and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently
order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and
liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated.
Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case
of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC,
188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be
reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present
relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that
a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly
possible.49
 SPETHICS 37
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III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be
that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because
or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence
public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing.
deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should
be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to
from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched
be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for
reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such
every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as
injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which
one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs.
was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article
NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be
2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51 records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel
may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past
their clients with
allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in
was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to
court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to
labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out
public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected
of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate
in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel,
consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that
however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would
the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and
is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were
counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
employers' capricious exercise of power.
conduct of litigation.56
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides
can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and
that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the
ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find
peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how
that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite
their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable
their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that
enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in
they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and
the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages
protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even
can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the respective clients.
following recommendation of the Solicitor General:
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the
 SPETHICS 38
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Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards
the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he
ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of
the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having
been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes
among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an
aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is
really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that
we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and
son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here
to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of
the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein
actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their
respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their
way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six
(6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
 SPETHICS 39
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EN BANC
A.C. No. 10574 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3047), September 20, ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL
2016 Date: August 24,2009
Place: Bermuda Subd.
PATRICK R. FABIE, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO M. Antipolo City
REAL, Respondents.
Conforme:
RESOLUTION Signed
DEL CASTILLO, J.: PATRICK R. FABIE3

In a Verified Petition,1 complainant Patrick R. Fabie claimed that he is the

owner of a parcel of land located in Bo. Dela Paz, Antipolo City registered However, more than a year had passed without anything being
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-1971. His sister Jaynie accomplished. Hence, complainant sought for the return of the items
May R. Fabie (Jaynie May) donated the property to him in support of his received by respondent. While respondent gave back to complainant TCT
intended application for immigration either to the United States of No. R-1971, he did not return the P40,000.00 and the other documents.
America or Canada. However, his plan to immigrate did not push through And since the demand letter4 for the return of the money was left
hence, he engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real to unheeded, complainant was constrained to lodge with the Commission
facilitate the return of ownership of the said property to Jaynie May. on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (EBP) the said
Verified Petition.
On August 24, 2009, complainant gave respondent the necessary
documents for the purported transfer of ownership of the property as In his Answer,5 respondent admitted that he received the items
well as the amount of £40,000.00 to answer for the expenses to be enumerated in the afore-quoted acknowledgement receipt albeit on a
incurred in connection therewith and for respondent's professional different date and for a different purpose, ie, on September 18, 2010,
fees.2 This is evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt which for the purpose of settling the estate of complainant's late father,
complainant attached to his Petition indicating as follows: Esteban E. Fabie, Jr. (Esteban). Later, however, the heirs of Esteban had
a change of heart and took back from respondent the documents and the
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT money on November 28, 2010. Complainant allegedly acknowledged the
return of the items by respondent as follows:6chanrobleslaw
Received from PATRICK R. FABIE the following documents:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation between Patrick ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT
Fabie and Jaynie May Fabie Received from Atty. Leonardo M. Real the following documents:
2. Tax Declaration of Real Property 1. Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation bet. Patrick Fabie
3. Tax Clearance and Jaynie
4. [Official] Real Property tax [r]eceipt 2. May Fabie
5. Xerox and Original [Transfer Certificate of] Title No. |TCT]. N- 3. Tax Declaration of Real Property
129303 4. Tax Clearance
6. Cash-P40,000.00 5. [Official] Real Property Tax Receipt
6. Xerox and original Title No. N-129303
Received by: 7. Cash-P40,000.00
Signed 9/18/10

Received by: Signed
PATRICK R. FABIE
Date: August 24,2009
Place: Bermuda Subd.
Antipolo City
Conforme:
Signed 11/28/10
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL7
Further, respondent attached to his Answer a photocopy of TCT No. N-
1293038 which he claimed to be a part of the estate of Esteban referred
to him by the latter's heirs for settlement proceedings. But since there
was a misunderstanding among the heirs, the settlement did not push
through. To prove the unpleasant relationship of the heirs, respondent
attached to his Answer a letter9 dated April 23, 2004 of complainant's
mother Elsie R. Fabie (Elsie) indicating her intention to repudiate an
amicable settlement that she earlier entered into with her children
because the latter committed criminal acts against her. Respondent
claimed that he got caught in the middle of this bitter spat of the heirs
such that complainant filed this disbarment case against him. At any
rate, respondent pointed out that complainant could not have delivered
to him TCT No. N-129303 on August 24, 2009 since the same was
recorded lost on April 26,2004 and was only recovered on July 27,2010
per entries at the dorsal side of the said title. 10chanrobleslaw
In his Reply,11 complainant clarified that the title which was the subject
of his engagement of respondent was TCT No. R-1971 as alleged in his
Petition and not TCT No. N-129303. While, indeed, the acknowledgement
receipt he appended to his Petition indicates that the TCT number of the
title received by respondent is TCT No. N-129303, this was a mere
typographical error committed by respondent's secretary who prepared
the said acknowledgement receipt. As to how respondent came into
possession of a photocopy of TCT No. N-129303, complainant recounted
that at one time, he and his mother met with respondent. Respondent
thereupon made representations that he could have TCT No. N-129303,
which was under the names of complainant's parents, transferred in the
sole name of complainant's mother. Upon respondent's further cajoling,
complainant's mother gave the former a photocopy of TCT No. N-
SPETHICS 40
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129303. The purported transfer, however, remained to be a mere plan
since complainant's family had no money to defray for the expenses.
Unfortunately, respondent was using his possession of a photocopy of
TCT No. N-129303 in this case to negate his clear deviation from the
conduct expected of a lawyer.
In his Rejoinder,12 respondent pointed out that the discrepancy between
the TCT numbers of the title alluded to by complainant in his Petition
(TCT No. R-1971) and of the title indicated in the acknowledgement
receipt appended thereto (TCT No. N~ 129303) was not a mere
typographical error considering that the alphanumeric characters of the
two TCT numbers were so different from each other. Respondent
reiterated his denial that he dealt with complainant with respect to TCT
No. R-1971 and asserted that the latter, in filing this complaint for
disbarment, was just sour-grapping because of the aborted settlement of
his father's estate.
Mandatory Conference was set on September 30, 2011.13 Although
respondent filed a Mandatory Conference Brief,14 he did not appear
thereat. Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated and the
parties were required to file their respective position
papers.15 Complainant filed his Position Paper16attaching thereto an
Affidavit17 executed by his mother Elsie. In the said affidavit, Elsie
corroborated the allegations of her son and denied that she or any of her
children engaged respondent for the settlement of the estate of Esteban.
She farther averred that the said estate was, in fact, already extra-
judicially settled through the assistance of a different lawyer as shown by
an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights.18 On
respondent's end, he attached to his Position Paper19 a draft20 of
the Complaint for Partition and Accounting which he claimed to have
prepare in accordance with his engagement by the heirs of Esteban.
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation21 dated November 9, 2011,
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) held that the evidence tended to support complainant's
allegations. For one, the items received by respondent included a Deed
of Absolute Sale and a Deed of Donation executed by and between

complainant and Jaynie May - documents which are significant to the
purported transfer of ownership of property between the said siblings.
For another, he found complainant as quite sure of the details of
respondent's return to him of TCT No. R-1971 only as complainant even
vividly recalled that the same took place in Starbucks, Edsa Central,
Mandaluyong City. On the other hand, Commissioner Cachapero did not
find credible respondent's claim that he was engaged by the heirs of
Esteban for the settlement of estate.
As to the respective acknowledgment receipts submitted by the parties,
Commissioner Cachapero made this observation:
The undersigned likewise notes that the [Respondent had apparently
perpetrated the odious act of riding on the mistake of his secretary.
There apparently was an error in his secretary's typing of the
acknowledgment receipt. This can be gleaned from the indication of one
and the same date (August 24, 2009) below the printed name of
[c]omplainant and [Respondent in the two (2) Acknowledgment
Receipts. Significantly, only the name of the recipient (Respondent) was
changed in the latter receipt and this gave way for him to use the
original one (with Complainant as recipient) which is erroneous [since
the said copy indicated complainant as the recipient when it should have
been the respondent] to support his claim that he had already returned
to Complainant the sum of P40,000.00 that was earlier paid to him the
said amount being indicated in the acknowledgment receipt.22
Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent to have (1)
breached his duties to his client when he failed to exercise due diligence
in his undertaking to cause the transfer of ownership of property from
complainant to Jaynie May and instead abandoned his client's cause; (2)
converted his client's fund of P40,000.00 to his personal use when he
failed to return the same to complainant; and, (3) committed dishonesty
when he claimed that he had been engaged to settle the estate of
Esteban when in truth he was not. And since the above transgressions
did not only show bad faith on the part of respondent but also caused
material damage to
complainant, Commissioner Cachapero recommended that respon
dent be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors
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In Resolution No. XX-2013-406 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Cachapero with modification that respondent be
suspended for a shorter period of six months.23chanrobleslaw
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 insisting that there was
no clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence adduced to establish that
he breached his duties to complainant as to warrant his suspension. The
IBP Board of Governors, however, issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-115
on March 21, 2014 denying respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration.25cralawred It further resolved to modify its earlier
resolution (Resolution No. XX-2013-406) by suspending respondent from
the practice of law for a period of two years in accordance with the
recommendation of Commissioner Cachapero.
Our Ruling
"The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that [he] denies the charges
against him; [he] must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against [him]. [He] must show proof that [he] still maintains that degree
of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of
[him]."26 Respondent failed in this regard.
It is undisputed that respondent received documents and money from
complainant. What is at issue, however, are the circumstances
surrounding such receipt. To recap, complainant asserts that respondent
received the items because he engaged the latter to cause the transfer
of ownership of a land from him to his sister Jaynie May. Respondent,
however, denies this and instead avers that he received the documents
and the money in connection with the settlement of the estate of
complainant's father Esteban for which he was employed by the latter's
heirs. Unfortunately, none of the parties was able to present a written
contract which would have been the best evidence of their respective
claims of professional engagement. Be that as it may, the Court has
carefully scrutinized the evidence presented by both parties and finds
that as held by Commissioner Cachapero, the weight of evidence favors
the complainant.

