PP VS ANDRE MARTI

TO WHOM DIRECTED

FACTS

 appellant and his common-law wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders too ship a package
 employee asked to inspect the package which appellant refused,
 before delivery to the BOC, the proprietor, following standard procedure, opened the box and
smelled a particular odor. It was sent to the NBI which confirmed that it was marijuana
 On August 27, 1987, while appellant was claiming his mail and the post office, he was invited by
NBI agents regarding the mj shipment. Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant
 RTC convicted appelant

ISSUE

WON the court erred in convicting appelant

HELD

 No. In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck
down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers
 On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
 Appellant cannot claim that his constitutional right against searches and seizure has been
violated. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
 The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
 Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding
agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. He took samples of the same to the NBI
and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused/appellant.
BACHE AND CO VS JUDGE RUIZ

WHO MAY INVOKE THE RIGHT

FACTS

 The commissioner of CIR wrote a letter addressed to Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners. After taking their depositions, Judge signed comissioner’s
application for search warrant
 Three days later, the warrant was served against petitioners. The search yielded 6 boxes of docs
 P’s filed a petition for the dissolution of the warrant; it was denied. In the meantime, the BIR
made tax assessments against P entirely based on the seized docs.

ISSUE

WON the search was invalid

HELD

 Yes. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause
 In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant and his witness. While it is true that the complainant’s application for search
warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which
could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against
herein petitioners. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her
notes

The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

 Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73,
208 and 209."
 The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
o 1st Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns)
o 2nd Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
o 3rd Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation
o 4th Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output
actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon)
 Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different
titles

The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

 The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1 that the warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized.
  While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the
said warrant nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include
all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.
 A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The herein
search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests.

A corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures

 In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a
corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures,
 In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents,
papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been
impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different
footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO

FACTS

 Upon application of the govt, several judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein and the corps of which they were officers to seize and take possession of the
following personal property
o Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins

ISSUE

WON P’s can contest the search done in the corporate offices

HELD

 NO. the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
 As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

WON the search in their residences are valid

 NO. 2 reqs: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants.
 The warrant were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications.
 it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
 against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
 Further, the description in the warrants are also violative of the consitutuion
 the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat
its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF

PROBABLE CAUSE

FACTS

 P’s assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano,
wherein the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched and the equipment therein was seized
ISSUE

WON the search warrant were invalidly issued for lack of probable cause

HELD

 YES. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
 And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar,
the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.
Mere generalization will not suffice.
 he broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has
in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. aid allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of
a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
AA VS CARBONELL

FACTS

 Petitioner worked as a secretary at a car service center. On May 27, 2001, appellant Jaime
Azardon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when she
returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless,
she went inside to get her handbag.
 On her way out, she saw Arzadon. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he
threatened her with the pipe and raped her
 Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But
when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the
incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.
 After an information was filed, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest which was granted by Judge
Carbonell
 December 16, 2005, Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order dismissing Crim Case for lack of
probable cause.

ISSUE

WON the judge committed gadalej in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause

HELD

 YES. Judge claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce."
 In Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.
Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.
 True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge’s personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to
show the existence of probable cause.
 Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. If the report, taken together
with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not
compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
 In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Crim Case without taking into consideration
several resolutions all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover,
he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of
probable cause was premised only on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence during the
hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause.
PEOPLE VS PASTRANA AND ABAD

FACTS

 NBI investigator filed a sworn application for a search warrant before the Makati RTC to search
respondents’ office due to info that R’s were engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors.
 The RTC judge issued the warrant. on 27 March 2001 the search was conducted. Abad moved to
quash Search Warrant
 RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it was issued for multiple offenses
 CA affirmed

ISSUE

WON the warrant was issued based on probable cause

HELD

 NO. In this case, Search Warrant was issued for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 and for estafa
o First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts
under the said law
o Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there are three
ways of committing the said crime:
o there are instances where the Court sustained the validity of search warrants issued for
violation of R.A. No. 6425 but the court did not nullify the same for it was clear in the
body that it was issued for the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics
o this is however, are not applicable in this case. Aside from its failure to specify what
particular provision of the SRC did respondents allegedly violate, the warrant als
covered estafa
 even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC was specified in the application for
search warrant, there could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with that
offense
 Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof that respondents lacked the
license to operate as brokers or dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the
time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary as to what offense to charge
respondents with.
 In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific
offense. It included violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal
provisions and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.
 Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one
specific offense.
SOLIVEN VS JUDGE MAKASIAR

