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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1580, MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

2005-03-17 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
05TELAVIV1580 SECRET
10:10 18:06 Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full

text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580
SIPDIS
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/03/05TELAVIV1580.html (16 of 19)12/5/2010 7:32:23 PM

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EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2010

TAGS PGOV, PREL, KWBG, IR, IS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN
FIGHTERS BEGINNING TO LEAVE IRAQ
Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4

(b) an d (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told CODEL Corzine March
13 that Israeli and U.S. thinking on Iran largely tracks, adding
that he believes the EU dialogue with Iran will ultimately fail.
Dagan said that Israel has evidence that some foreign fighters
have returned home from Iraq, perhaps indicating that the tide
may be starting to turn in the U.S. battle against the insurgency
there. He worried however, that these militants’ countries of
origin -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan --
are ill-equipped to control the returning jihadis, who might then
pose a threat to stability in the region and, ultimately, to
Israel. End Summary.
----
Iran
----
¶2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff member

Evan Gottesman, the Ambassador, Pol/Res and Poloff (notetaker),
met with Mossad Chief Meir Dagan March 13. Acknowledging that
there are at times differences in analysis of the facts, Dagan
stressed that it is similarities rather than differences that are
at the heart of the GOI-U.S. intelligence relationship,
particularly on Iran. The facts themselves are not in dispute,
Dagan continued, adding that the U.S. and Israeli assessments of
Iran’s intentions and plans are largely in accord. Iran has
decided to go nuclear, Dagan said, and nothing will stop it.
Dagan predicted that the EU dialogue with Iran will not succeed
and that the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions would eventually
go to the UN
Security Council.
-------------------------------------
Iraq - Foreign Fighters Heading Home?
-------------------------------------
¶3. (S) In response to the Senator’s question, Dagan said that

the tide may be starting to turn in Iraq with regard to foreign
militant activity. Dagan said Israel has evidence that foreign
fighters originating from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria and Yemen
have arrived back in their home countries, and he assumes that
some had returned to Saudi Arabia as well. Dagan predicted that,
as with men who fought in Afghanistan during the 80’s and 90’s,
these returning militants would stay in touch with each other,
forming a network based on their common experiences in Iraq.

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¶4. (S) Stressing that Israel has no assets in Iraq other than a
friendly relationship with the Kurds, Dagan said that Israel’s
interest is more in the impact the jihadis from, for example,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have once they return to their
countries of origin. Although he predicts Egypt and Jordan will
“do all right,” Dagan said he is less confident that governments
in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan are sufficiently well-
equipped to face down the domestic challenge these returning
militants will pose. The combination of their military training
and the absence of strong governments willing and able to
confront these men could have a devastating impact on Israel by
causing chaos in their home countries, he added. Dagan predicted
that these jihadis will have less of a direct impact on
Palestinians, because Palestinians are already well aware of
militant views and opinions via Internet chat rooms. Furthermore,
Dagan said he feels that most Palestinians are not searching for
“foreign flags,” such as al-Qaeda, under which to rally, because
those inclined to do so are already being well-mobilized under
existing groups in the West Bank and Gaza.
-------
Lebanon
-------
¶5. (C) Dagan opined that Hizballah will never make the
transition to a purely political party in Lebanon, since the
organization remains very dependent on its jihadi orientation.
Noting that even the recent Hizaballah-sponsored march in Beirut
has not deterred the Lebanese from pressing for a full Syrian
withdrawal, Dagan advised the U.S. to remain firm in its demand
for a complete pullout, and attributed the willingness of the
Lebanese people to rise up to U.S. action in Iraq.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
Essential to Use All Assets in the Fight Against Terrorism
--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of

intelligence assets, rather than relying exclusively on human
intelligence or signal intercepts, to counter terrorist threats.
Terrorist organizations have been seeking to obtain WMD as a
matter of course and, unlike countries that wish to acquire these
weapons as a deterrent, non-state actors would be more inclined
to actually use them, in Dagan’s opinion. Asked about the
relationship between illicit activities such as narcotic or arms
trafficking and terrorism, Dagan confirmed that terrorist
organizations try to fund their activities by criminal means,
adding that credit card fraud and counterfeiting are also methods
favored by these groups. Weapons originating from Yemen and Sudan
are smuggled into the territories through Egypt for sale, as well
as for use by militants, Dagan said.

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¶7. (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear this
message.
*********************************************
******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department’s
Classified SIPRNET website.
*********************************************
******************** KURTZER

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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1593, C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE




Discussing cables

2005-03-17 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
14:02 18:06 Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full

text of the original cable is not available.
SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015

TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP EU IR IS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and

(D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to

its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the "point of
no return" for Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The GOI
believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as
sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the
EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement.
The Israelis support a unified international front but are
concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position.
Despite the GOI's focus on the diplomatic track, public and
private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes
continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is
aware of significant differences from its successful strike
against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including an
uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition
forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to
retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed
strategic environment. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
The Iranian Threat, "Point of No Return," and Timelines
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran "the main threat to Israel" and
has recently expressed concern that some states are "getting
used to" the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other
senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran's
nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan
calls an "existential threat" that alters the strategic
balance in the region.
¶3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,

Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the
enrichment cycle as the "point of no return" for the Iranian
program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad
Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian
program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires
outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At
the technical level, the director for external affairs at the
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the
critical step would be Iran's operation of a centrifuge
enrichment cascade.

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¶4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when
they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In
February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there
is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window
of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned
that Iran is "less than one year away," while the head of
research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would
reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the
IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability
within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A
few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates
need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA's
strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from
1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998
at the latest.
--------------------------------------------
Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3
--------------------------------------------
¶5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining

diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and
EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC
sanctions, e.g. on Iran's airlines and trade, as noted below.
President Katsav has said that Tehran is "very conscious of
international opinion." Other MFA and NSC officials point to
the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos
case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect
decision-making in Tehran.
¶6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3

efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon
told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to
"play for time." In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and
military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are
"too soft." Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that
Iran will "cheat" on any commitments it makes. MFA staff
told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort
will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or
that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against
Iran.
¶7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the
Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would
like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities
covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each
step. Second, they want more robust verification measures
and greater focus on Iran's denial of access to IAEA
inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final
agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that
noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level.
Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that

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would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the

concrete consequences of such failure.
¶8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans
to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but
noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on
March 10 that "it would probably not be advisable to impose
an oil embargo on Iran," PM Sharon advocated trade and flight
restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps
could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe,
limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and
suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within
the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign
affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S.
for a "complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle
program." In the short term, this means a full suspension of
all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor
construction, and related R&D activities.
--------------------------------------------- --
Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement
--------------------------------------------- --
¶9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the

Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by
the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its
efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to
take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December
12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with
the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including
sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to "wait
for the Europeans."
¶10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the
extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic
front. The IAEC's director for non-proliferation admitted
that the GOI sees "little we can do" to increase pressure on
Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement.
The MFA's office director for the Gulf states said that
Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities,
such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material
related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes
that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a
surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on
Israel's own nuclear activities.
¶11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the

President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked
if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA
for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is
probably necessary to build international consensus for
taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed

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concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called

the EU's habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full
compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also
disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is
re-examining its position on Hizballah.
------------------------------------------
The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak
------------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli

officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible
military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the
importance of the "political and economic" track. During a
recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy
Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz
similarly said "we don't want to go there." In February,
President Katsav told the Secretary that "the military option
is not necessary -- bring the issue to the Security Council."
¶13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes

usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air
Force's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. In private,
GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would
make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission.
A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that
the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located
and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the
Iranian program. The MFA's office director for the Gulf
states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed
throughout the country, with several located in built-up
civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian
assistance in restraining Iran's nuclear ambitions and said
that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian
casualties and endanger Moscow's cooperation.
¶14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets
and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise
additional complications. An Israeli assault would
necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq,
they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation
throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and
NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit
a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians,
effectively freezing the peace process.
¶15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military
strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and
the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran's
ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by
its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that
Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of

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reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA's

office director for the Gulf states said that she believed
that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in
Israel and the Occupied Territories.
¶16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also
creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis
felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi
threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian
problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, "I do
not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an
Israeli problem -- it is a matter of concern for the whole
world."
--------------------------------------------- --
Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but ...
--------------------------------------------- --
¶17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic

channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real
concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against
the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown
time and again that it will act militarily if it believes
that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most
certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli
press reported that in February PM Sharon's Security Cabinet
had given "initial authorization" for an attack on Iran. The
press reports cited an unnamed "Israeli security source," who
claimed that the USG would "authorize" an Israeli attack.
Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations
for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose
nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force
activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme
sensitivity of the issue and the GOI's near inability to
prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held,
probably even from many members of PM Sharon's Cabinet.
¶18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its
interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at
the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3
effort is on track and backed by a solid international front.
We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position
may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should
recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will
understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not
match current USG assessments.
*********************************************
********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:

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You can also access this site through the State Department's
*********************************************
********************
KURTZER

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15




Discussing cables

2007-01-08 2010-11-28
07TELAVIV64 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv
16:04 18:06
VZCZCXRO2156
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0064/01 0081638
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081638Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8615
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IS KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders

have intensified since your last visit and have reached the
point that there appears to be little coordination or even
dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will
need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one
faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part
of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption
allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing
sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy
and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks.
Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent
in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the
political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public
confidence in the country's leadership at a time when
Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face
the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.
OPTIMISM ERODING
----------------
¶2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis.
The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed
December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated
under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan
Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket
attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on
both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack
of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the
unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak
summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid
in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were
killed.
¶3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the

IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of
Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of

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coordination between Israel's military and its civilian

leadership. When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing
with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is
military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall
meet! Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a
peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab
willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding,
and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will
need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the
streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of
the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war
hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert,
Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff
Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that
they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for
serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has
refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the
results of several separate investigations involving
corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage
him severely, if not force his resignation.
¶4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift

of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report
has been allayed by statements by you and the President,
there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the
Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to
come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public
support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with
interest the President's upcoming articulation of the
revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that
Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American
minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for
whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating
situation in Iraq.
¶5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great

anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the
political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats
to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in
his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a
nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically
by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to
Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of
Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views
about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of
the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to
state that military action must be a last resort and are
taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including
but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to
abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however,
srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a
military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the

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only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful
TEL AVIV 00000064 002 OF 003
Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran

did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland,
the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would
completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in
ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a
democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That
concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those
who say they do not want their children and grandchildren
growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.
LIVNI RISING
------------
¶6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued

refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on
polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the
Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late
December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime
ministership if he continued not to give her his full
backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of
her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with
the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with
the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve
as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad
takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances
himself from Iran. Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to
us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with
Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni
told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final
status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and
therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that
it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that
Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated.
She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern
that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point.
Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has
little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is
she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert).
Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more
serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are
released next month.
SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA

-----------------------
¶7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria
would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the

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international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in

Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to
dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue
to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria
reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps
to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and
Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by
Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian
intentions. A significant part of the security
establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion
that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions --
possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to
seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that
view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and
the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to
refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often
comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized
decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led
to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated
that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that
he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a
timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of
U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to
clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and
capabilities vis a vis Hamas.
PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS
----------------------
¶8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party

leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely
disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz' telephone
conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two
reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news
reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided
to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced
plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in
late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister's Office
almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt
here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of
the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as
Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz'
popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor
TEL AVIV 00000064 003 OF 003
members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they

saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to
intervene in their party's leadership contest. In any event,
the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree

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of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of

the GOI.
PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS

--------------------------------
¶9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is

some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward
improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite
his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious
partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement
and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push
by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce
barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the
Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh,
who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged
as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz'
conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the
Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but
Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military
governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit,
and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an
intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat
commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely
lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to
express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to
encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant
elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can
achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it
will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in
the coming year.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
JONES

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV1114, CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION

LEADER



Discussing cables

2007-04-18 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
07TELAVIV1114 CONFIDENTIAL
06:06 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO8870
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1114/01 1080655
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180655Z APR 07

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001114
SIPDIS
CODEL
SIPDIS
H PLEASE PASS TO REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP EFIN IR KPAL IS
SUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH OPPOSITION LEADER
BINYAMIN NETANYAHU: ECONOMIC SQUEEZE ON IRAN AND HAMAS;
SCENARIOS FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT; RIGHT OF RETURN AS ACID
TEST OF ARAB INTENTIONS
REF: TEL AVIV 1086
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Representative Gary Ackerman (D, New York),

Chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of
the House International Relations Committee, accompanied by
the Ambassador, met with Opposition Leader Binyamin Netanyahu
at the Knesset April 11. The discussion covered Netanyahu's
ideas on how to pressure Iran in order to block its nuclear
program and topple President Ahmadinejad; Netanyahu's views
on dealing with the Palestinians; his critique of Prime
Minister Olmert's handling of the Second Lebanon War; and
Netanyahu's analysis of Israel's domestic political
situation. On Iran, Netanyahu advocated intensified financial
pressures, including a U.S.-led divestment effort focused
largely on European companies that invest in Iran, as the
best way to topple Ahmadinejad. On the Palestinians,
Netanyahu did not object to supporting President Abbas but
said Israel and the U.S. should first focus more on
"strangling" Hamas. Netanyahu asserted that Israel's
mishandling of the Lebanon war had strengthened Israel's
enemies. He predicted that Olmert would not be able to stay
in power much longer, then described several different
mechanisms for forming a new government. Netanyahu expressed
confidence that the Israeli public recognized that he had
been right, that unilateral withdrawals were a mistake, and
that the priority now must be stopping Iran. Netanyahu noted
that he thought dropping the "right of return" was the acid
test of Arab intentions and insisted that he would never
allow a single Palestinian refugee to return to Israel. End
Summary.

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¶2. (U) House Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee

Chairman Gary Ackerman, accompanied by the Ambassador, Pol
Couns, Subcommittee Staff Director David Adams, and Staff
member Howard Diamond called on Opposition and Likud Party
Leader Binyamin Netanyahu at the Knesset April 11. Netanyahu
was joined by foreign policy adviser Dore Gold and MFA North
American Department Congressional liaison Eyal Sela.
Toppling Ahmadinejad
--------------------
¶3. (C) Representative Ackerman told Netanyahu that in his

meeting the day before with Egyptian President Mubarak, he
had asked Mubarak if military action were necessary to
prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, should the
strike be carried out by the U.S. or Israel? Mubarak had
responded that if it came to that, the U.S. should do it and
Israel should stay out. Netanyahu said he took Mubarak's
point, but commented that he thought the Iranian regime, or
at least President Ahmadinejad, could be toppled by economic
pressure, including a divestment campaign. Noting that
economic sanctions lose their effect over time, but can be
powerful in the short term. The goal should be to encourage
Ahmadinejad's political rivals to remove him from power.
Afterward, if the pressure could be maintained it might be
possible to bring down the entire Iranian regime, but that
would also entail identifying alternative leaders. The idea
was to use economic pressure to create a public sense of
regime failure. Netanyahu said he had consulted with noted
historian Bernard Lewis, who believed that Iran would be less
dangerous once Ahmadinejad was removed.
¶4. (C) Netanyahu said there were three bills in Congress
designed to divest U.S. pension funds from investing in about
300, mostly European, companies currently doing business in
Iran. Divestment would immediately bring down the credit
ratings of these companies, thus forcing them to respond.
Netanyahu urged Congress to support the divestment
legislation, adding that he also planned to use a visit to
the U.S. to raise the issue with Wall Street fund managers.
His approach was to tie in Darfur to expand the scope of
anti-genocide divestment and link it to U.S. policy goals.
Netanyahu said he was unsure that financial pressures would
be enough to stop Iran's nuclear program, but he was
confident they would succeed in bringing down Ahmadinejad.
He commended Dore Gold's efforts to put Ahmadinejad on a
genocide watch list as part of a broader effort to
delegitimize the Iranian President. Asked about the quality
of U.S. and Israeli intelligence on Iran, Netanyahu said his
nightmare was that we had missed part of the Iranian program.
He added that if the current intelligence was correct, it

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would take Iran a few more years to develop a nuclear weapon.

He agreed with Ambassador Jones' assessment that
TEL AVIV 00001114 002 OF 003
Ahmadinejad's announcement of a breakthrough in Iran's

centrifuge program was probably exaggerated. It would be
critical, Netanyahu stressed, to target companies investing
in Iran's energy sector.
Bring Down Hamas

----------------
¶5. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked Netanyahu for his views on

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Netanyahu said Abbas
was a "nice man who means well," but he added that Israel and
the U.S. should focus on "bringing down Hamas" through an
"economic squeeze." Netanyahu asserted that eight months
ago, the Hamas government had been on the brink of collapse,
but had become stronger because Israel became weaker as a
result of the Lebanon war. Without elaborating, Netanyahu
said it would be easier to weaken Hamas than to strengthen
Abbas.
¶6. (C) Netanyahu commented that Shimon Peres had admitted to

him that the Oslo process had been based on a mistaken
economic premise, and as a result European and U.S.
assistance to the Palestinians had gone to create a bloated
bureaucracy, with PA employees looking to the international
community to meet their payroll. Netanyahu predicted that
Palestinians would vote for Abbas if they believe that he can
deliver the money. He suggested putting in place an
"economic squeeze with an address," so that Hamas would
receive the popular blame. Asked if Fatah knew how to
conduct an election campaign, Netanyahu said the Palestinian
patronage system should be forced to collapse, which would
have an immediate impact since the entire Palestinian economy
was based on graft and patronage. Instead, he asserted, the
opposite was happening. Hamas was also handling the prisoner
release issue well since they had created the impression that
Hamas was in control of the process and "sticking it to the
Israelis."
¶7. (C) Congressman Ackerman asked if Abbas would survive

politically. Netanyahu said he was unsure, since politics
were stressful, especially Palestinian politics. The policy,
he added, should be to starve the NUG. If any money is
given, it should go directly to Abbas. Netanyahu said it was
not clear the GOI has a policy, there was a general climate
of weakness.