First, the documents received by respondent support the transaction for
which complainant claims to have engaged his services. Plainly, the Deed
of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation by and between complainant and
Jaynie May are the primary documents necessary to facilitate the
transfer of ownership of property between them. On the other hand,
these documents have no significance to the purported settlement of
estate of Esteban. Moreover, if respondent indeed received the
documents for purposes of settlement proceedings, why were such
documents, which notably relate to just a single property, the only ones
given to him when respondent himself alleges in his Answer27 that the
estate of Esteban comprises of prime properties located in Mandaluyong,
Quezon City, and Antipolo? Why were titles and documents pertaining to
such other properties not among those received by him?
To further negate the allegations against him, respondent capitalizes on
the discrepancy between the title number of the TCT of the property
supposed to be the subject of the transfer of ownership between
complainant and Jaynie May (TCT No. R-1971) and the title number of
the TCT received by him as indicated in the parties' respective
acknowledgement receipts (TCT No. N-129303). The Court notes that
complainant offered an explanation for this, i.e., that the said
discrepancy was brought about by a mistake on the part of respondent's
secretary who typed the acknowledgement receipt, that is, instead of
typing TCT No. R-1971 in the acknowledgment receipt, the secretary
typed TCT No. N-129303. Complainant further explains that he did not
anymore endeavor to correct the mistake since respondent allegedly told
him that both of them understood anyway that the same was a mere
typographical error. Respondent, however, argues that the commission
of such a mistake is highly improbable.
The Court finds otherwise.
The possibility of the respondent's secretary committing such a mistake
cannot just be discounted considering complainant's narration, which
significantly was not refuted by respondent, that the latter was also in
possession of a photocopy of TCT No. N-129303. Hence, it is not at all
unlikely for respondent's secretary to have indeed mixed up the title
numbers of the TCTs when she typed the acknowledgment receipt.
Besides, respondent himself acknowledged in the motion for
reconsideration he filed with the EBP that errors or mistakes are common
SPETHICS 42
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when using a computer. He further stated that "[secretaries are prone to
do their jobs by 'copy and paste' scheme rather than [by] typing
[characters] one by one in a document. All it takes is a simple copy
operation to copy large amounts of text or images from another
source."28
Respondent further avers that he could not have received TCT No. N-
129303 on August 24, 2009, the date indicated in the acknowledgment
receipt submitted by complainant, since the said title was recorded lost
on August 26,2004 and was only recovered on July 27, 2010 per entries
at the dorsal side of the said title. This averment, however, only bolsters
complainant's allegation that it was not the original copy of TCT No. N-
129303 which was received by respondent but that of TCT No. R-1971.
In any case, the Court notes that what was recorded lost was the original
of the owner's copy of TCT No. N-129303. This therefore does not negate
complainant's possession of a photocopy of TCT No. N-129303 at the
time he received from complainant TCT No. R-1971, which as already
mentioned could have caused the error in the typing of the TCT number
on the acknowledgment receipt submitted by complainant.
More importantly, it is well to note that complainant's allegations were
corroborated by the averments in Elsie's affidavit wherein the latter
narrated in detail the efforts undertaken by complainant and his family in
following up with respondent the purported transfer of ownership and
later, the recovery of the money which complainant paid him.
Respondent, on the other hand, aside from unconvincing averments,
failed to present competent evidence to support his defense. The Court
cannot give weight to the draft of the Complaint for Partition and
Accounting which respondent claimed to have prepared pursuant to the
alleged engagement of him by the heirs to settle the estate of Esteban.
As it is, the said Complaint is a mere draft which respondent could have
just prepared as an afterthought in order to support his defense in this
case. Moreover, respondent's story that he was tapped by the heirs of
Esteban for settlement proceedings hardly inspires belief. He did not
present a clear narration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
same. Important details were not provided such as when and how he
was engaged, who among the heirs in particular talked to him about the
matter, and why he made his claimed return of the documents and
money to complainant and not to the other heirs. Instead, respondent

merely made a general claim that there existed a professional
engagement between him and the heirs of Esteban. Plainly, respondent's
story leaves much to be desired.
Since his version of the story fails to convince, respondent's claim that
he already returned the documents and money to complainant likewise
loses credibility. Besides, per the above-quoted observation of
Commissioner Cachapero, the Acknowledgment Receipt he submitted to
support such claim is highly doubtful because of several inconsistencies
found therein. The Court likewise notes that the same contains
insertions/intercalations which were not counter-signed.
It bears to stress at this point that "[e]very attorney owes fidelity to the
causes and concerns of his [client]. He must be ever mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the [client]. His duty to safeguard the
[client's] interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts
until his effective release by the [client]. In that time, he is expected to
take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his [client's]
interests may require."29
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands
upon lawyers to serve their clients with competence and diligence, to
wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Lawyer's Oath similarly mandates a lawyer to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity to the courts and to his clients.
Clearly here, respondent failed to competently and diligently discharge
his duty when he was unable to cause the transfer of ownership of
property from complainant to Jaynie May. Despite doing nothing, he
even obstinately refused to return the P40,000.00 he received as
SPETHICS 43
Canon 1
attorney's fees. No doubt, respondent "fell short of the demands
required of [him] as a member of the bar. [His] inability to properly
discharge [his] duty to [his client] makes [him] answerable not just to
[him], but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general
public."30chanrobleslaw
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. Suffice it to
say, however, that "the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends
on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts."31 In Pesto v. Millo,32 the Court, after finding therein that Atty.
Marcelito M. Millo failed to comply with his obligation to serve his clients
with competence and diligence, suspended him from the practice of law
for six months and directed him to return the attorney's fees he received
on the ground that he did not render efficient service to his clients. The
surrounding facts and circumstances of this case calls for the imposition
of the same penalty and the adoption of a similar directive. Respondent
should thus refund to complainant the P40,000.00 given to him in
connection with the purported transfer of ownership of property with
interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the time he received the
amount on August 24, 2009 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum
from July 1,2013 until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real guilty of
violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Lawyer's Oath and thus SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of six months effective from notice, ORDERS him to return to
complainant Patrick R. Fabie within 10 days from notice the sum of
P40,000.00 with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the time he
received the amount on August 24,2009 until June 30,2013, and 6% per
annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment thereof, and STERNLY
WARNS him that commission of any similar infraction in the future will be
dealt with more severely. Finally, he must SUBMIT to this Court written
proof of his compliance within 30 days from notice of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real's personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016
ROUEL YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. JUSTO P.
PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Through this administrative Complaint1 directly filed before this Court,
Rouel Yap Paras (Rouel) charges his father Atty. Justo J. Paras (Atty.
Paras) with violation of his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2 Atty. Paras allegedly voluntarily offered properties he did
not own nor possess to the Department of Agrarian Reform for coverage
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.3 Atty. Paras has
been previously disciplined twice upon complaint of his
wife.4chanrobleslaw
In September 2006, Rouel found out that a listing of possible
beneficiaries for the Department of Agrarian Reform's Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program was being made by a certain Edna Mijares and
Tomas Visitacion.5 On the same month, he received at their residence in
Negros Oriental6 a copy of a Notice of Coverage7 dated September 8,
2006 from the Department of Land Reform. The Notice of Coverage was
addressed to Atty. Paras and was signed by Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer Grace B. Fua. Five (5) of the six (6) properties listed in the Notice
of Coverage were those subject of Civil Case No. 02-028-BY pending
before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros
Oriental.8 Civil Case No. 02-028-BY is based on a Complaint9 filed by
Rouel against Atty. Paras for annulment of Original Certificates of Title of
the properties.
Rouel referred the matter to his counsel, who wrote Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Grace B. Fua.10 In the letter dated October 9, 2006, his
counsel requested a copy of all documents pertaining to the September
8, 2006 Notice of Coverage addressed to Atty. Paras.11 Rouel's counsel
also informed the Department of Agrarian Reform that: (1) the real
properties were subject of a pending case;12 (2) Atty. Paras was
suspended by this Court for unlawfully "having the said properties titled
SPETHICS 44
Canon 1
in his name[;]"13 (3) the properties were titled in the name of Atty. Paras
only for free patent title coverage;14 (4) Atty. Paras did not possess the
properties;15 and (5) Rouel was the real owner and in possession of the
properties.16chanrobleslaw
The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the request and furnished
Rouel with all documents related to the Notice of Coverage.17 Among
these documents were: (1) Atty. Paras' October 20, 2004 letter18 to
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas; (2) an
authorization letter19 by Atty. Paras for Edna R. Mijares; and (3) an
October 9, 2006 Certification20 by Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
Grace B. Fua.21
On October 25, 2006, Rouel Yap Paras filed this Complaint before this
Court and alleged:
1. That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,. had violated the
LAWYER'S OATH and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
thus:
a) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus:
1. Deceit
2. Violation of Oath of Office
3. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
b) The Code of Professional Responsibility in Canon 1, "A lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes"; Canon 3, "a lawyer
in making known his legal services shall use only trne, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts;
Canon 7, "a lawyer shall at all times up hold [sic] the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession[,]"; Canon 10 that "a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court"; Canon 8, "a
lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues...";
2. That the respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and
deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly] represented himself as
"LANDOWNER", and voluntarily offered real properties to the
DAR for CARP coverage, when he knew fully well that he is NOT

THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
.....
3. That RESPONDENT, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS, ... with manifest bad faith
and inexcusable negligence, proceeded to present himself to the DAR,
and offered the subject properties, even with his full knowledge of the
pending litigations involving the said properties;
4. That in spite of the pendency of the "PETITION FOR annulment of OCT
NOS. 32360, 32361, 32362, and 33476 and DAMAGES" proceedings,
which is pending before the Regional Trial Court Branch 45, Bais City,
respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS, had instigated the VOLUNTARY
OFFER OF COVERAGE TO THE DAR, to dispossess the complainant, his
mother, and the members of the YAP family of their property rights, as it
is very clear that ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS was fully aware that the subject
real properties WERE NOT OWNED BY HIM, and he DID NOT HAVE ANY
ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of the subject real properties;
5. That the AUTHORIZATION issued to EDNA MIJARES by
respondent, is a GROSS MISREPRESENTATION, and this had
caused innocent barrio folks of Barangay Matobato, Bindoy,
Negros Oriental to pay P500.00 to Edna Mijares, in view of the
false promise that they will be included as DAR beneficiaries,
even if they were not tenants or residing in the subject property;
....
7. THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE SOLE INTENT OF
DISPOSSESSING THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS LEGITIMATE SON, OF
HIS PROPERTY RIGHTS, USING HIS LEGAL PROFESSION, AS HIS
WEAPON OF VENGEANCE, TO UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS MOTHER, ROSA YAP PARAS,
AND MEMBERS OF THE YAP FAMILY OF BINDOY, NEGROS
ORIENTAL[.]22(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred as respondent had
already been suspended by this Court in two (2) previous administrative
cases.23
On February 22, 2007, respondent filed his Comment.24 He alleged that
the present Complaint is "identical in subject-matter, principal parties
SPETHICS 45
Canon 1
involved, issues and persecutory intent"25cralawred with A.C. No.
734926 filed against him by Rosa Yap-Paras, complainant's
mother.27 However, respondent admitted that:
the properties subject-matter of the instant [administrative] complaint ...
[are] subject of a pending trial court proceedings [sic] before RTC,
Branch 45, Bais City: Civil Case No. 02-028-BY, entitled: ROUEL YAP
PARAS vs. JUSTO J. PARAS and Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, for
"Annulment of OCT Nos. 32360, 32350, 32361, 32362 and 33476 and
damages.["]28
On the allegation of voluntary offer of properties, respondent claimed:
4. That under ... [the] Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law . . . the
implementation of the law under C[omprehensive] A[graria]n R[eform]
P[rogram] on private properties is under two (2) modes, namely:
1) Compulsory Acquisition by DAR (Sec. 16, CARL), or 2) Voluntary Offer
of Sale (VOS, under Sees. 19 & 20, RA 6657). Under Mode 1, DAR on its
own initiative listing and documentation compulsorily covers usually big
real properties owned by a single landowner in a given community thru
service of its "NOTICE OF COVERAGE". The other Mode 2 covers
properties offered for sale under VOS by landowner. The pursuit of
whichever mode of acquisition is left to the discretion of DAR unless offer
is made.
Respondent's CARP coverage is thru the COMPULSORY MODE. This is
evidenced by ... a "NOTICE OF COVERAGE" of DAR- sent by DAR to
Respondent informing him of the extent of coverage of compulsory
acquisition by DAR with listing (initial) of his real properties covered. In
fact Respondent had been informed that following or subsequent
"NOTICE OF COVERAGE" shall include or involve properties not covered
by titles or under tax declarations only, real properties which respondent
owned in Bindoy as well as in the neighboring municipalities of Ayungon
and Mabinay, all in the province of Negros Oriental.
It being a compulsory coverage process initiated, pursued and
documented primarily by DAR, the listing of all real properties titled,
covered only by tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are all the

