University of Utah

Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender Bias in Elections? Evidence from Chile
Author(s): Sarah Shair-Rosenfield and Magda Hinojosa
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2014), pp. 837-850
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24371955
Accessed: 21-02-2020 21:16 UTC

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

University of Utah, Sage Publications, Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to Political Research Quarterly

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Article

Political Research Quarterly

2014, Vol. 67(4) 837-850
Does Female Incumbency Reduce Gender © 2014 University of Utah
Reprints and permissions:

Bias in Elections? Evidence from Chile sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1065912914550044
prq.sagepub.com

<§SAGE

Sarah Shair-Rosenfieid1 and Magda Hinojosa1

Abstract

The incumbency advantage is typically thought to constrain female political representation, but can female incumb
provide a signal to parties that reduces strategic gender bias? We argue that once women prove they can
elections, parties will revise their strategic evaluations of their value as candidates. We test this using an origin
dataset of twenty-one Chilean elections between 1989 and 2012. We use a Heckman selection model to asse
election rates by incumbent candidate gender, conditional on the re-nomination of incumbents. We find that fem
incumbents are just as likely to be re-nominated and re-elected as their male counterparts.

Keywords
gender, Chile, incumbency, elections, candidates

Much of the academic literature corroborates the conven nearest competitor by 7.5 percentage points, but she was
tional wisdom that women face bias—often in the form of also paired with a much weaker coalitional partner who
gender stereotypes that suggest that women lack the attri obtained less than 5 percent of the vote. As Goic explained
butes of leadership and are therefore "unelectable"— shortly after those elections, "Four years ago, the voters
when attempting to enter the political arena. In particular, bet on a woman, and I became the first female Deputy
empirical research has focused on the inability of sub from Magallanes . . . when I ran for re-election, I got the
stantial numbers of women to break into electoral politics votes to show that their bet had paid off' (Observatorio
as well as the various institutional mechanisms that (forc Género y Equidad 2009, 1).
ibly) reduce constraints that women face in becoming Despite such examples, most of the literature examin
both candidates and elected officeholders. Despite the ing gender and incumbency approaches the relationship
introduction of such mechanisms, only 18 percent of par as a negative one. Incumbency effects are typically
liamentarians around the globe are women. viewed as an additional impediment to female political
Yet, if one problem that aspiring female politicians representation. Women are rarely incumbents and thus
face is the belief that women are unelectable, do women seldom receive the resource and reputational advantages
continue to confront such bias once they have been that come with being an incumbent, while more fre
elected? We propose using incumbency to gain leverage quently contesting races against incumbents with those
on this question, investigating whether female incum advantages. The positive, or even neutralizing, effects of
bents continue to encounter gendered bias that results in a incumbency on women's representation have received
lower likelihood of being re-nominated and re-elected little scholarly attention outside the context of the United
than male incumbents. If bias against women is truly due States. If women are less likely to be nominated by their
to beliefs in their "unelectability," disparities between parties because they are perceived to be less qualified,
women and men should decline once women are elected. weaker, and less competitive candidates, what happens
The case of Carolina Goic serves as an example. Goic when they demonstrate that they can be winners?
currently serves as a senator from Magallanes, in theWe investigate the ability of the incumbency advan
south of Chile. In her first election in 2005, Goic ran for
tage to overcome bias against women. At the nomination
a seat in the Chamber of Deputies as the candidate of the
stage, if we assume that bias against women is partly due
Christian Democratic Party. Goic obtained the highest
vote share by a margin of less than 3 points over her near
'Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
est competitor in a highly contested district (the four
Corresponding Author:
highest vote-getters each obtained between 21 % and 27%Sarah Shair-Rosenfield, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona
of the vote). As an incumbent, the 2009 elections proved
State University, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902, USA.
an easier contest for Goic: not only did she beat her
Email: Sarah.Shair-Rosenfield@asu.edu

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 838 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

Our findings suggest

to strategic choices by parties driven that theby presence
the of female
desire
incumbentsincumbency
electoral success, then the affects choices at the nomination advantage
and election sh
stages, and that the incumbency advantage holds rela
serve to eliminate remnants of this particular bias: fe
incumbents should be as tively true for women
likely asas their
for men. First, female incum
male counterp
bents are marginally
to be re-nominated by their parties more likely than male they
once incumbents tohave pr
themselves electorally. Generally,
run in the subsequent election forincumbency
the same seat, even sh
positively encourage re-nomination
when we account for election type andas a member
coalition result of
ship. Second, whenelectability.
clear signal about a candidate's they do run for re-election, Infemaleaddition
the bias against womenincumbents
occurs are as likely
at as themale incumbents
election to retain stage (
their seats. However,with
part the result of inexperience female non-incumbents
female continue to
politician
voters), then the incumbency advantage
face discrimination at the should
nomination stage that their un
mine this bias as well: female incumbents should be as male counterparts do not, despite the fact that they are
likely to be re-elected as their male counterparts because
nearly as likely as their male counterparts to be elected if
of increasing familiarity with women leaders via a dem given a second chance. The findings support existing
onstration effect. Generally, incumbency should posi theories that bias lies with political parties rather than
tively affect a voter's assessment about the qualifications
with voters, and that reforms seeking to enhance female
of that candidate for political office regardless of gender.
representation in Chile should target parties.
The limited number of female incumbents in many
countries has stymied the evaluation of these causal pro
The Effects of Female Incumbency
cesses. In some cases, it is difficult to disentangle the
Researchers have found that the lack of female office
effects of party politics, affirmative action policies, and
socio-cultural norms from women's political representa
holders is at least partly explained by a lack of female
tion, especially when the number of female incumbentscandidates
is (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Kunovich and
Paxton 2005; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).
low. The ability to test the positive or neutralizing effects
of incumbency on women's political representation hasScholarly attention turned to the importance of candidate
remained elusive. recruitment and selection to explain the scarcity of female
This study seeks to remedy that problem, using an candidates. However, only a handful of academics have
original dataset of all Chilean elections from 1989 to examined the effects of candidate recruitment and selec
2012 for all elected political positions (including both tion procedures on women's political representation in
legislative chambers, municipal councils, and mayors), Latin America (Baldez 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and
except the presidency. The Chilean case provides numer Taylor-Robinson 2008; Hinojosa 2012).
ous advantages for this analysis. First, Chile has a large The candidate selection process may introduce bias
enough number of female incumbents across all types against
of women at the nomination stage because parties
elections to run statistical analyses. Moreover, there ismay
a perceive voters as unreceptive to female candidates.
general norm of non-deselection of incumbents, so that Stereotypes and perceptions of female undesirability may
incumbency typically results in re-nomination if the can stem from traditional norms that a woman's place is "in
didate wishes. However, incumbent re-nomination rates the home" or that women are more likely to be un(der)
are not so high as to assume automatic incumbent re qualified for politics (Donno and Russett 2004; Inglehart
nomination without some measure of party and/or candi and Norris 2003). Scholars have found evidence of per
date choice. sistent stereotyping about women's traits, policy posi
tions, and their expertise on policy issues (Koch 2000;
Chile also boasts a stable party system with a rela
Lawless 2004).
tively well-educated and largely urbanized population,
and has not introduced a national gender quota or other In terms of strategic rationale for candidate selection,
affirmative action mechanism that might distinctly party elites may fail to nominate women because they
believe that doing so will come with an electoral penalty,
affect party or voter choice. Finally, while parties con
trol the nomination process for the small pool of candithat is, voters will not cast ballots for women (Norris and
date names on ballots, voters cast their votes forLovenduski 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2006), or they incor
individuals at all levels of elections, and seats are thus
rectly assess women's electability (Kunovich and Paxton
2005). Because women are seen as weaker candidates,
distributed within parties/coalitions to candidates based
on individual vote totals. In other words, the Chilean they may be placed in tougher districts (as sacrificial
case is one that provides data with which to test the lambs) or discouraged from seeking higher office (Niven
effect of incumbency on bias against female candidates 2006; Thomas and Bodet 2013).
at both the nomination (party choice) and election While earlier studies concluded that there was voter
(voter choice) stages. bias against female candidates (Ambrosius and Welch

