Legal Ethics Cases Respondent admits that he married Luisa in Hongkong representing himself
as a bachelor; however, he claimed that the marriage certificate stated a
1) Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., complainant versus Atty. Leo J.
Palma, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 2474 September 15, 2004
Facts: Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
grossly immoral conduct.
Complainant was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA) and respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. He
hired respondent as his personal counsel. Consequently, respondent’s
relationship with complainant became intimate. On June 22, without the
knowledge of complainant’s family, respondent married Lisa, the
complainant’s daughter in Hongkong. Complainant came to know that, a) on
the date of the supposed marriage, respondent requested from his
(complainant’s) office and airplane ticket to and from Australia, with stop-
over in Hongkong; b) respondent misrepresented himself as bachelor in the
Hongkong authorities to facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and c) respondent
was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children. Complainant
filed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between respondent and
Lisa. The complainant contented that with the moral ascendancy of the
respondent over Maria Luisa and his misrepresentation that there was no
legal impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second marriage,
respondent succeeded in inducing and beguiling her into marrying him.
Without complying with the requirements of the Philippine law that he should
first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H.
Palma and that the “advice” of Maria Luisa’s parents should first be obtained
she being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent succeeded in
contracting marriage with her in Hongkong in June 22, 1992 by falsely
representing himself before the Hongkong authorities that he is a “bachelor.”
The respondent contented that “….. and that it is contrary to the natural
course of things for an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely
loves.”
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of respondent to Ma. Luisa is void ab
initio.
Held: To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
condition no different from the term “spinster” with respect to Luisa. There is
no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the law knew fully
well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a bigamous marriage
defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has a
subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification from the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at the Cardial’s Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other
hand, the Certificate of Marriage from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages in
Hongkong proves respondent’s subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9,
1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondent’s second marriage
was confirmed. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and since
he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning shows
a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such
relationship, the man and woman are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity. How could respondent perform these obligations
to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her,
then the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.
Furthermore, (not stated in the case) under Article 35 paragraph 3 of the
Family Code, “a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void ab
initio except those covered by the preceding chapter”. Though the marriage
was solemnized in Hongkong, the intrinsic validity of the marriage is
governed by the national law of the contracting parties. In the case at bar,
since both of the parties are Filipino citizens, the validity of their marriage
shall be governed by the Philippine law. Under the Philippine law, absence of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage shall make the marriage void
ab initio. Their marriage was contracted without the valid marriage license,
thus, the marriage of respondent and Ma. Luisa is void ab initio.
2) Torben Overgaard vs Godwin Valdez
A.C. no. 7902 March 31, 2009
Facts: Overgaard engaged the services of Atty. Valdez as his legal counsel
in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him.
Torben Overgaard filed a disbarment case against Atty. Valdez for despite
the receipt of the full amount of legal fees ofP900,000.00 as stipulated in a
Retainer Agreement, Valdez refused to perform any of his obligations under
their and, ignored the Overgaard’s request for report of the status of the
cases entrusted, and rejected the complainants demands for the return of
the money paid to him.
For his part, Atty. Valdez failed to neither answer the complaint against him
nor attend the hearing even with due notice.
On September 30, 2008 the Court found Valdez to be guilty of violations of
the canons of Code of Professional Responsibility his name was ordered to
be stricken the roll of attorneys.
October 21, 2008 filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that he have
no knowledge of the disbarment case filed against him. In September 2006
he abandoned his Makati office and Cavite residence and moved his office in
Bukidnon where he also resided due to a threat on his person, and he was
not able to receive the demands of Overgaard or orders and notices
pertaining to the disbarment case.
He also argued that he gave the Overgaard legal advice, and that he
searched for and interviewed witnesses in relation to the cases he was
handling for the latter. As for the 900, 000.00 pesos, he claimed that he
gave 300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives to locate witnesses. He
offered to return 250,000.00 but Overgaard’s partner refused to accept. But
he was not able to present receipt made by the intelligence operatives nor
other certification or receipts on how the money was spent to provide
sufficient accounting.
Held: In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and
without making sure that the cases he was handling for his client were
properly attended to during his absence, and without making arrangements
whereby he would receive important mail, the Valdez is clearly guilty of gross
negligence. A lawyer cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and
then rely on the convenient excuse that there were threats to his safety.
Even assuming that there were serious threats to his person, this did not
give him the permission to desert his client and leave the cases entrusted to
his care hanging. He should have at least exercised reasonable and ordinary
care and diligence by taking steps to ensure that the cases he was handling
were attended to and that his clients interest was safeguarded. If it was not
possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his care, he should have
informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that he be allowed
to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the services of
another counsel who could properly present him.
The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This Courts en banc decision in
Administrative Case No. 7902 dated September 30, 2008, entitled Torben B.
Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, is AFFIRMED
3) RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
AM P-0601007
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) instituted an
administrative case against Atty Kho, a former clerk of court of an RTC, after
an audit by the former found that the latter failed to remit P60K (confiscated
cash bonds) and P5K(Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund). Atty Kho
stated that these amounts were stored in the court’s safety vaults, as his
usual practice. The audit team advised him that he should deposit such
amounts to the Judicial Development Fund account and Atty Kho complied
with the directives.
Subsequently, the ICA received a complaint that Atty Kho, along with his
common-law wife, a stenographer, was engaged with lending out to court
employees money in his possession as clerk of court, personally deriving
profit from the interest earned. The OCA found Atty Kho liable of violating an
OCA Circular because he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a
year. The OCA then recommended that its report be docketed as an A.C. and
Kho be imposed a P10K fine.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Kho is liable.
HELD: YES. OCA recommendations VALID.
Dishonesty Conduct.
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. The failure
to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. His
malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
And although Kho had restituted all his cash accountabilities, he was
nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the collections for the
judiciary funds.