ISSUED PERSONALLY BY A JUDGE

FACTS

ISSUE

WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause
HELD

 What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
 Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
 It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed
procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
PITA VS CA

FACTS

 The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy. pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign, the mayor
of manila seized porno mags and burned them. Among them was P’s magazine
 P filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor seeking to enjoin and/or restrain said defendants and their agents from
confiscating P’s magazines claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and
educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected
by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
 RTC denied P’s petition. CA dismissed P’s appeal

ISSUE

WON the seizure of P’s mags were lawful

HELD

 NO. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. We have greater reason
here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or
invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different
from Burgos, a political case, because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech,
whether political or "obscene".
 The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, but as the provision itself suggests, the
search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account
of a crime committed. Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being
readied against any party, under Article 201
VDA DE GARCIA vs LOCSIN

EXAMINATION UNDER OATH

FACTS

 Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained A SEARCH WARRANT to search the store of
P.
 warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there (is) just
and probable cause to believe and he does believe that P’s store contains papers relating to her
activities as usurer
 Two packages of records were seized. Based on these, 6 criminal cases were filed against
 CFI denied P’s challenge on the search warrant because although the search warrant was illegal,
there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.

ISSUE

WON the court was correct in upholding the warrant

HELD

 NO. Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
search warrant to be valid
o (1) it must be issued upon probable cause
o (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person
o (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce
o (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.
 In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but
by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and
his witnesses, if any.
 Further, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as
required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by
him in building up cases against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was
issued there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was
issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore,
correct in reaching the conclusion that the search warrant (Exhibit B) was illegally issued by the
justice of the peace

Has P’ waived her right to unreasonable searches and seizures

 NO. the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived.
 No express waiver has been made in the case before us.
 the failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution
of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right.
 Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one
who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
 the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But this
was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to
demand the return of the documents seized.
 a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.
MATA VS BAYONA

FACTS

 Soriano Mata was charged with taking arranged bets in Jai Alai games by selling illegal tickets
 P filed a motion to quash warrant
 the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the
application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents WHICH WERE
WRONGFULLY SUBSCRIBED
 Furthermore, there is failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers
pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case

ISSUE

WON the warrant was validly issued

HELD

 NO. The judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
 Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
 We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid
 The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by
petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when P examined all the relevant papers connected
with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the
lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the
back of the joint affidavit of the complainants.
 Judge claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought
it more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the
court room.
 The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses
must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers
establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation
which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary
but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath
and must be in writing
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE

PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION

FACTS

 police officers, after conducting surveillance and test-buy, secured a search warrant from the
RTC and served it to P
 When they were about to serve it, they saw P run towards a small structure a nipa hut, in front
of his house.
 The police returned with tanods and searched P’s house and the nipa hut. One of the tanods
recovered 4 packs of shabu from the nipa hut
 An info was filed. RTC convicted P. CA affirmed RTC

ISSUE

WON the warrant particularly described the place and things to be seized

HELD

 NO. the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.
 In the present case, the Search Warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod
in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner.
 The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search,
 Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority. By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as
the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the
search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence.
 Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in evidence, petitioner's
third argument that the prosecution failed to establish constructive possession of the regulated
drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
 While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellant’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to
show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said
structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said
structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
PEOPLE VS SALANGUIT

FACTS

 Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the residence of accused-appellant
 witness SPO1 Edmund Badua testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12
grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The application was granted
 police served the warrant. They found 12 sachets, a box containing shabu, and 2 MJ blocks
 RTC convicted accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 for possession of shabu

ISSUE

WON the warrant particularly described the place or things

HELD

 YES. The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched.33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment
Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned
out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground
and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the
description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant
that the apartment was occupied by the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street,
Malboro Mass."
 In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence
on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched
with sufficient particularity.
 While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon
City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No.160
contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the
application for search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was
located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the
deposition of witness which described the premises as "a house without a number
located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location
of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellant's house
under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been
mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where
appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan.
Moreover, the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it
was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through
their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their
operation
DIMAL AND CASTILLO VS PEOPLE

FACTS

 Dimal was implicated in the disappearance of 3 persons who visited his compound. The police
supposedly conducted a search in Dimal’s compound w/o a warrant but found no evidence
linking Dimal.
 Castillo was accosted and allegedly tortured by the police to implicate Dimal.
 Dimal was arrested and charged him with Kidnapping and multiple murder
 P/Insp Malixi filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search Warrant in connection with the
kidnapping and multiple murder. It was granted
 The warrant was served and revealed several pieces of evidence
 Dimal and Castillo filed a motion to quash warrant. It was denied and ruled that the warrant was
validly issued. CA affirmed RTC

