G.R. No.

133000 October 2, 2001 In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in 20
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
vs. alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN
DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: 8
BUENA, J.:

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with
thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent Court of
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under
Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one
entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher,
and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the
filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322
square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the
real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six
children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980
into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered
by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where
the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third
person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land
covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On
07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in
favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of
Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent
sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a
quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed
the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should
have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

1
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings
include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some
special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings,
which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or
motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of
the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision 11 contemplates a
probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano
Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective
legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to
defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the
aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to
a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the
subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza
vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived". 15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of the
decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of
advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

2
 G.R. No. 16680 September 13, 1920 From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner, First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby overruled and the prayer of
vs. the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge appointing
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., respondents. the assessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as
Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner. to costs, it is so ordered.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
Araullo, Malcolm, Avanceña, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
JOHNSON, J.:

This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are
admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in
"special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an
administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a
deceased person.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provision of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint
assessors in "special proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for the appointment of
assessors in such proceedings.

The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following; (a) Section 57-62 of Act No.
190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e)
section 2 of Act No. 2369.

Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act No. 2369
provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190 provide for the
appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the peace. Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any
possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit in the trial.
Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."

Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by said section
154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives us an
interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an "action" and a "special proceeding."
Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every other remedy
furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."

In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature itself, we are driven
to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding," and that when the
Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special proceeding."

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding. "An action is a formal demand of one's
legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. (People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term
"special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special
proceedings is generally granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction
to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of wills; to
perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code
Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)

3
 G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009 assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits,
adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners, Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN,
I.
AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO
DECISION
ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

PUNO, C.J.:
II.

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a
RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE
Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2
ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR
JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios,
III.
and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING
Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court.6 The said complaint
FEES.
was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro
Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K.
Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents made the IV.
following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim;
(3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the properties RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH
others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the
estate of the decedent.9 WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private
respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
Article 175 of the Family Code.10 COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS
RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE
On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court held DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the
estate of deceased Muslims.11 In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District Court must be given
the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On December 28, 2005, petitioners has jurisdiction.20
filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of
hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’ opposition. 14 Despite finding that the said Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners
"were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion. 15 The Shari’a District Court
also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16 Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether
the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a
determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this
November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. 18 In its second issue.

4
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate
of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills,
issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind
the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption,"
courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings."22
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for
judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of
the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.
The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be
settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent. 24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for
the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case
because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a
court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an
answer25 or a motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant 27 or result in
having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. 28 Indeed, the
"defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be
deprived of its jurisdiction."29
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a
Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has
jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an
ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the
court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the
parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We
reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a
civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a
civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"34 necessarily has
definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. 35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which
a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," 36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that
the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, 37 pay its liabilities,38 and to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39
Docket Fees
Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable.
Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation
estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the
docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees
because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies
with the same clerk of court.41 In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction,
because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. 42 As "every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs
them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient
assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records
do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the
docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a District Court is
defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an
exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to
address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. 45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof." 46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of
its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in
cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a
5
vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather
than on technicalities.49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its
inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a
situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the
petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears
that the rights of the adverse party were not affected. 50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural
due process,51 for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do
not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition. 52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." 53 In the case at bar,
as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the
motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in
the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the motion
for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a
hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural
process, was duly observed.

Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined whether it has
jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should
be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare
who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and
September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

6
 G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking
Corporation, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a petition for
liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an
ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on this
question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the
Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under
liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2
On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled "Petition
for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which creditors
filed their claims with the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas, 4 President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No.
109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase
differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its
order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union. 5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September 13,
19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the Liquidator on
December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional
Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it
was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and
subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's
Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of
investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks,
consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged
that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign
Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private
respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. 7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but
his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration
on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and
October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record
on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October
28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.
II.
Proceedings in the Court of Appeals
The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the
orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the
Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled,
rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the
case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for
appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was
filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The
Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal
of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No.
112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the
period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal
notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion
for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the
Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit.
7
 2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Nañagas who
was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding governed by Rules 72 to 109
of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on
time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal filed on December 23,
1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:
1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case
and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from
receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose right to receive payment as
such would accrue only after all the creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of foreign
investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of
Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party
appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his
appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the
decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment
or decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period for appeal shall be forty-
eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with
all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an action for
interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where there are conflicting
claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a person who claims no interest thereon may file an
action for interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among
themselves. (Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary action, may be
appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the
preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41
covering appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a court of justice
by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding, the petition for assistance
of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not "one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously determined by the Central
Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to
liquidate the assets of the bank and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.
It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a special proceeding
under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the special proceedings that may be appealed
under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
8
 §1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
11
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran states:"
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of
a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an
action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's
wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able
to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only
seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration
of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims
in the disposition of the corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader.
For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation,
takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. 13 He is thus charged with insuring that the
assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under
Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the
payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or
executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the
corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and
the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent
corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly classified as
"claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval
of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end
with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may
also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a
particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed
liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose
claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal.
Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in accordance
with the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be
overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals
are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and
which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple appeals
are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of
competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All
claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in
the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to
a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing
a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In
such case, the original records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the
liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and
transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary
in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on
appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having
been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the
Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record
on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple
appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final
order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial
court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors
became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the
Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal
and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the
order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December
20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on
appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court merely assists in
adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the liquidation plan
9
approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot
question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted
PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims,
there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting
in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the
Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial
review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated.
Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad
faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-
29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or
proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes."
This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he believes to be
contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in
behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. This
contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial
court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the
case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed
were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

10
 G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, Petitioner,
vs.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-Administratrix, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC) dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors
to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a
contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately ₱206,250.00 in the event of the sale of
certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of ₱275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses
incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the
estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to
attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the
grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9,
2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket
fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?2
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of
non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the
claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to
special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to
rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to
special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or
accomplished.4 This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely
suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing
fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable
to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim
against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the
whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons
having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.5
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized
and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the
progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the
action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.7 (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the
claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim.
Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification
against non-forum shopping.
11
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,8 that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a
money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in
fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a
lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time.9 After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for
settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one
of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
In the case at bar, the address of respondent’s counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia’s counsel’s is Lucena
City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service impracticable. As
in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally "might have been superfluous."
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where,
among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis supplied)

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay10 is squarely in
point. Therein, the Court held thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a
pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or
filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the
practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving
or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare,
for instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered
mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before
claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or
other papers.
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC
which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the
great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim
personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12 the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why
service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its
discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors
and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid.13 The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v.
Santibañez,14 thus:
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage
case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the
personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception.
Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to
other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation
for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January
15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in
accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally No pronouncement as to costs.
applied Section 11 of Rule 13:
SO ORDERED.
"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done personally
whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering
the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly, service by
registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was
not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may",
signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not
filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)1âwphi1

12
 G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule
in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge
Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on
April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar
granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should
be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a
motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the
motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly
publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator '
filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that
during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of
Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia
and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed
as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B.
Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of
which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G.
Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31,
1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over
the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not
a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister
of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from
taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado
G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the
estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of
action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to
dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special
administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the special
administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of
all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like
"married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider
the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in
her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was
cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived
her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order
of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an
inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of
action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
13
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and
December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of
action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for
reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia
G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to
deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G.
Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the
court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single"
or "married to Amado Garcia."
2
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, Virginia G. Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon
City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue,
among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to
the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A.
Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on
appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of
P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No.
27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by
the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738
should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia
inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa
B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating
the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the
Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B.
Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate
and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining
order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in
the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and
considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name
and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon,
and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the
time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the
Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That
power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with
14
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
of convenience to the parties. 5 substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort
to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of 4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides
venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from
deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6 the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of
the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or
of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi
allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail
rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and
of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily
have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary. 11
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With
equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased
that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that
Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is
Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for
entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The
domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as
G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B.
appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers,
Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the First District
the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in
of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with
her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at
these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
Calamba, Laguna."
entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of
the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its
of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11
by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973
Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the
obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land
thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show

15
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority
to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670,
and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment
of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No.
L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

16
 G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984 Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that the estate
was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs. It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents. marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp.
49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).
AQUINO, J.
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B.
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement
an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
probate in the Utah district court).

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two
Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
(partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest
which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside
of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
the Philippines.
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly
country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was
incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and
of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not
Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine
California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53,
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot
It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate
considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris
and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p.
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
78, testate case).
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and
by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm. Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It
was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to
the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives
order of July 27, 1979.
(administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the
estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa,
17
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate
case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate
properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer
was notified of that motion.

Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration
with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had
previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by
lawyer Limqueco.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses,
that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died
testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.
Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment
of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088,
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

18
 G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21
November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by
his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed
Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco,
Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things,
that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued
an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March
1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the
same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a
special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons
the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies
of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and
executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu
court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment
of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its
resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on
the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano
Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was
neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they
challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April
1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's
petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No.
Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as
follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court
(wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent
being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of
the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of
the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a
resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the
petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated
that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the
former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one
will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears
to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first
choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the
exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April
1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent
was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared and
the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors
had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some
other persons for his benefit;
19
 (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied
with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three
instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose
P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary
evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all
indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in his last will,
the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed
petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with
case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and
against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2)
whether or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for
probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent
should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the
jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI,
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for
the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial
judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually
from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court.
All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein
and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965;
hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will
and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's
express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming
exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City
court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged
by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any impediment or
obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having
been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow
as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the
rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts
which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co
Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased
is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors,
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a
claim of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the
first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the
province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which
20
 have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206,
December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction
of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The
law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all
probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court
the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first
filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction
— indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be
actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate
petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the
will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at
the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it
and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the
estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at
least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of
the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as
the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the
present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this
wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a
clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection
that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed
a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963
that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the
Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more
than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
21
 is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in
comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case.
The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly
invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the exercise
jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the
question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis
of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of
the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as so
indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would depend
the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in
effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was
the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would seem to
have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is
to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself the actual residence of the
decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu
court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence)
and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed
on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding
proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76,
section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional
facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, his having left his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem.
The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a
will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court
acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of
prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be
sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's
action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly
had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra,
"the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings
before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a
petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so
and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would
be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still in cuerpo
presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament and the
right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly not intended by the
Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and
despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu
court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen
days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings
be converted into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per
the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and
petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will
and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on
jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court
everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's
marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision,
notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon
City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in
comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have
to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community
property and conjugal estate with the decedent.
22
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to
the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the
decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of
the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of deference)
to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance with
its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a
rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will
to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of
prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the
Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent
of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as
administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the
testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and
to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court
should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

23
 G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 —
against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental
and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively —
praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July
1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus motion to
intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings
pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from
proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare
itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as
prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its
Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that judgment
be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first
disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further commanding
said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a
resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up
on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the
latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142
in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the
date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law. The
record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as
special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-
mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last Will
and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to this
Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No.
51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same
on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to
proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to
initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition
for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on July 27,
1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing
from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December
7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for having been
filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was approved by this
Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the
Supreme Court on questions of law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby
disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila
Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had
in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for
his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the action,
as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of
Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
24
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344
qualify. — or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted
Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy
Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts
and Annulment of said proceedings. would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the
second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed by
will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other respondent, Juan
Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the
Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a
Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros
copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before
Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings for its
filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros
probate.
Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems
quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly
erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction venue therefor.
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons —
whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the matter
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed
in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be
of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with
settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in
the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment
the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the
with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on
settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to
October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila
take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance
Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
with his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a
second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.
lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, proceedings is raised too late.
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said that
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted Civil
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his contention, the proper
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for indeed his supposed interest in
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will
the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
acknowledgment."
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
25
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249;
Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in
view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental petition
is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the appeal that petitioner was
taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said
court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the validity of
said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for and,
as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.