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Lebanon War Failures

--------------------
¶8. (C) Turning to the Second Lebanon War, Netanyahu said the
problem was not the war's goals but rather the disconnect
between goals and methods. If the IDF had used a flanking
move by a superior ground force, it could have won easily.
Instead, Israel "dripped troops into their gunsights," an
approach he termed "stupid." The top leadership had lacked a
sense of military maneuver. In addition, they had been
afraid to take military casualties, but instead got many
civilian casualties. If Olmert had mobilized the reserves in
ten days, seized ground, destroyed Hizballah in southern
Lebanon, and then withdrawn, he would be a hero today.
Instead, Netanyahu predicted, Olmert will not last
politically. Olmert's current public support levels of three
percent were unsustainable.
A New Government?
-----------------
¶9. (C) Netanyahu said the pressure on Olmert was

accumulating as a result of corruption investigations as well
as the impending release of the Winograd Commission's interim
report. Olmert could be pushed out as a result of a
rebellion within the Kadima Party. Kadima members are
realizing they cannot allow Olmert to stay in power, but
Kadima itself might collapse since it was a "fake party."
Netanyahu described several options, including Kadima
replacing Olmert, a new coalition formed in the Knesset, or
Netanyahu's preferred option, new elections. New elections,
he stated, are supported by sixty-five percent of the public.
Netanyahu insisted he was in no rush since he was "enjoying
the time with his family" and rebuilding the Likud Party.
Likud was reaching thousands of new supporters, including
many highly educated professionals and high tech
entrepreneurs, through the internet.
¶10. (C) Netanyahu asserted there was a growing sense in the

public that he had been right in the last election.
TEL AVIV 00001114 003 OF 003
Unilateral "retreats" (i.e. such as the withdrawals from Gaza

and southern Lebanon) were the wrong way to go. Israel had
allowed an Iranian enclave to establish itself in Gaza.
Syria was arming itself for the first time in 20 years,
Hizballah had rearmed since the war, and Gaza was being
turned into a bunker. Egypt was not doing on a twelve mile
front along the Gaza border what Jordan was doing on a
150-mile front. The way out was to stop Iran, thereby

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dealing with the octopus, not just its tentacles.
Right of Return the Acid Test

-----------------------------
¶11. (C) Netanyahu stated that a return to the 1967 borders

and dividing Jerusalem was not a solution since further
withdrawals would only whet the appetite of radical Islam.
Ackerman asked if the Palestinians would accept peace based
on the 1967 lines. Netanyahu said he would not agree to such
a withdrawal since the 1967 lines were indefensible, but he
added that the "right of return" was the real acid test of
Arab intentions. Instead of Israel making more step-by-step
concessions, Israel should insist that further concessions be
linked to reciprocal steps toward peace. The Palestinians
must drop the right of return and accept Israel's right to
exist. The Arab initiative did not meet this standard since
it keeps the right of return open. Israel will only have a
peace partner when the Palestinians drop the right of return.
Asked whether Israel could accept case by case exceptions,
Netanyahu insisted not one refugee could ever return. Israel,
after all, was not asking for the right of Jews to return to
Baghdad or Cairo.
¶12. (C) Netanyahu said UNSCR 242 was not a bad formula since
it did not specify precisely from which territories Israel
would withdraw. After the withdrawals from Gaza and Lebanon,
there was deep disillusionment among Israelis about the
principle of land for peace. Even the noted Israeli leftist
writer AB Yehoshua had said in a recent interview that he
despaired about peace because the Arabs wanted all of Israel.
From 1948 to 1967, the conflict had not been about occupied
territories, but that point had been obscured by "effective
propaganda." The root of the conflict was an Arab desire to
destroy Israel, which had now become part of the larger
ambitions of radical Islam.
¶13. (C) The 1967 borders were not the solution since Israel
was the only force blocking radical Islam's agenda of
overrunning Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Netanyahu proposed that
Israel offer to work with the Saudis against Iran. If Iran
was not stopped, there would be no agreement with the
Palestinians, and the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt
would come under tremendous pressure. There could be no
deterrence against "crazies" such as Ahmadinejad. Netanyahu
advised Congress to expedite the legislative effort for
divestment. If that did not work, we could reconsider other
options. Congressman Ackerman said that if Netanyahu came to
Washington, he would hold a hearing on divestment.
¶14. (U) CODEL Ackerman did not have the opportunity to clear
this message.

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*********************************************
********************
JONES

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2280, APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA

REGION WITH



Discussing cables

2007-07-26 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
13:01 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO3230
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2280/01 2071352
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261352Z JUL 07
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2487

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RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017

TAGS: PTER PREL KNNP KWBG EFIN IR IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/
D).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the

President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC),
met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general
discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian
nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about
the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most
other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism
regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the
Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued
for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC
resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from
Iranian influence. In Dagan's personal opinion, present
attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam
Fayyad will fail, and "an entirely new approach" with the
Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed
political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf,
and shared concerns about Pakistan's ability to withstand the
challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------
Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran
--------------------------------------
¶2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting
with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions
against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747
caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on
the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions

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had been particularly successful through their indirect

consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian
businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being
connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG
cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic
problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.
¶3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the
Iranians are attempting to convey a "false presentation" that
they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The
reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they
are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something
they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in
Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the
Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of
supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan's
view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian
leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but
there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a
retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new
policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of
the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target
supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.
--------------------------------------------- -
Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran
--------------------------------------------- -
¶4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
States all fear Iran, but want someone else "to do the job
for them." Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of
affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief
accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a "very
negative role." He also pointed to the recent visit of the
Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and
turning point for relations between the two countries.
Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of
urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as
"a real problem," and accused Sheikh Hamid of "annoying
everyone." In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides --
Syria, Iran, Hamas -- in an effort to achieve security and
some degree of independence. "I think you should remove your
bases from there...seriously," said Dagan. "They have
confidence only because of the U.S. presence." Dagan
predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next
cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders
(specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps
to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally
responsible for its provocations.
----------------------------

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Syria Taking Dangerous Risks

----------------------------
TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003
¶5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an

Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of
readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of
attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate
over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick
escalation. Dagan believes that Syria's strategic alliance
with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views
these policies as both "successful and just." There is a
tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran,
said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening
Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by
enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to
disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the
glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions
would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried
for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued
Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for
action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently
frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies
in the Arab League.
---------------------------------------------
Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed
his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying
to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians,
"nothing will be achieved." Only Israeli military operations
against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding
control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah
would fall within one month and Abbas would join his
"mysteriously wealthy" son in Qatar. Offering what he
believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6
billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since
¶1994. "What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more
people to the Fortune 500?" asked Dagan. Although he
expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that
the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a
party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to
regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have
turned once again to the "old guard." The Mossad Chief
suggested that a completely new approach was required, but
did not provide Townsend any additional details.

Cable Viewer
--------------------------------------
Pakistan...and Other Regional Concerns
--------------------------------------
¶7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour

of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to
combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by
radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as
his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other "Global Jihad"
groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in
possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not
care about the well being of states or their image in the
media. "We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in
power," said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that
Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the
right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said
Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and
runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason
Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was
that he feared that he was "in the crosshairs" for regime
change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more
serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly
dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical
Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues
"in spite of the king," said Dagan, who appears to take
little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that
Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the
region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down
the secular character of the state and could become more
radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military
received more direct support from the United States, it would
be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.
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TEL AVIV 00002280 003 OF 003
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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2652, U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI

MOSSAD



Discussing cables

2007-08-31 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
12:12 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO5629
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2652/01 2431245
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 311245Z AUG 07

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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0817
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1007
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0441
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0434
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2017

TAGS: PREL PTER MARR MASS KNNP UNSC PK IR IZ ZP
JO, EG, RS, CH, LE, SY, IS
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' AUGUST 17 MEETING WITH ISRAELI MOSSAD
CHIEF MEIR DAGAN
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) In an August 17 meeting, Israeli Mossad Chief Meir

Dagan thanked Under Secretary Burns for America's support of
Israel as evidenced by the previous day's signing of an MOU
that provides Israel with USD 30 billion in security
assistance from 2008-2018. Dagan provided his assessment of
the Middle East region, Pakistan and Turkey, stressing
Israel's (a) concern for President Musharraf's well-being,
(b) view that Iran can be forced to change its behavior, and
(c) sense that Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are
unstable with unclear futures ahead of them. Dagan probed
for more detail about XXXXXXXXXXXX U.S. military assistance
to the Gulf states, and -- while signaling agreement with the
U.S. approach to the Gulf states vis-a-vis Iran -- cautioned
that
they may not be able to absorb significant military assistance.
Dagan reviewed Israel's five-pillar strategy concerning
Iran's nuclear program, stressed that Iran is economicall
vulnerable, and pressed for more activity with Iran's
minority groups aimed at regime change. Dagan urged
caution in providing assistance to the Siniora government in
Lebanon, noting Syrian and Iranian efforts to topple the GOL.
¶2. (S) Under Secretary Burns cited the MOU as tangible

evidence of the USG's commitment to Israel, and stressed that
the U.S. would support all of its friends -- Arabs included

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-- in the Middle East, and will remain engaged in the region

for the long term. He described U.S. efforts to support the
Musharraf and Karzai governments as they face opposition from
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and explained that the Gulf
Security Dialogue is meant to bolster Gulf states facing
threats from Iran. The Under Secretary reviewed U.S. efforts
to isolate Iran and increase pressure on it, stressing that
the U.S. is currently focused on the diplomatic track. He
shared USG thinking about the Siniora government in Lebanon,
and urged that the U.S. and Israel continue to consult on
Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------
THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MOU AND ISRAEL'S QME
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Dagan observed that the signing of the MOU on

security assistance could not have come at a better time, and
stressed that Israel appreciated America's support. The
Under Secretary agreed about the timing, noting that the
U.S., Israel and like-minded countries were facing multiple
threats around the world, and that the Middle East is a very
dangerous region. He said that the MOU serves as a concrete
reminder that the U.S. stands by its long-term security
commitments to its friends, and is ready to help them with
their needs. The Under Secretary noted that the Middle East
is now at the heart of American interests. Because Egypt
also plays a vital role in the region, the U.S. would also
renew its security assistance commitment to that country.
U.S. relations with the Gulf states were longstanding, and
America would stay true to those friendships, as well. The
Under Secretary stressed that the USG is committed to
Israel's QME. He noted that the majority of systems and
equipment that the U.S. would sell to Egypt and other Arab
partners would replace items that had been sold to those
countries in the past.
-------------------------------------------
DAGAN REVIEWS MIDDLE EAST, PAKISTAN, TURKEY
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (S) Assessing the region, Dagan said Israel sees itself in
the middle of a rapidly changing environment, in which the
fate of one Middle Eastern country is connected to another.
Dagan then said he was concerned about how long Pakistani
President Musharraf would survive: "He is facing a serious
problem with the militants. Pakistan's nuclear capability
could end up in the hands of an Islamic regime." Turning to
Iran, Dagan observed that it is in a transition period.
There is debate among the leadership between Rafsanjani and
Ahmadinejad and their respective supporters. Instability in
Iran is driven by inflation and tension among ethnic

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minorities. This, Dagan said, presents unique opportunities,

and Israelis and Americans might see a change in Iran in
TEL AVIV 00002652 002 OF 005
their lifetimes. As for Iraq, it may end up a weak, federal

state comprised of three cantons or entities, one each
belonging to the Kurds, Sunnis and Shias.
¶5. (S) Dagan said that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are
concerned about the growing importance of Iran and its
influence on them. They are taking precautions, trying to
increase their own military defensive capabilities.
Referring to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan warned
that these countries would not be able to cope with the
amount of weapons systems they intend to acquire: "They do
not use the weapons effectively."
¶6. (S) Dagan said that Jordan has successfully faced down
threats from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and that Egypt
is struggling with the question of who will replace President
Mubarak. He said he sees no hope for the Palestinians, and
that Israel looks at Syria and Lebanon, and sees only
instability. Further afield, it looks at Turkey and sees
Islamists gaining momentum there. The question, he asked, is
how long Turkey's military -- viewing itself as the defender
of Turkey's secular identity -- will remain quiet.
¶7. (S) If Israel's neighborhood were not unstable enough,

Dagan observed, it did not help that Russia is playing a
"very negative role" in the region. He observed that all of
these challenges have to be addressed globally -- they could
not be dealt with individually. Returning to Jordan as an
example, he noted that the more than one million Iraqi
refugees in Jordan were changing Jordanian society, and
forcing it into a new relationship with Saudi Arabia. This
is evidenced by Saudi King Abdullah's recent visit to Jordan,
which implies greater understanding between the Jordanians
and the Saudis.
----------------------------------------
DISCUSSION OF THE GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE
----------------------------------------
¶8. (S) Turning to the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD), Dagan

said that enhancing the capabilities of the Gulf states "is
the right direction to go," especially as they are afraid of
Iran. Such a U.S. commitment will be a stabilizing factor in
the region. Dagan clarified that he would not oppose U.S.
security assistance to America's Arab partners. He expressed
concern, nevertheless, about the current policies of those

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partners -- especially with regards to Syria and Iran. Dagan

added that if those countries must choose between buying
defensive systems from the U.S. or France, then he would
prefer they buy systems from the U.S., as this would bring
them closer to the U.S.
¶9. (S) Dagan observed that the challenge facing the U.S. now
is how to unite the Gulf states under a shared policy, and
pointed to Qatar as the weakest link in the chain, trying to
play all sides. Under Secretary Burns replied that the U.S.
is trying to get Qatar and its neighbors to look at issues
from a regional perspective, and to focus on threats in a
unified way. Acting PM Assistant Secretary Mull expressed
understanding for Israel's frustration with how the region
looked, but stressed nevertheless that if America did not
engage the Gulf states through the GSD, the situation would
become much worse. It is critical to get the Gulf states
focused on the Iran threat, and to adopt a regional approach
to countering it. Encouraging and supporting their
counterproliferation efforts would be crucial. Dagan said he
agreed with this approach, stressing that the threat of
radical Islam is real.
--------------------------------------------- ----
IRAN: DAGAN REVIEWS ISRAEL'S FIVE PILLAR STRATEGY
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶10. (S) Dagan led discussion on Iran by pointing out that the
U.S. and Israel have different timetables concerning when
Iran is likely to acquire a nuclear capability. He clarified
that the Israel Atomic Energy Commission's (IAEC) timetable
is purely technical in nature, while the Mossad's considers
other factors, including the regime's determination to
succeed. While Dagan acknowledged that there is still time
to "resolve" the Iran nuclear crisis, he stressed that Iran
is making a great effort to achieve a nuclear capability:
"The threat is obvious, even if we have a different
timetable. If we want to postpone their acquisition of a
TEL AVIV 00002652 003 OF 005
nuclear capability, then we have to invest time and effort

ourselves."
¶11. (S) Dagan described how the Israeli strategy consists of

five pillars:
A) Political Approach: Dagan praised efforts to bring Iran

before the UNSC, and signaled his agreement with the pursuit
of a third sanctions resolution. He acknowledged that
pressure on Iran is building up, but said this approach alone

Cable Viewer
will not resolve the crisis. He stressed that the timetable

for political action is different than the nuclear project's
timetable.
B) Covert Measures: Dagan and the Under Secretary agreed not

to discuss this approach in the larger group setting.
C) Counterproliferation: Dagan underscored the need to

prevent know-how and technology from making their way to
Iran, and said that more can be done in this area.
D) Sanctions: Dagan said that the biggest successes had so

far been in this area. Three Iranian banks are on the verge
of collapse. The financial sanctions are having a nationwide
impact. Iran's regime can no longer just deal with the
bankers themselves.
E) Force Regime Change: Dagan said that more should be done

to foment regime change in Iran, possibly with the support of
student democracy movements, and ethnic groups (e.g., Azeris,
Kurds, Baluchs) opposed to the ruling regime.
¶12. (S) Dagan clarified that the U.S., Israel and like-minded
countries must push on all five pillars at the same time.
Some are bearing fruit now; others would bear fruit in due
time, especially if more attention were placed on them.
Dagan urged more attention on regime change, asserting that
more could be done to develop the identities of ethnic
minorities in Iran. He said he was sure that Israel and the
U.S. could "change the ruling regime in Iran, and its
attitude towards backing terror regimes." He added, "We
could also get them to delay their nuclear project. Iran
could become a normal state."
¶13. (S) Dagan stressed that Iran has weak spots that can be
exploited. According to his information, unemployment
exceeds 30 percent nationwide, with some towns and villages
experiencing 50 percent unemployment, especially among 17-30
year olds. Inflation averages more than 40 percent, and
people are criticizing the government for investing in and
sponsoring Hamas, saying that they government should invest
in Iran itself. "The economy is hurting," he said, "and this
is provoking a real crisis among Iran's leaders." He added
that Iran's minorities are "raising their heads, and are
tempted to resort to violence."
¶14. (S) Dagan suggested that more could be done to get the
Europeans to take a tougher stand against Iran. Under
Secretary Burns agreed, and suggested that Israel could help
SIPDIS
by reaching out to the Europeans. Dagan said that Israel is

Cable Viewer
already doing this, and would continue to do so. Dagan

reiterated the need to strike at Iran's heart by engaging
with its people directly. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts
are important, but more radio transmissions in Farsi are
needed. Coordination with the Gulf states is helpful, but
the U.S. should also coordinate with Azerbaijan and countries
to the north of Iran, to put pressure on Iran. Russia, he
said, would be annoyed, but it would be fitting, as Russia
appears bent on showing the U.S. that it cannot act globally
without considering Russia.
¶15. (S) Under Secretary Burns stressed that the USG is

focused on Iran not only because of its nuclear program, but
also because it supports terrorism and Shiite militias in
Iraq. The U.S. approach is currently focused on the
diplomatic track and increasing pressure on Iran through
sanctions. Work in the UNSC helps to define the Iranian
nuclear threat as one that affects international security,
and not just that of Israel. While UNSC members Russia,
China and Qatar will water down efforts to increase pressure
on Iran, it is still worthwhile to push for a third sanctions
resolution. In the meantime, the U.S. will encourage the
Europeans, Japan and South Korea to implement unilateral
sanctions against Iran outside the UNSC framework. The U.S.
TEL AVIV 00002652 004 OF 005
will continue to encourage banks and financial institutions

to slow down their operations in Iran and financially isolate
it. Regarding military pressure, the Under Secretary noted
that the U.S. has deployed 1-2 carrier battle groups in the
Gulf over the last six months, and that President Bush has
stated that he will interrupt Iran's activity in Iraq. As
for outreach to the Iranian people, the VOA is now
broadcasting programs in Farsi, and the USG is trying to get
more Iranian students to visit the U.S. to promote
people-to-people relations.
-----------------------------------------
PAKISTAN: ISRAEL WORRIED ABOUT MUSHARRAF
-----------------------------------------
¶16. (S) On Pakistan, Dagan said that President Musharraf is

losing control, and that some of his coalition partners could
threaten him in the future. The key question, Dagan said, is
whether Musharraf retains his commander-in-chief role in
addition to his role as president. If not, he will have
problems. Dagan observed that there has been an increase in
the number of attempts on Musharraf's life, and wondered
whether he will survive the next few years. Under Secretary
Burns replied that South Asia has assumed vital importance in

Cable Viewer
American foreign policy since September 11. The U.S. is

committed to denying Afghanistan as a safe-haven for Taliban
and Al-Qaeda activity. The USG will continue to support
Pakistani President Musharraf, and is seeking to boost his
military defensive capabilities. At the same time, the U.S.
is encouraging Pakistan and Afghanistan to work with each
other militarily. Turning to India, Under Secretary Burns
noted that U.S.-Indian economic cooperation is growing, and
that the USG is working effectively to reduce tensions
between India and Pakistan.
-----------------------------
LEBANON: DAGAN URGES CAUTION
-----------------------------
¶17. (S) Dagan urged caution with respect to Lebanon, noting

that the results of efforts there to bolster the Siniora
government would impact Syria and Iraq. The U.S. and Israel,
he said, are on the edge of achieving something in Lebanon,
and so cannot afford to drop their guard. What is necessary
is finding the right way to support PM Siniora. "He is a
courageous man," Dagan said. Syria, Iran and Hizballah are
working hard against him. Dagan noted that much of what is
animating the leadership of Lebanon to take on Syria is
personal: "Hariri, Jumblat and others had their parents
executed by the Syrians." This anti-Syrian sentiment has
forged an alliance based on personal and national interests.
Siniora has worked well with the situation, but Dagan
suggested that the odds are against him. Under Secretary
Burns replied that the U.S. is trying to give PM Siniora as
much support as possible, and that we would continue to
consult closely with Israel on Lebanon. He noted that he
would return to Israel in October.
--------------------
MEETING PARTICIPANTS
--------------------
18, (SBU) Accompanying Under Secretary Burns in the meeting

were:
-- Ambassador Richard H. Jones
-- Acting PM Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull
-- Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Mary Beth Long
-- NEA/IPA Deputy Director Nicole Shampaine
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Counselor for Political Research
-- Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer (notetaker)
¶19. (SBU) Accompanying Mossad Chief Meir Dagan in the meeting

were:
-- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Salai Meridor
-- Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni Omer Caspi

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-- Two unidentified Mossad officials
¶20. (U) Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns cleared on this

cable.
*********************************************
********************
TEL AVIV 00002652 005 OF 005
*********************************************
********************
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Viewing cable 08TELAVIV2760, U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO MOMENTUM

WILL BE



Discussing cables

2008-12-10 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
08:08 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO1721
PP RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHTV #2760/01 3450810
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZUI ZDK RUEHZC SVC 4078
P 100810Z DEC 08

Cable Viewer
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 4716
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0552
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0461
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 6800
RUEHDIA/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0096
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0970
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR LEVEY, S.