workings of DAR. Respondent never submitted to DAR a listing of his
properties.29
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of this case.30
On April 11, 2007, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.31
On August 22, 2007, a mandatory conference was set for October 26,
2007 at 2:00 p.m.32 Counsel of complainant appeared for complainant,
while respondent appeared for himself.33 The conference ended with
both parties submitting their issues to Investigating Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.34
Complainant's counsel submitted the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the respondent should be liable for misrepresenting
himself as owner of the subject real properties when in truth an[d] in
fact. he is not;
2. Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires a lawyer to observe honesty, candor,
integrity and in the pleadings filed therein;
3. Whether or not the respondent is bound by the findings of the
Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 4947 the fact that respondent
committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for pre-patent [sic] of
the lands owned by another over which he had no actual physical
possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously
transferred in the name of Aurora Yap and which act reflected his fitness
to practice law in violation of Rule 7.03[,] Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.35
Respondent, on the other hand, submitted the following Issues for
resolution:
1. Whether or not the previously filed and pending Civil Case No. 02-
028-BY filed by the complainant and seeking annulment of free-patent
titles is a prejudicial question to this case;
SPETHICS 46
Canon 1
2. Whether or not complainant has successfully identified his quitclaimed
acquired properties as to be related to the three (3) free patented titles
of the respondent.36
Both parties were ordered to submit position papers.
November 23, 2007, complainant filed his Position Paper.38 He reiterated
the circumstances and grounds for respondent's disbarment and
emphasized respondent's October 20, 2004 letter to Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas, stating:
[C]ontrary to the misrepresentations of the respondent, he offered the
subject real properties for VOLUNTARY ACQUISITION with the DAR as
shown in his letter....
IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD THE DELIBERATE AND
MALICIOUS INTENT TO DEPRIVE THE COMPLAINANT OF OWNERSHIP
RIGHTS TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES, USING HIS LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE TO CIRCUMVENT THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES BY USING THE
DAR, INSPITE OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT SUSPENDING
HIM FOR ONE YEAR FOR "HIS DECEIT AND FALSEHOOD IN THE
APPLICATION FOR A FREE PATENT OVER SAID PROPERTIES.["] NOW HE
HAS DEFIED AGAIN THE SUPREME COURT BY VOLUNTARILY OFFERING
THIS LAND FOR COMPENSATION BY DAR BY FALSELY CLAIMING AS THE
OWNER OF SAID PROPERTIES[;]
THAT IT WAS ONLY IN 2006, THAT THE DAR GAVE NOTICE OF THE
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION, AND INSPITE OF THE POSSESSION OF
COMPLAINANT, THE RESPONDENT HAD CONTINUED TO PURSUE THE
DAR ACQUISITION, BY CONDUCTING MEETINGS WITH HIS ["]DAR
BENEFICIARIES", AS PROOF OF HIS .BENEVOLENCE, SINCE HE IS
GIVING AWAY ALL THE TITLED PROPERTIES, IN HIS NAME, KNOWING
THAT HE IS NOT THE TRUE OWNER/POSSESSOR THEREOF;
THAT RESPONDENT WAS FOLLOWING UP THE RELEASE OF THE CHECKS
REPRESENTING THE DAR PAYMENT FOR THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTIES, TO BE IN HIS NAME, THUS, THE INTENT TO "CASH IN", IS
SO GROSS AND UNJUST, AND SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT DOES NOT

DESERVE TO BE AN OFFICER OF THE COURT AND A MEMBER OF THE
BAR[.]39(Emphasis in the original)
On December 18, 2007, respondent filed his Position Paper.40 He claimed
that (1) the pendency of Civil Case No. 02-028-BY is a prejudicial
question to the present case;41 and that (2) complainant "failed to
identify [the] four (4) quitclaim-acquired properties as the same as those
gratuitously given by Government to Respondent by way of free patent
titles."42 To prove his second claim, respondent compared the size of
properties in the quitclaim to complainant as against the size of free
patent titled properties he acquired.43
On January 14, 2008, complainant filed his Reply.44 He restated his
claims and added that "while respondent claims ownership over real
properties located in Bindoy, Negros [O]riental, he has not paid any of
REAL TAXES over the subject real properties[.]"45
In his Report and Recommendation46 dated January 5, 2008,
Commissioner Hababag found respondent guilty of violating his lawyer's
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:47
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as
member of the bar in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free
patent over the properties in issue despite knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his· mother to complainant's aunt. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment, he committed deceit and
falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when
he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and
occupation of the said lands despite the fact these were continuously in
the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no
less by respondent's own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP
in Adm. Case No. 4947.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the
State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. . .
. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case indubitably reveal
respondent's failure to live up to his duties as lawyer in consonance with
SPETHICS 47
Canon 1
the strictures of the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he has shown no remorse nor reformation thereby
occasioning sanction for his stubbornness.48
The penalty of a one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law was
recommended.49
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-4250 dated January 17, 2008, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Hababag's Report and Recommendation.
However, the Board of Governors modified the penalty and reduced
respondent's suspension from one (1) year to six (6) months.51
On April 25, 2008, complainant moved for reconsideration52 of the
January 17, 2008 Resolution, praying that the penalty of suspension be
reconsidered and a penalty of disbarment be imposed instead. On
January 3, 2013, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Board
of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-07.53
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether respondent violated
his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
voluntarily offered property that he neither owned nor possessed for
coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
We confirm the guilt of respondent. However, we modify the penalty
imposed.
In deciding this case, this Court takes judicial notice of two (2)
administrative cases filed by Rosa Yap Panis against respondent.
In Paras v. Atty. Paras,54 respondent was found guilty of falsifying Rosa
Yap-Paras' signature in bank loan documents and other related
instruments; and of immorality, concubinage, and abandonment of his
own family.55 Respondent was meted the penalty of a six (6)-month
suspension from the practice of law for the first offense, and a one (1)-
year suspension for the second offense.56chanrobleslaw
In Yap-Paras v. Atty. Paras,57 respondent was found guilty of violating
his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
"[applied] for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in issue

despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his
mother to complainant's sister."58 This Court also found that:
[He] committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent
over the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had
been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite
the fact that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of
complainant's family, as evidenced no less by respondents own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.59
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.60
Both Yap-Paras and this case involve the same real properties. Both
likewise refer to respondent's deceit and misrepresentation as basis for
his administrative sanction.
In this case, one of the complainant's claims was that:
[R]espondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
when he deliberate[ly] represented himself as "LANDOWNER," and
voluntarily offered real properties to the DAR for CARP coverage, when
he knew fully well that he is NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTIES[.]61 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent's violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, by misrepresenting himself as the owner of
the properties, has already been decided in Yap-Paras:
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his
lawyer's oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society and to the courts, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably
lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free
patent over the properties in issue despite his knowledge that the same
had already been sold by his mother to complainant's sister. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed before this Court
when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the
Forestal Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap
some portions of entire occupancy of the Parases." Moreover, respondent
SPETHICS 48
Canon 1
committed deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over the
said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in the
actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that
these were continuously in the possession and occupation of
complainants family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.62 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)
Commissioner Hababag likewise found respondent guilty of the same
offense in this case:
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as
member of the bar in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free
patent over the properties in issue despite knowledge that the same had
already been sold by his mother to complainant's aunt. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment, he committed deceit and
falsehood in his application for free patent over the said properties when
he manifested under oath that he had been in the actual possession and
occupation of the said lands despite the fact these were continuously in
the possession and occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced no
less by respondent's own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP
in Adm. Case No. 4947.63 (Emphasis supplied)
Although respondent's violation in this case was not squarely addressed
by Commissioner Hababag's Report and Recommendation, the records of
the case reveal that respondent's voluntary offer of properties was
motivated by ill will, for which he should be sanctioned.
Prior to respondent's voluntary offer of properties, he was sanctioned by
the Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated February
27, 2004.64 The Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, thus:
[R]espondent committed deceit and falsehood in having applied for free
patent over lands owned by another over which he had no actual
physical possession being aware of the fact that the same was previously
transferred in the name of Aurora Yap[.]65
Despite the issuance of the Resolution and the full knowledge that the
properties were subject of a pending civil case,66 respondent submitted

in August 2004 to the Department of Agrarian Reform of Bantayan,
Dumaguete City a list of landholdings he allegedly owned for voluntary
offer under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program coverage.67 He
even wrote a letter dated October 20, 2004 addressed to Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas requesting that the list of
properties he submitted be covered under the Compulsory Acquisition
Scheme instead, as he could not get his spouse's conformity for
voluntary offer.68
The existence of the letter was contrary to his claim in his Comment that
he had no hand in the Compulsory Acquisition scheme:
It being a compulsory coverage process initiated, pursued and
documented primarily by DAR, the listing of all real properties titled,
covered only by tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are all the
workings of DAR. Respondent never submitted to DAR a listing of his
properties.69 (Emphasis supplied)
He further contradicted himself when he admitted the October 20, 2004
letter during the mandatory conference:
ATTY. YAP: The existence of the Letter of the Respondent, Atty. Justo J.
Paras dated October 20, 2004 to Stephen M. Leonidas, Provincial
Agrarian· Reform Officer of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Bantayan, Dumaguete City which is in [sic] filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Negros Oriental?
COMM. HABABAG: Any comment?
ATTY. PARAS:We admit that.70
Eight (8) months after this Court promulgated its Resolution in Yap
Paras,71 which confirmed the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVI-
2004-120, respondent authorized Edna R. Mijares, Chair of the Domolog
Tagaytay Multi-Purpose Cooperative, to come up with a list of
beneficiaries for the properties he requested to be covered under the
Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Department of Agrarian Reform.72
By authorizing Edna R. Mijares, respondent pushed for the inclusion of
his alleged properties for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
SPETHICS 49
Canon 1
coverage. He did this notwithstanding the Resolution finding him guilty of
"commit[ing] deceit and falsehood in his application for free patent over
the said properties when he manifested under oath that he had been in
the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact
that these were continuously in the possession and occupation of
complainants family[.]"73
Respondent's acts constitute a violation of his lawyer's oath, which
states:
I,__________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
His deliberate act of disregarding this Court's ruling is conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer and degrades the legal profession. He is likewise
guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 10- A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01. - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
 SPETHICS 50
Canon 1

doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
misled by any artifice. courts for their information and guidance and likewise be entered in the
record of respondent as attorney.
In offering to government property that he knew he neither owned nor
possessed, respondent committed dishonesty, misrepresentation, and SO ORDERED.75 (Emphasis supplied)
deceit. Although deceit and misrepresentation are present in both Yap-
Paras and in this case, the surrounding circumstances are different. This is respondent's fourth case involving the same properties and his
In Yap-Paras, deceit and misrepresentation were used to apply for the second infraction of an offense of the same nature. The six (6)-month
issuance of a free patent. On the other hand, in this case, they were suspension imposed by the Commission on Bar Discipline is too light a
used for a voluntary offer of land for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform penalty. Respondent deserves· a graver penalty for his acts of
Program coverage. The application for the issuance of a free patent and dishonesty, misrepresentation, and deceit.
the voluntary offer of property for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program coverage are distinct from one another and are not WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras
prerequisites of each other. His offense in the previous case is separate
and distinct from this case, for which he is sanctioned anew. GUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
Respondent has already been sanctioned three (3) times. The dispositive hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken from
portion of Paras, which was dated October 17, 2000, reads: the Roll of Attorneys.

In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney,
signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court
ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served their information and guidance.
simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondent's
record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated SO ORDERED.
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts concerned. SO ORDERED.74 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Yap-Paras, respondent was suspended and warned by this Court:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras guilty of

committing a falsehood in violation of It's lawyer's oath and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,the Court Resolved
to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as the Office of

EN BANC
A.C. No. 9401 October 22, 2013
JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female
client is guilty of reprehensible conduct that is unbecoming of a member
of the Bar and may be condignly punished with suspension from the
practice of law.
Antecedents
Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against
Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint-
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as follows:
1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I went to the
Public Attorney’s Office in Parañaque City, in order to inquire from ATTY.
TYRONE PEDREÑA about the status of my case for support for my two
minor children against my husband, which case is being handled by Atty.
Pedreña;
2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing, so I waited at
his office until he arrived at about 11:45 a.m. Atty. Pedreña told me to
go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so we could take our lunch together
and to talk about my said case;
3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me many
personal matters rather than to discuss my said case. But still, I
answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;
4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on February 1,
2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according to him, my said case was quite
difficult, that he needed more time to study;
5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home then, he told me
then to ride with him and he would just drop me by the jeepney station;
SPETHICS 51
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6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently convinced me to
get in the car, and so I acceded to his request so as not to offend him;
7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far from the City
Hall, Atty. Pedreña immediately held my left hand with his right hand,
insisted me to get closer with him and laid me on his shoulder;
8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in
trying to get hold of my hand and he also tried very hard to inserting
(sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand. Thus, I became very afraid
and at the same time offended for his lack of respect for me at that
moment; 9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left leg. I
was then attempting to remove his hand on my leg, but he grabbed my
hand and forced it to put (sic) on his penis;
10. Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I continued to
wrestle and struggle, and as I saw that we were already approaching the
7-Eleven Store, the place where I was supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña
made another move of pressing his finger against my private part;
11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and told him
categorically that I was getting off the car. But because the traffic light
was on green, he accelerated a bit more instead, but sensing my
insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off. He
then reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the
continuation of hearing of my case;
12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case, but this time,
I brought with me my five-year-old child to avoid another incident. I was
not able to see Atty. Pedreña then, so I just signed some documents;1
In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were
unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the
gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good
lawyers; that the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on
the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him
with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and
that he had also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.2
Attached to Atty. Pedreña’s answer were his counter-affidavit in the
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness and his complaint-affidavit for
theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De
Leon, but he vehemently denied making sexual advances on her,

insisting that she had sat very close to him during the ride that even
made it hard for him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only
two to three minutes.3 He claimed that De Leon was allowing herself to
be used by his detractors in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) after he
had opposed the practice of certain PAO staff members of charging
indigent clients for every document that they prepared. In his complaint
affidavit for theft, he stated that he had another passenger in his car at
the time he gave a ride to De Leon, who did not notice the presence of
the other passenger because the ride lasted for only two to three
minutes; and that the other passenger was Emma Crespo, who executed
her own affidavit attesting that she had witnessed De Leon’s act of
taking his (Pedreña) cellphone from the handbrake box of the car.4
Only De Leon appeared during the hearing.5 Hence, Atty. Pedreña was
deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.6
Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the striking off of his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.7 Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and
could proceed independently of the criminal case that was based on the
same facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait until the
criminal case for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña
was finally resolved, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
Pedreña had made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule
1.018 and Rule 7.039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and
imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for
three months.10
Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP, 11 which
adopted and approved Resolution No. XX-2012-43 dated January 15,
2012, denying the motion and affirming with modification its Resolution
No. XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to six
months.12
SPETHICS 52
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On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the
Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and the records of the case for final
approval.13
In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board of
Governors’ notice of Resolution No. XX-2012-43.14
Ruling
The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
stated thusly:
There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her case against
the Respondent. During the clarificatory hearing, she was
straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions propounded
on her. Her account of the incident that happened on 30 January 2006
was consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and Verified
Position Paper.
On the other hand, Respondent’s defenses are not credible enough to
rebut the claims of Complainant. His defenses are replete with Decision 5
A.C. No. 9401 inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire
proceedings show lack of integrity in his dealings with both the
Complainant and this Commission.
xxxx
We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The
Theft case filed by Respondent is a mere afterthought on his part. We
note that such criminal complaint hinged on a claim that there was
another person during that incident who allegedly saw Complainant
stealing Respondent’s mobile phone. Yet, in Respondent’s Position Paper
and in his Counter-Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which
was executed after the institution of the criminal complaint for Theft,
Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being
present during the incident. If the presence of this third person was
crucial to prove his case against herein Complainant, there is no reason
why this allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper and Counter-
Affidavit to at least support his defense.
Furthermore, Respondent’s contention that Complainant is being used by
his detractors is self-serving. His memo regarding the amount of RATA

he receives is a relatively harmless query to a higher authority, which
could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other people to file
cases against Respondent.15
We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating
Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors, for being
substantiated by the evidence on record.
The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg
with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand;
grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed
his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he
committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but
repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct
on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency.16
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to
retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are
clearly duty- bound to observe the highest degree of morality and
integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, be it in the
lawyer’s public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyer’s
suspension or disbarment.17 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for
grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a lawyer. Towards
that end, we have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to
live up to the standards and norms of the Legal Profession by upholding
the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then
a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent
litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be
SPETHICS 53
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accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her
vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.
Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the
recommended penalty of suspension for six months not commensurate
with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.
Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is
within the Court’s discretion.1âwphi1 The exercise of the discretion
should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity
or prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence
of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties
to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the
general public.18
In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty. Pedreña,
therefore, we take into consideration judicial precedents on gross
immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although most of the
judicial precedents dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital
affairs, or cohabited with women other than their wives,19 they are
nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of immorality committed by
the respondent.
In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyer’s acts
of turning his client’s head towards him and then kissing her on the lips
were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer
was merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and cautious
in his dealings with clients.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the
severest penalty was imposed not only because of his engaging in illicit
sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already
married and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-
year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her, and made her
pregnant. He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he
also breached his promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted
her and their child.
 SPETHICS 54
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In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer, a

married man with children, highly immoral for having taken advantage of
his position as the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in
enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to have carnal
knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her
subjects should she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct.

Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant’s sad experience,

however, we consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of
the same degree as the acts punished under the cited judicial
precedents. Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the
respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the
respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor’s wife notwithstanding that his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution
for the crime. We further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was
deceit and in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking
advantage of the respondent lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not
employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he desisted upon the
first signs of the complainant’s firm refusal to give in to his advances.

In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the

practice of law for two years is fitting and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA from the

practice of law for two years effective upon receipt of this decision, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979
PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,
vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for
disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.
The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the
complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her
divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California,
County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of
Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz,
answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal services; that
believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the
complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the
termination of the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly
friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for her; that
at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial
relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her
believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations
with said woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the
complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with
the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it
was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the
complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant;
that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal
of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970,
an application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant
and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the
respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get
married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of
the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she
reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being
together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond
her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of
April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the
respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to
SPETHICS 55
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by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil
marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed
the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between
Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under
the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the
respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent;
that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends
for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of
her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the
disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and
an officer of the courts of justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had
any illicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the
complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the
respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next
day when the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing,
she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance
Service to handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the
complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case;
that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to
complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed by
Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October
1970, the complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of
P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment
of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity,
the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called
at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a case against
the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the
wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he
could not Identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that
after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the
respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of
abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended
complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General
Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the
complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and
requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal
action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for disobedience; that the

respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn
statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied the
complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal
Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that
the respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare
and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the
mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her
custody although the petition was denied; that the respondent had never
informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil
marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to
the complainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed
application for the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of
November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as
husband and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived
complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2
In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30,
1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings:
The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that
may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse
between complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully
submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by
making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to
their respective spouses, they could legally get married to each other
and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with
him.
Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with
respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino,
who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2,
Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971). She also admitted that
before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she was informed by
SPETHICS 56
Canon 1
him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the
marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).
Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually
believed the representation of respondent that they could legally marry.
Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that
she has, it is difficult to accept the proposition that she swallowed hook,
line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full
awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages,
no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married
ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth
placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was
licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught
at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In
1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked into surrendering her
body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late twenties. It is
improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding
indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting
respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should
have pondered upon the serious legal implications and complications of a
second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer
for advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong,
Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her
behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to
converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations
complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's
husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino
citizen or the effects of a marriage brought about through the use of
force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her
mind.
The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have
to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent.
It is of no little significance that some persons utilized by complainant as
witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her
relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is not
recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she
knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the
Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was
elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant.

Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one
point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized
in the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant
knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit
priest declared under cross-examination:
Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive?
A Yes.
Q Up to the present?
A Yes.
Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?
A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce.
Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce?
A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.
Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:
Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that
divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an
impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone?
A Yes.
Q Did you inform her so?
A She knows about that.
(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)
Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the
existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the
intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's
wife and her own husband being still have was enough to stir her mind
and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could have, for
instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent
was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the
marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman
Bagatsing about respondent's personal status. After all she was
competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit,
Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme
Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n.,
November 18, 1971).
What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given
premises? Either complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled
by respondent's blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal
SPETHICS 57
Canon 1
impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage proposals, she
unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored
of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has
so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that
reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the
camouflage of innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and
educational background, no other conclusion is possible 'except that she
voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy with respondent without
entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by
legal union.
The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement
protestations of love and actually made an offer of marriage to
complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show.
Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the form of love letters
and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained
courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents
were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent
tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such
explanation, however, staggers human credulity considering that the
supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply
preposterous that she would easily Dart with the documents and give
them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it may, if
respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established
that complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account
of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings.
The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy between
complainant and respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to
his proposal that they live as husband and wife and as a matter of fact
they had three sexual intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel
and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While
there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except
her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and
Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A'
and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the
entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time' woman, not the complainant,
common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that
respondent lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless she
was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are

inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to
establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place
once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable
Court has stated, when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence,
it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet
the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which
at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No.
389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned,
the evidence of the complainant as to the trysts they had in the two
hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent. 4
Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor
General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to
require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against
the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the
Revised Rules of Court. 5
On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding
complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be
suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law,
with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with
more severely.
Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29,
1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the
complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a
certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the
respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her
interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her verified
complaint the following.
6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at
present because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry
me. In fact, our relationship is above- board just like any engaged
couple.
7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office
that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that
SPETHICS 58
Canon 1
the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to
all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.
8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from
me and not revenge for his deception. 6
The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the
complainant.
In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as
morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that
there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent,
Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like
any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the
collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for
revenge for his deception.
It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should
be exercised with caution because of its serious consequences. 7 The
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case against a
respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8
In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:
The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant and the charge against the lawyer must be
established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23,
1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25,
1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838,
Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from
doubt a case which compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary
powers. The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly
demonstrated. Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently
held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs.
Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise
held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of
any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case
against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661,
 SPETHICS 59
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June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483,
July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any

cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor
General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for
doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for
there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion
between two consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to
their own private consciences."

