G.R. No.

L-15430 September 30, 1963

IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC.,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are:
(1) The former judgment must be final;
(2) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
the parties;
(3) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) There must be, between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties (b) identity
of subject matter and (e) identity of cause of action (Navarro v. Director of Lands, L-18814, July
31, 1962; Aring v. Original, L-18464, Dec. 29, 1962).

Test on determining the identity of cause of action

395 Phil. 803 DIVISION
[ GR No. 121182, Oct 02, 2000 ]
VICTORIO ESPERAS v. CA +
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul the resolutions of
the Court of Appeals, Second Division, promulgated May 13, 1994[1] and April 19, 1995[2] in CA-
G.R. CV No. 29581, denying herein petitioner's prayer for dismissal of private respondents' appeal
and the subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively.

On August 30, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, Branch 8, rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 7623, entitled Heirs of Ponciano Aldos, represented by Anastacio Magtabog and
Josefina Magtabog, vs. Victorio L. Esperas, in favor of herein petitioner, Victorio Esperas, and
dismissing herein private respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Private respondents filed their notice of appeal. The appeal was perfected on September 28,
1989. Eight months later, on May 28, 1990, petitioner filed before the trial court, a motion to
dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. On June 15, the
trial court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, private respondents went to the Court of
Appeals and filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 22695. It
alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction to dismiss their appeal.

On October 8, 1990, the Special Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals declared null and void the
trial court's orders of June 15, 1990 and August 8, 1990, for having been issued without
jurisdiction.[3] It said that the Motion to Dismiss Appeal should have been filed with the Court of
Appeals.

Taking its cue from this resolution and to correct his erroneous filing before the trial court,
petitioner filed anew his motion to dismiss appeal, this time with the Court of Appeals. The appeal
was given the same docket number, CA G.R. SP No. 22695. On November 27, 1990, the appellate
court granted the motion to dismiss appeal.[4] Private respondents' opposition was denied and
likewise their motion for reconsideration.

Private respondents elevated to this Court, CA G.R. SP No. 22695 in a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 101461. We dismissed it for being filed out of time.[5] The
dismissal became final and executory and entry of judgment was made on January 28, 1992.[6]

Nine months later, on November 25, 1992, private respondents received a notice from the Court
of Appeals, requiring them to submit copies of their briefs in CA-G.R. CV No. 29581. Petitioner
manifested to the Court of Appeals that CA-G.R. CV No. 29581 was the same case CA-G.R. SP No.
22695 that originated from RTC as Civil Case No. 7623,[7] previously appealed in the Court of
Appeals and elevated to this court as G.R. No. 101461. Petitioner thus, prayed for the dismissal
of the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29581.

On May 13, 1994, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated the now assailed
resolutions, and denied the prayer for dismissal of CA-G.R. CV No. 29581 and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.[8] The Second Division's dismissal, in effect reversed the dismissal of
the appeal by the Special Eighth Division and paved the way for the re-litigation of Civil Case No.
7623.

Hence, this petition, invoking that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF A CASE WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN
FINALLY ADJUDICATED.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE THE POWER NOR DOES IT HAVE THE POWER TO SET
ASIDE/NULLIFY A PREVIOUS DECISION RENDERED BY ANOTHER DIVISION ON THE SAME COURT
OF APPEALS.

THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT (SECOND DIVISION) WAS NOT VALID AND
BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.

THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA HAS APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE.

Notwithstanding the formulation of four issues by petitioner, we only have to resolve one issue,
whether or not respondent Second Division of the Court of Appeals erred and abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of an appeal allegedly already barred by prior judgment and
in so doing, reversed a decision of another division of the same court.

When the Second Division of the Court of Appeals issued its resolution promulgated May 13,
1994, denying petitioner's prayer to dismiss the appeal, it stated that petitioner had the mistaken
impression that CA- G.R. CV No. 29581, before it, and CA-G.R. SP No. 22695, decided by the
Special Eighth Division, elevated to the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 101461 are one and the same.
The Second Division explains that the petition dismissed with finality by this Court was a special
civil action distinct from the case before it which is an ordinary appeal. It explained that the
appeal the trial court itself considered perfected, does not deserve outright dismissal since the
dismissal of such perfected appeal would not conform to law nor jurisprudence. To support its
contention, respondent court relied alone on Aguirre vs. The Honorable Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Branch III, et. al., 192 SCRA 454, 456-457 (1990).
In our view, public respondent misapplied Aguirre. It is true that like the instant case, Aguirre
involved a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the trial court; an
approval by the trial court of the record on appeal and appeal bond; the perfection of the appeal;
a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute the appeal; dismissal by a trial court of an
appeal for failure to prosecute; an opposition to the motion to dismiss on the ground that the
trial court had lost jurisdiction in view of the perfection of the appeal; a resolution granting the
motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute the appeal; and a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court. Thus ends the kinship between Aguirre and the present case. For
unlike Aguirre, this case involves another appeal of the same case resulting to a reversal of a
previous final adjudication by a division of another of equal rank.

In Aguirre, we made three pronouncements. One, that an appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance, (now Regional Trial Court) to the Court of Appeals may be dismissed for failure
to prosecute. Two, that once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over
the case and the proper court which must dismiss an appeal for failure to prosecute upon motion
of the appellant himself or upon the court's own motion is the Court of Appeals and not the Court
of First Instance. Three, that the order granting private respondents' motion to dismiss appeal
for failure of petitioners to prosecute their appeal is not merely an order for the protection of
the rights of the parties but is an order which disposes the case.[10] This is the extent of our
pronouncements in Aguirre and only under these instances is Aguirre pertinent to this case.

In his petition before us now, petitioner asserts that respondent Second Division erred in not
denying the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 29581 on the ground that said appeal is barred by res
judicata. He avers that CA-G.R. SP No. 22695 and CA-G.R. CV No. 29581 have the same parties,
the same facts and the same issues in the controversy. He submits that CA-G.R. SP No. 22695 was
already decided with finality when the Special Eighth Division ruled that private respondent's
appeal from the decision of the trial court was dismissed for failure to prosecute the appeal for
an unreasonable length of time. He claims that the Court of Appeals' oversight in requiring the
parties in Civil Case No. 7623 to submit appeal briefs was an error which private respondents
took advantage of with full knowledge that the grant of the Special Eighth Division of the motion
to dismiss the appeal put an end to the Civil Case No. 7623 after the petition for certiorari was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being filed out of time.

We agree with petitioner. When we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari of the
resolution of the Special Eighth Division granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court became the law of the case and constituted a bar to any re-litigation
of the same issues in any other proceeding under the principle of res judicata.
There are four essential conditions which must concur for res judicata to effectively apply: (1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the
first and second action, identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of
action. From the aforementioned particulars, it is unquestionable that the first three requisites
are present. The adjudication by the Special Eighth Division was a final adjudication by a
competent court with jurisdiction.

On the fourth requisite, between CA-G.R. SP. No. 22695 and CA-G.R. CV No. 29581, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. There is no question with respect to the
presence of identical parties and subject matter. Regarding identity of the causes of action, the
ultimate test to ascertain such identity is said to be whether or not the same evidence fully
supports and establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of action.[12]
Clearly, in the present case, the same evidence in the special civil action will have to be re-
examined to support the cause of action in the ordinary appeal. Thus, there is identity also of
the causes of action.
That one case is a special civil action and the other an ordinary appeal is of no moment here. The
application of doctrine of res judicata cannot be eluded merely by such nomenclature. Varying
the form of the actions or engaging a different method of presenting the issue will not escape
application of the doctrine. The fact remains that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Second
Division, effectively reversed the final orders of the Special Eighth Division. That reversal, if
countenanced, would result in the re-litigation of the same case involving the same issues,
parties, and subject matter.
All these would show that the Second Division acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioner's prayer to dismiss the ordinary appeal, for it meant effectively reversing final
orders of another division of co-equal rank. Considering the circumstances of the case, CA-G.R.
CV No. 29581 had become moot and academic. Well-settled is the rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. For insofar as the parties to this present controversy are concerned,
the resolution of the Court of Appeals, Special Eighth Division, dated November 27, 1990,
granting the motion to dismiss, has already terminated the controversy between said parties in
the light of our ruling in G.R. No. 101461.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of public respondent dated May 13, 1994,
denying petitioner's prayer for the dismissal of the ordinary appeal, and its resolution dated April
19, 1995, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Public
respondent is hereby ordered to dismiss the appeal of private respondents in CA-G.R. CV No.
29581. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 186730 June 13, 2012

JESSE YAP, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL ELEVENTH [11th] DIVISION), and ELIZA CHUA and EVELYN TE,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated December 10, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated February 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93974. The
dispositive portion of the CA’s assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING
the petition filed in this case and the Orders issued by the public respondent Judge Rommel O.
Baybay dated October 21, 2005 and January 18, 2006 are hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, Civil
Case No. 04-030 is hereby ordered as DISMISSED on account of litis pendentia and violation of
the rule against forum-shopping.
SO ORDERED.
On January 9, 2004, petitioner Jesse Yap (Yap) filed a complaint against respondents Eliza Chua
(Chua) and Evelyn Te (Te) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City principally praying
for the cancellation or discharge of several checks that he drew against his account with the Bank
of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Yap’s complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-030 and raffled
to Branch 66.
Yap alleged that he purchased several real properties through Te, a real estate broker, and as
payment, delivered to her a number of checks either payable to her, the property owners or to
the various individuals who agreed to finance his acquisitions. He agreed to effect payment in
such manner on Te’s claim that this will expedite the transfer of the titles in his favor.
Chua, one of those who funded his purchases, asked him to issue checks with her as payee to
replace the checks he delivered to Te. Obliging, he drew six (6) checks payable to her against his
account with BPI, which were uniformly postdated July 30, 1997. Particularly:

Check No.
Amount

659599 ₱3,000,000.00
708158 ₱2,500,000.00
708160 ₱2,756,666.00
712418 ₱10,900,000.00
712417 ₱10,900,000.00
727214 ₱960,000.00
He stopped payment on the above checks and closed his account when Te failed to deliver the
titles on the properties. He also did the same on the following checks that Te endorsed to Chua
for rediscounting without his consent:

Check No. Date Amount

0727205 September 15, 1997 ₱770,833.33
0727206 September 30, 1997 ₱770,833.33
He delivered to Te these checks, which were payable to a certain Badoria Bagatao (Bagatao), for
the purchase of a parcel of land that, as Te represented, Bagatao supposedly owns. He, however,
was later informed of the contrary leading to the conclusion that as no consideration attended
the contract with Bagatao and all the other contracts of sale that he entered into through Te, it
was just proper that the checks he issued as payment be cancelled or annulled.

Chua presented an altogether different version of the facts. According to Chua, she released
₱9,415,000.00 to Yap through a certain Jovita Dimalanta (Dimalanta) sometime in January 1997
in exchange for two (2) postdated checks payable to her with a face value of ₱5,000,000.00 each.
A similar transaction took place in February 1997, where she delivered to Dimalanta
₱9,415,000.00 upon request of Yap, with the latter issuing in her favor two (2) postdated checks
payable to her in the total amount of ₱10,000,000.00. Yap twice requested for an extension and
for Chua not to encash the four (4) checks. In return, he issued two (2) checks payable to Chua
with a face value of ₱1,400,000.00 and ₱1,206,066.66 to cover the interest due.

Yap later replaced the four (4) checks with a face value of ₱5,000,000.00 each with a check
payable to Chua for ₱20,000,000.00 and postdated April 22, 1997. When this check became due,
Yap once again requested Chua for an extension and replaced it with BPI Check Nos. 712418 and
712417 to include the interest that would accrue until June 15, 1997. Thereafter, Yap, who asked
for another extension, issued to Chua BPI Check No. 727214 to include payment of the interest
that would accrue until July 30, 1997 on the ₱20,000,000.00 covered by BPI Check Nos. 712418
and 712417.
Apparently, Yap also delivered to Chua BPI Check Nos. 659599 and 708158 to replace the checks
drawn against his account, which a certain Jesus Dy endorsed to her. Yap likewise delivered a
check payable to Canda Medical Clinic and Hospital to Te, who in turn, endorsed it to Chua for
rediscounting. Sometime in June 1997, Yap replaced this check with BPI Check No. 708160 to
cover the interest from March to May 1997. Yap also gave Te two (2) checks payable to Bagatao,
BPI Check Nos. 0727205 and 0727206, which were subsequently endorsed to Chua for
rediscounting.
BPI Check Nos. 659599, 708158, 708160, 712418, 712417 and 727214 were dishonored for the
reason "account closed". On the other hand, Yap stopped payment on BPI Check Nos. 727205
and 727206.
Verbal demands for Yap to make good the checks he issued proved to be futile. Thus, Chua filed
with the RTC of General Santos City a complaint5 for sum of money against Yap and his wife,
Bessie. Chua’s complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6236 and raffled to Branch 23.
On June 8, 2001, the RTC of General Santos City issued a Decision,6 the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering
the latter to pay the former the following:
1. ₱32,558,332.00 as principal with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the
case until the whole amount is fully paid;
2. ₱150,000.00 as moral damages;
3. ₱50,000,00 as exemplary damages;
4. ₱1,000,000.00 in concept of attorney’s fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
The third-party complaint is DISMISSED.
Armed with the foregoing narration, Chua moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-030 on
the twin grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. Chua averred that Yap violated the rule
against forum shopping when he failed to inform the RTC of Makati City of Civil Case No. 6236
and the pendency of his appeal of the decision rendered therein. The elements of litis pendentia
exist, and forum shopping as the logical consequence thereof, considering that the two (2) cases
arose from the same set of facts and involve the same parties.
In an Order8 dated October 21, 2005, the RTC of Makati City refused to dismiss the case,
ratiocinating as follows:
On litis pendentia as a ground for dismissal, the Court is not convinced. As correctly stated by the
plaintiff, the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different from each other considering that the
collection case before the RTC of General Santos City is different from the instant case praying
for the discharge/annulment of issued checks. As such the fundamental requisites of [litis
pendentia] have not been met.

Anent dismissal on ground of forum shopping, the same is likewise denied for lack of merit. It is
well-settled that it is the duty of the plaintiff, not the defendant, to declare pending suits it
initiated between and among parties in its verification and certificate of non-forum shopping and
not the other way around. A plaintiff in a civil case therefore, is not mandated under the Rules to
declare that said plaintiff was a defendant in a prior suit instituted against him and other
defendants by the defendant in a subsequent case of different nature.
In an Order10 dated January 18, 2006, the RTC of Makati City denied Chua’s motion for
reconsideration.
Chua filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that grave abuse of discretion attended
the Orders of the RTC of Makati City dated October 21, 2005 and January 18, 2006. By virtue of
the assailed decision, this was given due course and the CA ordered the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 04-030.
After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the whole matter, together with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence on the premises, we have come up with a finding that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The requisites of [litis pendentia] are: (a) the identity of parties or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and the relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
The relief sought in Chua in Civil Case No. 6236 was for Yap to pay the amount that he owed to
Chua based on BPI Checks (sic) Nos. 0727205, 0727206, 659599, 708158, 708160, 712418,
712417 and 727214 that he issued. On the other hand, the relief prayed for by Yap in Civil Case
No. 04-030 was for BPI Checks (sic) Nos. 0727205, 0727206, 659599, 708158, 708160, 712418,
712417 and 727214 that he issued to Chua purportedly without any valid consideration to be
declared as null and void.

The cause of action of Yap in Civil Case No. 04-030 was also his defense in Civil Case No. 6236.
Necessarily, in determining the liability of Yap in Civil Case No. 6236, the lower court addressed
the issue of the validity of the subject checks. Branch 23 of the RTC in General Santos City ruled
that the checks were validly issued and declared Chua as a holder in due course thereof.
Moreover, the lack of consideration was raised as an affirmative defense and as the basis for his
counterclaim and third-party complaint by Yap in Civil Case No. 6236. Therefore, Branch 66 of
the RTC in Makati City committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of Civil Case No. 04-030 and denied Chua’s motion to dismiss it on
account of the pendency of another action in another court between them for the same case.

Yap, in filing Civil Case No. 04-030, also violated the rule against forum shopping. In the test to
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor
to ask is whether the elements of litis pendencia (sic) are present, or whether a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another, i.e., whether in the two or more cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and the reliefs sought.

A Motion to Dismiss was timely filed by Chua invoking litis pendencia (sic) and violation of the
rule against forum shopping. After having been appraised of the pending appeal before the
Supreme Court of a case involving the same parties based on the same rights and reliefs sought,
the respondent judge should have granted the said motion of Chua and dismissed Civil Case No.
04-030.11 (Citations omitted)

Yap urges this Court to reverse and set aside the CA’s dismissal of his complaint against Chua and
Te, claiming that he is not guilty of forum shopping as the alleged existence of litis pendentia is
belied by the incomparable causes of action he and Chua advanced in the separate complaints
they initiated against each other. Yap claimed that his prayer for the cancellation or discharge of
the subject checks entails a determination of their validity and on whether a valid consideration
exists for their issuance, which is immaterial or irrelevant in determining whether he should be
liable for the amounts that Chua released to Te and Dimalanta.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted
to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for
certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets.12 What is critical is the vexation brought
upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues.13 Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for
summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt.
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is
the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject
matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order
that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and
status of persons.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment
in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

The foregoing guided this Court in determining whether Yap is liable for forum shopping for filing
a complaint for annulment or discharge of checks following Chua’s filing of a complaint for a sum
of money with the two cases allegedly involving the same factual antecedents, issues and
arguments. In so doing, this Court agrees with the CA that all the elements of litis pendentia exist
and that Yap had indulged in the detestable act of forum shopping, warranting the outright and
summary dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-030.
The first requisite of litis pendentia is present as there is identity of parties. The second and third
requisites are likewise present. Apart from the fact that the same factual antecedents prompted
the filing of the two cases, that Yap’s defense in Civil Case No. 6236 constitutes his cause of action
in Civil Case No. 04-030 necessarily implies reliance on the same evidence for the resolution of
both cases.
Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise,
a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or
the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the
subsequent action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause
of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Among the several
tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action
are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes
of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint
in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
This Court takes note of the fact that Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks he
issued to Chua after he was adjudged by the RTC of General Santos City liable. This strikes the
Court as indicative of his deliberate and willful attempt to render nugatory and defeat the
adverse decision of the RTC of General Santos City and relieve himself of his obligation to pay by
having the checks he issued annulled, albeit the remedy of appeal was available and which he, in
fact, resorted to. Chua’s complaint is anchored on the amounts Yap received from her and the
RTC of General Santos City decided in her favor on the strength of the checks that Yap issued and
endorsed to her. By seeking to cancel or discharge such checks, Yap attempted to use the RTC of
Makati City to destroy the evidentiary foundation of the decision of the RTC of General Santos
City. In doing so, Yap trifled with court processes and exposed the courts to the possibility of
rendering conflicting decisions. Worse, Yap sought to accomplish the prohibited - a court
reversing a decision rendered by a court of co-equal rank. Thus, it matters not that the factual
findings and conclusions of law of the RTC of General Santos City, the RTC of Makati City, the CA
and even of this Court may concur. It is the fact that our judicial system is rendered vulnerable
to such uncertainties and vexations that any and all efforts to forum shop should be treated with
aversion.
As this Court held in Madara v. Perello:
Other permutations depending on the rulings of the two courts and the timing of these rulings
are possible. In every case, our justice system suffers as this kind of sharp practice opens the
system to the possibility of manipulation; to uncertainties when conflict of rulings arise; and at
least to vexation for complications other than conflict of rulings. Thus, it matters not that
ultimately the Court of Appeals may completely agree with the RTC; what the rule on forum
shopping addresses are the possibility and the actuality of its harmful effects on our judicial
system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 10,
2008 and Resolution dated February 19, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93974
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182970 July 23, 2014

EMILIANO S. SAMSON, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE and GUILLERMINA GABOR, TANAY RURAL BANK, INC., and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MORONG, RIZAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Order1 dated August 18, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70750 and Decision2 dated May 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 88335.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent spouses Jose and Guillermina Gabor are the registered owners of a parcel of land
with an area of Sixty-One Thousand Eighty-Five (61,085) square meters, more or less, situated at
Barrio Mapunso, Tanay, Rizal Province, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
25565 issued by the Register of Deeds of Morong.3

On November 14, 1985, the Spouses Gabor executed a Deed of Assignment transferring Twenty
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-One (20,631) square meters undivided portion of the
aforementioned parcel of land in favor of petitioner Emiliano S. Samson as attorney’s fees in
payment for the services rendered by the latter for the former.
On October 22, 1987, petitioner Samson executed a Deed of Assignment transferring the same
undivided portion in favor of Ma. Remedios P. Ramos. Upon learning of the sale, respondent
spouses filed an action for legal redemption with the RTC of Tanay, Rizal. Immediately thereafter,
petitioner Samson and Ramos executed an Agreement of Rescission revoking the transfer of the
undivided portion.4 On July 25, 1989, the RTC dismissed the suit for legal redemption. On appeal,
however, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, reversed the decision of the RTC and upheld the
Spouses Gabor’s right of legal redemption. No further appeals were pursued.

Instead, during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 25530, petitioner Samson filed an action for
Partition of Real Property and Damages5 against respondent spouses with the RTC of Morong,
Rizal, which dismissed the same on the ground that the finalityof CA-G.R. CV No. 25530 effectively
barred the action for partition.6 Agreeing with the RTC, the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38373,7 upheld
the lower court’s decision, in the following wise:

The appeal is not meritorious. In view of the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. No. 25530
upholding the right of defendantsappellees to exercise their right oflegal redemption over the
20,631 square meters involved, plaintiff-appellant is devoid of any legal right or personality to
ask for partition of [the] subject property formerly owned in common. Having assigned his
undivided share therein to Ma. Remedios P. Ramos, plaintiff-appellant ceased to be a co-owner.
By exercising their right of legal redemption, which thisCourt upheld by final judgment,
defendants-appellees now own the entire area covered by TCT No. M-25565.

The subsequent execution of the Agreement of Rescission by plaintiff-appellant and Ma.

Remedios P. Ramos did not divest defendants appellees of the right of legal redemption vested
in them upon the consummation of the assignment plaintiff-appellant made to Ma. Remedios P.
Ramos. x x x

When the pending appeal in CA-G.R. No. CV 25530 was decided and judgment therein became
final and executory, the lower court had to follow what was adjudged by this Court, and while
plaintiff-appellant was not a party in the said Civil CaseNo. 125-T and CA-G.R. CV No. 25530,
plaintiff-appellant is bound by the judgment therein because he was fully aware of the pendency
of such cases. As a matter of fact, he testified in Civil Case No. 125-T. Therefore, the Agreement
of Rescission he later entered into with Ma. Remedios P. Ramos during the pendency of the said
case, did not deprive defendants-appellees of their right of legal redemption. The supposed re-
acquisition by plaintiff-appellant of his undivided share in question, having been effected
pendente lite, the same was subject to the outcome of the case.8
Petitioner Samson then appealed to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, but the same
was dismissed in a minute resolution9 dated June 8, 1994 for failure to submit an affidavit of
service. This court further denied Samson’s motion for reconsideration with finality in its
Resolution10 dated July 25, 1994 for having no compelling reason to warrant the reconsideration
sought.

On April 4, 2006, petitioner Samson filed a Complaint before the RTC of Pasig City for Recovery
of Property or its Value against respondent spouses, Tanay Rural Bank, Inc., and the Register of
Deeds of Morong, Rizal, claiming that he had been paying his one-third (1/3) share of realty taxes
covering the subject portion of land for the years 2002 to 2004. In 2005, however, his payment
was rejected by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanay, Rizal, at such time he discovered that
respondent spouses had already mortgaged the entire property in favor of respondent Bank back
in November 2002.

On August 18, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper
venue, res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action. It held that the suit is a real
action which should be filed in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the property subject of the case
is situated. Moreover, the lower court pointed out that as early as 1991, herein petitioner had
already filed a Complaint for Partition of Real Property and Damages involving the same subject
property against the same parties, which complaint was already dismissed by this Court with
finality. Thus, the principle of res judicata applies. Finally, the trial court held that petitioner’s
complaint states no cause of action against herein respondent Bank as it does not allege any
details as to the liability or any violation of petitioner’s rights.
Claiming that the lower court erred in dismissing his complaint, petitioner Samson filed an appeal
with the CA, which likewise dismissed the same for having been improperly brought before it.
The appellate court ruled in its Decision13 dated May 9, 2008 that since petitioner’s appeal raised
only issues purely of law, it should be dismissed outright.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONER’S APPEAL
FROM THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY.

II. SINCE THE PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT IS BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, IT WAS PROPERLY FILED
WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY.
III. PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION.
IV. PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
The petition lacks merit.
We agree with the CA’s decision to dismiss petitioner’s appeal, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates the dismissal of an appeal that raises only
questions of law. The appeal of petitioner, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues
purely of law.
Time and again, this Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law from those of
pure questions of fact in the following manner:
A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged
facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or
relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query
is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the
resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both
questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness of
the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an
error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.
In the instant case, petitioner appealed the Order of the trial court which dismissed his complaint
for improper venue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata.16 Dismissals based on these
grounds do not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of the law,
specifically in this case, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue to be resolved
is limited to whether or not said rule was properly applied, which will only involve a reviewof the
complaint, the motions to dismiss, and the trial court’s order of dismissal, but not the probative
value of the evidence submitted nor the truthfulness or falsity of the facts. Considering,
therefore, that the subject appeal raised only questions of law, the CA committed no error in
dismissing the same.
We, likewise, agree with the decision of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing petitioner’s complaint
on the ground that the same should have been filed in the RTC of Morong, Rizal, where the
property subject of this case is situated. Petitioner claims that as shown by the caption of his
complaint which reads "For Recovery of Property or its Value," his cause of action is in the
alternative, both real and personal. As such, his action may be commenced and tried where the
petitioner resides or where any of the respondents resides, at the election of the petitioner.
Petitioner’s argument is misplaced. In Latorre v. Latorre, we ruled that:
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall
be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. x x x.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. It is also a settled rule that
what determines the venue of a case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. x x x While
the complaint of the petitioner was denominated as one for "Recovery of Property or its Value,"
all of his claims are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third (1/3) portion
of the subject property. In his complaint, petitioner sought the return of the portion of the subject
property or its value on the basis of his co-ownership thereof. Necessarily, his alternative claim
for the value of the property is still dependent on the determination of ownership, which is an
action affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein. Clearly, petitioner’s
claim is a real action which should have been filed in the court where the property lies, which in
this case, is the RTC of Morong, Rizal.
We further agree with the RTC of Pasig City when it dismissed petitioner’s complaint on the
ground that the same states no cause of action in the following wise:
The complaint states no cause of action as herein defendant was impleaded without stating any
details of its liabilities nor any allegation of its violations to the plaintiff’s rights. The only
allegation of the rights violated are Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. More importantly,
there are no allegations in the complaint that defendant TRB has violated the aforesaid laws.
There is no detail on why the defendant TRB has been impleaded in the instant case.
A perusal of the complaint would show that aside from the fact that respondent spouses had
mortgaged the property subject herein to respondent bank, there is no other allegation of an act
or omission on the part of respondent Bank in violation of a right of petitioner. In Spouses Zepeda
v. China Banking Corporation, We had occasion to discuss the definition of the term "cause of
action," to wit:
A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action." Failure to make a sufficient
allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal."
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows:

1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test is as
follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the
complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The
court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.

As already mentioned, there is nothing in the complaint herein which states specific overt acts to
show that respondent Bank acted in disregard of the petitioner’s rights. Nowhere in the
complaint was it alleged that respondent Bank had knowledge nor could have known with the
exercise of due diligence that respondent spouses had acted illegally, in order to commit a wrong
against the petitioner. Petitioner should have at least specified the details of his cause of action
against respondent Bank. The complaint of petitioner in Nacua-Jao v. China Banking Corporation,
sheds light on the specific allegations which must at least be stated to constitute a statement of
cause of action, to wit:

We are unable to subscribe to the foregoing view of the CA. Even a cursory reading of the
Complaint readily reveals a clear statement of the cause of action of petitioner. The Complaint
reads:
"x x x xxx xxx
3. That plaintiff is the lawful owner of Lot No. 561 and its improvements xxx covered by Title No.
T-525552 issued in her name xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
9. That sometime this year, plaintiff was only shocked to learn that a falsified and fraudulent
Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 19, 1996 was presented to the Register of Deeds xxx
in order to cause the cancellation of plaintiff's title x x x.
10. That consequently, TCT No. T-525552 xxx was illegally cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-
602202 in the name of defendant Gan spouses x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
12. That Lot No. 561, now covered by TCT No. T-602202 (Annex "H") in the name of defendantGan
spouses is presently mortgaged to defendant China Banking Corporation in the amount of
₱1,600,000.00; the mortgage is annotated at the backof Annex "H" and the annotation is marked
as Annex "H-1"; all the proceeds thereof went to defendant Gan Spouses.
13. That on knowing the falsification and the illegal cancellation of her title, plaintiff wrote
defendant Jackson Gan and defendant China Banking Corporation protesting against the unlawful
transactions that not onlyinvolved Lot No. 561 at Ternate, Cavite but also Lot No. 9, Blk. 89 at
Parañaque, Metro Manila; machine copies of the letter-protestsare hereto attached as Annexes
"I" and "J", respectively, and made integral parts hereof;
xxx xxx xxx
15. That from the foregoing, therefore, it is very evident that defendants had connived and
conspired to effect the so-called sale and mortgage of Lot No. 561 and the transfer of the title
thereof to Gan spouses' name. (Emphasis ours)
xxxx

It appears that the aforementioned properties were unlawfully and criminally mortgaged to your
Bankby one Jackson Gan xxx who forged or caused to be forged and/or falsified or caused to be
falsified two (2) separate instruments of sale in his favor, covering the aforesaid properties
making it appear that the said instruments were signed by our client when in truth and in fact
were not."
In sum, the Complaint recites that (1) petitioner was the registered owner of the subject
property; (2) she was defrauded of her rights to the property when title thereto was transferred
in the name of Spouses Gan based on a forged deed of sale; and (3) she was further defrauded
of her rights to the property when respondent accepted the same as security for the payment of
a loan acquired by Spouses Gan even when the latter's title to the property is void.x x x
In contrast, the most that petitioner’s complaint herein stated was Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the
Civil Code and that "he found out that in November 2002, defendants Gabor mortgaged the
whole property x x x in favor of the defendant bank." Said bare allegation is insufficient to
establish any right or cause of action in favor of the petitioner.
Going now to the fourth and final argument, petitioner insists that his current action for Recovery
of Property or its Value is not barred by res judicata. He claims that not all the elements of the
principle of res judicata are present in this case, since the decision of this Court in the prior
partition case was not a judgment on the merits but due to sheer technicality and that the cause
of action in the prior case is partition while the cause of action herein is for recovery of property.
We disagree. In order for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, causes of
action as are present in the civil cases below. The foundation principle upon which the doctrine
of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

In Selga v. Brar, we held that:

Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit.

It must be remembered that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata
is a rule that pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two
grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and
necessity, which dictates that it would be in the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should
be vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer
the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of public
tranquility and happiness.
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(b),
and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47(c).These concepts
differ as to the extent of the effect of a judgment or final order as follows:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
Jurisprudence taught us well that res judicata under the first concept or as a bar against the
prosecution of a second action exists when there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action in the first and second actions. The judgment in the first action is final as to the claim
or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
matters that could have been adjudged in that case. In contrast, res judicata under the second
concept or estoppel by judgment exists when there is identity of parties and subject matter
but the causes of action are completely distinct. The first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved herein.

Guided by the above discussion, We observe that the case at hand satisfies the essential
requisites of res judicata under the first concept. With respect to the first three (3) requisites, We
find that the judgment sought to bar the instant case was a judgment on the merits by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, which properly obtained its finality.
As the records reveal, the decision to dismiss petitioner’s earlier complaint for Partition of Real
Property and Damages was rendered by the RTC of Morong, Rizal, having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties, after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted
by the parties at the trial of the case. Said judgment was rendered based on the evidence and
witnesses presented by the parties who were given ample opportunity to be heard as well as a
valid judgment by the CA, in the separate legal redemption case upholding spouses Gabor’s right
of legal redemption, which became final and executory upon the expiration of the period of
appealing the same, the parties pursuing no further appeal.

In the same way, petitioner’s complaint for partition likewise obtained finality when it was
dismissed by this Court of last resort.1âwphi1 Petitioner contends that his Petition for Review on
Certiorari was dismissed in a minute resolution31 dated June 8, 1994 for failure to submit an
affidavit of service, a sheer technicality, which is not a judgment on the merits. He failed to
mention, however, that this Court further denied his motion for reconsideration with finality in
its Resolution32 dated July 25, 1994 for having no compelling reason to warrant the
reconsideration sought. Thus, while this Court initially dismissed petitioner’s appeal on a mere
technicality, it had sufficient opportunity to reverse its dismissal on motion for reconsideration if
it found that any error or injustice has been committed. It, however, did not and in fact even
affirmed the dismissal by further denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. There is no
question, therefore, that the dismissal of petitioner’s partition case is final and executory.

Anent the fourth and final requisite, it is undisputed that there exists an identity of the parties
and subject matter between the prior action for partition and the instant subsequent action for
recovery of property, the same being filed by herein petitioner against the same spouses Gabor
over the same portion of land in Tanay, Rizal. The fact that respondents Bank and Register of
Deeds were only impleaded in the subsequent case is of no moment since absolute identity of
parties is not required; mere substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between
the party in the first case and the party in the subsequent case, shall suffice.
Petitioner, however, contends that the causes of action in both cases differ inasmuch as in the
prior case, the cause of action is partition while in the case at hand, the cause of action is the
recovery of property or its value.
Petitioner is mistaken. In Philippine National Bank v. Gateway Property Holdings, Inc., we have
laid down certain guidelines in determining whether there is identity of causes of action in the
following manner:
The crux of the controversy in the instant case is whether there is an identity of causes of action
in Civil Case Nos. TM-1022 and TM-1108.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which
a party violates a right of another." Section 3 of Rule 2 provides that "[a] party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action." Anent the act of splitting a single cause of action,
Section 4 of Rule 2 explicitly states that "[i]f two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a
ground for the dismissal of the others."
Apropos, Carlet v. Court of Appeals states that:
As regards identity of causes of action, the test often used in determining whether causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the
second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or
nature of the two actions be different. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both actions,
the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar
to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not.
Applying the above guideline to the instant case, while the two cases are captioned differently,
petitioner cannot claim that there is no res judicata by simply changing the title of the action
from "Complaint for Partition of Real Property and Damages" to a "Complaint for Recovery of
Property or its Value." The records clearly reveal that the evidence submitted by the parties in
both cases are identical. Petitioner, in claiming that he had either the right to partition or to
recover the subject property, submitted the same Deed of Assignment37 transferring in his favor
the subject property as payment for his legal services as well as the same Agreement of Rescission
of his earlier transfer of the subject property to Ms. Ramos. As previously mentioned, all of his
claims in both actions are actually anchored on his claim of ownership over the one-third (1/3)
portion of the subject property. If it be proven that he is not a co-owner of the subject portion,
he will neither have the right to partition in the prior action nor will he have the right to recover
the subject property or its value in the subsequent action. Hence, the ultimate question which
the trial court had to resolve in both cases was whether or not petitioner is a co-owner of the
subject property.
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation that an action of partition is merely a possessory action which
could not bar a subsequent action, the issue of ownership or co-ownership is necessarily resolved
before the trial court may issue an order of partition, as we have held in Reyes-De Leon v. Del
Rosario, 38 viz.:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to
effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself. As held in
the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it
first makes a determination as to the existence of co -ownership. The court must initially settle
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact,
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and
extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved,
it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. x x x.39
Considering, therefore, that the RTC of Morong had long before resolved the issue of co-
ownership against petitioner in his complaint for Partition of Real Property, which was affirmed
with finality by this Court, no less, petitioner’s subsequent claim for Recovery of Property or its
Value must likewise necessarily fail. To reiterate, even if the forms or nature of actions in both
cases are different, since the issues raised essentially involve the claim of ownership over the
subject property, there is identity of the causes of action.
It is, therefore, clear from the discussion above that since all of the elements of res judicata are
present, the instant suit for Recovery of Property or its Value is barred by said principle. As we
have consistently held, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.41 It is a
fundamental principle in our judicial system that every litigation must end and terminate
sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere
subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment are allowed only under the most extraordinary
of circumstances.43 Yet, when petitioner is given ample opportunity to be heard, unbridled
access to the appellate comis, as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a consideration of
evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, We cannot recklessly reverse the
findings of the courts below.
In view of the foregoing, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings of the RTC of Pasig
City and CA. The RTC of Pasig City correctly dismissed the complaint on the grounds of improper
venue, res judicata, and that the complaint states no cause of action. The CA likewise correctly
dismissed petitioner's appeal for raising only issues purely of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Order dated August 18,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70750 and Decision dated May 9,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88335 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.