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G.R. No.

L-68102 July 16, 1992 The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners, police officers was forthwith dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared
vs. by the investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14)
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. "footsteps" wide — seven (7) "footsteps" from the center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both
sides. 2 Pulong Pulo Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders and concrete
G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992 railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.
CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO, ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion of the cargo truck was two (2)
ELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, "footsteps" from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line of the
vs. bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16)
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents. "footsteps" away from the northern end of the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from
the opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine (9) "footsteps",
DAVIDE, JR., J.: while skid marks produced by the left front tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the
truck, however, produced no skid marks.
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos.
69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that
reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners' complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 kilometers) per hour.
Civil Case No. 4478 of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31
"Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime January 1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and
Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Branch V of the said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the
Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, P3,650.00 for the
The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident which burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102
led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death
Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee. benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the
Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and the
case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00
deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh
as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for the
and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the late Jose Koh,
hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the
McKee, Jr., in connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver of the truck at the time of
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the
the accident.
Medical Center, P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air
The antecedent facts are not disputed. Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to P5,000.00. They also sought an award of
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur attorney's fees amounting to 25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4
Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence
an International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private respondents, Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial
and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same
Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5
injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford
Escort.
Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated
Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, private
the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action (Civil Case No. 4477)
of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat. and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch III of the same court, which was
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio
was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counter-claim 8 wherein they alleged
Fernando. When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of the that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, .
bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys . . which was on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose and regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed
Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on for an award of damages as may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of
the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases.
opposite lane, on the said bridge.
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent Court in
the testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition for its review 23 was filed with this Court;
opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order denying said petition was subsequently denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the
the motion for consolidation, 10 which Judge Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
directed that Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of the court then On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate Court,
presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of
Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751. which reads:
In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered,
Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered several ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants as follows:
documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, For the death of Jose Koh:
Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman Dayrit. 12
P 50,000.00 as moral damages
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)
Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)
and offered several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon the other hand, the defense presented the accused P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M)
Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
exhibits. 14
For the death of Kim Koh McKee:
On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: P 50,000.00 as moral damages
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh. M)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and after applying the provisions P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)
of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon said P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)
accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh McKee:
indemnify the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death; to reimburse the P 25,000.00 as moral damages
heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital (Exh. E)
Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and
deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15 D-2)
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on the same day, counsel for P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1)
petitioners filed with Branch III of the court — where the two (2) civil cases were pending — a manifestation For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh McKee:
to that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16 P 25,000.00 as moral damages
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil cases on 12 November 1980 P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G and
and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 17 The G-1)
dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows: P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)
WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and against the P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital (Exh. F)
plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants had P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. MM)
proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:
awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 P 10,000.00 as moral damages
and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)
hereby dismissing for lack of proof to that effect (sic). 18 P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)
A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; as
received on 2 December 1980. 19 counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was No pronouncement as to costs.
docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases
SO ORDERED. 26
Nos. 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the appellate court.
The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's
assigned to the Fourth Civil Cases Division. inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that
the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as employers of
On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming
Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
the conviction of Galang. 21 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. selecting and supervising the said employee.27 This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based on the
Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol. following findings of fact:
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is not included in the record. According to the Table of Contents submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2
posited in the fourth assigned error as follows: was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's claim
IV that he stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and
damages.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN
SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE RIGHT. 3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car about 10 meters away:
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee testified thus: ATTY. SOTTO:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge? Q Do I understand from your testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road is straight
and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the about ten (10) meters away from you for the first time?
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys
who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed xxx xxx xxx
the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way A I noticed it, sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.
to come back to our right lane. ATTY. SOTTO:
Q Did the truck slow down? Q So, for clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have (sic) not noticed it before that
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way. ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)
Q What happened after that? Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped only because of the
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's
my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July affidavit (Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge.