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby

DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 12467 [Formerly CBD Case No. 16-5072], April 10, 2019
SPOUSES PEPITO AND PRESCILA FRIAS, COMPLAINANTS, v. ATTY.
NELLY E. ABAO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint1 for Disciplinary Action dated September 1,
2016 filed by the spouses Pepito Frias and Prescila Chavez
Frias (Spouses Frias) against respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao (Atty.
Abao) for violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of the Notarial Law.
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Pepito Frias, married to Prescila Chavez, is the registered
owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 3270-A, Psd-06-000781,
situated at Barangay Malonoy, Dao, Capiz, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-14354 (subject property).
The Spouses Frias narrated that in early 1900s, Susana Frias, their
daughter, was enduring a heart disease. Because of financial difficulties,
they accepted the offer of one of their daughters who was then residing
in Mindanao, to bring Susana to Davao for treatment. Before they left,
the Spouses Frias asked Rodrigo Arbiz, and his wife, Maria, the parents
of Jermehilda Escutin, if they could lend them money to cover for their
transportation to Mindanao and the medical expenses of Susana.
Although the Spouses Arbiz agreed to lend them some money, they
demanded that the Spouses Frias secure the loan with the subject
property, for twenty years.
Because the Spouses Frias were unsure of their capacity to pay back the
loan in time, and were afraid they might lose the subject property if they
failed to settle the loan, they allegedly offered instead to lease the
property to the Spouses Arbiz, instead of mortgaging it to them.
Rodrigo Arbis allegedly accepted the offer to lease the subject property,
and gave them the amount of P340,000,00. Both parties agreed that:
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(1) the Spouses Frias would not have any obligation to give back the
amount of P340,000.00 to Rodrigo Arbiz; (2) Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife
would possess the subject property for twenty years, that is from
January 16, 1995 to January 16, 2015, and enjoy the use and produce of
the land; (3) Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife would be responsible to pay for
the real estate taxes due on the property because it would be difficult for
the Spouses Frias to pay them while they were in Mindanao; (4) the
Spouses Frias would not disturb Rodrigo Arbiz and his wife's possession
of the property until after the expiration of twenty years; and (5) the
Spouses Frias would entrust the original owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-14354 that covers the subject property to Rodrigo Arbiz and his
wife. These agreements, however, were not put into writing as it was the
usual practice those days.
On January 16, 1995, the Spouses Frias left for South Cotabato, leaving
whatever they owned in Capiz. Despite all medical treatments they could
afford with their savings, Susana died in 2000 in South Cotabato.
Sometime in 2000, the Spouses Frias learned that Rodrigo Arbiz died.
Later, in 2005, they also learned that Rodrigo Arbiz's wife, Maria, also
died. They discovered that the heirs of the Spouses Arbiz, Jermehilda
Escutin and Danilo Escutin, took possession of the subject property.
The Spouses Frias alleged that even after the death of the Spouses Arbiz,
they could not return to Dao, Capiz because they respected the alleged
lease agreement. After the expiration of the lease contract, they decided
to return to Capiz, and claim the subject property as they believed to be
entitled thereto. However, the Spouses Escutin refused to turnover the
possession of the subject property. Thus, the Spouses Frias filed a
complaint for ejectment against the Spouses Escutin.
In their Answer, the Spouses Escutin argued that the subject property
was sold to their parents by the Spouses Frias. They attached a copy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 11, 1995 purportedly executed by
complainants in favor of the parents of the Spouses Escutin.2
The Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized by herein respondent Atty.
Abao on July 11, 1995, as document no. 106, found on page 23, Book
No. LVIX.3 However, the Spouses Frias insisted that they did not execute
any document of conveyance of the said parcel of land to anybody. They

claimed that it was impossible for them to execute the said Deed of
Absolute Sale on July 11, 1995 because at that time they already left for
Mindanao and never came back to Dao, Capiz, until April 4, 2015.
The Spouses Frias then searched for an original copy of the deed of
absolute sale with the Clerk of Court of Roxas City. The Clerk of Court of
Roxas City, Atty. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna, issued a Certification4 dated
November 3, 2015 stating that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Pepito Frias and Prescila Frias in favor of Rodrigo Arbiz and Maria L. Arbiz
under Doc. No. 106, Page 23, Book No. LVIX dated July 11, 1995 and
notarized by Atty. Abao does not exist. It further certified that
respondent Atty. Abao was never commissioned as Notary Public in the
City of Roxas, Province of Capiz for the year 1995 and had no notarial
files on record for the same year. 5
The Spouses Frias, likewise, lamented that while Atty. Abao admitted
that she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by
them, she, however, made false statements in her Judicial
Affidavit6 dated July 28, 2016 wherein she alleged that: (1) Pepito Frias
was present when she notarized the said document; (2) Prescila Frias
was present when she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3)
Pepito Frias and Prescila Frias affixed their signatures in the said Deed of
Absolute Sale.7
Thus, the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Abao for
violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
On October 3, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) ordered Atty. Abao to submit her answer to
the complaint against her.8
In her Answer9 dated November 14, 2016, Atty. Abao admitted that she
notarized the subject Deed of Absolute Sale without the necessary
notarial commission to do so. She offered no valid excuse for her
unauthorized notarial act. She denied having notarized a fictitious deed
of absolute sale, and maintained that complainants personally appeared
and signed the subject Deed of Absolute Sale before her.
Meanwhile, on November 29, 2016, the complaint for unlawful detainer
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filed by the Spouses Frias against the Spouses Escutin, docketed as Civil
Case No. V-376, was dismissed.10
In its Report and Recommendation11 dated September 19, 2017, the
IBP-CBD found Atty. Abao liable for notarizing documents without a
notarial commission and for executing an untruthful judicial affidavit. For
notarizing a document without commission, the IBP-CBD recommended
that Atty. Abao be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months,
and that if she is presently commissioned as notary public, she be
disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two
(2) years. Further, for executing an untruthful judicial affidavit and
testifying thereon, the IBP-CBD, likewise, recommended a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In a Resolution12 dated June 29, 2018, the IBP-Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD
on the recommended penalty.
RULING
We agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD, except as to use
recommended penalty.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public
interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public.13 It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a
notary public converts a private document into a public document
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
In the present case, it is undisputable that Atty. Abao performed notarial
acts on the subject deed of absolute sale knowing fully well that; she
was without a valid notarial commission. Her lack of notarial commission
at the time of the unauthorized notarization was likewise sufficiently
established by the Certification issued by Atty. Jelou F. Almalbis-Laguna,

Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
6th Judicial Region, Roxas City in the territory where Atty. Abao
performed the unauthorized notarial act.14 Clearly, Atty. Abao could not
perform notarial functions in Dao, Capiz, since she was not
commissioned in the places to perform such act in the year 1995.
Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, a person commissioned as a
notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority
to perform notarial or the written evidence of authority.15 Without a
commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts.
Clearly, for misrepresenting in the subject Deed of Absolute Sale that
she was a notary public for and in Dao, Capiz, when in fact she was not,
Atty. Abao further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly
anathema to the lawyer's oath. Atty. Abao's misdeeds run afoul of her
duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the
court, Atty. Abao violated not only her oath to obey the laws, particularly
the Rules on Notarial Practice, but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes all lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and directs them to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, at all times.16
In the case of Nunga v. Atty. Viray,17 the Court appropriately held that
where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the
lawyer's oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not,
he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
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Canon 1
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."18
In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary
action for notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or
with an expired commission. In Zoreta v. Atty. Simpliciano,19 the
respondent was, likewise, suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being
commissioned as a notary public for notarizing several documents after
the expiration of his commission. In the case of Judge Laquindanum v.
Atty. Quintana,20 the Court suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and
was disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a period
of two (2) years, because he notarized documents outside the area of his
commission, and with an expired commission. In the more recent case
of Japitana v. Atty. Parado,21 following the Court's pronouncements
in Re: Violation of Rules on Notarial Practice,22 the lawyer was suspended
for two (2) years from the practice of law and forever barred from
becoming a notary public when he notarized documents with no existing
notarial commission.
Considering that Atty. Abao has been proven to nave performed notarial
work in Dao, Capiz, without the requisite commission, the Court finds the
recommended penalty insufficient. Likewise, Atty. Abao's assertion of old
age and sickness fails to convince, considering that at the time of the
commission of the unauthorized act of notarizing, she was only fifty-four
(54) years old. Instead, Atty. Abao must be barred from being
commissioned as notary public permanently and suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.23
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nelly E. Abao is found GUILTY of
malpractice as a notary public, and violating the lawyer's oath as well as
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary
Public, effective upon her receipt of a copy of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through
 SPETHICS 63
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the Office of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the
personal files of Atty. Abao.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019
AMALIA R. CENIZA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA,
JR., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The abandonment by an attorney of his legitimate family in order to
cohabit with a married woman constitutes gross immorality that wan-
ants his disbarment.1
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the complainant's letter-
complaint denouncing the immoral conduct committed by her husband, a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.2 She submitted
therewith her affidavit detailing the grounds for her denunciation.3
The complainant stated that she and the respondent were married on
November 12, 1989 at the Sacred Heart Parish in Cebu City; that in time
they had two children, Marie Agnes (Agnes) and Christopher
Chuck;4 that on April 21, 2008, he told her that he would be attending a
seminar in Manila, but because she had some business to attend to in
General Santos City, he seemingly agreed to her request to forego with
his trip to Manila, and that upon her return from General Santos City on
April 26, 2008, however, he had already moved out of their home, taking
along with him his car and personal belongings.
On May 23, 2008, the complainant went to the Mandaue City Hall where
the respondent worked as a legal officer in order to inquire about his
situation. She learned from members of his staff that they had suspected
him of carrying on an extra-marital affair with one Anna Fe Flores Binoya
(Anna). On the next day, the complainant, accompanied by her daughter
and a nephew, went to the address provided by the staff to verify the
information. They were able to meet Anna's sister who informed them
that she had moved out of their address; that Anna and her second
husband, Atty. Eliseo Ceniza, Jr., the herein respondent, had been living
together in Aldea Subdivision; and that in the evening of said date the
complainant and her daughter proceeded to the new address where they
found and confronted the respondent, who simply denied having
SPETHICS 64
Canon 1
committed any wrongdoing.
On July 9, 2008, the respondent commenced a civil action seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the complainant,5 alleging her
psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
On August 11, 2008, the respondent visited the complainant at work and
requested her to agree to the nullification of their marriage. She refused
and instead pleaded with him to avoid displaying his paramour in public.
Her pleas notwithstanding, he continued with the illicit relationship.
On November 18, 2008, the complainant brought a complaint for
immorality against the respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB-V-A-10-0345-G).
On April 2, 2009, the complainant sent a letter to President Macapagal-
Arroyo alleging therein that her husband had abandoned her and their
children in order to live with another woman.
On May 18, 2009, the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the
President forwarded the complainant's letter to President Macapagal-
Arroyo to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).6 In due course, the OBC
directed the respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
On October 26, 2009, the respondent filed his comment,7 wherein he
denied having engaged in immoral conduct and maintained that Anna
had only been a business partner. He insisted that he had moved in with
his parents after leaving their family home; and that he had left the
complainant because her behavior had become unbearable.
In the meantime, on August 5, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued its decision in OMB-V-A-10-0345-G,8 in which it found the
respondent guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an
extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which required that:
.... all public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to
the people and shall discharge their duties with utmost responsibility,
integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead
modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.9
 SPETHICS 65
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The Office of the Ombudsman disposed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
finding respondent ELISEO B. CENIZA guilty of Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct. The said respondent is hereby meted the penalty
of SUSPENSION from the service for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS
without pay with a stern warning that subsequent violations of similar
nature will be dealt with a more severe penalty.10
Upon the other hand good moral character is a requirement not only
upon one's application for admission but it is rather a continuing
requirement even after admission for the enjoyment of the privilege to
practice. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
(Boyong vs. Oblema, 7 SCRA 859).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended
that the administrative suit be dismissed but with WARNING to the
respondent to be more circumspect in his actuation to avoid the
impression of committing immorality.12

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which upheld the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.11
On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued its Resolution
Report and Recommendation of the IBP No. XX-2013-148 adopting the recommendation of Commissioner
Hababag,13 to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE as it is hereby unanimously
On October 7, 2010, Commissioner Salvador Hababag of the Integrated ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), to which Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
the complaint against the respondent had been referred for investigation, entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and
submitted his findings and recommended the dismissal of the complaint, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
opining that the respondent be cautioned to be more circumspect in his and the applicable laws and rules, the case is
actuations to avoid the impression of committing immorality. hereby DISMISSED. However, the Warning imposed against respondent
is hereby ordered deleted.
Commissioner Hababag rendered the following observations, to wit:
The issue is whether or not respondent is guilty of immorality in his
relationship with Anna Fe Binoya. On February 26, 2014, the case was considered closed and terminated
for failure of the complainant to seek a reconsideration or appeal by
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, petition for review.14
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. On June 4, 2014, however, the complainant transmitted a letter of
appeal vis-à-vis the resolution of February 26, 2014, attaching thereto
To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer's conduct must not only her motion for reconsideration.14
be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a Thereupon, the Court referred the case to the OBC for report and
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting evaluation.
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. (Emma T.
Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes A.C. No. 6486 September 22, 2004). Upon the recommendation of the OBC,15 the Court set aside its
 SPETHICS 66
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resolution of February 26, 2014, and required the respondent to adduced against him. He had been sufficiently shown to have abandoned
comment on the complainant's motion for reconsideration. 16 his legitimate spouse and family in order to live with a married woman.

The findings made by the Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative

On February 23, 2016, the Court promulgated a resolution referring the
case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.17
On March 1, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XXII-2017-889 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Issue
case brought against the respondent more than sufficed to show his
immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up to the legal and ethical
obligations of a lawyer. In this regard, we adopt and reiterate the apt
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
Respondent is adamant in his denial that he has a relationship with
Binoya. He insists that complainant's accusation that he was having an
affair with Binoya was purely speculative and unsupported by evidence.

Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not only of their daughter,
Should the respondent be disciplined for the actions attributed to him by Marie Agnes ("Marie"), but also of two others, namely: Roberto Joseph
the complainant? Galvan ("Galvan") and Gabriel Jadraque ("Jadraque").
Ruling of the Court
Marie declared, in part, that:
9. That we found out on May 24, that he had another woman named
Anna Fe Flores Binoya, and he was currently living with her in Block 11,
We disagree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors for
Lot 27, Aldea Subd., Timpolok, Lapulapu City.
the dismissal of the charge of immorality.
10. That I was there in Umapad dump site when I met Myrna Flores,
It appears to us that Commissioner Hababag utterly failed to
Ann's mother, Ann and Ann's daughter. She tried to deny her
conscientiously discharge his responsibility as the factfinder; and that he
relationship with my father, but just a few minutes after, I heard her
also did not properly appreciate the facts in relation to the relevant laws
three aunts tell us that she had a new husband. She identified the new
and the canons of ethics. All that he accomplished was to rehash the
husband as Atty. Eliseo B. Ceniza, Jr.
principles of law that he believed were applicable, but without calibrating
such principles to whatever facts were found by him to be established.
He did not even explain why the principles were relevant to the case of Meanwhile, Galvan alleged that:
the respondent. Such nonchalant discharge of the responsibility of fact-
2. That I have been living at Aldea Buena Subdivision, Timpolok, Mactan,
finding was almost perfunctory, certainly lackluster, and bereft of the
Lapu-Lapu City since February 2005;
requisite enthusiasm. What makes it worse for the timid, if not lethargic,
recommendation was the unquestioning affirmance by the IBP Board of
3. That I regularly stroll in our subdivision on board my bicycle or
Governors, which seemingly failed to even notice the glaring inadequacy.
motorcycle with my kids;
For sure, the finding of insufficient evidence against the respondent was
4. That on several occasions in the month of December 2008 and
unwarranted. He had not even put forward anything of substance in his
January 2009, I saw the black Honda care (sic) with plate no. YDX 692
defense. He had been content with merely denying the imputed
or sometimes the red Toyota Corolla care (sic) with plate no. GEJ 877
wrongdoing, but his denial did not disprove the substantial evidence
belonging to ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR., parked in front of the house
 SPETHICS 67
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located on Block 11 Lot 27 of Aldea Buena Subdivision; RED TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 parked in front of the house #27[,]
at the same time[,] I saw one lady [who] went out from the house and
5. That more particularly, I have seen these vehicles parked for long proceeded to the gate and unlocked it then she went back inside the
periods of time and in some days overnight at the said place; house;

6. That on December 22, 2008 at around 8:00 PM, I personally saw ATTY. That a moment after, one man went out from the driver aside of the RED
ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR. taking dinner, half-naked, facing the table in the TOYOTA with LTO Plate # GEJ-877 wearing white T-shirt and proceeded
above-mentioned house together with a woman whom I later identified to the house # 27, he opened the gate[,] went inside, then he locked it
as ANN FLORES from the picture that AMALIA R. CENIZA showed me; and proceeded to the main door of the house where the lady who
unlocked the gate waited near the main door;
7. That I saw them again inside the house on December 23, 2008 at
around nine o'clock in the morning up to past twelve o'clock noontime; (sic) That later[,] I identify (sic) the man who went out form the RED
TOYOTA with LTO Plate GEJ-877 and proceeded to the house #27 as
Finally, Jadraque averred that:
ATTY. ELISEO B. CENIZA JR.

That sometime on the first week of January 2009, Mrs. Amalia R[.]
Ceniza approached me and sought assistance to conduct a surveillance
Complainant likewise proffered photographs proving her claim that
of her husband's activities.
respondent frequents Binoya's house, as well as, proofs that the place
which her husband visits was indeed owned by Binoya. Complainant also
That Mrs. Ceniza provided me information that her husband has a
adduced evidence to the effect that facts of marriage appear in the Office
girlfriend who is residing at blk 11, lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD. [,]
of the City Civil Registrar, Cebu City, between Binoya and a certain
Timpolok[,] Lapu-Lapu City Cebu, which she also believed that her
Ebrahaim Angeles Yap who were married on 18 October 2002 at Al
husband frequently slept there at night and most of the time uses their
Khariah Mosque, San Nicolas, Mambaling, Cebu City. The corresponding
car a RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877;
Certificate of Marriage was likewise submitted.
That on the nineth(sic) of January Mrs. Ceniza contacted me thru my
Vis-à-vis complainant's overwhelming allegations, respondent offered
mobile phone that the classes of her daughter will end at 6:30 in the
only self-serving denials. It is elementary that denials are weak
afternoon at Cebu Doctor's College at Mandaue City and her husband will
especially if unsupported by evidence. Denial is an intrinsically weak
be the one to pick up and brought [her] home.
defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.
That at about 6:00 in the afternoon that day[,] I went ahead with a
videocam with me in Blk 11, Lot 27[,] ALDEA BUENA SUBD.[,]
It bears stressing that aside from his general claim that complainant only
Timpolok[,] Lapu-lapu City and strategically positioned myself in order to
wanted to destroy his reputation and that the instant complaint is purely
observed(sic) the place and the activities of the people in the
a vendetta on her part, respondent did not even attempt to present
surroundings;
countervailing evidence to substantiate his bare allegations.
That few minutes after I saw a RED TOYOTA with LTO plate GEJ-877
No less than respondent's own daughter, Marie Agnes, spoke her piece
approaching the place this time I remembered the car mentioned by Mrs.
about the nature of her father's association with Binoya. His daughter is
Ceniza that [was] frequently driven by her husband, so I immediately
a budding teen-ager and has already attained a certain level of maturity
turn[ed] on the video cam, and while the tape is running[,] I saw the
to understand the dynamics of the relationship of her parents.

Moreover, the photographs and declarations of Galvan and Jadraque
negate respondent's assertion that he merely visits Binoya as a business
associate. His vehicles were seen in front of Binoya's house for long
periods of time and in some days, on overnight stays. He was also seen
in Binoya's house half-naked while having a meal. Under the prevailing
circumstances, these cannot be deemed as actuations of a business
partner or the usual business meetings as respondent insists.
It is true that complainant was unable to present photograph/s of
respondent and Binoya together. Still, from the foregoing, she has given
several pieces of evidence which yield the unmistakable conclusion that
respondent and Binoya are having an illicit affair. Under the present
scheme of things, these circumstances meet the requirement of
substantial evidence in administrative proceedings. In the extant case,
there is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion that respondent and Binoya are
engaged in an illicit relationship.
We are cognizant of the fact that cases like this usually entail a 'He said
– She said' version. However, complainant was able to build her case
against respondent. As afore-discussed, complainant presented evidence
to support her claims. There were documentary evidence and affidavits
proving, to the best of her ability, her accusations against respondent."19
The CA upheld the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, observing
as follows:20
Petitioner [Atty. Ceniza] maintains that the insinuations and accusations
that he is having a relationship with Anna Fe Binoya is unfounded and
baseless. Petitioner claims that he had a friendly relationship with the
family of Anna Fe, and that they are far from being intimate. Petitioner
contends that public respondent based its findings purely on
circumstantial evidence. Petitioner emphasizes that not even a picture of
him and Anna Fe was ever presented. Instead, the circumstantial
evidence relied upon by public respondent at most would only prove that
indeed the petitioner visited Anna Fe at her residence. A grave charge of
disgraceful and immoral conduct according to petitioner requires direct
and competent evidence which is absent in the extant case.
Petitioner's protestations fail to persuade. Evidence on record is awash of
SPETHICS 68
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the immoral and disgraceful conduct of petitioner. We find no reason
therefore to disturb the findings of public respondent that petitioner is
guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.
x x x x
In the face of the evidence presented by private respondent, the bare
denial and self-serving statements of petitioner crumble. The positive
and categorical assertions of private respondent and the uncontradicted
statements of the witnesses that they saw petitioner staying overnight at
Anna Fe's house on numerous occasions, have sufficiently established
the administrative liability of petitioner. They reasonably and logically
lead to the conclusion that petitioner was intimately and scandalously
involved with Anna Fe. In fact, petitioner even admitted having visited
Anna Fe's home several times but claimed that Anna Fe is her distant
relative and client. If this was so, petitioner could have presented proof
showing his business transaction with Anna Fe. Also, petitioner's claim
that Anna Fe is his distant blood relative is wanting of any evidence.
Nonetheless, if petitioner and Anna Fe are indeed relatives, this fact
would not help prove petitioner's innocence from the charge of immoral
conduct. Rather, it would only make petitioner's actions appear more
scandalous and distasteful and would only tend to validate petitioner's
inclination to thoughtless indiscretions.
Also quite untenable is petitioner's protestation that the evidence
presented would prove at most his causal visits to his friend and relative
Anna Fe. In his vain attempt for absolution, petitioner pointed out that
neither a single photograph of him and Anna Fe going out together was
ever presented nor even an allegation that they were seen holding hands
or that they had a 'friendly kiss, or beso-beso'.
It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to maintain
intimate relations with another person of the opposite sex other than his
or her spouse. In the context of and during such an illicit affair, acts
which are otherwise morally acceptable (such as having lunch or dinner,
working overtime or watching a movie together) become tainted with
immorality when done by a married man or woman with a person not his
or her spouse. These otherwise innocent acts (like petitioner's casual
visits to Anna Fe's house and his overnight stays) are deemed unclean
because they are done in furtherance of and in connection with