ATHENS FOR PURCELL, A.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018

TAGS: KTFN EFIN ECON KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY REASSURES GOI THAT NO MOMENTUM WILL BE
LOST IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERROR FINANCE
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
SUMMARY
-------
1.(S) In a visit to Israel on 16-17 November, Treasury Under

Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Stuart A.
Levey, reassured GOI officials that no momentum would be lost
in USG efforts to combat terrorist financing or to pressure
Iran during the transition to a new US administration in
January. In meetings with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni,
Mossad Director Meir Dagan, National Security Council
Chairman Dani Arditi, and others, U/S Levey emphasized recent
U.S. designations against the Union of Good, the Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and the recent
revocation of Iran's "U-Turn" license. In response to GOI
officials' pressure to have the U.S. designate the Central
Bank of Iran (CBI), Levey underscored the importance of
international, multilateral concurrence for such an effort to
be a success.
2.(S) Israeli officials were keen to outline an "escalation"

in CBI programs that they believed pose a danger to the
international financial system. Several key Israeli officials
identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI, as a key
figure in masterminding new ways to help the Iranian
commercial and banking sectors circumvent sanctions. Levey
promised to continue pushing the Gulf states on adopting
stronger regulation until the last day of his appointment.

Cable Viewer
3.(S) Mossad Chief Meir Dagan informed Levey that sanctions

were beginning to have a negative effect on Iran's regime.
NSC Chairman Arditi also told him that the PA was performing
well in its renewed fight against terror finance in the West
Bank. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -----
GOI CONCERNED ABOUT COUNTER TERROR FINANCE POLICY CONTINUITY
--------------------------------------------- -----
4.(S) National Security Council (NCS) Chairman, Dani Arditi,

in a November 16 meeting with U/S Stuart Levey, asked whether
Levey thought his efforts would continue into the next U.S.
administration. Even though he said he planned to resign as
required in January, Levey told Arditi that he believed the
Obama team would be committed to continuing the ambitious
program against terrorism finance that he has shepherded over
the last several years. Saying counterterrorism finance was
not a partisan issue in the U.S., Levey subsequently
confirmed these sentiments to Foreign Minister (FM) Tzipi
Livni and Mossad Director Meir Dagan in separate meetings
that occurred on the following day, November 17.
----------------------
IRAN/NON-PROLIFERATION
----------------------
5.(S) On November 16, Levey outlined for Ministry of Foreign

Affairs Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon
Bar, and Senior Deputy Director General Yossi Gal positive
developments in the Iran effort. He told them that Treasury
had been very successful in curtailing business with Iran by
most "major players". Levey said that expanding the
non-proliferation strategy into insurance, and putting
pressure on Iran's oil refining capacity and Liquid Natural
Gas (LNG) industry were next steps being pursued. He also
reported that the recent IRISL designation has been unusually
effective.
CBI's Reza Raei Masterminds New Methods

---------------------------------------
6.(S) During their November 16 meeting, Arditi told Levey

that the Israeli intelligence community has continued to see
an escalation in CBI efforts to help designated Iranian
commercial banks circumvent international and U.S. sanctions.
The NSC Chairman presented several recent examples of CBI
behavior that he characterized as unusual for a central bank.
Arditi identified Reza Raei, Vice Governor of the CBI for
Foreign Exchange Affairs, as the mastermind of these new
TEL AVIV 00002760 002 OF 004

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efforts.
7.(S) Meir Dagan subsequently told Levey that the CBI had
engineered a way for the UN-designated Iranian bank Sepah to
conduct foreign business transactions through use of the
Iranian Postal Bank. Bank Melli, a USG-designated bank, had
also purchased shares in investment funds as a way to escape
the effects of the sanctions, according to Dagan. Using these
methods, Melli and Sepah have been able to fabricate a method
of providing correspondent-like banking services to
designated Iranian banks that find it increasingly difficult
to deal in foreign currency. Arditi named the "Persia Equity
Fund" as one such financial instrument being used by Melli.
Levey commented that any such investment fund or financial
instrument could be listed as a derivative designation of
Melli if enough evidence could be shown linking the two
organizations. Levey told Meir Dagan that he was in favor of
pursuing a designation of Raei if GOI allegations were
accurate.
No International Support for Designation of the CBI

--------------------------------------------- ------
8.(S) Arditi and subsequently, Dagan, asked Levey whether the

USG was considering a designation of the CBI. Although
Treasury had looked into the possibility, said Levey, a
designation of the CBI would be ineffective without a
multilateral effort. International support for such an effort
simply did not yet exist, Levey explained. He told Dagan that
we need to build support by sharing info about the CBI's
illicit conduct, similar to the support we built for cutting
off the U-turn license. Levey said that it would be better to
focus on limiting other central and commercial banks'
business with the CBI. Noting that the banking industry
relies heavily on reputation, Levey told Arditi that the
right strategy is to continue exposing the illicit activities
of Iranian banks and banking officials.
European Banks' Business with Iran

----------------------------------
9.(S) MFA interlocutors revisited the progress of European

banks in non-proliferation efforts. In a November 16 meeting
with Yossi Gal, Senior Deputy Director General, and Alon Bar,
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Gal raised
concerns that Italy and Germany were falling short in their
commitment to enforce sanctions within their banking sectors.
Gal told Levey that the MFA was planning a visit to Italy in
December, but was unsure whether its attempt to persuade the
politicians would filter down to action within the
bureaucracy. Gal expressed the same concern about the banking

Cable Viewer
sector in Germany, saying that resistance from the

bureaucracy and the private sector often undermined attempts
by political figures to improve German regulation. Bar and
Gal encouraged Levey to join the GOI in pressing the
governments and banking sectors of Germany and Italy to do
more.
Cautious Optimism on Gulf States

--------------------------------
10.(S) On the status of UAE efforts to stem Iranian finance,

Levey told Gal and Bar that he was optimistic about the
country's efforts. Among other examples, he mentioned that
the UAE had decreased the number of visas it was issuing to
Iranian nationals and that Emirati ministers were receptive
to his requests for increased banking regulation.
11.(S) FM Livni told Levey that Israel continues to encourage

the Gulf states to more publicly outline their actions
against Iranian finance within their banking sectors despite
the countries' reasons for keeping such actions secretive.
She asked Levey to join in this effort. Levey affirmed that
the USG was encouraging sanctions in all sectors and posited
that the Iranians were beginning to feel the pressure. Livni
asked if the declining price of oil was becoming leverage in
the efforts to thwart Iranian financial efforts. Levey said
that it was and that the Iranian private sector was becoming
more vocal in its criticisms of the government.
12.(S) Levey outlined for his GOI interlocutors recent
TEL AVIV 00002760 003 OF 004
efforts by Treasury to broaden its sanctioning of Iran to the

shipping, insurance, and reinsurance industries. He cited the
designation of IRISL as a positive first step and mentioned
that Treasury had found willing partners in Europe and the UK
to further efforts in this area.
Effect of Sanctions on Iran

---------------------------
13.(S) Dagan told Levey that the economic problems Iran is

experiencing as a result of sanctions are encouraging debate
within the regime. He said that in order to preserve the
revolution, some key figures have begun to consider the need
for change. The pressure is on, Dagan said, but he could not
estimate when Iran would hit the brink. He noted that the
lower cost of oil at the moment would likely prompt Iran to
increase its production, thereby encouraging more business
through the CBI. With oil prices low everywhere, however,
Dagan and Levey agreed that Iran was a less attractive place

Cable Viewer
for investment. Levey told Dagan that the present low oil
prices provide a critical opportunity to convince other
members of the international community to apply more
pressure.
14.(S) Livni asked Levey if there was a risk of Iran

regaining a foothold in certain markets as a result of the
world financial crisis. Levey said that the market turmoil
has worked to the USG's advantage: the crisis has made
financial institutions even more risk-averse, thereby
lessening Iran's attractiveness even further. Additionally,
while Iran's banks are isolated, its economy is not.
U.S. Engagement with Iran

-------------------------
15.(S) FM Livni asked Levey during their November 17 meeting

why the USG was considering a rapprochement with Iran through
a U.S. Interests section in Tehran. She questioned whether
the tactic would have a net positive outcome when measured
against the negative perceptions such a move would be bound
to create. Levey told Livni that this was a question better
posed to the State Department, but that her concern was the
central issue being debated by policy makers in Washington.
In Levey's previous meeting with MFA officials Bar and Gal,
he said that engagement with Iran would not work without
leverage, indicating that sanctions would need to be in place
no matter what the USG decides to do.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
STEMMING PALESTINIAN TERROR FINANCE: GOI PLEASED WITH PA'S
PROGRESS
--------------------------------------------- -------------
16.(S) Levey told Arditi that Treasury's recent designation

of the "Union of Good" was proof of the USG's commitment to
continue to work against Hamas and Palestinian terrorists.
Levey said, however, that while the USG supported efforts at
thwarting terrorism in the territories, the USG wished to
keep humanitarian goods flowing to the needy within the
population.
17.(S) Arditi told Levey that Palestinian Authority (PA)

efforts at stemming terrorism within the territories were
going quite well. He said the PA's positive efforts
"surprised" his staff and that he "never thought" the PA
would do so well. Levey said that Treasury coordinated with
Prime Minister Fayyad on the Union of Good designation and
was pleased to hear that PA efforts were held in high regard
by the GOI.
18.(S) When Levey inquired about efforts to prevent

correspondent banking relations in Gaza from being severed,

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Arditi said that the Postal Bank "was on the agenda". Arditi
lamented that the services provided by the Postal Bank would
not be as good because of its small size and limited
capacity. He expressed his hope that the central bank
governor would be able to delay the commercial banks'
decision to end their relationship with the Palestinians
until a permanent solution was ensured.
19.(S) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Stuart
TEL AVIV 00002760 004 OF 004
Levey.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV457, CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA,

PALESTINIANS,

2009-02-26 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
12:12 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO3204
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0457/01 0571219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261219Z FEB 09
file:///F|/EWACS/wikileaks/Israel/2009_02_26TELAVIV457.htm (2 of 8)12/5/2010 7:57:33 PM

Cable Viewer
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IR SY
SUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS,
AND ISRAEL ELECTION WITH BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY During their trip to Israel, CODEL Cardin

discussed Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and
the Israeli elections with Likud Party leader and candidate
for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu described a
nuclear Iran as the greatest threat facing Israel, and urged
strong economic sanctions backed by a viable military option
to confront a problem that he said threatened the region and
could prove a "tipping point" in world history. Describing
his approach to "economic peace" with the Palestinians,
Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic
obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a
"pyramid" from the "bottom up" that would strengthen the
Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians a viable
alternative to radicalism. Netanyahu expressed support for
the concept of land swaps, and emphasized that he did not
want to govern the West Bank and Gaza but rather to stop
attacks from being launched from there. Netanyahu suggested
Syrian interest in peace negotiations with Israel were really
overtures to the United States, and described the Syrians as
firmly in the Iranian camp. Netanyahu expressed confidence
that President Peres would offer him rather than Kadima Party
leader Livni the opportunity of forming a coalition because
the bloc of center-right/right wing parties in the new
Knesset amounted to 65 seats. Netanyahu said his desire
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
not agree to a rotating prime ministership. END SUMMARY
¶2. (SBU) As part of their February 14-17 visit to Israel,

CODEL Cardin met with Likud Party leader and candidate for
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 16 in
Jerusalem. Netanyahu was at the center of intense political
speculation about the formation of a governing coalition
following the extremely close Israeli national election of
February 10, which did not produce a clear winner. The CODEL
met with Netanyahu following meetings the previous day with
President Peres, and prior to meetings later in the day with
Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority Prime
Minister Fayyad.
----

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IRAN
----
¶3. (C) Netanyahu quickly launched into his oft-stated

position that Iran is the greatest threat facing Israel.
Noting that "Persia" already had two bases on the
Mediterranean (referring to Hizballah and Hamas), Netanyahu
complained that Iran's "tentacles" were choking Israel, and
that a new one grew back whenever one was cut off. Netanyahu
charged that Iran was developing nuclear weapons with the
express purpose of wiping out Israel, and described
preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability as
Israel's highest policy priority. Netanyahu described five
threats that he saw emanating from Iranian nuclear
development: a direct threat to Israel; a direct threat to
other regional states; increased terrorist power under an
Iranian nuclear umbrella; a Middle East nuclear arms race;
and a destabilized Middle East, with Arab regimes
"terrified" of Iran in his view. Netanyahu, commenting that
he normally avoided political jargon, pointed to one phrase
that he said applied to this issue - "a tipping point."
According to Netanyahu, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon
capability it will "topple the peace process" and "change the
history of the world."
¶4. (C) When asked what advice he offered to the United

States, Netanyahu reported that he had spoken to
then-candidate Obama and said the method was less important
than the goal, and asked rhetorically whether the President
would allow Iran to "cross the nuclear threshold ... on his
watch." Netanyahu suggested there were many ways to pressure
Iran, which he saw as economically weak at the moment due to
plunging oil prices at the same time that the U.S. President
had strong international backing, a situation Netanyahu
described as the opposite of the past few years. He said he
would look forward (as Prime Minister) to discussing with
President Obama concrete measures to be taken against Iran.
Netanyahu said these would not be a substitute for
Palestinian negotiations, but that any result from such
negotiations would be "washed away" by Iran's attaining a
nuclear bomb.
¶5. (C) When asked how Iran could be isolated, Netanyahu

suggested a blockade as one possibility. The nuclear program
could be stopped if the U.S. led the international community
to "ratchet up" economic sanctions, but that these sanctions
would only work if Iran knew that the U.S. military option
remained viable. Netanyahu said he did not object to a U.S.
dialogue with Iran provided the talks were close ended,
perhaps two months, with fixed results, otherwise Iran would
TEL AVIV 00000457 002 OF 003

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"take you to the cleaners." He said he agreed with the

Europeans' urging the U.S. to postpone any talks until past
the Iranian elections in June. Netanyahu said he did not
know for certain how close Iran was to developing a nuclear
weapons capability, but that "our experts" say Iran was
probably only one or two years away and that was why they
wanted open ended negotiations. He again urged "tough
negotiations" if military means were not used (and added
that Special Envoy Mitchell was both nice and tough.)
Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as crazy, retrograde,
and fanatical, with a Messianic desire to speed up a violent
"end of days." That was not the whole country, however, in
his view, as he said that "75 percent of the Iranian people"
oppose the regime, but that it governed with terror and would
be hard to overthrow. There was no single view from
Iranians, therefore, but there was from the powers that
dominate. He reiterated that strong economic action could
stop their nuclear development or possibly even bring down
the regime - as could "the U.S. military process."
-----------------
PALESTINIAN TRACK
-----------------
¶6. (C) Turning to peace with the Palestinians, Netanyahu

said the reason the process had not worked so far was that
while 70 percent of Israelis were willing to make
concessions, the same number were convinced that there was no
real Palestinian partner. Netanyahu warned that when Israel
left Lebanon is created a first Iranian base, that when it
left Gaza it created a second Iranian base, and if Israel
"promised" a third retreat from the West Bank it would see
the same results. There were three options, according to
Netanyahu - withdrawing to the 1967 borders (that would "get
terror, not peace"); doing nothing ("just as bad"); or
"rapidly building a pyramid from the ground up." Netanyahu
suggested a rapid move to develop the West Bank economically,
including "unclogging" bureaucratic "bottlenecks." He
promised to "take charge personally" (as Prime Minister) to
facilitate this bureaucratic reform, which would occur in
tandem with political negotiations and cooperation with
Jordan to build up Palestinian Authority security capacity.
Netanyahu noted that there were larger demonstrations
against the Gaza operation in Madrid and London than in the
West Bank. He said this was because the West Bankers
recognized that Hamas represents the prospect of "violent,
crazy" people in charge of their society; they should be
offered real alternatives in order to have the strength to
resist the radicals.

Cable Viewer
¶7. (C) Netanyahu said his "new approach" would also

include not continuing to fund a "bloated" Palestinian
bureaucracy. It would be aimed at direct development.
Netanyahu, noting that he had previously "turned around" the
Israeli economy (as Finance Minister), gave one example of a
problem he would fix as an electric powerline in the West
Bank that was held up by conflicting and competing agencies.
He said this powerline was needed and would create jobs, but
was held up not because the Palestinians were targeted, but
because that was how the Israeli bureaucracy worked for
everyone, including Israelis. When asked whether these
reforms could include room to modify security arrangements,
Netanyahu agreed that some of what the GOI calls security is
in fact bureaucracy. Pointing to what he described as strong
but unpublicized trade between Haifa port and Iraq via
Jordan, he suggested assembly points could be set up in the
West Bank for some goods, which would create thousands of
jobs. This would not be a substitute for a political
settlement, according to Netanyahu, but economic prosperity
would make peace possible, as occurred in Northern Ireland.
-----
SYRIA
-----
¶8. (C) Netanyahu said he was actually more optimistic about

dealing with the Palestinians than with Syria, because he was
confident that the Palestinian Authority wants Iran and its
proxies out. He said he was less sanguine about Syria, which
he complained straddles the fence all the time. The Syrians
might "talk about" a new (U.S.) relationship, but he did not
see them disconnecting from Iran. Netanyahu suggested that
Israel "giving up" the Golan would just result in assurances
that Syria would later "tear up." Describing King Hussein as
heroic, and noting that the King came from his "death bed" in
1998 to get then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and
then-Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat to reach an
agreement at the Wye River talks, Netanyahu said that when
Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, even King Hussein "snuggled up"
to the Iraqi leader out of necessity. Such is the reality in
the Middle East.
TEL AVIV 00000457 003 OF 003
-------------------
COALITION FORMATION
-------------------
¶9. (C) Despite finishing one Knesset seat behind Kadima and
its candidate Tzipi Livni in the February 10 Israeli national

Cable Viewer
elections, Netanyahu expressed complete confidence that

President Peres would offer him the opportunity to form a
government because the bloc of center-right/right wing
parties in the new Knesset has 65 seats compared to Livni's
potential bloc of 45 seats for center-left/left wing parties
plus 11 seats for Arab parties. Netanyahu said his desire
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would
not agree to a rotating prime ministership with Ms. Livni.
He explained that the one time Israel had a rotation came as
a result of an exact tie between the two political
coalitions, but this time the right wing bloc was much
larger.
¶10. (C) When asked about Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael

Beiteinu party, Netanyahu reminded the CODEL that Kadima had
in fact included Lieberman in their government in its earlier
stages. Netanyahu stressed repeatedly that he preferred a
unity government, and said the large security and economic
problems facing Israel called for the strength that a unity
government would offer. Livni "collapsed" left- wing votes
(from Labor and other parties) to score a one vote margin for
Kadima over Likud in the elections, but took no votes away
from the right, according to Netanyahu. When asked what he
might offer to Kadima, Netanyahu suggested Kadima would get a
few key ministerial portfolios, but did not elaborate. He
said that he while he was convinced a rotating Prime
Ministership would not happen, he was confident a unity
government could. Netanyahu said the government would not
include the Arab parties.
¶11. (C) Netanyahu promised that as Prime Minister his

government would not "go back" to unilateral withdrawals, and
would have a clear focus. On the economy, he said Israel was
not a huge economy such as the United States or China, and
that he would be able to turn things around quickly, as "a
small share of a declining market" was big for Israel. Asked
about settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had not
established any new settlements when he was Prime Minister.
Half of the West Bank, the area east of the ridge line and
the Jordan Valley, is virtually unpopulated and only contains
a few settlements. In the other half, Israeli and
Palestinian populations are intertwined. Once the
Palestinian Authority develops into a real partner it will be
possible to negotiate an agreement over territory,
settlements and "refined" Palestinian sovereignty without an
army or control over air space and borders. Netanyahu said
it would be too hard to negotiate agreements over Jerusalem
and refugees until the other issues are resolved. Claiming
that many Palestinians accept this point, Netanyahu said he
was not talking about a delaying tactic but rather a
temporary freeze, adding that he hoped PA Prime Minister
Fayyad would still be around since Fayyad also thinks along

Cable Viewer
economic lines.
¶12. (SBU) As an example of economic development, Netanyahu

spoke about expanding faith tourism. He said that it "defied
imagination" that the well-known site on the Jordan River
where John the Baptist baptized Jesus was "paralyzed" by a
GOI/PA jurisdiction dispute. With Jericho only a mile away,
Netanyahu offered to give an "easy", secure "envelope" for
transporting tourists from the Galilee to this part of the
West Bank. That would lead to "co-production" that would
provide large revenue streams of tourist dollars to the
Palestinians, from a population that was already coming to
Israel. He asked why Israelis would be less disposed to
make concessions to a viable Palestinian government and
society. Netanyahu agreed that West Bank checkpoints take
too long, and offered to look into express lanes, increased
staffing, and other possible solutions - as Prime Minister.
¶13. (U) CODEL Cardin has cleared this cable.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV654, ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS
ON



Discussing cables

2009-03-19 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
09TELAVIV654 SECRET
14:02 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #0654/01 0781437

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191437Z MAR 09

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INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 5175
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 5680
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0150
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3724
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0904
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0651
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 0930
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0001
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2225
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000654
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES FOCUS ON
IRAN, PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI INFLUENCE IN WASHINGTON
REF: TEL AVIV 605
¶1. (S) Summary. MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle
East Yacov Hadas provided PolCouns March 16 with an overview
of Israel's relations with several of the Gulf states. Hadas
described Israel's relations with the Gulf as a function of
the Gulf Arabs' fear of Iran, but also as due to the Arabs'
belief in Israeli influence in Washington. Fleshing out some
of the points he had made earlier to NEA Acting A/S Feltman
(reftel), Hadas described Qatar's shift toward the radical
camp in the region as a "game" linked to Qatari rivalry with
Saudi Arabia. Hadas believes Qatar is feeling pressure from
Israel, Egypt and the Saudis, adding that he has been invited
to visit Doha for talks about how to resume normal
Qatari-Israeli ties. Hadas noted that while the Omanis are
generally correct in their dealings with Israel, they appear
not to recognize the seriousness of the threat from Iran. He
said that while the UAE is increasingly hostile to Iran, it
remains unclear how far they are willing to go in terms of
increasing financial pressures on Tehran. Hadas said the
Gulf Arabs feel that the U.S. does not listen to them and
therefore sometimes try to pass messages through Israel.
While he agreed that progress on the Palestinian track would
make it easier for the Gulf states to be open about their
ties to Israel, he cautioned that the Gulf states use the
peace process as an "excuse not to take action" against Iran
or in support of the PA. End Summary.

Cable Viewer
¶2. (C) PolCouns called on Deputy Director General for the

Middle East Yacov Hadas March 16 to follow up on Hadas' March
4 discussion with Acting A/S Feltman of Israeli-Gulf
relations. Beginning with Qatar, Hadas said there were signs
that various pressures on the Qataris were starting to have
an effect. Hadas noted that Qatar could only get its
humanitarian relief supplies into Gaza through Israel.
Qatari diplomats assigned to their Gaza consulate also had to
cross through Israel since Egypt would not allow them to
enter Gaza from Rafah. For now, the Israelis are not
allowing either Qatari assistance or personnel to cross into
Gaza. Hadas noted that he had been invited to visit Doha to
discuss reopening the Israeli trade office, which he saw as a
positive sign. He added that the Qataris needed to
understand that they could not expect to restore cooperative
relations with Israel without agreeing to reopen the trade
office.
¶3. (S) While Hadas was critical of the Qataris' treatment of

Israel since the Gaza operation, he stressed that he thought
Qatar's policies were not a matter of a shift in ideology
toward the radical camp, but linked to their rivalry with the
Saudis and, by extension, with Egypt. In private settings,
Hadas noted that the Qatari leadership harbored "no
illusions" about Iran. Prince Hamad had told the Israelis in
October 2006 that he believed Iran was determined to develop
a nuclear bomb no matter the cost. According to Hadas, Hamad
complained at the time that he felt the U.S. would not listen
to him and tended to believe what it heard from Iran.
¶4. (S) Hadas reiterated the point he had made to Feltman

regarding Oman, calling the Omanis the "most problematic" of
the Gulf states in terms of their view of Iran. With regard
to Omani contacts with Israel, Hadas said they were
"correct," but the Omanis never fulfilled their commitment to
open an Israeli office in Muscat. He said Oman has "its own
definition" of what poses a threat to the Gulf, partly due to
Oman's geographical location. He did not think Oman would be
willing to join the rest of the GCC against Iran.
¶5. (S) Hadas agreed that the UAE was increasingly hostile to
Iran, but there remained a question as to how far they were
prepared to go. The UAE has extensive trade and financial
relations with Iran, including money laundering, and it was
unclear whether they were ready to use these relations as
leverage. Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdallah has developed
good personal relations with Foreign Minister Livni, but the
Emiratis are "not ready to do publicly what they say in
private." (Note: It was clear from Hadas' remarks that
Israel's channel to Saudi Arabia does not run through the
Foreign Ministry.)

Cable Viewer
¶6. (S) Hadas said the Gulf Arabs believe in Israel's role
because of their perception of Israel's close relationship
with the U.S. but also due to their sense that they can count
on Israel against Iran. "They believe Israel can work
magic," Hadas commented. When considering a trilateral
U.S.-Israel-GCC partnership, Hadas suggested we bear in mind
that Iran's nuclear program is the primary source of concern
to the U.S. and Israel, while the Gulf Arabs also worry about
Iran for a host of historic and sectarian reasons.
¶7. (C) PolCouns noted that Arabs say that progress on the
Palestinian track would make it easier for them to publicly
engage Israel. Hadas countered that while peace with the
Palestinians is an Israeli interest and important in its own
right, it should not be the sum total of Israel's relations
with the Arab World. Arab League Secretary General Amre
Moussa had invented the "never-ending hurdle race" in which
Israel could never do enough to deserve a positive response.
The Israeli-Palestinian track should not serve as an excuse
for the Gulf to avoid action, whether against Iran or through
practical steps to support the Palestinian Authority.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV936, CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

NETANYAHU:

2009-04-28 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
09TELAVIV936 SECRET
08:08 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO0626
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #0936/01 1180813
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280813Z APR 09
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

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SIPDIS
H PASS TO CODEL KYL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KNNP KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU:
WHAT WILL THE U.S. DO ABOUT IRAN?
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Kyl, accompanied by the Ambassador,

called on Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu April 6 in the
first official U.S. meeting with Netanyahu since he formed a
government. The main topics of discussion were stopping
Iran's nuclear program and Netanyahu's approach to
peace-making with the Palestinians. On Iran, Senator Kyl
raised ways to increase the effect of sanctions, including
possible legislation targeting Iranian imports of refined
petroleum. Adopting a forceful stance, Netanyahu asked
repeatedly what the U.S. plans to do if sanctions and
engagement fail to stop Iran's program. Calling Iran's
development of a nuclear bomb a world-changing event,
Netanyahu said all other issues become insignificant by
comparison. On the Palestinians, Netanyahu reviewed his
intent to pursue a three-track approach with political,
economic, and security aspects. While noting that his
government is conducting a review of Israeli policy toward
the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted that there is agreement
within the government and among 80% of Israelis that the
Palestinians should be able to rule themselves, but with
limits imposed by Israel's security requirements. Netanyahu
said the only difference between his position and that of
opposition leader Tzipi Livni is over the name of the goal,
i.e. the two-state solution. In response to comments by
Senator Sessions that the Palestinian Authority needs
functioning courts and jails as well as police, Netanyahu
agreed but said he had not yet focused much on Palestinian
governance issues. Netanyahu said he wants to show the
Palestinians the benefits of peace, but with the proviso that
if Iran goes nuclear, peace will fail. Predicting that his
government would pleasantly surprise many critics, Netanyahu
concluded that he hopes to come up with a common approach
with President Obama. End Summary.
¶2. (U) CODEL Kyl, consisting of Senator Jon Kyl (R, AZ);
Senator Jeff Sessions (R, AL); Representative Jane Harman (D,

Cable Viewer
CA); Representative John Kline (R, MN); and Representative

Chris Carney (D, PA), called on Prime Minister Benyamin
Netanyahu April 6. The Ambassador, Congressional staff, and
Pol Couns (notetaker) participated in the meeting. Netanyahu
was joined by National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Spokesman
Mark Regev, Policy Adviser Ron Dermer, former chairman of the
Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Kadima MK
Tzachi Hanegbi (Senator's Kyl's counterpart in the
U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on National
Security), and the Israeli Embassy in Washington's
Congressional liaison officer. The meeting was the first
official U.S. face to face contact with Netanyahu since he
formed his government.
What Will the U.S. Do About Iran?

---------------------------------
¶3. (S) After a brief discussion of the world economic crisis,

Senator Kyl raised Iran, noting the "sobering" briefings the
CODEL had received from senior Israeli defense and
intelligence officials the previous day. Kyl said the
Congress is looking at legislation that would target Iran's
imports of refined petroleum products, adding that there are
only four or five companies that supply refined petroleum to
Iran and the U.S. has considerable leverage over most of
them. Kyl added that Israeli experts had told the CODEL that
they thought such legislation would be helpful. Netanyahu
said nothing is slowing the progress of Iran's nuclear
program. The Prime Minister asked what will happen to the
Middle East if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon? If such a
prospect is unacceptable, what will the U.S. do as Iran
reaches the nuclear threshold? What will the U.S. do if
Pakistan is taken over by Islamic radicals?
¶4. (S) Representative Harman told Netanyahu that no one in

the CODEL disagreed with his analysis, but the U.S. should
give engagement an opportunity to see if it works. If it
does not, at least it would show the world that the U.S. had
tried. She added that Congress supports engagement on a
bipartisan basis. Senator Kyl added that the Europeans tried
to engage Iran for five years but it did not work. President
Obama will pursue engagement, but Kyl said he doubted it
would be successful. We should consider what to do in the
mean time. Netanyahu responded that the U.S. should move
quickly. Engagement should have a short time limit and a
specific goal, for example talk to the Iranians for four to
twelve weeks and make clear that the U.S. goal is an end to
their nuclear program. Leaning forward, Netanyahu repeated
his earlier question: "What will you do if it does not work?"
TEL AVIV 00000936 002 OF 003

Cable Viewer
¶5. (S) Netanyahu said that learning to live with a nuclear

Iran would be a big mistake which would lead to a different,
more dangerous world. While he noted that he could not say
for certain that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against
Israel, if Iran had a bomb Israelis would have to ask that
question every day. This is a historic moment, and leaders
have a responsibility to make decisions. All other issues
are insignificant by comparison. For a third time, Netanyahu
asked, "What are you going to do?"
Netanyahu's Approach to the Palestinians

----------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Senator Kyl asked the Prime Minister about his view of
the two-state solution. Netanyahu said he plans to engage
the Palestinian Authority quickly and will not tie political
talks with the Palestinians to developments with Iran.
Reviewing a now familiar formula, Netanyahu said he will
approach the Palestinians on parallel political, economic and
security tracks. Political talks would aim at achieving an
agreement within certain limits, the economic approach would
promote foreign and Arab investment and joint projects with
Israeli partners, while the security track would continue to
build up the PA's security forces. In order to do any of
this, Netanyahu noted, he will need a Palestinian partner.
¶7. (C) Representative Harman observed that the CODEL had

visited units of the PA's National Security Forces and the
Presidential Guard. PA Prime Minister Fayyad said he was
happy with the PA's security forces, and they want to take on
increased responsibility for security in Jericho and Jenin.
Netanyahu replied that Israel would be happy to let them do
more, but it is not clear what Hamas will do next. If Hamas
forces a confrontation, Israel will have to initiate further
military action in Gaza. Israel did not want to go back into
Gaza, but it will do what is necessary to protect its people.
¶8. (C) Netanyahu said his government is reviewing Israel's

policy toward the Palestinians. There is a consensus in the
government and among 80% of the Israeli public that the
Palestinians should be able to govern themselves. The only
limits on Palestinian sovereignty would be elements that
affect Israel's security. A Palestinian state must be
demilitarized, without control over its air space and
electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into
treaties or control its borders. Netanyahu concluded that he
and opposition leader Tzipi Livni "only disagree about the
name," i.e. the two-state solution.

Cable Viewer
¶9. (C) Senator Sessions noted that people everywhere want law
and order. Palestinians not only need to deal with
terrorism, they also need a functioning legal system. Moving
from a lawless system, the Palestinian Authority is showing
some pride, but police are not enough, they need courts and
jails that work. Economic development is impossible in a
lawless society. Netanyahu agreed this was a valid point and
uncharacteristically admitted that he had not focused much on
Palestinian governance. He added that international
assistance should provide funding for jails and courts. It
is possible to create crime-free zones and begin economic
development "in bubbles" which would then be expanded.
Senator Sessions noted that Lt. General Dayton is focused on
this issue. Representative Harman commented that "bubbles"
in the West Bank would not be enough, Palestinians need law
and order everywhere.
¶10. (C) Netanyahu said the "classic rhetoric" of the peace

process has been that if Israel withdraws, all will be well.
Now, however, if Israel withdrew from the West Bank, Hamas
would take over. Economic development would not be a
substitute for a political settlement, but it would change
the environment and show Palestinians the benefits of peace.
Israel has been trying to "build a roof without a foundation"
and it has not worked. Netanyahu said there was one proviso:
If Iran gets a nuke, peace efforts will fail.
¶11. (C) Netanyahu pointed to the example of Jordanian King

Hussein, whom he termed Israel's best Arab ally and a man
deeply committed to peace. Yet when Saddam Hussein took
Kuwait, King Hussein got on board with the Iraqis. In the
event of a nuclear Iran, "all the Arabs will become Qatar."
We should therefore move in parallel to work for peace with
the Palestinians while acting to stop Iran. Netanyahu said
he thought his government would pleasantly surprise many of
its critics. He concluded the meeting by saying that he
wants to coordinate Israel's positions with the U.S. and
hopes to come to a common position with President Obama.
TEL AVIV 00000936 003 OF 003
¶12. (U) CODEL Kyl has cleared this cable.
*********************************************
********************

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*********************************************
********************
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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1060, REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF

INTELLIGENCE



Discussing cables

2009-05-13 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
12:12 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO3194
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTV #1060 1331220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131220Z MAY 09

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019

TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)
¶1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida),

accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM
Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG
Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his
discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of
Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian
nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM
was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington.
In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been
provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and
Mossad on Iran's nuclear program. The intelligence presented
included assessments of the current status of the Iranian
program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the
international community; and outcomes of engagement. The
differences that exist between the intelligence community in
interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the
relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also
presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented
its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08
May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will
be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington.
Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined
that the PM appears determined on Iran.
¶2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the

differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG
Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group
and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile
program and a fissile program, there was no justification for
a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted
its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but
reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in
the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to
explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate
Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.

Cable Viewer
¶3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more

precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and
timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the
position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its
current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what
Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and
sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to
produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for
several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to
produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right
time in the future and that there are some who will always
doubt it despite the evidence.
¶4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of

engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement,
and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago
expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives
in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon
deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if
engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any
chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should
have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible
outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the
Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement
that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts
to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater
cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran
playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of
engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain
a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler
went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that
the President may have better leverage with the American
public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted
and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people
need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG
Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a
third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees
things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can
not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler
stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised
by the President's acceptance of all possible options in
regards to Iran.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1098, ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?




Discussing cables

2009-05-15 2010-12-01 Embassy Tel
09TELAVIV1098 UNCLASSIFIED
14:02 21:09 Aviv
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
VZCZCXYZ0018
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1845
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 2041
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC//INTD/CTD/CT WATCH//
RHMFIUU/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC 0068
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 7509
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 001098
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CORRECTED ADDEE)
DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C; CA/VO/L/A; CA/FPP SARAH SEXTON; INR/TIPOFF; DS

OFAC
ROME FOR DHS/ICE
CA/FPP: PLEASE PASS TO DOJ LISA HOLTYN AND BRUCE OHR

SIPDIS
E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: CVIS SNAR CMGT KFRD KCOR KCRM KTIP PINR IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL, A PROMISED LAND FOR ORGANISED CRIME?
Summary
---------
¶1. (SBU) Organized crime (OC) has longstanding roots in Israel,

but
in recent years there has been a sharp increase in the reach and
impact of OC networks. In seeking a competitive advantage in such
lucrative trades as narcotics and prostitution, Israeli crime
groups
have demonstrated their ability and willingness to engage in
violent
attacks on each other with little regard for innocent bystanders.
The Israeli National Police (INP) and the courts have engaged in a
vigorous campaign against organized crime leaders, including the
creation of a new specialized anti-OC unit, but they remain unable
to cope with the full scope of the problem. Organized crime in
Israel now has global reach, with direct impact inside the United
States. Post is currently utilizing all available tools to deny
Israeli OC figures access to the United States in order to prevent
them from furthering their criminal activities on U.S. soil. End
Summary.
Crime War Hits the Streets of Israel

-------------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) In November 2008, Israeli crime boss Yaakov Alperon was
assassinated in broad daylight in a gruesome attack on the streets
of Tel Aviv, only about a mile away from the Embassy. According to

Cable Viewer
several media accounts, a motor scooter pulled up alongside

Alperon's car and the rider attached a sophisticated explosive
device with a remote detonator to the car door. The bomb killed
Alperon and his driver, and injured two innocent pedestrians. The
hit was the latest in a series of violent attacks and reprisals,
and
indicated a widening crime war in Israel.
¶3. In July 2008, a 31-year-old Israeli woman was killed by a

stray
bullet on the beach in Bat Yam in front of her husband and two
children during a failed assassination attempt on noted crime
figure
Rami Amira. In a feud between the Abutbul and Shirazi clans, crime
boss Shalom "Charlie" Abutbul was shot by two gunmen in September
2008, an attack that also wounded three bystanders. In December
2008, Charlie Abutbul's son-in-law, Nati Ohayon, was gunned down
in
his car in Netanya. Before the fatal bombing of his car, Alperon
himself had survived at least three previous attempts on his life
before his assassination, and was engaged in an ongoing feud with
the rival Abergil clan (although there are numerous suspects in
Alperon's murder). The day after Alperon's death, two members of
the Abergil syndicate were sentenced for conspiring to kill
Alperon's brother, Nissim, in May 2008.
¶4. (SBU) In response to rising concerns for public safety, former

Prime Minister Olmert convened an emergency meeting of top law
enforcement officials, cabinet members, and prosecutors in
December
¶2008. He promised to add 1,000 officers to the INP and to
allocate
approximately NIS 340 million (USD 81 million) to improve the
INP's
technical capabilities. In general, the rise in OC-related
violence
has led some public figures to call for emergency state powers to
attack criminal organizations, and OC became a minor but important
issue in the February 2009 Knesset elections. Former Labor Party
MK
Ephraim Sneh publicly decried criminal extortion in his campaign
ads, only to have his car torched in apparent retaliation outside
his home in Herzliya.
Background
------------
¶5. (SBU) Organized criminal activity is not a new phenomenon in

Israel, and major crime families are well known to the Israeli
public (the Alperons even featured in a recent reality television
program). Five or six crime families have traditionally dominated
OC in Israel, although the names and makeup of these syndicates

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have
fluctuated in recent years. The Abergil, Abutbul, Alperon, and
Rosenstein organizations are among the most well known, but recent
arrests and assassinations have created a power vacuum at the top.
New names such as Mulner, Shirazi, Cohen and Domrani have moved
quickly to fill the gap. Other up-and-coming groups include the
Harari, Ohana, and Kdoshim families. There are also a number of
rival families active in the underworld of Israel's Arab sector.
¶6. (SBU) Traditional OC activities in Israel include illegal

neighborhood casinos, prostitution rings, extortion, and loan
sharking, with each family controlling a different geographic
region. The Alperon family, for instance, dominates the Sharon
region, while the Abutbul operation is based in the coastal city
of
Netanya. The focus is largely on easy money guaranteed by the
limited use of violence. Criminal involvement in the recycling
business, for example, has been well covered in the press. OC
families collect bottles illegally from municipal recycling bins

and
restaurants, return them at the collection centers claiming twice
the actual numbers, and pocket the change for millions in profits.
Not Your Grandfather's Mob

---------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Despite their notoriety, OC figures have generally been

viewed as a nuisance to be handled by local police. Law
enforcement
resources were directed to more existential security threats from
terrorists and enemy states. In recent years, however, the rules
of
the game have changed. According to xxxxx, the old school of
Israel
OC is giving way to a new, more violent, breed of crime. xxxxx
told conoffs that the new style of
crime features knowledge of hi-tech explosives acquired from
service
in the Israeli Defense Forces, and a willingness to use
indiscriminate violence, at least against rival gang leaders. New
OC business also includes technology-related crimes, such as stock
market and credit card fraud, and operates on a global scale.
¶8. (SBU) As the reach of Israeli OC has grown, so have the

stakes.
Crime families are working further from home and exporting
violence
abroad. Older gambling schemes have grown to include sprawling
casino franchises in Eastern Europe. The Abutbul family began its
gambling business in Romania over a decade ago, and now owns the
Europe-wide Casino Royale network. In 2002, Israeli OC turf wars

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spilled into Europe when Yaakov Abergil and Felix Abutbul were
killed two months apart. Abutbul was gunned down in front of his
casino in Prague in a show of force by the Abergils as they
attempted to capture a portion of the European gambling market.
¶9. (SBU) Israeli OC now plays a significant role in the global

drug
trade, providing both a local consumer market and an important
transit point to Europe and the United States. In 2004, Zeev
Rosenstein was arrested in Israel for possession of 700,000
ecstasy
tablets in his New York apartment, destined for distribution in
the
U.S. market. He was ultimately extradited to the United States in
2006, where he is currently serving a 12-year prison sentence. Two
other crime figures, Meir Abergil and Israel Ozifa, are also
facing
U.S. extradition charges on charges that include smuggling 100,000
ecstasy tablets into the United States.
¶10. (SBU) The prostitution business has also grown beyond the
neighborhood brothel. In March 2009, the INP arrested twelve
suspects in what is believed to be the largest Israeli-led human
trafficking network unearthed to date. Ring leader Rami Saban and
his associates were charged with smuggling thousands of women from
the former Soviet Union and forcing them to work as prostitutes in
Israel, Cyprus, Belgium, and Great Britain. Some women were flown
to Egypt and smuggled across the Sinai border by Bedouins.
Law Enforcement Steps up the Pressure

-------------------------------------
¶11. (SBU) After years of perceived inaction, in 2008 the INP
created a new unit called Lahav 433. The elite unit operates under
the direct command of the police commissioner, and is charged
specifically with infiltrating and eliminating Israel's major
crime
syndicates. Lahav 433 also cooperates closely with district
investigative units to combat smaller criminal organizations, many
of which are aligned with the larger crime families.
¶12. (SBU) Following Alperon's assassination, the INP initiated a

series of raids that led to the arrests of a number of leading
crime
figures. Among their targets were Aviv and Adam Abutbul, sons of
crime-family head Charlie Abutbul, both charged with possession of
illegal weapons. (A third brother, Francois, is already facing
murder charges for a nightclub killing in 2004.) Police also
arrested gangland figure Amir Mulner for weapons possession and
conspiracy to commit a crime. Mulner is known to be an explosives
expert by army training, and is a suspect in Yaakov Alperon's
murder. He is also believed to be managing affairs for Rosenstein

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while the latter serves his sentence in the United States.
¶13. (SBU) Yaakov Alperon's brother Nissim was arrested with 18

others in December 2008, in what was reported to be a "mafia
meeting" in a Tel Aviv-area caf. According to the Jerusalem Post,
the group may have been planning a revenge attack for his
brother's
recent assassination. Alperon's son Dror, recently dismissed from
his army service for disorderly behavior, also faces several
counts
of assault and was convicted on extortion charges. Also in
December, police in Netanya launched several raids on illegal
gambling houses and the homes of suspected money launderers with
ties to the crime families. In Ashdod, brothers Roni and David
Harari were arrested on charges of extortion. Regional police
stuck
a blow against the Jerusalem Gang, and convicted its leader Itzik
Bar Muha.
Skepticism Hovers Over GOI Efforts

----------------------------------
¶14. (SBU)xxxxx told conoffs that

"thousands of foot soldiers" remain active on the streets despite
these aggressive anti-OC operations. He noted that approximately
2,000 people attended Alperon's very public funeral. xxxxx
expressed skepticism that recent arrests will bear fruit in the
long
term without a sustained commitment to enforcement. He noted that
many of the crime leaders remain active while in prison and their
operations are not hampered significantly even when they are
convicted and jailed.
¶15. (SBU) In December 2008, former Prime Minister Olmert himself
admitted that efforts to combat OC have long been diluted among
different agencies, and that INP technology lags far behind that
allocated to security services for counterterrorism. Given the
recent change in government and the current economic crisis, there
is public skepticism as to whether GOI promises to remedy the
situation will be fulfilled. In 2003, following a failed
assassination attempt on Rosenstein, then Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon made similar promises to commit manpower and resources to
combating the problem.
¶16. (SBU) It is not entirely clear to what extent OC elements

have
penetrated the Israeli establishment and corrupted public
officials.
The INP insists that such instances are rare, despite the
occasional revelation of crooked police officers in the press.
Nevertheless, there have been several dramatic revelations in
recent

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years that indicate a growing problem. In 2004, former government

minister Gonen Segev was arrested for trying to smuggle thousands
of
ecstasy pills into Israel, a case that produced considerable
circumstantial evidence of his involvement in OC. The election of
Inbal Gavrieli to the Knesset in 2003 as a member of Likud raised
concerns about OC influence in the party's Central Committee.
Gavrieli is the daughter of a suspected crime boss, and she
attempted to use her parliamentary immunity to block
investigations
into her father's business. (Gavrieli is no longer a member of the
Knesset.) Just last month, Israeli politicos and OC figures came
together for the funeral of Likud party activist Shlomi Oz, who
served time in prison in the 1990s for extortion on behalf of the
Alperon family. Among those in attendance was Omri Sharon, son of
former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was himself convicted in
2006 on illegal fundraising charges unrelated to OC.
Courts Testing New Powers

--------------------------
¶17. (SBU) In 2003, the GOI passed anti-OC legislation that

carries
a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for heading a criminal
organization and three years for working in such an organization.
The law defines such a body as a group of people working in an
"organized, methodical and ongoing pattern to commit offenses that
are defined by the laws of Israel as crimes." The law also allows
for property forfeiture, both in the wake of conviction and in
cases
where it is proven to belong to a criminal organization.
¶18. (SBU) Until recently, xxxxx, judges and lawyers have been
slow to make use of this authority, and are hampered by a lack of
resources, insufficient understanding of the tools at their
disposal, and reticence to mete out tough sentences. A witness
protection program for those who testify against OC is just now
getting off the ground, and is not backed by any specific
legislation. Nevertheless, on March 16th, a Tel Aviv district
court
took the important step of sentencing 14 convicted criminals
belonging to two mob organizations in Ramle and Jaffa to up to 27
years in prison.
¶19. (SBU) Increased efforts by Israeli authorities to combat OC

have engendered retaliatory threats of violence. Recent press
reports indicate that as many as 10 Israeli judges are currently
receiving 24-hour protection by the police against the threat of
violence from members of crime organizations. Israeli OC appears
to
be intent on intimidating judges personally, as a way of
influencing

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the legal process. Judges in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa have
been assigned police protection, underscoring the depth of the
problem.
Israeli Crime Reaches American Shores

--------------------------------------
¶20. (SBU) Israel's multi-ethnic population provides a deep well

of
opportunity for Israeli OC to expand into new territory. Most
Israeli crime families trace their roots to North Africa or
Eastern
Europe, and many of their Israeli operatives hold foreign
passports
allowing them to move freely in European countries, most of which
participate in the visa waiver program with the United States.
Approximately one million Russians moved to Israel following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, and Russian citizens no longer
require visas to enter Israel. Many Russian oligarchs of Jewish
origin and Jewish members of OC groups have received Israeli
citizenship, or at least maintain residences in the country.
Little
is known about the full extent of Russian criminal activity in
Israel, but sources in the police estimate that Russian OC has
laundered as much as USD 10 billion through Israeli holdings.
While
most Israeli OC families are native-born and the stereotype that
Russian immigrants tend to be mobsters is greatly overblown,
indigenous OC groups routinely employ "muscle" from the former
Soviet Union.
¶21. (SBU) The profit motive serves as a great unifier among

Israel's diverse demographic groups. According to xxxxx, some
Amsterdam-based Hasidic groups allegedly are implicated in
international drug smuggling through links to Israeli OC. Arab and
Jewish Israeli criminals routinely cooperate and form alliances to
expand control of lucrative drug, car theft and extortion rackets.
Even hostile and closed borders pose few obstacles to OC groups.
According to the INP, 43% of intercepted heroin in 2008 was
smuggled
from Lebanon, 37% from Jordan, and 12% from Egypt.
Israeli OC Operating Freely in United States

---------------------------------------------
¶22. (SBU) Given the volume of travel and trade between the United
States and Israel, it is not surprising that Israeli OC has also
gained a foothold in America. Over the last decade, media reports
have detailed a number of high-profile cases involving Israeli OC,
ranging from large-scale drug deals to murder. The ongoing Central
District of California grand jury investigation against the
Abergil

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family, where a RICO conspiracy case was initiated in December

2007,
best demonstrates the full extent of such criminal activity.
Investigators have linked Yitzhak Abergil and his entire network
to
crimes of "embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping, and money
laundering." Yitzhak Abergil is currently under arrest in Israel
and facing extradition for related charges linking him to the
murder
of Israeli drug dealer Samy Attias on U.S. soil.
¶23. (SBU) As part of an ongoing effort to track Israeli OC

through
media reports and police sources, Post so far has identified 16
families and 78 related individuals who are at the center of
Israeli
organized criminal activity. The consular section has revoked
several visas for those who have been convicted of crimes in
Israel,
but many OC figures have no prior criminal convictions and carry
no
visa ineligibilities. As a result, many hold valid nonimmigrant
visas to the United States and have traveled freely or attempted
to
travel for a variety of purposes.
¶24. (SBU) In March 2009, Post received information from law

enforcement authorities that convicted criminal and member of the
Abergil organization, Mordechai Yair Hasin, along with his
pregnant
wife and child, was intending to flee Israel for Los Angeles on
valid tourist visas. Hasin's visa was revoked based on his
conviction, as were his family's visas after they were determined
to
be intending immigrants.
¶25. (SBU) As in the Hasin case, Post is using every available
tool
to limit OC travel to the United States, but such efforts are not
always successful. In June 2008, Post issued Adam Abitbul a valid
tourist visa. Abitbul had no prior criminal convictions, and
carried no visa ineligibilities. Several months later, Post
received information from the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
that he had traveled to the United States to carry out a hit.
Abitbul returned to Israel prematurely for his father's funeral,
at
which time Post revoked his visa. (Post can only revoke the visas
of
Israeli citizens while in country.) In a similar case, in October
2008 Post issued Moshe Bar Muha a tourist visa; he claimed to be
traveling for medical treatment. Post subsequently received
information from the LAPD that Bar Muha is in fact the brother of

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Itzik Bar Muha of the Jerusalem Gang (see above) and a convicted
criminal.
¶26. (SBU) As recently as March 2009, Zvika Ben Shabat, Yaacov

Avitan, and Tzuri Rokah requested visas to attend a
"security-related convention" in Las Vegas. According to local
media reports, all three had involvement with OC. Post asked the
applicants to provide police reports for any criminal records in
Israel, but without such evidence there is no immediate
ineligibility for links to OC. Luckily, all three have so far
failed to return for continued adjudication of their applications.
Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that many known OC figures hold
valid tourist visas to the United States and travel freely.
Comment: Israeli OC Slipping Through the Consular Cracks

--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶27. (SBU) Given the growing reach and lethal methods of Israeli
OC,
blocking the travel of known OC figures to the United States is a
matter of great concern to Post. Through collaboration with
Israeli
and U.S. law enforcement authorities, Post has developed an
extensive database and placed lookouts for OC figures and their
foot
soldiers. Nevertheless, the above visa cases demonstrate the
challenges that have arisen since the termination of the Visas
Shark
in September 2008. Unlike OC groups from the former Soviet Union,
Italy, China, and Central America, application of INA
212(a)(3)(A)(ii) against Israeli OC is not specifically authorized
per Foreign Affairs Manual 40.31 N5.3. As such, Israelis who are
known to work for or belong to OC families are not automatically
ineligible for travel to the United States.
Cunningham

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1177, CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH

DEFENSE



Discussing cables

2009-06-02 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
06:06 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO8024
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1177/01 1530619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020619Z JUN 09

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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV MOPS IR KWBG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS CASEY AND ACKERMAN MEET WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER BARAK
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Post hosted two CODELS during the week of
May 25: one from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee led
by Senator Casey, the other from the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs led by Congressman Ackerman. Both
delegations met with Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who
conveyed similar points on the Peace Process and Israel's
concerns about Iran. End summary.
Peace Process
-------------
¶2. (C) Barak began his meeting with the Casey delegation by
apologizing for being late due to what he described as an
"internal debate" at the Prime Minister's office regarding
the development of a response to President Obama's upcoming
speech in Cairo. He noted there are "perceived gaps" between
the USG and the GOI regarding the Peace Process, and
explained the GOI's internal debate is focused primarily on
how to ensure that the U.S. and Israel "trust each other."
Barak expressed confidence that PM Netanyahu is sincere in
wanting to "seize this opportunity and move forward" with the
Palestinians, but alluded to members of the coalition who do
not agree with this course of action.
¶3. (C) From his perspective, Barak told the Casey delegation
that the GOI was in no position to dictate policy to the
Palestinians or the USG regarding the Peace Process -- "it
takes two to tango, and three to negotiate," he said. Barak
noted that it is the GOI's responsibility to ensure that "no
stone is left unturned" regarding the Peace Process; if
efforts to achieve peace ultimately fail, then the GOI must
be able to state that every effort was pursued. He said he
personally had no objection to "two states for two nations,"
and panned Arab arguments for a bi-national state in Israel.
Barak said Israel envisions "two peoples living side by side

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in peace and good neighborliness" as the final goal.
¶4. (C) With the Ackerman delegation, Barak focused on the

need for a regional approach to the peace process. He
supports a regional initiative for peace and cooperation for
the entire Middle East region to be launched by Israel. He
stressed as well the need to build trust and convince the
U.S. administration that the new Israeli government is
"serious in its efforts toward peace."
¶5. (C) Barak commented on political developments in the West

Bank and Gaza in both meetings. He said the GOI continues to
review its policy, and then added that the Palestinian
Authority has much to accomplish in terms of law enforcement,
a functioning judiciary, and regaining control of Gaza before
a "balanced" Palestinian state can be created. He has been
extremely impressed with the work of U.S. Security
Coordinator Gen. Dayton training PA security forces, and
commended Salam Fayyad's concrete, practical approach.
¶6. (C) Barak made clear in these meetings that he feels the
Palestinian Authority is weak and lacks self-confidence, and
that Gen. Dayton's training helps bolster confidence. He
explained that the GOI had consulted with Egypt and Fatah
prior to Operation Cast Lead, asking if they were willing to
assume control of Gaza once Israel defeated Hamas. Not
surprisingly, Barak said, the GOI received negative answers
from both. He stressed the importance of continued
consultations with both Egypt and Fatah -- as well as the NGO
community -- regarding Gaza reconstruction, and to avoid
publicly linking any resolution in Gaza to the release of
kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Iran/North Korea
----------------
¶7. (C) In his meeting with CODEL Casey, Barak said the GOI
believes its "keystone" relations with the USG remain strong.
He described the integral role the USG plays in preserving
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), especially when
faced with threats posed by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. He
noted that the GOI's positions on Iran are well known, and
described North Korea's recent nuclear test as a "second
wake-up call" (the first being the AQ Khan network). Barak
asked rhetorically how a lack of firm response to North Korea
would be interpreted by Iran's leadership, speculating the
USG would be viewed as a "paper tiger."
¶8. (C) In both meetings, Barak said "no option should be

removed from the table" when confronting Iran and North
Korea; engagement will only work in conjunction with a
credible military option, he said. Barak said he was