26
 G.R. No. 107207 November 23, 1995
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA. DE ONGSIONG, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The parties pose this question: May the vendor demand the rescission of a contract for the sale of a parcel of land for a
cause traceable to his own failure to have the squatters on the subject property evicted within the contractually-
stipulated period?
Petitioner Virgilio R. Romero, a civil engineer, was engaged in the business of production, manufacture and exportation
of perlite filter aids, permalite insulation and processed perlite ore. In 1988, petitioner and his foreign partners decided
to put up a central warehouse in Metro Manila on a land area of approximately 2,000 square meters. The project was
made known to several freelance real estate brokers.
A day or so after the announcement, Alfonso Flores and his wife, accompanied by a broker, offered a parcel of land
measuring 1,952 square meters. Located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the lot was covered by
TCT No. 361402 in the name of private respondent Enriqueta Chua vda. de Ongsiong. Petitioner visited the property
and, except for the presence of squatters in the area, he found the place suitable for a central warehouse.
Later, the Flores spouses called on petitioner with a proposal that should he advance the amount of P50,000.00 which
could be used in taking up an ejectment case against the squatters, private respondent would agree to sell the property
for only P800.00 per square meter. Petitioner expressed his concurrence. On 09 June 1988, a contract, denominated
"Deed of Conditional Sale," was executed between petitioner and private respondent. The simply-drawn contract read:
DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract, made and executed in the Municipality of Makati, Philippines this 9th day of June, 1988 by and
between:
ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA. DE ONGSIONG, of legal age, widow, Filipino and residing at 105 Simoun St.,
Quezon City, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR;
-and-
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO, married to Severina L. Lat, of Legal age, Filipino, and residing at 110 San Miguel St.,
Plainview Subd., Mandaluyong Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE:
W I T N E S S E T H : That
WHEREAS, the VENDOR is the owner of One (1) parcel of land with a total area of ONE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTY TWO (1,952) SQUARE METERS, more or less, located in Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of
Parañaque, Province of Rizal, covered by TCT No. 361402 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasig and more
particularly described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, the VENDEE, for (sic) has offered to buy a parcel of land and the VENDOR has accepted the offer,
subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY ONE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,561,600.00) ONLY, Philippine Currency, payable by VENDEE to in to
(sic) manner set forth, the VENDOR agrees to sell to the VENDEE, their heirs, successors, administrators,
executors, assign, all her rights, titles and interest in and to the property mentioned in the FIRST WHEREAS
CLAUSE, subject to the following terms and conditions:
1. That the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) ONLY Philippine Currency, is to be paid
upon signing and execution of this instrument.
2. The balance of the purchase price in the amount of ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,511,600.00) ONLY shall be paid 45 days after the removal of
all squatters from the above described property.
3. Upon full payment of the overall purchase price as aforesaid, VENDOR without necessity of demand
shall immediately sign, execute, acknowledged (sic) and deliver the corresponding deed of absolute
sale in favor of the VENDEE free from all liens and encumbrances and all Real Estate taxes are all paid
and updated.
It is hereby agreed, covenanted and stipulated by and between the parties hereto that if after 60 days from the
date of the signing of this contract the VENDOR shall not be able to remove the squatters from the property
being purchased, the downpayment made by the buyer shall be returned/reimbursed by the VENDOR to the
VENDEE.
That in the event that the VENDEE shall not be able to pay the VENDOR the balance of the purchase price of
ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P1,511,600.00) ONLY after 45
days from written notification to the VENDEE of the removal of the squatters from the property being purchased,
the FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) previously paid as downpayment shall be forfeited in favor of the
VENDOR.
Expenses for the registration such as registration fees, documentary stamp, transfer fee, assurances and such
other fees and expenses as may be necessary to transfer the title to the name of the VENDEE shall be for the
account of the VENDEE while capital gains tax shall be paid by the VENDOR.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto signed those (sic) presents in the City of Makati MM, Philippines
on this 9th day of June, 1988.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
VIRGILIO R. ROMERO ENRIQUETA CHUA VDA.
DE ONGSIONG
Vendee Vendor
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Rowena C. Ongsiong Jack M. Cruz1
27
 Alfonso Flores, in behalf of private respondent, forthwith received and acknowledged a check for P50,000.00 2 from
petitioner.3
Pursuant to the agreement, private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment (Civil Case No. 7579) against Melchor
Musa and 29 other squatter families with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque. A few months later, or on 21
February 1989, judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to vacate the premises. The decision was handed
down beyond the 60-day period (expiring 09 August 1988) stipulated in the contract. The writ of execution of the
judgment was issued, still later, on 30 March 1989.
In a letter, dated 07 April 1989, private respondent sought to return the P50,000.00 she received from petitioner since,
she said, she could not "get rid of the squatters" on the lot. Atty. Sergio A.F. Apostol, counsel for petitioner, in his reply
of 17 April 1989, refused the tender and stated:.
Our client believes that with the exercise of reasonable diligence considering the favorable decision rendered by the
Court and the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, it is now possible to eject the squatters from the premises of
the subject property, for which reason, he proposes that he shall take it upon himself to eject the squatters,
provided, that expenses which shall be incurred by reason thereof shall be chargeable to the purchase price of the
land.4
Meanwhile, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor ("PCUD"), through its Regional Director for Luzon, Farley
O. Viloria, asked the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque for a grace period of 45 days from 21 April 1989 within
which to relocate and transfer the squatter families. Acting favorably on the request, the court suspended the
enforcement of the writ of execution accordingly.
On 08 June 1989, Atty. Apostol reminded private respondent on the expiry of the 45-day grace period and his client's
willingness to "underwrite the expenses for the execution of the judgment and ejectment of the occupants." 5
In his letter of 19 June 1989, Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., counsel for private respondent, advised Atty. Apostol that the
Deed of Conditional Sale had been rendered null and void by virtue of his client's failure to evict the squatters from the
premises within the agreed 60-day period. He added that private respondent had "decided to retain the property." 6
On 23 June 1989, Atty. Apostol wrote back to explain:
The contract of sale between the parties was perfected from the very moment that there was a meeting of the
minds of the parties upon the subject lot and the price in the amount of P1,561,600.00. Moreover, the contract had
already been partially fulfilled and executed upon receipt of the downpayment of your client. Ms. Ongsiong is
precluded from rejecting its binding effects relying upon her inability to eject the squatters from the premises of
subject property during the agreed period. Suffice it to state that, the provision of the Deed of Conditional Sale do
not grant her the option or prerogative to rescind the contract and to retain the property should she fail to comply
with the obligation she has assumed under the contract. In fact, a perusal of the terms and conditions of the
contract clearly shows that the right to rescind the contract and to demand the return/reimbursement of the
downpayment is granted to our client for his protection.
Instead, however, of availing himself of the power to rescind the contract and demand the return, reimbursement of
the downpayment, our client had opted to take it upon himself to eject the squatters from the premises. Precisely,
we refer you to our letters addressed to your client dated April 17, 1989 and June 8, 1989.
Moreover, it is basic under the law on contracts that the power to rescind is given to the injured party. Undoubtedly,
under the circumstances, our client is the injured party.
Furthermore, your client has not complied with her obligation under their contract in good faith. It is undeniable that
Ms. Ongsiong deliberately refused to exert efforts to eject the squatters from the premises of the subject property
and her decision to retain the property was brought about by the sudden increase in the value of realties in the
surrounding areas.
Please consider this letter as a tender of payment to your client and a demand to execute the absolute Deed of
Sale.7
A few days later (or on 27 June 1989), private respondent, prompted by petitioner's continued refusal to accept the
return of the P50,000.00 advance payment, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, Civil Case No.
89-4394 for rescission of the deed of "conditional" sale, plus damages, and for the consignation of P50,000.00 cash.
Meanwhile, on 25 August 1989, the Metropolitan Trial Court issued an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 7579 on
motion of private respondent but the squatters apparently still stayed on.
Back to Civil Case No. 89-4394, on 26 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Makati8 rendered decision holding that
private respondent had no right to rescind the contract since it was she who "violated her obligation to eject the
squatters from the subject property" and that petitioner, being the injured party, was the party who could, under Article
1191 of the Civil Code, rescind the agreement. The court ruled that the provisions in the contract relating to (a) the
return/reimbursement of the P50,000.00 if the vendor were to fail in her obligation to free the property from squatters
within the stipulated period or (b), upon the other hand, the sum's forfeiture by the vendor if the vendee were to fail in
paying the agreed purchase price, amounted to "penalty clauses". The court added:
This Court is not convinced of the ground relied upon by the plaintiff in seeking the rescission, namely: (1) he
(sic) is afraid of the squatters; and (2) she has spent so much to eject them from the premises (p. 6, tsn, ses.
Jan. 3, 1990). Militating against her profession of good faith is plaintiffs conduct which is not in accord with the
rules of fair play and justice. Notably, she caused the issuance of an alias writ of execution on August 25, 1989
(Exh. 6) in the ejectment suit which was almost two months after she filed the complaint before this Court on
June 27, 1989. If she were really afraid of the squatters, then she should not have pursued the issuance of
an alias writ of execution. Besides, she did not even report to the police the alleged phone threats from the
squatters. To the mind of the Court, the so-called squatter factor is simply factuitous (sic).9
The lower court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint and ordered, instead, private respondent to eject or
cause the ejectment of the squatters from the property and to execute the absolute deed of conveyance
upon payment of the full purchase price by petitioner.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 29 May 1992, the appellate court rendered its decision. 10 It
opined that the contract entered into by the parties was subject to a resolutory condition, i.e., the ejectment of the
squatters from the land, the non-occurrence of which resulted in the failure of the object of the contract; that private
respondent substantially complied with her obligation to evict the squatters; that it was petitioner who was not ready to
pay the purchase price and fulfill his part of the contract, and that the provision requiring a mandatory
return/reimbursement of the P50,000.00 in case private respondent would fail to eject the squatters within the 60-day
period was not a penal clause. Thus, it concluded.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered
declaring the contract of conditional sale dated June 9, 1988 cancelled and ordering the defendant-appellee
to accept the return of the downpayment in the amount of P50,000.00 which was deposited in the court
below. No pronouncement as to costs.11
Failing to obtain a reconsideration, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari raising issues that, in fine, center
on the nature of the contract adverted to and the P50,000.00 remittance made by petitioner.
28
A perfected contract of sale may either be absolute or conditional 12 depending on whether the agreement is devoid of,
or subject to, any condition imposed on the passing of title of the thing to be conveyed or on the obligation of a party
thereto. When ownership is retained until the fulfillment of a positive condition the breach of the condition will simply
prevent the duty to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. If the condition is imposed on an obligation of a party
which is not complied with, the other party may either refuse to proceed or waive said condition (Art. 1545, Civil Code).
Where, of course, the condition is imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of such condition would
prevent the juridical relation itself from coming into existence. 13
In determining the real character of the contract, the title given to it by the parties is not as much significant as its
substance. For example, a deed of sale, although denominated as a deed of conditional sale, may be treated as
absolute in nature, if title to the property sold is not reserved in the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to
unilaterally rescind the contract predicated
on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition.14
The term "condition" in the context of a perfected contract of sale pertains, in reality, to the compliance by one party of
an undertaking the fulfillment of which would beckon, in turn, the demandability of the reciprocal prestation of the other
party. The reciprocal obligations referred to would normally be, in the case of vendee, the payment of the agreed
purchase price and, in the case of the vendor, the fulfillment of certain express warranties (which, in the case at bench
is the timely eviction of the squatters on the property).
In any case, private respondent's action for rescission is not warranted. She is not the injured party.21 The right of
resolution of a party to an obligation under Article 1191 of the Civil Code is predicated on a breach of faith by the other
party that violates the reciprocity between them.22 It is private respondent who has failed in her obligation under the
contract. Petitioner did not breach the agreement. He has agreed, in fact, to shoulder the expenses of the execution of
the judgment in the ejectment case and to make arrangements with the sheriff to effect such execution. In his letter of
23 June 1989, counsel for petitioner has tendered payment and demanded forthwith the execution of the deed of
absolute sale. Parenthetically, this offer to pay, having been made prior to the demand for rescission, assuming for the
sake of argument that such a demand is proper under Article 1592 23 of the Civil Code, would likewise suffice to defeat
private respondent's prerogative to rescind thereunder.
There is no need to still belabor the question of whether the P50,000.00 advance payment is reimbursable to petitioner
or forfeitable by private respondent, since, on the basis of our foregoing conclusions, the matter has ceased to be an
issue. Suffice it to say that petitioner having opted to proceed with the sale, neither may petitioner demand its
reimbursement from private respondent nor may private respondent subject it to forfeiture.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and another
is entered ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the balance of the purchase price and the latter to execute the
deed of absolute sale in favor of petitioner. No costs.