something immoral.
Moreover, immorality is not confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
public welfare.
The Court will not deviate from the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman as fully affirmed by the CA.
The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest
standards of morality because the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
There is no question that a married person's abandonment of his or her
spouse in order to live and cohabit with another constitutes immorality.
The offense may even be criminal – either as concubinage or as adultery
Immoral conduct, or immorality, is that which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. As a basis of disciplinary action, such
immoral conduct, or immorality must be so corrupt as to virtually
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.21 That the
illicit partner is himself or herself married compounds the immorality.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. The Court will exercise its disciplining authority only if the
SPETHICS 69
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case against the respondent is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence. Given the serious and far-reaching consequences
of disbarment, only a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the
imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment. 22 Preponderance of
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means
evidence that is more convincing as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.23
Herein, the complainant presented clearly preponderant evidence
showing that the respondent, while being lawfully married to her, had
maintained an illicit relationship with a married woman. It is of no
moment that she presented no direct evidence of the illicit relationship
between him and his mistress; or that her proof of his immorality was
circumstantial. Direct evidence is that evidence which proves a fact in
issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the
part of the factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue; the factfinder must draw an inference or
reason from circumstantial evidence.24 The lack of direct evidence should
not obstruct the adjudication of a dispute, for circumstantial evidence
may be available for the purpose. The Rules of Court has really made no
distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of
circumstances from which the existence of a may be inferred.25 Thus, for
the respondent to insist that the complainant did not discharge her
burden of proof because she did not adduce direct evidence of the
immorality is utterly fallacious. As the records amply indicated, the
circumstantial evidence adduced herein compelled the conclusion that he
had abandoned the complainant and their children in order to cohabit
with his married mistress.
Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or
morality of a member of the Bar is challenged, it is not enough that he or
she denies the charge, for he or she must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence presented on the charge. He or she must present proof that
he or she still maintains the degree of integrity and morality expected of
him or her at all times.26 The respondent failed in this regard.
In keeping with the high standards of morality imposed upon every
lawyer, the respondent should have desisted from the illicit relationship
with his mistress, and should have avoided the impression on the part of
 SPETHICS 70
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the public that he was defying the moral standards required of him. 27 His
leaving his wife and family to cohabit with his married mistress definitely We now deal with the penalty to be imposed.
transgressed the clearly-defined bounds of decency and morality. His
transgression inflicted on his wife and children a lot of suffering, In Narag v. Narag,31 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for
including depression, as borne out by one child's attempt at suicide out abandoning his family and living with his paramour. In Dantes v.
of despair for what he had caused to their family. These circumstances Dantes,32 the Court disbarred the respondent attorney for having
were more than sufficient to establish the charge of gross immorality. maintained two illicit relationships, thereby not keeping up with the strict
requirements of law for the continued practice of the noble profession.
That the immoral conduct of the respondent pertained to his private life In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,33 disbarment was also imposed
did not diminish the gravity of his ethical violation. In Advincula v. on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit
Advincula,28 we have exhorted all lawyers to always conduct themselves affair with another woman. Likewise, in Guevarra v. Eala,34 disbarment
in a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a
they are flouting the moral standards of the legal profession, thusly: married woman while he was also married.
.... it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must
By his scandalous and highly immoral conduct, therefore, the respondent
not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be
showed that he did not possess the requisite good moral character
of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
needed for the continued practice of law. He deserves the extreme
moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
penalty of disbarment.
Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from
adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he
ELISEO B. CENIZA, JR. guilty of gross immorality in violation of Rule
is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an
1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its
Responsibility; DISBARS him from the practice of law effective upon
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in
receipt of this decision; and ORDERS his name stricken off the Roll of
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good
Attorneys.
moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Indeed, any lawyer guilty of gross misconduct should be suspended or Furnish a copy of this decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
disbarred even if the misconduct relates to his or her personal life for as its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator
long as the misconduct evinces his or her lack of moral character, for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.
honesty, probity or good demeanor.29 Every lawyer is expected to be
honorable and reliable at all times, for a person who cannot abide by the SO ORDERED.
laws in his private life cannot be expected to do so in his professional
dealings.30

In view of the foregoing, the respondent's immoral conduct

violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 SPETHICS 71
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EN BANC even after [AAA] moved to Mandaluyong City.

A.C. No. 10021, September 18, 2018
Sometime in the last quarter of 1998, [AAA] began to feel very
AAA,1Ccomplainant, v. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS uncomfortable with the situation when she realized that [respondent Atty.
REYES, Respondent De Los Reyes] was becoming overly possessive and demanding to the
extent that she could not refuse his offer to bring her home; her
A.C. No. 10022 telephone calls were being monitored by [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] who constantly asked her who she was talking with on the
AAA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANTONIO N. DE LOS REYES, Respondent. telephone and would get mad if she told him that it was a male person;
she would be called to his office during office hours just to listen to his
DECISION
stories about his life, how he was raised by a very strict father, a former
PER CURIAM: NBI director, how unhappy he was with his wife who treated him like a
mere boarder in their house and sometimes just to sit there doing
Before the Court are two administrative complaints filed by complainant nothing in particular, simply because he wanted to see her. He also sent
AAA seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Antonio De Los Reyes or left her love notes.
(respondent Atty. De Los Reyes) on the grounds of sexual harassment
and gross immoral conduct. AAA claims that respondent Atty. De Los [AAA] tried to avoid [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who vacillated
Reyes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he between being verbally abusive toward her, cursing and shouting
committed acts which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful invectives at her whenever she did, and overly solicitous the next
which warrant his disbarment. moment, apparently to placate her.
The Factual Antecedents
On 11 December 1998, when she refused his offer to take her home, he
got angry with her and shouted "putangina mo." She tried to get away
from him but he blocked her path, grabbed her arm and dragged her to
In her undated Complainant's Position Paper, AAA narrated the following: the parking area and pushed her inside his service vehicle. He drove off,
Sometime in February 1997, [AAA] was hired as secretary to ignoring her cries and pleas to stop and let her get off. He slapped her
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes], then Vice-President of the Legal and twice and she became hysterical. She opened the car door and
Administrative Group of [National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation] attempted to jump but he was able to grab her jacket and dropped her
NHMFC. off somewhere in Makati. She reported the incident to the police.

[AAA] became a permanent employee with a plantilla position of private
secretary 1, pay grade 11, on a co-terminus status with [respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes]. She later learned that it was [respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] who facilitated her rapid promotion to her position soon after
becoming his secretary.
Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]
offered to take [AAA] home in his NHMFC issued service vehicle telling
her that her residence on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati was along his route.
From then on it became a daily routine between them, which continued
[AAA] did not file a formal report or complaint against [respondent Atty.
De Los Reyes] as she thought that it would be futile. She told Atty.
Fermin Arzaga [then Senior Vice-President for Finance at NHMFC] what
happened and showed him her bruises on her wrists. She told him of her
plan to resign and he asked her not to resign and instead to request for
a transfer. Despite his advice, she sent a resignation letter that was
received by the Personnel Department on 22 December 1998.
On the same date, both the manager and the assistant manager talked
to [AAA] and persuaded her to reconsider her resignation by promising
 SPETHICS 72
Canon 1

her that she would be re-assigned to the Office of the President, as herself, but did not deter [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] from calling
stated in an Office Order dated 21 January 1999. and texting her or even. coming to her house to personally check on her.

On 22 January 1999, [AAA] reported to the Office of the President. But [AAA] attempted to put a stop to [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's]
even before she could start working in her new assignment, she was told obsession with her by flaunting an American as her boyfriend.
to return to her former post as private secretary of [respondent Atty. De [Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] went into a jealous rage when he
Los Reyes]. learned about it.

[AAA] later learned from [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] that he had
called up Atty. Arzaga and told him not to interfere ("huwag kang
makialam"). He told her that her position was co-terminus with his,
being his private secretary.
Much as she wanted to pursue her plan to resign, [AAA's] financial
position at that time left her with no choice but to continue working as
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes'] secretary. [Respondent Atty. De Los
Reyes] knew that [AAA] was the sole breadwinner of her family, as her
father had deserted them when she was but 8 years old, leaving her to
care for her sick mother, a two-year-old niece and two sisters who were
still in school.
[Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] exploited his knowledge to force [AAA]
to continue working for him as his secretary. He moved in on her steadily,
making it plain to all that she was his property, isolating her from the
other people in the office who did not want to cross him, dominating and
humiliating her. He eventually made it clear to her that he was
determined to make her his mistress and overpowered her resistance by
leaving her no choice but to succumb to his advances or lose her job.
x x x x
It seemed that [AAA] could never escape from the clutches of
[respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] who always found a way to ensure that
she would always end up being re-assigned to his office, even after she
was assigned to other units. He continued to bring her home, no matter
that her residence was now in Canlubang, Laguna. He also continued to
see her [in] his office at least twice a day, even sending an assistant to
fetch her when she refused to go.
In January 2003, [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] continued to keep a
tight watch over her even when [AAA] went on official study leave to
attend her CGFNS review classes. He insisted on personally bringing
[AAA] to and from her classes or he made sure that his official driver
took her there using his official vehicle when he could not personally
accompany her.
[AAA] failed to take her exam in March 2003 and requested a leave of
absence to take the July 2003 exam. She stopped seeing [respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes] and refused to see or talk to him completely.

From then on, she became his sex slave who was at his beck and call at [Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes] kept sending [AAA] text messages that
all times for all kinds of sexual services ranging from hand-jobs in his she ignored and even requested for a change of number of her cell
vehicle to sexual intercourse in his office. She could not even refuse him phone. After a month of not receiving anything from him, she thought he
without risking physical, verbal and emotional abuse. had already given up on her but she was wrong.