ISSUE

WON the was valid

HELD

 The petition is partly meritorious. Search Warrant No. 10-11 was validly issued, but most of the
items seized pursuant thereto are inadmissible in evidence, as they were neither particularly
described in the warrant nor seized under the "plain view doctrine".
 there is no merit to petitioners' contention that the search warrant was applied for in
connection with two unrelated offenses. where a person kidnapped is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, there is only one special complex crime
 There is no dispute that Search Warrant No. 10-11 was applied for and issued in connection with
the crime of kidnapping with murder. Neither can petitioners validly claim that the examining
judge failed to ask searching questions
o The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the
circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must
employ a flexible totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This
Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led
to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long
as there was substantial basis for that determination.
 the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in both ruling that Judge Ong found probable cause to
issue a search warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp.
Malixi and his witnesses. Their testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable ground to
believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's compound to sell palay, but were probably killed by
Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its premises.
 Contrary to petitioners' submission, the search warrant issued by Judge Ong identified with
particularity the place to be searched, namely; (1) the house of Jaylord Dimal and (2) the palay
warehouse in the premises of the Felix Gumpal Compound at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela.
 A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain
and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in
the community.34 A designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.35 To the Court's view, the abovequoted search warrant sufficiently
describes the place to be searched with manifest intention that the search be confined strictly
to the place described.
 Meanwhile, a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1)
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when
the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to
those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued.40 The
purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly
described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures
will be committed.
 technical precision of description is not required. "It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized
 In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be
seized in connection with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder, namely:
o 1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves
jacket and a black tshirt, and
o (2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol.
 Having no direct relation to the said crime, the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold
by the victims to Dimal and found in his warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search
warrant because they do not fall under the personal properties stated under Section 3 of Rule
126, to wit: (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of
the offense; or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense,
can be the proper subject of a search warrant.
 Since only 2 items were particularly described on the face of the search warrant, the Court
declares that only two articles under the Return on the Search Warrant are admissible in
evidence as they could be the blood-stained clothes of Gemma subject of the warrant
PEOPLE VS SUCRO
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
FACTS
 Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation OF the Dangerous Drugs Act,
 Police had information that SUcro was selling MJ. Police saw Sucro take MJ out of a
compartment inside a chapel and return to the street to sell. Thereafter, police moved to
intercept Sucro. The police first caught the buyer who admitted he bought from Sucro. The
police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel
ISSUE
WON the warrantless arrest was valid
HELD
 YES. The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, He stresses that there was
sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants. This contention is
without merit.
 Section 5, Rule 113 provides for the instances where arrest without warrant is considered
lawful.

o Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
o (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
o (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(Emphasis supplied)
 An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof.
 The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor
the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw
Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some things.
These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio would
then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
 Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was
caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the
same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to
Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
 The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the former's joining the police force. As
the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years.
 because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised
him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable information given by some
informants that selling was going on everyday, he was constrained to report the matter to the
Station Commander.
 On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed.
 There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable
cause. Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for
the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the
contraband.
PEOPLE VS GO

FACTS

 Police arrested appellant due to an operation where they arrest people with unlicensed firearms
 On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car. The police
officers saw pieces of glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. Accused-
appellant took out an attache case. The first bag contained a white substance, the 2nd bag
contained money
 Informations were filed against appellant. RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed

ISSUE

WON the warrantless arrest was valid

HELD

 YES. In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The
gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant
could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus,
he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest
was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
 As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant
 his is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of
drug paraphernalia and the crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu,
though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed,
cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search.
 Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak, the objects found at the scene of the
crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence
against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented
search is admissible in evidence.
REYES VS PEOPLE

FACTS

 Police officers were approached by 2 teens that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on
her left arm had just bought shabu. They found a woman who matched the description who is
Reyes. Police asked her to bring it out, Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng
babae?" and at that point, turned her back. pulled something out from her breast area and held
a small plastic sachet on her right hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and
brought it to the police station
 RTC convicted Reyes. CA affirmed.

ISSUE

WON the seizure was valid

HELD

 NO. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must
concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had
in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the accused had committed it.
 In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is essential. Under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
[contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same,
[the officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.
 the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing that
"the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that
[she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she] was apprehended.
 the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself admitted that
Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she
smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the
act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act
 Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify
a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime
 In this case, records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime
had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2)
teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance."
 In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
UMIL VS RAMOS

FACTS

 Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon,
believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile
patrols was being treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds.
 Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that his real name
is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
 Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for
security reasons.
 Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
 In this 8 consolidated petitions for habeas corpus, it assails the validity of the arrests and
searches made by the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without
warrant.
ISSUE

WON the warrantless arrest was valid

HELD

YES. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of
the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule
113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and
for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive,
FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital.
Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant,
at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had
shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member)
did not end there and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as
agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any
arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary
action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands
of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts
constituting the alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence
of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the
performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held
liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26
and/or for other administrative sanctions.
LUZ VS PEOPLE

FACTS

 PO2 Atienza saw the accused driving a motorcycle without a helmet, flagged him down, e
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station, noticed that the accused was uneasy, he told
the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket, contained a metal container,
inside was sshabu
 RTC convicted Luz, CA affirmed

ISSUE

WON the search was lawful

HELD

 NO. there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
 Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or
by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
 At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There
was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
 It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner,
the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
 Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with.
 If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
to be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he
was already in their custody.
VILLAMOR VS PEOPLE

FACTS

 Villamor was charged with violation of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting bets for an illegal
numbers game
 Prosec side: police got info about an illegal numbers game. Upon arrival at the target area, they
saw petitioners in the act of counting bets. When they entered the gate of the compound, they
introduced themselves as police officers and confiscated the items found on the table. P’s were
brought to Camp Camacho
 RTC convicted P. CA affirmed

ISSUE

WON the conviction should be upheld

HELD

 The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was
violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid
warrant of arrest or a search warrant. None of the exceptions apply
 In this case, the apprehending officers claim that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto.
police officers claim that petitioners were committing the offense of illegal numbers game when
they were arrested without a warrant. In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a),
Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
 the Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners.1âwphi1 It was not
properly established that petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Based on the testimonies of PO1 Saraspi and PD Peñaflor, they were
positioned some 15 to 20 meters away from petitioners.
 Considering that 15 to 20 meters is a significant distance between the police officers and the
petitioners, the Court finds it doubtful that the police officers were able to determine that a
c1iminal activity was ongoing to allow them to validly effect an in flagrante delicto warrantless
arrest
 The police officers even admitted that the compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence 5'7"
to 5'9" in height, which made it harder to see what was happening inside the compound. It
appears that the police officers acted based solely on the information received from PD
Peñaflor's informant and not on personal knowledge that a crime had just been comitted,
 The Court finds it doubtful that the police officers witnessed any overt act before entering the
private home of Bonaobra immediately preceding the arrest. PO1 Saraspi even admitted that
from his position outside the compound, he could not read the contents of the so-called
"papelitos;" yet, upon seeing the calculator, phone, papers and money on the table, he readily
concluded the same to be gambling paraphernalias.
 From the circumstances above, it is highly suspect that PD Peñaflor had witnessed any overt act
indicating that the petitioners were actually committing a crime. While PD Peñaflor claims that
he caught the petitioners in the act of collecting bets and counting bet money, this observation
was highly improbable given the distance of the police from the petitioners and the fact that the
compound was surrounded by a bamboo fence.
 Verily, the warrantless arrest conducted by PD Peñaflor and his team was unlawful as the same
does not satisfy the requirements of an in flagrante delicto arrest. Consequently, the search and
seizure of the effects found inside the house of Bonaobra are likewise illegal since there could
be no valid search incident to an illegal warrantless arrest. Thus, evidence seized from
Bonaobra's house is inadmissible for being a fruit of the poisonous tree.
PEOPLE VS GERENTE

HOT PURSUIT

FACTS

 Edna Edwina Reyes testified appellant Gabriel Gerente TOGETHER WITH OTHERS were smoking
and drinking 6m away from her house and overheard their intention to kill Clarito Blace. They
implemented their plan the same day and testified she witnessed the killing. Police were
informed Reyes saw the killing and she pointed to Gerente. Police went to R’s house, frisked him
and found MJ
 RTC convicted R of violating the DDa and for murder

ISSUE

WON the seizure of MJ was invalid

HELD

 NO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
 The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the
crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which
the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported
the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers.
Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
 In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one
(1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court
 The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest.
PEOPLE VS CUBCUBIN

FACTS

 Police respondend to a call and found a tricycle driver dead. A fellow driver informed police that
appellant was last seen with the victim in a café. Another driver lead police to R’s house. Police
knocked and it as answered by R. They searched the house and found a shirt with 2 bullet
casings. They went to the café and R was identified as the victim’s companion. Police conducted
further seaches inside the house where they found the gun
 RTC convicted R of murder

ISSUE

WON R’s arrest was unlawful

HELD

 NO. but he waived the right to challenge the arrest. Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for
a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just committed an offense and, second,
the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in
arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion
 In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The
question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that
there was none. The two did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-
appellant had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they
allegedly inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others,
 Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned. Accused-
appellant did not object to the arraignment. Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the
information on the ground that his arrest was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no
jurisdiction over his person. Accused-appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of
his arrest
PEOPLE VS DON RODRIGUEZA

TIME OF ARREST

FACTS

 Police received confidential info that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs.
the poseur buyer was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohibited
drugs. he met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where be could find Don, left, and
returned with don rodrigueza. After agreeing on the price, Don came back with the MJ.
The poseur buyer reported the sale.
 Based on that information an operation was conducted to apprehend R. the police were
not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the three accused.
The arrestees were brought to the headquarters for investigation.
 Thereafter, agents conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of appellant.. hey were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however, was not
authorized by any search warrant.
ISSUE

WON the arrest was lawful

HELD

 NO. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and
catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. 12 Applied to the case at bar, the term in
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in
the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as a
buyer.
 In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to
meet this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his custody. This act of
CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take place, is
decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and inconsistent with the aforestated
purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape
without having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction
of duty by an agent of the law.
 The poseur, in his testimony, said that they had already been conducting surveillance of
the place where the buy-bust operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he
did not even know the exact place and the identity of the person from whom he was to
buy marijuana leaves.
 The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his direct examination, he
declared that they arrested the three accused all at the same time. But, in his cross-
examination, it appeared that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times
and that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were arrested. Instead, it
was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who was picked up at a much later time.
GO VS CA

FACTS

 petitioner's and THE VICTIM’S cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from
his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and
left the scene.
 Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a
manhunt for petitioner.
 petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports
that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively
identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide, elevated to murder
 the CA consolidated a petition for habeas corpus and petition for certiorari filed by P. it
rendered a decision dismissing the 2 petitions and declared the warrantless arrest of P
was valid.
ISSUE

WON the CA was correct that the arrest was valid

HELD

 NO. we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113
 Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact
just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was
the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one
stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the alleged
gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's
name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge.
 It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When
he walked into San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact
placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that he was
"surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he
had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have
immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was
probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead,
as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7
of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation.
This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and
that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be
released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE VS PASUDAG

LACK OF URGENCY

FACTS

 Around 1:30 in the afternoon, SPO2 Pepito Calip urinated at a bushy bamboo fence behind the
public school. About five (5) meters away, he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There
were marijuana plants in between corn plants and camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper
nearby as to who owned the house with the garden. The storeowner told him that Alberto
Pasudag owned it. He went to the Police Station and reported to Chief of Police. The latter
dispatched team to conduct an investigation. At around 2:30 in that same afternoon, the team
arrived and went straight to the house of accused Pasudag. SPO3 Fajarito looked for accused
Pasudag and asked him to bring the team to his backyard garden which was about five 5 meters
away. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called for a photographer, who took
pictures of accused Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants. They uprooted 7
marijuana plants. The team brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to the police
station. At the police station, accused Pasudag admitted, in the presence of Chief of Police that
he owned the marijuana plants.
 On March 18, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty as charged
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

Won THE seizure of the plants was valid

HELD

 NO. As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant is required before a law enforcer
may validly search or seize the person, house, papers or effects of any individual.
 In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample opportunity to secure from the court a
search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately recognized that some plants in the
backyard of the house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the essence to uproot and
confiscate the plants. They were three months old and there was no sufficient reason to
believe that they would be uprooted on that same day.
 The prosecutions evidence clearly established that the police conducted a search of accuseds
backyard garden without a warrant; they had sufficient time to obtain a search warrant; they
failed to secure one. There was no showing of urgency or necessity for the warrantless search,
or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants. With the illegal seizure of the marijuana
plants subject of this case, the seized plants are inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant.
PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN

FACTS

 According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him
in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
ISSUE

WON R’s claim that he was searched w/0 a warrant is valid

HELD

 It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana.
 Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days
before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25."
 In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
 Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as
in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft
are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before
the warrant can be secured.
 The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the
PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
 In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
 was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him.
 decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED