[ G.R. No.

208792, July 22, 2015 ]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER,
VS.
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND TERESITA GENUINO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

A complaint for the collection of a sum of money was filed by the petitioner bank
for collection of sum of money against respondent Spouses. The complaint alleges that
Spouses Genuino secured themselves a credit amounting to P8,840,000 via Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land in General Trias with the Petitioner. Respondents
defaulted, and failed to pay despite demand resulting to the outstanding balance and other
charges to be due and demandable. The above mentioned parcel of land was foreclosed
and was sold to the highest bidder leaving the total obligation of the spouses to an amount
of P27,744,762.49 after deductions due to the foreclosed property. Such obligation
however remained unpaid despite written demands.

Aggrieve the Petitioner bank filed a complaint with prayer of a reduced amount of
P10,626,121.69 as payment waiving a part of the total amount which were due and
demandable. The Respondents however argued for the nullity of the action since they
were serve notice nor demand before the above mentioned foreclosure. The Regional
Trial Court in its decision dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of interest to
prosecute under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner bank argued for
application of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC in its motion for reconsideration however it was also
dismissed. The Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, such
Petition for Certiorari as well as a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals.

Hence this petition,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure to prosecute when Bank of
the Philippine Islands failed to file a motion to set case for pre-trial conference.

RULLING:

NO, The Court held that pursuant to Rule 17, Sec 03 of the Rules of Court which
reads that:
 “SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause,
the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply
with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own motion without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court”

A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC however provides that:

“xxx if the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch
COC shall issue a notice of pre-trial xxx”

However such rule may not be applied in the case at bar since the incidents occurred prior
to the effectivity of such rule. For arguments sake, supposed said rule is applicable, such
rules do not repeal Rule 17, Sec. 03 of the Rules of Court, there is nothing that would
justify the act of letting the Trial Court to shoulder the sole burden of a pre-trial. Reading
the two above rules as well as Rule 18, Sec 01 of the Rules of Court would justify the
outright dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to show any justifiable
reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the conditions provided by law. The
court however allowed for the continuance of such proceedings even due to the failures
mentioned when the facts of the case exhibits that the extreme sanction of dismissal of
the complaint might not be warranted. Such condition may be entertained if no
substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and
compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.
It must be however be noted that this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently, since as discussed in Regner v. Logarta “A plaintiff's failure
to vigilantly pursue his or her case also affects respondent's right to speedy trial.” and as
stated in Rule 17, Sec. 03 of the Rules of Court “Failure to do so without justifiable cause
warrants an outright dismissal of the Complaint”

In the case at bar the Petitioner’s reason of misfiling by previous counsel's

secretary of the case records together with terminated cases in the office bodega as the
reason for non-compliance of the guidelines established by law is not a justifiable cause.
Such complaint then can be outright dismissed by the court.

Hence the Trial Court did not act with grave abuse of discretion.
[ G.R. No. 175493, March 25, 2015 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS.
HEIRS OF GABRIEL Q. FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The Department of Public Works and Highways was intending to construct a four-
lane highway in Barangay Tuyo. To achieve this goal, the department wanted to acquire
the 11,165-square-meter property owned by the Respondent Heirs and another one owned
by Sotera Santuyo. Purchase of the property however was refused by the Respondent.
The Petitioner then filed a expropriation complaint with prayer for issuance of a Writ of
Possession in its favor, however the Respondent argued that the Petitioner did not comply
with the guidelines found in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, before a proper Writ of
Possession can be issued.

It is alleged by the Petitoners that they offered P50.00 per square meter for the
property of the respondents however such offer was denied and instead demanded a
P1000 per square meter by the respondents as counter offer, such offer however was
understandably refused. The Petitioners further alleges that they followed the guidelines
of the aforementioned provisions and that they issued a payment of P167,475.00 which is
the zonal value of the property evidenced by a Landbank check in the name of Gabriel Q.
Fernandez. By virtue of this the trial court ordered that the properties of the respondents
be given to the Republic since they have a lawful right by virtue of the check which value
is based on the zonal value of P15.00 per square meter, and that a commissioners be
appointed to determine the value of just compensation.

Aggrieve the Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
deemed that the taking of the property is improper while agreeing that a three
commissioners be appointed to determine the value of just compensation. The Court of
Appeals also disagreed with the P15.00 per square meter computation since such
computation was for pastureland. In the tax declaration of Fernandez it is indicated that
the property is categorized as a 1st agricultural land which is valued at P50.00 per square
meter, hence the issued payment by the Republic is improper.

Hence this petition,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper

RULLING:
 No. Pursuant to Section 04 of Republic Act No. 8974 which reads as:

“Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is

necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any
national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the
appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation
proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum, of (1). one
hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no
zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty
(60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a
zonal valuation for said area; and
(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of
utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the
area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the
standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.”

It is clear then that upon filing the expropriation complaint the owner of the property
must be paid with an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on
the current relevant zonal valuation by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the value of
any improvements or structure on a replacement cost method. Furthermore such issuance
of writ of possession may only be done after presentment of certificate of availability of
funds. However such provisional value as contemplated by the above provision should
not be confused with just compensation as required by the Constitution as it was
discussed in Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority where it ruled
that provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation
is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property. The former is in a manner of
pre-payment and is not a final determination of just compensation while the latter is the
final determination of the fair market value of the property and is properly described as
“the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated
has to suffer by reason of the expropriation”
 In the case at bar the Republic failed to comply with the guidelines of the
above provisions since the amount they paid was based on the P15.00 per square meter
which is incorrect since the proper value is P50.00 per square meter. A proper Writ of
Possession then may not be issued since the guidelines were not followed. For the
Republic to be able to take possession of the property, the law mandates that it must first
pay to the landowner 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant
zonal valuation of the property by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The payment of less
than the amount required by law cannot be considered substantial compliance.

Hence the Petition was Denied.

[ G. R. No. 171601, April 08, 2015 ]
SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, PETITIONERS, VS. KIMWA
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Lucia was approached by Respondent Kimwa expressing its interest to

purchase gravel and sand, Lucia agreed to enter into a contract with a condition that the
40,000 cubic meter be withdrawn or completely hauled before 15 May 1995. Convinced
of such assuarance the Petitioner Spouses entered into a contract with Respondents
Kimwa denominated as “Agreement for Supply of Aggregates”. Pursuant to such contract
Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates however at some point they stopped,
and as a response the aggrieve spouse filed a Complaint for breach of contract with
damages. It its answer Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000 cubic
meters with Lucia, and that May 15, 1995 was never intended to be a deadline invoking
the Parol Evidence Rule it barred the Spouses from introducing evidence that the parties
had agreed differently.

The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the Petitioner Spouses. On appeal
the Court of Appeals reversed the Decision since the decision was based upon the
evidence supposedly in violation of Parol Evidence Rule.

Hence this Petition,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the parol evidence presented by the Spouse is admissible

RULLING:

YES. It is worth noting that in the Agreement entered into by the parties, there is
no specific mention of the conditions Petitioner Lucia alleges. Section 09, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence reads as follows:

“Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the terms
of an agreement have been reduced into writing:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an

agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
 agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written

agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills.”

As ruled in Inciong, Jr. v. Court of Appeals as well as Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v.

Autocorp Group, the rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms
were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. This is the
General Rule. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of First Instance of Albay it is
discussed that if the contract mentioned does not express the true agreement of the parties
then parol evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties.

In the case at bar the Court of Appeals seriously erred in not considering the
exceptions provided for by the above mentioned provision. It automatically decided that
the spouses are in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. The spouses pleaded for the
imperfection in the Agreement and its failure to express the true intent of the parties, the
respondents even responded to the pleading of these issues indicating that the proceeding
is an exceptional case that may allow an admission of parol evidence. The assertion made
by the Petitioner concerning the deadline of the haul being at May 15, 1995 or else such
hauling be rendered impossible due to the rechanneling of the petitioner’s permitted area
is the very foundation of the reason the Spouses came to court for relief. The issue
mentioned was successfully pleaded by the petitioner’s evidence by the answer of the
respondents. Accordingly this case falls under the exceptions provided for by the
abovementioned provision hence the parol evidence sought to be introduced are
admissible.

Hence the Petition is GRANTED,

[ G.R. No. 220456, June 10, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
GAJIR ACUB Y ARAKANI A.K.A. "ASAW," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS:

SPO1 Mirasol was tipped that a certain ‘Asaw’ later identified as the accused
Acub, had been selling illegal drugs at Ayer Village. A buy-bust operation against the
alleged offender was planned. PO2 Cordero was to act as the poseur-buyer along with
PO3 Ajuji as back-up. Upon arrival of two undercover police officers in Ayer Village
they walked toward a small alley together with the informant where Asaw was. The
transaction then occurred, The undercover cop handed the marked P500 bill as payment
and Asaw subsequently handed a plastic sachet containing the dangerous drug. After the
pre-arranged signal was performed, The police officers arrested Asaw. Accused Acub
was charged in violation of Section 05 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act when
he sold a dangerous drug, more specifically Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or more
commonly known as shabu to an undercover police officer during said buy-bust
operation.

The confiscated sachet was marked with the initials of PO2 Cordero, before being
handed over to PO3 Delumpines who also marked the sachet with his own initials. PO3
Delumpines then prepared a request for laboratory examination and delivered the same
along with the marked sachet to the Regional Crime Laboratory Offices. Such items were
received by PO1 Bentican and was turned-over to Police Inspector Manuel, the latter then
found the sachet positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

The Trial Court found Acub guilty as charged. Acub then filed with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals decision affirmed the Regional trial Court and further
states that the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with Article 02, Section 21
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was immaterial.

Hence this petition,

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with
Article 02, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be grounds to
acquit the accused

RULLING:
 YES. The court held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused. As ruled in People v. Morales, to sustain a conviction
concerning illegal drugs, it requires that the transaction be proven to have occurred and
that the illicit drug be presented as evidence. As correctly explained in People v. Jaafar,
Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable, they must undergo scientific testing and
analysis. It is then imperative that the drugs seized, tested, and offered as evidence refers
to only one confiscated substance. The chain of custody as a method of authentication
removes unnecessary doubts involving the identity of the seized drugs. Such method is
provided for in the above mentioned provision. The Court as reiterated in People v Que
emphasizes that such guidelines must be followed strictly to prevent tampering and
planting of evidence. However as contemplated by the same Court, such compliance may
not be always possible. As such the Implementing Rules and Regulations provided for
such scenario:

“Provided, finally, that non-compliance with these requirements under

justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”

For this saving clause to apply, the twin requirements of (1) the noncompliance was
justifiable; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved.
The reason for noncompliance must be explained by the prosecution along with the
proving the justifiable grounds for noncompliance.

In the case at bar there is no question that the prosecution failed to follow the
guidelines provided by the above provision. The lower courts both ignored such failure to
comply by reason that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu was
preserved. The lower courts are clearly mistaken. The seized sachet raises some doubts as
to its authenticity. Questions of tampering or planting of evidence arises from the
minuscule amount of shabu found in the drug, since as ruled in People v Holgado the
likelihood of tampering is greatest when only a small amount is found, although not a
ground for acquittal it raises the need for more compliance with Article 02, Section 21 of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. As ruled in Marinas v People noncompliance
is tantamount to a substantial gap in the chain of custody and raises serious doubts as to
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drug.

The failure of the prosecution to explain the reason of noncompliance as well as

the non-presentment of the proof for the justifiable grounds for noncompliance
necessitates that the accused be acquitted since the noncompliance created a huge gap in
the chain of custody that not even the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties may remedy, since the lapses themselves are irregular. The guilt of the
accused is not proven beyond reasonable doubt.