Civil Procedure Cases - Rule 9 To 14

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 168914. July 4, 2007.]

METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT (MCWD), petitioner, vs.
MARGARITA A. ADALA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu dated February 10, 2005,
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) dated
September 22, 2003 in favor of Margarita A. Adala, respondent, is being challenged in the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Respondent filed on October 24, 2002 an application with the NWRB for the issuance
of a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain waterworks system
in sitios San Vicente, Fatima, and Sambag in Barangay Bulacao, Cebu City.
At the initial hearing of December 16, 2002 during which respondent submitted proof
of compliance with jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, herein petitioner
Metropolitan Cebu Water District, a government-owned and controlled corporation created
pursuant to P.D. 198 1 which took effect upon its issuance by then President Marcos on May
25, 1973, as amended, appeared through its lawyers to oppose the application.
While petitioner filed a formal opposition by mail, a copy thereof had not, on
December 16, 2002, yet been received by the NWRB, the day of the hearing. Counsel for
respondent, who received a copy of petitioner's Opposition dated December 12, 2002 earlier
that morning, volunteered to give a copy thereof to the hearing officer. 2
In its Opposition, petitioner prayed for the denial of respondent's application on the
following grounds: (1) petitioner's Board of Directors had not consented to the issuance of
the franchise applied for, such consent being a mandatory condition pursuant to P.D. 198,
(2) the proposed waterworks would interfere with petitioner's water supply which it has the
right to protect, and (3) the water needs of the residents in the subject area was already being
well served by petitioner.
After hearing and an ocular inspection of the area, the NWRB, by Decision dated
September 22, 2003, dismissed petitioner's Opposition "for lack of merit and/or failure to
state the cause of action" 3 and ruled in favor of respondent as follows:
PREMISES ALL CONSIDERED, and finding that Applicant is legally
and financially qualified to operate and maintain the subject waterworks
system, and that said operation shall redound to the benefit of the of the [sic]
consumers of Sitio's San Vicente, Fatima and Sambag at Bulacao Pardo,
Cebu City, thereby promoting public service in a proper and suitable
manner, the instant application for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC)
is, hereby, GRANTED for a period of five (5) years with authority to charge
the proposed rates herein set effective upon approval as follows: ScTaEA
Consumption Blocks Proposed Rates
0-10 cu. m. P125.00 (min. charge)

11-20 cu. m. 13.50 per cu. m.
21-30 cu. m. 14.50 per cu. m.
31-40 cu. m. 35.00 per cu. m.
41-50 cu. m. 37.00 per cu. m.
51-60 cu. m. 38.00 per cu. m.
61-70 cu. m. 40.00 per cu. m.
71-100 cu. m. 45.00 per cu. m.
Over 100 cu. m. 50.00 per cu. m.
The Rules and Regulations, hereto, attached for the operation of the
waterworks system should be strictly complied with.
Since the average production is below average day demand, it is
recommended to construct another well or increase the well horsepower
from 1.5-3.00 Hp to satisfy the water requirement of the consumers.
Moreover, the rates herein approved should be posted by GRANTEE
at conspicuous places within the area serviced by it, within seven (7)
calendar days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 4
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NWRB by Resolution of May
17, 2004, petitioner appealed the case to the RTC of Cebu City. As mentioned early on, the
RTC denied the appeal and upheld the Decision of the NWRB by Decision dated February
10, 2005. And the RTC denied too petitioner's motion for reconsideration by Order of May
13, 2005.
Hence, the present petition for review raising the following questions of law:
i. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSENT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
THE WATER DISTRICT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON TO THE
GRANT OF CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE BY THE
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD UPON OPERATORS OF
WATERWORKS WITHIN THE SERVICE AREA OF THE WATER
DISTRICT?
ii. WHETHER THE TERM FRANCHISE AS USED IN SECTION 47
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 198, AS AMENDED MEANS A
FRANCHISE GRANTED BY CONGRESS THROUGH LEGISLATION
ONLY OR DOES IT ALSO INCLUDE IN ITS MEANING A
CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ISSUED BY THE
NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF WATERWORKS SYSTEM OR WATER SUPPLY SERVICE? 5
Before discussing these substantive issues, a resolution of the procedural grounds
raised by respondent for the outright denial of the petition is in order.
By respondent's claim, petitioner's General Manager, Engineer Armando H. Paredes,
who filed the present petition and signed the accompanying verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, was not specifically authorized for that purpose. Respondent
cites Premium Marble Resources v. Court of Appeals 6 where this Court held that, in the
absence of a board resolution authorizing a person to act for and in behalf of a corporation,
the action filed in its behalf must fail since "the power of the corporation to sue and be sued
in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers."
Respondent likewise cites ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of
Appeals 7 where this Court held that "[f]or such officers to be deemed fully clothed by the
corporation to exercise a power of the Board, the latter must specially authorize them to do
so." (Emphasis supplied by respondent)
That there is a board resolution authorizing Engineer Paredes to file cases in behalf
of petitioner is not disputed. Attached to the petition is petitioner's Board of Director's
Resolution No. 015-2004, the relevant portion of which states:
RESOLVE[D], AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, to authorize the General
Manager, ENGR. ARMANDO H. PAREDES, to file in behalf of the
Metropolitan Cebu Water District expropriation and other cases and to
affirm and confirm above-stated authority with respect to previous cases
filed by MCWD.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent, however, the board resolution is invalid and ineffective for being a
roving authority and not a specific resolution pursuant to the ruling in ABS-CBN. SADECI
That the subject board resolution does not authorize Engineer Paredes to file the
instant petition in particular but "expropriation and other cases" does not, by itself, render
the authorization invalid or ineffective.
In BA Savings Bank v. Sia, 9 the therein board resolution, couched in words similar to
the questioned resolution, authorized persons to represent the corporation, not for a specific
case, but for a general class of cases. Significantly, the Court upheld its validity:
In the present case, the corporation's board of directors issued
a Resolution specifically authorizing its lawyers "to act as their agents
in any action or proceeding before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency[;] and to sign, execute and deliver
in connection therewith the necessary pleadings, motions, verification,
affidavit of merit, certificate of non-forum shopping and other instruments
necessary for such action and proceeding." The Resolution was
sufficient to vest such persons with the authority to bind the
corporation and was specific enough as to the acts they were
empowered to do. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in the
original)
Nonetheless, while the questioned resolution sufficiently identifies the kind of cases
which Engineer Paredes may file in petitioner's behalf, the same does not authorize him for
the specific act of signing verifications and certifications against forum shopping. For it
merely authorizes Engineer Paredes to file cases in behalf of the corporation. There is no
mention of signing verifications and certifications against forum shopping, or, for that matter,
any document of whatever nature.
A board resolution purporting to authorize a person to sign documents in behalf of
the corporation must explicitly vest such authority. BPI Leasing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals 10 so instructs:
Corporations have no powers except those expressly conferred
upon them by the Corporation Code and those that are implied by or are
incidental to its existence. These powers are exercised through their
board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Hence,
physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate bylaws or
by specific act of the board of directors.
The records are bereft of the authority of BLC's [BPI Leasing
Corporation] counsel to institute the present petition and to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. While said counsel may be the
counsel of record for BLC, the representation does not vest upon him the
authority to execute the certification on behalf of his client. There must be
a resolution issued by the board of directors that specifically authorizes
him to institute the petition and execute the certification, for it is only
then that his actions can be legally binding upon BLC. (Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, moreover, that Rule 13 Section 2 of the Rules of Court merely
defines filing as "the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court." Since
the signing of verifications and certifications against forum shopping is not integral to the act
of filing, this may not be deemed as necessarily included in an authorization merely to file
cases.
Engineer Paredes not having been specifically authorized to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in petitioner's behalf, the instant petition may be
dismissed outright.
Technicality aside, the petition just the same merits dismissal.
In support of its contention that the consent of its Board of Directors is a
condition sine qua non for the grant of the CPC applied for by respondent, petitioner cites
Section 47 of P.D. 198 11 which states:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. — No franchise shall be granted to
any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water
service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the
extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by
resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review
by the Administration. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There being no such consent on the part of its board of directors, petitioner concludes
that respondent's application for CPC should be denied.
Both parties' arguments center, in the main, on the scope of the word "franchise" as
used in the above-quoted provision. AcDHCS
Petitioner contends that "franchise" should be broadly interpreted, such that the
prohibition against its grant to other entities without the consent of the district's board of
directors extends to the issuance of CPCs. A contrary reading, petitioner adds, would result
in absurd consequences, for it would mean that Congress' power to grant franchises for the
operation of waterworks systems cannot be exercised without the consent of water districts.
Respondent, on the other hand, proffers that the same prohibition only applies to
franchises in the strict sense — those granted by Congress by means of statute — and does
not extend to CPCs granted by agencies such as the NWRB.
Respondent quotes the NWRB Resolution dated May 17, 2004 which distinguished a
franchise from a CPC, thus:
A CPC is formal written authority issued by quasi-judicial bodies for
the operation and maintenance of a public utility for which a franchise is not
required by law and a CPC issued by this Board is an authority to operate
and maintain a waterworks system or water supply service. On the other
hand, a franchise is privilege or authority to operate appropriate private
property for public use vested by Congress through legislation. Clearly,
therefore, a CPC is different from a franchise and Section 47
of Presidential Decree 198 refers only to franchise. Accordingly, the
possession of franchise by a water district does not bar the issuance of
a CPC for an area covered by the water district. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied by respondent)
Petitioner's position that an overly strict construction of the term "franchise" as used
in Section 47 of P.D. 198 would lead to an absurd result impresses. If franchises, in this
context, were strictly understood to mean an authorization issuing directly from the
legislature, it would follow that, while Congress cannot issue franchises for operating
waterworks systems without the water district's consent, the NWRB may keep on issuing
CPCs authorizing the very same act even without such consent. In effect, not only would the
NWRB be subject to less constraints than Congress in issuing franchises. The exclusive
character of the franchise provided for by Section 47 would be illusory.
Moreover, this Court, in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 12 has
construed the term "franchise" broadly so as to include, not only authorizations issuing
directly from Congress in the form of statute, but also those granted by administrative
agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been delegated by Congress, to wit:
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power
to grant licenses for, or to authorize the operation of certain public
utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of
the practice by the courts. It is generally recognized that a franchise may
be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency,
and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been
delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In
pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by
local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative
franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the
Legislature. 13
That the legislative authority — in this instance, then President Marcos 14 — intended
to delegate its power to issue franchises in the case of water districts is clear from the fact
that, pursuant to the procedure outlined in P.D. 198, it no longer plays a direct role in
authorizing the formation and maintenance of water districts, it having vested the same to
local legislative bodies and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
Sections 6 and 7 of P.D. 198, as amended, state:
SECTION 6. Formation of District. — This Act is the source
of authorization and power to form and maintain a district. Once formed,
a district is subject to the provisions of this Act and not under the jurisdiction
of any political subdivision. For purposes of this Act, a district shall be
considered as a quasi-public corporation performing public service and
supplying public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the powers, rights
and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in addition
to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed, under
this Act. To form a district, the legislative body of any city, municipality
or province shall enact a resolution containing the following:
(a) The name of the local water district, which shall include the name
of the city, municipality, or province, or region thereof, served by said
system, followed by the words "Water District". DIETHS
(b) A description of the boundary of the district. In the case of a city
or municipality, such boundary may include all lands within the city or
municipality. A district may include one or more municipalities, cities or
provinces, or portions thereof: Provided, That such municipalities, cities or
provinces, or portions thereof, cover a contiguous area.
(c) A statement completely transferring any and all waterworks
and/or sewerage facilities managed, operated by or under the control of
such city, municipality or province to such district upon the filing of
resolution forming the district.
(d) A statement identifying the purpose for which the district is
formed, which shall include those purposes outlined in Section 5 above.
(e) The names of the initial directors of the district with the date of
expiration of the term of office for each which shall be on the 31st of
December of first, second, or third even-numbered year after assuming
office, as set forth in Section 11 hereof.
(f) A statement that the district may only be dissolved on the grounds
and under the conditions set forth in Section 45 of this Title.
(g) A statement acknowledging the powers, rights and obligations as
set forth in Section 25 of this Title.
Nothing in the resolution of formation shall state or infer that the local
legislative body has the power to dissolve, alter or affect the district beyond
that specifically provided for in this Act.
If two or more cities, municipalities or provinces, or any combination
thereof, desire to form a single district, a similar resolution shall be adopted
in each city, municipality and province; or the city, municipality or province
in which 75% of the total active service connections are situated shall pass
an initial resolution to be concurred in by the other cities, municipalities or
provinces.
SECTION 7. Filing of Resolution. — A certified copy of the
resolution or resolutions forming a district shall be forwarded to the
office of the Secretary of Administration. If found by the Administration
to conform to the requirements of Section 6 and the policy objectives
in Section 2, the resolution shall be duly filed. The district shall be
deemed duly formed and existing upon the date of such filing. A certified
copy of said resolution showing the stamp of the Administration shall be
maintained in the office of the district. Upon such filing, the local government
or governments concerned shall lose ownership, supervision and control or
any right whatsoever over the district except as provided herein. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting that once a district is "duly formed and existing" after following the
above procedure, it acquires the "exclusive franchise" referred to in Section 47. Thus, P.D.
198 itself, in harmony with Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 15 gives the
name "franchise" to an authorization that does not proceed directly from the legislature.
It would thus be incongruous to adopt in this instance the strict interpretation
proffered by respondent and exclude from the scope of the term "franchise" the CPCs issued
by the NWRB. 16
Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47 of P.D. 198 applies to the
issuance of CPCs for the reasons discussed above, the same provision must be
deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution which was ratified on January 17, 1973 — the constitution in force when P.D.
198 was issued on May 25, 1973. Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution reads:
SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under
the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which
is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty
years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The
participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) HCETDS
This provision has been substantially reproduced in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution, including the prohibition against exclusive franchises. 17
In view of the purposes for which they are established, 18 water districts fall under
the term "public utility" as defined in the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals: 19
A "public utility" is a business or service engaged in
regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public
consequence such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or
telegraph service. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears noting, moreover, that as early as 1933, the Court held that a particular water
district — the Metropolitan Water District — is a public utility. 20
The ruling in National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated
Unions 21 is also instructive:
We agree with petitioner that the NAWASA is a public utility because
its primary function is to construct, maintain and operate water
reservoirs and waterworks for the purpose of supplying water to the
inhabitants, as well as consolidate and centralize all water supplies and
drainage systems in the Philippines. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public
utilities, is clearly repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, 22 it
is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its
opposition against respondent's application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by
the NWRB.
WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional. The Petition is thus, in light
of the foregoing discussions, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, [July 4, 2007], 553 PHIL
432-449)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002.]
LEON petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES

RODOLFO DE LEON,
BATUNGBACAL respondents.
ESTELITA and AVELINO BATUNGBACAL,
Gil Venerando R. Racho for petitioner.

De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On the complaint for sum of money led by petitioner against respondent spouses,
the trial court issued a partial judgment against Estelita on May 14, 1996 and a nal
judgment against Avelino on June 2, 1997. Thereafter, the spouses led an appeal from
both decisions, which was opposed by petitioner who thereby did not le an appellee's
brief. The Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss and admitted the Amended
Appellants' Brief. The issue is the propriety of the appeal which was submitted for decision
without petitioner's brief.
The one judgment that nally disposes of the case on the merits was rendered on
June 2, 1997. Hence, the appeal led within the reglementary period from notice of said
decision is proper. As nothing indicated that the appeal was allowed capriciously, the
same is ruled proper within the discretionary power of the appellate court. However, it was
an error to require petitioner to le an appellee's brief in response to the amended
appellants' brief which was led without leave and approval and beyond the extensions of
time granted to appellants. For failure to le appellee's brief, the Court deemed the same
waived by petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT LAW; REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; SEVERAL

JUDGMENTS; WHEN PROPER. — A several judgment is proper only when the liability of
each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims
against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or
against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. Where a common cause of action
exists against the defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several judgment is
not proper. cIEHAC
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL JUDGMENT; BETWEEN TWO JUDGMENTS RENDERED,

THERE COULD ONLY BE ONE FINAL JUDGMENT; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, private
respondents are sued together under a common cause of action and are sought to be held
liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is the clear import of the
allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan bene ted the conjugal
partnership. Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there could only
be one judgment that nally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this
nal judgment marks the point when the reglementary period is to begin running. In this
case, that judgment is the decision rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is only
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary period began to run. The
partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue in the
case and is not the nal and appealable order or judgment that nally disposes of the case
on the merits. It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the decision dated June 2,
1997. A nal order is that which gives an end to the litigation. When the order or judgment
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the
merits, it is merely interlocutory. Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering Estelita to
pay petitioner is an interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the trial court to
do and does not decide with nality the rights and obligations of the parties. Speci cally,
at the time the partial judgment was rendered, there remained other issues including
whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Article 121 of the Family Code.
However, as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in the case, it is to
be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two
issuances form one integrated decision.
3. ID.; ID.; APPEAL; PERIOD COMMENCES FROM THE TIME COUNSEL OF PARTY
RECEIVES A COPY OF DECISION. — The question now is when the period to appeal should
actually commence, from June 6, 1997, as petitioner contends; or from June 10, 1997, as
private respondent Estelita Batungbacal claims? We hold that the period began to run on
June 6, 1997 when counsel for private respondents received a copy of the decision dated
June 2, 1997. When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer,
not the counsel of record, is not notice in law. The exception to this rule is when service
upon the party himself has been ordered by the court. In this case, it does not appear that
there was any substitution of counsel or that service upon private respondent Estelita
Batungbacal had been speci cally ordered by the trial court; hence, the counsel of record
for the private respondents is presumed to be their counsel on appeal and the only one
authorized to receive court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel,
therefore, was notice to the clients for all legal intents and purposes.
TAEcSC
4. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN COURT OF APPEALS; GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF

APPEAL ARE DISCRETIONARY; CASE AT BAR. — Worth stressing, the grounds for
dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court are discretionary
upon the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from the very wording of the Rules which uses
the word 'may' instead of 'shall.' This Court has held in Philippine National Bank vs.
Philippine Milling Co., Inc. that Rule 50, Section 1 which provides speci c grounds for
dismissal of appeal manifestly "confers a power and does not impose a duty." "What is
more, it is directory, not mandatory." With the exception of Sec. 1 (b), the grounds for the
dismissal of an appeal are directory and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of
the court to dismiss the appeal. The discretion, however, must be a sound one to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case. The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion
when, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the
appellants' brief were in substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in
the appellants' brief could su ciently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously
the portions of the record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 13(c) and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination
was properly within the appellate court's discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it
was exercised capriciously, whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party
litigant. For the same reasons, we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not
err when it did not dismiss the appeal based on the allegation that appellants' brief failed
to comply with the internal rules of said court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE AMENDED BRIEF WAS FILED BEYOND THE LEGAL PERIOD. —
The Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to file the appellee's brief in response to
the amended appellants' brief. Note that the amended brief was filed without the proper
motion for leave to do so and corresponding order from the respondent court. Even more
significant, it was filed beyond the extensions of time granted to appellants. The discretion
in accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent court which this Court applied in the
cases of Maqui vs. CA and Vda. de Haberer vs. CA, finds no application under the present
circumstances because, unlike in these two cases, here no valid reason was advanced for
the late filing of the amended brief. While the amended brief might contain no substantial
and prejudicial changes, it was error for the respondent court to accept the amended brief
as filed and then require petitioner to file appellee's brief because admittedly the amended
brief was filed beyond August 31, 1998, the last period of extension granted to private
respondents.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER REMEDY IN DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS IS TO FILE
APPELLEE'S BRIEF AND PROCEED WITH THE APPEAL. — On the second issue, we hold
that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering the
appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the motion to
dismiss is to le the appellee's brief and proceed with the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted
to le a motion for reconsideration which, unfortunately, was pro forma. All the grounds
raised therein have been discussed in the rst resolution of the respondent Court of
Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant reversal of the resolution. A
cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a near verbatim repetition of
the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss; hence, the ling of the motion for
reconsideration did not suspend the period for ling the appellee's brief. Petitioner was
therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellee's brief.
DECISION
QUISUMBING , J : p
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It seeks to annul and set aside the resolution 1 dated January 13, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989, denying petitioner's motion (a) to dismiss
the appeals of private respondents, and (b) to suspend the period to le appellee's brief.
Also assailed is the CA resolution 2 dated April 19, 1999, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 11, 1996, petitioner Rodolfo de Leon led with the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan, Branch 3, a complaint 3 for a sum of money plus damages, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, against herein private respondents Avelino and Estelita
Batungbacal. The complaint averred that private respondent Estelita Batungbacal
executed a promissory note 4 in favor of herein petitioner for her P500,000 loan with
stipulated interest at 5 percent monthly. The loan and interest remained unpaid allegedly
because the check issued by Estelita was dishonored. Private respondents led an answer
with counterclaim. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the
ground that his wife was not the designated administrator and therefore had no authority
to bind the conjugal partnership. Avelino further averred that his wife contracted the debt
without his knowledge and consent.
Based on Estelita's admission, petitioner led a motion for partial judgment against
Estelita, which the trial court granted in an order 5 dated May 14, 1996:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby
granted in accordance with Sec. 4 of Rule 36, Rules of Court. As prayed for,
judgment is hereby rendered against Estelita Q. Batungbacal, ordering her to pay
plaintiff Rodolfo de Leon the principal amount of the loan obligation of
P500,000.00 plus the stipulated interest which has accrued thereon at 5% per
month since May 1995 until now, plus interest at the legal rate on said accrued
interest from date of judicial demand until the obligation is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the partial judgment on
May 21, 1996, but no appeal was taken therefrom. Thus, petitioner led a motion for
execution of said judgment on June 6, 1996. Counsel for private respondents was
furnished a copy of the motion on the same date. As private respondents interposed no
objection, a writ of execution was correspondingly issued. The sheriff then proceeded to
execute the writ and partially satis ed the judgment award against the paraphernal
property of Estelita and the conjugal properties of the private respondents with due notice
to the latter and their counsel. Again, private respondents interposed no objection.
Pre-trial was held and trial proceeded on two main issues: (1) whether the loan was
secured with the knowledge and consent of the husband and whether the same redounded
to the bene t of the conjugal partnership; and (2) whether the capital of the husband
would be liable if the conjugal assets or the paraphernal property of the wife were
insu cient to satisfy the loan obligation. On June 2, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment 6 ordering private respondent Avelino Batungbacal to pay the amount of the loan
plus interest and other amounts in accordance with Article 121 of the Family Code.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the decision on June 6,
1997. Avelino through counsel, led a notice of appeal 7 on June 19, 1997. In a notice of
appearance 8 dated June 25, 1997 bearing the conformity solely of Estelita, a new counsel
appeared in collaboration with the counsel of record for the private respondents. On the
same date, Estelita through said new counsel, served a notice that she is appealing both
decisions promulgated on May 14, 1996, and June 2, 1997, to the Court of Appeals.
However, the trial court, in an order 9 dated July 7, 1997 denied the notice of appeal 1 0 filed
by Estelita on the ground that said notice was led beyond the reglementary period to
appeal.
Private respondents' appeal was docketed with the respondent Court of Appeals as
CA-G.R. CV No. 57989. Petitioner then led with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss
the Appeal with Motion to Suspend period to le Appellee's Briefs 1 1 on October 21, 1998.
Petitioner based his motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the statement of
the case as well as the statement of the facts in the appellants' brief do not have page
references to the record, and that the authorities relied upon in the arguments are not cited
by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on which the
citation is found; (2) that no copy of the appealed decision of the lower court was attached
to the appellants' brief, in violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals; (3) that
private respondents furnished only one copy of the appellants' brief to the petitioner, also
in violation of the Rules of Court; (4) that the decision promulgated against Estelita on May
14, 1996 is no longer appealable; and (5) that the notice of appeal led on June 25, 1996
by Estelita concerning the decision of the trial court against Avelino was led beyond the
reglementary period to appeal. 1 2 The motion also prayed that the period for ling the
appellee's brief be suspended in view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss. 1 3
Private respondents, in their opposition, 1 4 insisted that the statements of the case
as well as the statement of facts in their brief contained page references to the record, and
that Estelita had seasonably led her appeal. Private respondent spouses also stated that
they had led an Amended Appellants' Brief 1 5 on November 27, 1998 and that two copies
thereof had been served on petitioner together with copies of the trial court's decisions.
On January 13, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution 1 6 denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss and virtually admitting the Amended Appellants' Brief as
follows:
As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of the
appealed Decision in the Statement of the Case, indicated speci c pages in the
appealed decision where the quoted portions are found. In the bottom of page 2
of the brief, is the quoted portions of the decision, referring to pages 1 and 2
thereof. On page 3 of the brief is the dispositive portion, taken on page 11 of the
decision. The rest of the narration in the Statement of the Case are the speci c
dates of the pleadings, orders, and portions of the decision citing the page
references where they are found.
Two (2) copies of the Amended Brief were served upon appellee with the
appealed Decision attached as Annex "A", and "B".
Appellant Estellita Batungbacal explained that her appeal was led on
time. She cited Guevarra, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-49017 and 49024,
that a partial judgment may be appealed only together with the judgment in the
main case. She personally received a copy of the main Decision, dated June 2,
1997 on June 10, 1997, and led her notice of appeal dated June 25, 1995 ( sic)
sent by registered mail on even date, per Registry Receipt No. 2618, attached as
Annex "C" hereof, thereby showing that the notice of appeal was led within 15
days from receipt of the Decision appealed from. At any rate, the merit of
appellee's contention that appellant Estellita Batungbacal can no longer appeal
from the decision may be resolved after the case is considered ready for study
and report.
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and appellee is

required to file his appellee's brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On January 22, 1999, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 7 of the

aforesaid resolution but said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution 1 8
dated April 19, 1999, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
The resolution promulgated on January 13, 1999 required appellee to le
his appellee's brief within forty- ve (45) days from receipt of that resolution, or up
to March 4, 1999. Up to this date no appellee's brief has been submitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted for decision

without the bene t of appellee's brief, and the records of this case is hereby
transmitted to the Raffle Committee, for re-raffle, for study and report.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 9 wherein petitioner contends that
respondent Court of Appeals acted:
(1) WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT ESTELITA BATUNGBACAL;
(2) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN DISREGARD OF THE
EXPRESS MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES AS WELL AS
AGAINST SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED THE
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT SPOUSES;
(3) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED APPELLANT'S
BRIEF FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND IN REQUIRING THE
PETITIONER AS APPELLEE TO FILE HIS APPELLEE'S BRIEF;
(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT RESOLVED TO HAVE
THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEEMED
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WITHOUT BENEFIT OF APPELLEE'S
BRIEF. . . . 2 0
Simply put, the following are the issues presented before this Court for resolution:
(1) whether or not the appellate court erred in taking cognizance of the appeal; and (2)
whether or not the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it
considered the appeal as submitted for decision without petitioner's brief.
On the rst issue, petitioner contends that the decisions of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6480 promulgated on May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997 had become nal and
executory as to private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. This is because Estelita never
appealed the partial judgment promulgated on May 14, 1996. In fact, there has been a
partial execution of said judgment with notice to and without objection from private
respondent spouses. As regards the decision dated June 2, 1997, petitioner contends that
the same had become nal for failure to le the notice of appeal within 15 days, counted
from the time counsel of record for private respondent spouses received a copy on June 6,
1997 and not from the time Estelita received a copy on June 10, 1997. Petitioner points to
Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and argues that since the trial court never
ordered that service of the judgment be made upon Estelita, she was not entitled to
service of the judgment. The fact that she received a copy of the judgment separately from
her counsel cannot prejudice the legal consequences arising out of prior receipt of copy of
the decision by her counsel. It was thus clear error for the Court of Appeals to accept
Estelita's argument that the reglementary period commenced not from receipt of a copy
of the decision by counsel of record but from the time she received a copy of the decision.
The appeal having been led out of time, the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal of Estelita.
Petitioner also assails the appellants' brief for certain formal defects. As pointed
out in his motion to dismiss led before the public respondent, there are no page
references to the record in the statements of the case and of the facts in the appellants'
brief submitted by private respondents. Petitioner asserts that while there are many
pleadings and orders mentioned in said statements, only the decision dated June 2, 1997
is cited, and the citation is limited only to the particular page or pages in said decision
where the citation or quotation is taken, without any reference to the pages in the record
where the decision can be found. Neither is there reference to the pages in the record
where the particular cited or quoted portions of the decision can be found.
Petitioner likewise alleges that the authorities relied upon in the appellants' brief of
private respondents are also not cited by the page on which the citation is found, as
required in Sec. 13 (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Page references to the record are
also required in Section 13, paragraphs (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44 and absence thereof is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1 (f) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner also harps on the failure of private respondents to furnish petitioner with two
copies of the original appellants' brief, to submit proof of service of two copies of the brief
on the appellee, and to furnish the petitioner with two copies of the amended appellants'
brief as required by the Rules of Court. Additionally, petitioner asserts that the failure of
private respondents to append copies of the appealed decisions to their appellants' brief
constitutes a violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and is likewise a
ground for dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the virtual admission into the record by the
respondent court of the amended appellants' brief of the private respondents under the
resolution dated January 13, 1999 and its corresponding action to require the petitioner to
respond thereto, constitute grave abuse of discretion and blatant disregard of due
process of law because the amended brief was filed without leave of court.
Private respondents, for their part, argue that the resolutions being assailed by
petitioner are interlocutory in character because the Court of Appeals still has to decide
the appeal on the merits; hence, certiorari does not lie in his favor. Private respondents
allege that petitioner has another adequate and speedy remedy, i.e., to le his brief raising
all issues before the Court of Appeals. Once the appeal is resolved on the merits, all proper
issues may be elevated to the Supreme Court. An order denying a motion to dismiss being
merely interlocutory, it cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy is
to appeal in due course after the case is decided on the merits.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
On the rst issue, we nd that the Court of Appeals did not act without jurisdiction in
entertaining the appeal led by private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. Contrary to
petitioner's apparent position, the judgments rendered by the trial court in this case are not
several judgments under the Rules of Court so that there would be multiple periods of
finality.
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable
and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could
have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other. 2 1 Where a common cause of action exists against the
defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several judgment is not proper. In this
case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of action and are
sought to be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is the
clear import of the allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan bene ted the
conjugal partnership.
Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there could only be one
judgment that nally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this nal
judgment marks the point when the reglementary period is to begin running. In this case,
that judgment is the decision 2 2 rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is only
from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary period began to run. The
partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue in the
case and is not the nal and appealable order or judgment that nally disposes of the case
on the merits. 2 3 It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the decision dated June
2, 1997.
A nal order is that which gives an end to the litigation. 2 4 When the order or
judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon
the merits, it is merely interlocutory. 2 5 Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering
Estelita to pay petitioner is an interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the
trial court to do and does not decide with nality the rights and obligations of the parties.
Speci cally, at the time the partial judgment was rendered, there remained other issues
including whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Article 121 of the Family
Code. However, as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in the case,
it is to be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two
issuances form one integrated decision.
The question now is when the period to appeal should actually commence, from
June 6, 1997, as petitioner contends; or from June 10, 1997, as private respondent Estelita
Batungbacal claims? We hold that the period began to run on June 6, 1997 when counsel
for private respondents received a copy of the decision dated June 2, 1997. When a party
is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon
said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is
not notice in law. 2 6 The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself has
been ordered by the court. 2 7 In this case, it does not appear that there was any
substitution of counsel or that service upon private respondent Estelita Batungbacal had
been speci cally ordered by the trial court; hence, the counsel of record for the private
respondents is presumed to be their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to
receive court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was notice
to the clients for all legal intents and purposes.
Private respondents' appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since
Avelino Batungbacal had led a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their
counsel's receipt of the decision on June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly
sued under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband inures to the
bene t of the wife. The notice of appeal led by Estelita was a super uity, the appeal
having been perfected earlier by her husband.
We come now to petitioner's contention that the appellants' brief suffers from fatal
defects.
Worth stressing, the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50
28 of the Rules of Court are discretionary upon the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from
the very wording of the Rules which uses the word 'may' instead of 'shall.' This Court has
held in Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc. 2 9 that Rule 50, Section 1
which provides speci c grounds for dismissal of appeal manifestly "confers a power and
does not impose a duty." "What is more, it is directory, not mandatory." 3 0 With the
exception of Sec. 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are directory and not
mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal. 3 1 The
discretion, however, must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of
justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. 3 2
The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the appellants' brief were in
substantial compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in the appellants' brief
could su ciently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the
record referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c)
and (d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the appellate
court's discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it was exercised capriciously,
whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the same reasons,
we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the
appeal based on the allegation that appellants' brief failed to comply with the internal rules
of said court.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to le the appellee's brief
in response to the amended appellants' brief. Note that the amended brief was led
without the proper motion for leave to do so and corresponding order from the
respondent court. Even more signi cant, it was led beyond the extensions of time
granted to appellants. The discretion in accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent
court which this Court applied in the cases of Maqui vs. CA 3 3 and Vda. de Haberer vs. CA,
3 4 nds no application under the present circumstances because, unlike in these two
cases, here no valid reason was advanced for the late ling of the amended brief. While the
amended brief 3 5 might contain no substantial and prejudicial changes, it was error for the
respondent court to accept the amended brief as led and then require petitioner to le
appellee's brief because admittedly the amended brief was led beyond August 31, 1998,
the last period of extension granted to private respondents.
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in considering the appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case
of denial of the motion to dismiss is to le the appellee's brief and proceed with the
appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to le a motion for reconsideration which, unfortunately,
was pro forma. All the grounds raised therein have been discussed in the rst resolution of
the respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant
reversal of the resolution. A cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a
near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss; hence, the ling of
the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for ling the appellee's brief.
Petitioner was therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to le appellee's brief.
aEHAIS
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions dated January 13, 1999 and
April 19, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989 are AFFIRMED, and the
Court of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal and decide the case with dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr. and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. CA, Rollo, pp. 116-117.

2. Id. at 135-136.
3. Rollo, pp. 31-38.
4. Id. at 39.
5. Id. at 48-49.
6. Id. at 54-64.
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id. at 66.
9. Id. at 68.
10. Id. at 67.
11. Supra, note 1 at 57-63.
12. Id. at 57-59, 62.
13. Id. at 63.
14. Id. at 92-93.
15. Id. at 81-91.
16. Id. at 116-117.
17. Id. at 121-125.
18. Id. at 135-136.
20. Id. at 5.
21. F. Regalado, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 (6th ed. 1997).
22. Supra, note 6.

23. See Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
24. Investments, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-60036, 147 SCRA 334, 340 (1987), citing PLDT
Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-8138, 97 Phil. 424,
426 (1955).
25. PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, id. at 426-427.
26. Bernardo vs. CA (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, 275 SCRA 413, 423-424
(1997), citing Chainani vs. Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, 90 Phil. 862, 864 (1952).
27. Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
28. RULE 50 — DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the

Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was taken
within the period fixed by these Rules;
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the period
prescribed by these Rules;
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in
Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of Rule 41;
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on

appeal as provided in Section 4 of Rule 44;
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page

references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f)
of Rule 44;
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order;
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under Rule 48
or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause; and
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a)
29. G.R. No. L-27005, 26 SCRA 712, 715 (1969).
30. Ibid.
31. See Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41609, 69 SCRA 368, 374 (1976).
32. Vda. De Haberer vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-42699 to L-42709, 104 SCRA 534, 544 (1981).
33. Supra, note 31.
34. Supra, note 32.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 227222. August 20, 2019.]
VIRGILIO P. VILLALONGHA, LUZVIMINDA P. VILLALONGHA-

OMBING, and VIRGINCITA P. VILLALONGHA-BATUTO , petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, (Twenty-Second Division), REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, DAVAO CITY BRANCH 38, FELIPA VDA. DE VILLALONGHA,
AURORA VILLALONGHA-CABARRUBIAS, RAMONITO VILLALONGHA,
JOSEFINA VILLALONGHA-DALEON, BOLTON BRIDGE
HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF DAVAO , respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE , ** J : p
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari 1 led by petitioners Virgilio P.

Villalongha (Virgilio), Luzviminda P. Villalongha-Ombing (Luzviminda), and Virgincita P.
Villalongha-Batuto (Virgincita; collectively, petitioners) assailing: (a) the Resolution 2
dated July 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01027-MIN, which
declared its Decision 3 dated March 22, 2013 as having become nal and executory,
and directed the Division Clerk of Court to make an entry of judgment; and (b) the
Resolution 4 dated September 20, 2016, which noted without action petitioners'
Manifestation/Compliance with Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint 5 for annulment of sale and transfer
certi cates of title (TCT), damages, and attorney's fees led by siblings Virgilio,
Luzviminda, Virgincita, Deogracias 6 Villalongha (Deogracias), and Alejandro Villalongha
(Alejandro; collectively, plaintiffs Villalongha) against their mother, Felipa Vda. de
Villalongha (Felipa), and their siblings Aurora Villalongha-Cabarrubias (Aurora), Jose na
Villalongha-Daleon (Jose na), and Ramonito Villalongha (Ramonito; respondents
Villalongha), together with Bolton Bridge Homeowners' Association, Incorporated
(BBHAI), and the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao (RD-Davao) before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 27,442-
99.
Plaintiffs Villalongha claimed that: (a) they are co-owners of the properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-130982, 7 T-141817, 8 and T-141832 9 that used to be conjugal
properties of Felipa and her late husband, Mauricio Villalongha (Mauricio), who passed
away in 1978; 1 0 (b) in a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of
Donation 1 1 dated May 7, 1996 (extrajudicial settlement), Felipa waived her rights over
her shares in the said lands, which were allotted and awarded as follows: (i) TCT No. T-
141817 to Virgilio, Deogracias, and Alejandro, (ii) TCT No. T-141832 to Ramonito and
Josefina, and (iii) TCT No. T-130982 to Virgincita, Luzviminda, and Aurora; 1 2 (c) despite
having lost all rights and interests on the said lands, Felipa subsequently sold 1 3 to
BBHAI the lands covered by TCT Nos. T-141817 and T-141832 (subject lands) upon
the malicious instigation of respondent Aurora, resulting in the issuance of TCT Nos. T-
313206 1 4 and T-313207 1 5 in the name of BBHAI, which is now threatening or
procuring to eject the plaintiffs from the subject lands. 1 6
For their part, respondents Villalongha denied 1 7 the conjugal nature of the
subject lands and their participation in the execution of the extrajudicial settlement.
They averred that: (a) Felipa is the sole owner of the subject lands which she purchased
from the Board of Liquidators on October 20, 1988, long after Mauricio's demise in
1978; (b) Felipa signed the extrajudicial settlement on the representation of Luzviminda
that the said document will only show the boundaries and monuments of the properties
involved, without any intention to donate her properties to her children; and (c) the
signatures of Aurora and Jose na appearing thereon were forged, and they did not sign
any acceptance of the alleged donation to them. 1 8
On the other hand, BBHAI claimed to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and
for value. 1 9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 2 0 dated June 30, 2006, the RTC (a) dismissed the complaint on the
ground that plaintiffs Villalongha failed to establish their claim by a preponderance of
evidence; (b) declared the extrajudicial settlement null and void; and (c) adjudged Felipa
as the sole owner of the subject lands. 2 1 Aggrieved, plaintiffs Villalongha appealed 2 2
to the CA. cDHAES
The CA Proceedings
In a Decision 2 3 dated March 22, 2013 (March 22, 2013 Decision), the CA
a rmed with modi cation the RTC ruling, thereby (a) adjudging Felipa as the exclusive
and sole owner of the subject lands; (b) declaring her sale to BBHAI as valid and
binding; (c) ordering Felipa to deliver possession of the subject lands to BBHAI; and (d)
ordering plaintiffs Villalongha to pay litigation expenses and attorney's fees. 2 4
A copy of the March 22, 2013 Decision was sent to plaintiffs Villalongha's
counsel, Atty. Victorio U. Advincula, Jr. (Atty. Advincula, Jr.), with registered letter No.
03654, and was received by a certain Ariel Hernandez on May 8, 2013. 2 5 However, in a
manifestation 2 6 dated March 11, 2014 (request manifestation), Atty. Advincula, Jr.
informed the CA that: (a) he did not receive said notice; and (b) Ariel Hernandez is not
his staff or employee, and not personally known to him or to his associate, Atty.
Victorio S. Advincula, Sr.
Atty. Advincula, Jr. also filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 2 7 dated March 11,
2014 (motion to withdraw) for plaintiffs Villalongha with the conformity of Virgilio. In a
Resolution 2 8 dated March 23, 2015, the CA granted the motion to withdraw and
submitted the request manifestation for resolution.
In a Resolution 2 9 dated June 3, 2015 (June 3, 2015 Resolution), the CA noted
without action the request manifestation, pointing out that (a) Atty. Advincula, Jr. has no
more personality and/or authority to le pleadings in behalf of plaintiffs Villalongha;
and (b) the request manifestation did not specify the action requested from the CA. 3 0
Virgilio received a copy of the said resolution on July 15, 2015, and led a notice
of receipt, requesting for time to engage the services of a new counsel. 3 1 On August
17, 2015, he also received notice 3 2 of BBHAI's Motion for Issuance of Entry of
Judgment 3 3 in the case. Thereafter, Atty. Arnold C. Abejaron (Atty. Abejaron) led a
formal entry of appearance as counsel 3 4 for herein petitioners only, and opposed 3 5
BBHAI's motion on the ground of prematurity, averring that there was no proper notice
of the March 22, 2013 Decision on their former counsel, Atty. Advincula, Jr.
Respondents Villalongha countered 3 6 that petitioners already had knowledge of
the said Decision, and that Virgilio even attached a copy of the same in his Judicial
Affidavit 3 7 dated October 21, 2014 in Criminal Case No. 121,417-A-F-2005 (a criminal
case for theft led by Alejandro 3 8 against petitioners) before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities in Davao City, yet petitioners failed to do anything to verify if Atty. Advincula, Jr.
received notice of said Decision and/or protect their remedial rights, if any. 3 9
In a Resolution 4 0 dated July 7, 2016, the CA held that the March 22, 2013
Decision had become final and executory on May 24, 2013 in the absence of any motion
for reconsideration or further appeal and, accordingly, directed the Division Clerk of
Court to make an entry of judgment. 4 1 The said Decision was thus entered 4 2 in the
Book of Entries of Judgments.
Petitioners led a Manifestation/Compliance with Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment, 4 3 which was noted without action in a Resolution 4 4 dated September 20,
2016.
In the meantime, respondents Villalongha and BBHAI moved 4 5 for the issuance
of a writ of execution before the RTC; hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining, among others, the Presiding Judge of the
RTC from hearing and/or giving due course to the said motions; and respondents from
ejecting petitioners from the subject lands. In order not to render moot the issue in this
case, the Court issued a TRO. 4 6
The Issue before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in directing an entry of judgment in the case, and denying
petitioners' motion to recall the same, despite their claim of lack of proper service of
the March 22, 2013 Decision.
The Court's Ruling
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that "if any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court." Thus, even if a party
represented by counsel has been actually noti ed, said notice is not
considered notice in law . 4 7 "The reason is simple — the parties, generally, have no
formal education or knowledge of the rules of procedure, speci cally, the mechanics of
an appeal or availment of legal remedies; thus, they may also be unaware of the rights
and duties of a litigant relative to the receipt of a decision. More importantly, it is best
for the courts to deal only with one person in the interest of orderly procedure — either
the lawyer retained by the party or the party him/herself if [he/she] does not intend to
hire a lawyer." 4 8
As to service of judgments and proof thereof, Sections 7 and 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court pertinently provide:
Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be
made by depositing the copy in the post o ce in a sealed envelope, plainly
addressed to the party or his counsel at his o ce, if known, otherwise at his
residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If
no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or the
addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. ASEcHI
xxx xxx xxx

Section 13. Proof of service. — x x x If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an a davit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with Section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail , proof shall be made by such a davit and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing o ce. The registry return card shall be
led immediately upon its receipt by the sender , or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter together with the certi ed or sworn copy of the notice given by
the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at bar, the registry return card pertaining to Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s copy
of the notice was not returned to the CA. 4 9 However, the CA concluded that the notice
was received by Atty. Advincula, Jr. on the basis of the reply to tracer of William H.
Olmoguez, Postmaster of Davao City, that a certain Ariel Hernandez received the notice
on May 8, 2013. 5 0 But in his request manifestation, Atty. Advincula, Jr. denied having
received such notice and knowing Ariel Hernandez, which was not refuted by
respondents.
It must be stressed that the mail matter must be received by the addressee or
his duly authorized representative since service on a person who was not a clerk,
employee or one in charge of the attorney's o ce, is invalid. 5 1 "[S]ervice
[S]ervice of the
court's order upon any person other than the counsel of record is not legally
effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the corresponding
reglementary period for the subsequent procedural steps that may be taken
by the attorney.
attorney " 5 2 Since Ariel Hernandez was not an employee and, thus, not
authorized to receive court notices in behalf of Atty. Advincula, Jr., his alleged receipt of
the notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision on May 8, 2013 is without any effect in law,
and cannot start the running of the period within which to le a motion for
reconsideration or appeal.
Notably, Atty. Advincula, Jr. likewise withdrew as counsel for petitioners with the
conformity of Virgilio, which was approved by the CA.
Having been informed that the withdrawing counsel has not been duly served
with notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision, and considering further that no new
counsel has entered any appearance in behalf of plaintiffs Villalongha, the CA should
have ensured that the latter were duly served notice thereof, but it did not. While it
originally sent a copy of the said Decision to them under registered letter No. 03562 on
April 12, 2013, the same was unserved, and thus, returned to sender. 5 3 Nonetheless, it
bears to reiterate that such earlier notice is not considered notice in law since plaintiffs
Villalongha were then represented by counsel.
While Virgilio received a copy of the June 3, 2015 Resolution (noting without
action Atty. Advincula, Jr.'s request manifestation), and manifested that plaintiffs
Villalongha will engage a new counsel "to whom a copy of the x x x [March 22, 2013
Decision may] be served," 5 4 neither plaintiffs Villalongha nor Atty. Abejaron who
subsequently entered his appearance for petitioners was served a copy of the March
22, 2013 Decision.
In view of the foregoing, the Court nds that plaintiffs Villalongha have not been
duly served with notice of the March 22, 2013 Decision; hence, the period within which
they may le a motion for reconsideration has not commenced to run. Thus, the Entry
of Judgment made in the case on the ground that the said Decision had become nal
and executory on May 24, 2013 or after the lapse of the fifteen (15)-day period from the
invalid receipt by Ariel Hernandez was therefore premature and ine cacious, and
should be recalled and lifted. An entry of judgment merely records the fact that a
judgment, order or resolution has become nal and executory; but it is not the operative
act that makes such judgment, order or resolution nal and executory. 5 5 In the case at
bar, the Entry of Judgment did not make the March 22, 2013 Decision nal and
executory considering that as of the date of entry, notice of said Decision has not yet
been served on plaintiffs Villalongha/petitioners. Consequently, the Court nds that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its July 7, 2016 Resolution directing
entry of judgment in the case, and the September 20, 2016 Resolution noting without
action petitioners' motion to recall such entry.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED.
GRANTED The Resolutions dated July 7, 2016 and
September 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01027-MIN are
SET ASIDE , and the Entry of Judgment dated July 7, 2016 is RECALLED.
RECALLED The case is
REMANDED to the CA which is hereby ordered to furnish petitioners, through counsel,
a copy of the March 22, 2013 Decision and give petitioners a period of fteen (15) days
from such notice to file their motion for reconsideration therefrom.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Jardeleza and Carandang, JJ., concur.
Bersamin, * C.J. and Gesmundo, *** J., are on official business.
Footnotes
* On official business.
** Per Special Order No. 2700 dated August 15, 2019.
*** On official business.
1. See Urgent Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction; rollo, pp. 3-20.
2. Id. at 25-28. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Maria
Filomena D. Singh and Perpetua T. Atal-Paño, concurring.
3. CA rollo, pp. 138-163. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices
Edgardo A. Camello and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of the Court),
concurring.
4. Rollo, p. 30.
5. Dated July 21, 1999; id. at 31-44.
6. "Diogracias" in some parts of the records.
7. In the name of the Heirs of Mauricio Villalonga, represented by Felipa Vda. De Villalonga.
Exhibit "A," folder of exhibits, pp. 1-2, including dorsal portion.
8. In the name of Felipa Vda. De Villalongha. Exhibit "B," id. at 3-4, including dorsal portion.
9. In the name of Felipa Vda. De Villalongha. Exhibit "C," id. at 5-6, including dorsal portion.
10. See rollo, p. 33.
11. Exhibit "D-1," folder of exhibits, pp. 7-11.

13. See Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 2, 1999; Exhibit "E," folder of exhibits, pp. 13-14.
14. Exhibit "G," id. at 17-18, including dorsal portion.
15. Exhibit "H," id. at 19-20, including dorsal portion.
16. See rollo, pp. 35-38.
17. See Answer dated August 17, 1999; records, Pieza 1, pp. 51-59.
18. See id. at 56-57.
19. See id. at 86-87.
20. Records, Pieza 2, pp. 411-431. Penned by Judge Wenceslao E. Ibabao.
21. See id. at 430-431.
22. See Notice of Appeal dated July 31, 2006; id. at 433.
23. CA rollo, pp. 138-163.
24. See id. at 162.

25. See id. at 196.
26. See Request Manifestation In Re: Tracer of Decision dated September 5, 2013; rollo, pp. 58-
59.
27. Id. at 60-61.
28 Id. at 62.
29. Id. at 63-65. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Henri
Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of the Court) and Pablito A. Perez, concurring.
30. See id. at 64-A.
31. See Notice of Receipt with Request for Time to Engage Services of New Counsel dated July
20, 2015; id. at 66-68.
32. Id. at 10.
33. Dated July 28, 2015; id. at 73-75.

34. Dated August 19, 2015; id. at 71-72.
35. See Comment and Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment dated
August 27, 2015; id. at 76-78.
36. See Entry of Appearance with Manifestation dated August 3, 2015; id. at 69-70. See also
Comment on the Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment dated September 9, 2015; id.
at 79-81.
37. CA rollo, pp. 282-291.
38. See id. at 267.
40. Id. at 25-28.

41. See id. at 27.
42. See Entry of Judgment; id. at 29.
43. Dated August 3, 2016; id. at 82-90.
44. Id. at 30.
45. See respondents' Motion for issuance of Writ of Execution dated September 19, 2016 (id. at
94-96) and BBHAI's Motion for Execution dated October 3, 2016 (id. at 99-101).
46. See id. at 106-109.
47. See Prudential Bank v. Business Assistance Group, Inc., 488 Phil. 191, 197 (2004).
48. See Delos Santos v. Elizalde, 543 Phil. 12, 26 (2007).
49. See Certification dated March 4, 2014 issued by the Office of the Division Clerk of Court of
the CA's Twenty-Second Division; rollo, p. 91.
50. See id. at 57.
51. See Tuazon v. Molina, G.R. No. L-55697, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 365, 368.
52. See Soriano v. Soriano, 558 Phil. 627, 642 (2007).
53. See mailing envelope; CA rollo, p. 166-A.
55. See Realty Sales Enterprises, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (Resolution), 254 Phil. 719,
723 (1989).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125383. July 2, 2002.]
FORTUNATA N. DUQUE , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.

ENRICO BONIFACIO and DRA. EDNA BONIFACIO , respondents.
MARCOSA D. VALENZUELA, assisted by her husband, ABELARDO

VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES EDNA
BONIFACIO and ENRICO BONIFACIO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J :
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which seeks to reverse the Decision dated March 13, 1996 issued by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 23991 and 23992, setting aside the Decision dated July 3, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering the remand of the case to
the said RTC for trial on the merits.
The facts of this case are undisputed.
Petitioner Duque led a complaint 1 before the RTC of Valenzuela alleging that:
respondents spouses Enrico and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with her certain checks in
exchange for cash in the total amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P270,000.00); respondents represented themselves to be holders in due course and for
value and claimed that the checks were su ciently funded; upon presentation of the
checks on their respective dates of maturity, the same were dishonored; petitioner Duque
gave notice of dishonor to the respondents; and this notwithstanding and despite
repeated demands, respondents refused and continued to refuse to honor said checks or
replace it with cash. 2
Petitioner Valenzuela alleged the same circumstances in her complaint, 3 except that
with her, the total amount involved is Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos
(P432,000.00). 4
In their Answers, the respondents spouses denied: having personally negotiated
with the plaintiffs any of the checks annexed to the complaints; representing to both
plaintiffs that they were holders in due course and for value of said checks; representing
that the same had su cient funds; having drawn or issued all the checks alluded to by
plaintiffs; and refusing to honor the checks or replace it with cash after being informed of
the dishonor thereof.
Further, respondents contend that upon learning that the checks were returned to
the petitioners, they made arrangements for settlement but only for the checks duly issued
by them. Finally, respondents dispute the true amount of their total liability to the
respective petitioners as alleged in their separate complaints, claiming that "they do not
owe that much" to either of them. 5
On June 28, 1988, the RTC issued a pre-trial order de ning the principal issues, thus:
"whether or not the defendants owe the plaintiffs the amount of money as claimed in the
complaint, and whether or not defendants can be permitted to adduce evidence which
would contradict the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents
attached to the complaint"; and setting the cases for trial on the merits. 6
On November 22, 1988, petitioners led a Request for Admission and furnished to
counsel for private respondents, specifically requesting that they admit that:
1) they negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks
annexed to the respective complaints;
2) defendant Edna M. Bonifacio signed separate promissory notes
dated November 23, 1987, acknowledging that she is indebted to
plaintiff Duque in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Valenzuela Four Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00), respectively; and
3) the plaintiffs in the two cases sent letters of demand to the
defendants both dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received
on December 5, 1987. 7
For failure of the respondents spouses to respond to the aforementioned request,
the RTC, citing Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, issued an Order on
December 27, 1988, which reads in part:
"Defendants' failure to deny under oath the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the reason why he cannot truthfully
admit/deny those matters in accordance with the cited provisions of the Rules of
Court is an implied admission of the matters of which admission is requested." 8
In the same Order, the RTC deemed the cases submitted for decision. 9
On February 1, 1989, the RTC of Valenzuela rendered a decision against the private
respondents, pertinent portions of which read:
"For failure of the defendants to make/submit sworn statement either
denying speci cally the matters of which admission is requested or the reasons
why they cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters as required in
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, upon motion of plaintiffs
through counsel, the matters of which admission is requested are considered
admitted.
"Defendants deemed to have admitted that they negotiated with plaintiff
Fortunata N. Duque the certain checks enumerated in the request for admission
and which are the annexes in the complaint, that defendant Edna M. Bonifacio
signed a promissory note dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging her
indebtedness to plaintiff Fortunata N. Duque in the amount of P270,000.00 and
have received the letter of demand of said plaintiff on December 5, 1987.
Defendants were also considered to have admitted that they negotiated with
plaintiff Marcosa D. Valenzuela the certain checks as annexes to the complaint
and enumerated in the Request for Admission, that defendant Edna M. Bonifacio
signed a promissory note dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging her
indebtedness to plaintiff Marcosa D. Valenzuela in the amount of P432,000.00
and have received plaintiffs letter of demand on December 5, 1987. With the
admissions, plaintiffs in both cases are entitled to a favorable judgment.
xxx xxx xxx

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants Spouses Enrico and Dra. Edna M. Bonifacio.
"Civil Case No. 2756-V-88

"Condemning defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
Fortunata N. Duque the principal amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand
Pesos (P270,000.00) with legal rate of interest from the ling of the complaint on
January 12, 1988 until fully paid;
"Civil Case No. 2757-V-88

"Sentencing defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff Marcosa
D. Valenzuela the principal amount of Four Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Pesos
(P432,000.00) with legal rate of interest from the ling of the complaint on
January 12, 1988 until the amount is fully paid.
"SO ORDERED." 1 0
Dissatisfied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals.

On March 13, 1996, the appellate court rendered a decision vacating and setting
aside the decision of the trial court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET
ASIDE and these cases remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits. The
trial judge is enjoined to resolve the cases with dispatch.
"No costs.
"SO ORDERED." 1 1
It reasoned that: the matters of which admission by the appellants is being sought
in the appellees' separate requests for admission are, or pertain to those already denied by
the former in their respective Answers to the two Complaints led against them; the lower
court failed to appreciate the fact that the requests for admission in question were led in
court and not served directly on the appellants, as required in Section 1 of Rule 26;
appellant's counsel were served copies of said requests but such is not compliance with
the requirements of the rule as held by the Supreme Court in Briboneria vs. Court of
Appeals. 1 2
Petitioner led motion for reconsideration on April 2, 1996 1 3 but the same was
denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated May 21, 1996. 1 4
Hence the petition for review, assigning the following errors:
A
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECS. 1 AND 2, RULE 26

OF THE RULES OF COURT.
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO SERVICE

OF THE REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. 1 5
Otherwise stated, the issues of this case are as follows: (1) whether or not the
failure of the private respondents to respond to the request for admission by the
petitioners is tantamount to an implied admission under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) whether or not there was personal service of the request on private
respondents.
As to the rst issue, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred when it totally
disregarded Sections 1 and 2, Rule 26 because the RTC correctly held that there was an
implied admission by the private respondents of the allegations in the request for
admission upon their failure to admit or deny the matters in the request; 1 6 that
respondents cannot ignore their request for admission since it contained relevant
evidentiary matters of facts for the purpose of establishing their cause of action or
defense; 1 7 and that the answer of respondents did not deny under oath the truth and
genuineness of the actionable documents attached to the complaint. 1 8
Anent the second issue, petitioners allege that the appellate court erred in holding
that there was no service of the request for admission on private respondents; that this
allegation was never raised by private respondents because it is false; and that granting
arguendo that the request was served on the lawyer and not on private respondents
themselves, still this is su cient and is equivalent to service on the respondent according
to PSFC Financial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. 1 9
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The prevailing rule in 1988 at the time when the request for admission was made is
Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
"Sec. 1. Request for admission — At any time after issues have been
joined, a party may serve upon any other party 2 0 a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described
in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set
forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request
unless copies have already been furnished.
"Sec. 2. Implied admission — Each of the matters of which an

admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period
designated in the request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service
thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice,
the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying speci cally the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
"Objections on the ground of irrelevancy or impropriety of the matter

requested shall be promptly submitted to the court for resolution."
This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the
genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for
admissions to enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse side thereby
facilitating an amicable settlement of the case or expediting the trial of the same. 2 1
However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceeding by abetting
redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be
defeated. 2 2
In the present case, petitioners requested the admission of three things: rst, that
respondents negotiated with the plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed
to the respective complaints; second, that defendant Edna N. Bonifacio signed separate
promissory notes, both dated November 23, 1987 acknowledging that she is indebted to
plaintiff Fortunata Duque in the sum of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P270,000.00) and to plaintiff Marcosa Valenzuela in the sum of Four Hundred Thirty Two
Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00); and third, that the plaintiffs in the two (2) cases sent
letters of demand commonly dated November 28, 1987 which the latter received on
December 5, 1987.
The rst matter sought to be admitted by the petitioners pertains to the checks
supposedly negotiated by the respondents to the plaintiffs. As correctly observed by the
appellate court, these are the same checks referred to and annexed in the Complaint, to
wit:
"III
"The defendants, conspiring, confederating, aiding and helping each other,

negotiated with the plaintiff certain checks in exchange for cash, as shown in the
schedule which is hereto attached . . . and the checks as Annexes 'B', 'B-1' to 'B-24'
(in Civil Case No. 2756-V-88) and Annexes 'B', 'B-1' to 'B-39' (in Civil Case No.
2757-V-88) and made integral parts hereof, making representations that they were
holders in due course and for value and the checks were sufficiently funded." 2 3
The corresponding denial thereof by the respondents in their Answer reads:

"That paragraph 3 is speci cally denied for being devoid of the truth as
defendants did not personally negotiate with plaintiff any of the checks marked
as Annexes 'B' to 'B-24' (in Civil Case No. 2756) and Annexes 'B' to 'B-39' (in Civil
Case No. 2757); neither did defendants represent that they are holder in due
course and for value of said checks nor did they claim that the same have
su cient funds, moreover, not all the checks alluded to by plaintiff(s) were drawn
or issued by defendants." 2 4
Clearly therefrom, to require an admission on this point even though it was already
denied in the Answer would be superfluous.
As expounded by this Court in Po vs. Court of Appeals: 2 5
"A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted
by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d,
752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a second
denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for
admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of
fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is
to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose,
it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, 'pointless, useless' and 'a mere
redundancy.'
On the second matter requested, petitioners sought the admission of respondents

that Edna Bonifacio executed promissory notes in favor of the petitioners acknowledging
therein her indebtedness to them in the amount of Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P270,000.00) and Four Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Pesos (P432,000.00). The
appellate court held that the allegation of the private respondents in their Answers that
"they do not owe that much" is su cient and does not necessitate a reply to the
admission. 2 6 To this we disagree. The request for admission pertains to promissory notes
while the allegation quoted by the appellate court simply refers to the amount allegedly
owed by the respondents, not to the promissory notes which in the rst place were not
mentioned in the Complaint of petitioners.
However, we nd no cogent reason to deviate from the observations of the Court of
Appeals that the request for admission regarding the alleged promissory notes is
defective for failure of petitioners to attach copies of said notes to the request for
admission; and that private respondents were not previously furnished copies of the same.
Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements under Section 1 of Rule 26 which
provides that a party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission
by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request; and that copies of the documents should be delivered with the
request unless copies have already been furnished. Except for the bare allegation of the
petitioners that they also furnished private respondents said promissory notes, their
requests do not show that there was indeed such previous or simultaneous service of the
said documents on the petitioners.
Also improper is the admission sought with respect to plaintiffs' demand letters
dated November 28, 1987 which the defendants allegedly received on December 5, 1987.
Paragraph V of the Complaint reads:
Plaintiff gave notice of dishonor to the defendants, but this
notwithstanding, and in spite of repeated demands, the defendants refused and
failed and continue to refuse and fail to honor the said checks or replace them
with cash. 2 7
Paragraph 4 of the Answer reads:

That paragraph 5 is speci cally denied for being devoid of the truth as
defendants after having obtained knowledge that their checks were turned-over to
the possession of plaintiff and were dishonored, made arrangement for the
settlement of the checks issued by them. 2 8
Thus, a denial by the respondents would be a surplusage in the light of the allegation in
paragraph 5 of the respective Complaints which speak of such a demand, and the
denial of the same allegation in appellants' separate Answers to said complaints.
The second issue involves the question of su ciency of service on a party of a
request for admission.
The petitioners claim that respondents were personally served requests for
admission as required by the Rules; and that granting that they were not, service on the
counsel would be sufficient.
Records show that only the counsel of the respondents, Atty. H.G. Domingo, Jr. was
furnished copies of the requests. 2 9 This is not su cient compliance with the Rules. As
elucidated by the Court in the Briboneria case:
"The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section
2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel
and not upon the party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of
the party and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its
procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the
rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in
competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's case ( Chainani vs. Judge
Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952; Capili v. Badelles , G.R. No. L-17786,
Sept. 29, 1962). However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly
provides that notice must be served upon a de nite person. In such cases, service
must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in
order that the notice be valid." 3 0
Consequently, the requests for admission made by the petitioners were not validly
served and therefore, private respondents cannot be deemed to have admitted the
truth of the matters upon which admissions were requested. Thus, the summary
judgment rendered by the RTC has no legal basis to support it. 3 1
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED. STcADa
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2756-V-88.
2. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, pp. 1-2.
3. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2757-V-88.
5. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, pp. 45-46, 48-49.
6. Id. at 58; RTC Records, CV Case No. 2757-V-88, p. 42.

7. Id. at 67-70.
8. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, p. 74.
9. Ibid.
11. Rollo, p. 83.

12. Rollo, pp. 80-83; 216 SCRA 607.
13. CA Rollo, pp. 55-60.
14. Rollo, p. 86.

15. Id. at 15.
16. Rollo, pp. 17-18.
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id. at 19.
19. Rollo, pp. 19-21.
20. Under Section 1, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requests for admission
must not only be served upon the party but also filed in court.
21. Oscar M. Herrera, Vol. II, Remedial Law (1994), pp. 1-2.
22. Rey Lañada vs. Court of Appeals and Buena, G.R. No. 102390 and 102404, February 1,
2002.
23. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, p. 1; RTC Records, CV Case No. 2757-V-88, p. 1.
24. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, p. 45.
25. 164 SCRA 668, 670 (1988), see also Briboneria vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 607,
615 (1992).
26. Rollo, p. 82.

27. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, p. 2, RTC Records, CV Case No. 2757-V-88, p. 2.
28. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, pp. 45-46, 48-49.
29. RTC Records, CV Case No. 2756-V-88, pp. 68, 70.
30. Briboneria vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 616, 617 (1992).
31. Ibid., 618.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200469. January 15, 2018.]
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK , petitioner, vs . JOSEPHINE L. PAPA ,

respondent.
DECISION
MARTIRES J :
MARTIRES, p
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 21
July 2011 Decision 1 and the 1 February 2012 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 112611, which a rmed the 14 October 2009 Decision 3 and the 14
January 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 ( RTC), in Civil
Case No. 09-545, which in turn reversed and set aside the 23 December 2008 Decision
4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 ( MeTC) in Civil Case No.
90987.
THE FACTS
On 30 March 2006, petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) led before the
MeTC a complaint 5 for collection of sum of money against respondent Josephine L.
Papa (Papa). In its complaint, PSB alleged that Papa obtained a exi-loan with a face
amount of P207,600.00, payable in twenty-four (24) monthly installments of P8,650.00
with interest at 38.40% per annum. For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note
dated 26 July 2005. PSB further alleged that the promissory note provides additional
charges in case of default, to wit: Three percent (3%) late payment charge per month of
the total amount until the amount is fully paid; Twenty-Five percent (25%) Attorney's
Fees, but not less than P5,000.00; Ten percent (10%) liquidated damages, but not less
than P1,000.00; and costs of suit. When the obligation fell due, Papa defaulted in her
payment. PSB averred that as of 27 March 2006, Papa's total obligation amounted to
P173,000.00; and that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to meet her obligation.
On 26 October 2006, Papa led her Answer. 6 She alleged that PSB had no cause
of action against her as her liability had already been extinguished by the several
staggered payments she made to PSB, which payments she undertook to prove. She
likewise claimed that there was no basis for the interest and damages as the principal
obligation had already been paid.
During the trial on the merits, PSB introduced in evidence a photocopy of the
promissory note, 7 which the MeTC admitted despite the vehement objection by Papa.
Meanwhile, Papa chose to forego with the presentation of her evidence and manifested
she would instead file a memorandum.
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for decision.
The MeTC Ruling
On 23 December 2008, the MeTC rendered a decision in favor of PSB and against
Papa. The MeTC was convinced that PSB was able to establish its cause of action
against Papa by preponderance of evidence. It also emphasized the fact that other than
her bare allegation, Papa never adduced any evidence regarding the payments she had
allegedly made. The McTC, however, deemed it equitable to award interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum only instead of the stipulated interest, penalty, and
charges. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant JOSEPHINE L. PAPA to pay plaintiff the amount of P173,000.00 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from February 9, 2006 until the whole
amount is fully paid; the amount of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's
fees; and the costs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Papa moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the MeTC in its
Order, dated 14 May 2009.
Aggrieved, Papa elevated an appeal before the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated 14 October 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC
decision. The trial court ruled that PSB failed to prove its cause of action due to its
failure to prove the existence and due execution of the promissory note. It opined that
Papa's apparent admission in her Answer could not be taken against her as, in fact, she
denied any liability to PSB, and she never admitted the genuineness and due execution
of the promissory note. It explained that the fact that Papa interposed payment as a
mode of extinguishing her obligation should not necessarily be taken to mean that an
admission was made regarding the contents and due execution of the promissory note;
speci cally the amount of the loan, interests, mode of payment, penalty in case of
default, as well as other terms and conditions embodied therein. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The decision dated December 23, 2008 in Civil Case No. 09-945 is
reversed and set aside.
SO ORDERED. 9
On 10 November 2009, PSB led its motion for reconsideration, 1 0 wherein it
admitted that it received the copy of the 14 October 2009 RTC decision on 26 October
2009.
In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa posited, among
others, that the RTC decision had already attained nality. Papa explained that although
PSB led the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears that service
of the said motion was made one (1) day late as PSB availed of a private courier service
instead of the modes of service prescribed under the Rules of Court. As such, PSB's
motion for reconsideration is deemed not to have been made on the date it was
deposited to the private courier for mailing but rather on 11 November 2009, the date it
was actually received by Papa.
In its Order, dated 14 January 2010, the RTC denied PSB's motion for
reconsideration ratiocinating that its 14 October 2009 decision had already attained
finality, among others.
Aggrieved, PSB led a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of
Court before the CA.
In her comment, 1 1 Papa reiterated her position that the 14 October 2009 RTC
decision had already attained finality.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated 21 July 2011, the CA a rmed the 14 October
2009 decision and the 14 January 2010 order of the RTC.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC decision had already attained nality due
to PSB's failure to serve on Papa a copy of its motion for reconsideration within the
prescribed period. The appellate court noted that in its motion for reconsideration, PSB
did not offer any reasonable explanation why it availed of private courier service instead
of resorting to the modes recognized by the Rules of Court.
The appellate court further agreed with the RTC that PSB failed to prove its cause
of action. It concurred with the RTC that Papa made no admission relative to the
contents and due execution of the promissory note; and that PSB failed to prove that
Papa violated the terms and conditions of the promissory note, if any.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Makati Regional
Trial Court, Branch 65 dated 14 October 2009 and its subsequent Order dated 14
January 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in Civil Case No.
09-545 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 1 2
PSB moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated 1 February 2012.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL BY
REASON OF PURE TECHNICALITY THEREBY PREJUDICING THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO RECOVER THE UNPAID
LOAN OF THE RESPONDENT.
II.
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE LOWER COURTS
DECISION DATED 14 OCTOBER 2009 ON THE GROUND THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ITS CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN IT
FAILED TO PRESENT THE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE
THEREBY FAILING TO ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE AND
EXECUTION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
III.
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL
RESULTING IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENT. 1 3
Stated differently, PSB argues that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the
RTC decision had already attained nality; and that the appellate court erred when it
ruled that it failed to prove its cause of action despite Papa's admission regarding the
existence of the loan.
OUR RULING
PSB insists that it timely led its motion for reconsideration. It stresses that the
records of the case would disclose that it personally filed the subject motion before the
RTC on 10 November 2009, or the last day of the 15-day prescriptive period. PSB also
claims that, although it deviated from the usual mode of service as prescribed by the
Rules of Court when it served the copy of the aforesaid motion by private courier
service, there was still effective service upon Papa considering that she received the
motion for reconsideration through her counsel, on 11 November 2009, and nine (9)
days prior to its intended hearing date. Additionally, PSB contends that the timeliness
of the ling of the motion for reconsideration should not be reckoned from the date of
the actual receipt by the adverse party, but on the actual receipt thereof by the RTC,
pointing out that filing and service of the motion are two different matters.
PSB further argues that, notwithstanding the said deviation, a liberal construction
of the rules is proper under the circumstances and that the Court has the power to
suspend its own rules especially when there appears a good and e cient cause to
warrant such suspension.
These arguments deserve scant consideration.
PSB is correct that ling and service are distinct from each other. Indeed, ling is
the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court; whereas, service
is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. 1 4
Nevertheless, although they pertain to different acts, ling and service go hand-
in-hand and must be considered together when determining whether the pleading,
motion, or any other paper was led within the applicable reglementary period.
Precisely, the Rules require every motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of
service thereof to the other parties concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed
to act on it, 1 5 effectively making such motion as not filed.
The kind of proof of service required would depend on the mode of service used
by the litigant. Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service shall
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the o cial return of the
server, or the a davit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the
date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof
thereof shall consist of an a davit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such a davit and the registry receipt
issued by the mailing o ce. The registry return card shall be led immediately
upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together
with the certi ed or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee. [emphasis supplied]
In some decided cases, the Court considered ling by private courier as
equivalent to ling by ordinary mail. 1 6 The Court opines that this pronouncement
equally applies to service of pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by a
private courier or ordinary mail, a party must attach an a davit of the person who
mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such a davit must show compliance with Rule
13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be
made by depositing the copy in the post o ce in a sealed envelope, plainly
addressed to the party or his counsel at his o ce, if known, otherwise at his
residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If
no registry service is available in the locality of either the senders or
the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. [emphasis
supplied]
This requirement is logical as service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances
where no registry service exists either in the locality of the sender or the addressee. 1 7
This is the only credible justi cation why resort to service by ordinary mail or private
courier may be allowed.
In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration
to Papa's counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an
a davit of the person who sent it through the said private messengerial service.
Moreover, PSB's explanation why it resorted to private courier failed to show its
compliance with Rule 13, Section 7. PSB's explanation merely states:
Greetings:
Kindly set the instant motion on 20 November 2009 at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning or soon thereafter as matter and counsel may be heard. Copy of this
pleading was served upon defendant's counsel by private registered mail for
lack of material time and personnel to effect personal delivery. 1 8
Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7
for an effective service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was
not effected due to lack of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an
acceptable reason why it resorted to "private registered mail" instead of by registered
mail. In particular, PSB failed to indicate that no registry service was available in San
Mateo, Rizal, where the o ce of Papa's counsel is situated, or in Makati City, where the
office of PSB's counsel is located. Consequently, PSB failed to comply with the required
proof of service by ordinary mail. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB's motion
for reconsideration, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively considered as
not filed.
Since PSB's motion for reconsideration is deemed as not led, it did not toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for the ling of an appeal; and considering
that PSB's appeal was led only after the expiration of the 15-day period on 10
November 2009, such appeal has not been validly perfected. As such, the subject 14
October 2009 decision of the RTC had already attained nality as early as 11 November
2009.
It is well-settled that judgments or orders become nal and executory by
operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The nality of a judgment becomes a
fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no
motion for reconsideration or new trial is led. The court need not even pronounce the
finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. 1 9
At this juncture, the Court stresses that the bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" or, in this case, "good or e cient case" is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not
to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced
a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only
for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed. 2 0
Time and again, the Court has reiterated that rules of procedure, especially those
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of business. 2 1 While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of
justice, it is well-settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was never intended to
be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. Liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and
under justi able causes and circumstances. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 2 2
Considering that the RTC decision had already attained nality, there is no longer
need to discuss whether the RTC and the CA erred in ruling that PSB failed to prove its
cause of action. A decision that has acquired nality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modi ed in any respect, even if the modi cation is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down. 2 3
WHEREFORE , the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 21 July
2011 Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 112611 are AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 46-56; penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, and concurred in by
Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justices
Michael P. Elbinias.
2. Id. at 43-44.
3. CA rollo, pp. 170-176; penned by Presiding Judge Edgardo M. Caldona.
4. Id. at 51-53; penned by Presiding Judge Henry E. Laron.
5. Id. at 33-35.
6. Id. at 41-42.
7. Id. at 37.
8. Id. at 53.
9. Id. at 176.
10. Id. at 54-57.
11. Id. at 98-118.
12. Rollo, p. 55.
13. Id. at 8-41.
14. RULES OF COURT, Rule 13, Section 2, par. 2.
15. RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, Section 6.
16. Industrial Timber Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 303 Phil. 621, 626 (1994).
Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 678 Phil. 660, 674
(2011).
17. Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 678 Phil. 660, 674 (2011).
18. CA rollo, p. 57.
19. Barrio Fiesta Restaurant v. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, 11 July 2016, 796 SCRA 257, 277.
20. Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000).
21. Philippine National Bank v. Deang Marketing Corporation, 593 Phil. 703, 715 (2008).
22. De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial Corporation, 734 Phil. 652, 663 (2014).
23. Gadrinab v. Salamanca, 736 Phil. 279, 292-293 (2014).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 213525. January 27, 2015.]
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. , petitioner, vs .

COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF
ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE ,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN J :
BERSAMIN, p
Petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. seeks the reconsideration 1 of the
resolution promulgated on August 19, 2014, 2 whereby the Court dismissed its petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court due to its non-
compliance with the provisions of Rule 64, particularly for: (a) the late ling of the petition;
(b) the non-submission of the proof of service and veri ed declaration; and (c) the failure
to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. 3
Antecedents
Respondent Provincial Government of Antique (LGU) and the petitioner executed a
memorandum of agreement concerning the life insurance coverage of quali ed barangay
secretaries, treasurers and tanod, the former obligating P4,393,593.60 for the premium
payment, and subsequently submitting the corresponding disbursement voucher to COA-
Antique for pre-audit. 4 The latter o ce disallowed the payment for lack of legal basis
under Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Respondent LGU appealed but its
appeal was denied.
Consequently, the petitioner led its petition for money claim in the COA. 5 On
November 15, 2012, the COA issued its decision denying the petition, 6 holding that under
Section 447 and Section 458 of the Local Government Code only municipal or city
governments are expressly vested with the power to secure group insurance coverage for
barangay workers; and noting the LGU's failure to comply with the requirement of
publication under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform
Act).
The petitioner received a copy of the COA decision on December 14, 2012, 7 and
led its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. 8 However, the COA denied the
motion, 9 the denial being received by the petitioner on July 14, 2014. 1 0
Hence, the petitioner led the petition for certiorari on August 12, 2014, but the
petition for certiorari was dismissed as earlier stated through the resolution promulgated
on August 19, 2014 for (a) the late ling of the petition; (b) the non-submission of the
proof of service and veri ed declaration; and (c) the failure to show grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. EHTSCD
Issues
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
In its motion for reconsideration, the petitioner submits that it led the petition for
certiorari within the reglementary period following the fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals ; 1 1 and that the petition for certiorari included an a davit of
service in compliance with Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It admits having
overlooked the submission of a veri ed declaration; and prays that the declaration
attached to the motion for reconsideration be admitted by virtue of its substantial
compliance with the E cient Use of Paper Rule 1 2 by previously submitting a compact
disc (CD) containing the petition for certiorari and its annexes. It disagrees with the Court,
insisting that it showed and proved grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in
issuing the assailed decision.
Ruling
We deny the motion for reconsideration for being without merit.
I
Petitioner did not comply with
the rule on proof of service
The petitioner claims that the a davit of service attached to the petition for
certiorari complied with the requirement on proof of service.
The claim is unwarranted. The petitioner obviously ignores that Section 13, Rule 13
of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service, namely: the a davit and the
registry receipt, viz.:
Section 13. Proof of Service. — . . . . If service is made by registered mail,
proof shall be made by such a davit and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing o ce. The registry return card shall be led immediately upon its receipt
by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certi ed or
sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of
service shall consist of the a davit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry
receipt, both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the
rule is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.
13
Here, the petition for certiorari only carried the a davit of service executed by one
Marcelino T. Pascua, Jr., who declared that he had served copies of the petition by
registered mail "under Registry Receipt Nos. 70449, 70453, 70458, 70498 and 70524
attached to the appropriate spaces found on pages 64-65 of the petition." 1 4 The petition
only bore, however, the cut print-outs of what appeared to be the registry receipt numbers
of the registered matters, not the registry receipts themselves. The rule requires to be
appended the registry receipts, not their reproductions. Hence, the cut print-outs did not
substantially comply with the rule. This was the reason why the Court held in the resolution
of August 19, 2014 that the petitioner did not comply with the requirement of proof of
service. 1 5 CTacSE
II
Fresh Period Rule under Neypes
Neypes
did not apply to the petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court

The petitioner posits that the fresh period rule applies because its Rule 64 petition is
akin to a petition for review brought under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court; hence,
conformably with the fresh period rule, the period to le a Rule 64 petition should also be
reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or the
motion for new trial. 1 6
The petitioner's position cannot be sustained.
There is no parity between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for
certiorari under Rule 64.
As to the nature of the procedures, Rule 42 governs an appeal from the judgment or
nal order rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Such appeal is on a question of fact, or of law, or of mixed question of fact and law, and is
given due course only upon a prima facie showing that the Regional Trial Court committed
an error of fact or law warranting the reversal or modi cation of the challenged judgment
or nal order. 1 7 In contrast, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 is similar to the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or nal order of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The petition is
not designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. 1 8 Questions of
fact cannot be raised except to determine whether the COMELEC or the COA were guilty of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the
aggrieved party is allowed 15 days to le the petition for review from receipt of the
assailed decision or nal order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. 1 9 In the latter, the petition is led within 30 days from notice of the
judgment or nal order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The ling of a motion for new
trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party
may le the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than ve days in
any event, reckoned from the notice of denial. 2 0
The petitioner led its motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013, which was
31 days after receiving the assailed decision of the COA on December 14, 2012. 2 1
Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 64, it had only ve days from receipt of the denial of its
motion for reconsideration to le the petition. Considering that it received the notice of the
denial on July 14, 2014, it had only until July 19, 2014 to le the petition. However, it led
the petition on August 13, 2014, which was 25 days too late.
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections 2 2 that the belated ling of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply
was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for
having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes 2 3 applied. Rules of
procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 2 4
Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper. AHDcCT
III
Petition for certiorari further lacked merit
The petition for certiorari is also dismissible for its lack of merit.

The petitioner insists on having fully shown that the COA committed grave abuse of
discretion, to wit: (1) the challenged decision was rendered by a divided COA proper; (2)
the COA took almost a year before promulgating its decision, and more than a year in
resolving the motion for reconsideration, in contravention of the express mandate of the
Constitution; (3) the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration was made up of
only two sentences; (4) the matter involved a novel issue that called for an interpretation of
the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code; and (5) in issuing the resolution,
COA Commissioners Grace Pulido-Tan and Heidi L. Mendoza made it appear that they
knew the Local Government Code better than former Senator Aquilino Pimentel who
offered an opinion on the matter. 2 5
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 2 6
A close look indicates that the petition for certiorari did not su ciently disclose
how the COA committed grave abuse of its discretion. For sure, the bases cited by the
petitioner did not approximate grave abuse of discretion. To start with, the supposed
delays taken by the COA in deciding the appeal were neither arbitrary nor whimsical on its
part. Secondly, the mere terseness of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was not
a factor in demonstrating an abuse of discretion. And, lastly, the fact that Senator
Pimentel, even if he had been the main proponent of the Local Government Code in the
Legislature, expressed an opinion on the issues different from the COA Commissioners'
own did not matter, for it was the latter's adjudication that had any value and decisiveness
on the issues by virtue of their being the Constitutionally o cials entrusted with the
authority for that purpose.
It is equally relevant to note that the COA denied the money claim of the petitioner
for the further reason of lack of su cient publication as required by the Government
Procurement Act. In that light, the COA acted well within its authority in denying the
petitioner's claim.
IV
Petitioner and its counsel
exhibited harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members
The petitioner contends that the Court erred in appreciating the petitioner's non-
compliance with the requirement of the proof of service, alleging that even "a perfunctory
scrutiny" of the petition for certiorari and its annexes could have easily shown that it had
attached an a davit of service to the petition. It goes on to make the following
statements, viz.:
25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify the
PETITION and its annexes up to its last page, thus, the erroneous nding that
there was non-submission of the proof of service;
26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other members of this
Honorable Court who took the observation from the o ce of the Justice-in-
charge, to be the obtaining fact, when in truth and in fact, it is not; 2 7
cHITCS

The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain inability to accept the ill
consequences of their own shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity
to readily lay blame on others like the Court and its Members. In doing so, they employed
harsh and disrespectful language that accused the Court and its Members of ignorance
and recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication.
We do not tolerate such harsh and disrespectful language being uttered against the
Court and its Members. We consider the accusatory language particularly offensive
because it was unfounded and undeserved. As this resolution earlier clari es, the petition
for certiorari did not contain a proper a davit of service. We do not need to rehash the
clari cation. Had the petitioner and its counsel been humbler to accept their self-in icted
situation and more contrite, they would have desisted from their harshness and disrespect
towards the Court and its Members. Although we are not beyond error, we assure the
petitioner and its counsel that our resolutions and determinations are arrived at or reached
with much care and caution, aware that the lives, properties and rights of the litigants are
always at stake. If there be errors, they would be unintended, and would be the result of
human oversight. But in this instance the Court and its Members committed no error. The
petition bore only cut reproductions of the supposed registry receipts, which even a mere
"perfunctory scrutiny" would not pass as the original registry receipts required by the Rules
of Court.
Accordingly, the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, should fully
explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for their
harsh and disrespectful language towards the Court and its Members; and, in his case,
Atty. Fortaleza should further show cause why he should not be disbarred.
WHEREFORE , the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of
merit; ORDERS the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why they should not be punished for indirect
contempt of court; and FURTHER DIRECTS Atty. Fortaleza to show cause in the same
period why he should not be disbarred.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, ** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., is on leave.
Brion, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
* On Leave.
** Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1914.
*** On official leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 229-242.
2. Id., at 226.
3. Id., at 226.
4. Id., at 18.
5. Id., at 13-22.
6. Id., at 71-91.
7. Id., at 92.
8. Id., at 92-104.
9. Id., at 70.
10. Id., at 6.
11. G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
12. A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC, November 13, 2012.
13. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002, 388 SCRA 72, 80-81.
14. Rollo, p. 224.
15. Supra note 1.

16. Rollo, pp. 234-235.
17. Section 6, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
18. Reyna v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011, 647 SCRA 210, 225.
19. Section 1, Rule 42, Rules of Court.
20. Section 3, Rule 64, Rules of Court, states:
Section 3. Time to file petition. — The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion
for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed
under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein
fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of denial.
21. Rollo, p. 7.
22. Pates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184915, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 481, 488.
23. Supra, note 11.
24. Canton v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 152898, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 441, 448.
25. Rollo, pp. 239-242.
26. Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169498, December 11, 2008, 573 SCRA 690, 700.
27. Rollo, p. 238.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 149797-98. February 13, 2004.]
TY petitioner, vs . BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND

NANCY L. TY,
MORTGAGE BANK, COURT OF APPEALS and HON. PATERNO V. TAC-
AN, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Batangas City,
Branch 84 , respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to set aside and reverse the June 7, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition led by
petitioner and affirmed the assailed Orders dated April 14, 2000 and May 8, 2000. caCEDA
On August 16, 1995, respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco
Filipino, for brevity) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, presided
by respondent Judge Paterno V. Tac-an, an action for reconveyance of real property
against petitioner Nancy Ty, together with Tala Realty Services Corporation, Pedro B.
Aguirre, Remedios A. Dupasquier, Pilar D. Ongking, Elizabeth H. Palma, Dolly W. Lim, Cynthia
E. Mesina, Rubencito M. Del Mundo, and Add International Services, Inc. (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Tala, et al.).
On November 15, 1995, Tala, et al. led a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint. However, on a motion for reconsideration by Banco Filipino, the complaint was
reinstated. 2
Tala, et al., with the exception of Nancy Ty 3 and Cynthia Mesina, 4 led a motion for
reconsideration, which was however denied in an Order dated June 3, 1996. The pertinent
portion of the Order reads:
On the Motion for Reconsideration led by defendants, except Nancy Ty
and Cynthia Mesina, the record shows that the Motion for Reconsideration led
by the plaintiff dated February 23, 1996 was sent by mail on February 2, 1996 to
this Court and received by the Court on March 5, 1996. The copy of the said
Motion for Reconsideration was furnished to Alampay Gatchalian Mawis
Carranza and Alampay, Counsels for the defendants at their address in Makati
City on February 26, 1996. The copy sent to the Court was received on March 5,
1996. It could safely (sic) assumed that copy sent to the defendant's counsel at
the nearer address at Makati City even before March 5, 1996 or on March 1, 1996,
at least 4 days in transit. In the normal course of events or as a matter of practice,
counsels le comments or opposition to Motions without need of Court orders.
So, from March 1, 1996, they could have led comment and opposition within 10
days therefrom, or on March 11, 1996 without awaiting for a Court order. The
Court does not believe that the said motion for reconsideration was received by
said defendant's counsel on March 28, 1996 or one month and 2 days after
mailing by plaintiffs counsel. The extension of 5 days given to defendants
contained in the Order of March 7, 1996 was only a matter of grace extended by
the court, a reminder that their opposition must be forthcoming. Lawyers must be
vigilant in the defense of their clients. . . .. (Emphasis supplied)
On July 8, 1996, petitioner and Tala, et al. led their respective answers to the
complaint. Two days later, Tala, et al. also led a motion to suspended proceedings, on the
ground that an appeal by Banco Filipino to the April 1, 1996 Order of the respondent court
is still pending resolution. The motion to suspend proceedings was, however, denied by
respondent court.
On October 21, 1996, Banco Filipino moved for an order directing Tala, et al. to
produce or make available books, documents and other papers relevant to the case. 5
Notwithstanding Tala, et al.'s opposition thereto, the trial court directed Tala, et al. to
produce certain documents within a speci ed period of time, despite failure by Banco
Filipino to tender the costs for such production and inspection. In its Order dated
November 20, 1996, the trial court justi ed Banco Filipino's failure to advance the
expenses of production and inspection in this wise: 6
Further to the Order dated November 1996, requiring the defendant Tala to
produce certain documents within the speci ed period of time, for those
documents in which the defendant is bound to keep by law or regulation, their
production cannot be the subject of assessment for cost against plaintiff-movant.
Otherwise, cost may be assessed and billed but the same shall be submitted to
the Court for approval. . . ..
Thereafter, Tala, et al. led their motion for reconsideration to the afore-quoted
Order, on January 14, 1997.
In the meantime, on December 20 1996, Banco Filipino led a
manifestation/omnibus motion 7 praying, among others, for the declaration of certain
allegations and propositions as being factually established and for the
allegations/defenses in Tala, et al.'s answer to be stricken out.
The trial court granted Banco Filipino's motion to declare certain facts as
established in an Order on February 26, 1998, the dispositive portion of which provides: 8
Premises considered, and pursuant to Rules 27 and Section 3, Rule 29 of
the Revised Rules of Court, this Court hereby:
A) Declares
1) as having been established the fact that defendant TALA did not
have the nancial capacity to acquire by purchase the disputed Batangas
property at the time of their acquisition;
2) as having been established the fact that TALA had not the means
of acquiring the Batangas property other than through the advanced rental
payments made by plaintiff;
3) as having been established the fact that the Batangas property had
merely been transferred by way of trust to TALA, as trustee for the bene t of the
plaintiff, which was there as purchaser of the property;
4) prohibits defendant TALA from introducing any evidence contrary to

sections (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph A, above.
B) Strikes out allegations/defenses in defendant TALA's Answer
and/or other pertinent pleadings averring that:
1) TALA is an independent corporation, not a trustee of the plaintiff;
2) TALA acquired the Batangas property independently and using its

own funds through armslength transaction;
3) TALA is the full and absolute owner of the disputed property.
Meanwhile, Tala, et al. failed to produce the requested documents. In a

Supplemental Order dated April 15, 1998, Tala, et al. were directed to produce additional
documents. The Supplemental Order reads: 9
Further to the Order dated February 26, 1998 and considering that the
documents presented so far by the defendant Tala are not complete in relation to
those itemized in the said Order, defendant Tala is further ordered to produce the
following documents from 1979 to 1985:
1. records of stocks subscribed, paid-in and issued;
2. for loans payable leasees' deposit, subsidiary ledger, evidence of

indebtedness;
3. for lands purchased, the deeds of sale.
xxx xxx xxx
On May 4, 1998, Banco Filipino's urgent motion to reset hearing and for extension of
time to appoint a commissioner, through its special counsel, was granted. On May 11,
1999, Banco Filipino was directed to present its next witness. 1 0
Thereafter, Banco Filipino formally offered its exhibits, all of which were admitted by
the trial court. 1 1 Tala, et al.'s motion for reconsideration of the order admitting the said
exhibits was denied. Banco Filipino's motion to withdraw certain exhibits was granted.
Thereafter, Tala, et al. led a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or
disquali cation of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest pre-judgment and
partiality.
On April 14, 2000, respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled that
all the Orders of the court were based on facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.
Respondent judge likewise reprimanded Tala, et al. for ling several motions designed to
delay the proceedings. 1 2
Separate motions for reconsideration were led by Nancy Ty and Tala, et al., but the
same were denied by the trial court in an Order dated May 8, 2000.
Dissatis ed, Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. led separate petitions for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59576 and CA-G.R. SP
No. 59173, assailing the two Orders of respondent judge dated April 14, 2000 and May 8,
2000.
In a consolidated Decision dated June 7, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the
two petitions and affirmed the assailed Orders by respondent judge. 1 3
Hence, the instant petition, based on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL

COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, THUS CALLING FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF SUPERVISION AND REVIEW, WHEN IT
CHOSE TO EXAMINE ONLY SOME, NOT ALL, OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF
JUDGE TAC-AN, WHICH, TAKEN COLLECTIVELY AND NOT INDIVIDUALLY,
DEMONSTRATE A STRONG BIAS AND ANIMOSITY AGAINST PETITIONER AND
TALA ET AL AND REVEAL AN OBVIOUS PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF BANCO
FILIPINO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REFUSED TO APPLY, OR
EVEN CONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN FECUNDO V. BERJAMEN, LUQUE V. KAYANAN AND
OTHER SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE INTEMPERATE AND
ACCUSATORY LANGUAGE OF JUDGE TAC-AN IN HIS ORDER DATED 14 APRIL
2000 IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE LATTER'S "EXASPERATION BORDERING ON
INDIGNATION" AT THE PETITIONER WHICH "MAY UNNECESSARILY CLOUD HIS
IMPARTIALITY" AND WHICH WARRANTS HIS VOLUNTARY INHIBITION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN

ACCORD WITH SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDERS OF
THE LOWER COURT AND FOUND THAT THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 20
MARCH 2000 DID NOT BETRAY THAT JUDGE TAC-AN HAD ALREADY
PREJUDGED THE CASE PENDING BEFORE RTC BATANGAS BRANCH 84.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALLY

MANDATED, ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, OR
AT LEAST SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE BY JUDGE TAC-AN, WHEN IT
DELIBERATELY SELECTED ONLY A FEW OF THE BADGES OF BIAS, HOSTILITY
AND PRE-JUDGMENT CITED BY THE PETITIONER AND, WORSE, WHEN IT
WILLFULLY FAILED TO RESOLVE ISSUES RAISED IN PETITIONER'S AND TALA
ET AL'S RESPECTIVE PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT

PETITIONER'S OMNIBUS MOTION WAS INTENDED TO DELAY THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT TO AVAIL OF THE LEGAL
REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE RULES OF COURT TO ENSURE THAT HER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED.
14
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for voluntary inhibition.

Petitioner argues that, by selectively appreciating some, and not all, of the orders of
respondent judge cited as "badges of hostility, bias and pre-judgment", the appellate court
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and disregarded
principles laid down by jurisprudence.
Petitioner asserts that the Orders which were issued by respondent judge
demonstrated his predilection to act with bias in favor of Banco Filipino and manifested
his escalating hostility and animosity towards petitioner and her co-defendants, Tala, et al.
In regard to the Order dated June 3, 1996, petitioner contends that it was not Tala,
et al. but Banco Filipino, which was duty bound to establish the date of actual receipt of its
motion for reconsideration. She complains that respondent judge contravened the express
provisions of the Rules of Court when he "unilaterally relieved Banco Filipino of its statutory
obligation to prove service of its motion for reconsideration and, instead, applied, . . . a so-
called safe assumption in determining when petitioner and her co-defendants should have
received the same." 1 5 Moreover, she takes offense to the respondent judge's statement
that he did not believe Tala, et al.'s claim of receipt of the pleading on 28 March 1996, thus,
in effect branding them as "liars".
Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court provides that service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the
post o ce within ve (5) days from the date of the rst notice of the postmaster, service
shall take effect at the expiration of such time.
In the case at bar, there is no postmaster's certi cation that the registered mail was
unclaimed by the addressee and thus returned to the sender, after rst notice was sent to
and received by addressee on a speci ed date. Absent such notice, the disputable
presumption of completeness of service does not arise and by implication, respondent
judge could not presume actual receipt by addressee.
Petitioner also alleges that the Order dated November 20, 1996 is another indicium
of respondent judge's manifest partiality when he granted the motion for production of
documents despite failure by Banco Filipino to advance the cost for such production and
inspection. The respondent judge justi ed his Order with a sweeping declaration that "the
amount is insigni cant by any standard and could readily been resolved between the
parties involved. Records reveal that Tala did not charge Banco Filipino for the documents
it eventually produced pursuant to the motion for production." 1 6
Respondent judge's peremptory act of absolving Banco Filipino from paying the
expenses for the production of documents is disturbing for its lack of basis. There was no
basis for respondent judge to conclude that the amount involved was "insigni cant"
considering that, as the records would show, no reference of any amount was made by the
parties. Moreover, his categorical declaration that Tala, et al. did not bother to charge
Banco Filipino the amount of expenses runs counter to the evidence at hand. In opposing
the motion for the production of documents, 1 7 Tala, et al. cited, as one of their grounds,
the excessive expense it would incur in case the motion would be granted. Sound judicial
action dictates that he should have inquired rst into the validity of Tala, et al.'s claim,
whose rights were bound to be affected, instead of making a sweeping and dismissive
Order exempting Banco Filipino from complying with its legal obligation. aTADcH
Petitioner also assails the Orders dated: (1) April 15, 1998 Order directing Tala, et al.
to produce certain documents not requested by Banco Filipino; and (2) May 11, 1999
Order directing Banco Filipino to present its witness.
The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings should only be
con ned to promote the expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent unnecessary
waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference where
the judge's participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or bolster a case for one
of the parties. This is enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.06 which provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up
some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial,
it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case, orders the
presentation of speci c documentary evidence without a corresponding motion from any
party, or directs a party when and who to present as a witness and what matters such
witness will testify on. To our mind, respondent judge transgressed the boundaries of
impartiality when he suggested to Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its
case. While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting evidence in order to
promote the orderly conduct of the trial, the nal determination of what evidence to
adduce is the sole prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not unmindful of
their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to dispose of cases
speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties, should
refrain from showing any semblance of bias or more or less partial attitude in order not to
create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the
bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the people's faith in our courts. 1 8
Petitioner also questions the manner with which respondent judge resolved Banco
Filipino's formal offer of exhibits. The records show that on November 29, 1999, petitioner
led her comment on Banco Filipino's formal offer of exhibits. On December 8, 1999,
respondent judge granted Banco Filipino and Tala, et al. ve (5) days each within which to
le their respective reply and rejoinders. On December 9, 1999, Tala, et al. led their
comment. Yet the next day, December 10, respondent judge, without awaiting the reply and
rejoinders of the parties, issued an order admitting all the exhibits offered.
The seeming haste with which respondent judge resolved Banco Filipino's formal
offer of exhibits cannot simply be ignored. It is true, as the appellate court observed, that
the ling of a reply lies in the sound discretion of the court. What is objectionable, however,
is that respondent judge expressly granted the parties a period of time within which to le
their respective pleadings, only to disregard in the end, the period he himself had set and,
thus deprived the parties an opportunity to ventilate their respective sides and render the
issues clearer.
Finally, petitioner argues that respondent judge prejudged the case when he issued
the March 20, 2000 Order. She claims that the Order, which categorically and unquali edly
stated the existence of an implied trust, rendered a de nite resolution of one of the
principal issues in the main case without awaiting her and Tala, et al.'s evidence.
In his April 14, 2000 Order, respondent judge brushed aside petitioner's argument by
declaring that the " nding is only interlocutory because this can be rebutted by the
defendants . . .. Necessarily, the Court must make an initial assessment of the evidence as
presented by the plaintiff if they constitute prima facie evidence . . . ."
There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to conclude, out of necessity, the
existence of a prima facie case on the basis alone of the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is only when the plaintiff demurs to
evidence that the trial court may rule on the case before the defense presents its evidence.
Moreover, the assailed Order, being interlocutory in nature, is not the nal decision. As
such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to rule, in an interlocutory order, on the
principal issue that effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the interest of
substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust relationship between the
parties must be threshed out in a full-dress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory
Order.
It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the trust and con dence
reposed in him by the parties as an impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of
justice. When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or unfairly, to
perceptions of bias, such faith and con dence are eroded. His decisions, whether right or
wrong, will always be under suspicion of irregularity. In the case of Bautista v. Rebueno , 1 9
we stated:
. . . The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very rst
sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the case. A judge may not
be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear
that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party,
or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of
Justice is not impaired. The better course for the Judge under such
circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood,
his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the
ideal of impartial administration of justice is lived up to. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which respondent judge
issued the assailed directives gives rise, not to a fanciful suggestion or to a super cial
impression of partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and prejudice. While we
are not unmindful of this Court's previous pronouncements that to warrant the judge's
inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-
judicial or extrinsic source, 2 0 this rule does not apply where the judge, as in the instant
case, displays an inordinate predisposition to deviate from established procedural
precepts that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is also true that the
Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled that the issuance of the complained orders
and decision that pertain to the judge's judicial functions may not be proper
considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts may be erroneous. 2 1 However,
where said complained orders, taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the
judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, due process dictates that he
voluntarily inhibits himself from the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The June 7, 2001
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 59173 & 59576 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari and prohibition led by petitioner and a rmed the Orders dated April
14, 2000 and May 8, 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent judge is directed to
inhibit himself from presiding in Civil Case No. 4521. The Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City is directed to re-raffle the said case to another judge.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part, former counsel of a party.
Footnotes
1. Decision penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by

Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Eleizer R. De Los Santos.
2. Original Records, p. 353.
3. Filing her own separate motion for reconsideration which was denied by respondent
court, see: Original Records p. 376.
4. Dropped as defendant as per order by respondent judge on 8 January 1996.
6. Id., p. 764.
7. Id., p. 725.
8. Id., p. 950.
9. Rollo, p. 157.
10. Id., p. 1176.
11. Id., p. 1362.
12. Id., p. 194.
13. Id., p. 86.
14. Id., p. 32.
15. Rollo, p. 38.
16. Court of Appeals Decision, p. 5.
18. Campaner v. Alano, 46 O.G., 5029, 15 December 1948.

19. No. L-46117, 22 February 1978, 81 SCRA 535.
20. Aleria, Jr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 127400, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 611; Viewmaster
Construction Corporation v. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 133576, 13 July 2000, 335 SCRA 540.
21. Equatorial Realty Development Inc. v. Judge Casiano P. Asuncion, A.M. No. MTJ-91-
562, 10 October 1997, 280 SCRA 571; Flores v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101152, 29
July 1996, 259 SCRA 618.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142406. May 16, 2005.]
SPOUSES CONRADO and MA. CORONA ROMERO , petitioners, vs .

ORDEN respondents.
COURT OF APPEALS and SATURNINO S. ORDEN,
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J :
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, p
Before us is a petition for certiorari led under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
the nulli cation of the Decision 1 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) on September
30, 1999 in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 49608 and the Resolution 2 promulgated on January 26, 2000,
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-
contract to sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden. In said contract, private
respondent proposed to purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at
Denver cor. New York Sts., Cubao, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certi cate of Title
(TCT) No. 145269, for the total amount of P17M. The contract stipulated that private
respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of
absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later than December 19, 1996 and that private
respondent shall shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property. 3
When private respondent failed to pay the down payment, petitioner Corona told him
that she was rescinding the contract to sell. 4 Private respondent then led a complaint for
speci c performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-31114 alleging that he has
complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to
demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. 5
Simultaneous with the ling of the complaint, private respondent caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 145269. 6
On August 11, 1997, Manuel Y. Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos, subsequent
buyers of the subject property sold by petitioner Corona and her siblings, led a motion for
leave to intervene with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. They led a
motion for the cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution dated
November 26, 1997. The RTC reasoned that:
In the instant case, the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff do[es] not
bear out the main allegations in the complaint. While the ling of the notice may
not have been for the purpose of molesting the defendants and the defendants-in-
intervenors, still the inscription is not necessary to protect the alleged right of the
plaintiff over the subject property. The plaintiff is not entitled to the inscription of
the notice on TCT No. 145269 in the name of the defendants and others because
he does not have any actionable right over the subject property there being no
deed of sale executed between him and the defendants over the subject real
properties as offered in the alleged agreement dated April 23, 1996. The alleged
agreement dated April 23, 1996 although with the conformity of Maria Corona S.
Romero cannot serve as su cient basis for the inscription of the notice on TCT
No. 145269. Therefore said notice should be cancelled. 7
The motion for reconsideration led by private respondent was denied by the RTC in its
Resolution dated August 28, 1998. 8
On November 16, 1998, private respondent led a petition for certiorari before the
CA seeking the nulli cation of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the re-annotation
of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT. 9 The CA granted the petition in its Decision dated
September 30, 1999, portions of which read:
First, the general rule is that a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled
while the action is pending and undetermined except in cases expressly provided
by statute. aDHCcE
Section 77, P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before nal judgment, a

notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party,
or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to
be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon
verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after nal judgment in favor of the defendant, or other

disposition of the action such as to terminate nally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which
a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in
the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled
upon the registration of certi cate of the clerk of court in which the action
or proceeding was pending stating the manner of disposal thereof.
In the instant case, there was not even a hearing upon which could be
predicated a "proper showing" that any of the grounds provided by law exists. The
cited case of Victoriano presupposes that there must be a hearing where the
evidence of the party who sought the annotation of the notice of lis pendens must
be considered.
Second, as shown in the above cited provisions, there are only two grounds
for the court to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens during the
pendency of an action, and they are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not
necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. While the
parties are locked up in legal battle and until it becomes convincingly shown that
either of the two grounds exists, the court should not allow the cancellation.
Third, the Doctrine of Lis Pendens is founded upon reasons of public

policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation
within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the
defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose would
be rendered meaningless if the private respondents are allowed to le a bond
regardless of the amount, in substitution of said notice. Moreover, the law does
not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the
mere ling of a su cient bond by the party on whose title said notice is
annotated.
In the case at bench, the judgment is even defective, in that the same does
not specify who among the private respondents — whether the defendants-
vendors or intervenors-vendees — should file a bond.
Fourth, if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the petitioner and
the private respondents-owners (which question of fact is not for this court to
determine in this petition), then the said parties are bound by the provisions of
Article 1475 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment

there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand

performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of
contract.
As a matter of fact, there would have been no need for a notarial rescission
if there was no actionable contract at all.
Without ruling on the merits of the case below, we are constrained to

remind the public respondent that when a case is commenced involving any right
to land registered under the Land Registration Law, any decision therein will bind
the parties only, unless a notice of the pendency of such action is registered on
the title of said land, in order to bind the whole world as well. Therefore, in order
that a notice of lis pendens may affect the right of a subsequent purchaser, such
notice should be annotated on the back of the certificate of title.
In any case, a notation of lis pendens does not create a non-existent

right or lien. It serves merely as a warning to a person who purchases or
contracts on the subject property that he does so at his peril and subject to
the result of the pending litigation. It is not even required that the applying
party must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be
annotated.
Thus, it was legally erroneous for the respondent court to order the
cancellation of the notice.
Finally, when a judge improperly orders the cancellation of a notice of lis

pendens, he is said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion, as held in the
case of Sarmiento vs. Ortiz.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolutions of the

public respondent dated 26 November 1997 and 28 August 1998 are SET ASIDE
for being NULL AND VOID. The public respondent is directed to issue an order for
the Register of Deeds to restore the annotation of the notice of lis pendens upon
the affected title. 1 0 (Citations omitted)
The motion for reconsideration led by petitioners was denied on January 26, 2000.
1 1 Hence the present petition alleging that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE REANNOTATION

OF THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE SUBJECT TITLE DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AFFECTED
NEITHER THE TITLE TO NOR THE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
12
Petitioners contend that: the notice of lis pendens is not necessary in this case since
the complaint does not pray for an express award of ownership or possession; what is
involved in this case is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale, thus, no title has
passed to private respondent yet which needs to be protected by a notice of lis pendens;
by ordering the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens, when private respondent did not
even assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property, the CA went against
the doctrine in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 1 3 where this Court held that the applicant
must, in the complaint or answer led in the subject litigation, assert a claim of possession
or title over the subject property in order to give due course to his application; the CA, in
concluding that there was no hearing before the annotation was cancelled, overlooked the
fact that the motion for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12, 1997, that
private respondent was duly noti ed but failed to appear, and that he was able to le his
opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which the RTC considered before
promulgating its Resolution dated November 26, 1997. 1 4
Private respondent, on the other hand, contends that: the court a quo cancelled the
notice of lis pendens even before it has been apprised of all the relevant facts of the case;
the CA was correct in ruling that while the parties are locked in legal battle and until it
becomes manifest that the grounds set forth in Sec. 77, P.D. No. 1529 exist, the trial court
should not allow the cancellation of the lis pendens; the RTC ruling in this case is
proscribed by the case of Tan vs. Lantin 1 5 which held that the law does not authorize a
judge to cancel lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere ling of a bond; the danger
sought to be prevented by the Tan ruling, i.e., the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation, already happened in this case because the subject property was
sold on July 28, 1999 by petitioners to Mueller Trading Corporation; 1 6 said sale was made
with evident bad faith by petitioners because they had full knowledge of the pendency of
private respondent's petition for certiorari before the CA; and the sale of the property in
favor of private respondent verily affects the title to or possession of the real properties
making it the subject of the law of lis pendens. 1 7
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate their arguments and cited AFP Mutual Bene t
Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 1 8 where it was held that a notice of lis pendens may
be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects title to or
possession of real property. They further maintain that the requirement of prior hearing
was sufficiently complied with in this case and petitioners did not act in bad faith when she
sold the subject property pending the outcome of this case since there was no
outstanding injunction or restraining order which would have prevented her from doing so.
19
Clearly, the only issue that needs to be addressed in the present petition is whether
or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis
pendens. THcEaS
We rule in the negative.

Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or
control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
the action, and until nal judgment. 2 0 Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis
pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until
the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. 2 1 Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over said property. 2 2
The ling of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the nal judgment to
prevent the defeat of the nal judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently. 2 3
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such
power, meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions of law. 2 4 As provided for by Sec.
14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party
who caused it to be recorded. 2 5
In Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 2 6 we held that a
notice of lis pendens is appropriate in the following:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action to quiet title thereto;

(c) an action to remove clouds thereon;
(d) an action for partition; and
(e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the
land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon. 2 7
(Emphasis supplied)
I n Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp. , 2 8 we further held that
resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily con ned to cases that involve title to or
possession of real property but also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an
equitable estate or interest in, a speci c real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an
encumbrance against it. We clari ed however that the doctrine of lis pendens has no
application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money
judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is
essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action
or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication
between con icting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to speci c
property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis
pendens upon the ling of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case
turns out to be a purely personal action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes
functus officio. 2 9
To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens, all a party has to
do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property. It is not necessary
that ownership or interest over the property is proved. 3 0
We disagree with petitioners' claim that lis pendens is not proper since private
respondent has no title over the property neither did he pray speci cally in his complaint
for the ownership or possession thereof. EaIcAS

The complaint for speci c performance and damages led by private respondent
speci cally prayed that petitioners, as defendants thereat, be bound by the terms and
conditions of their letter-contract. By praying thus, private respondent in effect asks the
court to order petitioners to ful ll their promise to sell the property covered by TCT No.
145269 for the amount of P17M. 3 1 While private respondent did not explicitly state that
he was running after the ownership of the property, a simple reading of the complaint
would show that such was his intent. This is su cient for purposes of annotating lis
pendens.
Whether or not the claim of private respondent has merit is of no moment and
should not affect the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the subject property. There is
nothing in the rules which requires a party seeking annotation of lis pendens to show that
the land belongs to him. There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation
must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated. Thus, we have
held that even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale, a notice of lis pendens may be
annotated on the title. Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against
the certi cate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens
does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. 3 2 The rules merely require that an
a rmative relief be claimed since a notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a
case nor creates a right or a lien. It only protects the applicant's rights which will be
determined during trial. 3 3
In ne, petitioners failed to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Per Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices

Jesus M. Elbinias and Rodrigo Cosico, Rollo, pp. 19-24.
2. Rollo, p. 26.
3. Rollo, p. 33.
4. Id., p. 5.
5. Id., pp. 29-30.
6. Id., p. 6.
7. Rollo, p. 35.
8. Id., p. 7.
9. Id., pp. 5-7.
10. Rollo, pp. 21-23.