Unlawful conduct.
Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the
Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a
lawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of
trouble with the law. The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is
to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. The presence of evil intent on
the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission
within the terms of Rule 1.01 which specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct.
4) TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA
A.C. No. 9000, 5 October 2011
Facts: Atty. Gumba obtained a loan of P350,000.00 from Mr. Tan and
offered the parcel of land registered in her father’s name as security. She
even showed Special Power of Attorney that she was authorized to sell or
encumber the property. However, Atty. Gumba defaulted on her loan
obligation and failed to pay the same despite repeated demands. So, Mr. Tan
went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that the
SPA did not give respondent the power to sell the property but only
empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should be subject to disciplinary actions
considering that the deception was made in her private capacity.
Ruling: Yes, a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest
and immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, Atty. Gumba’s actions clearly show that she deceived
complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and
false representations and taking advantage of her education and
complainants ignorance in legal matters.
However, suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
5) MARILI C. RONQUILLO vs ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR
FACTS: Atty. Homobono t. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment for the
price of P1.5M in favor of Marili C. Ronquillo, a Filipino citizen residing in
Cannes, France his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot and
obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he
executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer.
Respondent received P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment
and was able to encash the first check of P187,500.00.
Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that
respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse and he also failed
to deliver a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia. Complainant ordered stop payment on the second check of
P187,500.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Homobono T. Cezar should be disbarred or
suspended for deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
HELD: YES, he should be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of 3 YEARS.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.
He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price
of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell,
transfer or assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the
money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino
Worker for 10 years, is morally reprehensible.
Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether
they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession whether or not the attorney is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar; cannot rule on the
issue of the amount of money that should be returned.
6) Donton v. Atty. Tansingco, A.C. No. 6057, June 27, 2006
Facts: Peter Donton filed a complaint against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, as
the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement, and against
others (Duane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for estafa thru falsification of
public document.
A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner on May 20, 2003 against
respondent Atty. Emmanual O. Tansingco for serious misconduct and
deliberate violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility arose when respondent Atty. Tansingco filed a
counter-charge of perjury against Donton.
Atty. Tansingco in his complaint stated that he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, an owner and long-time
resident of a real property located at Cubao, Quezon City. Since Mr. Stier is a
U.S. Citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name, he
agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.
Donton averred that Atty. Tansingco’s act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier is a foreign national, constitutes
serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Donton prayed
that Atty. Tansingco be disbarred.
Atty. Tansingco claimed that complainant Donton filed disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Aletajan, because he refused to act witness in the criminal case against Stier
and Manggay.
In Resolution dated October 1, 2003, the court referred the matter to the
IBP for investigation, report and recommendation and for which the latter,
through Commissioner Milagros San Juan of the IBP Commission of Discipline
recommended suspension from the practice of law for two years and
cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six
months.
The report was then forwarded to SC as mandated under Section 12(b), Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or Not Atty. Tansingco is guilty of serious misconduct?
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02
of the Code. The Court ruled that a lawyer should not render any service or
give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is
bound to uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Atty. Tansingco had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his
oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Atty.
Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such
an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended.
As such, respondent is being suspended for six (6) months.
7) ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO v. ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON
A.C. No. 6968, 9 August 2006
A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
FACTS: Dennis Venturina (Venturina), Francis Carlo Taparan (Taparan) and
Raymundo Narag (Narag) were taken as suspects in the killing of a UP
student. They were taken into the custody of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of
the UP Security Force. Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special
Operations Group, requested that Taparan and Narag be taken into his
custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino (Lambino), Legal Counsel of UP Diliman,
opposed Atty. Dizon’s move, he not being armed with a warrant for their
arrest. After what appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon
and the UP officials, the students were allowed to go back to their
dormitories. Atty. Villamor committed to accompany them to the NBI the
following morning.
Atty. Dizon filed a complaint against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of Canon 1. Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code
of Professional Responsibilty. He also earlier filed a criminal complaint
against Atty. Lambino before the Ombudsman for violation of P.D. 1829
which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenses.

Atty Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Upon Atty. Lambino’s motion, the
administrative cases were consolidated.
ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Lambino or Atty. Dizon acted within their
official duties
HELD: By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors
of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B.
Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Lambino in
light of a finding that she ―acted within her official duties as she
safeguarded the rights of the students in accordance with the school’s
substitute parental authority‖ and ―within the bounds of the law as the NBI
agents had no warrants of arrest.‖
With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner
recommended to reprimand him for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility in ―recklessly trying to arrest‖ the suspects without warrant.
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted
and approved the Commissioner’s Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to
this Court its Notice of Resolution, together with the records of the cases
which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006.
When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against
Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was
elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the negative
the two issues raised therein, to wit:
(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could
be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable
cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No. 1829. x x x,
held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students
―cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without
rendering it unconstitutional,‖ they having ―a right to prevent the arrest [of
the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.‖
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a
warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides, among others that a lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
8) SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts: A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty.
Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend
himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang
driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril.
Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite being granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the
victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizon’s crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving
moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1)Yes. Moral Turpitude is “everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals…”
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not
only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his
attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a
simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes. His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy
his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath
and in the CPR, he is bound to “obey the laws of the land.” The liabilities in
question have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the
condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
9) Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., A.C. No. 7332, June 18, 2013
FACTS: Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals involving a Labor Case. Complainant then filed a Motion for Issuance
of a Writ of Execution before the Regional Arbitration Branch which the
respondent was the Labor Arbiter. After the lapse of five (5) months,
complainant’s motion remained unacted, prompting him to file a Second
Motion for Execution. However, still, there was no action until the
complainant agreed to give respondent a portion of the monetary award
thereof after the latter asked from the former how much would be his share.
Thereafter, respondent issued a writ of execution but the employer of the
complainant moved to quash the said writ. Eventually, issued a new writ of
execution wherein complainant’s monetary awards were reduced to the
effect that it modifies the DECISION of the CA. Complainant now filed the
instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), averring that respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant in exchange for a
favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and
advantage to PT&T, complainant’s employer.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his
violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code.
HELD: YES. The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of
the Code, delineate the lawyer’s responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves
the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging in any unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from
encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any man’s cause for any
corrupt motive or interest; meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to
lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one’s public
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or
(3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well to note
that a lawyer who holds a government office may be disciplined as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. The infractions of the respondent constitute gross
misconduct. Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It treads
the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency. On the other hand, gross misconduct
constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error of
judgment." In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states
that when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct or gross
misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. However, the Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous
administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr. v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr., which
therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the same. In view
of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00 in order to penalize respondent’s transgressions as
discussed herein and to equally deter the commission of the same or similar
acts in the future.
10) LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts: A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services.
Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial
assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them,
Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To support his
allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty
relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the
printing and circulating of said calling card.
Issue: W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Held: Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and
16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a
business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a
commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the
public’s estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule
1.03, which proscribes “ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally
or through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from
barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by
Linsangan, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.
For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money
was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in
the legal profession.
11) PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. Later on, Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK
insolvent.
Former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then
Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court
in GENBANK's liquidation.
After EDSA 1, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG for the purpose of
recovering ill gotten wealth. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages against respondents Tan, et al. so PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-
named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence
with former President Marcos. These respondents were represented by
Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents. The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in said service.
ISSUE: W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza?
HELD: NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent
Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the
Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even
filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should
resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of 'matter’ under Rule
6.03.

The 'matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in
filing the necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,
therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
'matter in Civil Case No. 0096 which is about the sequestration of the shares
of respondents Tan, et al.

The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation
of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No.
0096.

Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is not

significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of
the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in
determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK.

Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead

issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently
remanded to the Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under
which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's
motive as highly suspect.

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness
for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that
'switching sides' carries the danger that former government employee may
compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern
does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of
respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to
liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan,
et al., in Allied Bank. There is no switching sides for there were no sides.