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TEL AVIV 00001177 002 OF 002
personally skeptical that engagement would lead to an

acceptable resolution, and argued in favor of a paradigm
shift to confront the triple threat posed by nuclear
proliferation, Islamic extremist terrorism, and rogue/failing
states. He said a strategic partnership with China, Russia,
India, and the EU is essential in facing these threats.
Barak argued that failure to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran
would result in a nuclear arms race in the region as Turkey,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia look to acquire nuclear weapons.
¶9. (C) When asked if the USG and GOI have fundamental
differences of opinion when assessing Iran's nuclear program,
Barak said we share the same intelligence, but acknowledged
differences in analysis. He suggested that the USG view is
similar to presenting evidence in a criminal court case in
which a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
As such, USG standards are tougher -- especially following
the failure to find WMD in Iraq -- while end-products such as
the 2007 NIE unintentionally take on a softer tone as a
result. Barak said the fate of the region and the world
rests on our ability to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear
weapons -- as such, the standards for determining guilt
should be lower as the costs are higher.
¶10. (C) In both meetings, Barak described Iranians as "chess,

not backgammon players." As such, Iran will attempt to avoid
any hook to hang accusations on, and look to Pakistan and
North Korea as models to emulate in terms of acquiring
nuclear weapons while defying the international community.
He doubted Tehran would opt for an open, relatively
low-threshold test like the recent one in North Korea.
Rather, Iran will seek ways to bypass the NPT while ensuring
its program is redundant and well-protected to prevent an
irreparable military strike. Barak estimated a window
between 6 and 18 months from now in which stopping Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons might still be viable. After that,
he said, any military solution would result in unacceptable
collateral damage. He also expressed concern that should
Iran develop nuclear capabilities, other rogue states and/or
terrorist groups would not be far behind.
Pakistan
--------
¶11. (C) Barak reinforced his message regarding Pakistan in

both meetings. He described Pakistan as his "private
nightmare," suggesting the world might wake up one morning
"with everything changed" following a potential Islamic

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extremist takeover. When asked if the use of force on Iran

might backfire with moderate Muslims in Pakistan, thereby
exacerbating the situation, Barak acknowledged Iran and
Pakistan are interconnected, but disagreed with a causal
chain. To the contrary, he argued that if the United States
had directly confronted North Korea in recent years, others
would be less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons programs.
By avoiding confrontation with Iran, Barak argued, the U.S.
faces a perception of weakness in the region.
¶12. (U) CODELS Casey and Ackerman did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1184, CODELS ACKERMAN AND CASEY MEETINGS WITH

PRIME



Discussing cables

2009-06-02 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
13:01 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO8379
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1184/01 1531325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021325Z JUN 09

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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR KWBG EG IS
SUBJECT: CODELS ACKERMAN AND CASEY MEETINGS WITH PRIME
MINISTER NETANYAHU
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4

(b),(
d)
¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Ackerman and Casey met separately May
26 and 27 with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The Prime
Minister discussed his visit to Washington, focusing on his
discussions of Iran, a regional approach in support of
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and his approach to the
Palestinians and settlements, including his opposition to a
complete freeze on settlement construction. Netanyahu said
he was pleased with President Obama's approach to engagement
with Iran and on a regional component to peacemaking. On the
Palestinians, he reiterated his view that the Palestinian
Authority (PA) must declare its recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state, and also reviewed his thinking on the
importance of security for Israelis and his support for
increased Arab private investment in the West Bank. On
settlements, Netanyahu said he would take action against
illegal outposts and would not build new settlements or
confiscate more Palestinian land, but he insisted that he
would not support a complete freeze on construction, and
noted that his advisers would try to close the gap with the
U.S. on this issue. Members of the CODELs pressed Netanyahu
on the importance of finding ways to strengthen PA President
Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, as well as to address
humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Gaza. End summary.
Washington Visit
----------------
¶2. (S) Prime Minister Netanyahu told CODEL Ackerman that he

did not feel boxed in politically and that his coalition in
fact reflects the demands of the Israeli public to address
their concern about security. While some argue that
agreements bring security, Netanyahu said Israel's experience
of the past fifteen years proved that neither agreements nor
unilateral withdrawals brought security. Netanyahu said he
had told President Obama that while he would not condition

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negotiations with the Palestinians on halting Iran's progress

toward a nuclear weapon, if Iran obtained such a weapon it
would destroy any progress made toward peace. He added that
Egyptian President Mubarak and Jordanian King Abdullah were
in complete agreement with him on that point.
¶3. (S) For the sake of both security and peace, the first
task is to stop Iran's nuclear program. Netanyahu noted that
the President had assured him that by the end of the year,
the U.S. will decide whether engagement is working and that
the goal is to stop Iran's program. The President told him
that all options remain on the table, a point confirmed by
Secretaries Clinton and Gates. Netanyahu said he and Mubarak
agreed that a nuclear Iran would lead others in the region to
develop nuclear weapons, resulting in the biggest threat to
non-proliferation efforts since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This "nightmare scenario" is well understood in Washington,
he said.
¶4. (C) Turning to peace efforts, Netanyahu said the

President is bringing a fresh approach to regional peace
whereby the Arabs would enhance the Israeli-Palestinian
track. It will be especially important to get the Saudis on
board, he added. On the two-state solution, Netanyahu noted
that the President had stressed his support for two states.
He had told the President that Israelis did not want to rule
Palestinians. Netanyahu said he was prepared for
"arrangements" with the Palestinians that would entail some
limits on their sovereignty such as no Palestinian army, and
Israeli control over borders, airspace, and the
electromagnetic spectrum. Netanyahu asserted that seventy to
eighty percent of Israelis are ready to make concessions for
peace but they do not believe they have a Palestinian partner
since Hamas is in control of Gaza and Iran has a base on
Israel's border. How can there be peace without a new
situation in Gaza, he asked.
¶5. (C) Turning to settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had

told the President that both Israel and the Palestinians had
unfulfilled Roadmap commitments. Without elaborating, he
noted that there were written and oral understandings between
President Bush and Prime Ministers Sharon and Olmert on the
Roadmap. In Gaza, Israel dismantled twenty-seven settlements
but got six thousand rockets from Hamas in return.
Support the PA
--------------
¶6. (C) Chairman Ackerman commented that President Abbas and

Prime Minister Fayyad are necessary for progress, and noted
that both Israel and the U.S. will be in trouble if they are
replaced. Something needs to be done to help them stay in

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power. They need material support but also the promise of
TEL AVIV 00001184 002 OF 003
statehood. Foreign investment in the West Bank would give a

real horizon as well. Netanyahu agreed, saying Gulf Arab
investors had been successful in transforming their own
societies and could make a great contribution to the
Palestinians. He added that he wanted to bring Gulf
investors into the West Bank since they would change reality
for the Palestinians but also give Israelis confidence.
Ackerman responded that this was a great idea, but it should
come from Abbas, not Israel. The more credit Abbas can take
for steps forward, the better.
¶7. (C) In response to a question about the PA security

forces' capabilities, Netanyahu commented that he supports
the PA's desire to keep Hamas at a distance. A national
unity government without Hamas' acceptance of the Quartet
conditions would serve Hamas' interests, adding that Israel
has a common interest with the PA to prevent a Hamas takeover
of the West Bank. Netanyahu said there is a steady flow of
Iranian weapons to Gaza through Sudan or Syria and then by
sea, but he said Egypt's performance in stopping the tunnels
has improved now that Cairo understands that the Iranian arms
pipeline is a direct threat to Egypt as well.
¶8. (C) On the economic side, Netanyahu said he wants to

establish a joint plan with the PA to improve conditions in
the West Bank. He cited Cyprus as an example of economic
prosperity leading to reduced political tensions. Sen.
Lautenberg pushed Netanyahu to &put Israel,s best face
forward8 in the West Bank, and to work with the PA on water
issues, conservation and health, where Israel could
contribute a great deal and there are many opportunities to
build cooperation that would benefit people. Netanyahu
responded that his ministerial committee on improving the
lives of Palestinians in the West Bank met earlier in the day
and that he is committed to overcoming the turf wars and
excessive caution that have undercut development efforts in
the West Bank in the past. He said the GOI is looking at
creative ideas, such as how to facilitate tourism to Jericho,
advance projects in water and agriculture, in addition to
promoting business (note: he estimated that there are 100
projects Israel is examining in the West Bank). &It is
beyond belief8 what can be done in the West Bank, he said,
but he hoped the PA would engage with Israel on these
efforts. Netanyahu added that the fact that there had not
been any large anti-Israel demonstrations in the West Bank
during Operation Cast Lead meant that Palestinians in the
West Bank want a better life, not confrontation with Israel.

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¶9. (C) Representative Ellison, noting that he is the first

Muslim to be elected to Congress, said he visited Gaza in
February and met with NGO representatives who could deliver
assistance without the credit going to Hamas. He urged
Netanyahu to consider opening the Gaza crossings, adding that
Gazans he had met told him they want peace and would like to
get their jobs back in Israel. Netanyahu responded that he
is looking at ways to balance Israeli security with enabling
Gazans to have a normal life. The flow of money and weapons
to Hamas remains a problem since Hamas is extending the range
and payload of the rockets it possesses. In response to
Representative Ellison's comment that Israel should allow
USAID to return to Gaza, Netanyahu said he thought that it
might be a good thing to have USAID operate in Gaza.
Settlements and Outposts

------------------------
¶10. (C) Netanyahu said that illegal outposts were a legal

question and his government would enforce the law. The
outposts should be removed through dialogue with the GOI if
possible, but it should be done in any case. Regarding
settlements, Netanyahu said he wants to work with the U.S. on
the basis of the understandings reached with the Bush
Administration, i.e. that Israel will not build new
settlements or seize more land, but if families grow, they
will still have the right to build within existing settlement
boundaries. Now Israel is hearing that the U.S. wants no
construction at all. Israelis consider this position to be
unfair, he said. The question is whether the U.S. is seeking
a geographic or a demographic restriction on settlements.
¶11. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel needs a common
understanding with the U.S. The U.S. position should be
"reasonable," since opposition to a total freeze cuts across
political parties in Israel. This is more of an issue with
the U.S. than with the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted,
arguing that the PA will go along if there is an
understanding between Israel and the U.S. He noted that
Israeli officials were meeting with U.S. officials on this
issue, adding that there could be an understanding if the
U.S. wants one. Netanyahu commented that he understood there
should be no land seizures, but he could not tell settlers
TEL AVIV 00001184 003 OF 003
not to have children. In response to a question about GOI

incentives to settlers, Netanyahu's adviser Ron Dermer said
the Olmert government had already removed them. Netanyahu
said this was an issue that Israel could discuss further with

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the U.S.
Iranian Threat
--------------
¶12. (S) Chairman Ackerman said that in his meetings with

Arab leaders, he found them all concerned about Iran. They
said it would helpful to resolve the Palestinian issue, but
Israel-Palestine is not the main threat to the region.
Netanyahu, following a similar comment during his meeting
with CODEL Casey, responded that there are no Arab leaders
who would tell the U.S. to wait on Iran until there is a
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Ackerman also
explained that the U.S. will try engagement in order to
prevent an unwise and premature use of force. We will
tighten sanctions at the same time, for which we need the
support of the international community, Ackerman explained.
Netanyahu noted that Ahmadinejad had said he would not stop
Iran's nuclear program. President Obama had been clear in
his comments to Netanyahu that U.S. engagement would be
results-oriented and not open-ended. If engagement did not
work, the U.S. would gain the moral high ground, which would
help make economic pressure more effective. Ackerman agreed
that more pressure was needed and said we need to figure out
what the Russians and others want. Netanyahu said that in
contrast to North Korea, the Iranian nuclear and missile
programs were direct threats to Israel, Europe and U.S.
interests in the Gulf, and he emphasized that the program was
not defensive in nature. In response to a question from
Representative Jackson-Lee, Netanyahu encouraged quick action
on a bill in the Congress to pressure foreign oil companies
not to sell refined petroleum to Iran. This might not be
enough to stop Iran's program but it would send a strong
signal. Netanyahu also urged that the U.S. demand that Iran
stop all uranium enrichment since enrichment is the main
element of their program. He commented that Iran might try
to use the talks with the U.S. to continue or accelerate
their enrichment process. Netanyahu cautioned that he was
skeptical of the idea that the Iranian leadership could
change. They have a dangerous worldview, a violent
theocracy, but it may be possible to move them if they find
the U.S. strong and determined. Iran, he commented, is bent
on becoming a global and not just a regional power.
¶13. (U) CODELS Ackerman and Casey did not have the
opportunity to clear this message.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************

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********************
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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV1688, PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL




Discussing cables

2009-07-30 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
10:10 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #1688/01 2111023

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301023Z JUL 09
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6300

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RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5784
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6619
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 2806
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO'S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military

Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on
July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli
political-military relationship, and to discuss among other
issues Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI
interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to
review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress,
and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on
potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect,
the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on
August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential
F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to
express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to
Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss
U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese
Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns
over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any
policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher
sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to
other "options on the table." Other issues raised by GOI
officials included the Peace Process, Israel's export control
system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides
agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November
in Israel. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director
General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos
Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu,
and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5
Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At

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the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General
Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by
Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and
Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also
participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited
Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.
U.S.-Israeli Relationship
-------------------------
¶3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the

U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the
significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in
his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the
Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors
appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this
important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG
Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in
the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting
the number of misunderstandings in the future.
Qualitative Military Edge

-------------------------
¶4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining

Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that
Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate
Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and
prefers such sales originate from the United States instead
of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel
continues to stress the importance of identifying potential
risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for
this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the
official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S.
arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).
¶5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in
reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress.
A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an
assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not
releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to
the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and
welcomed any comments the GOI might have -- although such
comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the
report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated
the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it
was difficult to comment on the report's results without
reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that
respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the
QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.
¶6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that

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moderate Arab countries could in the future become

adversaries -- and that this should be taken into account in
the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the
MFA's Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar,
the MFA's Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs
on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the
argument that these countries could become future foes.
Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession
concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a
perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and
Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel
moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a
fixture in the region.
¶7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos

Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President
Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was
ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military
led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and
exercise as if "Israel was its only enemy." He added that
there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women
are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel
"is too thin, too superficial." On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said
that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief
priority is the survival of the regime.
¶8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer

non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential
transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including
the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System,
and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a
working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an
Israeli technical team accompany BG Heymann to Washington (in
town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss
the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was
not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on
the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.
Lebanon
-------
¶9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the
opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the
LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections
represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and
its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese
institutions, including the army, was now more important than
ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far
demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems
transferred to Lebanon.

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¶10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon

were positive, but countered that Hizballah's influence
remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna
Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack
sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential
for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad
said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel.
However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was
certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict
with Hizballah.
¶11. (S) Analysts from the MFA's Center for Policy Research
argued there has been no dramatic change in the political
arena despite the March 14 coalition's significant victory in
the elections. They said the fragile political situation in
Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an
unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be
tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah's desire for a
reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy
Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces
tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a
Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA
DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from
investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing
by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese
and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations
had praised the GOI's restraint in these cases.
¶12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be

the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community
against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered
that the results were indicative of several factors,
including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable
opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah
might be a bit chastened following the elections, as
suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try
and undermine the March 14 coalition.
¶13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG Heymann also

acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However,
he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF
must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about
ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also
said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt
smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.
¶14. (S) BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation

measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an
"accidental engagement" by the IAF. Overall, he was
skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said
the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation

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regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with

respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to
coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in
Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro
offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it
proved too difficult on short notice to bring together
interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF,
A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political
Military Group talks later in the fall.
Iran
----
¶15. (S) Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI's

primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear
to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In
separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel's
preeminent priority is to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons
program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race
across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt
pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical
that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to

"establish a new empire" and pointing to Iranian support for
Hizballah and "Hamastan." Buchris added that the United
States' desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by
tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of
time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military
strike, Buchris said "all options must remain on the table,"
and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was
ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it
may be.
¶16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was
unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary
Clinton's July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on
Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran
-- but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S
Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to
engage will only help bolster international support for
increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain
situation following the Iranian elections -- it was unclear
at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our
offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the
engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United
States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later
this fall.
¶17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the

Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat --
we should take advantage of this commonality, he said.
During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors

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expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the

Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated
for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear
and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that
assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel's QME,
but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well
as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also
helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie
with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.
¶18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special

envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not
believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris
that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary
Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran
has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special
envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S
Shapiro said -- in any case, much of the discussion will be
behind the scenes.
¶19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary

Clinton's trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States
would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab
countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already
conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy
Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised
the Secretary's Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that
the Secretary's comments did not indicate a new policy
approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions -- not as a concession -- and that
journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of
the statement than was intended.
¶20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia's potential sale of the

S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian
interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran,
and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the
system would not be delivered for political reasons.
However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this
political calculation should the United States continue to
pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech
Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to
put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue
alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear
committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,
but he personally had doubts about their intelligence
capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the
Syrian nuclear project.
Peace Process
-------------

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¶21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority

was doing a "good job" in the West Bank, noting respect for
Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control
of security -- giving them the chance to succeed was
important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of
United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training
the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be
difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah.
Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled -- Amos
Gilad said both sides are "more interested in swallowing one
another" than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions
with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have
not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred
to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell's efforts, but noted
Secretary Clinton's point that a stronger PA will offer an
alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton's
remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will
not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet
principles.
Export Control
--------------
¶22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief

Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an
improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for
improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli
export controls, including enhanced legislation,
cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and
increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780
registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing
licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219
returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey
Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on
export licenses, and explained the system's dispute
resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on
a particular case.
¶23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI
continues to seek assistance in closing export control
loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering
had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that
accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered
in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws,
and planned to raise it during the annual defense export
control working group to be held in Washington in October.
Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to
Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering
issues.