It would be futile to challenge the agreement here in question as not being a duly perfected contract. A sale is at once
perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a
specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees. 15

The object of the sale, in the case before us, was specifically identified to be a 1,952-square meter lot in San Dionisio,
Parañaque, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 361402 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasig and therein
technically described. The purchase price was fixed at P1,561,600.00, of which P50,000.00 was to be paid upon the
execution of the document of sale and the balance of P1,511,600.00 payable "45 days after the removal of all
squatters from the above described property."

From the moment the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage
and law. Under the agreement, private respondent is obligated to evict the squatters on the property. The ejectment of
the squatters is a condition the operative act of which sets into motion the period of compliance by petitioner of his own
obligation, i.e., to pay the balance of the purchase price. Private respondent's failure "to remove the squatters from the
property" within the stipulated period gives petitioner the right to either refuse to proceed with the agreement or waive
that condition in consonance with Article 1545 of the Civil Code. 16 This option clearly belongs to petitioner and not to
private respondent.

We share the opinion of the appellate court that the undertaking required of private respondent does not constitute a
"potestative condition dependent solely on his will" that might, otherwise, be void in accordance with Article 1182 of the
Civil Code17 but a "mixed" condition "dependent not on the will of the vendor alone but also of third persons like the
squatters and government agencies and personnel concerned."18 We must hasten to add, however, that where the so-
called "potestative condition" is imposed not on the birth of the obligation but on its fulfillment, only the obligation is
avoided, leaving unaffected the obligation itself.19

In contracts of sale particularly, Article 1545 of the Civil Code, aforementioned, allows the obligee to choose between
proceeding with the agreement or waiving the performance of the condition. It is this provision which is the pertinent
rule in the case at bench. Here, evidently, petitioner has waived the performance of the condition imposed on private
respondent to free the property from squatters.20

29
 G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013 The Issue Before the Court

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
The Court’s Ruling
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

The petition has no merit.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition
for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners
assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause
of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
(Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth;
(b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of
action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners
have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. 16 It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. 19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the
rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a
civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

The RTC Ruling

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, 12 this did not mean that they
the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence
of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13
omitted)

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the
counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
30
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to
the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action,
a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. 25 Thus, concordant
with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be
pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any
legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

31
 [G.R. NO. 154645 : July 13, 2004] x x x The complaint alleges that [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on
September 12, 1981; that [respondents] Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo, Jr. are the legitimate children of
[respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes; that for years before his death, Rodolfo A. Reyes
MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES, Petitioner, v. LOURDES REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL,
had illicit relations with [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that before his death, x x x Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice
MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all surnamed REYES, Respondents.
President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15,000.00 a month and, after
retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount
DECISION of P315,0[1]1.79; that [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though registered in the paramours name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband belongs to
his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse.The filiation of the paramours children must be settled in a probate or
special proceeding instituted for the purpose, not in an action for recovery of property.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the February 4, 2002
Decision2 and the August 14, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 45883.The CA disposed
as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The complaint further alleges that on July 12, 1979, a [D]eed of [S]ale of a property consisting of a house and lot at BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 of the Register of Deeds of Metro
Manila, District IV was issued in the name of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino; that the funds used to purchase this
property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and
Company as [petitioner] Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same; that [petitioner] executed a Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in
order to pay the balance of the purchase price; that said Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a life insurance
[policy] with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth
Insurance Corporation; that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his
death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life
Insurance [p]olicy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby partially DENIED and the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of The complaint finally alleges that the deceased had two cars in [petitioners] possession and that the real and personal
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 111 in Civil Case No. 9722-P is MODIFIED to read, as properties in [petitioners] possession are conjugal partnership propert[ies] of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ Rodolfo A. Reyes and one-half belongs exclusively to [respondent] Lourdes P. Reyes and the other half to the estate of
Rodolfo A. Reyes to be apportioned among the [other respondents] as his forced heirs.[Respondents] therefore, pray
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant as that the property covered by T.C.T. No. 90293 be declared conjugal property of the spouses Lourdes P. Reyes and
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ Rodolfo A. Reyes and that [petitioner] be ordered to reconvey the property in [respondents] favor; that the two cars in
[petitioners] possession be delivered to [respondents] and that [petitioner] be made to pay actual, compensatory and
moral damages to [respondents] as well as attorneys fees.
A. Declaring the house and lot registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 90293 (26627-A) of the Registry of
Deeds of Metro Manila, District IV as conjugal partnership property of the late Spouses Rodolfo and Lourdes
Reyes;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary xxx

b. Ordering the [petitioner] to surrender possession of said subject property, pursuant to the applicable law on
succession, to the respective estates of the late Rodolfo Reyes and Lourdes Reyes and to pay a reasonable rental
of P10,000.00 a month, to the same juridical entities, upon their failure to do so until possession of the property is
delivered; andcralawlibrary
c. To pay [respondents] attorneys fees in the sum of P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.4 ςrνll
The questioned Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
[Respondents] filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, containing the following allegations:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
[Petitioner] eventually filed her Answer, dated August 1, 1982, the allegations of which have been summarized by the
trial court in the following manner:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In her Answer, [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino alleges that she purchased the real property in question with her own
exclusive funds and it was only for convenience that the late Rodolfo Reyes facilitated the mortgage over the same;
that although the late Rodolfo Reyes paid the monthly amortization of the mortgage as attorney-in-fact of [petitioner],
the money came exclusively from [her].
[Petitioner] further alleges in her answer, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that during all the nineteen (19)
years that [she] lived with Rodolfo Reyes from 1962 continuously up to September 12, 1981 when the latter died,
[petitioner] never had knowledge whatsoever that he was married to someone else, much less to [respondent] Lourdes
P. Reyes; that [petitioner] was never the beneficiary of the emoluments or other pecuniary benefits of the late Rodolfo
Reyes during his lifetime or after his death because [she] had the financial capacity to support herself and her children
begotten with the late Rodolfo Reyes.[Petitioner] prays for a judgment dismissing [respondents] complaint and for the
latter to pay unto [petitioner] moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be determined during the trial,
including atto[r]neys fees and the costs of the suit. x x x.

xxx

32
On February 2, 1993, [respondent] Lourdes Reyes died. Issues

Subsequently, the trial court granted the complaint based on the following factual Petitioner submits the following issues for the Courts consideration:
findings:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
I.
Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in Manila.They have four children, namely:
Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-[respondents] in this case.Rodolfo Reyes died
Whether or not it has been indubitably established in a court of law and trier of facts, the Regional Trial Court, that
on September 12, 1981.At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife, Milagros
petitioners three [3] illegitimate children are x x x indeed the children of the late Rodolfo Reyes.
Joaquino, x x x with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed
Reyes.
II.
During his lifetime, Rodolfo Reyes worked with Marsman and Company and later transferred to Warner Barnes & Co.,
where he assumed the position of Vice-President [Comptroller] until he retired on September 30, 1980.His monthly Whether or not it is legally permissible for [respondents] to make a mockery of the law by denying [the] filiations of their
salary at Warner Barnes & Co. was P15,000.00 x x x and upon his separation or retirement from said company, [two] 2 illegitimate sisters and one [1] illegitimate brother when in fact the very complaint filed by their mother, the
Rodolfo Reyes received a lump sum of P315,011.79 in full payment and settlement of his separation and retirement lawful wife, Lourdes[,] shows that her husband Rodolfo had illicit relations with the petitioner Milagros and had lived
benefits. with her in a house and lot at Baghdad Street.

During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they III.
decided to buy the house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila.A
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of [petitioner] Milagros Joaquino and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name of [petitioner only] on July 20, 1979. Whether or not the fact that the Court of Appeals made a finding that the house and lot at Baghdad Street are conjugal
property of lawfully wedded Rodolfo and Lourdes including the insurance proceeds which was used to pay the final bill
for the house and lot, this will prevail over Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
To secure the finances with which to pay the purchase price of the property in the amount of P140,000.00, [petitioner]
executed on July 20, 1979, a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes for the latter, as attorney-in-fact,
to secure a loan from the Commonwealth Insurance Company.An application for mortgage loan was filed by Rodolfo IV.
Reyes with the Commonwealth Insurance Company and a Real Estate Mortgage Contract was executed as collateral
to the mortgage loan.The loan was payable in ten (10) years with a monthly amortization of P1,166.67.The monthly Whether or not the Supreme Court should enforce the rule that the parties to a lawsuit should only tell the truth at the
amortizations were paid by Rodolfo Reyes and after his death, the balance of P109,797.64 was paid in full to the trial and in [their] pleadings x x x.
Commonwealth Insurance by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes. 5 ςrνll
V.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner questioned the following findings of the trial court: 1) that the house and lot had been
paid in full from the proceeds of the loan that Rodolfo Reyes obtained from the Commonwealth Insurance Company; 2)
that his salaries and earnings, which were his and Lourdes conjugal funds, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed Whether or not the legitimate children of the late Rodolfo Reyes should respect their fathers desire that his illegitimate
property was conjugal; and 3) that petitioners illegitimate children, not having been recognized or acknowledged by him children should have a home or a roof over their heads in consonance with his duty to love, care and provide for his
in any of the ways provided by law, acquired no successional rights to his estate. children even after his death.7 ςrνll

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The issues boil down to the following: 1) the nature of the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paranaque,
Metro Manila); and 2) the propriety of ruling on the filiation and the successional rights of petitioners children.

Affirming the RTC, the CA held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes
because the monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the The Courts Ruling
balance thereof, came from his salaries and earnings.Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was
financially capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay The Petition is devoid of merit.
for it.Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective estates of the spouses.
First Issue:
The appellate court, however, held that the trial court should not have resolved the issue of the filiation and the
successional rights of petitioners children.Such issues, it said, were not properly cognizable in an ordinary civil action
for reconveyance and damages and were better ventilated in a probate or special proceeding instituted for the The Conjugal Nature of the Disputed Property
purpose.
Before tackling the merits, we must first point out some undisputed facts and guiding principles.
Hence, this Petition.6

33
As to the facts, it is undisputed that the deceased Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Respondent Lourdes Reyes on Thus, when a common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them -- through
January 3, 1947.8 It is also admitted that for 19 years or so, and while their marriage was subsisting, he was actually their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry -- shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to
living with petitioner.It was during this time, in 1979, that the disputed house and lot was purchased and registered in their respective contributions.
petitioners name.
With these facts and principles firmly settled, we now proceed to the merits of the first issue.
Plainly, therefore, the applicable law is the Civil Code of the Philippines.Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal
partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage9 and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment,
The present controversy hinges on the source of the funds paid for the house and lot in question.Upon the resolution of
legal separation or judicial separation of property.10 Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband
this issue depends the determination of whether the property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive
and wife.11 As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we
(owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.
quote:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The above issue, which is clearly factual, has been passed upon by both the trial and the appellate courts, with similar
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
results in favor of respondents.Such finding is generally conclusive; it is not the function of this Court to review
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
questions of fact.20 ςrνll

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
Moreover, it is well-settled that only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in cases brought to it
them;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
from the Court of Appeals or under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.21 This principle applies with greater force herein,
because the CA came up with the same factual findings as those of the RTC.
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse.
Even then, heeding petitioners plea, we have gone through the pleadings and the evidence presented by the parties to
find out if there is any circumstance that might warrant a reversal of the factual findings.Unfortunately for petitioner, we
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the have found none.
wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG.For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties
must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage.12 ςrνll
Indeed, a preponderance of evidence has duly established that the disputed house and lot was paid by Rodolfo Reyes,
using his salaries and earnings.By substantial evidence, respondents showed the following facts: 1) that Rodolfo was
The law places the burden of proof13 on the plaintiffs (respondents herein) to establish their claim by a preponderance gainfully employed as comptroller at Warner, Barnes and Co., Inc. until his retirement on September 30, 1980, upon
of evidence14 -- evidence that has greater weight or is more convincing than that which is offered to oppose it. 15 ςrνll which he received a sizeable retirement package; 22 2) that at exactly the same time the property was allegedly
purchased,23 he applied for a mortgage loan24 -- intended for housing25 -- from the Commonwealth Insurance
Company;3) that he secured the loan with a real estate mortgage 26 over the same property;4) that he paid the monthly
On the other hand, Article 14416 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are
amortizations for the loan27 as well as the semi-annual premiums28 for a Philam Life insurance policy, which he was
living together but are not legally married.Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for Article 144 to apply, the
required to take as additional security; and 5) that with the proceeds of his life insurance policy, the balance of the loan
couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage.17 It has been held that the Article is inapplicable to common-law
was paid to Commonwealth by Philam Life Insurance Company. 29 ςrνll
relations amounting to adultery or concubinage, as in this case.The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-
ownership in cases in which there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. 18 ςrνll
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that
19 gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal.More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan
In default of Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. The latter Article
obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and
provides:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.

Art. 148.In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of her claims -- that she was financially capable of buying the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
house and lot, or that she actually contributed to the payments therefor.
proportion to their respective contributions.In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. Indeed, it does not appear that she was gainfully employed at any time after 1961 30 when the property was
purchased.Hearsay are the Affidavits31 and the undated Certification32 she had presented to prove that she borrowed
money from her siblings and had earnings from a jewelry business.Respondents had not been given any opportunity to
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
cross-examine the affiants, who had not testified on these matters.Based on the rules of evidence, the Affidavits and
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.If the party which acted in bad faith is not validly
the Certification have to be rejected.In fact, they have no probative value. 33 The CA was also correct in disregarding
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
petitioners allegation that part of the purchase money had come from the sale of a drugstore 34 four years earlier.
Article.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name was
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros.By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation

34
was void, because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the issue.In view thereof, the illegitimate filiation of her children could not have been duly established by the proceedings
donation. as required by Article 887 of the Civil Code.47 ςrνll

The prohibition against donations between spouses35 must likewise apply to donations between persons living together
in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former. 36 Article 87 of the Family Code now
expressly provides thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Art. 87.Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. (Italics
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Regarding the registration of the property in petitioners name, it is enough to stress that a certificate of title under the
Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership. 37 It has
been held that property is conjugal if acquired in a common-law relationship during the subsistence of a preexisting
legal marriage, even if it is titled in the name of the common-law wife.38 In this case, a constructive trust is deemed
created under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which we quote:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
The registration of the property in petitioners name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfos legal spouse and
compulsory heirs of ownership.By operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for
them.Therefore, she cannot rely on the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to
the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title.39
In view of the foregoing reasons, the CA cannot be faulted for tackling the propriety of the RTCs ruling on the status of
the children of petitioner, though she did not assign this matter as an error.The general rule -- that only errors assigned
may be passed upon by an appellate court admits of exceptions.Even unassigned errors may be taken up by such
court if the consideration of those errors would be necessary for arriving at a just decision or for serving the interest of
justice.48 ςrνll
The invocation by petitioner of Articles 1949 and 2150 of the Civil Code is also unmeritorious.Clearly, the illegitimate
filiation of her children was not the subject of inquiry and was in fact not duly established in this case.Thus, she could
not have shown that respondents had acted in bad faith or with intent to prejudice her children.These are conditions
necessary to show that an act constitutes an abuse of rights under Article 19. 51 She also failed to show that
respondents -- in violation of the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code -- had acted in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
Moreover, we note that the issue concerning the applicability of Articles 19 and 21 was not raised by petitioner in the
trial court or even in the CA.Hence, she should not be permitted to raise it now.Basic is the rule that parties may not
bring up on appeal issues that have not been raised on trial.52 ςrνll
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Second Issue:

Ruling on Illegitimate Filiation

Not Proper

It is petitioners alternative submission that her children are entitled to a share in the disputed property, because they
were voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his children.Claiming that the issue of her childrens illegitimate filiation
was duly established in the trial court, she faults the CA for ruling that the issue was improper in the instant case.

Her position is untenable.

Indeed, it has been ruled that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. 40 Sustaining the
appellate court in Agapay v. Palang,41 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to
a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.

Considerations of due process should have likewise deterred the RTC from ruling on the status of petitioners children.It
is evident from the pleadings of the parties that this issue was not presented in either the original 42 or the Supplemental
Complaint43 for reconveyance of property and damages; that it was not pleaded and specifically prayed for by
petitioner in her Answers44 thereto; and that it was not traversed by respondents Reply to the Supplemental
Complaint.45 Neither did petitioners Memorandum,46 which was submitted to the trial court, raise and discuss this

35
 G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN,
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA
GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated April 28,
2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The
challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19,
dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession,
thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same
from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother,
Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death
of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land
but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous
demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate
the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that
Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the
subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter
while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against
Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was
dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause
of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita
Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita
Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already
covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan
(Teofilo’s daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff
the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants
represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff
Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way of moral
damages; ₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondent’s
claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent
reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale 5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo,
Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del
Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and
the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the
daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the
CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right
to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property could not ripen into
acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an
owner.lawphil.net
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed
the following reversible errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and
surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN";
36
 THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the
child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed
Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject
matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts. 8 It is
not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal
upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.91avvphi1
However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts,
such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.10
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review
rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or
clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent. 11
In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.
The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is
undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his
lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be
made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as
one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is
then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right. 13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where
the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous
marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants
were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that Marcosa
Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence
of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until
the presentation of the project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, 16 the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to
the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the Court relaxed its rule and
allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay,
96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties
to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
37
After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in
conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her
alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of
her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous
possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct
testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated
that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a
certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent.
Among the differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena Calarito" in
the handwritten birth certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff
herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants. Which of this
(sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the
observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the "as is and where
is" rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s
maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the entries found thereof (sic) is
handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for
mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother
filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to
believe that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth. 20
Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of
the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere
photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding
that Exhibit 122 was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states
"Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial court’s
finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No
actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a
true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil
registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their names.
The words "A certified true copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be
inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a
witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by
respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one
of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners’
Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho),
Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their
official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of
respondent’s handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their
respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before
the trial court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit
1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of
respondent’s birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate. 26 Ms. Cacho, in turn,
testified that the original of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from
which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of
Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective offices’ copies of respondent’s
birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they were
motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1
and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a
reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan
Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother was
a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of
Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only
proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan
Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final
judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present
any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they
knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana.
However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of
birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureana’s
wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from,
others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies. The records would show
that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana
by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan. 29 His testimony regarding
38
the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac, 30 this Court is wary of according probative weight to their
testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondent’s) husband is the son of
Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are
also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome
of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a
Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the
heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed
the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against
interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34
However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent
evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being
properly authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot
uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are
instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the
original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in
Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario, 37 we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the
loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the
original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on
the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by
a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office.
Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court 38 provide that the record of public documents,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.40
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists
in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient
authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even
worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is
highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s office is not the official repository
of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register
and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial
register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness
and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified
true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s
office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the
purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan
as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still
nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit
H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the
only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan" (respondent’s Exhibit A)
was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondent’s own
testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to
recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent
and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It
is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No.
5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan. 43 However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for
failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case. 45 She
claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already
old.46
We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who
might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that
respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held
in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant,
not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine
purity."47
All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with
clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim,
respondent has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
39
 G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a
person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case
that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over
the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-
Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock
investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer
for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the
duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernal properties." Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her
appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the
estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to,
in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite
bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26,
1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate. 11 Emmanuel did not submit an
inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13 praying, among others, that an Order be
issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs;
and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature
and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s estate
as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court
ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of
petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the
instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the
petitioner in their partnership venture.’"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate
court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim
of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution,
the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private
respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court
has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of
advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the proceedings. The
probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s
40
claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of
grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored
on the following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR
FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO
CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS
AND BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters
having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that
such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.
In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we
held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct
a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the
purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case show that such was not the
purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed
only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor,
however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a
more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she
believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only
to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his
own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent
considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s
inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or
should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate court
went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:
"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that
since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not
possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s
claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she allegedly
placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct interest
in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to
"determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the
oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct
interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court" or hearing is
geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving
her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to
maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased
person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course
of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial
court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
41
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."22 A: Yes, sir.

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita's estate.
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the
issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as xxxxxx
stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in
the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their title Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs.
Alcid23 relevant, thus:
A: Yes, sir.