[AAA] become despondent with her situation, knowing that she was the He now trained his sight on [Ma. Victoria] Marivic Alpajaro, a good friend
object of gossip and ridicule among her officemates. She felt so helpless and officemate of [AAA], who had now become the object of his ire and
and frustrated that she thought of committing suicide on countless jealousy because of her apparent closeness to [AAA].
occasions. Coming to the office was such an ordeal that she often
suffered from all sorts of illnesses such as fever, stomachaches, sore His threats to fire Marivic compelled [AAA] to seek him out and plead
throat, and migraine which gave her a convenient reason to absent with him to spare her friends. On 10 July 2003, they met outside the
 SPETHICS 73
Canon 1

office and he insisted that they go back together to the office to show
everyone that everything was still the same between them. She refused
and ran out of the restaurant. He followed and wrapped his arms around Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes further stated that AAA's affidavits were
her but she evaded him. He was shouting "mahal kita" in public, to her replete with inconsistencies and unrealistic statements that are contrary
great embarrassment. He attempted to stop her but she threatened that to human nature. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied her allegations
she will throw herself in the path of oncoming vehicles if he persisted.2 and explained the following points:

(a) He offered his service vehicle not only to AAA but also to other
employees of NHMFC who lived along his route; and it was AAA herself
AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated November 19, 2004, with
who requested that she be brought home together with other
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
employees;
Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes still
continued to harass her and her colleagues (Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and
(b) NHMFC has corporate policies prohibiting the long use of telephones
Mercedita Lorenzana) who agreed to be her witnesses in her earlier
by the employees for personal purposes;
complaint. According to AAA, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed
baseless charges against her and her sympathetic officemates before the
Office of the Ombudsman, and sought their preventive suspension
without affording them due process through an initial administrative (c) The incident reported by AAA that she was grabbed and dragged into
investigation at the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation his service vehicle is highly incredible as it would have been readily
(NHMFC). She added that because of what respondent Atty. De Los noticed by many employees because it was immediately after office
Reyes did to her, she suffered from various illnesses, insomnia, hours;
listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was diagnosed as suffering from Major
Depressive Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress (d) He did not ask for any sexual favors in his office or in his service
Disorder by Dr. Norietta Calma-Balderama, a psychiatrist at the vehicle considering the location of the office which was very accessible to
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine at the University of other employees including the security guard by the door that is always
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital (UP-PGH). open; and respondent Atty. De Los Reyes always sat on the front
passenger side of his service vehicle with his driver;
In his defense, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes denied AAA's allegations
relating to the alleged sexual harassment and gross immorality for lack
of factual and legal bases. In his Consolidated Position Paper for the
(e) The requests for transfer of assignment made by AAA did not
Respondent dated May 16, 2005, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
mention that it was because of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes or of any
contended that AAA's complaint-affidavits were not sufficient in form and
sexual harassment that she suffered at his hands; and
substance as required under the Rules of Court and should be dismissed
for being mere scraps of paper. According to respondent Atty. De Los
(f) The complaints for disbarment filed by AAA against respondent Atty.
Reyes, the complaints failed to state the ultimate facts or particulars,
De Los Reyes were purely in retaliation since he was conducting
approximate dates, and other details of the sexual acts or advances that
investigations against AAA and her two friends at the NHMFC.
he allegedly committed, in violation of his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. He averred that AAA's
Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes also countered the Certification issued by
lame excuse for her omission allegedly due to her fear that she would be
Dr. Calma-Balderama of the UP-PGH Department of Psychiatry and
exposing herself to shame and humiliation after her colleagues would
Behavioral Medicine as a mere scrap of paper and without any probative
know of the details of her complaint is unbelievable.
 SPETHICS 74
Canon 1

value since said certification was not made under oath or subscribed to,
and was not supported by any clinical or psychological report.
Finally, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes asserted that assuming the
alleged grounds for disbarment regarding the claim for sexual
harassment were true, the same had already prescribed since they
occurred in 1999 or more than three years prior to the institution of the
complaints.
The Findings of the IBP
Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Antonio De Los Reyes is hereby SUSPENDED [INDEFINITELY].4

In the Report and Recommendation dated June 6, 2011, the CBD-IBP

Commissioner found respondent Atty. De Los Reyes guilty of violating Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration which
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XX-2013-
the penalty of one (1) year suspension. The Investigating Commissioner 311 dated March 21, 2013, thus:
opined that there was no indication that AAA was not telling the truth,
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [respondent Atty. De Los Reyes']
and that she acceded to the numerous incidents of sexual intercourse
Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
because of fear of reprisals or consequences if she refused. The
Resolution and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
Commissioner explained thus:
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution
We also take note that there is an apparent ambivalence or hesitancy in No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.5
the use of the word "rape" by herein complainant. This is because the
numerous sexual intercourse occurred with the complainant's seeming
consent. However, such cannot be characterized as voluntary. The Issue
Complainant acceded to the sexual intercourse because of fear of
reprisals or consequences if she did not. Whether there is actual rape, as
it is defined in the Revised Penal Code, would not be relevant in this
The issue in this case is whether or not respondent Atty. De Los Reyes
disbarment case since the sexual intercourse coupled with unspoken
committed acts amounting to sexual harassment and gross immoral
threats of dire consequences would nonetheless constitute grave
conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
misconduct.
would warrant his disbarment.
Respondent has also raised the argument of prescription. While there The Court's Ruling
could be a prescriptive period under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law,
there is no prescriptive period for grave misconduct in disbarment
proceedings and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Disbarment
proceedings are sui generis.3 After due consideration, we adopt the findings and conclusions of the
Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors.

The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

In Resolution No. XX-2012-254 dated July 21, 2012, the IBP Board of
 SPETHICS 75
Canon 1

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
impression that he is flouting those moral standards." Consequently, any
errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his public or private activities,
which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.

CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
Thus, lawyers are duty-bound to observe the highest degree of morality
the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
and integrity not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout
their career in order to safeguard the reputation of the legal profession.
x x x x Any errant behavior, be it in their public or private life, may subject
them to suspension or disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects Court expressly states that members of the Bar may be disbarred or
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private suspended for any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of their
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal oath.
profession.
In Ventura v. Samson,7 we explained that immoral conduct involves acts
that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of
In Valdez v. Dabon,6 we explained that the possession of good moral
the community. It is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
profession, to wit:
to shock the community's sense of decency.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of
good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership
Here, we rule that the records of this administrative case sufficiently
in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to
substantiate the findings of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner, as
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's
well as the IBP Board of Governors, that indeed respondent Atty. De Los
integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Reyes committed acts of gross immorality in the conduct of his personal
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
affairs with AAA that show his disregard of the lawyer's oath and of the
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
Code of Professional Responsibility.
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
A perusal of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) taken during the
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit that "as officers of the
June 30, 2006 hearing of the instant case shows AAA's straightforward
court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
testimony of her ordeal at the hands of respondent Atty. De Los Reyes:
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A Atty. [Angelito] Lo [Counsel for respondent Atty. De Los Reyes]:
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also Q. You said that you were being raped twice a week by the respondent?
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
AAA:
 SPETHICS 76
Canon 1

I have to clarify this kasi it's vague. We need to know exactly what
A. Yes, sir. happened. Nagtinginan lang kayo sa mata, what happened?

COMM. FUNA: AAA:

Twice a week for how many weeks? I was inside the C.R. I'm using the restroom, pumasok sya.

AAA: COMM. FUNA:

I guess it's from 1999 to more or less 2000. Did he touch any part of your body?

COMM. FUNA: AAA:

For clarification, what do you mean by rape? Yes.

AAA: COMM. FUNA:

I was forced...he forced me to have sex with him. Was there a sexual intercourse between you and the respondent?

COMM. FUNA: AAA:

In what sense? Conversation? Yes.

AAA: COMM. FUNA:

Other than that, sir. Most of the time, I was not allowed...from the very There was?
start, I was not allowed to use the C.R.
AAA:
COMM. FUNA:
Yes.
No, no, no. Do you know what rape is?
COMM. FUNA:
AAA:
How many times?
Yes. I was forced to have sex with him. There [were] some instances
that he would go inside the C.R. while I'm still inside. He would push me AAA:
and force me to have sex with him. Tinutulak nya ako pababa.
At most is twice a week.
COMM. FUNA:
COMM. FUNA:
 SPETHICS 77
Canon 1

Now, you will be raped and yet you did not report to the police? That's what... kasi my position is co-terminus with him. It's permanent
but still co-terminus with him. Sabi nya nga, I'm working [at] his
AAA: pleasure. It's up to him anytime if he wants to fire me. He can do that.

I'm so scared and I don't know kung may maniniwala sa akin. COMM. FUNA:

COMM. FUNA: Atty. Ambrosio, how would you characterize that?

You will be raped and yet you continue to work. ATTY. [MINERVA] AMBROSIO [Counsel for AAA]:

AAA: Which one, sir? She's raped, plain and simple, sir, sexual harassment.

As I have mentioned in my Affidavit, I am the sole breadwinner in my COMM. FUNA:

family. I tried to leave the office, I tried to look for a job.
Would you go to this office...(interrupted)
COMM. FUNA:
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
So when you go to work, you know that you will be raped...
Sir, why are you laughing?
AAA:
COMM. FUNA:
Because I have to fend [for] my whole family. My mother is sick. I don't
have a father. I have my other siblings to support, I have my niece. It's ... if you know that you will be raped?
really hard for me but...(Witness crying)
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
COMM. FUNA:
Sir...(unintelligible) to understand.
So, iyong subsequent rapes were done with your consent? Would you
say that? COMM. FUNA:

AAA: Tomorrow, you know that you will be raped ... (Comm. Funa and Atty.
Ambrosio talking at the same time)
It's an exchange to maintain my job.
ATTY. AMBROSIO:
COMM. FUNA:
[She's] telling you wala siyang choice. That's the whole essence of
So you consented because you believe that you will lose your job? sexual harassment because a woman is forced to continue working or to
continue in this particular position because she has no choice. If she
AAA: doesn't consent to his sexual advances, she gets fired or she gets

demoted or she will get a deduction in her pay. See, that's plain and
simple sexual harassment. This is...(unintelligible) I do not understand.
You're all laughing here. This is a woman crying telling you... there's
injustice being done to this woman.8
Clearly, the above-quoted excerpt from the TSN dated June 30, 2006,
shows that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of "sextortion" which
is the abuse of his position or authority to obtain sexual favors from his
subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling victim who was not in a
position to resist respondent's demands for fear of losing her means of
livelihood. The sexual exploitation of his subordinate done over a period
of time amounts to gross misbehavior on the part of respondent Atty. De
Los Reyes that affects his standing and character as a member of the
Bar and as an officer of the Court. All these deplorable acts of
respondent Atty. De Los Reyes puts the legal profession in disrepute and
places the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, thus
warranting disciplinary action from the Court.9
It bears emphasizing that an administrative case for disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case
but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members for the protection of the public and of the courts. It
is an investigation on the conduct of the respondent as an officer of the
Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.10
This Court held in Pena v. Aparicio11 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. x x x Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still
a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
SPETHICS 78
Canon 1
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to
the office of an attorney. x x x.
While we agree with the findings of the IBP, we, however, consider the
recommended penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law
not commensurate with the gravity of the acts committed by respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes.
In a number of administrative cases involving illicit sexual relations and
gross immorality, this Court imposed upon the erring lawyers various
penalties ranging from suspension to disbarment, depending on the
circumstances. In De Leon v. Pedreña,12 we suspended the respondent
from the practice of law for two years for rubbing complainant's leg with
his hand, putting complainant's hand on his crotch area, and pressing his
finger on complainant's private part. In Tumbaga v. Teoxon,13 the
respondent was suspended for three years from the practice of law for
committing gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with
complainant. This Court, in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 meted the penalty of
indefinite suspension on Atty. Castillo when he had an illicit relationship
with a woman not his wife and sired a child with her, whom he later on
refused to recognize and support. In Dantes v. Dantes,15 the respondent
was disbarred when he engaged in illicit relationships with two different
women during the subsistence of his marriage to complaint. We also
ruled in Arnobit v. Arnobit,16 that respondent's act of leaving his wife and
12 children to cohabit ad have children with another woman constitutes
grossly immoral conduct, for which respondent was disbarred. Likewise,
in Delos Reyes v. Aznar,17 we disbarred respondent, Chairman of the
College of Medicine, for his acts of enticing the complainant, who was
then a student in the said college, to have carnal knowledge with him
under the threat that she would fail in all of her subjects if she refused
respondent.
In Ventura v. Samson,18 this Court has reminded that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Disbarment should not be imposed where a lesser penalty may
 SPETHICS 79
Canon 1

accomplish the desired goal of disciplining an erring lawyer. In the

present case, however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions show
that he lacks the degree of morality required of him as a member of the
legal profession, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment. Respondent
Atty. De Los Reyes is disbarred for his gross misbehavior, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but
also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.19

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los

Reyes GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of respondent

Atty. De Los Reyes in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies
of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.