22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases). 5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to his
xxx xxx xxx proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid marks under the
truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the truck and
speed before the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)? none were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the truck
A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on were caused by the truck's front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the mishap
side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very
Appellants' Brief). short distance to avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly stepped on
Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and his brakes but the smashup happened just the same.
circumstances: For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of the
1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it defendants in the selection of their driver or in the supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such
had already collided with the car: defense of having exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees in their answers. They did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of
xxx xxx xxx
selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the proximate
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the criminal case: cause of the mishap. If Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the car earlier or at
xxx xxx xxx a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a
collision was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the bridge his attention was not
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness because he was one of the first to
riveted to the road in front of him.
arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital. On the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply proven, but the items must be
reduced. 28
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of
the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the street. A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was subsequently filed by private
respondents on the basis of which the respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29 reconsidered
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary course of events people usually take the
and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment of 12 November
side of the person with whom they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general rule,
1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984.30
they do not wish to be identified with the person who was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously
created among the several persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Hence, this petition.
Jan. 31, 1962). Petitioners allege that respondent Court:
With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did not I
go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap,
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY
but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in
BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER'S
refusing to believe Dayrit.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE,
distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED
completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.
II orientation, perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID DOWN rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present
FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for
WAS INDICTED. the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal
action subject, however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal case.
III
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of reckless
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt to
WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED set aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no relevance or importance
IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE to this case.
NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is
IV entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the case of independent civil
ANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES. actions under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would
V be entirely irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
. . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE . . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in
TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the
SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE result of the criminal case.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER. Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
VI proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that
AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE,
they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS
respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .
HONORABLE COURT.
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in the criminal case should
VII
not be considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would
. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in
ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN which case private respondents' liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OF Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against
DAMAGES. 31 Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents to Comment on the respondents. 41
petition. 32 After the said Comment 33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this Court then And now to the merits of the petition.
gave due course to the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they accordingly
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not
complied with.
respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere
There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of dissecting the arguments and counter- speculations, conjectures and presumptions.
arguments, some observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal
Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil liability arising from a quasi-delict under by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution
Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with
Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III of the trial respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42
court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
reasonably concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the civil cases,
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court
or vice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and understandably so, since by then no specific
failed to consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated
provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil
in its judgment. 43 The same is true where the appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on
action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases in this
conjectures, speculations and surmises 44 or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a
case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been
misapprehension of facts. 45
farthest from their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions
as it may, there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are
of Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, not supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the inferences made
clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the
expense to the parties litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing the correct findings of fact.
unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating, according to their respective
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately negligence." 49
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh
This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
darted across the road from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner Araceli
Koh McKee: In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:
Q What happened after that, as you approached the bridge?
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
A When we were approaching the bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively,
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
who were crossing, he blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2) boys. We noticed other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
to come back to our right lane. injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
Q Did the truck slow down? person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) continued on its way. reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. 50
Q What happened after that?
Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
my father stepped on the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46 because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have
of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down
injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus: the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the
truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck,
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance
prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley
of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially
defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was running at 30
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence. private respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by the investigating officer of the truck
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour.
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman The law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the contrary,
law. . . . this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.
In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held: The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the earlier quoted testimony of
. . . Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern v.
xxx xxx xxx
Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
Q Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
speed before the actual impact of collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were A It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our right lane on
even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and Appellants' Brief)54
could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus:
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
A It was moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.
Q Immediately after you saw this truck, do you know what happened? Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck driver's
A I saw the truck and a car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of
1979) the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows
xxx xxx xxx from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de
Q From the time you saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the said truck ever stopped? jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic) already collided with the car and it was already motionless. (tsn. prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' Brief). 55 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures those of persons for whom one is responsible.
and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting xxx xxx xxx
accident. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured xxx xxx xxx
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
responsible for the consequences thereof.56 The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held: employees. 60 The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose
this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last sufficient legal and factual moorings.
clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death must, however, be increased from
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to
solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the
165). death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or Costs against private respondents.
even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's
peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due SO ORDERED.
care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur.
798-799). Bidin, J., took no part.
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled:
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude
a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but
the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart
v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or
proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a
plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to
defeat claim (sic) for damages.
G.R. No. L-29745 June 4, 1973 and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. This provision reads
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE, petitioner, as follows:
vs. Sec. 491. Firepro of partitions, exits and stairways. — ... All buildings and separate sections of buildings or
ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al., respondent. buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more persons
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. domiciled therein either temporarily or permanently, and all public or quasi-public buildings having less
than three stories, such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human detention,
Jose G. Gatchalian for respondents. assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two
unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of
MAKALINTAL, J.: not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall
likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be placed as
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
far apart as possible.
The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the second storey of the
a vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-
Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
storey, semi-concrete edifice (Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and "4") located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.
and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400
square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of negligence and that such
each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders (Exh. "4"), and the presence of each of said fire- negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on a number of
exits was indicated on the wall (Exh. "5"). authorities in the American jurisdiction, thus: .
At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the
located about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be
panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, proximate cause of the injury. (65 C.J.S. 1156).
together with the registrar, tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a
them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and matter or law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se for the reason that non-
that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care
stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the instructresses, took to the which an ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to
microphone so as to convey to the students the above admonitions more effectively, and she even injure others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect
slapped three students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is
the stairway, stood up and tried with outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing and pushing their fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or negligence in and of
way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been
few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would have been regarded as negligence
causing stampede therein. in the absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact, any reason to
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including anticipate that injury would result from such violation. .... (65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628).
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the
of the stampede. speed limit, for example, do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is
xxx xxx xxx enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by
creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the upper lip,
ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such
contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and
circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law
third right ribs. The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures
has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the makers of the ordinance
of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
anticipated. This court has applied these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the manner of
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as driving. (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and
... However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of
the violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the result so remote that
3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and
no action can be maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents,
sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000.00, plus interest at the
but in their character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the
legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.
injurious consequence. The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
The case came up to this Court on a petition for review filed by the defendant below. remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident,
The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as the in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to
petitioner, was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Prevent. (38 Am Jur 841).
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The first is that Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction City of Manila refers to public buildings and hence did not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of
private ownership. It will be noted from the text of the ordinance, however, that it is not ownership which
determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the purpose for ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
which a particular building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to any one occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance — for instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of
precisely was — then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
such a building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such relation to the use or purpose for which intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
the building is devoted. cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not specifically allege that the
building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner herein, who is a mere lessee, who should be liable ordinance in question had been violated. The violation, however, as an act of negligence which gave rise
for the violation. The contention ignores the fact that it was the use of the building for school purposes to liability, was sufficiently comprehended within paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads: .
which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross negligence of the defendant who failed
owners who was responsible for such use. to exercise due care and diligence for the safety of its students in not providing the building with adequate
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by the petitioner is whether or not the failure to comply with fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to avoid the stampede, aside from the fact that the
the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. The case defendant did not have a permit to use the building as a school-house.
of Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs. Medina, G. R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is cited in support of The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
the contention that such failure was not the proximate cause. It is there stated by this Court:
Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close Castro and Barredo, JJ., reserve their votes.
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of
"Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and
cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced
the injury complained of. A statement of the doctrine relied upon is found in Manila Electric Co. vs.
Remoquillo, L-8328, May 18, 1956, wherein this Court, citing Corpus Juris said:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, and
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no
causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a
faulty juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the
petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in
point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was
a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation
which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in
case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was
bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is true that in this
particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for
under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, as
stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or
EN BANC “ cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts. There was, according
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.] to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is no insulation material in
commercial use for such kind of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand secondly, because the only insulation
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the material that may be effective is still in the experimental stage of development and, anyway, its costs
minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed would be prohibitive… ”
MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff is that although the owner of the
house in constructing the “media agua” in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after
DECISION making that “media agua”, its construction though illegal, was finally approved because he was given a
MONTEMAYOR, J.: final permit to occupy the house; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was the company that was at fault and
was guilty of negligence because although the electric wire in question had been installed long before
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located
the construction of the house and in accordance with the ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere
on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The
compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for
“media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno
adopting such other precautionary measures as may be warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned
negligence cannot be determined by a simple matter of inches; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the
the city did was to prescribe certain minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required
Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media
that primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the obligation of due diligence is
agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to
not fulfilled by placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors. The
recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor —
appellate court, however, refrained from stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures could
P10,000 as compensatory damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as actual damages; chan
and should have been adopted.
roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as
attorney’s fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we are
modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has inclined to agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was primarily caused
appealed said decision to us. by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its
edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are stated in the following
and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”. We fail to see how the
portions of its decision which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles on the called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2
street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s house 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation distance of
was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident took place, 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a “media agua”,
although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his
holding happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the “media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
house forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which the wire presented, and as a “media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the “media
result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the agua” the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires
other end where it was. and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit,
“At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet
from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which the deceased was making repairs was between the “Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of
only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept three feet from the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely
the building.’ Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at bar the reckoning should we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless
not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the of breach of any ordinance or regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout
distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless, for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after
for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it in finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so
measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the
that even assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
the edge of the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance was disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the
actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave construction of the “media agua” was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.
him a permit to construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he built one Had said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno standing on it, would
having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between
reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet. the edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if
not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by the city
authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and that if he had not done so Appellants wire would We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the house or its “media agua” was
have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three feet from the edge of the ‘media always a source of danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but the claim of
agua’. It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’ was constructed the owner was given a final the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted as we gather from
permit of occupancy of the house cralaw . the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept them as satisfactory. Consequently, we
may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate said
wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered
sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater “A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and
too far toward the middle of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua” just occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition
below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.” (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6- We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is
feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence a constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to be near said
and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila authorities and the electric
causing his own electrocution. company could get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was liable for damages the Court of Appeals establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians
cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is exactly because drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other
applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the walls of Intramuros, necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since these
Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was “a public place where persons high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung
come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves”. The electric company was clearly negligent in placing its only up to the outskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to
wires so near the place that without much difficulty or exertion, a person by stretching his hand out could a voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better
touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped protection of the public.
the electric wire and was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in said case was a boy who was in no In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the
position to realize the danger. In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the street where complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
there was no possible danger to pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons standing on the
“media agua”, but a “media agua” can hardly be considered a public place where persons usually Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and
gather. Moreover, a person standing on the “media agua” could not have reached the wires with his Endencia, JJ., concur.
hands alone. It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long enough to reach the wire.
Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith
trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and “media agua”. Moreover, in that very
case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that although it is a well- established rule that
the liability of electric companies for damages or personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence,
nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.
But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant electric
company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and “media
agua” in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted
claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold
the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company
must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in
turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal
cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that case, the electric company was
found negligent in leaving scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old boy
found and carried home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he opened one of
them, held it out with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to explode and
injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this Tribunal in denying recovery for the
injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent
act of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless Plaintiff’s own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.”
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire,
evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better
understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following
citation helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988 Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner, was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
vs. At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very
serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused
by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: infected by tetanus.
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of Dr. Exconde
decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty are as follows:
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Date Diagnosis
The records disclose the following facts of the case. 11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield adm. at DX TETANUS
at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed 1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see #35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was 11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting 02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50
meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of Barangay Captain In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before
Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged.
incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as
Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine. together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo Padilla who of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered
conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of
September 28, 1981) which reads: his penalty.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised the award
of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the following: The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was based on an
affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar prominence, right.
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented to me only for
having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano
places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two
accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields
Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit: of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches
were regulated and reduced;
xxx xxx xxx
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and ditches which
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before this Station
will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable
accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors
for catching mudfishes;
and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano
who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary Perfecto
this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Jaravata;
Records.)
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
shallow irrigation canals with some companions; other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
(p. 33, Rollo) injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition. reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition. probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier
liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for We look into the nature of tetanus-
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631). The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable
symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of which days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of
Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the
following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus. Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and
appellate court said: is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the deceased generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle
was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not deserve serious involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in
consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death the region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the
was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in the process of signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death. Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated with a poor prognosis.
of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by which he could be infected with Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases
tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may
cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418). laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6
irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild.
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The
20-21, Rollo) criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle
own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. incubation period of the disease.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November
was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. November 15, 1980, he died.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of proximate If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
cause: time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
xxx xxx xxx tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively,
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action for the
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes
inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful
the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 act is also punishable by the criminal law?
Phil. 1038). "For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will correct
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged."
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00.
et al. (99 Phil. 118). However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then Intermediate
efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into SO ORDERED.
operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125) Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the
records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this
respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the
facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the
express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127
SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal
aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil
liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in
the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the
accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission
as follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage
of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility,
and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of
the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two

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