FIRST DIVISION

G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and FRANCISCA FABELLA, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr.
and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed in toto the
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.

This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez
against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The
complaint alleges these material facts:

2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19
located at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from
Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is
hereto attached marked as Annex "A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her name
marked as Annex "B";

3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their house in
the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;

4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises
to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;

5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of
the former to surrender the lot peacefully;

6. That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably, the Barangay
Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in
order that the necessary cause of action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto
attached marked as Annex "C";

7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender
the premises in question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional services of
counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing
acceptance fee and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12,
1994 sent a formal demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "D";

8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in
question, plaintiff[s] suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x x x2

In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical
possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents claimed
ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for
more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 regarding
affidavits against non-forum shopping.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering private respondents to
vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.

Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8
January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.

Undeterred, the private respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997
questioning the decision of the RTC.

In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held that
petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private
respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same,
which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in petitioners’ complaint lack
jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of
Appeals ratiocinated thus:

An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for ejectment
are conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible entry,
xxx and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear to be a case of
unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy
the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.

xxx

In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which the action for
ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January
1997 rendered by the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of
jurisdiction.3

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.4

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration5:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR
UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.

Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer having
alleged that private respondents unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question, which
allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance or
permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land
upon demand by the owner.

The petition is not meritorious.

Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real
property: (a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful
detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force,
intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two are
distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning,
and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.9

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the
right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s
possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the
proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.14

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.16 As
explained in Sarona v. Villegas17:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may
require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from
the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that
such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of
action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor
is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior
court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can
really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand,
bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him
out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance
of the summary nature of the action.18 (Underlining supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If,
however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court
jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.20

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive
of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper
regional trial court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against
respondent alleging that they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied
by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the issue on whether or
not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled23:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their
parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after her death, by their
own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to
vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he
is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where
petitioners’ cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the
alleged tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as
alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon
without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into
the land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as
possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court
of Appeals [224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.

And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v. Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer
merely contained the bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to
her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the
possession. x x x

xxxx

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the
claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an
action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful
detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of
sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.25

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate
petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question
by building their house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said
on how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract
existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal.26 Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-26848 August 17, 1981

CARIDAD O. DE GALLEGO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
LAND AUTHORITY (Formerly Land Tenure Administration), oppositor-appellee.

GUERRERO, J.:

The petitioner herein, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Parañaque ,
Rizal and covered by TCT No. 46402 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, seeks the cancellation of the following
'CONDITIONS' appearing in the Memorandum of, Encumbrances of the aforementioned Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 46402, to wit:

1. That the parcel of land described in this certificate of title, shall not be sold, assigned,
encumbered, mortgaged or transferred, within the period of five (5) years from the date hereof
without first obtaining the written consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources;

2. That except by hereditary succession, it shall not be conveyed, transferred to, assigned in favor
of any person who is not landless and disqualified to acquire or own land in the Philippines;

3. That violation of either of the next two preceding paragraph shall be sufficient ground for the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or his duly authorized representative to take such
action as may be necessary for the reversion of the land to the government. (Doc. No. 1858, page
57, Book XXVI, S. of 1954 of Notary Public of Manila, Andres Urrutia) Date of instrument - June
28, 1954. Date of the inscription - June 30, 1954 - 10:10 a.m.

In her Petition for Cancellation of Encumbrance filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 7, in LRC
Case No. 458, it is alleged that the said conditions were entered on June 30, 1954 and a period of five (5) years have
since then elapsed so that Condition No. 1 has long become academic; that the aforestated parcel of land formerly
formed part of a tract of land which the Government acquired for subdivision into residential lots with the principal
objective of distributing the same to the landless and thereby allow more people to have their own homes for which
reason, Conditions Nos. 2 and 3 above were entered as encumbrances on the said certificate of title; that the area
wherein the above-mentioned parcel of land is comprised has since become commercial community, fronting, as it
does, the Manila Bay, and not only said parcel of land but the immediate vicinity thereof now contain improvements
devoted purely to commercial purposes that by reason of the foregoing, the objective of the Government in imposing
Conditions Nos. (2) and (3) above has lost its meaning inasmuch as the value of said property has become
prohibitive to any landless who desire to establish his home therein; that to allow the said Conditions to remain and
to affect said parcel of land will only be a deterrent to the economic development and progress of the country; and
that in line with the country's program of economic development, therefore, said Conditions should be eliminated.

