1. G.R. No.

188046: July 24, 2013

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. AMERICAN RUBBER
CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS: American Rubber Corporation (respondent) is the registered owner of two parcels of land
with a combined area of 940.7276 hectares situated in Barangay Ba1uno, Isabela City, Basilan. The
first parcel with an area of 927.9366 hectares is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
1286, while the second parcel consists of 12.7910 hectares under TCT No. T-1285.

Sometime in January 1998, respondent voluntarily offered to sell the two parcels and another
property (TCT No. T-4747) together with all improvements for the total price ofP105,732,921.00. The
total area acquired by DAR was 888.6489 hectares valued by petitioner at P55,682,832.67.

Since respondent rejected DARs offer based on petitioners valuation, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO) endorsed the claim folder to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) Central Office for summary administrative proceedings. Exasperated by DARABs inaction
for more than two years, respondent filed in the Regional Trial Court (SAC) a suit for judicial
determination of just compensation.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, the SAC designated three commissioners nominated by the parties
and their report was submitted to the Court. After the SAC denied its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA.

Petitioner assails the CA in affirming the SAC valuation which merely adopted the Commissioners
Report which, in turn, is based solely on the recommended valuation by respondents private
appraiser, Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. using a different criteria. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the basis of the just compensation is correct

HELD: No. CA decision reversed and set aside

Political Law- "just compensation" for parcels of land taken pursuant to the agrarian
reform program as "the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator."

The measure of compensation is not the takers gain but the owners loss.Just compensation means the
equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. It means a fair and full equivalent
value for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its
improvements and capabilities should be considered. Thus, the current value of like properties should
have been considered by petitioner to accurately determine the value of the land at the time of taking,
that is, in August 2000 when respondents title was transferred to the Government.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas we said that:

The "taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an
expropriation proceeding." In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the
RTC should take into consideration the "value of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of
the rendition of judgment." "The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.

However, while the CA correctly observed that petitioners valuation omitted an integral factor
mandated by Section 17, the records are bereft of any supporting evidence to compute the CS. The
documents submitted by the respondent to the Commissioners consisted merely of sworn affidavits of
adjacent owners/sellers and not registerable deeds of sale. The SACs decision actually did not contain
any discussion of its application of any formula to the facts established by evidence, as it merely
adopted the Commissioners Report, which in turn was based solely on the findings and computation
of the Cuervo Appraisal Report.

Considering, therefore, that the SAC based its valuation on a different formula, while petitioner failed
to take into full consideration the factors set forth in Section 17, and in the absence of sufficient
evidence for the determination of just compensation, we are constrained to remand the present case
to the SAC for the determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, DAR
AO 5, Series of 1998 and Joint DAR-LBP MC No. 7, Series of 1999. The said trial court may, motu
proprio or at the instance of any of the parties, again appoint one or more commissioners to ascertain
facts relevant to the dispute and file a written report thereof.

Petition GRANTED.

3. MONETARY BOARD v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, GR No. 189571, 2015-01-21

Facts:
Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouses, as
well as salary loan product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to its mandate under
Republic Act (RA) Nos. 3518[3] and 7169[4] to provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers.
Respondent devised a program by charging a premium in the form of a higher fee known as Credit
Redemption Fund (CRF) from said borrowers. Resultantly, Special Trust Funds were established by
respondent for the pension loans of the veteran-borrowers, salary loans of teachers and low-salaried
employees. These trust funds were, in turn, managed by respondent's Trust and Investment
Department, with respondent as beneficiary. T... an examination was conducted by the Supervision
and Examination Department (SED) II of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). It found, among
other things, that respondent's collection of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and
pension loans of... borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of RA
No. 8791[5] which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer. The
BSP notified respondent about the Insurance Commission's opinion that the CRF is a form of
insurance. Thus, respondent was requested to discontinue the collection of said fees. Petitioners
issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 1139 directing respondent's Trust and Investment
Department to return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF... respondent requested
reconsideration of said MB Resolution. However, the same was denied
Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC... he RTC dismissed
respondent's petition for declaratory relief. Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion to Admit
its Motion for Reconsideration against said order alleging that it did not receive a copy thereof.
Despite the foregoing, the RTC allowed respondent's motion for reconsideration and required
petitioners to file their answer. In a Decision dated June 15, 2009, the RTC of Makati City granted
respondent's petition for declaratory relief
Issues: The issue is whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Ruling: We rule in the negative.
Ergo, the Court, in CJH Development Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,[10] held that in the
same manner that court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief,
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies... cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the
simple reason that if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may
avail of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter
for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial powers or functions.
The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the character of its
determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be imposed upon erring banks, as an
exercise of quasi-judicial function
A priori, having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body exercising
quasi-judicial functions, then its decision in MB Resolution No. 1139 cannot be the proper subject of
declaratory relief.
Lastly, also worth noting is the fact that the court a quo's Order dated September 24, 2007, which
dismissed respondent's petition for declaratory relief, had long become final and executory.
Principles:
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for declaratory relief, viz.:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or... violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for
a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute;... and for a declaration
of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question
of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute.[9]
Undoubtedly, the BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial powers or
functions. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, the BSP Monetary Board is an independent
central monetary authority and a body corporate with fiscal and administrative... autonomy,
mandated to provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It has the power to
issue subpoena, to sue for contempt those refusing to obey the subpoena without justifiable reason, to
administer oaths and compel presentation of books, records and... others, needed in its examination,
to impose fines and other sanctions and to issue cease and desist order. Section 37 of Republic Act No.
7653, in particular, explicitly provides that the BSP Monetary Board shall exercise its discretion in
determining whether administrative... sanctions should be imposed on banks and quasi-banks, which
necessarily implies that the BSP Monetary Board must conduct some form of investigation or hearing
regarding the same.

4. Clark Investors and Locators Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance and

Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 200670, July 6, 2015
Facts:

Clark Investors and Locators Association (petitioners) assail the validity of RR 2-2012 via petition
for certiorari (Rule 65) promulgated by the Secretary of Finance upon the recommendation of the
CIR. RR 2-2012 imposes VAT, and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum
products from abroad into the Freeport or Economic Zones (former Clark and Subic
Military Conservations). By virtue of RA 7227, the said military conservations were converted
into Freeport or Economic zones. RA 7227 provided that the zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory, therefore exempt from VAT, and in lieu of national and local taxes, all
businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall pay a preferential
gross income tax rate of 5%. The said provisions were extended to the Clark Economic Zone. It is also
exempt from the payment of all taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment.

Thus, the petitioners assailed the validity of RR 2-2012. It argues that by imposing the VAT and excise
tax on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or
Economic Zones, RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted by RA No. 7227 and RA
No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating within the Subic Special Economic Zone and
Clark Freeport Zone.
The Respondents however attacked the remedy resorted to by the petitioners. According to
respondents, Certiorari (via Rule 65) was not the proper remedy because: (a) RR 2-2012 was issued
by the respondents in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, not quasi- judicial powers; (b) violated
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. On the merits, it argued that it did not unilaterally revoke the law
because Sec. 3 of the RR provides for tax refund, upon sufficient proof that the imported petroleum
were used within the zones.

Issues:

1. Whether a Special Civil Action via Certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy;
2. Whether or not RR 2-2012 is valid.
Ruling:

The petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 was NOT the proper remedy.

Firstly, respondents did not act in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. A petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is a special civil action that may be
invoked only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For a
special civil action for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the
tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions
and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.2Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

RR 2-2012 was issued in the exercise of Quasi- Legislative or Rule- Making Powers

Respondents do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. They issued RR 2-2012 in the exercise of their quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers, and not judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Verily, respondents did not adjudicate or
determine the rights of the parties. In order to determine whether a Revenue Regulation is quasi-
legislative in nature, we must examine the legal basis of the Secretary of Finance in the issuance
thereof. In BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,5 we ruled that Revenue Regulation 19-86
was quasi-legislative in nature because it was issued by the Secretary of Finance in the exercise of his
rule-making powers under Section 244 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Similarly, in
the case at bar, RR 2-2012 was also issued by the Secretary of Finance based on Section 244 of the
NIRC.

The proper remedy is a Petition for Declaratory Relief

While this case is styled as a petition for certiorari, there is, however, no denying the fact that, in
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the
questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.

Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. 8 The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.9 The Rules of
Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court.

The petition violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court
with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.

A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon
the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.