Kida vs Senate of the Philippines

- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
Facts:

RA No. 93332 was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August
2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified
in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with
the regular national and local elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the
ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146,
with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with this Court – G.R. No. 1962713 -
assailing the constitutionality of both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 as well
for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No.
196305 filed another petition4 also assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

Issues:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections including the regional elections of
autonomous regions
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
a. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of
RA No. 9054?
b. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
c. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether the proposal for incumbent elective officials to extend their term through a holdover until their successors
are elected is constitutional and legal
V. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
VI. Whether the Court has the power to shorten the terms of elective officials from what is mandated by the
Constitution
VII. Whether RA No. 10153 in unconstitutional in so far as it grants the President the power to appoint OICs violating
the following Constitutional provisions:
a. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution (see VIII)
b. Section 16, supra
c. Section 18, supra
VIII. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

Rule:

Court DISMISSED the petitions. RA 10153 is held CONSTITUTIONAL.

Ratio:
 Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections including the regional elections
of autonomous regions.

The Constitution recognizes the synchronization of elections including the regional elections of autonomous
regions.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, 10 which show
the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent
officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.11

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all
future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.12 This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. 13

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all
serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it
is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. 17 Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions
of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to Local Government. That
an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Section 26(2), Article 6, 1987 Constitution. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members
three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

a. The petitioners challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution18 which provides that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws, they
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of
the bill’s immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,19 explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in
the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.

b. On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there was no
public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law Art.
VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of
hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]

The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their legislative discretion – gave full
recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of
RA No. 9054?

RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054. Consequently, there was no need to
submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply with
Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law.

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised
by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60)
days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular
(subsequent) elections.

RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 were enacted to fix the date of the subsequent elections. They cannot be considered
amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a
gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1
and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

Yes. The supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 905432 is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members
in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide

This provides that a "majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business." In other words, as long
as majority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient
to enact laws or approve acts.

Doctrine on irrepealable laws

Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. Since Congress’ powers are plenary, and limited only by the
Constitution, any attempt to limit the powers of future Congresses via an irrepealable law is not allowed.

It cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban
against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2,
Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

Yes. Any change in the date of elections would not require a plebiscite called for the purpose.

SECTION 18, supra. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President
from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-

IV. Whether the proposal for incumbent elective officials to extend their term through a holdover until their
successors are elected is constitutional and legal

Holdover Option is Unconstitutional.

It would violate Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.

As this Court put in Osmeña v. COMELEC:52

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their
successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue
the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this
Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot
be extended by holdover by Congress.

Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power
of the President.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that
prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,62 except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion results.

V. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections

Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory
grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to
another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances
provided for in the law.

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have already been
scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of
election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature that the
holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
principle of ejusdem generis, the term "analogous causes" will be restricted to those unforeseen or unexpected events
that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These "analogous causes" are further defined by the phrase "of such
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible."

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where elections have already been scheduled but do not
take place because of (a) force majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns
or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6
addresses instances where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to
the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imagination can these
reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all
pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a
statute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. 66 Clearly,
neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal
basis to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections.

VI. Whether the Court has power to shorten the terms of elective officials from what is mandated by the
Constitution

The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials, and doing so will violate Section 8, Art. 8 of the
Constitution.

Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of
office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,67 is specifically given to
Congress.

SECTION 8, Article X. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for
less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years 71 as this tinkering would directly contravene
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as ruled in Osmena.

VII. Whether RA No. 10153 in unconstitutional in so far as it grants the President the power to appoint OICs
violating the following Constitutional provisions:

 Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

 Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed.

 Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance
and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly,
both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts
shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

A. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs is essentially executive in nature, pursuant to Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this
power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.73 The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. 74

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that
the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on
clear constitutional basis.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
B. Petitioners contend that the Constitution, pursuant to Section 18, Article X, requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be "elective and representative of the constituent political units." This requirement indeed is
an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.

The Court held that RA No. 10153 does not change the “elective and representative” character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153 does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in
terms of structure of governance.

What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to "appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office." It is an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

The power of appointment that extends beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a
government that is not "democratic and republican." For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This will breach the "elective
and representative" governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.

This is not true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more
importantly, the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA No. 9054 – will not
systemically be touched nor affected at all.

Synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the
community’s choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the
manner that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units 76 and the
adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces.77 These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national
demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these
measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where
one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the "representative" character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be affected by the appointment of
OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the "elective" aspect shall be supplanted by
the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the
appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the
Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its proper context – is a law that is not violative of
the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

C. Petitioners argue that upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent of giving the
President the power to cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with
OICs.

The argument lacks merit. The power to cancel the election does not fall within the powers of the President. It falls within
the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers, subject to limitations set by the Constitution [Sec. 8,
Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose – the
synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-
10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be transferred or
applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for
special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as
above discussed.

VIII. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

Petitioners argue that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and
regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.

This interpretation violates a basic principle in constitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except
where the primacy of one over the other is clear.82

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be
interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may
give to all of them full force and effect. [Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. RA 10153 does not in any way
alter, change or modify its [ARMM, pursuant to its Organic Law RA 9054] governing features, except in a very temporary
manner and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.

While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated
autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate “within the larger framework
of the State” [Sec. 15, Art. X, 1987 Constitution], and is still subject to the national policies set by the national
government [Sec. 17, Art. X, supra], save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional
autonomous determination.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre86 the Court said:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units
are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
- Law enactment process [Secs. 26, 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution]
- Doctrine of irrepealable law
- Power of the Executive branch to appoint [Sec. 16, Art. 7, Supra]
- Power of Congress to fix the date of the election subject to limitations set by the Constitution
[Sec. 8, Art. VI - Legislature, Sec. 4(3), Art. VII- President and Vice President, Sec. 3, Art. X- Local government]
- Synchronization of elections as mandated by the Constitution [Art. XVIII – Transitory Provisions, supra]
- Authority of autonomous regions (ARMM and CAR) in relation to State authority [Secs. 15-21, Art. X, supra]
-