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on
the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to
after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the the estate of your late husband?
matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x
A: If I only knew that this will happen…
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved,
the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x" A: Wala po."24

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare
assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:" In
accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give
only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being
the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall
having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both
here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor
vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with
these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-
50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro,
in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o
hatian ninyo ni Emil?
A: Kung ano ang sa akin…
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian
or hindi?

42
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her.
Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim
did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of paraphernal
properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to change her
submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter most of her
properties to be used in a joint business venture. 27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed
in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her
death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two minor children. 28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights
or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties
alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

43
 G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014 exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00. 6
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs. On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the
MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents. supporting documents Teresita had submitted.

DECISION On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita
to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. 7
BERSAMIN, J.:
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless
the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue. 8
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
Ruling of the RTC
property of the deceased spouse.

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
Antecedents
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly
ruled:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s
V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L.
motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties
Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties
mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty (60) days from notice of this order.
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the late
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition
SO ORDERED.9
considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7,
1992.
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March
14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the
been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
no real properties but only personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture
and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth
₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25. 2 On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be
included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC
direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the
order of January 8, 1993. Decision of the CA

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in

44
children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS
SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN
THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows: 13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders
dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment
dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing a
new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the
ownership of the thing sold "shall be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery," and to
Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to
Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty
as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included"; that as to the January 10,
1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land,
subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration
through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10,
1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory "considering that there is nothing wrong or
objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a
property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by
disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the
matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from
questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what
properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually,
a reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly
shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they are
not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for
approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir
Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a
corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.
Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
45
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC
were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and
interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from
an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised
by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties
in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the
order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed
or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a
final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village
lots." The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71
SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 19 where the Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a
testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v.
Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, 20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination
of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders.
The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, 21 which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may
be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is
expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues
may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple
appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
46
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties in
the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the
facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in,
court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. 27 (Italics
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in
court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina
decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in
Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while
her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
possession of another person or entity.
Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required
to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the
court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not include
and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." 23 Hence,
in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from
the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
money derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, 24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in
these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in
in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges
enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action
taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC commits In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank
no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank
duty. account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of the
properties constituting as estate of her husband.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26 of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in
Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this

47
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N
for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days
before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the
transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include
the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said
properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his
death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O). 28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure
for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include the
properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary,
or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988,
their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it
was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific
property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of
proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing
evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and
Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were, 31 and which
of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be
included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings
that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was
resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted in
the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of
Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No.
CEB-12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have
already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering
that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its
President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument
did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal
efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the
intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place,
intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the
primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned
by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his
death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that
there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the
CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts
to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid
basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the
execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to
lands.1âwphi1 However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of
manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever
to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or
that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their
duties.35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should
still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed, 36 but it does not prevent the
RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have
all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective." 37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving
the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory
heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of
the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession
of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
48
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

49
 G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 1 Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 2 which dismissed, after
trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which they sought
to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein
co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed,
Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan
in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292
covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on
March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the
Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer
certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not
entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her
Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void
and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s name and to issue in its
stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and
their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial
evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the
estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil
action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong
(ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and
right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and
right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio decedendi in dismissing the
case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
50
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the two women
both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in
said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the only
question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased
Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the
case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact
in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants and
defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the
parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions
as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil
action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is
axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a
declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary
civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling
in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the evidence
presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed,
and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above
disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cariño apply, a
decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is valid,
and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the
annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. 25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows
courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to
the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as
compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two
lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled
in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions
thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles.
The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of
action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof
or even a semblance of it—except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that
they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found that
the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio
v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of
administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael
Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922
in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent." The CFI
granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court,
against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of
51
Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his
petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the
decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both
were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter
alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether
Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and
its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the
deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth
that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary
evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the
deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed
from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said
court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on
the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia
before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to
Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court
affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the
RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of
the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court,"
this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v.
CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless
[therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of
the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez
Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the
decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of
lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her
in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father
to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement to suspend action or resolution
on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her
complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set
aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her
motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court,
by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s
share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive
and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has
not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share,
is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing,
but allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the
right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on
February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.37
52
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction
to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the
estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the
parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial
and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues defined
during the pre-trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

53
 G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF
CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-
REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO
CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN;
HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-
RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely,
JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals
in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in
this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged
heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his nephews and nieces,8 his
illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five
other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural
children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12 with
whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without
the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the
answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly
married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his
heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no
evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon
Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral
relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place
is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of
necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on
June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972.
During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact
been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
54
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The
the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were dispositive portion of the decision read:
what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor- listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same
his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
1920 until her father’s demise. In fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the
other parties hereto.
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of
Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15,
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil
Code.21
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in
this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the
adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated,
estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was overtaken by his death on
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
February 28, 1974.

Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda.
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
(P500,000.00).
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda.24
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt
Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana hereof.
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr.,
and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
SO ORDERED.28
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado.
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed
on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only
Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice. 32
herein), the motion was granted.

In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and
oppositors’ failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified
Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our
decision33 read:
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the
estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay
and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who
xxx xxx xxx
had died on May 18, 1987.

55
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating
to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were
to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground
of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have been
construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

xxx xxx xxx

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

xxx xxx xxx

The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof
27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents’ Record on
of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are,
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990
in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
decision.

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision
read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of
the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba
Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants
as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration of
the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on
the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to
the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to
render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and posting of the bond.
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them
to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of
administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony
of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that
no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen

56
the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, 42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their
position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
"lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who baptized the
child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the alleged single
or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences
which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48 On the other
hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of
sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2)
Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations
with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba,
Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and
sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even
though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the
illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even
if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-
blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers
and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-
brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake
of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on
September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear on this
matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s
estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974
at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary
rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights
to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
57
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following
cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that
of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
62
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of
her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she
could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory
acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent. 65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed. 66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of
voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia).
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from
the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the
signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972,
that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an
authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by
him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance
with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed
upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger
to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is
wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise,
the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the
person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma
Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of
the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the
remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section
6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, 72 a
situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and
a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the
time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado
who are entitled to share in her estate.
58
 3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita)
and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares
shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now
deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may
be determined by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