Respondent opposed the Petition for Cancellation insofar as Conditions Nos. (2) and (3) are concerned on the
ground that Condition No. 2 carries with it no prescriptive period at all and the same is considered perpetual in
character and any subsequent transactions or dealings involving the land in question must necessarily be with the
written consent and permission of the Land Authority, and that Condition No. 3 is likewise perpetual in character.
Respondent, however, agrees that Condition No. 1 may be cancelled since it carries the five-year prescriptive period.
In his Order dated July 19, 1966, Presiding Judge Francisco dela Rosa, finding the grounds relied upon in the
Opposition to be well- taken, denied the Petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner thru Counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, alleging among others, that subsequent to the filing of
the Opposition, counsel made representations with the respondent for a withdrawal of the Opposition in line with the
position taken by the same office in connection with G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Pasig, Branch X entitled, "Sotera Duavit Vda. de Bautista, et al., petitioners," wherein no opposition was filed
by the Land Authority to a similar petition for the reason that the property involved was already commercial so that
the Land Authority cannot maintain inconsistent position, otherwise it may be guilty of discrimination, arbitrariness,
or grave abuse of its official discretion.

Petitioner further pointed out that as to the fact that the land in question is a commercial property and is situated in a
commercial territory, namely, fronting the Roxas Boulevard, Parañaque , Rizal, three has been no controversy and
the court can take judicial notice thereof as a matter of common knowledge, as in fact the property is presently
occupied by the night-club "E L MUNDO" and is classified for real estate taxation as commercial.

It is likewise insisted by petitioner that the primary intention of the restriction against transfers or conveyances of
the property except to the landless and except by hereditary succession in order to insure that more people shall own
residential homes, has been lost by the transformation of the property from residential to commercial since the
landless who may want to establish their residential homes can no longer afford to pay the commercial price of this
commercial property and following the principle that "when the reason for the law ceases," the said restriction
should be eliminated to allow the aforementioned property to contribute to the economic development of the
country.

The attention of the court a quo was also called to the fact that the petitioner who is the wife of former Ambassador
Manuel Gallego, is not a landless individual, nor was she landless at the time when the said property was acquired
by her, the fact being that the restriction refers only to voluntary conveyances and did not comprehend sales by
public auction, as in the particular case, where the petitioner came to own the property as the highest bidder in a
foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon. Petitioner concludes that accordingly, the restriction cannot be
intrinsically intended to limit the ownership of this type of property to only the landless where it may be acquired by
a landed owner thru an involuntary sale.

The court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Order of September 8, 1966, hence the present appeal to this
Court.

Petitioner submits a lone assignment of error, and that is, that the trial court erred in denying the petition for
cancellation and in denying the motion for reconsideration.

In Petitioner's Brief, it is pointed out that the Order dated July 19, 1966 denying the Petition for Cancellation, as
well as the Order of September 8, 1966 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, did not express the reasons in
support of said Order. Petitioner argues that Condition No. (1) in the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No.
46402 had long become academic because five years have already elapsed from the date the said annotation was
made on June 30, 1954, inasmuch as the Petition for Cancellation was filed on February 11, 1966, almost twelve
years after the entry of such condition.

Oppositor Land Authority does not oppose the cancellation of Condition No. (1), hence, finding the said cancellation
to be in order, the said condition is hereby ordered cancelled.

Petitioner further contends that Conditions No. (2) and (3) have lost any sound basis in that while the subject parcel
of land was originally a residential lot, the classification of the property had been changed to that of commercial, as
evidenced by the present tax declaration thereof (Exhibit "B"). According to petitioner, the original intention of the
controverted condition to restrict ownership of subject property by people who could utilize the same as their
residence has lost its meaning for the said property has gone beyond the reach of any individual to acquire for purely
residential purposes.
It is likewise claimed that the inhibition in Condition No. (2) is not entirely absolute because a person who is not
landless may still properly acquire the said property in a foreclosure of a mortgage thereon, as in the instant case
where petitioner, who is the wife of former Ambassador Manuel V. Gallego, is not landless and had acquired the
subject property, not by voluntary conveyance in her favor but as the highest bidder in the public auction sale
thereof in relation to a foreclosure of a mortgage involving the said property, which argument assumes that
Condition No. (2) limits the restriction only to a conventional or voluntary sale, transfer or assignment of the
property, excluding mortgage or encumbrance whereas Condition No. (1) inhibits not only the sale but also the
encumbrance or mortgage of the subject land.

Petitioner's contentions are without merit and We reject the same.

Conditions No. (2) and (3) are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land Registration Order No. R-3 under the
subject "Rules and Regulations Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate," approved November
15, 1951 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. These sections provide as follows:

16. Prohibition to Alienate.-The applicant shall not sell, assign, encumber, mortgage or transfer,
his rights under the agreement to sell or in the property subject thereof without first obtaining the
written consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and this condition shall
subsist until the lapse of five (5) years from the date of the execution of the final deed of sale in
his favor and shall be annotated as an encumbrance on the certificate of title of the property that
may be issued in his favor.

17. Conveyance of Lands, Covered by Final Deeds of Sale.- Except by hereditary succession, no
lands acquired hereunder shall be transferred or assigned to any individual unless he be landless
and not otherwise disqualified from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines. This
prohibition shall be made a condition in all deeds of sale and shall be annotated as encumbrance in
the certificate of title.

18. Violation of the two preceding paragraphs: its effect.-Any sale, assignment, encumbrance,
mortgage, or transfer made in violation of the provisions of the next two preceding paragraphs
hereof is null and void, and shall be sufficient ground for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to cancel the deed of sale and to order the reversion of the land to the government and
the forfeiture of whatever payments made on account thereof. In case, however, a deed of sale has
already been issued, the violation of the said provisions shall be sufficient ground for the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources to take appropriate action in court with a view to obtaining
the reversion of the land involved to the government. All lands reverted to the government shall be
disposed of as vacant lot.

It is pertinent to state here that pursuant to the provisions of Section 4, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which mandated that Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of
land to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals, Commonwealth Act 539 enacted May 26,
1940, authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest therein, thru purchase or
expropriation and to subdivided the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under
such conditions as he may fix to their bonafide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the
lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines (Section 1, Commonwealth Act
539). And under Section 2 of the same Act, the President may designate any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of the Act,
and for tills purpose, the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation. Commonwealth
Act 539 amended Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended by Commonwealth Act 260, and Commonwealth Act
No. 378, as amended by Commonwealth Act 420.

As indicated earlier, Sections 16, 17 and 18 of Lands Administrative Order No. R-3 dated October 19, 1951 are the
sources which gave rise to the annotation of Conditions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the title of subject property. The said
Order was published in the Official Gazette of December, 1951, pp. 6075 to 6078, Volume 47, No. 12, and has the
force and effect of law. (Javillonar vs. Land Tenure Administration, G. R. No. 10303, Aug. 22,1958,104 Phil. 323)

As the Administrative Order itself provides, the rules and regulations governing the acquisition and disposition of
private estates were promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned "(p)ursuant to the provisions of
section 4, article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code, and
Executive Order No. 376, dated November 28, 1950."

Conditions Nos. 2 and 3, having been imposed pursuant to an Administrative Order which has the force and effect of
the law, are therefore binding upon any person who acquires title to the same, it appearing that said Conditions are
annotated as encumbrances on the back of the Certificate of Title of the land. Moreover, the said Conditions are not
contrary to law, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these Conditions had been imposed in order to implement
more effectively the main purpose of the constitutional provision which is to break up landed estates into reasonably
small portions and to discourage the concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals,
(Republic vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New Constitution of 1973 provided a modification of the
original provision in the 1935 Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving
citizens.

These two encumbrances or Conditions annotated on the back of TCT 46402 imposed by and pursuant to the
Administrative Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may not, therefore, be cancelled for
under Section 39 of the Land Registration Act,

Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall
hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:

First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States
or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of
record in the registry:

Second. Taxes within two years after same become due and payable;

Third. An public highway, way, private way established by law, or any Government irrigation
canal or lateral thereof, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway, way, or irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been determined.

But if there are easements or other rights. appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any
reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant
notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished
by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner. (As amended by Act No. 2011,
and Sec. 4, Act No. 3621.)

Presidential Decree No. 1529, amending and codifying the laws relative to registration of property and for other
purposes, promulgated June 11, 1978, substantially contains the same provision under Section 44 thereof, which
provides:

Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good
faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and
any of the following encumberances which may be subsisting, namely:
 First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines
which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid
against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record;

Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the
acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the
right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer
alone;

Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof. if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined;

Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to,
Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.

Until and unless the law, or the Administrative Order which has the force and effect of law, is repealed, amended, or
otherwise, altered or modified, the said encumbrances must remain, notwithstanding the contention of petitioner that
a previous governor of the Land Authority had not opposed a similar petition for cancellation in Sotera Duavit Vda.
de Bautista and Jaime Bautista, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7672 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, for a
wrong act cannot be cured by the commission of another wrong. laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary. (Article 7, New
Civil Code)

Neither can petitioner's arguments that the lot in question contains improvements, a nightclub devoted to a purely
commercial purpose, that the value of the land has become prohibitive to any landless who desires to establish his
house thereon, that to allow the said Conditions to remain and to affect said parcel of land will only be a deterrent to
the economic development and progress of the country and that in line with the country's program of economic
development, said Conditions should be eliminated, be sustained. The courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
necessity or propriety of the law, for these are the particular province of the legislative. As this Court said in Morfe
vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450, speaking thru Justice (now Chief Justice) Fernando
citing Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, "It is well to remember, that this Court, in the language of
Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.' "

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Orders appealed from dated July 19, 1966 and September 8,
1966 are hereby MODIFIED in the sense that Condition No. (1) inscribed as an encumbrance in Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 46402 (Rizal Registry) covering Lot 4, Block 4, Psd-10988 Baclaran, Estate, Baclaran, Parañaque ,
Rizal, under the name of petitioner Caridad O. de Gallego, is hereby ordered cancelled, the five-year period stated
therein having already expired, and that Conditions No. (2) and (3) shall remain as they are.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.