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 839

1984), more recent studies find

selection procedures the
by teaching parties opposite
that women can (Bl
Erickson 2003; Darcy,win and by showing voters
Welch, and that women
Clarkcan govern1994;
Newman, and Leighton (Shair-Rosenfield
1997) 2012). Reserved
and seats for women in
confirm evi
India also
party bias instead (Fox and appear Lawless
to create a demonstration
2004; effectSanbon
on
2002). Indian voters,
Barriers to female entry who have are
more positive
often views about wom
attribut
ties in which male-dominated
en's capacity to governrecruitment proce
once women have held office in
cally overlook, whether intentionally
their districts or not,
(Beaman et al. 2009). Female incumbency qu
female candidates might
(Hinojosa 2012;
then contribute to a reduction Lawless
in party and voter
2005; Sanbonmatsu 2006).
bias against women.
These explanations, pr
from studies of the United States, can prove us
understanding political parties' reticence to put
The Utility of the Chilean Case
female candidates or to place them in certain d
But what happens when women
The Chilean have
case provides a useful proven
environment through th
ability by running which
for and to evaluate questions of gendered
winning office? incumbency
The incumbency advantage reflects
effects. First, the absence the
of a national gender benefi
quota or
come with office-holding: increased
similar affirmative access
action mechanism eliminates to the
the pos
greater networks of support, sibility that increases influence
in female candidate and over
election nom
opportunities to deliver goods
rates are the and services
result of an institutional change rather than to c
ents, and access to resources changes to candidacies(Frechette,
or party strategies within theManiqu
con
Morelli 2008; Gordon and Landa 2009; Flirano and text of a single set of rules. Women's representation in
Snyder 2009). However, scholars of American politics Chile has lagged behind that of other Latin American
have noted that incumbency can act as a barrier to wom countries such as Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Yet,
en's representation (Carroll 1994; Seltzer, Newman, and each of those countries adopted gender quotas before
Leighton 1997). Because incumbents tend to win, result improvements were observed, making it difficult to iso
ing in fewer available seats for newcomers, and incum late the effect of other mechanisms such as incumbency.
bents tend to be men, the incumbency advantage can Even though some parties have adopted their own gender
serve as an obstacle to women's incorporation into poli quotas, most have failed to adhere to those provisions
tics. Cross-national research demonstrates that higher (Hinojosa 2012).1 Second, the systemwide use of prefer
retention rates lead to fewer women winning office in ential voting in Chile enables analysis of both party and
thirty-three legislatures across the world (Schwindt voter choice as distinct (though related) phenomena.
Bayer 2005). Third, incumbent retention in Chile is high enough (70%)
Yet, there are compelling reasons to believe that to provide a large pool of incumbents to test our theory,
incumbency might prove advantageous to women's polit but there is enough variation in incumbent re-nomination
ical representation. After all, women incumbents should rates so that re-nomination is not a foregone conclusion.
theoretically accrue the same benefits that come with The election of President Michelle Bachelet provided
incumbency as their male counterparts. Work on Indian Chile with a well-publicized boost for women's represen
municipal council elections confirms this: seats won tation, but despite her electoral successes in 2006 and
under female reservations are retained even after reserva 2013, women are highly underrepresented in all other
tions are removed (Bhavnani 2009). In the Czech Chilean elected offices. Following the 2012 municipal
Republic, incumbency was a greater predictor of elec elections, 44 (13%) mayors were women while 559 coun
toral success for women than men in the 2006 and 2010 cilors (25%) were women. In 2013, women held five
legislative elections (Stegmaier, Tosun, and Vlachovâ (14%) senate seats and seventeen (14%) deputy seats.
2014). Moreover, although work from the United States
Although the proportion of female municipal councilors
demonstrates that female incumbents invite greater com
is growing, the other offices remain largely closed to
petition (Berch 2004; Palmer and Simon 2005), femalefemale candidates.2
incumbents are ultimately as likely as male incumbents toFor our purposes, it is also important to assess the per
win election (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). centage of candidacies that women obtained. Following
In addition to the traditional advantages associated
the electoral split between councilor and mayoral elec
with incumbency, incumbency may help women's repre tions (see below), women's candidacies to council seats
sentation for other reasons. Rather than examining the
increased, to 26.3 percent in 2012, but mayoral candida
individual effects of incumbency, recent research has
cies declined to 14.7 percent in 2012. Women remained a
examined broader incumbency effects on women as a proportion of all candidates for national seats, com
small
group. For example, previous research on Indonesia pro
prising only 17.0 percent of deputy candidates and 15.1
vides evidence that female incumbency alters candidate
percent of senatorial candidates in 2009.

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 840 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

We include both national and local elections in our between newcomers and non-incumbents allows us to
analysis. Including subnational elections affordstest
us ahow strategic bias affects the re-nomination and elec
larger number of observations due to the higher propor tion stages.
tion of female councilors, as well as the chance to evalu We assume that two distinct processes occur during
ate within-country variation in female representation the nomination and election stages. First, political parties
patterns. Municipal elections are also important because assess their beliefs about how and when certain candi
of the possibility of launching a national-level political dates might be political liabilities and consider various
career from a municipal position. Moreover, elections factors,
for such as candidate qualification, electability, and
municipal positions do not vary substantially in function campaigning resources, during the process of selecting
or form across subnational units. This is not the case in candidates to nominate. Second, voters make choices by
Mexico, for example, where councilors are elected using automatically casting their ballots for their party's candi
various forms of proportional representation (PR) rules dates, by picking up on cues sent by their parties (i.e.,
across the thirty-one states. As voters in Chile cast a sinvoters' behavior is conditioned by the nomination strate
gle ballot for an individual candidate in all elections,gies of their parties), or by evaluating candidates on their
comparing party nomination and voter selection strate own. In both stages, there are opportunities for gender
gies across electoral levels is less problematic than if difbias to affect decision making: parties may assume that
ferent forms of preferential voting were used. women are less likely to win seats, and voters may per
Representatives to the Senate and Chamber of ceive female candidates as less qualified or desirable than
Deputies (lower house) are elected in two-seat multi their male counterparts. The perception or assumption of
member districts referred to as the "binomial" system. the latter likely conditions the former, reinforcing party
Under this system, for a party to win both of a district's perceptions about women's chances for electoral
seats, it must double the vote share received by the sec success.
ond-place finisher. If the first-place finisher does not However, female electoral success should over
meet this requirement, then the second seat goes to the such party-based biases in decision making. If a
party receiving the second largest number of votes. The demonstrates that she can win, a strategic party
binomial system causes the major parties to function the very least re-assess her value and ability to w
through coalitions (Siavelis 2006). Chile's municipalities voters. The effect of demonstration is only evid
elect a mayor and a council. Council size varies by popu ning with party choice in the second of two se
lation, from six to ten members, with most municipalities elections. For example—assuming limited inf
(~85%) electing the minimum. From 1992 to 2000, may about all other qualifications and resources a ca
might possess—if gender bias is a determining fa
ors and councilors were elected on a single ticket using an
open-list PR system. Since 2004, councilors are elected might be curbed or eliminated on demonstration
via the open-list PR rules and mayors are elected via plu electoral success, we would only see the change
rality in concurrent elections. sion making in subsequent elections. Our analysi
Chilean incumbent retention rates are high enough to on incumbents and non-incumbents as it is only
assume that incumbency plays a role in determining out groups, and not for newcomers, that parties can re
comes, offering us the opportunity to assess whether based on a previous electoral contest.
there are gendered differences in the rates of incumbent The logic of strategic nomination should then r
re-nomination and re-election. The Chamber has the a scenario where female incumbents have passed
highest retention rate, with 80.4 percent of deputies win
tial demonstration test: by winning election, they
ning seats they contested. The senate (63.9%), mayoral
their parties that they are political assets rather th
(65.8%), and councilor (71.9%) re-election ratesities.
are If this is the case, we should expect to see
incumbents
slightly lower.3 Chile only applies term limits to the presi re-nominated at the same rate as male incum
bents.
dency so incumbent re-nomination is not artificially conParticularly when using the Chilean case as a test,
strained in our sample. where generally parties do not de-select sitting incum
bents, we should not expect to see female incumbents re
nominated at lower rates.4
Re-nomination and (Re-)Election However, if we assume bias against women based on
We distinguish among three types of candidates:
the new
logic of strategic nomination, then we should observe
a different outcome for women who stand for election,
comers, non-incumbents, and incumbents. Newcomers
lose, and attempt to gain re-nomination in the next elec
are candidates who did not stand in the previous election,
tion.pre
and are distinct from non-incumbents who ran in the If female incumbents overcome gender bias because
they are proven winners, women who lose elections
vious election and lost. Incumbents stood in the previous
(female non-incumbents) should reinforce party bias
election, won, and currently occupy a seat. Distinguishing

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 841

about female should see female

electability and incumbents
result re-elected at
inthe same rate
strategic a
of re-nominating as male incumbents.
them. We should If voters act on their
not own biases
observe t
degree of avoidance of
against
menfemale candidates,
whore-election
loserates elections
should differ. as
no additional stereotyping
However, the logic
thatof strategic
informs
nomination produces
thea ma
Therefore, should we
expect
different to the
expectation about see female
electoral fortunes of no
bents re-nominated
at lower ratesIfthan
female non-incumbents. Hypothesis male non-inc
lb holds, female
and hypothesize the following:
non-incumbents will continue to face strategic bias that
male non-incumbents do not face and thus will be re
Hypothesis la: Female incumbents
nominated will
at lower rates. Subsequently, we be
would expect re
nated at the same rate as male incumbents. that those women who are re-nominated possess excep
Hypothesis lb: Female non-incumbents will be re tional qualifications, lost extremely close races in their
nominated at lower rates than male non-incumbents. initial election campaigns, and/or bring substantial
resources that outweigh the strategic fears that would oth
Particularly given the context of the Chilean electoral erwise keep them from the nomination, and these factors
should resonate with voters. If this is the case, we should
system, with open-list balloting and relatively low district
magnitude, the effects of party strategic decision making expect to see female non-incumbents elected at higher
at the nomination stage are clear. Because coalitions can rates than male non-incumbents.
only field two candidates per district at the national level,
there is an incentive to field well-known candidates with Hypothesis 2a: Re-nominated female incumbents
name recognition and established political careers will win re-election at the same rate as re-nominated
(Hinojosa and Franceschet 2012). A similar logic applies male incumbents.
with the low-district magnitude at the municipal level: Hypothesis 2b: Re-nominated female non-incum
one seat per district in the mayoral races and on average bents will win election at higher rates than re-nominated
seven seats per district in the councilor races. Thus, the male non-incumbents.
Chilean case provides a good place to test a theory of
strategic nomination by parties: a system where parties Once again, the Chilean system provides a nice labo
can place so few nominees that they will undoubtedly ratory to test the distinction between our first set of
choose the most competitive in the pack. hypotheses (regarding party choice) and our second
The logic for voters is distinct from that of parties, as (regarding voter choice). District magnitude varies
voters may not perceive their choice in the same "strate among the elections for deputies and senators (two seats
gic" way that parties do. We assume the broad goal of per multimember district), mayors (single-member dis
parties to be seat-maximization, so evidence of gender tricts), and municipal councilors (average of 6.5 seats per
stereotyping in the nomination process results largely multimember district). However, all districts operate
from perceptions that women are not the strongest, most under a balloting system in which voters select individual
electable candidates. In terms of voter bias, the stereo candidates rather than voting only for a political party.
types may be more varied in nature, ranging from reli Furthermore, at all levels, voters cast a ballot for only one
gious or conservative views about the role of women in candidate, regardless of how many seats are available.
public life to perceptions that women are less likely to be This provides a chance to examine the distinct claims that
qualified than men.5 In electoral systems where voter female underrepresentation is a result of party and/or
choice is limited or non-existent, for example, closed-list voter preferences: if parties nominate women, will voters
PR, it is difficult or impossible to observe voter-specific vote for them?
bias and to test party elite explanations that voters, not Beyond the constraints of party choice at the nomina
parties, are to blame for female underrepresentation. tion stage, we recognize that there may be individual
However, in electoral systems where voter choice is evi level decisions that affect nomination rates. There is,
dent in the form of ballots cast for specific individuals, it however, little reason to assume that these individual
is possible to evaluate claims that voter bias is the reason level decisions would come into play only at the re
for female candidate failures at the ballot box. nomination stage. In other words, these individual-level
Per the logic of strategic nomination, we expect that decisions (which could include family obligations or per
parties' decisions to re-nominate female incumbents may sonal resources) may be expected to limit the pool of
affect voters in two ways. It may signal to voters that gen those who initially run for office, that is, newcomers, but
der is not a factor that should matter in their individual have limited effect on subsequent attempts.
evaluation of candidates. Alternatively, some voters will Due to data limitations, our inability to test the effects
cast their ballots for their party's nominee regardless of of these factors renders us unable to control for alterna
personal feelings or bias. If either effect occurs, we tive explanations of candidate quality that may also drive

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 842 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

gender-specific all candidate names.

differences or The initial match criteria were
similarities in quite
candi
nomination and low and the However,
success. correct matches were then hand-coded
thefrom large po
female non-incumbent theandfull computer-generated
incumbent list of possible matches.
candidates ru
again in the municipalByelections
analyzing the results of (N =mayoral,
councilor, 643, in 201
deputy,
and senate number
well as the ever-increasing elections from 1989 of to 2012,female
we can evaluate incum
factors that might
in all elected offices, suggest affect when
that we men are
and women are re
evaluating
than just "the cream of nominated.
the Then,
crop"
we can determine
of whether
Chilean
sex plays a wome
role in re-election.
addition, male incumbents areOur dataquite
allow us to make both evalu
likely to be
tional candidates themselves. This
ations, yet we want to account for theis not
dependence of reto say
election on whether
women do not face higher hurdles;a candidate has yet,
been re-nominated.
given the
larger number of men To understand gendered
trying to win differences in re-nomination
office in andthe C
conditional
system, it is possible that re-election,
the male we run candidate
a Heckman selection pool i
least as selective as the model to control first
female for an incumbent's
pool, if re-nomination
not more so.
We are also cognizant that
before re-election
assessing whether rates
female incumbents are as com may
affected by a number petitive
of factors, including
as male incumbents once district
they have been re-nom
petitiveness, party inated. If different re-election rates are the result
competitiveness, and of so on.
account for a number different
of these re-nomination rates, it would lead us to incor
explanations by intr
ing controls for individual- and district-level charac
rectly assume that voters, rather than parties, are the ones
causing the the
tics that might vary within difference—evaluating
Chileanre-election case condi as outlin
tional on re-nomination
detail in the Data and Analysis accounts for this
section problem.
below. The f
ing section turns to our Wedata
evaluate incumbents
analysis. compared We
with female and
describe
male non-incumbents
dataset, the coding of our variables, to assess whether
and party
the and voter
choice o
ferent models to strategictest
distinctly biases based on genderand
party stereotypes
voterare allevichoice
ated by
then explain our results incumbency.
and We first assess whetherimplication
substantive incumbent
re-nomination
the models before tinning to and re-election
our rates differ by sex before
concluding remark
running multivariate analyses that can accommodate
alternative arguments and control for both incumbency
Data and Analysis and candidate membership in either of the two largest
We evaluate our hypotheses political coalitions,
using Concertation
an (the Center-Left) ordatase
original
all candidates for elections in Chile since the return to Alianza (the Right). In general, the rates of re-nomination
democracy in 1989 through 2012. The dataset includes and re-election are not very different for male and female
every election for councilor, mayor, deputy, or senator.6 candidates, and in many cases the rates are higher for
The dataset includes not only candidate names and offices women than for men (e.g., incumbent deputies seeking
sought but also municipality/district, vote percentage,re-election in 2001, 2005, and 2009). Chi-square tests
and party and list information.7 Additional informationshow that none of the differences between female and

on controls for demographic and party variation was male incumbent re-nomination rates are statistically sig
coded at the electoral district level from a range of nificant when broken down by election year or type.9
Chilean ministry sources. To account for remaining unob To test Hypotheses la and lb we run probit models to
served district-level effects, all models use standard assess whether there is a gendered difference in candidate
errors clustered on electoral districts. re-nomination, controlling for incumbency. The depen
The dataset includes over 48,500 candidates (396 sendent variable is whether a candidate is re-nominated; in
atorial candidates, 2,441 deputy candidates, 3,633 mayboth models, the unit of analysis is the individual candi
oral candidates, and 42,046 councilor candidates). All date. The independent variable is a set of sex-incumbent
candidate names were coded for sex. To code for re-nom identifiers for all candidates attempting to regain a party's
ination and re-election across different offices over nomination. Using male non-incumbents as the baseline
category, we code a series of dummy variables for alter
twenty-three years for each of these candidates, we used
a Python program.8 The program identified re-nomina native candidate types, 1 for a candidate being a member
tion not only within positions (i.e., incumbent mayors of the group and 0 for all others: female non-incumbents
{Female non-incumbent), sitting male incumbents {Male
seeking mayoral seats) but also across them (i.e., incum
incumbent), and sitting female incumbents {Female
bent mayors seeking deputy seats) during the entire
incumbent)}0
period. Given the variation in the presentation of candi
date names on official documents, the program was As control variables, we include two individual-level
variables, dummy variables for whether the candidate is
designed to allow for the possibility of variations in name
spelling and accent use, as well as the use of some but nominated
not by Concertation or Alianza and the

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 843

Table I. The Effect of Sex and Incumbency on Like

Baseline: Male non-incumbent

Female non-incumbent -0.133* (0.031)

Male incumbent 1.147* (0.022)
Female incumbent 1.204* (0.036)
Concertacion -0.043* (0.022)
Alianza -0.085* (0.019)
Percent vote (previous election) 0.010* (0.001)
Level of election 0.093* (0.014)
Own coalition competitiveness 0.001* (0.000)
Female non-incumbent * Own coalition competitiveness 0.001 (0.001)
Male incumbent x Own coalition competitiveness -0.002* (0.000)
Female incumbent x Own coalition competitiveness -0.003* (0.001)
Constant -1.141* (0.057)
N 34,192

Two-tailed tests report *p < .05 significance levels; district-clustered standard errors are given in parentheses.

percentage of the vote obtained by the candidate in the as an additional indicator of candidate strength. The result
previous election, one district-level variable, the com is true for both men and women. As the effects of probit
petitiveness of the candidate's party in his or her electoral coefficient results are difficult to substantively interpret,
district, and the type of election (senator, deputy, mayor, Figure 1 shows the difference in predicted probabilities of
or councilor). The competitiveness measure was calcu the impact of incumbency and party coalition on men's
lated by combining the vote share in the district's election and women's likelihood of being re-nominated at each
won by each party coalition (0-100) and evaluating level of election. The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows
which party coalition had the largest vote share in the dis predicted re-nomination rates of incumbents and non
trict. All candidates running in that district from that party incumbents of Concertation and the right-hand side
coalition were assigned the positive value of the largest shows predicted re-nomination rates of incumbents and
vote share, while all candidates running in that district non-incumbents of Alianza. Bars are grouped: the left
from all the other party coalitions were assigned the nega most bars depict councilor elections, the center bars
tive value of the largest vote share. The measure ranges depict mayoral elections, and right-most bars depict dep
from -100 to 100, with greater positive values indicating uty elections. Different colors represent candidate type:
greater competitiveness by a candidate's party coalition the black bars show predictions for male non-incumbents,
in that district and greater negative values indicating less the white bars for female non-incumbents, the dark gray
competitiveness by a candidate's party coalition in that bars for male incumbents, and the light gray bars for
district. female incumbents. We do not include senatorial elec
We also consider that a party coalition's relative com tions due to the small number of observations.12
petitiveness in a given district may possess distinct strate Evidence of gender egalitarian re-nomination would
gies that may have indirect consequences for differences be observed if the dark gray-light gray and black-white
in re-nomination rates by sex. These include the possibil sets of bars in each category were nearly the same height,
ity that certain party coalitions may be more likely to indicating similar re-nomination rates for each group.
insert fresh faces or "outsiders" into their candidate pools Clearly, this is not the case. Flowever, the incumbent re
(Luna and Rosenblatt 2012), or more likely to place risk nomination rates in the dark and light gray bars show that
ier or less known candidates into unwinnable districts female incumbents are actually slightly more likely to be
(risking women and newcomers more often in districts re-nominated than their male counterparts and at consis
where the party coalition is less competitive). We there tent levels of around 2 percentage points. Only modestly
fore include a set of interaction terms between the candi higher differences in re-nomination rates occur with the
date types and the competitiveness of the candidate's own two major coalitions compared with the sample from all
coalition in the district.11 Table 1 presents the results from parties, and this may partially derive from the small size
each of these models. of the female incumbent pool. This signals confirmation
The results indicate that incumbency is indeed a sig that the deselection of candidates is common enough
nificant and positive factor affecting the likelihood of across the political spectrum that incumbent re-nomination
being re-nominated, as is previous vote share that serves is not a foregone conclusion, with the predicted

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 844 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

90
90

Concertaciön Alianza
Concertacion
80
80

70 70 6668 65 64
63
83 61 <1 - 6163
61 6361
59
59
60 60 59 57

50

40

30
30
2323
2222
20 20
■ 19
119 19

fF
18
20 17

n n n
10

0 In I15 116 114

Councilors Mayors Deputies Councilors Mayors Deputies

■ Male Non-incumbents □ Female Non-incumbents ■ Male Incumbents Female Incumbents

Figure I. Differences in predicted re-nomination rates between males and females.

Predicted probabilities were calculated using CLARIFY for Stata 12 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

slim
re-nomination rates for all incumbents at 60.4 percent formargins in the previous attempt. To evaluate this
deputy seats, 63.9 percent for mayors, and 67.2 percent
possibility, we create a proxy to compare the gendered
differences
for councilors. Yet, there is no gendered difference in the in rates of losing close elections for municipal
predicted frequency of deselection, with female incum councilor, the most prevalent type of election and candi
bent re-nomination rates at 61.2 percent for deputy date in our dataset.14 For each electoral district, two aver
seats,
64.6 percent for mayors, and 67.9 percent for council
age district vote percentages were calculated: one for the
ors.13 These findings support Hypothesis la. elected candidates and one for the losing candidates.
The comparison of the black and white bars shows Then,
a the difference between each individual candidate's
very different picture than the comparison of the votegraypercentage and average district vote percentage was
bars. For the non-incumbent rates, all black-colored calculated
bars based on whether the individual candidate won
are higher than all white-colored bars, suggesting that or lost. A positive difference indicates that the candidate
regardless of type of race or coalition, female non-incum won a greater percentage of votes than his or her district's
bents are less likely to be re-nominated by their parties average, while a negative difference indicates that the
than male non-incumbents. The differences between male candidate won a smaller percentage than the average.
and female non-incumbents are all between 3 and 4 per Figure 2 shows the overall, incumbent, and non
centage points. Therefore, the "losing" effect is com incumbent percentages of positive differences by sex.
pounded by gender stereotypes resulting in the relatively The difference in the percentages of incumbent men and
low re-nomination rates of female non-incumbents, at women with positive gaps is virtually indistinguishable,
13.8 percent for deputy seats, 15.9 percent for mayoral as is the difference between non-incumbent men and
seats, and 18.3 percent for councilor seats. These are com women.15 This result indicates that although female non
pared with the average of male non-incumbents at 17.9 incumbents were losing elections, they were nearly as
percent for deputy seats, 20.4 percent for mayoral seats, likely as non-incumbent men to collect above-average
and 23.0 percent for councilor seats. Overall, we find sup vote percentages among the losing candidates. This sug
port for Hypothesis 1 b, though the substantive 3 to 4 per gests support for an extension of our argument in
centage point difference from the model is not large. Hypothesis 1 b: where female non-incumbents lose close
One potential reason for the limited gap is that female races or win substantial vote percentages similar to their
non-incumbents may not be losing their elections by male counterparts, they may still overcome party strate
extremely large margins. For example, women who lose gic bias in the re-nomination process as viable candidates
elections may indeed face strategic bias if they choose to despite not being "proven" as winners.
seek re-nomination in future elections, but this effect is One additional explanation accounted for in the mod
mediated by whether those same women lost by wide or el's specification is the possibility that certain types of

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 845

70%

61%
59%
___ 59%

0%
0%
Male — All Female — All Male — Female — Male — Non- Female — Non
Incumbents Incumbents incumbents incumbents

Figure 2. Percentage of candidates at or above the district's average vote share.

candidates may be re-nominated in districtsdecision

that are con
to re-nominate an incumbent is likely affected by
sidered party strongholds or "safe" districts,
manyand other
factors, not the least of which is previous margin of
types may be re-nominated in "unwinnable"victory.
districts. We
Even though incumbent deselection is rare, regu
test this proposition by interacting the candidate type political scandals, or "suggestive" retire
lar retirements,
with the competitiveness of the party's own mentscoalition
reduce thein frequency of re-nomination. Indeed, our
his or her district. Although the results in Table
previous1 analysis
support shows that incumbents average less than
the argument that this interaction matters, with
a 70 statisti
percent likelihood of being re-nominated, so it is not
cally significant coefficients for each of the interaction
a foregone conclusion that an incumbent will automati
terms with incumbent candidates, the substantive
cally standeffects
for re-election.
of the interactions are extremely limited. TheTo female non
test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, and to account for this
selection
incumbent interaction term is not statistically effect, we use a censored probit model that
significant
in any specification of the model, and even allows
for theus to control for some possible sources of selec
incum
bent candidates the statistical significance tion
is limited
bias in thetopool of candidates and subsequent elect
only the most extreme cases of competitive ability. Our model predicts the following stages of
dominance
by a party coalition.16 selection: in the first stage, we model the likelihood that a
candidate
The data from multivariate analysis provide is re-nominated (including both incumbents
a much
richer picture of the substantive difference between
and the
non-incumbents), and in the second stage, we model
likelihood of male and female incumbents to be re-nomi the outcome of election victory once a candidate is nomi
nated, and also evaluate the impact on re-election rates ofnated (again, including both incumbents and non-incum
male and female incumbents conditional on whether theybents). The censoring variable in the selection equation is
were rc-nominated. A simple maximum-likelihood evalu re-nomination, coded "0" for all candidates in election at
ation method predicts re-nomination or re-election with time t who do not run in the election at time t + 1 and "1"
out considering the endogenous and dependent relationshipfor those who run at time t + 1. The dependent variable in
between the two. Not only is the likelihood of electoral the outcome equation is winning an election, coded "0"
success contingent on re-nomination but also the choice offor all candidates who lose the election at time t + 1 and
who to nominate is certainly not random. Parties will stra"I" for all candidates who win the election at time t + \.
tegically choose as candidates those individuals theyThe independent variable in both stages is whether a can
believe have the greatest chance of winning election. The didate is an incumbent, coded "0" for non-incumbents

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 846 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

Table 2. The Effect of Sex and Incumbency on Likelihoo

Baseline: Male non-incumbent Re-nomination stage Re-election stage

Female non-incumbent -0.169* (0.027) 0.145* (0.026)

Male
Male incumbent
incumbent 1.086* 1.086*(0.021(0.021) ) -0.202*
-0.202* (0.021
(0.021)
)
Female incumbent 1.155* (0.036) -0.244* (0.036)
Concertacion
Concertacion -0.056* -0.056*(0.021 (0.021) ) 0.122*
0.122* (0.021
(0.021))
Alianza -0.088* (0.019) 0.182* (0.020)
Percent
Percent vote
vote (previous
(previous election)
election) 0.014*
0.014* (0.001
(0.001))
Level of election 0.122* (0.013) -0.117* (0.017)
Own coalition competitiveness 0.001* (0.000)
Female non-incumbent x
* Own coalition -0.000 (0.000)
competitiveness
Male incumbent x
* Own coalition -0.002* (0.000)
competitiveness
Female incumbent * Own coalition -0.003* (0.001)
competitiveness
Total candidates (in district) -0.005* (0.001)
Total seats available (in district) 0.046* (0.006)
Competitive district (in second election) -0.001 (0.004)
Percent female civil service (in district) 0.000 (0.000)
Constant
Constant -1.277*
-1.277* (0.051
(0.051)) 1.202*
1.202* (0.055)
(0.055)
Log likelihood -24,996.79
Wald
Waldx2
%2 276.15
276.15
Uncensored
Uncensored n
n I
11,980
1,980

Two-tailed tests report *p < .0

and "1" for

candidates shouldincumbent
play a role in the nomination stage. We
model with male non-incumbents as the baseline inde
do not include in the second stage of the model the vari
pendent variable category along with Female non-incum
able accounting for the individual's vote share in the pre
vious election, as various factors such as candidate
bent, Male incumbent, and Female incumbent dummy
variables. experience or resources likely change from one election
Our model includes a number of control variables that to the next. We also replace the interaction term modeling
might lend credence to alternative explanations of the the candidate's party's competitiveness in the previous
selection process and election outcomes. The controls election with the overall competitiveness measure for the
used in the first stage are the same as in the previous pro district's new election.
bit models. In addition to the party coalition variable and Table 2 shows the results of the selection model, with
the type of election variable used in the first stage, the the second column reflecting the coefficients for the re
second stage uses four district-level control variables: nomination stage and the third column reflecting the
number of candidates standing for election in the district, coefficients for the re-election stage. Because coefficients
number of seats being contested in the district, competi in selection models are difficult to interpret, we estimate
tiveness of the district,17 and the percentage of women in the marginal effects of the selection model that allow for
civil service jobs in the district.18 The control variables substantive interpretation of the results. In the model,
are meant to account for structural factors that might female incumbents have a 53 percent likelihood of being
affect the ease of election in a given district, and the re-elected and male incumbents have a 51.5 percent like
female civil service measure represents the most sensitive lihood of being re-elected. In other words, female incum
option available at the municipal level that might serve as bents are 3 percent more likely to be elected than male
a proxy for women's incorporation into education and incumbents, a modest difference in re-election rates. The
labor force structures.19 difference in the likelihood of election for non-incum
There are reasons to include some of these predictors bents is more striking: female non-incumbents have a
in only the first or second stage. When nominees go to 13.8 percent likelihood of getting elected, whereas male
register with the electoral commission, it is often difficult non-incumbents have a 16.3 percent likelihood of getting
to know how many other candidates will also register, elected. However, this difference is not statistically
making it problematic to theorize why the number of significant.