59
 G.R. No. L-273 March 29, 1947
CRESENCIA HERNANDEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZACARIAS ANDAL, defendant-appellant.
QUIRINO DIMASACAT, MARIA HERNANDEZ and AQUILINA HERNANDEZ, intervenors-appellants.
Pedro Pañganiban y Tolentino for appellants.
Vicente Reyes Villavicencio for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez
who are not parties here, are brother and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of
land of which he died seized and known as lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
On January 23, 1944, the intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel, a portion which is particularly described
in the deed of conveyance Exhibit A, to Zacarias Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of P860. This
portion purports to be the combined shares of the intervenors in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal partition
alleged to have been made (time not stated) among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, on a date as to which the evidence is in disagreement but which is not now important, the plaintiff
attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her original complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she
offered the purchasers P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that complaint, the amount Andal had paid
for Maria Hernandez's and Aquilina Hernandez's shares, but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property.
On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged that when the cause was called for trial on March 8,
she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860 and reimburse
Andal for his expense; that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had made other expenses; that
on 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's
sisters had intervened; and that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for P970.
It results that on the date last mentioned Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the intervenors, an amount
which included Andal's expenses as well as the normal sale price. The document of repurchase gave as reason for the
transaction the fact that it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise the sellers should return to the buyer
what they had received and pay the latter his expenses.
On February 14, 1944, the defendant filed his answer alleging that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their
respective portions of the inherited land for P860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of
the plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of the deed of sale amounting to P50, but that
he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff offered him besides his expenses.
On April 4, 1944, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez's answer in intervention was filed. The intervenors alleged that there
had been a partition among them and their brother and sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and
after partition and delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his portion in the
partition." They charged the plaintiff with bad faith in that "it was upon her request for chance that the sale to the
defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed till January of this year when she finally informed the
intervenors that they could sell to the defendant, or she could pay only P150 and could not raise the amount of P860
offered by the defendant."
Cresencia Hernandez, the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own behalf. Substantially she reiterated the
allegations in her two complaints. Zacarias Andal, the defendant, also testified. He said that he was in possession of
the land in question until he returned it to the intervenors. He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land
from him long after he had bought it, that is, when she was about to file her action. He stated that after he came from
Candelaria, Tayabas, with the document of sale he showed it to the plaintiff: that was on the 23rd of January. He was
able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by her house on his way home from Candelaria. He said
that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document."
When asked whether the land "described in the complaint of the herein plaintiff has been the object of partition among
the co-owners Pedro, Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez," counsel for the plaintiff objected
on the ground that the best evidence was the document of partition, and the objection was sustained. The same
objection and the same ruling were made on the same ground when the witness was queried how it was that the land
he had bought from Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had been specified in the deed of sale, Exhibit A.
In consequence of this ruling, counsel for the defendant and intervenors did not call any more witnesses but only
announced that he had witnesses ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had been
made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses. Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that "under the
Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person
against whom the proof is offered. "Upon this objection, the court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of
Court (Statute of Frauds) as well as under article 1248 of the Civil Code, parol evidence of partition was inadmissible,
adding that to decide the case it had enough with the testimony and evidence offered by the parties.
Thereafter the court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria
and Aquilina Hernandez was illegal and in bad faith. It, however, did not seem to have found as a fact the allegation
that the resale was simulated. The court then made this judgment:
(a) declarando y sin valor alguno el documento de reventaotorgado por el demandado Zacarias Andal en 26
de marzo de 1944, a favor de Maria y Aquilina Hernandez sobre el terrenocuestionado que se presento
como Exhibito 2 de dichodemandado, y consiguientemente se anulan tambien todas lastransacciones
posteriores que las mencionadas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez hayan hecho sobre el terreno cuestionado
despuesdel 26 de marzo de 1944, asi como tambien cualquiera anotacionen la Oficiana del Registrador de
Titulos de Batangas que hayaanotado dicha reventa por el demandado Zacarias Andal a favorde las
terceristas Maria y Aquilina Hernandez en el citado dia 26 de marzo de 1944; y
(b) se ordena al aqui demandado Zacarias Andal, que otorgue unaescritura de reventa a favor de la aqui
demandante Cresencia Hernandez, de las participaciones de las terceristas en el terrenodescrito en la
demanda suplementaria previo pago de P860 mas lacantidad de P50 como gastos de documentacion. Se
absuelve al demandado de los daños y perjuicios que reclama la demandante. Se absuelve tambien a la
demandante de la contra-demanda de lasterceristas.
Sin especial pronunciamento en cuanto a las costas.
The defendant and the intervenors are appealing from the foregoing decision and in their joint brief made one
assignment of error:
The lower court erred in refusing to admit oral evidence for proving a contract of partition among the heirs on
the ground that it was not admissible.
Before proceeding with a discussion of the questions raised we are tempted to point up some seeming incongruities in
the above-quoted judgment. Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far as the land is
concerned, and even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners and are now in full possession of
the property, while Andal has already gotten his money back, the judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale
60
in favor of the plaintiff and received from her the price of repurchase. The judgment is silent as to the intervenors with
reference to the execution of the deed of sale or the receipt of the sale price. And the lower court made no finding and
expressed no opinion as to whether the offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff
as price of repurchase was sufficient compliance with article 1067 of the Civil Code on which the court rested the
plaintiff's cause of action.
However, in this decision we are concerned mainly with the application of section 21 of Rule 123 and section 1 of Rule
74 both of the Rules of Court. Article 1248 of the Civil Code has no bearing on the case.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether an agreement of partition is such a contract as is required to be in writing
under the statute of frauds. One line of authorities holds the affirmative view; other authorities say no. The reason for
the rule that excludes partition from the operation of the statute of frauds is that partition is not a conveyance but simply
a separation and designation of that part of the land which belongs to each tenant in common. (27 C.J., 206.) The
differences in the conclusions reached are "due perhaps to varied phraseology of the statutes" in the several states.
(40 Amer. Jur., 15.) However the case may be, as enacted in the Philippines, first in section 335 of the former Code of
Civil Procedure, and now in Rule 123, section 21, of the Rules of Court, the law has been uniformly interpreted in a
long line of cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or executed contracts. (27 C.J., 206.) In this
jurisdiction performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the statute. (Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil., 485;
Almirol and Cariño vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil., 67.) The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein
enumerated void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for specific performance. (Almirol and
Cariño vs. Monserrat, supra.) In the United States, even in those states where the affirmative view of the question has
been followed, "the weight of authority upholds the rule that an oral partition is effective when several possession is
taken under it by the respective parties to the agreement." (27 C.J., 206.)
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition
when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in
proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in
severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize
and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and
in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of the land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And
a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of
concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified
the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or
otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part
performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been
held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties. (40 Amer. Jur., 15-18.)
It is on the effects of Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition that there are sharp divergences of
opinion among the members of this Court. This section reads:
If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument file in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one
legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the
register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters
of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.
It is contended that under this rule a verbal partition is entirely void and cannot be validated by any acts of the parties
short of the execution of a public document and its registration.
As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a
condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the
statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The decisions of
this Court which we have noticed were predicated on this assumption. The Civil Code, too, requires the
accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure
its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to
execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs .Hernaez, 45 Phil., 746.)
Is section 1 of Rule 74 constitutive and not merely evidential of partition? In other words, is writing the act that confers
legal validity upon the agreement? There are no indications in the phraseology of this rule which justify an affirmative
answer to these questions. It must be noted that where the law intends a writing or other formality to be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal terms. Thus, the statute of frauds as
originally enacted in England and as enacted in some of the states, uses the words "utterly void" with statute
transactions required to be in writing are absolutely void and not merely voidable if not made in the manner indicated.
Again article 633 of the Civil Code says that donation may be valid only when made in a public document. Article 146
of the Mortgage Law makes known its intention to have the execution of a public instrument and its registration in the
registry indispensable to the validity of the contract by using this phrase: "in order that voluntary mortgages may be
legally created in a valid manner." Article 1765 of the Civil Code also employs for the same purpose similar expression
with reference to the execution of a public document: "in order that mortgage may be validly constituted." And with
respect to the formalities of last wills and testaments, section 618 of Act No. 190 makes this emphatic statement: "No
will shall be valid to pass upon any estate real or personal nor change or affect the same, unless it be written etc."
Other examples might be mentioned.
Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the required public instruments is to be
constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court
had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent on
the execution of a public instrument and its registration. On the other hand, the opposite theory is not without
reasonable support. We can think of possible factors against the proposition that a public document and its registration
were contemplated as necessary ingredients to give life to a contract of partition so that without them no oral partition
can bind the parties.
1. In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part were promulgated by the
Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of procedure exclusively. For this court to prescribe what is to
be a binding agreement between co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of
third parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. We bring out this limitation upon the authority of this court
to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, as a method of arriving at the conclusion that section 1 of Rule 74 was meant
to be remedial and not a rule of substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the bounds of this court's functions
61
and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution It is said that the findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not assigned as errors and that for
and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the this reason the appeal should be dismissed. We do not think that the premise of this objection is exactly correct. The
rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the jurisdiction of the courts to evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled out and they specifically complain of
administer and distribute. The interests of third parties eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and this exclusion as error. In this manner the assignment of error squarely meets and attacks the opinion and judgment of
practice and invades the realm of substantive law. the trial court. A superficial analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition hangs the result of
the entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn the competence of the excluded evidence. These two
interrelated points are the core of the whole case. All other points are incidental to and revolve around them. If a
Section 596 of Act No. 190, which is the precursor of section 1 Rule 74, is enlightening and instructive. The former
completed oral partition may be enforced, as the defendant and the intervenors contend and as we opine, their
after stating that heirs may apportion and divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly
evidence should be allowed, and if allowed and it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action vanishes.
executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise." These words, in our opinion, were expressive of
an intention to make the written formality inherent element of the validity of a parol partition. But what is far more to the
point is that by logical process of deduction the elimination from the new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports If the appellant's assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to the decision of the court below, we still
the casting away from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the document enjoyed in the former believe that the objection takes a narrow view of practice and procedure contrary to the liberal spirit which pervades
code. At the same time, the inclusion of the aforesaid words in the old provision serves to emphasize the necessity of a the Rules of Court. The first injunction of the new Rules (Rule 1, section 2) is that they "shall be liberally construed in
positive and clear language if a given contractual formality is to be the exclusive basis of the contract's binding effect order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
on the parties. It is of course unnecessary to say that the attaching of jural character to the prescribed public action and proceeding." In line with the modern trends of procedure, we are told that, "while an assignment of error
instrument in section 596 of Act No. 190 is no argument for contending that such document must be clothed with the which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to appellate review, and only those assigned will be
same raiment in the new Rules. Act No. 190 was a mixture of procedural and substantive provisions, having been considered, there are a number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to
enacted by the legislative body itself which, unlike this court, was unhampered and untrammelled, except by the waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an unassigned error closely
fundamental law, in the choice of its subjects of legislation. related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the determination of the question raised by the error properly
assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error." (4
C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77.) At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to
2. The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments in acts and contracts with greater liberality with a view to
examine and pass upon the decision of the court below.
better adaptation to human frailties and idiosyncracies. In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of
experience and foresight, and their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and continue to make verbal contracts.
The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far short of compensating for the resulting damage, The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding and a new decision not
injustice, inconveniences and confusion. So even though articles 1278, 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code have made incompatible with this decision, with costs of this appeal against the appellee.
provisions for public instrument for all transactions and contracts whose object is the creation, modification or extinction
of real rights in immovables, it has been recognized and held that verbal contracts may be effective between the
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
parties. A leading case on this subject is Thunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561), Mr. Justice Williard writing the
decision. It was said in that case that when the essential requisites for the existence of a contract are present, the
contract is binding upon the parties, and, although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff
can maintain an action under article 1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument. It says that "article 1279
does not impose an obligation, but confers a privilege upon both contracting parties, and the fact that the plaintiff has
not made use of same does not bar his action." It further says that article 1279, far from making the enforceability of
the contract dependent upon any special intrinsic form, recognizes its enforceability by the mere act of granting the
contracting parties an adequate remedy whereby to compel the execution of public writing or any other special form
whenever such form is necessary in order that contract may produce the effect which is desired according to whatever
its object. This doctrine was iterated and reiterated in a series of decisions perhaps longer than that on any other legal
topic. And it has been extended even to verbal contracts involving land registered under the Torrens Act. Do the Rules
of Court adhere to this salutary principle? We can perceive no sufficient ground for the new Rules to depart from it. No
considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate among co-heirs greater than those involved in a
contract between strangers which operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land. If as
between strangers the creation, transmission, modification or extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol
agreement notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in writing, the new rule could not be more intransigent when
the transaction is between co-heirs and there is no change of ownership but simply designation and segregation of that
part which belongs to each heir.

The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has, in our opinion, for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the
last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice,
and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not
affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

62
 G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon),
Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri
(Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the
April 27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN
which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and
instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s
feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (heirs of Uy).
The Facts
period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had
no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of
the subject properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and
Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994
when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their
co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to
Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they
consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have
ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in
because of their inaction for a long period of time.

During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo
The Issues
Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique),
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and
Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:
Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536 and P-
20551 (P-8348)7 issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE;
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH
homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING
(spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and

On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include
Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as childrenof The Ruling of the Court
Anunciacion from her first marriage.
The petitionis meritorious.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and
exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
prescription and laches. second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal
shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code which read:

The RTC Ruling

ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as
to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory
xxx

63
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:
Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As
the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their
right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to
their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their
undivided share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their
natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing
at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their
2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child
under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be
considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of
Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos
or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the
property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of
the child’s property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required
by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance
with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317
and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by law
a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it
has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or
who has acted beyond his powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or
defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
64
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly received
benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive
effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In
Napoleon and Rosa’s Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us
and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy
on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale
was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action
accrues,22 which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed. 23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in
1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10
years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
as regards the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda
D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention to file a case 3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL
against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied) Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and

Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus,
purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the
estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence
showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the
buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer." 20 On this score, Article 493 of
the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda
D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid
corresponding to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with
legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per
annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding the
3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably
with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares equivalent to ₱ 5,000.0021 each
or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.

On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2
years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

65
 G.R. No. 160556 August 3, 2007 representation that it would be used as security for a business loan; and that agreeing to accommodate Pacita,
Angelica and Alegria signed a document which Pacita prepared which turned out to be the deed of absolute sale in
Pacita’s favor.
TEOFILO BAUTISTA, represented by FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, Attorney-in-Fact, Petitioner,
vs.
ALEGRIA BAUTISTA, ANGELICA BAUTISTA, PRISCILLA BAUTISTA, GILBERT BAUTISTA, JIM BAUTISTA, In their Answer with Counterclaim,10 Pedro and Cesar Tamondong claimed that they were buyers in good faith. 11 In any
GLENDA BAUTISTA, GUEN BAUTISTA, GELACIO BAUTISTA, GRACIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO S. TANDOC and event, they contended that prescription had set in, and that the complaint was a mere rehash of a previous complaint
CESAR TAMONDONG, Respondents. for falsification of public document which had been dismissed by the prosecutor’s office.12

DECISION By Decision13 of June 24, 1999, Branch 57 of the RTC of San Carlos City rendered judgment in favor of Teofilo,
disposing as follows:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
During her lifetime, Teodora Rosario was the owner of a 211.80-square meter parcel of land (the property) in
Poblacion, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12951. She died intestate 1) Declaring as null and void and of no force and effect the following documents:
on January 19, 1970, leaving behind her spouse Isidro Bautista (Isidro) and five children, namely: Teofilo Bautista
(Teofilo), Alegria Bautista (Alegria), Angelica Bautista (Angelica), Pacita Bautista (Pacita) and Gil Bautista (Gil).
a) Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated April 21, 1981;

On April 21, 1981, Isidro and four of his five children – Pacita, Gil, Alegria, and Angelica – executed a Deed of Extra-
b) Deed of Absolute Sale [d]ated May 14, 1981;
Judicial Partition1 of the property in which Isidro waived his share in favor of his said four children. Teofilo was
excluded from the partition.
c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18777;
Alegria and Angelica, who, under the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, acquired ½ of the property, sold the same, by
Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981, to their sibling Pacita and her common-law husband Pedro Tandoc d) Tax Declaration Nos. 59941, 45999, and 46006;
(Pedro).2
e) Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 13, 1993;
Pacita and Pedro soon obtained tax declarations3 and TCT No. 187774 in their names over 209.85 square meters of
the property including the shares they purchased from Angelica and Alegria.
2) Ordering the partition of the land in question among the compulsory heirs of the late Spouses Isidro
Bautista and Teodora Rosario
Pacita, with Pedro’s conformity, later conveyed via Deed of Absolute Sale 5 dated April 13, 1993 ½ of the property in
favor of Cesar Tamondong, Pedro’s nephew.
3) Ordering defendants Cesar Tamondong and Pedro Tandoc to vacate the premises.

On January 24, 1994, herein petitioner Teofilo, represented by his attorney-in-fact Francisco Muñoz, filed a
Complaint6 against his siblings Alegria and Angelica, along with Pedro (the common-law husband of his already
deceased sister Pacita), Priscilla Bautista (wife of his already deceased brother Gil), Pricilla’s children Gilbert, Jim,
Glenda, Guen, and Gelacio and Cesar Tamondong before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, for
annulment of documents, partition, recovery of ownership, possession and damages.
In his complaint, petitioner claimed that his co-heirs defrauded him of his rightful share of the property and that the
deed of sale executed by Pacita in favor of Cesar Tamondong was fictitious as it was impossible for her to have
executed the same in Manila, she being already seriously ill at the time. 7
In their Answer,8 the defendants-herein respondents sisters Alegria and Angelica, who were joined therein by their co-
defendants-respondents Priscilla, Gilbert, Jim, Glenda, Guen, Gelacio, and Gracia, claimed that it was Pacita who
caused the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and because they trusted Pacita, they signed the
document without scrutinizing it; and that they learned about the contents of the partition only upon Teofilo’s filing of
the Complaint.
By way of cross-claim9 against Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the answering defendants-respondents claimed that a
few weeks after the partition, Pacita approached Angelica and Alegria to borrow their share in the property on her
No pronouncement[s] as to cost.14 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by Pedro and Cesar Tamondong, the Court of Appeals, by Decision15 of February 21, 2003, reversed and
set aside the trial court’s decision and dismissed Teofilo’s complaint on the ground of prescription. 16 His Motion for
Reconsideration17 having been denied,18 Teofilo filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.19
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that prescription had set in, reasoned:
Unquestionably, the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is invalid insofar as it affects the legitimate share pertaining to the
defendant-appellee in the property in question.1avvphi1 There can be no question that the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition was fraudulently obtained. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted.
Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four years from the discovery of
the fraud. Significantly, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction
may be known actually or constructively.

66
In the present case, defendant-appellee is deemed to have been constructively notified of the extra-judicial settlement
by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot on December 21, 1981. From
the time of its registration, defendant-appellee had four (4) years or until 21 December 1985, within which to file his
objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. Unfortunately, defendant-appellee failed to institute
the present civil action within said period, having filed the same only on 17 January 1994 or more than twelve (12)
years from the registration of the deed of extra-judicial partition. Hence, defendant-appellee’s right to question the deed
of extra-judicial partition has prescribed.

Even on the extreme assumption that defendant-appellee’s complaint in Civil Case No. SC-1797 is an action for
reconveyance of a portion of the property which rightfully belongs to him based upon an implied trust resulting from
fraud, said remedy is already barred by prescription. An action of reconveyance of land based upon an implied or
constructive trust prescribes after ten years from the registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title.

xxxx

The complaint of defendant-appellee was filed only on 17 January 1994, while the deed of extra-judicial partition was
registered and inscribed on Transfer Certificate of Title 12951, on 21 December 1981. Clearly, the complaint was filed
twelve (12) years and twenty-seven (27) days after the inscription of the deed of extra-judicial partition on TCT 12951.
Hence, even if We consider defendant-appellee’s complaint as an action for reconveyance against plaintiff-appellants
on the basis of implied trust, we find and so hold that his remedy for reconveyance has also
prescribed.20 (Underscoring supplied)

As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for
annulment on the ground of fraud and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.

The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilo’s co-heirs was invalid, however. So Segura v. Segura21 instructs:

x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years x x x22 (Underscoring supplied)

The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe. 23

Since the deed of extra-judicial partition is invalid, it transmitted no rights to Teofilo’s co-heirs.24 Consequently, the
subsequent transfer by Angelica and Alegria of ½ of the property to Pacita and her husband Pedro, as well as the
transfer of ½ of the property to Cesar Tamondong is invalid, hence, conferring no rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the court a quo is SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Branch 57 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

67
 G.R. No. 161237 January 14, 2009 The investigation disclosed that the petitioners falsified a document entitled “Extra-judicial Settlement with
Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) dated December 3, 1967” 12 (hereinafter referred to as
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale) so that the respondents were deprived of their shares in Lot No. 4144.
PERFECTO MACABABBAD, Jr.,* deceased, substituted by his heirs Sophia Macababbad,
The document purportedly bore the respondents’ signatures, making them appear to have participated in the execution
Glenn M. Macababbad, Perfecto Vener M. Macababbad III and Mary Grace Macababbad,
of the document when they did not; they did not even know the petitioners. The document ostensibly conveyed the
and SPS. CHUA SENG LIN AND SAY UN AY, petitioners
subject property to Macababbad for the sum of P1,800.00. 13 Subsequently, OCT No. 1946 was cancelled and Lot No.
vs.
4144 was registered in the names of its new owners under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13408, 14 presumably
FERNANDO G. MASIRAG, FAUSTINA G. MASIRAG, CORAZON G. MASIRAG,
after the death of Pedro and Pantaleona. However, despite the supposed sale to Macababbad, his name did not
LEONOR G. MASIRAG, and LEONCIO M. GOYAGOY, respondent
appear on the face of TCT No. 13408.15 Despite his exclusion from TCT No. 13408, his “Petition for another owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 13408,” filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, was granted on July 27, 1982. 16
FRANCISCA MASIRAG BACCAY, PURA MASIRAG FERRER-MELAD, AND SANTIAGO MASIRAG, Intervenors-
Respondents.
Subsequently, Macababbad registered portions of Lot No. 4144 in his name and sold other portions to third parties. 17

DECISION
On May 18, 1972, Chua filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-13408 and the issuance of a title evidencing
his ownership over a subdivided portion of Lot No. 4144 covering 803.50 square meters. On May 23, 1972, TCT No. T-
BRION, J.: 18403 was issued in his name.18

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Perfecto Macababbad, Jr.1 (Macababbad) and the spouses
Chua Seng Lin (Chua) and Say Un Ay (Say) (collectively called the petitioners), praying that we nullify the Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration that followed. The assailed
decision reversed the dismissal Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan,
remanding the case for further trial.
Based on these allegations, the respondents asked: (1) that the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale be declared
null and void ab initio and without force and effect, and that Chua be ordered and directed to execute the necessary
deed of reconveyance of the land; if they refuse, that the Clerk of Court be required to do so; (2) the issuance of a new
TCT in respondents’ name and the cancellation of Macababbad’s and Chua’s certificates of title; and (3) that the
petitioners be ordered to pay damages and attorney’s fees.

BACKGROUND
On April 28, 1999, respondents Fernando Masirag (Fernando), Faustina Masirag (Faustina), Corazon Masirag
(Corazon), Leonor Masirag (Leonor) and Leoncio Masirag Goyagoy (Leoncio) (collectively called the respondents),
filed with the RTC a complaint5 against Macababbad, Chua and Say.6 On May 10, 1999, they amended their complaint
to allege new matters.7 The respondents alleged that their complaint is an action for:
Macababbad filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July 14, 1999, while Chua and Say filed an
“Appearance with Motion to Dismiss” on September 28, 1999.
On December 14, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of Francisca Masirag Baccay, Pura Masirag Ferrer-Melad, and
Santiago Masirag for leave to intervene and to admit their complaint-in-intervention. The motion alleged that they have
common inheritance rights with the respondents over the disputed property.

quieting of title, nullity of titles, reconveyance, damages and attorney’s fees 8 against the defendants [petitioners here] x THE RTC RULING
x x who cabal themselves in mala fides of badges of fraud dishonesty, deceit, misrepresentations, bad faith, under the
guise of purported instrument, nomenclature “EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITH SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF
The RTC, after initially denying the motion to dismiss, reconsidered its ruling and dismissed the complaint in its
PORTION OF REGISTERED LAND (Lot 4144)”, dated December 3, 1967, a falsification defined and penalized under
Order19 dated May 29, 2000 on the grounds that: 1) the action, which was filed 32 years after the property was
Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, by “causing it to appear that persons (the plaintiffs herein [the
partitioned and after a portion was sold to Macababbad, had already prescribed; and 2) there was failure to implead
respondents in this case]) have participated in any act or proceeding when they (the plaintiffs herein [the respondents
indispensable parties, namely, the other heirs of Pedro and Pantaleona and the persons who have already acquired
in this case]) did not in fact so participate” in the “EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT WITH SIMULTANEOUS SALE OF
title to portions of the subject property in good faith.20
PORTION OF REGISTERED LAND (Lot 4144” – covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1946) [sic].9

The respondents appealed the RTC’s order dated May 29, 2000 to the CA on the following grounds:
The amended complaint essentially alleged the following:10

I
The deceased spouses Pedro Masirag (Pedro) and Pantaleona Tulauan (Pantaleona) were the original registered
owners of Lot No. 4144 of the Cadastral Survey of Tuguegarao (Lot No. 4144), as evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 1946.11 Lot No. 4144 contained an area of 6,423 square meters. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE

Pedro and Pantaleona had eight (8) children, namely, Valeriano, Domingo, Pablo, Victoria, Vicenta, Inicio, Maxima and II
Maria. Respondents Fernando, Faustina, Corazon and Leonor Masirag are the children of Valeriano and Alfora
Goyagoy, while Leoncio is the son of Vicenta and Braulio Goyagoy. The respondents allegedly did not know of the
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE NATURE OF APPELLANTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION AS THAT
demise of their respective parents; they only learned of the inheritance due from their parents in the first week of March
DESIGNATED IN THE COMPLAINT’S TITLE AND NOT IN (SIC) THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT 21
1999 when their relative, Pilar Quinto, informed respondent Fernando and his wife Barbara Balisi about it. They
immediately hired a lawyer to investigate the matter.
68
The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal primarily on the ground that the errors the respondents raised involved
pure questions of law that should be brought before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The respondents insisted that their appeal involved mixed questions of fact and law and
thus fell within the purview of the CA’s appellate jurisdiction.
THE CA DECISION22
The CA ignored23 the jurisdictional issue raised by the petitioners in their motion to dismiss, took cognizance of the
appeal, and focused on the following issues: 1) whether the complaint stated a cause of action; and 2) whether the
cause of action had been waived, abandoned or extinguished.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTC’s dismissal of the complaint. On the first issue, it ruled that the
complaint “carve(d) out a sufficient and adequate cause of action xxx. One can read through the verbosity of the
initiatory pleading to discern that a fraud was committed by the defendants on certain heirs of the original owners of the
property and that, as a result, the plaintiffs were deprived of interests that should have gone to them as successors-in-
interest of these parties. A positive deception has been alleged to violate legal rights. This is the ultimate essential fact
that remains after all the clutter is removed from the pleading. Directed against the defendants, there is enough to
support a definitive adjudication.”24
On the second issue, the CA applied the Civil Code provision on implied trust, i.e., that a person who acquires a piece
of property through fraud is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property came. Reconciling this legal provision with Article 1409 (which defines void contracts) and Article 1410 (which
provides that an action to declare a contract null and void is imprescriptible), the CA ruled that the respondents’ cause
of action had not prescribed, because “in assailing the extrajudicial partition as void, the [respondents] have the right to
bring the action unfettered by a prescriptive period.”25
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
The Third Division of this Court initially denied26 the petition for review on certiorari for the petitioners’ failure to show
any reversible error committed by the CA. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition. In their motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners clarified the grounds for their petition, as follows:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PASS UPON AND RULE ON THE
APPEAL TAKEN BY THE RESPONDENTS IN CA-GR CV NO. 68541.27
In the alternative, ex abundanti cautela, the petitioners alleged other reversible errors summarized as follows: 28
 The RTC dismissal on the ground that indispensable parties were not impleaded has already become final
and executory because the CA did not pass upon this ground;29
 The respondents' argument that there was no failure to implead indispensable parties since the other heirs of
Pedro and Pantaleona who were not impleaded were not indispensable parties in light of the respondents'
admission that the extra-judicial settlement is valid with respect to the other heirs who sold their shares to
Perfecto Macababbad is erroneous because innocent purchasers for value of portions of Lot 4144 who are
also indispensable parties were not impleaded; 30
 The CA erred in reconciling Civil Code provisions Article 1456 and Article 1410, in relation to Article 1409;31
 The CA erred in saying that the Extra-judicial Partition was an inexistent and void contract because it could
not be said that none of the heirs intended to be bound by the contract. 32
The respondents argued in their Comment that:33
 The appeal was brought on mixed questions of fact and law involving prescription, laches and indispensable
parties;
 The non-inclusion of indispensable parties is not a ground to dismiss the claim
 The respondents’ action is not for reconveyance. Rather, it is an action to declare the sale of their respective
shares null and void;
 An action for the nullity of an instrument prescribes in four (4) years from discovery of the fraud. Discovery
was made in 1999, while the complaint was also lodged in 1999. Hence, the action had not yet been barred
by prescription;
 Laches had not set in because the action was immediately filed after discovery of the fraud.
OUR RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Questions of Fact v. Questions of Law
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.34 A question of law may be resolved by the
court without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.35 No examination of the probative value of the evidence would be
necessary to resolve a question of law.36 The opposite is true with respect to questions of fact, which necessitate a
calibration of the evidence.37
The nature of the issues to be raised on appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of appeal filed in the trial
court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court. 38 In their Notice of Appeal, the respondents manifested
their intention to appeal the assailed RTC order on legal grounds and “on the basis of the environmental
facts.”39 Further, in their Brief, the petitioners argued that the RTC erred in ruling that their cause of action had
prescribed and that they had “slept on their rights.”40 All these indicate that questions of facts were involved, or were at
least raised, in the respondents’ appeal with the CA.
In Crisostomo v. Garcia,41 this Court ruled that prescription may either be a question of law or fact; it is a question of
fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of an allegation of fact; it is a question of law when
there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a given state of facts. The test of whether a question is one of law
or fact is not the appellation given to the question by the party raising the issue; the test is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Prescription, evidently, is a question of
fact where there is a need to determine the veracity of factual matters such as the date when the period to bring the
action commenced to run.42
Ingjug-Tiro v. Casals,43 instructively tells us too that a summary or outright dismissal of an action is not proper where
there are factual matters in dispute which require presentation and appreciation of evidence. In this cited case whose
fact situation is similar to the present case, albeit with a very slight and minor variation, we considered the improvident
dismissal of a complaint based on prescription and laches to be improper because the following must still be proven by
the complaining parties:
first, that they were the co-heirs and co-owners of the inherited property; second, that their co-heirs-co-owners sold
their hereditary rights thereto without their knowledge and consent; third, that forgery, fraud and deceit were committed
in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Confirmation of Sale since Francisco Ingjug who allegedly
executed the deed in 1967 actually died in 1963, hence, the thumbprint found in the document could not be
his; fourth, that Eufemio Ingjug who signed the deed of sale is not the son of Mamerto Ingjug, and, therefore, not an
heir entitled to participate in the disposition of the inheritance; fifth, that respondents have not paid the taxes since the
execution of the sale in 1965 until the present date and the land in question is still declared for taxation purposes in the
69
name of Mamerto Ingjug, the original registered owner, as of 1998; sixth, that respondents had not taken possession of
the land subject of the complaint nor introduced any improvement thereon; and seventh, that respondents are not
innocent purchasers for value.
As in Ingjug-Tiro, the present case involves factual issues that require trial on the merits. This situation rules out a
summary dismissal of the complaint.
Proper Mode of Appeal
Since the appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on the respondents for invoking the
appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal. Rule 41, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
In Murillo v. Consul,44 this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction, covered by Rule 41; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered
by the RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, covered by Rule 42; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
Prescription
A ruling on prescription necessarily requires an analysis of the plaintiff’s cause of action based on the allegations of the
complaint and the documents attached as its integral parts. A motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically
admits the allegations relevant and material to the resolution of this issue, but not the other facts of the case. 45
Unfortunately, both the respondents’ complaint and amended complaint are poorly worded, verbose, and prone to
misunderstanding. In addition, therefore, to the complaint, we deem it appropriate to consider the clarifications made in
their appeal brief by the petitioners relating to the intent of their complaint. We deem this step appropriate since there
were no matters raised for the first time on appeal and their restatement was aptly supported by the allegations of the
RTC complaint. The respondents argue in their Appellant’s Brief that:
x x x Although reconveyance was mentioned in the title, reconveyance of which connotes that there was a mistake in
titling the land in question in the name of the registered owner indicated therein, but in the allegations in the body of the
allegations in the body of the instant complaint, it clearly appears that the nature of the cause of action of appellants,
[sic] they wanted to get back their respective shares in the subject inheritance because they did not sell said shares to
appellee Perfecto Macababbad as the signatures purported to be theirs which appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement
with Simultaneous Sale of Portion of Registered Land (Lot 4144) were forged.
As appellants represented 2 of the 8 children of the deceased original owners of the land in question who were Pedro
Masirag and Pantaleona Talauan, the sale is perfectly valid with respect to the other 6 children, and void ab initio with
respect to the appellants.46
The respondents likewise argue that their action is one for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and
sale bearing their forged signatures. They contend that their action had not yet prescribed because an action to declare
an instrument null and void is imprescriptible. In their Comment to the petition for review, however, the respondents
modified their position and argued that the sale to the petitioners pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of estate and
sale was void because it was carried out through fraud; thus, the appropriate prescription period is four (4) years from
the discovery of fraud. Under this argument, respondents posit that their cause of action had not yet prescribed
because they only learned of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale in March 1999; they filed their complaint
the following month.
The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the relevant prescriptive period here is ten (10) years from the date of
the registration of title, this being an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust.
We believe and so hold that the respondents’ amended complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause to declare the nullity of
the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, as they claimed in their amended complaint. Without prejudging the
issue of the merits of the respondents’ claim and on the assumption that the petitioners already hypothetically admitted
the allegations of the complaint when they filed a motion to dismiss based on prescription, the transfer may be null and
void if indeed it is established that respondents had not given their consent and that the deed is a forgery or is
absolutely fictitious. As the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale has been raised and is the primary
issue, the action to secure this result will not prescribe pursuant to Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
Based on this conclusion, the necessary question that next arises is: What then is the effect of the issuance of TCTs in
the name of petitioners? In other words, does the issuance of the certificates of titles convert the action to one of
reconveyance of titled land which, under settled jurisprudence, prescribes in ten (10) years?
Precedents say it does not; the action remains imprescriptible, the issuance of the certificates of titles
notwithstanding. Ingjug-Tiro is again instructive on this point:
Article 1458 of the New Civil Code provides: "By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself
of transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or
its equivalent." It is essential that the vendors be the owners of the property sold otherwise they cannot dispose that
which does not belong to them. As the Romans put it: "Nemo dat quod non habet." No one can give more than what he
has. The sale of the realty to respondents is null and void insofar as it prejudiced petitioners' interests and participation
therein. At best, only the ownership of the shares of Luisa, Maria and Guillerma in the disputed property could have
been transferred to respondents.
Consequently, respondents could not have acquired ownership over the land to the extent of the shares of
petitioners. The issuance of a certificate of title in their favor could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property;
neither could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the
evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Being
null and void, the sale to respondents of the petitioners' shares produced no legal effects whatsoever.
Similarly, the claim that Francisco Ingjug died in 1963 but appeared to be a party to the Extrajudicial Settlement and
Confirmation of Sale executed in 1967 would be fatal to the validity of the contract, if proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated
otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and party
capable of being contracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its
execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and therefore null and void by reason of its having been
made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person
terminates contractual capacity.
70
In actions for reconveyance of the property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and
void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. "The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe." Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine
in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as
"justice outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas
nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil; Code conferring imprescriptibility to
actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should preempt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and
petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time. 47
We have a similar ruling in Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban.48
The respondents’ action is therefore imprescriptible and the CA committed no reversible error in so ruling.
Laches
Dismissal based on laches cannot also apply in this case, as it has never reached the presentation of evidence stage
and what the RTC had for its consideration were merely the parties’ pleadings. Laches is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. 49 Without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid
ground to dismiss the respondents’ complaint.
party is indispensable if his interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined
with the other parties’ interest.55
In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of the property sought to be recovered are indispensable parties. Thus, if
reconveyance were the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say
would suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the action is for the declaration of the nullity of extrajudicial
settlement of estate and sale, all of the parties who executed the same should be impleaded for a complete resolution
of the case. This case, however, is not without its twist on the issue of impleading indispensable parties as the RTC
never issued an order directing their inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court, there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal of the action.
In relation with this conclusion, we see no merit too in the petitioners’ argument that the RTC ruling dismissing the
complaint on respondents’ failure to implead indispensable parties had become final and executory for the CA’s failure
to rule on the issue. This argument lacks legal basis as nothing in the Rules of Court states that the failure of an
appellate court to rule on an issue raised in an appeal renders the appealed order or judgment final and executory with
respect to the undiscussed issue. A court need not rule on each and every issue raised, 56 particularly if the issue will
not vary the tenor of the Court’s ultimate ruling. In the present case, the CA ruling that overshadows all the issues
raised is what is stated in the dispositive portion of its decision, i.e., “the order of the lower court dismissing the case is
SET ASIDE and the case is remanded for further proceeding.”
In sum, the CA correctly reversed the RTC dismissal of the respondents’ complaint.

Non-joinder of Indispensable parties is not a

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of merit.
Ground for a Motion to Dismiss

SO ORDERED.
The RTC dismissed the respondents’ amended complaint because indispensable parties were not impleaded. The
respondents argue that since the extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale was valid with respect to the other heirs
who executed it, those heirs are not indispensable parties in this case. Innocent purchasers for value to whom title has
passed from Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say are likewise not indispensable parties since the titles sought
to be recovered here are still under the name of the petitioners

We also find the RTC dismissal Order on this ground erroneous.

Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action, thus:

Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded
with separately.

In Domingo v. Scheer,50 this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable
party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of
the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties.
If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.51 Only upon
unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. 52

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties in interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action.53 They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy
that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence.54 A
71