UMIL VS RAMOS violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment

therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative

FACTS: measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation
as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule
Military agents received confidential information that a certain
is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order
man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to be one of the five NPA sparrows
in our communities. In ascertaining whether the arrest without
who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being
warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth
treated in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds. Later on,
in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the
it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a fictitious name and that
persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for
his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of
which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
the NPA). Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers,
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. Meanwhile, he was
in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public
positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered
order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. The courts should not
the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. In this 8 consolidated cases, it
expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them.
assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military
Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly
on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist
paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found
Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable.
without warrant.
But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
ISSUE: arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26
Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid and/or for other administrative sanctions.

HELD: PEOPLE VS BURGOS

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the
contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an
offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a
member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing
offense. Given the ideological content of membership in the
CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less
of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was,
at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was
identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest,
without a warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the
two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a
"sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given
another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of the
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like
rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing
offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery,
murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an
organized government is attained. Nor can it be said that Dural's
arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable
cause," as supported by actual facts mentioned in this case. With
all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after
the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque,
Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it
would have been better for the military agents not to have acted
at all and made any arrest. That would have been an
unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary
action against the peace officers involved. For, one of the duties
of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in
the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom
devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged
Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member
of a subversive group who forcibly recruited him and based on
this information, the police went to arrest the suspect. At the time
of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his field.
Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to
the authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused
Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this
information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D)
and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of the
arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the
firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later,
Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a
gun was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of
cogon where the officers recovered alleged subversive
documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search
valid?
Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever
knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its
entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the wife of Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect
that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing
for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from
the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an
arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made,
generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can
make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also
tainted.
VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN
In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly
rounded up, put on a ship, and sent to Davao as laborers. A writ
of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said
that the women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the
fundamental right not to be forced to change their place of
residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the
right of domain.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the
prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom
Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also
raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in
deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as
Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton
Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170
women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically
in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are
inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street,
in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent
moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already
out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of
Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the
bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness
or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the
court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved
the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage
due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to
defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim
that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official,
had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to
whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody
of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why
the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police,
acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from
the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted
to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while
the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates
against petitioners and the corporations of which they were
officers. Peace officers were directed to search the persons of the
petitioners and/or their premises of their offices, warehouses
and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets, and profit and loss statements and Bobbins were
to be seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and
void as having contravened the Constitution and the Rules of
Court for, among others, it did not describe the documents, books
and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.
Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major
groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations; and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
the petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested
warrants on the first major group. This is because corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of their officers, directors and stockholders. The legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be
settled: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under authority thereof, are valid or
not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said documents, papers
and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from
unreasonable searches and seizure. Two points must be stressed
in connection to this constitutional mandate: (1) no warrant shall
be issued except if based upon probable cause determined
personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2)
the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the
warrant’s application. The averments of the offenses committed
were abstract and therefore, would make it impossible for judges
to determine the existence of probable cause. Such impossibility
of such determination naturally hinders the issuance of a valid
search warrant.
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described
with particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three
residences of petitioners are null and void.
BURGOS VS CHIEF OF STAFF
Facts:
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the
premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and
the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive
activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause
and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the
same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant
were real properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure
of the items.
Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two
warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and
immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place
sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose
and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the
issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court
applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,
ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property
or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any
other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners
did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of
the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance
of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description
and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and
seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of
the said items.
PEOPLE VS BAES
FACTS: Baes, the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Lumban, Laguna, charged the accused with an offense against
religion for causing the funeral of a member of the “Church of
Christ” to pass through the churchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, belonging to said church and devoted to the
religious worship thereof. The parish priest opposed this, but
through force and threats of physical violence by the accused,
was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said
churchyard.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act complained of is notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, thereby
violating Article 133 of the RPC.
HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense
defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised Penal Code,
and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and
a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be
conclusively established, the court may find the accused guilty of
the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass
under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious
feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not
those of other faithful ones.
Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to
depend upon the more or less broad or narrow conception of any
given particular religion, but should be gauged having in view the
nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts
and circumstance which should be viewed through the mirror of
an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity or leniency of
the offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the
act from the point of view of a given religious denomination or
sect, and in such a case, the application of the law would be
partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country
said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and
persecution.”
Article 133, RPC:

Offending the religious feelings. – The penalty of arresto mayor in

its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious
ceremoncy, shall perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful.