IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. ____________________

ESTATE OF ALLAN GEORGE, by and through its personal representative Sarra George,
SARRA GEORGE, individually;
KENNETH ALLAN GEORGE, individually;
NICOLE LYNN WALLACE, individually;
M.E.G., a minor, by and through their legal guardian Sarra George;
T.E.G., a minor, by and through their legal guardian Sarra George,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF RIFLE, COLORADO, a municipality;

POLICE CORPORAL DEWEY RYAN, in his individual capacity; and
POLICE CHIEF TOMMY KLEIN, in his individual capacity,

Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP, respectfully

allege for their Complaint and Jury Demand as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. On August 5, 2019, Allan George was about to be arrested by the Rifle Police

Department (“RPD”) on an outstanding warrant. Confronted by two RPD officers, including

Defendant Police Corporal Dewey Ryan, on a bridge overlooking the Colorado River outside of

Rifle, Colorado, Mr. George began to despair over the prospect of being sent to prison. His

despairing thoughts led him to contemplate suicide, and he pointed a gun at his chest and

threatened to kill himself.

2. After approximately three minutes, Mr. George put the gun into his right front
pants pocket and slowly began to jog away from the officers on the bridge. At no time did Mr.

George ever point the gun at the officers or anyone else, or threaten anyone but himself. Mr.

George’s conduct made clear that he posed no imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death

to anyone, including the police officers on scene, besides himself. And even the previous threat

to himself was no longer imminent, as he had put the gun away and had stepped away from the

edge of the bridge. Mr. George began to slowly jog away from the officers.

3. Yet instead of trying to apprehend him with the least amount of force necessary,

or even giving him a warning to stop or he would be shot, Defendant Ryan took careful aim with

his rifle and fired two shots directly into the back of Allan George who was slowly jogging from

the scene, killing him.

4. Nearly thirty-five years before Defendant Ryan killed Mr. George, the United

States Supreme Court made clear:

The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony
suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend
him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate
when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little
late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

5. Based on the use of excessive deadly force against Mr. George, Defendants are

liable for his death under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of

America. Defendant Ryan is likewise liable under Colorado state law for willful and wanton

conduct resulting in the death of Mr. George, who was the husband of Plaintiff Sarra George and

the father of the other individual Plaintiffs.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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 4. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and is

brought pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is also brought under Colorado state law, including

the wrongful death act, C.R.S. § 13-21-201 et seq. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction supporting Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees and costs

is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

5. Venue is proper in the District of Colorado pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All

of the events alleged herein occurred within the State of Colorado.

6. Timely Notice of Claim under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act was

given by Plaintiffs to Defendants regarding Defendant Ryan’s willful and wanton wrongful

killing of Allan George in violation of Colorado’s wrongful death statute.

PARTIES

7. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, the decedent Allan

George was a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of and domiciled in the State

of Colorado. Sarra George is the personal representative of the Estate of Allan George.

8. Plaintiff Sarra George was the wife of Allan George when he was killed. At all

times pertinent, Mrs. George was a citizen of the United States of America and a resident of and

domiciled in the State of Colorado.

9. Plaintiff Kenneth Allan George is an adult child of Mr. George. At all times

pertinent, Kenneth George was a citizen of the United States and was a resident of and domiciled

in the State of Utah.

10. Plaintiff Nicole Lynn Wallace is an adult child of Mr. George. At all times

pertinent, Ms. Wallace was a citizen of the United States and was a resident of and domiciled in

the State of Utah.

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 11. Plaintiff T.E.G. is a minor child of Mr. George, and Mr. George was T.E.G.’s

legal guardian when Mr. George died. T.E.G. brings this action by and through their legal

guardian, Sarra George. At all times pertinent, T.E.G. was a citizen of the United States and was

a resident of and domiciled in the State of Colorado.

12. Plaintiff M.E.G. is a minor child of Mr. George, and Mr. George was M.E.G.’s

legal guardian when Mr. George died. M.E.G. brings this action by and through their legal

guardian, Sarra George. At all times pertinent, M.E.G. was a citizen of the United States and was

a resident of and domiciled in the State of Colorado.

13. Defendant City of Rifle, Colorado, is a municipality organized under the laws of

the State of Colorado, and is a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Rifle Police

Department (“RPD”) is a law enforcement agency that is part of the City of Rifle. Defendant

City of Rifle is responsible for the oversight, supervision, discipline, and training of RPD

officers including Defendant Ryan.

14. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, Defendant Dewey

Ryan was a citizen of the United States and a resident of and domiciled in Colorado. At all times

pertinent, Defendant Ryan was acting within the scope of his official duties and employment and

under color of state law in his capacity as a law enforcement officer and Corporal employed by

the Rifle Police Department.

15. At all times pertinent to the subject matter of this litigation, Defendant Tommy

Klein was a citizen of the United States and a resident of and domiciled in Colorado. At all times

pertinent, Defendant Klein was acting within the scope of his official duties and employment and

under color of state law in his capacity as Chief of the Rifle Police Department. At all times

pertinent, Defendant Chief Klein was in charge of the Rifle Police Department; creating and

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enforcing RPD policies; and the supervision, training, and discipline of all RPD officers.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Defendant Ryan unlawfully and unconstitutionally killed Allan George.

16. On or about August 5, 2019, members of the Rifle Police Department were

attempting to arrest Allan George pursuant to an arrest warrant, alleging a violation of C.R.S.

§ 18-6-403, which is a non-violent offense.

17. On the evening of August 5, 2019, Defendant RPD Corporal Dewey Ryan and his

partner, RPD Officer Shelby McNeal, were alerted to the warrant by the Rifle Police

Department.

18. Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal decided to conduct a traffic stop of Mr.

George as he was returning to his home in Rifle from work outside of the city.

19. These officers, and the RPD generally, had reason to believe that Mr. George was

suicidal, as, among other information in their possession, Mr. George’s wife, Sarra George, had

provided information to RPD about Mr. George’s recent suicidal statements and actions. The

information Mrs. George provided was conveyed to Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal.

20. Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal did not take appropriate precautions when

deciding how to contact Mr. George in light of their knowledge of his suicidal intentions. Best

modern policing practices would have required that they have an individual accompany them

who had training on dealing with individuals experiencing a mental health crisis.

21. At 6:34 p.m. on August 5th, Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal parked their

well-marked police vehicles outside of Rifle at a location they expected Mr. George would drive

past, near the intersection of Interstate-70 and Colorado State Highway 13, at I-70 Exit 90.

22. At 7:11 p.m., still in broad daylight, the officers observed Mr. George pull off the

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highway onto the exit ramp. Both vehicles activated their emergency lights and pulled Mr.

George over on a bridge overlooking the Colorado River, known locally as the “River Bridge.”

23. Both police vehicles were positioned about five to ten yards behind Mr. George’s

truck.

24. Both officers understood that Mr. George was suicidal and likely had a legally-

purchased weapon in his possession. After the stop was made, Defendant Ryan exited his

vehicle, positioned himself protectively behind his open door, and, while holding a rifle, loudly

ordered Mr. George to place his hands outside of his vehicle. Officer McNeal also exited her

vehicle with her service handgun drawn and moved to take cover behind Defendant Ryan’s

vehicle.

25. Mr. George got out of his vehicle and began walking toward the back of his truck.

26. Mr. George then pulled a handgun from his waistband and walked away from the

officers toward a guardrail on the other side of the bridge, during which time he kept the gun

pointed down. Mr. George then sat down on the guardrail and aimed the gun at his own chest.

27. Both officers pointed their weapons at Mr. George and commanded him to put

down his gun. Although Mr. George did not put down the gun, at no time did he ever point the

gun at the officers or anyone besides himself.

28. At some point, Mr. George stood up from the guardrail, but he continually kept

the gun pointed at his own chest.

29. During this encounter, Mr. George repeatedly made suicidal statements to the

officers. Both officers attempted to talk Mr. George out of shooting himself. Mr. George said

that he did not wish to continue to live if he was going to prison, that he was never going to see

his kids again, and he was going to “end it.”

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 30. Around this time, Officer McNeal radioed RPD dispatch to request cover officers,

stating that she and Defendant Ryan were conducting a traffic stop and the subject had a pistol to

his chest.

31. As Officer McNeal and Defendant Ryan had time to communicate with RPD

headquarters and to deliberate and discuss with each other and with headquarters how to handle

the situation, the circumstances did not require either officer to make a split-second decision in

response to any rapidly unfolding chain of events. Instead, they each had the opportunity to

consider and discuss how best to respond if Mr. George began to act in one or more of several

ways predictable to well-trained law enforcement officers in that situation, such as if he started to

attempt to leave the scene (which he ultimately did) or started making threats toward the officers

(which he never did).

32. After several minutes, Mr. George turned around so that his back was to the

officers, stepped over the guardrail, put the gun into his right front jeans pocket, and appeared to

be about to jump into the river. The officers clearly saw Mr. George place the gun in his pants

pocket.

33. For the next few minutes, Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal continued to try to

talk Mr. George out of killing himself. Then, with the gun still in his right front pants pocket, Mr.

George stepped back over safely onto the street-side of the guardrail and began to jog very

slowly along the road away from the officers.

34. Mr. George made no move to remove the gun from his pocket at this point. His

hands were clearly empty.

35. Mr. George made no threatening moves toward either police officer or any other

person, nor did he make any threatening statements. He was simply jogging away—extremely

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slowly—with a handgun in his pocket.

36. Given Mr. George’s very slow pace and decision to abandon his vehicle and

proceed on foot, there was no reasonable probability that he was going to escape the officers.

They could have easily overtaken him on foot or by vehicle. They could also have

communicated for backup officers to position themselves along the road ahead of where Mr.

George was jogging.

37. Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal also had fulsome opportunity to arrange for

someone with appropriate training in negotiating and communicating with people in mental

health crisis to come to the scene to assist in safely apprehending Mr. George.

38. As Mr. George slowly jogged away from them, neither officer was in reasonable

fear of imminent serious bodily injury or death. They also had no reason to believe that Mr.

George posed an imminent risk of serious bodily injury or death to anyone else.

39. Despite having every opportunity to do so, neither officer warned Mr. George that

they intended to shoot him if he did not stop jogging away from them.

40. Though Defendant Ryan had no reason to believe that Mr. George posed an

imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to either officer or any other person,

approximately five seconds after Mr. George had climbed back over onto the street-side of the

guardrail, Defendant Ryan intentionally, unreasonably, willfully and wantonly shot Allan George

twice in the back, killing him.

41. After shooting him, Defendant Ryan ran to the body of Mr. George and removed

the handgun from Mr. George’s right front pocket.

42. Mr. George was 58 years old at the time of his death.

43. Mr. George and his wife Sarra were married and were raising Mr. George’s two

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minor children, M.E.G. and T.E.G., together.

44. Mr. George also had two other children, Kenneth George and Nicole Wallace,

who were adults at the time of his death. Although Kenneth and Nicole did not live in Colorado,

they each maintained a close relationship with Mr. George and are devastated by his death.

45. Because of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, the lives of Sarra George, Kenneth

George, Nicole Wallace, M.E.G., and T.E.G. will never be the same.

No criminal charges of any kind were filed against Defendant Ryan.

46. Despite having shot and murdered Allan George, after deliberation, with the

intent to cause the death of Mr. George, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-102 (murder in the first

degree), Defendant Ryan faced no criminal charges of any kind.

47. An investigation of the killing was undertaken by the District Attorney’s Office

and several law enforcement agencies in Colorado. These investigations concluded without the

filing of any criminal charges against anyone as a result of the intentional killing of Mr. George.

48. The killing was investigated by the Critical Incident Team, which is a consortium

of local law enforcement agencies, and the District Attorney for the Ninth Judicial District

(“DA”). These agencies exonerated Defendant Ryan of any wrongdoing, despite the fact that

Defendant Ryan’s actions clearly violated United States Supreme Court and associated federal

law on the use of deadly force by police officers against fleeing felons.

49. The conclusions reached by the investigators, including the DA, relied, in part, on

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707, which is entitled “Use of Physical Force in Making an Arrest or in

Preventing an Escape.” The statute reads in relevant part:

(1) Except as provided in subsections (2)…of this section, a peace officer is

justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary:

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 (a) To effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested
person unless he knows that the arrest is unauthorized; or

(b) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes

to be the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or
attempting to effect such an arrest or while preventing or attempting to
prevent such an escape.

(2) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force upon another
person for a purpose specified in subsection (1) of this section only when he
reasonably believes that it is necessary:

(a) To defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes

to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or

(b) To effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, of a person

whom he reasonably believes:

(I) Has committed or attempted to commit a felony involving

the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon; or

(II) Is attempting to escape by the use of a deadly weapon; or

(III) Otherwise indicates, except through a motor vehicle

violation, that he is likely to endanger human life or to
inflict serious bodily injury to another unless apprehended
without delay.

***

(4) …. A peace officer who is effecting an arrest pursuant to a warrant is

justified in using the physical force prescribed in subsections (1) [and]
(2)…of this section unless the warrant is invalid and is known by the officer
to be invalid.

(Emphasis added.)

50. It is the custom, policy and practice of the Rifle Police Department to apply this

statute to its law enforcement agents in the apprehending of felony suspects with the use of

deadly force.1 Because Rifle police officers rely on the above-cited statute in determining under

1
The statute provides a defense to a criminal charge against an officer that uses deadly force under the
circumstances described in the statute. It does not render legal – against a civil rights claim alleging excessive force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution – any use of deadly force upon a fleeing

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what circumstances to use deadly force, the Rifle Police Department custom, policy and practice

to apply this statute to the apprehension of felony suspects causes the unconstitutional use of

deadly force in situations (such as in the apprehension of Mr. George) in which an “officer…is

effecting an arrest pursuant to a warrant,” but the use of deadly force is not necessary to prevent

the suspect’s escape and/or the officer does not have probable cause to believe that the suspect

poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others—as required by

clearly established Supreme Court precedent for the an officer to use deadly force against a

fleeing felon without violating the Fourth Amendment. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.

51. Allan George was being arrested pursuant to a warrant, yet deadly force was not

reasonably necessary to prevent his escape and he never gave an officer or third-party reason to

fear imminent serious bodily injury or death. The use of deadly force to apprehend him in the

circumstances described herein was constitutionally excessive.

52. Federal constitutional law is clearly established that deadly force is not authorized

simply to effect an arrest when a felony arrest warrant has been issued for a suspect.

Accordingly, a law enforcement agency’s (and its officers’) use of the Colorado statute quoted

above as the governing policy for apprehension of such felony suspects allows—and in fact

causes—police officers to use deadly force against fleeing felons in a manner inconsistent with

the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as prescribed by the Supreme Court.

53. The investigations surrounding Mr. George’s killing rely explicitly upon this

statute as grounds for exonerating Defendant Ryan of any wrongdoing, even though he shot and

killed Mr. George without having probable cause to believe that Mr. George was “likely to

felony suspect when such use of deadly force contravenes Garner and its progeny. It is possible that the use of
deadly force by a law enforcement officer would not be a criminal law violation, but would still constitute a civil
rights violation because such use was excessive force under the circumstances under Garner and Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989). Such is the case with respect to the killing of Mr. George.

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endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury to another unless apprehended without

delay.” Garner, 417 U.S. at 17 n.18.

Defendant Ryan killed Allan George pursuant to the customs, practices, policies,
and inadequate training and supervision of Defendants City of Rifle and Chief
Klein.

54. Defendants City of Rifle and Chief Klein created and maintained policies,

customs, and training responsible for the use of unconstitutional deadly force by Defendant Ryan

against Mr. George.

55. Defendant Klein is the Chief of Police and is responsible for the development,

application, and enforcement of policies, practices, customs, and all training and supervision of

officers employed by the Rifle Police Department.

56. As the official responsible for supervision, training, and creating and enforcing

policies, Defendant Klein failed to adequately train and supervise Defendant Ryan and other

RPD officers on the use of deadly force against fleeing felons.

57. Defendant Ryan was never disciplined by Defendants City of Rifle or Chief Klein

for the unconstitutional killing of Allan George.

58. All investigators command staff personnel, and policymakers, including

Defendant Rifle by and through its Chief of Police, Defendant Klein, exonerated Defendant

Ryan of any wrongdoing.

59. Defendants Rifle and Klein’s failure to discipline Defendant Ryan for his use of

excessive deadly force against Mr. George clearly demonstrates that Defendant Ryan’s conduct

was carried out pursuant to the customs, policies, practices, and regimen of training of RPD and

Defendant Klein. Had Defendant Ryan’s conduct violated RPD customs, policies, practices, or

training, Defendants Rifle and Klein would have disciplined Defendant Ryan.

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 60. The ratification of the conduct that caused the death of Mr. George is not alleged

as proof that this ratification itself “caused” his death. Rather, it evidences that the police

conduct which caused Mr. George’s death was engaged in pursuant to policy, custom, and

practice of Defendants Rifle and Klein; had it been outside of policy, disciplinary or remedial

action would have been taken.

61. Accordingly, the customs, policies, practices, and training of Defendants Rifle

and Klein include the principle that RPD officers are empowered to use deadly force without

needing to use such force to prevent a fleeing felon’s escape and without having probable cause

to believe that the suspect poses a significant imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to

the officer or others if not immediately apprehended.

62. Had Defendant Klein acted adequately in supervising and training RPD officers,

while Defendant Ryan and Officer McNeal were in contact with RPD headquarters during their

encounter with Mr. George, RPD would have provided them with instructions in handling the

situation that minimized the likelihood that Defendant Klein would have used unlawful deadly

force against Mr. George.

63. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on government entities and supervising

officials under circumstances that “cause” an officer acting under color of state law to violate

another’s constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Thus,

“when the execution of a government’s policy or custom,” including those relating to training

and supervision, “inflicts [an] injury,” the “government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”

Id. at 694.

64. By failing to institute policies, practices, customs, and/or training that provided

RPD officers with adequate guidance on the use of deadly force against fleeing felons,

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Defendants Rifle and Chief Klein caused Defendant Ryan to violate Mr. George’s Fourth

Amendment rights. As a direct result of Defendant Rifle’s and Klein’s inadequacies in these

areas, Defendant Ryan shot Mr. George twice in the back without warning and killed him.

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

42 U.S.C. § 1983
Fourth Amendment Violation--Excessive Force
(The Estate of Allan George Against All Defendants)

65. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

66. Defendant Ryan acted under color of state law, and within the course and scope of

his employment, in his capacity as an officer of the Rifle Police Department at all times relevant

to the allegations in this Complaint.

67. Defendants are “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

68. Under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment, Decedent Allan George had a constitutionally protected right to be

secure in his person against unreasonable seizures through the use of excessive force. It is

clearly established that excessive force violates the Constitution. Specifically, it has been clearly

established since 1985 that it is unconstitutional to use deadly force to stop a fleeing felon when

the officer does not have probable cause—a reasonable basis supported by the totality of the

circumstances—to believe the suspect posed a significant threat to a police officer or any other

person if not immediately apprehended.

69. Under the application of the specific facts and totality of circumstances as

described herein, Defendant Ryan violated the clearly established constitutional rights of Mr.

George.

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 70. Any reasonable law enforcement officer knew or should have known of this

clearly established right at the time of Mr. George’s death.

71. Defendant Ryan did not have a legally valid basis to seize Mr. George in the

manner and with the level of force used under the circumstances present.

72. Defendant Ryan seized Mr. George by means of objectively unreasonable and

excessive, deadly force when he shot him to death without any prior warning without having

reasonable belief Mr. George posed a significant threat to Defendant Ryan, Officer McNeal, or

any other person if not immediately apprehended.

73. The decision to employ deadly force by shooting Mr. George in the back multiple

times and killing him, when other less-than-lethal force was readily available, was excessive

under the circumstances.

74. Defendant Ryan’s actions, as described herein, were objectively unreasonable in

light of the facts and circumstances confronting him. Any reasonable officer in Defendant

Ryan’s position would have known that it was unreasonable to use deadly force under the totality

of the circumstances and that to do so would violate Mr. George’s clearly established

constitutional rights.

75. Defendant Ryan’s actions, as described herein, were motivated by malice and/or

involved reckless or callous indifference to Mr. George’s federally protected rights, and

Defendant Ryan engaged in these actions and omissions intentionally, willfully, and/or wantonly,

demonstrating deliberate indifference to, and a reckless disregard for, Mr. George’s

constitutionally protected rights.

76. The acts and omissions in which Defendant Ryan engaged in were because of and

pursuant to the custom, policy, training, and/or practice of Defendants Rifle and Klein.

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 77. At all relevant times, Defendant Klein, as the Chief of Police for the City of Rifle,

was a final policymaker for Defendant City of Rifle such that his edicts or acts may fairly be said

to represent the City of Rifle’s official policy, and in that capacity, he established policies,

procedures, customs, and/or practices for the Rifle Police Department.

78. At all relevant times, Klein had a legal duty to adequately train and supervise

RPD officers including Defendant Ryan.

79. Defendant Ryan’s actions were the direct result of Defendants Klein’s and the

City of Rifle’s (1) promulgation, creation, implementation, or enforcement of policies, customs,

or practices that failed to provide that RPD officers including Defendant Ryan use deadly force

against fleeing felons only when constitutional requirements for such force was met and/or

(2) deliberate choice to follow a course of action from among various alternatives available to

these Defendants of not adequately training or supervising RPD officers including Defendant

Ryan regarding the constitutional use of deadly force, given that the need for such training and

supervision was so obvious, and the inadequacy of training and/or supervision was so likely to

result in the violation of constitutional rights such as those described herein.

80. Defendants Rifle and Klein knew to a moral certainty that RPD officers will be

required to arrest fleeing felons in the execution of their official law enforcement duties. The

City armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, in light

of the duties and responsibilities of RPD officers who are inevitably called on to arrest fleeing

suspected felons, the need to train RPD officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of

deadly force was so obvious that Defendants Rifle’s and Klein’s failure to do so constituted

deliberate indifference to Mr. George’s constitutional rights.

81. Defendants Rifle and Klein knew or should have known that their acts or

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omissions were substantially certain to cause RPD officers including Defendant Ryan to violate

individuals’ constitutional rights to be free from excessive deadly force, and they consciously or

deliberately chose to disregard this risk of harm in adhering to their policy, custody, or practice

of failing to provide that RPD officers use deadly force against fleeing felons within

constitutional limits, and/or in deliberately choosing not to provide adequate training to RPD

officers in this area.

82. Therefore, Defendants Rifle and Klein set in motion a series of events that they

knew would cause an individual in a similar situation as Mr. George to be deprived of the

constitutional right to be free from excessive force at the hands of law enforcement. But for the

above acts or omissions of Defendants Rifle and Klein, Mr. George would not have been

subjected to a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and such a deprivation was a proximate

cause and a natural and foreseeable consequence of these acts and omissions.

83. As a direct and proximate cause and consequence of Defendants’ unconstitutional

acts and omissions, described above, Plaintiff Estate suffered injuries, damages, and losses.

84. The herein described acts or omissions of Defendants are the moving force and

the legal, direct, and proximate cause of Plaintiff Estate’s injuries and losses, including but not

limited to Mr. George’s death, the physical and mental pain and anguish Mr. George suffered

before and during his shooting death, the loss of Mr. George’s relationships with his wife and

children, life, and other compensatory and special damages including but not limited to

permanent lost earnings and earnings capacity of Mr. George.

85. The intentional actions or inactions of Defendants as described herein

intentionally deprived Mr. George of due process and of rights, privileges, liberties, and

immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America.

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 SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Battery Causing Wrongful Death
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-201 et seq.
(Sarra George, individually, Kenneth Allan George, Nicole Lynn Wallace,
M.E.G., and T.E.G. Against Defendant Ryan)

86. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

87. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-10-105(1) and 24-10-118(2)(a), public

employees like Defendant Ryan are not immune under the Colorado Governmental Immunity

Act (“CGIA”) for acts or omissions that are willful and wanton.

88. Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-109, Plaintiffs provided the Mayor and Chief

of Police of Rifle with timely notice of claim on January 30, 2020.

89. Defendant Ryan intentionally shot Mr. George twice in the back with the intent to

inflict harmful contact on Mr. George, and which such contact caused injury to Mr. George,

namely his death.

90. As described in detail in above, Defendant Ryan’s shooting of Mr. George did not

constitute the use of reasonable force because the shooting was in excess of the amount of force

that an officer in Defendant Ryan’s position would have reasonably believed necessary to arrest

Mr. George or prevent his escape.

91. Defendant Ryan’s intentional infliction of physical harm upon Mr. George,

causing his death, was without legal authorization, privilege, or consent.

92. In shooting Mr. George, Defendant Ryan consciously disregarded a substantial

and unjustifiable risk of danger of death or serious bodily injury to Mr. George.

93. Defendant Ryan’s willful and wanton conduct caused Mr. George’s death and the

Plaintiffs’ damages.

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 94. Defendant Ryan’s conduct was attended by circumstances of malice, or willful

and wanton conduct, which Defendant Ryan must have realized was dangerous, or that was done

heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to the consequences to Mr. George or his family, his

safety and life and their lives.

95. Defendant Ryan’s conduct also constituted a felonious killing under C.R.S. §§ 13-

21-203 and 15-11-803, in that his conduct caused the death of Mr. George and that Defendant

Ryan (1) consciously disregarded (2) a substantial and (3) unjustifiable risk that he knew would

(4) cause the death of another, namely, Mr. George.

96. Plaintiffs, as the wife and children of Mr. George, suffered and continue to suffer

economic and non-economic damages due to Defendant Ryan’s conduct, including but not

limited to extreme emotional stress, grief, loss of companionship, impairment of quality of life,

inconvenience, pain and suffering, funeral expenses, and financial losses due to the financial

benefits they may have reasonably expected to receive from their husband and father had he

lived, and all other damages as allowed under the Colorado Wrongful Death Act.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter judgment in their
favor and against each of the Defendants, and grant them all relief as allowed by law and equity,
including, but not limited to:
(a) Declaratory and injunctive relief, as appropriate;
(b) Economic losses on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at
trial;
(c) Compensatory and consequential damages, including, but not limited to, damages
for emotional distress, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other pain and
suffering on all claims allowed by law in an amount to be determined at trial;
(d) Punitive damages on all claims allowed by law and in an amount to be determined

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 at trial;
(e) Attorneys’ fees and the costs associated with this action, including expert witness

fees, on all claims allowed by law;

(f) Pre- and post-judgment interest at the lawful rate;
(g) Any further relief that this court deems just and proper, and any other relief as
allowed by law.
PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL TO A JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE.
Dated this 25th day of February 2020.

KILLMER, LANE & NEWMAN, LLP

s/ David A. Lane_______________
David A. Lane
Darold W. Killmer
Liana Orshan
Reid Allison
1543 Champa Street, Suite 400
Denver, Colorado 80202
Phone: (303) 571-1000
dlane@kln-law.com
dkillmer@kln-law.com
lorshan@kln-law.com
rallison@kln-law.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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