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 847

This second finding may Our work suggests

partly possible directions
result for future schol
from the
lower numbers of female non-incumbents
arly inquiries. First, future research could examine why runn
some male and female incumbents
election in a second consecutive are not being re
election compar
nominated. The rates ofevaluated
all other types of candidates non re-nomination are suffi
in this a
For example, the largest
ciently high number
as to warrant further of female
investigation, thoughnon
many incumbents
bents standing in a second are re-nominated. It is election
consecutive unlikely that is
female municipal councilor
these are due simply candidates
to normal retirements. Are from
incum
elections who lost butbentsstood
opting out voluntarily?
for councilorAre political parties failing
again
In comparison, to observe
there wereinformal rules that allow incumbents
1,129 male to stand munici
cilor candidates from the 2008 elections who lost but for re-election except under extraordinary circumstances?
stood for councilor again in 2012. These substantive
Are parties more likely to de-select women, intentionally
interpretations support Hypothesis 2a, that female incum or not? Although male and female incumbents seek re
bents are as likely as male incumbents to be re-elected, election at relatively equitable rates, they may have dif
but reject Hypothesis 2b, that female non-incumbents ferent are motivations for doing so, or for opting out.
more likely to be elected than male non-incumbents. Differences in incumbent tenure rates may be gendered;
In general, one interesting result from the selection for example, women may begin their political careers
model and substantive interpretation from the marginal closer to retirement age or may be more likely to abandon
effects is that incumbents have only slightly better than politics
a because of family obligations (Carroll 1994; Fox,
50/50 likelihood to win re-election once they are re-nom Lawless, and Feeley 2001). As Fox and Lawless (2011)
inated. This captures partisan shifts in the electoratenote, as political ambition may be dynamic, changing over
well as the possibility that in some districts newcomers the course of men's and women's lives.
and non-incumbents may prove to be strong competitors.Second, this research could extend to analysis of
In terms of other substantive findings, nomination by whether men and women officeholders choose to seek
both of the major coalitions increases the odds of election higher office at similar rates and under similar circum
while larger pools of candidates running for more seats stances. If incumbents are choosing to run for higher
(e.g., municipal council elections) reduce the likelihood offices, that is, exhibiting progressive rather than static
of election. Both of these are expected, and effects are ambition, this may explain some of the variation in re
limited to <1.5 percentage points above or below baseline nomination rates that we identify. Studies in the United
predictions. States suggest gendered difference in ambition and self
However, the result from the selection model is clear: evaluation (Fulton 2012; Fulton et al. 2006; Lawless and
voters are not choosing to cast ballots against female Fox 2005). Chilean incumbent re-nomination rates may
incumbents presented by their parties, electing them at reflect distinctions in the decision to run for the same
the same rate as their male counterparts. Although female office, to pursue higher office, or party support for such
non-incumbents are slightly less likely to be elected than ambitions.
their male counterparts, the finding is not statistically sig Again, the case of Carolina Goic is instructive. After
nificant. This may be a function of how few female non two successful terms as a deputy, Goic received her coali
incumbents there are, relative to the overall pool of tion's nomination for the Senate. She described the pro
candidates attempting to be (re-)elected. Coupled with cess of obtaining her party's nomination as "an easy
the finding from the probit model that female non-incum path": "we had paved the road so that the logical next step
bents are less likely than male non-incumbents to be re not just for me and my political career but also for the
nominated, this suggests that if gendered bias remains in Christian Democrats was for me to be the Senate candi
the Chilean electoral system, then it remains in the area of date" (Observatorio Género y Equidad 2013,1). She won
party choice, not voter choice. handily, beating her closest competitor by nearly 11
points. However, Adriana Munoz, a well-respected politi
Conclusion cian serving as a deputy since 1998, found it difficult to
move up to higher office and felt that the problems in
Our analysis of the Chilean case demonstrates that the her coalition's nomination "could not be sepa
obtaining
advantages of incumbency can counter gender bias at the
rated from [her] condition as a woman" (ibid). Although
nomination stage. Once women prove their electability,
she ultimately won her Senate election, she felt that "the
the strategic choice of parties becomes simple: re-nominate
party did not prioritize" her campaign (ibid). While both
candidates who can win, regardless of gender. Wewomenalso were successful, it is only in the 2013 elections
find that voters follow these re-nomination signals,
thatwith
we see more women like Goic and Munoz attempting
evidence that female incumbents are as likelytoasmove
maleto higher office.
incumbents to be re-elected once they have been Analyses of female political ambition have been ham
re-nominated. pered by the overall low numbers of female incumbents

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 848 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

Funding
until the past two decades. The Chilean case is a pri
example: low absolute numbers of support
The author(s) received no financial successful
for the research, femal
didates meant that there were
authorship, few
and/or publication of this women
article. who migh
to "move up" until quite recently. With more fe
incumbents at all levels of
Notes elected office in Chile, a
tematic analysis comparing progressive political
1. Online Appendix 1 (http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemen
tion between men and talf)women in the 2016 muni
evinces the ineffectiveness of party quotas, which
elections or 2017 national elections
have been used since the 1990s. might be pos
This is likely true of many
2. See Onlineother
Appendix 1 forcountries
detailed information onthat
Chilean had
levels of female politicalfemale
representation
candidacy and election rates. until recen
now that women make 3. up The councilor rate decreases to 70 percent
increasingly when account
larger propo
of elected bodies, it willingbe for those who ran for mayorto
possible in 2004.
compare pol
ambition in men and women in a way that 4. Incumbents "have a right to re-nomination" if they choose prev
was
not possible. (Siavelis 2002, 426) but deselection can and does occur,
often due to scandal and/or mismanagement (Luna and
Finally, we urge scholars to turn a critical lens to nom
Rosenblatt 2012).
ination practices for newcomers. In Chile, despite our
5. Survey data show that in most Latin American countries,
findings that there is in fact an incumbency advantage for
more than 25 percent of the population believes that men
women, women's representation in elected office has make better political leaders than women (Morgan and
increased slowly. We attribute this in part to the fact that Buice 2013).
female candidate rates have remained relatively low 6. From 1989 to 2012, the only other elected office was the
(<25%), though where they have increased (municipal presidency. Regional council members are now elected but
councils) women have begun to win election at higher the first elections for these took place in October 2013.
rates. Chilean feminists have long argued for the adoption 7. Data were compiled from www.elecciones.gov, and then
of a national gender quota that would require parties to coded for sex, re-nomination, and re-election.

nominate female candidates. Our findings support these 8. Information about the programming and code can be
obtained from the corresponding author.
arguments and the choice to target parties rather than vot
9. See Online Appendix 2 for more detailed information
ers, as Chilean voters appear no less predisposed to vote about re-nomination and re-election rates.
for women candidates but parties are less inclined to 10. Alternative models were run with interactions between sex
nominate female non-incumbents than male non-incum
and incumbency dummies.
bents. Such affirmative action policies that target party
11. An alternative specification with year dummies produced
nominations may increase opportunities for female new identical results.
comers and non-incumbent women. As Carolina Goic has 12. With thirty-eight available seats and eight-year terms, only
stated, "We have to create conditions within political par 133 senators have been elected since 1989.

ties that allow women to become candidates, and provide13. See Online Appendix 2.
14. These elections occur in six- to ten-seat multimember dis
them with the financial resources that they need to com
pete" (Observatorio Género y Equidad 2013, 1).
Authors' Note
Replication data are publicly available on the authors'
websites.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Kim Fridkin, Sarah Fulton, Miki
Kittilson, Diana O'Brien, Mark Ramirez, Melody Valdini,
members of the SPGS CP/IR Workshop, and three anonymous
reviewers for their helpful feedback and suggestions. We
would also like to extend our gratitude to Jean Crissien for
research assistance and to Daniel Cuaron for computer
programming.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 18. All district variable data were collected from http://
article.
tricts so we cannot calculate a simple margin of winning
versus losing candidates' vote percentages to evaluate how
close the loss is.
15. The reason for the higher rates for non-incumbents is based
on the distinct "elected" and "losing" average calculations
for each electoral district. Because there were more candi
dates and wider variation in vote shares among those who
lost seats than won seats, newcomers and non-incumbents
were less likely to be clustered closer to the average vote
percentage of losers.
16. See Online Appendix 3 for the substantive effects of candi
date type on the likelihood of re-nomination under differ
ent levels of district competitiveness.
17. District "competitiveness" was calculated by categorizing
the difference in vote share between the first- and second
place electoral lists in a district: 1 for a gap of first-place
winning >50 percent more than second place, 2 for 25 to
49.99 percent, 3 for 10 to 24.99 percent, 4 for 5 to 9.99
percent, and 5 for 0 to 4.99 percent.
www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/, except for the

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Shair-Rosenfield and Hinojosa 849

competitiveness Fulton, Sarah

measure that A., Cherie
was D. Maestas, L. Sandy Maisel, and
constructed fro
tion outcome data. Walter J. Stone. 2006. "The Sense of a Woman: Gender,
19. Traditional measures of female higher education and labor Ambition, and the Decision to Run for Congress." Political
force participation rates are difficult to obtain at the munic Research Quarterly 59:235—48.
ipal level and vary only slightly across the Chilean regions. Gordon, Sanford C., and Dimitri Landa. 2009. "Do the
Advantages of Incumbency Advantage Incumbents?"
Journal of Politics 71:1481-98.
References
Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. Selecting Women, Electing Women:
Ambrosius, Margery M., and Susan Welch. 1984. "Women Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin
and Politics at the Grassroots: Women Candidates for America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
State Office in Three States, 1950-1978." Social Science
Hinojosa, Magda, and Susan Franceschet. 2012. "Separate but
Journal 21:29-42. Not Equal: The Effects of Municipal Electoral Reform
Baldez, Lisa. 2004. "Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law on Female Representation in Chile." Political Research
for Legislative Candidates in Mexico." Legislative Studies Quarterly 65:758-70.
Quarterly 29:239-58. Hirano, Shigeo, and James M. Snyder Jr. 2009. "Using
Beaman, Lori, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of
Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova. 2009. "Powerful the Incumbency Advantage." American Journal of Political
Women: Does Exposure Reduce Prejudice?" Quarterly Science 53:292-306.
Journal of Economics 124:1497-540. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide:
Berch, Neil. 2004. "Women Incumbents, Elite Bias and Voter Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World.
Response in the 1996 and 1998 U.S. House Elections." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Women & Politics 26:21-33. Koch, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Do Citizens Apply Gender Stereotypes
Bhavnani, Rikhil R. 2009. "Do Electoral Quotas Work to Infer Candidates' Ideological Orientations?" Journal of
after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural Politics 62:414-29.
Experiment in India." American Political Science Review Kunovich, Sheri, and Pamela Paxton. 2005. "Pathways to
103:23-35. Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women's National
Black, Jerome H., and Lynda Erickson. 2003. "Women Political Representation." American Journal of Sociology
Candidates and Voter Bias: Do Women Politicians Need to 111:505-52.
Be Better?" Electoral Studies 22:81-100. Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. "Women, War, and Winning
Carroll, Susan. 1994. Women as Candidates in American Elections: Gender Stereotyping in the Post September 11th
Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Era." Political Research Quarterly 53:479-90.
Darcy, Robert, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. 1994. Women,
Lawless, Jennifer L., and Richard L. Fox. 2005. It Takes a
Elections, and Representation. Lincoln: University ofCandidate: Why Women Don 't Run for Office. New York:
Nebraska Press. Cambridge University Press.
Donno, Daniela, and Bruce Russett. 2004. "Islam, Authori Luna, Juan P., and Fernando Rosenblatt. 2012. "^Notas para una
tarianism and Female Empowerment: What Are the autopsia? Los partidos politicos en el Chile actual" (Autopsy
Linkages?" World Politics 56:582-607. Notes? Political Parties in Chile Today). In Democracia con
Escobar-Lemmon, Maria, and Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson. Partidos: Informe para la reforma de los partidos politi
2008. "How Do Candidate Recruitment and Selection
cos en Chile, edited by Francisco Javier Diaz Apablaza
Processes Affect the Representation of Women?"
andInLucas Sierra, 115-267. Santiago: Centro de Estudios
Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate
Püblicos and Corporaciôn de Estudios Para Latinoamérica.
Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter Siavelis and Jana, and Melissa Buice. 2013. "Latin American
Morgan,
Scott Morgenstern, 345-68. State College: Pennsylvania
Attitudes toward Women in Politics: The Influence of Elite
State University Press. Cues, Female Advancement, and Individual Characteris
Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2004. "Entering tics." American Political Science Review 107:644-62.
the Arena: Gender and the Decision to Run for Office." Niven, David. 2006. "Throwing Your Hat Out of the Ring:
American Journal of Political Science 48:264—80. Negative Recruitment and the Gender Imbalance in State
Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2011. "Gaining and
Legislative Candidacy." Politics & Gender 2:473-89.
Losing Interest in Running for Public Office: The Concept of
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment:
Dynamic Political Ambition." Journal of Politics 73:443-62.Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. New
Fox, Richard L., Jennifer L. Lawless, and Courtney Feeley.
York: Cambridge University Press.
2001. "Gender and the Decision to Run for Office." Observatorio Género y Equidad. 2009. "Ellas lo Lograron"
Legislative Studies Quarterly 26:411-35. (They Did It). http://www.observatoriogeneroyequidad.
Fréchette, Guillaume, Francois Maniquet, and Massimo cl/index.php?option=com_content&;task=view&id=2302
Morelli. 2008. "Incumbents' Interest and Gender Quotas."
(accessed May 5, 2013).
American Journal of Political Science 52:891-909. Observatorio Género y Equidad. 2013. "Faha la otra mitad"
Fulton, Sarah A. 2012. "Running Backwards and in High (The Other Half is Missing). http://www.observatoriogen
Heels: The Gendered Quality Gap and Incumbent Electoral
eroyliderazgo.cl/index.php/reportajes2/7448-falta-la-otra
Success ."Political Research Quarterly 65:303-14. mitad (accessed May 5, 2013).

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 850 Political Research Quarterly 67(4)

Palmer, Barbara, and Dennis Simon. 2005. "When Women Run Siavelis, Peter M. 2002. "The Hidden Logic of Candidate
against Women: The Hidden Influence ofFemale Incumbents Selection for Chilean Parliamentary Elections." Compara
in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1956 tive Politics 34:419-38.
2002." Politics & Gender 1:39-63. Siavelis, Peter M. 2006. "Accommodating Informal Institu
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Political Parties and the Recruitment of
tions and Chilean Democracy." In Informal Institutions
Women to State Legislatures." Journal of Politics 64:791-809. and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America, edited by
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. "Do Parties Know that 'Women Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, 33-55. Baltimore:
Win?' Party Leader Beliefs about Women's Electoral Johns Hopkins University Press.
Chances." Politics & Gender 2:431-50. Stegmaier, Mary, Jale Tosun, and Klâra Vlachovâ. 2014.
Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2005. "The Incumbency Disadvantage "Women's Parliamentary Representation in the Czech
and Women's Election to Legislative Office." Electoral Republic: Does Preference Voting Matter?" East Euro
Studies 24:227—44. pean Politics and Societies 28:187-204.
Seltzer, Richard, Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. Thomas, Melanie, and Marc A. Bodet. 2013. "Sacrificial
1997. Sex as a Political Variable: Women as Candidates Lambs, Women Candidates, and District Competitiveness
and Voters in U.S. Elections. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. in Canada." Electoral Studies 32:153-66.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 2003.

Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah. 2012. "The Alternative Incumbency
Effect: Electing Women Legislators in Indonesia.""CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting
Electoral Studies 31:576-87. Statistical Results." Journal of Statistical Software 8:1-30.

This content downloaded from 111.119.178.142 on Fri, 21 Feb 2020 21:16:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms