Chapter 16 – Writ of Habeas Corpus

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

The writ for Habeas Corpus has been called the great writ of Liberty by which the legality of ones deprivation
of freedom to ones movement may be inquired into.

GR: Directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of a detained person at a
designated time and place. It affords from unlawful imprisonment of any kind (private and public)
Exception 1 : Release of prisoner from custody makes the petition for Habeas corpus moot and academic.
Exception 2 : When the person is charged with the crime under the court, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
applied.
Remedy : Motion to quash

GR: A private person can be brought to court for the petition for habeas corpus:
Exception : A person cannot be compelled to live with his family.

Being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, whenever necessary, the President may call out the
AFP.

1. to PREVENT or SUPPRESS: 2. May also:

a. Lawless violence; a. Suspend the privilege of the writ of
b. Invasion; or habeas corpus; and
c. Rebellion. b. Proclaim a state of martial law.

Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaring martial law;

1. Grounds 2. The invasion or rebellion must be ACTUAL

a. Invasion or and not merely imminent.
b. Rebellion; and
c. Public safety requires it.

3. Limitations:
a. Suspension or proclamation is effective for only 60 days.
b. Within 48 hours from the declaration or suspension, the President must submit a report to Congress.
c. Congress, by majority vote and voting jointly, may revoke the same, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation.

Gumabon v Director of Prisons

Petitioners Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares
were charged and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They were imposed the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua. At the time of the petition each suffered more than 13 years of imprisonment.
Subsequently, the Court ruled in PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ that the information against the accused in that
case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 143 of the
RPC, there being no such complex offense. Petitioners thus invoke that the ruling in Hernandez be applied to
them. Petitioners contend that he has served more than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
upon them and is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.
Issue : w/n Habeas Corpus can be granted to convicted inmates.

Held : Petition for Habeas Corpus Granted, petitioners ordered released.

Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of jurisdiction and Habeas Corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. The
essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to
relieve therefore if such restraint is illegal. The exception of jurisdiction, excluding habeas corpus to
sentenced prisoners, is not found here because of the retroactivity of the Hernandez rulings.

What is required under the equal protection of law is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the
liability imposed. For the principle that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burdens or charges,
those that fall within a class shall be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest.

Subayno v Enrile

Ybanez, an officer of the education arm of the BAYAN movement was abducted in Cebu City. Alleging that
his abductors was the military, Subayno who is Ybanez’s lover, filed a petition for Habeas Corpus to the
court. A line up was conducted on the military of Camp Lapu-Lapu which yielded no identification of the
perpetrators.

Issue : w/n a motion for Habeas Corpus can be granted by mere accusation of illegal detention.

Held: The petition must be dismissed for lack of proof, without prejudice to the filing of another petititon.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the return of the writ must be taken on its face value considering that,
unless it is in some way traversed or denied, the facts stated therein must be taken as true. Moreover, a writ of
habeas corpus should not issue where it is not necessary to afford the petitioner relief or where it would be
ineffective. The writ of Habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of obtaining evidence.

Ilusorio v Bildner

The wife of Potenciano Ilusorio filed a petition for Habeas Corpus of his 86 year old husband. After living
for 30 years under the same house, the couple separated in 1972. The younger daughter of the two filed a
petition for custody of the father because of his failing physical and mental health. Later on, the daughter
allegedly prohibited the mother from seeing the father and living with her. Potenciano filed a motion to
enjoin a previous motion granted for visitation rights.

Issue : w/n Writ of Habeas Corpus can compel a husband to live with his wife.

Held: No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.

In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from
bed and board since 1972.

Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration

Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that
Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her
husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.

Held : Motion denied Again

Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23,
1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that
he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved. We were not convinced that
Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.

Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Bail and Damages

Bill of Rights Delimits circumstances of the privilege

1) Invasion
2) Rebellion
3) When Public safety requires it.

Declaration of martial law may suspend writ of Habeas corpus but it does not suspend the constitution. A
person arrested shall be judicially charged within 3 days or released.

Aberca v Ver

Geb. Fabian Ver ordered various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force Makabansa, to conduct
pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in MM.

Pursuant to said order, elements of the TFM were alleged to have done the ff.:

1. raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants
2. confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs
3. plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts
4. while in detention, plaintiffs were denied visits of relatives and lawyers
5. plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel
 6. military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain indiscriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
7. all violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights were part of a concerted plan to terrorize them, and that
said plans are known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs filed a civil action for actual/compensatory, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants (thru counsel Estelito Mendoza) on the ff. grounds:

1. plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
2. assuming that courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done
in the performance of their official duties

Issue: w/n the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under
the Constitution

Held: Damages awarded. Military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well

Repsondents’ invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. Concededly, it may be
true that they were merely responding to their duty, say in accordance with Marcos’ Proclamation No. 2054,
but this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizens.

Article 32 of the CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages
for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

There is no merit in respondents’ suggestion that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege does nor render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, their rights and cause of action for damages are even explicitly recognized in PD 1755 (re: right of
action for injury arising from acts of public officer connected to Martial Law).

Doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable in the instant case. NO such relationship exists between superior
officers of the military and their subordinates.

Art 32 of the NCC, It is not the actor alone who must answer for damages.

1.It is wrong to limit the plaintiff’s action for damages to “acts of alleged physical violence” which
constituted delict or wrong. Art. 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in said Article.
2.Neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated “directly” should be held liable. Art.
32 encompasses those directly, as well as indirectly responsible for its violation.
Chapter 17 – Speedy Disposition of Cases

Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

Distinction between Section 14 and Section 16.

While the rights of an accused only apply to the trial phase of criminal cases, the right to a speedy
disposition of cases covers all phases of judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative and even military proceedings.

The protection extends to all citizens including those of the military and covers the period before, during and
after trials. What it simply ensures is the freedom from arbitrary, oppressive, vexatious and unreasonable
delays, not an absolute right to a specific period.

Tatad v Sandiganbayan

The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act
No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep"
in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister)
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. ]

On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the
Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after
petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential
Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad
and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was
approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the
prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed
against him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.

Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation,
which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a
case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court
that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or
justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
Cadalin v POEA Administrator

On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own
behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an
"Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII .

The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment
contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of
the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe
benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the
BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of B

Issue: w/n the proceedings conducted by the POEA conformed with the requirements of speedy disposition
of Cases.

Held : POEA conformed with constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of cases. Petitions dismissed.

In determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated, certain factors maybe
considered. The length of delay, reason, the assertion of right and failure to assert it and the prejudice to the
administration of justice all comes into play.

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC
had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.
The cases are not run of the mill variety. The numbers of the claimants contributed to the length of time in
the process of the case.

NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code which the
petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits
than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where
the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract."
Chapter 18 – Privilege against Self – Incrimination

Sec 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

GR: The constitutional provision prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions
Exception : It does not prohibit the inquiry itself.

When is a question incriminating

A question tends to incriminate when the answer of the accused or the witness would establish a fact
which would be a necessary link in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by the
accused or the witness.

Distinction between an accused and an ordinary witness

An accused can refuse to take the witness stand altogether by invoking the right against selfincrimination.
An ordinary witness cannot refuse to take the stand. He can only refuse to answer specific questions.
What is PROHIBITED is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the witness.

History, Development and Policy Considerations

It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity – of policy, because if the party were
required to testify, it would place the accused under the strongest temptation to commit perjury.

It promotes fairness by not allowing the burden of the government to prove the accused is guilty to shift to the
accused itself.

Scope and Privilege

Considerations in invoking Privilege from self incriminations

1) Nature of Evidence
2) Personality
3) Proceeding involved

Testimonial v Physical Evidence

GR: The privilege from self incrimination is directed at testimonial evidence and extends to all government
proceedings.
Exception 1: Physical evidence – those objects obtained by lawful means.
Exception 2 : Investigations illicited by private individuals (ie Firms or Corporations)

Villaflor v Summers

Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense
that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights
against self-incrimination.
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights.

The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.

Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and the constitutional provisions are then provided not to protect
the guilty but the innocent. No accused person should be afraid of any method which will establish the truth.

Beltran v Samson

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered
him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order
was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates the petitioner's right against self-incrimination.

HELD: Yes.

The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well the
furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
accused has a right to hold secret.

For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce
a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness
is required to furnish evidence against himself. The present case is more serious than that of compelling the
production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing
means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner
is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained
genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand
of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Reenactments

A person who is made to reenact a crime can rightfully invoke privilege against self incrimination
People v Olvis

From a report given by the siblings of the Bagon (victim), the authorities were led to Sorela. Sorela had some
scratches and abrasions in his neck, face and arms which he claimed that he got from the clearing the Rice
field. After some prodding, the accused confessed to having participated in the killing of Bagon. He then
proceeded to reenact the crime. He led them to the ricefeild where Bagon’s decomposing body was found in
a sack covered by cogon. In the reenactment, photographs were taken of Sorella raising the bolo and
concealing it under a banana tree. Sorela pointed to Mayor Olvis as having paid them to dispose of Bagon.
The accused later recanted his testimony in custody. The RTC acquitted Olvis by the fact that the confessions
of the accused during the reenactment are inadmissible.

Issue : w/n The reenactment confession can be used as evidence

Held : Confession is not valid. Case dismissed

We refer to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their
apprehension. Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against
self- incrimination.

This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion, but this has
since been extended to any evidence "communicative in nature" acquired under circumstances of duress.
Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly
inhuman procedure of competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction." This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the inquisition in which
accusation was equivalent to guilt. Thus, an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to
disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution.

Diverse Proceedings, Different Roles

GR: The privilege against self incrimination may be invoked in all kinds of proceedings in which an
incriminating statement maybe obtained including civil and administrative proceedings.

Exception : When the accused takes his stand as a witness, he waives his right to the privilege.

The writ of privilege from self incrimination is not self executing but should be invoked.

Chavez v CA

The petitioner was charged with qualified theft of a motor vehicle. Before the trial in the RTC, the accused
immediately invoked his right to the privilege of self incrimination. The prosecution called him as a witness
none the less. The judge permitted the prosecution’s action. Chavez was then convicted because of his
testimony as a self confessed culprit.

Issue : w/n Right to self incrimination is present when accused is called as a witness of the prosecution

Held: Privilege against self incrimination is present even when the accused is called as a witness. Accused is
ordered discharged.
The privilege is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to
the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is
fundamental to our scheme of justice. The constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and
imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted.

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People
would be to incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman
procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule
may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.

Cabal v Kapunan

Upon the filing of a letter complaint by Col Jose Maristela on the petitioner, Manuel Cabal was charged with
graft and corrupt practices and unexplained wealth. The president created a committee to investigate Cabal.
The committee called Cabal as a witness. On the hearing, Cabal invoked his privilege against self
incrimination.

Issue : w/n The committee proceedings is putitive and criminal in character.

Held : Petitioner can rightfully invoke his privilege against self incrimination

The Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee
which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. Such for forfeiture has been held, however, to
partake of the nature of a penalty.

In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a

default an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed
by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a
prescribed course of conduct. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of proper are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against
themselves are applicable thereto.

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question
which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A
question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises
his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is
because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is
virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket
refusal to answer any and all questions.
Pascual v Board of Medical Examiners

Pascual filed a petition for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners in their investigation against
him for immorality. The petitioner invoked his constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against
himself in order not to testify against their next hearing.

Issue : w/n Privilege against the right of self incrimination applies also to the Medical Board of Examiners

Held: We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice,
respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the
person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to
declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of
his guilt." 12 Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 13 speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed
the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to
take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights
granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to
the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens." 14

Garrity v New Jersey

Appellants, police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs, were questioned during the course of a state
investigation concerning alleged traffic ticket "fixing." Each officer was first warned that: anything he said
might be used against him in a state criminal proceeding; he could refuse to answer if the disclosure would
tend to incriminate him; if he refused to answer, he would be subject to removal from office. The officers'
answers to the questions were used over their objections in subsequent prosecutions, which resulted in their
convictions.

Issue : w/n Regulation violates self incrimination prohibition in the American Constitution.

Held: Regulation violates constitution. Evidence obtained during investigations inadmissible

The choice imposed on petitioners was one between self incrimination of forfeiture of office. The only
bearing it had was whether, valid or not, the choice between being discharged under it for refusal to answer
and self-incrimination rendered the statements products of coercion. The appeal is dismissed, the papers are
treated as a petition for certiorari, and certiorari is granted.

The threat of removal from public office under the forfeiture of office statute to induce the petitioners to forgo
the privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the resulting
statements involuntary, and therefore inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings.
Spevack v Klein

In a proceeding to discipline petitioner, a member of the New York bar, for professional misconduct for
failure to produce demanded financial records and for refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry, petitioner
defended on the ground that production of the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him. The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred, holding that the privilege against
self-incrimination was not available in light of Cohen v. Hurley,. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
on the authority of Cohen v. Hurley and on the further ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not
apply to a demand not for oral testimony, but for records required by the Appellate Division to be kept by an
attorney.

Issue : w/n The right to the privilege from self incrimination extends to Bar investigations

Held: Hurley overruled, judgment reversed. Appellant reinstated

1. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which has been absorbed in the Fourteenth,
extends its protection to lawyers, and should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment
and the deprivation of livelihood as a penalty for asserting it. Cohen v. Hurley, supra, is overruled.

2. Since petitioner had been disbarred on the theory that the privilege against self-incrimination was
applicable to the demanded records, but that the invocation of the privilege could lead to disbarment, his
disbarment cannot be affirmed on the ground that the privilege was not applicable thereto in the first place, as
that would deny him an opportunity to show that the records demanded were outside the scope of the court
rule requiring attorneys to keep records relating to contingent fee cases, and that the records demanded had no
"public aspects."

McKune v Lile

A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate
in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to
complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes
for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities,
regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from
SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile
refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would
violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.

Issue : w/n SATP violates the privilege against self incrimination

Held No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and
that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.
Regulatory Reporting Requirements

Includes papers, transactions and activities that are made for the efficient management of life.

California v Byers

Jonathan Byers proceeded for writ of prohibition to restrain the Court from proceeding further on a complaint
of violation of California's "hit and run statute." The statute 1) prohibits any party who is involved with a car
accident to leave the scene 2) requires parties to give their names and contacts to authorities after the
accident. Petitioner contends that this is a violation of self incrimination clause

Issue: W/n statute violates the self incrimination clause of the constitution

Held: Providing personal information at the scene of an accident does not infringe on one's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.

The "hit and run" statutes were not criminal, but regulatory in nature. Such statutes put the burden of
compliance on the public at large rather than on a group of suspected criminals, and the possibility of self-
incrimination was not substantial. Therefore, there was no significant infringement on Byers' privilege against
self-incrimination. Relying on United States v. Sullivan, the Chief Justice wrote that even with the possibility
that compliance under the statute were an incrimination per se, an extension of Fifth Amendment protection
would be an "extreme if not extravagant application." The Chief Justice analogized that just as there is no
constitutional right to refuse to file a tax return, there is no constitutional right to flee the scene of an accident.

Silence and Guilt

The privilege must also be understood that invoking it must not be a sign of guilt.

Self Incrimination and Unreasonable Searches

To compel a person to produce his private papers (without a valid search warrant) to be used in evidence
against him would be equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself.

Boyd v United States

The case concerned an allegation that E. A. Boyd & Sons had imported plate glass without paying the duty
required by the 1874 customs act. As authorized by the act, the United States attorney obtained a court order
that the Boyds produce their invoices for the glass. The case was a civil proceeding, involving no criminal
charges. The Boyds contended that the compulsory production of records violated their rights under the
Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment protecting
freedom from compulsory self‐incrimination.

Issue : w/n Customs statute, which require records to be produced, violated the right to self incrimination

Held : Statute unconstitutional, information obtained during search cannot be admitted to evidence.

The seizure or compulsory production of a man's private papers to be used in evidence against him is
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or
forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
It does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to constitute an
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; a compulsory production of a
party's private books and papers to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or penal proceeding,
or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the Amendment.

A proceeding to forfeit a person's goods for an offence against the laws, though civil in form, and whether in
rem or in personam, is a "criminal case" within the meaning of that part of the Fifth Amendment which
declares that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Both
amendments relate to the personal security of the citizen. They nearly run into, and mutually throw light upon,
each other.

Corporations and Self Incrimination

Rights against self incrimination also runs also with juridical persons and their representatives.

Immunity Statutes

Testimony can be obtained in exchange for immunity of the accused. The accuse can turn state witness.

1. One which grants “Use Immunity” - prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.

2. One which grants “Transactional Immunity” - grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an
offense to which his compelled testimony relates.

Galman v Pamaran

In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and
exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was promulgated
creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings wherein
various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience
to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced
evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition.

Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence
and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the
Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not
available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc
Fact Finding Board.

Issue 1) w/n the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence.

2) w/n the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board and not to an
investigating officer

Held: We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer
questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section
5 of the same law.
1) Testimony infringes on constitutional right. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders
inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-
extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D.
1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard
his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results — the
private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in
jeopardy.

The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY
had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to
testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed
immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot
be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips
away from the witness.

The Aggrava Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only
with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly,
the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefore so that they may be brought before
the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the
ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately,
their conviction.

In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but
also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned
and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing
evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light
on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the
character and extent of his participation therein.

2) The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case
where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation
before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang
on the balance.

The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also
applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against
himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case.

Mapa v Sandiganbayan

Petitioner was charged with violating the anti graft and corrupt practices act from the sale of Pantranco
Express Inc, a GOCC to North Express Inc. At the same time period, Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos
were charged under the U.S. RICO statutes of requeteering in New York. To ensure conviction, Mapa was
acquired as a witness. The PCGG formalized the agreement between Mapa and the government. On the US
trial, Imelda Marcos was acquitted and Ferdinand Marcos died before Mapa can testify. The prosecution
suddenly shifted to Mapa. The prosecution contended that the agreement was void since Mapa did not get to
testify.
Issue : w/n Mapa can be prosecuted in view of the circumstances.

Held : Immunity statute still stands. Criminal Case against the petititoners dismissed.

The practice of immunity is expressedly granted in the constitution Sec 3 Art XVI, the state may not be sued
without its consent. Aside from the consitotution, PD 749 grants immunity to the one who testifies.

The power of the PCGG to grant immunity to grant adversarial witness is in line with constitution (Sec 5 of
EO 14) . With this premise, we hold that the question of immunity is largely procedural aspects.

Even if the testimony was not given, the agreement itself binds the people from prosecuting Mapa. The
nature of the agreement is transactional immunity. They are the transactional immunity and the use-and-
derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a
witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction. In
contrast, by the grant of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured that his or her particular
testimony and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

United States v Hubbell

October 1996, while Hubbell was in jail as a result of the conviction on the guilty plea in the Whitewater case,
the Independent Counsel served him with a subpoena calling for the production of eleven categories of
documents before a grand jury.

In November 1996, Hubbell appeared before the grand jury and invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. In response to questioning by the prosecutor, Hubbell initially refused "to state
whether there are documents within my possession, custody, or control responsive to the Subpoena." The
prosecutor then produced an order, which had previously been obtained from the District Court directing
Hubbell to respond to the subpoena and granting him immunity "to the extent allowed by law."

Hubbell then produced 13,120 pages of documents and records. He also responded to a series of questions
that established that the produced documents were all of the documents in his custody or control that were
responsive to the commands in the subpoena. The contents of the documents produced by Hubbell provided
the Independent Counsel with the information that led to the second prosecution.

Issue : w/n The evidence provided by a previous immunity bargain can be used in another case.

Held: Information obtained in the hearings inadmissible.

The fact that the Government intends no such use of the act of production leaves open the separate question
whether it has already made "derivative use" of the testimonial aspect of that act in obtaining the indictment
against respondent and in preparing its case for trial.

Given the breadth of the description of the 11 categories of documents called for by the subpoena, the
collection and production [by Webster Hubbell] of the materials demanded was tantamount to answering a
series of interrogatories asking a witness [in this case, Webster Hubbell] to disclose the existence and location
of particular documents fitting certain broad descriptions.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a witness from being compelled to
disclose the existence of incriminating documents that the Government is unable to describe with reasonable
particularity. The Court also ruled that if the witness produces such documents, pursuant to a grant of
immunity, the government may not use them to prepare criminal charges against him.

Incrimination in Foreign Jurisdictions

The privilege against self incrimination does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the state (US v Balsys)

US v Balsys

Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to testify
about his wartime activities between 1940 and 1944 and his subsequent immigration to the United States.
Alsys reported that he was a member of the Lithuanian army from 1934 through 1940 and that he had been
"in hiding" in Lithuania from 1940 until 1944.15 He swore that the information he provided was true.16 The
Office of Special Investigations (OSI)17 suspected that Balsys had been involved in Nazi persecution during
World War II,18 which, if correct, would subject him to deportation. Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation,
Balsys refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Issue: w/n Privilege against self incrimination can be invoked in deportation proceedings

Held : Privilege cannot be invoked.

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that although resident aliens are entitled to the same Fifth Amendment
protections as citizen "persons" the risk of their deportation is not sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination
privilege intended to apply only to the United States government. The Court explained that since the Fifth
Amendment does not bind foreign governments, and that would not be subject to domestic enforcement of
immunity-for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-incrimination protection against possible
prosecution at their hands.

Chapter 19 - Political Prisoners and Involuntary Servitude

Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.

Values are consistent with the underlying philosophy of a free society, the values of individual freedom and
self determination.

U.S. v. Pompeya

Complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya
with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without
justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do
not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

Issue : 1) w/n said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of
their right against Involuntary servitude
Held: Ordinance valid exercise of Police Power
The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific
purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages
of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the
maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as
by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a
punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or
otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any
governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the
maintenance of peace and good government?

In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal
system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the
individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within
the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the
same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said
Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected
thereby.