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China
-----
¶24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated

that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national
interests with respect to exports to China. He noted,
however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007
a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated
end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same
exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently
stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the
bilateral statement of understanding with the United States.
While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any
requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to
obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often
found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the
Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day
turn-around on all export license requests -- which is not
possible, given the length of time required to obtain an
answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise
the issue in Washington.
JPMG
----
¶25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint
Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the
Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November.
GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the
calendar and propose dates.
¶26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.
*********************************************
********************
*********************************************
********************
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2482, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW

MEETS WITH



Discussing cables

2009-11-16 2010-11-28 SECRET// Embassy Tel
09TELAVIV2482
08:08 18:06 NOFORN Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #2482/01 3200855

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 160855Z NOV 09

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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WSHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA FOR A/S FELTMAN; NSC FO DAN SHAPIRO; OSD FOR USD-P
FLOURNOY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
IS
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of

Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
(MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its "axis"
with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas's future, given
his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
SUMMARY
-------------------

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Bilateral Relations
-------------------
¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow's trip to Israel came as a number of

high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD's visit
also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
Israel's QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.
¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel's assessment of

recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
Israel's security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
often clash with broader American security interests in the
region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as "the
effective process plus the right mitigations." While not
explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
process that incorporates "intimate dialogue." DG Buchris
thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
that the technical working group discussions would be
launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
Israeli participation on this issue.
------------------------
Iran Remains Top of Mind
------------------------
¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that

Iran's nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
and HAMAS.
¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment

of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

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rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take

Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
supporting "HAMAStan" in Gaza and "Hezbollahstan" in Lebanon.
Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials

about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
proposal and Iran's recent equivocation on the agreement.
Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
for Iran if it legitimized in the world's eyes Iran's right
to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
officials expressed surprise about Iran's apparent reversal
on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
nuclear weapons capability.
¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran's
response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
likely begin pursuing the pressure track.
¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran's

support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that

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there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,

Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
emphasized Iran's role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
Minister Netanyahu's "secret" visit to Moscow and President
Obama's engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians' signals
on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
Qom facility.
-------------------
West Bank and Gaza
-------------------
¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the

subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
assessment of Abbas's future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take
difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk

away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues --
specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.
¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political

discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern

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that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,

and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
unacceptable, and would result in the loss of "strategic
depth" for Israel.
¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to

soley focus on the short-term "here and now," but rathr to
envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
Bank could have for Israel's secrity situation in the
future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
coud serve as a "magnet" and help solve the Gaza problem.
He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
information operations campaign to better communicate with
the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
the territories, but reinforced Israel's core belief that
HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel's
concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel's
biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation --

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concepts that are never realized -- are only resulting in a

climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
Gilad mentioned that Egypt's role in pushing reconciliation
is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
junctures.
¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris

emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS's
deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was

necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.
--------------------
Anxiety Over Turkey
--------------------
¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over

the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
of Israel's participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan's
views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
understandable as Turkey's EU accession prospects look
increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
with both regions to succeed.
¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to

contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks' agenda
was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
term, but that Israel would continue to foster the

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military-to-military relationship because of its strategic

importance.
¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
mediator. He also commented that Erdogan's ideological views
may lead him to focus on Turkey's Islamic neighbors, but he
is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey's
ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.
----------------------------
Quiet on the Northern Border
----------------------------
¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the "quiet"

nature of its northern border -- something they attribute to
the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.
¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over

developments within Hezbollah -- specifically, its
relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel's
calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for

Israeli policymakers then becomes: "to strike or not to
strike."

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-----------------
Optimism on Syria
-----------------
¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence

assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
away from Iran's orbit. He explained that President Assad
used his "negative assets," namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah's and
Iran's flexibility would be significantly reduced.
-------------------------------
Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
-------------------------------
¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a

complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
Egypt and Israel's "frozen peace" and that neither side knows
anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
military visit for Egypt was in 1991.
¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt's

counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
assistance along borders with Egypt.
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra - Strengthening the Relationship
--------------------------------------------- ---------------
¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General

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Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,

stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
technological advancements have made the system much more
viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
additional USG support to help fund additional production of
Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
(Arrow-3 and David's Sling, respectively). In an earlier
meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
Israel and, therefore, every effort to
stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
be taken.
¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz's initial
impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent
developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile

defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
cooperation, but stated that Russia's realization that the
new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
ask many questions about the system.
-------
Summary
-------
¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow's interlocutors carried a

consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel's
greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
relative calm on all Israel's borders does not obscure the
fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
calm to end one day.

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¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2500, 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE


2009-11-18 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER EG CH IR RU SA LE TU IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE
SESSION (PART 1 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th

Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli
counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new
Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI
interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued
pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the
disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants
expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation
with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also
raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to
sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey's
disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran -- and away
from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels)
reporting on the JPMG. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director

General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs
-- Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff

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-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian

and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
Qualitative Military Edge

-------------------------
¶3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the

September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in
Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of
contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing
on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale
to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and
intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working
on the details of each working group's meeting schedule and
timeline.
¶4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15
sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG
is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale
until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request
(LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about
stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the
northwest corner of Saudi Arabia -- close to the Israeli
border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that
this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering
stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also
raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained
that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with
capabilities similar to the C-5 version -- and therefore
provides little to no increase in capabilities.
Iran, China and Russia

----------------------
¶5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent

revelation regarding Iran's nuclear facility at Qom, and
agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and
internationally against Iran in order to better determine
Tehran's motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the
facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member
of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some
consideration be given to "shutting Qom operations down
completely" to prevent further progress on obtaining a
nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the
international community not become bogged down on the Tehran
Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from
TEL AVIV 00002500 002 OF 002

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the bigger issue of Iran's nuclear program.
¶6. (S) Several questions were raised about China's position

on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides
agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is
needed -- as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG
speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow
Moscow's lead. USG participants argued that China would seek
to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI
described 2010 as a critical year -- if the Iranians continue
to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more
difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then
discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting
bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled
quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping
Israel prepare for a strike against Iran.
¶7. (S) The GOI made the case for "crippling sanctions";
cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and
China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be
effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that
any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG
will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making
progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the
Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are
visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described
eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to "pivot to
apply appropriate pressure" on those points and tracks that
have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010
is a critical year -- but the continued application of
pressure is vital.
¶8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that
Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort -- GOI
participants opined that Russia is considered a "mystery"
with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the
Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still
pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return
to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends
regarding Russia's internal condition.
Dual Citizenship Issues

-----------------------
¶9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within
the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S.
participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the
issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to
reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended
obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which
Canada or Australia benefit.

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Turkey
------
¶10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government
of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran -- and away from
Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been
supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more "Islamic"
direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower.
The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its
ability to influence government decisions and strategic
direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they
have a "bad feeling" about Turkey. The GOI noted that the
Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak
to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish
counterpart declined.
¶11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.

CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2502, 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF

4)



Discussing cables

2009-11-18 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military

Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
behavior -- Iran will use the engagement process as an
opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not "open
ended"; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
learned regarding confronting terrorists in
civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
JPMG. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:
-- Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director

General
-- Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military

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Chief
-- Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
Attache to the United States
-- Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
-- Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
-- COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
-- Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
-- Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General
Main U.S. Participants:
-- Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of

Political-Military Affairs
-- James Hursch, Director, DTSA
-- Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense
-- Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
-- Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
-- Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
-- Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-- COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
-- Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
-- Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL
Plenary
-------
¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the

plenary, stating this was "perhaps the most important JPMG to
date." He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will "impact the
stability of the world," Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
the political-military dialogue between the United States and
Israel. He said the United States wants to "re-energize" the
JPMG, with the goal to "bring back strategic elements" into
the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.
Iran
----
¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a

strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
Obama's statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
current dialogue with Iran as the "most sensitive stage" and
Iran's "last chance." He said Iran remains determined to

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TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004
reach the "nuclear option," which he described as

"intolerable." He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran "only needs one bomb for
Israel," implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
regardless of its leadership.
¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
Israel's concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. He said that the United States is beginning with
engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
engagement was not "open ended" -- the United States needs to
see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
respond to engagement, then the United States will move
toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to "run
out the clock," and noted that engagement also serves to
build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.
¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands

that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
to "play for time" and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
From Mossad's perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
capability to build a nuclear weapon -- essentially reducing
the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
said Iran's main crisis is in the political sphere -- the
current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
the domestic political environment -- Khamenei realizes the
frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei's death might change
the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
suggest a change in Khamenei's health, while those
surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.
¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional

hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to

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its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort

to split Syria from Iran's influence, and is working hard to
deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
region and in Europe.
Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
-----------------------
¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by "Hizballahstan" and

"Hamastan," noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
ballistic missiles -- although not new -- remain Israel's
most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah's growing military
capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
Lebanon's susceptibility to outside influences, including
Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
Gen. Graziano's tour for an additional six months.
¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI's desire for

specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation
TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004
with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF's current weakness.

He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that

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more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.

Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
of Hizballah if attacked by Israel -- thus, a strengthened
LAF hurts Israel.
QME
---
¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad

suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a "codename" for
potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates -- but the future is uncertain, and each
of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
U.S. weapons -- "the best in the world" -- level the playing
field by reducing the need for training -- and could
ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency -- while
there may be differences between Israel and the United States
in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
there are no surprises, he said.
Peace Process
-------------
¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a

"pillar" of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
Palestinian security forces as the "good guys." NEA/IPA
Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.
Goldstone Report
----------------
¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel's immediate neighbors within

the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
checked "all the details" of the report, and have concluded
that the report's accusations are "baseless." Buchris said
the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone

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calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the

effort to prevent civilian casualties -- "no other country
has taken such steps," Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report's referral
to the UN Security Council, noting the report's biased
mandate.
¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
violated the ceasefire or "tahdiya," which many Israelis felt
was "humiliating" and left Defense Minister Barak open to
criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
any further damage from the report.
Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
-----------------------
¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab

neighbors -- including specifically Egypt -- for supporting
the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
smuggling into Gaza "completely," and questioned whether
Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad
TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004
stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on

counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
officers visit Israel.
¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to

strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following

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the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF's participation. A/S

Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
Israel.
¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the

counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
cited the importance of working with Israel's neighbors --
including especially Egypt and Turkey -- to prevent Iranian
weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude -- and
possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
since the beginning of 2009.
¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political

sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers -- goods such as
cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
said he would take that back to Washington for further
consideration.
Iraq/Yemen
----------
¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

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¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
heading toward an "Afghanistan-type scenario" with general
lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
Sudan -- this should be encouraged and expanded.
¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2757, U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL


2009-12-22 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
09:09 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTV #2757/01 3560922

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220922Z DEC 09
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7022

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2106
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0162
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9552
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP EG IR
SUBJECT: U/S TAUSCHER'S DECEMBER 1-2 VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. (S) Summary: Under Secretary for Arms Control and

International Security Ellen Tauscher visited Israel December
1-2. U/S Tauscher focused her visit on setting the stage for
a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference (RevCon) in May 2010. She consulted with GOI
interlocutors on potential strategy in addressing Egyptian
insistence on pushing for the establishment of a nuclear
weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, as a way to
divert attention from Iran to Israel. U/S Tauscher
reiterated that the United States will not take any action to
compromise Israel's security and would consult closely with
Israel -- which GOI officials greatly appreciated.
Nevertheless, U/S Tauscher said the United States is
interested in exploring possible small steps involving Israel
to address some of Egypt's NWFZ concerns regarding the lack
of implementation of the 1995 resolution. GOI officials for
the most part were critical of these tactics, questioning why
Israel should be portrayed as part of the problem. They
recommended a more direct approach to President Mubarak --
thereby circumventing the Egyptian MFA -- in which Egypt is
reminded that Iran is the regional nuclear threat. Other
topics discussed include President Obama's arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, the P5 1 process and Iran's nuclear
program, the FMCT and CTBT, Jordan's plans for a nuclear
reactor, and Israel's qualitative military edge (QME). End
summary.
¶2. (SBU) U/S Tauscher met with National Security Advisor Uzi
Arad on December 1. Arad was accompanied by NSC Senior
Advisor and Nuclear Security Summit Sherpa Gil Reich. In a
separate meeting on December 1, U/S Tauscher met with MFA
Director General Yossi Gal, Deputy Director General for North
America Baruch Bina, and Deputy Director General for
Strategic Affairs Alon Bar. U.S. participants for the Arad
and Gal meetings included Political Counselor Marc Sievers, T
Senior Advisor James Timbie, NSC's Adam Scheinman, and

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political military officer Jason Grubb. U/S Tauscher met for

dinner with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and MFA
senior officials on December 1, including IAEC Director
General Saul Chorev, Deputy Director General David Danieli,
and Director for Policy and Arms Control Merav Zefary-Odiz,
as well as MFA DDG Bar and Director for Arms Control Rodica
Radian-Gordon. On December 2, U/S Tauscher met for breakfast
with MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad; U.S. attendees
included Charge D'Affaires Luis Moreno, Timbie, Scheinman,
and Grubb.
Arms Control/Nonproliferation Agenda

------------------------------------
¶3. (S) In various meetings with GOI interlocutors, U/S

Tauscher outlined an ambitious arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, beginning with the President's
Prague speech, and including other priorities such as a
follow-on to START, CTBT ratification, the upcoming NPT
Review Conference, and negotiating the FMCT. She noted that
negotiations with Moscow on START were slow to develop in
part due to delayed confirmations and Russian wariness. But
U/S Tauscher expected a START follow-on -- including a strong
verification regime -- soon.
¶4. (S) National Security Advisor Arad described President

Obama's arms control and nonproliferation agenda as "daunting
and challenging." He reaffirmed that the GOI will
participate in the April 2010 Nuclear Security summit in
Washington, noting that PM Netanyahu planned to attend the
summit as discussed between President Obama and PM Netanyahu
during their recent one-on-one meeting in Washington. GOI
Nuclear Summit Sherpa Gil Reich noted, however, that the
Holocaust memorial day in Israel might be a potential
scheduling conflict with the summit. Arad expressed
appreciation for the summit, noting that if the initiative
had been pursued ten years previously, perhaps proliferation
cases such as AQ Khan might have been prevented or at least
controlled. He wished the United States success negotiating
with the Russians on START.
¶5. (S) Due to the U.S. administration's prioritization of

arms control and nonproliferation, Arad also noted that the
GOI had recently reconvened a high level committee on these
issues comprised of GOI officials and experts from outside
the government. He noted that the committee had been formed
during President George Herbert Walker Bush's administration
to analyze treaties such as the CWC and CTBT, but stopped
meeting in 2007. U/S Tauscher expressed interest in meeting
with the group during her next visit to Israel; Arad took the
request on board.

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Egypt and the NPT

-----------------
¶6. (S) On the NPT, U/S Tauscher reiterated the importance of

a successful Review Conference -- including hopefully a
consensus resolution. She raised U.S. concerns over
potential Egyptian actions at the RevCon, based on previous
decades of behavior and "10-15 year-old talking points." U/S
Tauscher said the United States is not "naive" with respect
to Egypt; nevertheless, the United States must make a
sincere, good faith effort to create the conditions for a
positive RevCon -- this might include small steps with Israel
to address some of Egypt's desire to demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution on a region free of
weapons of mass destruction.
¶7. (S) That said, U/S Tauscher reiterated that the United
States would consult and coordinate with Israel, and would
take no action that might compromise Israel's security. She
noted that the United States would like to elevate the NPT
RevCon issue to President Mubarak at an appropriate time, and
expressed interest in developing an alternate communication
track to Mubarak to circumvent the MFA, potentially through
Egyptian Intelligence Minister LTG Suleiman. U/S Tauscher
said her message to Cairo will be "very tough," and that
Egyptian obstructionist behavior linking Israel to Iran's
nuclear program is not helping Egypt.
¶8. (S) Arad said relations with Egypt were "relatively good,"
describing continued dialogue between PM Netanyahu and
President Mubarak, and strong channels of communication at
other levels. In many respects, he said Israel's relations
with Egypt are almost as good as during PM Rabin's time.
Arad said Egypt and Israel do not see "eye-to-eye" on some
issues such as Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, but
otherwise relations are strong.
¶9. (S) Arad described the Egyptian MFA, however, as a

"nagging problem" in the relationship, particularly regarding
the Middle East NWFZ issue, and noted Cairo's refusal to talk
to FM Lieberman. Other GOI officials expressed exasperation
over Egyptian motivations on the NWFZ; Reich raised Egyptian
behavior at the latest IAEA General Conference, as well as
Cairo's negative reaction to the IAEA Board of Governor's
recent statement on Iran. Arad said Israel has supported a
regional NWFZ as far back as 1992, provided Israel enjoyed
peaceful relations with its neighbors. He said the GOI has
spoken frankly with Cairo, noting that such behavior is not
helpful, and is misdirecting focus away from Iran.
¶10. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad said Egypt

understands that Iran is the real threat to the region,

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noting that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran is a redline for

Cairo. He averred that Egypt does not accept that Iran will
become a superpower, but remains afraid of its own domestic
political situation post-Mubarak. Gilad expressed succession
concerns, noting that Mubarak is "approaching the past more
quickly than the future." He added that Mubarak does not
have confidence in Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit.
¶11. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs

Alon Bar outlined repeated attempts by the GOI to engage with
the Egyptian MFA, but to no avail. He described Egyptian
actions linking Israel to Iran's nuclear program in the IAEA
as "not encouraging," and questioned how to convince Egypt to
drop this "obsession" over the NWFZ. Israel Atomic Energy
Commission (IAEC) Director General Saul Chorev and Arms
Control Director Merav Zefary-Odiz speculated that Egypt
feels challenged by Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons, and includes Israel in any public attack on Tehran
in order to give Cairo coverage from regional criticism. Bar
argued that the Egyptian MFA raises Israel's nuclear program
as a "wedge issue" in order to prevent better relations
between Israel and others in the region. IAEC Deputy
Director General David Danieli concurred, noting that Egypt
can use the nuclear issue to put Israel "in a corner" while
benefiting from positive relations between the two countries.
¶12. (S) Zefary-Odiz also reviewed her participation in an

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament conference in September 2009 in Cairo. She
described the conference as "very confrontational," and that
it was clear Israel was targeted by Egyptian interlocutors.
Zefary-Odiz acknowledged that the GOI had anticipated such
behavior, and contemplated skipping the conference. She
noted that Egyptian officials also lambasted Iranian
participants, but were always careful to include Israel and
Iran in the same sentence.
¶13. (S) Arad said the GOI will take their cue from U.S.
"heavy-lifting": if there is a small step -- "not a
concession," he stressed -- that Israel could take to help
facilitate, then the GOI would consider it. He noted that
the GOI wanted to see a "reversal of trends" from Egypt
regarding Iran's nuclear program -- after all, it is in
Egypt's interest to do so. He said Israel continues to have
reservations regarding the NPT -- following nuclear pursuits
by Libya, Syria, and Iran, it is clear to the GOI that the
NPT is not sufficient and must be strengthened. The goal of
the NPT, he stressed, should not be to "prevent the next
Iran, but to stop Iran in order to prevent the next Iran"
from occurring.

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¶14. (S) Chorev speculated that Egypt will aim to ruin the
RevCon. Bar said the Egyptians have not been held
accountable for past bad behavior at the NPT RevCon -- "they
have never paid the price." He noted that Cairo knows the
importance the United States attaches to a successful RevCon,
and therefore will try to leverage a "high price" in order
not to ruin it. He noted similar tactics with regard to
Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts along the border with Gaza.
¶15. (S) Timbie outlined several small steps that might

address Egyptian concerns and demonstrate progress in
implementation of the 1995 resolution and the Middle East
NWFZ: an IAEA forum on the experience of other regional
NWFZs; a special coordinator or rappateur on 1995 resolution
implementation; a statement from the United States, United
Kingdom and Russia reiterating the importance of the 1995
resolution; and exploring text with Israel and Egypt on
universality and compliance.
¶16. (S) Gilad questioned these steps from a

"tactical/strategic" context, and suggested this was not a
tactical matter. He argued against creating the impression
that Israel was the problem. Instead, Gilad recommended a
strategic, traditional approach -- concessions will only be
used by Egypt as leverage. He suggested the United States
remind Egypt of its special relationship based on U.S.
support, and reaffirm that Iran is the "bad guy." Gilad said
Egypt should also be reminded that most countries in the
region agree with the NWFZ concept in principle; the Egyptian
MFA's insistence on an immediate NWFZ neither fits the
current political reality nor makes sense as it diverts focus
from Iranian intransigence. He noted that Egypt listens to
the United States; it is therefore important to speak clearly
and directly when taking the issue to Mubarak.
¶17. (S) Chorev and Zefary-Odiz argued these steps had been
tried in the past -- and had failed. Danieli questioned why
Israel should take any steps at all. Based on experience at
the IAEA and the UN First Committee on Disarmament and
International Security, he said "nothing satisfies Egypt" as
Cairo "pockets every concession" and demands more -- "it's a
slippery slope." Danieli said Israel will not "play by
Egypt's rules." Bar concurred, noting that Egypt will "raise
the bar," and begin negotiations with these small steps as
the baseline -- he was skeptical such steps would prove
helpful.
¶18. (S) Arad characterized these steps as "talking endlessly"

-- that is "not progress," he said. He was uncomfortable
discussing Israel NPT compliance, especially as Israel is not
a party to the treaty. He also raised concerns regarding the

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definition of the Middle East NWFZ -- did it also include

Pakistan, India and Iran, for example? Arad said such
questions should be posed to Cairo -- if Egypt is willing to
include Pakistan in its definition of a Middle East NWFZ,
then we can take that as a signal that Cairo is ready for a
serious conversation on the matter.
¶19. (S) Zefary-Odiz argued that the NPT as a "global

solution" is not appropriate in the current political
realities of the Middle East. Due to the region's prior
track record of NPT non-compliance, she said a gradual,
step-by-step process employing confidence building measures
be used to improve relations between neighbors. NPT partner
obligations should be enhanced, not reduced, she said.
Zefary-Odiz noted that only after peaceful relations are
established can arms control measures be pursued, starting
with conventional weapons and later focusing on
chemical/biological/nuclear arms. She said that Egypt and
other Arab states de-link comprehensive peace from arms
control measures -- Israel views these elements as
inseparable and sequential.
¶20. (S) On a related note, Chorev asked if Israel should

attend the RevCon as an observer. U/S Tauscher and Timbie
replied that the decision was ultimately the GOI's to make,
but offered to raise the issue in Washington . Chorev noted
that Israel would be careful not to "make any noise," and
could play a positive, consultative role. On the other hand,
Danieli acknowledged the argument that as a non-party,
perhaps it was not appropriate for Israel to attend.
Iran
----
¶21. (S) U/S Tauscher said the United States was very
concerned about the recently announced Iranian plans to build
ten additional uranium enrichment facilities. She reiterated
the two track strategy of persuasion and pressure, and noted
that the time for persuasion is "waning." U/S Tauscher said
the United States has "created the coalition" it had hoped
for, and was happy to see the recent IAEA BOG's resolution
transferred to the UNSC.
¶22. (S) U/S Tauscher noted that the United States was working
hard through the P5 1 process to encourage Russian and
Chinese cooperation to counter continued Iranian
intransigence and inflammatory rhetoric -- Russia and China
are "lynch pins," she said. She noted that Russia had worked
closely with the United States on the Tehran Research Reactor
(TRR) proposal, which Moscow considered an "elegant
solution," -- but Iran had not agreed. Keeping Russia
engaged, U/S Tauscher explained, also means Chinese

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cooperation.
¶23. (S) MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad described

recent Russian cooperation on Iran as encouraging, but
expressed reservations that Russia would join in any
sanctions against Iran. He explained that Moscow has raised
the provision of sophisticated Israeli unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) technology in exchange for canceling the S-300
sale to Tehran. Gilad said that Russian interlocutors had
acknowledged development gaps in their UAV platform, and is
prepared to pay USD one billion for Israeli UAV technology.
He reiterated that Israel will not provide its latest UAV
technology, arguing that such technology would likely end up
in the hands of the Chinese.
¶24. (S) Arad said the GOI appreciated the United States'
efforts regarding Iran, noting how hard the United States has
worked to build an alliance. He pointed to the recent IAEA
Board of Governor's resolution as a successful example of
U.S. efforts. Regarding the Qom facility, Arad said the GOI
was not surprised by Tehran's "chutzpah." He described a
high degree of alertness in Israel, and added that the GOI
studies daily Iranian posturing and boastful announcements in
an attempt to discern Iranian intentions. Arad commented
that the trends are bad, as Iran continues to accumulate low
enriched uranium.
¶25. (S) MFA DG Gal said there was not much difference in the
national intelligence estimations (U.S., UK, France, and
Russia) regarding Iran. He said the GOI takes "very
seriously" Iranian plans for ten new enrichment facilities --
"time is of the essence," and "now is the time to implement
crippling sanctions," he added. Gal likened the case for
enhanced sanctions to prescribed antibiotics from a doctor --
one must take the full course of antibiotics for the
prescribed period of time, or they will not work.
¶26. (S) Turning to his crystal ball, Gilad was not sure
Tehran had decided it wants a nuclear weapon -- but is
"determined" to obtain the option to build one. He
acknowledged that the engagement strategy is a good idea --
"as long as you understand that it will not work." Gilad
said it should be clear by February 2010 that engagement as a
option has failed -- the imposition of "crippling sanctions"
for the February/March/April timeframe is crucial. He said
Russian cooperation will be the key, and the current Russian
cooperative mind-set cannot necessarily be counted on in
several weeks time. By June of next year, Gilad said it
should be clear whether sanctions have worked. However,
given Tehran's clandestine nuclear program (e.g., Qom), he
said it will not be clear when Iran has reached the "point of
no return" -- he doubted Iran will choose to let it overtly

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known that it has produced a nuclear weapon.
FMCT and CTBT

-------------
¶27. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised the FMCT's future in the

Conference on Disarmament. U/S Tauscher acknowledged
frustration with Pakistan, and noted that while Washington
places a high priority on the FMCT, other efforts like a
START follow-on and the CTBT will come first. Timbie added
that it will take some time to negotiate an FMCT.
¶28. (S) Chorev asked about the current prospects for CTBT
ratification in the Senate. U/S Tauscher noted that the
START follow-on was a higher priority, and said the Senate
will likely focus on the Law of the Sea treaty before turning
its attention to the CTBT. She pointed to mid-term
Congressional elections in 2010, and explained that focusing
on the CTBT in 2011 might be more prudent given the
controversy associated with the treaty. U/S Tauscher
explained the necessity of making the case for the CTBT, and
hoped to build political momentum in favor of the treaty
through the release of the Nuclear Posture Review, a new
national intelligence estimate, and the handover on the
stockpile stewardship program.
¶29. (S) Chorev asked that the United States consult with the
GOI on the CTBT, where he said Israel could be "more flexible
than the FMCT." U/S Tauscher asked if the GOI might be
willing to make affirmative statements in support of the
CTBT; Chorev made no promises, but suspected such a statement
might be possible -- especially if it would help with Senate
ratification.
¶30. (S) Chorev described the FMCT as "very difficult" for

Israel. Scheinman confirmed that negotiations would be based
on the 2006 draft FMCT text, with an added verification
regime that is being worked on -- he described the
verification regime's definitions as "critical" in that
regard. Danieli questioned the FMCT's added value, arguing
that it would have little impact. He asked who was the
FMCT's real target -- India, Pakistan or even Israel?
Jordanian Nuclear Reactor

-------------------------
¶31. (S) IAEC DG Chorev raised Jordanian plans to build a

nuclear reactor. He said the GOI has decided not to oppose
the reactor, and have offered the Jordanians Israeli
expertise on where best to build it. Chorev said the IAEC
formed a steering committee with its Jordanian counterpart
comprised of three working groups focusing on safety,

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geological surveys, and water issues. Chorev said the

steering committee first met in Amman in June 2009, and is
waiting to convene again. Danieli stressed that the GOI does
not want to hamper the Jordanian nuclear plans, but added
that Israel has concerns about border issues and security
associated with the reactor. Timbie said the United States
is pushing Jordan to sign a 123 Agreement along the same
lines as the recent agreement signed with UAE, only stronger.
Zefary-Odiz noted that Egypt is putting tremendous pressure
on Jordan not to accept a 123 Agreement.
QME
---
¶32. (S) U/S Tauscher reiterated the United States' strong

commitment to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), and
expressed appreciation for the GOI's willingness to work with
us through the newly created QME working groups. Both MOD
Pol-Mil Chief Gilad and MFA DDG Bar commended the newly
created QME working groups, and asked they be scheduled to
convene as soon as possible.
¶33. (U) T has cleared this cable.
CUNNINGHAM

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Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2777, CODEL SKELTON'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER


2009-12-23 2010-11-28 Embassy Tel
10:10 18:06 Aviv
VZCZCXRO3883
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2777/01 3571034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231034Z DEC 09
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 7238

Cable Viewer
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP MASS SY TU FR KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: CODEL SKELTON'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
NETANYAHU
¶1. (C) Summary. CODEL Skelton met with Prime Minister

Netanyahu November 16 at the Prime Minister's office in
Jerusalem. Their discussion covered Netanyahu's meeting with
President Obama the previous week, Netanyahu's interest in
resuming negotiations with the Palestinians, the Iranian
nuclear program and options for tougher sanctions, possible
negotiations with Syria, U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile
defense, and Israel's objections to the Goldstone Report.
Netanyahu said his meeting with the President was the best
meeting that they have had. He stressed that he had told the
President that he is ready to negotiate with Abu Mazen now,
and contrasted Israel's position with the PA's setting of
preconditions for negotiations. Netanyahu listed steps the
GOI has taken to support Abu Mazen, noting that the PA is
"doing a good job" on security. A nuclear Iran, however,
would "wash away" all progress as well as undermining
Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. Netanyahu
said that Iran is vulnerable to sanctions and urged the U.S.
to increase the pressure on Iran, with likeminded countries
if Russia and China will not support new sanctions in the
Security Council. Netanyahu commented that there is broader
Arab and European support for tough sanctions than in the
past, although the Arabs may not say so publicly. Netanyahu
praised President Obama's commitment to missile defense, and
commented that U.S.-Israeli cooperation on missile defense
sends a strong signal to Israel's enemies. He thanked the
CODEL for the Congress' support. Netanyahu said Israel faces
three main threats: Iran's nuclear program, the build-up of
rockets and missiles in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and the
Goldstone Report, which condemned Israel for defending its
civilian population from years of rocket attacks. Netanyahu
said Israel will need to ensure that a future Palestinian
state cannot launch rockets at Israel's international airport
or critical facilities. End Summary.
Let's Get on with Negotiations

------------------------------

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¶2. (U) CODEL Skelton, consisting of House Armed Services

Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D, MO) and Mrs. Skelton,
Representative Steve Israel (D-NY), Representative Tim Murphy
(R, PA), Congressional Staff members Phil McNaughton, Michael
Casey, and John Wason, Military aides Colonel Jeff Koch and
PolCouns met with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu November
¶16. Netanyahu was joined by Deputy National Security Adviser
Rear Admiral (reserve) Avriel Bar Josef, media adviser Mark
Regev, policy adviser Ari Harrow, and a Congressional liaison
officer from the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
¶3. (C) Netanyahu began the meeting by noting his

appreciation for his meeting with President Obama at the
White House the previous week. Netanyahu described his
conversation with the President as "the best we've had so
far." He said that regarding negotiations with the
Palestinians, he told the President, "let's get on with it."
Netanyahu stated that his government had removed hundreds of
obstacles and roadblocks in the West Bank, helping the West
Bank economy achieve a seven percent growth rate, adding "and
we can kick it up to ten percent growth." Netanyahu said his
Bar Ilan address last June had been difficult for him, but it
had united Israelis in support of accepting a demilitarized
Palestinian state. The current GOI had also restrainted
construction in settlements more than its past several
predecessors.
¶4. (C) Netanyahu then contrasted his efforts with the PA,
which he said is maintaining a "political and economic
boycott" of Israel, setting preconditions for negotiations,
supporting the Goldstone Report in the UN, and is now talking
about a unilateral declaration of independence. Israel wants
to engage, but the Palestinians do not. Netanyahu quoted a
Palestinian official as saying that the PA had "exhausted the
negotiating process," then noted that the Palestinians have
not even started to talk to his government. The real
difference, he pointed out, is that Abu Mazen is facing
elections, while Israel has already conducted its elections.
Netanyahu also commented that the Palestinians had initially
expected the U.S. to "deliver Israel" on all of their
demands, but are now realizing that this will not happen.
President Obama understands, he stated, that Israel is ready
to move forward. The alternatives to negotiations are bad
for everyone. Netanyahu said that if Abu Mazen would engage,
they would confront all the issues. The process would not be
easy, but it has to get started.
¶5. (C) Netanyahu said the West Bank had remained quiet
during Operation Cast Lead because the Palestinians do not
TEL AVIV 00002777 002 OF 003

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want to live under Hamas' rule. He asserted that according

to recent polls, Abu Mazen and Fatah would easily win an
election, even in Gaza. Netanyahu stressed that he was not
pushing for the Palestinians to hold elections, but was
instead focused on promoting the expansion of the West Bank
economy by removing both physical and bureaucratic obstacles.
He acknowledged that the PA is "doing a good job" on
security, though he added that PA leaders are not aware of
everything Israel is doing to support the PA's security. If
we could add a political process to the cooperation that
currently exists, we could get security, economic
development, and peace. Netanyahu warned, however, that if
Iran gets a nuclear bomb, the peace process would be "washed
away." Even Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan
would come under enormous pressure.
Iran Sanctions
--------------
¶6. (C) Chairman Skelton noted that his Committee is

following Iran closely. Netanyahu said he had advised the
President to stick to the deadline on the TRR offer, adding
that it is also important to ask Iran to stop its enrichment
activities. Netanyahu commented that there is a new mood in
the major European capitals in support of sanctions. The
U.S. does not need to depend on the Security Council, but can
work with likeminded countries. Sanctions should focus on
Iran's importation of gasoline, while also focusing on
opening up the information networks. The U.S. should lead
the world toward tougher sanctions, or more of the Arab
states will start appeasing Iran, as Qatar is doing.
Netanyahu summed up his advice as: "stick to the deadline,
be firm on the terms, and apply sanctions" if Iran does not
comply. He thought Russia may be more inclined than in the
past, but it would be best not to count on the Security
Council. Having set a deadline, the P5 1 should stick to it.
The Western powers at least will go along. We should close
the gap between understanding the problem and acting on it,
he said. Netanyahu said Israel's problems with Iran are not
limited to its nuclear program. Even without a nuclear
umbrella, Iran is sending hundreds of tons of weapons to
Syria, Hamas and Hizballah. The ship seized November 3 by
the Israeli Navy had on board two thirds of the amount of
rockets fired at Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.
¶7. (C) Representative Israel asked Netanyahu about the

timetable for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapon. Netanyahu
responded that Iran has the capability now to make one bomb
or they could wait and make several bombs in a year or two.
It is important to bear in mind that the Iranian regime was
exposed as a fraud during their presidential elections. The

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Iranian people detest the regime and have shown great courage
in the streets. The exposure of the Qom facility also helped
convince doubters in the international community that Iran
has a weapons program. Iran has a weak economy and a
fractured political system, so it is vulnerable to sanctions.
The time to act diplomatically is now, Netanyahu said,
adding that we still have a year or two to stop the Iranian
program. Netanyahu said he thought President Obama
understands Iran perfectly. The Arab leaders hope Iran will
be stopped, there is broad Arab and European support for
"vigorous steps." Chairman Skelton asked whether the Arabs
would state their support publicly. Netanyahu replied they
might not, but it would not make a large difference since the
Arab "street" will not rise up in support of the Iranian
regime.
Ready to Talk to Syria

----------------------
¶8. (C) Regarding Syria, Netanyahu urged the U.S. to press

Damascus to stop supplying arms to Hizballah. Noting that he
had stopped in Paris to meet President Sarkozy on his way
back to Israel from Washington, Netanyahu confirmed media
reports that Sarkozy had offered to mediate between Israel
and Syria. Netanyahu said he would prefer direct
negotiations with the Syrians, but added that he would accept
France as a mediator. President Asad, however, still wants
Turkey as the mediator. Noting that Turkish PM Erdogan had
recently stated that he would prefer to meet with Sudanese
President Omar Bashir than with Netanyahu, Netanyahu asked
how the Turks could be fair mediators.
Working Together on Missile Defense
-----------------------------------
¶9. (C) Netanyahu said that in addition to peace with the

Palestinians and Iran, he and the President had discussed
joint U.S.-Israeli efforts on missile defense. Netanyahu
TEL AVIV 00002777 003 OF 003
commented that he had personally visited the Juniper Cobra

joint military exercise. The program has reached a phase at
which it is possible to monitor incoming missiles with a good
lead-time, but it is still very expensive to intercept "crude
rockets" such as those fired from Gaza. The information
shield is moving ahead nicely, but the physical shield is
lagging behind. Netanyahu observed that it is very important
for the U.S. and its allies to be able to defend themselves
against missile attack. Chairman Skelton noted that U.S.
personnel who briefed the CODEL were very optimistic about

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the program. Netanyahu said only the U.S. and Israel are
currently working on missile defense. This cooperation sends
a powerful message to Israel's enemies he noted, and thanked
the CODEL and the Congress for their support.
Goldstone Report a Key Threat

-----------------------------
¶10. (C) Netanyahu commented that Israel currently faces

three principal threats: Iran's nuclear program, missile
proliferation and the Goldstone Report. Goldstone gave
terrorists immunity to attack Israel if they fire from
populated areas. During Cast Lead the IDF send thousands and
flyers, text messages and phone calls to civilians, warning
them to get out of the way, yet Israel was accused of war
crimes. Hamas and other terrorists fired 12.000 rockets into
Israel from Gaza, Netanyahu said, noting that Israel is the
only country in the world faced with threats to annihilate
it. Netanyahu asked the CODEL to imagine a situation in
which Israeli Air Force pilots must consult with lawyers
before they can travel abroad. Former PM Olmert, former
FonMin Livni and DefMin Barak could be hauled before the
International Criminal Court. Netanyahu said he could not
accept that IDF soldiers could be charged with war crimes for
protecting their country from constant attack. The deaths of
several hundred civilians in Gaza was "tragic," Netanyahu
said, but there was no deliberate targeting of civilians by
Israel. Deliberate targeting of civilians is a war crime,
but what should Israel do when terrorists deliberately target
Israeli civilians and then hide within their civilian
population?
¶11. (U) CODEL Skelton did not clear this cable.
CUNNINGHAM

ROTFW - Israel - Chronos

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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1580, MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN

originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580

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EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2010

Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4

¶2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff member

¶3. (S) In response to the Senator’s question, Dagan said that

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/03/05TELAVIV1580.html (17 of 19)12/5/2010 7:32:23 PM

¶6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of

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Viewing cable 05TELAVIV1593, C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE

originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2015

REF: STATE 26053

Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and

¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to

¶3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December,

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¶5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining

¶6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3

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would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the

¶9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the

¶11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/03/05TELAVIV1593.html (19 of 22)12/5/2010 7:35:29 PM

concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called

¶12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli

¶13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2005/03/05TELAVIV1593.html (20 of 22)12/5/2010 7:35:29 PM

reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA's

¶17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic

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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV64, SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15

originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.

includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.

specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/01/07TELAVIV64.html (16 of 21)12/5/2010 7:42:21 PM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

¶1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders

¶3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the

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coordination between Israel's military and its civilian

¶4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift

¶5. (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great

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only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans. Thoughtful