11. Id., p. 26.
12. Id., p. 8.
13. G.R. No. 117108, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 298, 311.
14. Rollo, pp. 9-14.

15. No. L-28526, 142 SCRA 423, July 7, 1986.
16. Also Manuel Limsico, Jr. and Aloysius R. Santos, p. 77.
17. Rollo, pp. 53-56.

18. G.R. No. 104769, 327 SCRA 203, March 3, 2000.
19. Rollo, pp. 69-70.

20. Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005.
21. Lim vs. Vera Cruz, G.R. No. 143646, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 386, 393.
22. Yared vs. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53, 58.
23. Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. vs. Enriquez, supra.
24. Fernandez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115813, October 16, 2000, 343 SCRA
184, 194.
25. Yared case, supra at p. 60.
26. G.R. No. 60323, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 325, 330.
27. Id., p. 330.

28. G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 409, 416.
29. Id., pp. 416, 419-420.

30. Yared case, supra at p. 60.
31. Rollo, pp. 31-33.

32. Lim case, supra at p. 392.
33. Viewmaster Construction Corp. vs. Maulit, G.R. No. 136283, February 29, 2000, 326
SCRA 821, 833.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119088. June 30, 2000.]
ZAIDA RUBY S. ALBERTO , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS,

EPIFANIO J. ALANO, CECILIA P. ALANO, YOLANDA P. ALANO, and
INC. respondents.
NATALIA REALTY, INC.,
Alberto Salazar and Associates for petitioner.

Patricio M. Patajo for respondent Natalia Realty, Inc.
Oben Ventura Defensor and Alano for Yolanda P. Alano.
Aquino and Javier Law Offices for E. Alano & C. Alano.
Santos Parungao Aquino & Santos for private respondent Y.P. Alano.
SYNOPSIS
Spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano, stockholders of respondent corporation,

retained the services of petitioner-lawyer on a contingent basis to recover real properties,
money and other assets from the corporation. It was agreed that petitioner would be paid
P200,000.00 and 10% of whatever real estate that may be awarded to the spouses.
Thereafter, petitioner led with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) an action
for liquidation, accounting and damages against respondent corporation. During the
pendency of the case, the spouses entered into an amicable settlement with the
corporation without the consent of their counsel whereby the spouses would receive 32.4
hectares of land from the corporation. However, 230,090 square meters thereof was sold
by the corporation to spouses' daughter, Yolanda. Thereafter, the SEC case was
dismissed. Petitioner demanded payment of her fees, but the spouses refused. Thus, the
complaint for collection with damages against the spouses. Judgment was rendered in
favor of petitioner. Meanwhile, a notice of lis pendens and attorney's lien were annotated
on the title of the subject properties. Judgment was not, however, executed for
insu ciency of spouses' properties. Thus, petitioner led a complaint, and later a second
amended complaint, against Yolanda, to declare the subject deed of sale null and void on
the ground that the transfer was simulated and intended to defraud petitioner of her claim
for attorney's fees. Attached to the amended complaint was a Deed of Sale and other
responsive pleadings particularly the Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiff which would
reveal that there are not enough parcels of land to satisfy petitioner's attorney's fees. The
trial court dismissed the complaint for insu ciency of cause of action. It did not consider
the attached exhibits but only referred to the averments of the complaint in resolving the
case. The decision was a rmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals which ruled that
petitioner, not being a party to the deed of sale between the corporation and Yolanda, has
no legal personality to assail the same. It ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens on the ground that it is not necessary for the protection of petitioner's rights and
that the complaint is not an action affecting title and possession of real property. Hence,
this petition.
In resolving a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action,
courts should not be too rigid in applying the rule that only averments in the complaint and
no other are to be consulted. Documents procedurally responsive attached to the
complaint are already part of the records and should be considered in resolving the
motion.
A notice of lis pendens is not con ned to cases involving title to or possession of
real property, but includes any claim to enforce a lien, charge or encumbrance against it.
The lower court's and the Court of Appeals' mis-application of the rule on lis pendens will
leave petitioner's claim unprotected.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; DISMISSAL; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION;

DETERMINED NOT ONLY BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT BUT ALSO BY ALL
THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT. — The trial court and the Court of
Appeals should not have been too rigid in applying the rule that in resolving a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, only the averments in the
complaint and no other are to be consulted. The rule admits of exceptions. First: All
documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not
denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without
need of introducing evidence thereon. Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in
addition to the complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STRICTLY LIMITING EVALUATION OF MERITS OF COMPLAINT
TO ITS AVERMENTS OR ALLEGATION WOULD BE TOO CONSTRICTING AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE RULE. — It is only logical for the lower Court to consider these
pleadings in determining whether there was a su cient cause of action as the order of
dismissal is summary in nature. So long as those attached pleadings are procedurally
responsive to the complaint, then they may be considered in evaluating the su ciency of
the cause of action in the complaint. In addition, since the dismissal of a complaint by
virtue of a motion to dismiss for failure to state or for insu ciency of cause of action
would be tantamount to a summary judgment, the lower court should at least have
considered the attached documents and pleadings as a matter of due process. Strictly
limiting the evaluation of the merits of the complaint to its averments or allegations would
be too constricting an interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that the complaint
itself is accompanied by documentary evidence attached as annexes. The responsive
pleadings, in addition, though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since
they are already part of the records of the case and should therefore be considered.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In any case, this Court has held that where
"the allegations in the complaint are ambiguous, inde nite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a
cause of action can, in any manner, be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover in any aspect of the facts or any combination of the facts alleged, if they
were to be proved, then the motion to dismiss should be denied." In other words, a
complaint should not be dismissed for insu ciency of cause of action unless it appears
clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any
state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein. A reading of said
complaint plus the attached documents and pleadings show that petitioner is entitled to
relief.
4. ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; CONSTRUED. — The notice of lis pendens is
an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and
serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his
own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; COVERAGE. — In Viewmaster Construction Corporation v.
Reynaldo Y. Maulit and Edgardo Castro , this Court did not con ne the availability of lis
pendens only to cases involving the title to or possession of real property when it held
that: . . . it is proper . . . any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon." It likewise pertained
to the following: ". . . all suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only
those which involve the question of title, but also those which are brought to establish an
equitable estate, interest, or right, in speci c real property or to enforce any lien, charge, or
encumbrance against it, there being in some cases a lis pendens, although at the
commencement of the suit there is no present vested interest, claim, or lien in or on the
property which it seeks to charge. It has also been held to apply in the case of a
proceeding to declare an absolute deed of mortgage, or to redeem from a foreclosure
sale, or to establish a trust, or to suits for the settlement and adjustment of partnership
interest." CIaHDc
6. ID.; ID.; PARTY MUST BE GIVEN FULLEST OPPORTUNITY TO ESTABLISH

MERITS OF HIS COMPLAINT OR DEFENSE RATHER THAN LOSE LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY ON TECHNICALITIES. — In Ginete v. Court of Appeals , this Court held that
[w]hat should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him
to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. In the same case, this Court
emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38380 a rming the Omnibus Order 2 of the lower court
dismissing petitioner's second Amended Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action.
Respondent spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano retained the legal services of
petitioner Atty. Zaida Ruby S. Alberto to represent them before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in an action to recover real properties, money and other
assets that may pertain to them by virtue of their stockholdings in the Natalia Realty, Inc.
Both parties formalized their conformity in a retainer agreement 3 the salient feature of
which is for respondent-spouses to pay petitioner on a contingent basis the following: a)
the equivalent in kind of ten percent (10%) of whatever real estate may be awarded, and b)
the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). LibLex
In accordance with said Agreement, petitioner led on behalf of respondent-

spouses SEC Case No. 3054, an action for liquidation, accounting and damages against
Eugenio S. Baltao and ve other persons of Natalia Realty, Inc., and appeared at the
hearings thereof.
On January 3, 1989, petitioner learned that respondent-spouses moved to dismiss
SEC Case No. 3054 which motion was con rmed in a manifestation by Baltao and Natalia
Realty, Inc. It appeared that during the pendency of the case, the opposing parties reached
a settlement without consulting petitioner. Petitioner only learned of the settlement on
January 16, 1989 when she received a copy of a SEC order giving Baltao and Natalia Realty,
Inc. three days to comment on respondent-spouses' motion to dismiss on account of said
settlement. In effect, Baltao and Natalia Realty, Inc. joined respondent-spouses in their
motion to dismiss on account of a satisfactory settlement having been reached between
them in said SEC case. Accordingly, the said case was dismissed on January 19, 1989.
When confronted, respondent-spouses admitted that a settlement had indeed been
reached and that they expected to receive 35 hectares of land. Petitioner demanded the
payment of the fees stipulated in their retainer agreement, however, respondent-spouses
refused to pay despite repeated demands.
Petitioner was thus constrained to le a Complaint for collection of sum of money
with damages 4 against respondent-spouses. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
151 rendered a decision on November 17, 1989 in favor of petitioner the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant-spouses:
1. Declaring plaintiff entitled to ten percent (10%) equivalent to three and a

half (3 1/2) hectares of the thirty- ve (35) hectares awarded to and/or received by
defendant-spouses from those lands and real properties involved in SEC Case No.
3054, located at Sitio Banaba, Barrio No. 3, Antipolo, Rizal covered by Transfer
Certi cate of Title No. 31527 issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Rizal; Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 67845 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, Marikina Branch; as well as those subdivision lots certi cates of title
(segregated from Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 31527) issued by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch numbered as follows:
(LISTING OF TITLES OMITTED)
and ordering defendant-spouses to transfer, cede, assign and deliver the

same to the plaintiff; and,
2. Ordering defendant-spouses to pay to plaintiff the following

amounts:
(a) P180,000.00 representing the balance of her monetary fee under

their retainer agreement, with interest of 12% from the ling of the complaint on
February 22, 1989 until fully paid;
(b) P30,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages; and
(d) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, all three (3)
foregoing amounts with interest of 12% from date hereof until fully paid."
In a subsequent Order, the lower court declared that the attorney's fees awarded in
the above-cited decision constitute a lien on the properties subject of the case and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch, to annotate said lien on the
covering certi cates of title and their derivatives. When the above-cited decision became
nal and executory, petitioner caused the issuance of a writ of execution. However, per
Sheriff's Return, 5 only P3,500.00 of personal properties of respondent-spouses were
levied. dctai
Apparently, Natalia Realty, Inc. had sold to private respondent Yolanda Alano,
respondent-spouses' daughter, 230,090 square meters or a little over 23 hectares out of
the 32.4 hectares given to them as settlement of the SEC case. 6 The sale was executed on
December 28, 1988 or six days before respondent-spouses moved to dismiss the SEC
case on January 3, 1989. This discovery prompted petitioner to le a complaint, and
thereafter, a second Amended Complaint 7 to declare the deed of sale null and void ab
initio on the ground that the transfer of the subject parcels of land to Yolanda Alano was
simulated. Petitioner likewise caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the
transfer certificates of title.
The trial court, in an Omnibus Order, 8 dismissed petitioner's Complaint for
insu ciency of cause of action. As a matter of course, the annotations of the notice of lis
pendens as well as the attorney's lien on the transfer certificates of title were cancelled.
The Court of Appeals a rmed the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and the annotation of attorney's lien. In a rming
the lower court's Omnibus Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint for
insufficiency of cause of action, the Court of Appeals held thus:
"The rst assigned error is devoid of sustainable basis. Well-settled is the
rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action, only the averments of the complaint, and no other, are to be consulted.
Extraneous matters are irrelevant. We agree with the trial court, as opined in its
Omnibus Order under attack, that the Deed of Sale, attached to the Second
Amended Complaint as Annex "C", was executed before the ling of the complaint
for attorney's fees in C.C. No. 57023; Plaintiff is not a party to subject Deed of
Sale and the defendant movant, Yolanda P. Alano, was not a party in said C.C.
No. 57023; that the defendant spouses, Epifanio Alano and Cecilia Alano, were
awarded by SEC thirty- ve (35) hectares; that only twenty three (23) hectares of
the said 35 hectares was sold by the latter to defendant Yolanda P. Alano under
the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled here; and under the Judgment in Civil
Case No. 57023, plaintiff was adjudged as entitled to 10% of the aforesaid award
of 35 hectares, as her attorney's fees. Such being the case, even assuming that
plaintiff is entitled to receive from the defendant spouses, Epifanio and Cecilia
Alano, 3 1/2 hectares, as her earned professional fees, the same can be taken
from the remaining twelve (12) hectares not deeded out under the Deed of Sale in
question. The claim of plaintiff for such attorney's fees is not at all prejudiced or
affected by the sale of twenty three (23) hectares to Yolanda P. Alano, which sale
the present complaint of plaintiff seeks to annul.
In the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore

decisively clear that the lower court did right in dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action against defendant appellee
Yolanda P. Alano, who was not a party in Civil Case No. 57023 and consequently
not bound by the judgment therein. The latter was never a client of plaintiff-
appellant, and is a total stranger in Civil Case No. 57023. Undoubtedly, subject
attorney's fees of plaintiff-appellant of 3 1/2 hectares can not be enforced
against the properties of Yolanda P. Alano which she validly purchased under the
said Deed of Sale inked prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 57023. Absent
any allegation in the second Amended Complaint that Yolanda P. Alano assumed
her parent's obligation to pay such attorney's fees of plaintiff-appellant or that her
own properties would be used to satisfy said obligation of her parents, plaintiff-
appellant is without any cause of action against defendant-appellee Yolanda P.
Alano. On the basis of its allegation of ultimate facts, dismissal of the Second
Amended Complaint under scrutiny is, therefore, inevitable.
What is more, as observed below, appellant is not a party to the Deed of

Sale executed between Yolanda P. Alano and Natalia Realty, Inc. A stranger to
said contract, appellant has no legal right and personality to assail the same. To
the fore, in this connection, is the pertinent provision of Art. 1397 of the New Civil
Code — that "The action for annulment of contract may be instituted by all those
who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily."
Although the aforecited legal provision in point admits of an exception, as

when a person not a party to the contract could show that he would suffer
damage or injury by reason of the contract, in connection with at least one of the
contracting parties, . . . We agree with the lower court that the case of appellant
here is not within the contemplation of Article 1397 supra. So also, as pointed out
by appellees, there is no allegation in the Second Amended Complaint that
appellant proceeded with the execution of the Decision of the Pasig court in Civil
Case No. 57023 and was unable to obtain satisfaction therefor that she had
exhausted all available remedies for the satisfaction of such judgment against
the judgment debtors, spouses Epifanio Alano and Cecilia Alano."
Indeed, it is irrefutable that the Second Amended Complaint contains no

allegation that plaintiff-appellant's prayer for attorney's fees equivalent to 3 1/2
hectares in Civil Case No. 57023 is bound to be prejudiced by the Deed of Sale
executed by the said spouses in favor of defendant-appellee Yolanda P. Alano.
Appellant's submission, that exhaustion of the properties of her said former
clients is not essential to the accrual of her cause of action, is untenable. To
repeat: from the remaining twelve (12) hectares of her former clients may be
taken her (appellant's) attorney's fees of 3 1/2 hectares." 9
Hence, this petition. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:
(A) IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S AMENDED COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 90-1798 DID NOT STATE A SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THAT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DISMISSING SAID COMPLAINT
ON THAT GROUND; AND
(B) IN FINDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 90-1798 IS NOT AN ACTION

AFFECTING TITLE TO OR POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 24
OF RULE 14, REVISED RULES OF COURT, HENCE NOT A PROPER SUBJECT OF A
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she "had no legal
right or personality to assail the deed of sale between Natalia Realty, Inc. and Yolanda P.
Alano 1 0 as she was a stranger to the contract sought to be annulled, hence without
sufficient cause of action.
This contention is impressed with merit. In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 1 1 this Court held:
"To determine the su ciency of a cause of action, only the facts alleged in
the complaint and no other should be considered; and that the test of su ciency
of the facts alleged in a petition or complaint to constitute a cause of action is
whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition or complaint.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are su cient to support

a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion
to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist, . . ."
The su ciency of petitioner's cause of action in the second Amended Complaint is

readily apparent. A right in her favor was created by virtue of the retainer agreement
executed between her and respondent-spouses. This right was con rmed and upheld by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig when it ruled in favor of petitioner in Civil Case No. 57023
for collection of sum of money and damages. 1 2 Correspondingly, respondent-spouses
had the obligation to honor and not to violate the provisions of the retainer agreement it
entered into with petitioner. Unfortunately, respondent-spouses breached their obligation
under the retainer agreement when they refused and failed to pay petitioner's attorney's
fees in accordance with their agreement. Worse, when petitioner moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution, she discovered to her dismay that respondent-spouses had no more
leviable properties except a few personal properties amounting to only P3,500.00. In fact,
by making it appear that it was Natalia Realty, Inc. which sold respondent-spouses' 23
hectares to respondent Yolanda P. Alano, petitioner not only had a cause of action against
respondent-spouses but likewise against Yolanda P. Alano. Clearly, all these instances
which were alleged and enumerated in the second Amended Complaint constitute a
sufficient cause of action on the part of petitioner.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals should not have been too rigid in applying
the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, only the averments in the complaint and no other are to be consulted. The rule
admits of exceptions.
First: All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of
which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the
complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon. 1 3
Attached to the second Amended Complaint is the Deed of Sale the due execution
and genuineness of which were never denied by respondents. While admittedly, petitioner
is not a party to the Deed of Sale, nevertheless, she anchors her right upon the allegation
that her share in the 35 hectares of land awarded to respondent-spouses was prejudiced
by the simulated sale to Yolanda P. Alano. The allegation that the Deed of Sale was
simulated does not have to be proved at the outset as it could be done during the trial on
the merits of the case.
Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, may
be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action. 1 4
In City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals 1 5 this Court held thus —
"In the case of Tan v. Director of Forestry (125 SCRA 302), this court
departed from the aforementioned rule and held that, '. . . although the evidence
of the parties were on the question of granting or denying the petitioner-
appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court correctly
applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss.' Likewise, in
Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia (143 SCRA 178), we sanctioned the act
of the trial court in considering, in addition to the complaint, other pleadings
submitted by the parties in deciding whether or not the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. This Court deemed such course of action
but logical where the trial court had the opportunity to examine the merits of the
complaint, the answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's answer to the
counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission."
In the instant case, aside from the original and the amended complaint, the lower
court had every opportunity to study the merits of the case by examining the other
pleadings submitted by the parties such as the Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of
Lis Pendens and Attorney's Lien, Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiff; Opposition to
Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of Lis Pendens and Attorney's Lien, Answer with
Counterclaim, Answer with Counterclaim and Special/A rmative Defenses, Reply to
Special/A rmative Defenses and Answer to Counterclaim of Defendant Spouses Epifanio
and Cecilia Alano, Answer of Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Answer to Counterclaim of
Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Interrogatories to Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Amended
Answer with Counterclaim to Defendant Yolanda P. Alano and Opposition to Admit
Amended Answer for Yolanda P. Alano. cdll
It is only logical for the lower court to consider all these pleadings in determining
whether there was a su cient cause of action as the order of dismissal is summary in
nature. 1 6 So long as those attached pleadings are procedurally responsive to the
complaint, then they may be considered in evaluating the su ciency of the cause of action
in the complaint. In addition, since the dismissal of a complaint by virtue of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state or for insu ciency of cause of action would be tantamount to a
summary judgment, the lower court should at least have considered the attached
documents and pleadings as a matter of due process. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the
merits of the complaint to its averments or allegations would be too constricting an
interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that the complaint itself is accompanied
by documentary evidence attached as annexes. The responsive pleadings, in addition,
though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since they are already part of
the records of the case and should therefore be considered.
What this Court nds unusual is the timing of the sale and the reason why the share
of the respondent-spouses as part of the settlement they had with Natalia Realty, Inc. had
to be sold to their daughter Yolanda P. Alano by the said corporation. These questions
immediately manifested themselves from a reading of the two documents attached to the
second Amended Complaint. The retainer agreement provided, thus:
"This is to con rm in writing our agreement to retain your legal services to
represent us in the Securities and Exchange Commission, and until the Supreme
Court, if necessary, in our action to recover whatever real properties, moneys and
other assets, plus damages, as may be due or pertain to us by reason of our
stockholdings in the Natalia Realty, Inc. under the following terms and conditions:
xxx xxx xxx." (Italics supplied)
The above agreement resulted in the ling of SEC Case No. 3054, for liquidation,
accounting and damages, with preliminary injunction against Eugenio S. Baltao and ve
others of the Natalia Realty, Inc.
Apparently, on December 28, 1988, or six days before respondent spouses led
their motion to dismiss the SEC case on January 3, 1989, a deed of sale was already
executed between Natalia Realty, Inc. and respondent-spouses' daughter Yolanda Alano. In
said deed, Natalia Realty, Inc. sold 23 hectares, out of the total 32.4 hectares awarded to
the Alano spouses, to Yolanda Alano for P500,000.00.
We cannot comprehend why 23 hectares awarded to the Alano spouses as their
rightful share by virtue of their stockholdings in Natalia Realty, Inc. were sold to their
daughter. The SEC case was precisely initiated by the Alano spouses to recover their
rightful share in said company. In fact, a close perusal of the pleadings attached to the
records of the case, particularly the Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs, would reveal
that there are not enough parcels of land to satisfy petitioner's attorney's fees. In the
Answer to the Interrogatories of Plaintiff, it was disclosed that the remaining 12 hectares
of land out of the 35 hectares awarded to respondent-spouses were already ceded to Atty.
Antonio Raquiza, respondent spouses' former lawyer. This only strengthens and lends
credence to the suspicion that respondent-spouses intended to defraud petitioner of her
attorney's fees and that the Deed of Sale was indeed simulated.
In any case, this Court has held that where "the allegations in the complaint are
ambiguous, inde nite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a cause of action can, in any manner,
be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in any aspect of the
facts or any combination of the facts alleged, if they were to be proved, then the motion to
dismiss should be denied." 1 7 In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for
insu ciency of cause of action unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint
that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved
within the facts alleged therein. 1 8 A reading of said complaint plus the attached
documents and pleadings show that petitioner is entitled to relief.
With regard to the second assigned error, petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the grounds that
it is not necessary for the protection of petitioner's rights and that the complaint is not an
action affecting title and possession of real property.
Petitioner maintains that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens is necessary to
protect her claim inasmuch as —
a) the respondent spouses had in fact no leviable properties when levy
on execution was attempted by the sheriff to satisfy the decision in Civil Case No.
57023, proof thereof being the sheriff's return;
b) although 32.4 hectares were given to the respondent spouses by

virtue of the compromise agreement with respondent Natalia Realty, Inc. in SEC
Case No. 3054, 30% of said area was, at the instance of said respondent spouses,
directly transferred to their creditor, Antonio Raquiza, by Natalia Realty, Inc., and
that the remaining area due the respondent spouses was "rounded off" to 23
hectares, these then being simulated conveyance to their daughter, respondent
Yolanda P. Alano.
Petitioner further argues that based on Section 14, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of
Court and Section 76 of the Property Registration Decree, "the whole point of the action
initiated by that complaint was and is to vindicate petitioner's right to an undivided portion
of the lands subject of the questioned sale, of which she had been deprived by the
fraudulent machinations of private respondents." Such is a real action affecting title or
possession of real property in which a notice of lis pendens is proper and justified. prLL
Petitioner's argument is well-taken. The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to

the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that
one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. 1 9
In Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Reynaldo Y. Maulit and Edgardo Castro ,
2 0 this Court did not con ne the availability of lis pendens only to cases involving the title
to or possession of real property when it held that:
"According to Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens is proper in the following
cases, viz.:
a) An action to recover possession of real estate;
b) An action to quiet title thereto;
c) An action to remove clouds thereon;
d) An action for partition; and
e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title
to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon." (italics
supplied)
Granting that petitioner's action is not, actually, one directly affecting title to or
possession of real property, still, in Viewmaster case, the perception of this Court is that
the rule of lis pendens likewise pertained to the following:
". . . all suits or actions which directly affect real property and not only
those which involve the question of title, but also those which are brought to
establish an equitable estate, interest, or right, in speci c real property or to
enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against it, there being in some cases a
lis pendens, although at the commencement of the suit there is no present vested
interest, claim, or lien in or on the property which it seeks to charge. It has also
been held to apply in the case of a proceeding to declare an absolute deed of
mortgage, or to redeem from a foreclosure sale, or to establish a trust, or to suits
for the settlement and adjustment of partnership interests." (Italics supplied)
In this case, petitioner claimed an interest or right in the property specifically subject
of the alleged simulated sale. In fact, the object of the complaint is not only to enforce a
lien or encumbrance against the subject property but to enforce a valid claim as clearly
shown in the prayer.
Verily, petitioner's prayer in her second Amended Complaint is more than adequate
to justify the registration of a notice of lis pendens when it prayed for the following reliefs:
"(a) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Defendant Natalia Realty
Inc. in favor of Defendant Yolanda P. Alano, Annex "C" of this complaint, null and
void ab initio as well as the corresponding transfer certi cates of title issued by
the Register of Deeds for Marikina, Metro Manila, in the name of Defendant
Yolanda P. Alano as a consequence of the same, as follows:
Transfer Certificate of Title Book

No.
No. 178579 T-891

Nos. 162863 to T-813
163034 inclusive T-814
Nos. 160691 to T-802
160941 inclusive T-803
T-804
Nos. 175404 to T-875
175433 inclusive
(b) Ordering defendants to transfer, cede and assign to plaintiff 23,609

square meters of the land subject of said void and inexistent sale, in partial
payment of the attorney's fees due her for services rendered to Defendants-
Spouses Epifanio J. Alano in SEC Case No. 3054.
(c) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff

attorney's fees in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), moral
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and
exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), plus costs of suit."
The above-cited prayer in the second Amended Complaint shows that it directly
affects the title to or possession of said real properties. It is speci c enough as it refers to
a portion covered by the above-mentioned Transfer Certi cates of Title covering 23,609
square meters of the subject real property. The Notice of Lis Pendens is necessary to
protect petitioner's right especially since respondents allegedly intended to defraud
petitioner as shown by the sale under suspicious circumstances of the respondent-
spouses' settlement share of subject property by Natalia Realty, Inc. to the former's
daughter, respondent Yolanda P. Alano. cdll
Plainly, the lower court's and the Court of Appeals' misapplication of the rule on lis
pendens will leave petitioner's claim unprotected. As this Court has stated in the
Viewmaster case:
"The Court is not here saying that petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in its Complaint pending in the RTC. Verily, there is no requirement that the
right to or the interest in the property subject of a lis pendens be proven by the
applicant. The Rule merely requires that an a rmative relief be claimed. A
notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a
lien. It merely protects the applicant's rights, which will be determined during the
trial."
I n Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 2 1 this Court held that [w]hat should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities. In the same case, this Court emphasized that the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 19, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 38380 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, which is ordered to proceed with
the trial of Civil Case No. 90-1798. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch are directed to maintain the annotation of lis
pendens in the certi cates of title to the properties subject of said case until nal
judgment therein. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima ( now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Corona Ibay-Somera.
2. Annex "G", issued by Judge Juan Q. Enriquez,, Jr., Assisting Branch 74 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, Rollo, p. 82.
3. Annex "A", Rollo, p. 37.
4. Docketed as Civil Case No. 57023.
5. Annex "B-1", Rollo, p. 48.
6. Annex "C-1", Rollo, p. 58.
7. Docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1798.
8. Issued by Judge Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Assisting Branch 74 of
Cainta, Rizal, Annex "G", Rollo, p. 82.
9. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38380, Rollo, pp. 156-174.
10. Petition, Rollo, p. 10.
11. 268 SCRA 727 [1997].
12. See Note 4.
13. City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 175 [1996].
14. Id., p. 178.
15. Supra.
16. Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, 143 SCRA 178 [1986].
17. Sumulong, et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al ., 232 SCRA 372 as cited in City of Cebu v.
Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 175 [1996].
18. Ibid.
19. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 298 [1997].
20. G.R. No. 136283, February 29, 2000 citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325 [1990].
21. 296 SCRA 38 [1998] citing Obut v. Court of Appeals , 70 SCRA 546 [1976] as cited in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 [1978].

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114217. October 13, 2009.]
HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY, SY 1

petitioners, vs . ROLANDO SY, ROSALINO SY, LUCIO SY, ENRIQUE SY,
ROSAURO SY, BARTOLOME SY, FLORECITA SY, LOURDES SY,
FERRERA-SY respondents.
JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY,
[G.R. No. 150797. October 13, 2009.]
ILUMINADA TAN, SPOUSES JULIAN SY AND ROSA TAN, ZENAIDA

TAN, and MA. EMMA SY , petitioners, vs . BARTOLOME SY, ROSALINO
SY, FLORECITA SY, ROLANDO SY, LOURDES SY, ROSAURO SY,
FERRERA-SY respondents.
JULIETA SY, and ROSITA FERRERA-SY,
DECISION
NACHURA J :
NACHURA, p
Before this Court are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The rst Petition, G.R. No. 114217, assails the Decision 2 dated May 6,
1993 and the Resolution 3 dated February 28, 1994 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 17686. On the other hand, the second Petition, G.R. No. 150797, questions
the Decision dated February 28, 2001 and the Resolution dated November 5, 2001 of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 46244.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
G.R. No. 114217
On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy led a Complaint for Partition against
spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy,
Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 8578. 4
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy,
Bartolome Sy, Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his
second marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang,
Julian Sy and Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his rst marriage to Ba Nga,
and petitioners Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses
Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan. 5
Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties,
including several businesses. 6
During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and respondents, it was
agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the common properties
and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed temporarily in the
hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to delegate some of his
functions to any of petitioners or private respondents. Thus, the function or duty of
bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian Sy, and the duty
or function of management and operation of the business of cinema of the common
ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent Rosauro Sy. 7 STCDaI
Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three
cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to
respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case
No. 8578, for Judicial Partition, and the income from the vast parts of the entire estate
and other businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners.
Hence, since the year 1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had
taken charge of the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the
income derived therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and
maintenance. 8
On March 30, 1981, the Judge rendered a First Partial Decision based on the
Compromise Agreement dated November 10, 1980, submitted in Civil Case No. 8578
by plaintiff Rolando Sy and defendants Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. On April 2, 1981, the
Judge rendered a Second Partial Decision based on the pretrial order of the court,
dated March 25, 1981, entered into by and between respondent Renato Sy and
petitioner spouses. Said First Partial Decision and Second Partial Decision had long
become final, without an appeal having been interposed by any of the parties. 9
On June 8, 1982, the Judge rendered a Third Partial Decision, 1 0 the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders this Third Partial Decision:
(a) Declaring that all the properties, businesses or assets, their income,
produce and improvements, as well as all the rights, interests or participations
(sic) in the names of defendants Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan and
their children, defendants Zenaida and Ma. Emma; both surnamed Sy, and
defendants Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, as belonging to the estate of Sy
Bang, including the properties in the names of said defendants which are
enumerated in the Complaints in this case and all those properties, rights and
interests which said defendants may have concealed or fraudulently transferred
in the names of other persons, their agents or representatives;
(b) Declaring the following as the heirs of Sy Bang, namely: his

surviving widow, Maria Rosita Ferrera-Sy and her children, Enrique, Bartolome,
Rosalino, Rolando, Rosauro, Maria Lourdes, Florecita and Julieta, all surnamed
Sy, and his children by his rst wife, namely: Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy, Lucio Sy,
Oscar Sy and Renato Sy;
(c) Ordering the partition of the Estate of Sy Bang among his heirs
entitled thereto after the extent thereof shall have been determined at the
conclusion of the proper accounting which the parties in this case, their agents
and representatives, shall render and after segregating and delivering to Maria
Rosita Ferrera-Sy her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership between her
and her deceased husband Sy Bang;
(d) Deferring resolution on the question concerning the inclusion for

partition of properties in the names of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique,
all surnamed Sy.
SO ORDERED.
On June 16, 1982, petitioners led a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for
Inhibition, alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor
of their co-defendants in the case. This motion was denied on August 16, 1982. 1 1
On July 4, 1982, petitioners led a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition
(Disquali cation) and Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court
docketed as G.R. No. 60957. The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was denied,
and the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was Noted. 1 2 ISCcAT
On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the rst Order, 1 3 Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners' Motion for New Trial
and/or Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July
12, 1982, were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second Order, 1 4 the Judge
ordered the immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the
certificates of title in the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.
On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver,
Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy. 1 5
While the Petition for Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the
First Division of the Supreme Court, petitioners led a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 61519. A Temporary
Restraining Order was issued on August 31, 1982, to enjoin the Judge from taking any
action in Civil Case No. 8578 and, likewise, restraining the effectivity of and compliance
with the Resolution dated August 16, 1982, the two Orders dated August 17, 1982, and
the Order dated August 18, 1982.
On September 2, 1982, petitioners withdrew their Petition for Mandamus with
Restraining Order, docketed as G.R. No. 60957.
On September 11, 1982, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was led by Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento, the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on
September 24, 1982. 1 6
After several incidents in the case, the Court, on May 8, 1989, referred the petition
to the CA for proper determination and disposition.
The CA rendered the assailed Decision 1 7 on May 6, 1993, denying due course to
and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It held that Judge Puno acted correctly in
issuing the assailed Third Partial Decision. The CA said that the act of Judge Puno in
rendering a partial decision was in accord with then Rule 36, Section 4, of the Rules of
Court, which stated that in an action against several defendants, the court may, when a
judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to
proceed against the others. It found that the judge's decision to defer resolution on the
properties in the name of Rosalino, Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique would not affect
the resolution on the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada, Julian, Rosa,
Zenaida, and Ma. Emma, since the properties were separable and distinct from one
another such that the claim that the same formed part of the Sy Bang estate could be
the subject of separate suits.
The CA also upheld the judge's appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge
did so after both parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by
respondents, and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA
found proper the order to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certi cates
of title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando and Bartolome.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 1994. 1 8
On April 22, 1994, petitioners led this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. aEHAIS
The Court denied the Petition for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91
for failure of petitioners to attach the registry receipt. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, and the Petition was reinstated on July 13, 1994.
In this Petition for Review, petitioners seek the reversal of the CA Decision and
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 17686 and, consequently, the nulli cation of the Third
Partial Decision and orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 8578. They also pray for
the Court to direct the trial court to proceed with the reception of further evidence in
Civil Case No. 8578. 1 9 In particular, petitioners allege that the CA decided questions of
substance not in accord with law when it upheld the trial court's Third Partial Decision
which, they alleged, was rendered in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners narrate that the trial court initially gave them two trial days — May 26
and 27, 1982 — to present their evidence. However, at the hearing on May 26, the judge
forced them to terminate the presentation of their evidence. On June 2, 1982, following
petitioners' submission of additional documentary evidence, the trial court scheduled
the case for hearing on June 8 and 9, 1982, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon "in view of the
importance of the issue concerning whether all the properties in the names of Enrique
Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as
those in the names of other party-litigants in this case) shall be declared or included as
part of the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic)
presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan". At the June 8 hearing, petitioners presented
additional evidence. Unknown to them, however, the trial court had already rendered its
Third Partial Decision at 11 o'clock that morning. Thus, petitioners argue that said Third
Partial Decision is void. 2 0
They also question the trial court's First Order dated August 17, 1982 and Order
dated August 18, 1982 granting the prayer for receivership and appointing a receiver,
respectively, both allegedly issued without a hearing and without showing the necessity
to appoint a receiver. Lastly, they question the Second Order dated August 17, 1982
canceling the notice of lis pendens ex parte and without any showing that the notice
was for the purpose of molesting the adverse parties, or that it was not necessary to
protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded. 2 1
On May 9, 1996, Rosita Ferrera-Sy led a Motion for Payment of Widow's
Allowance. She alleged that her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate.
The properties of the estate were found by the trial court to be their conjugal
properties. From the time of Sy Bang's death in 1971 until the ling of the motion,
Rosita was not given any widow's allowance as provided in Section 3, Rule 83 of the
Rules of Court by the parties in possession and control of her husband's estate, or her
share in the conjugal partnership. 2 2
In their Comment on the Motion for Payment of Widow's Allowance, petitioners
argued that Section 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court speci cally provides that the same
is granted only "during the settlement of the estate" of the decedent, and this allowance,
under Article 188 of the Civil Code (now Article 133 of the Family Code), shall be taken
from the "common mass of property" during the liquidation of the inventoried
properties. 2 3 Considering that the case before the trial court is a special civil action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, Rosita is not entitled to widow's
allowance.
On September 23, 1996, the Court granted the Motion for Payment of Widow's
Allowance and ordered petitioners jointly and severally to pay Rosita P25,000.00 as the
widow's allowance to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang, effective September 1, 1996
and every month thereafter until the estate is nally settled or until further orders from
the Court. 2 4 IDATCE
In a Manifestation dated October 1, 1996, petitioners informed the Court that

Rosita and co-petitioner Enrique Sy had executed a waiver of past, present and future
claims against petitioners and, thus, should be dropped as parties to the case. 2 5
Attached thereto was a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Rosita and Enrique stated that
they were given P1 million and a 229-square meter parcel of land, for which reason they
were withdrawing as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8578. 2 6
Respondents, except Enrique Sy, led a Counter-Manifestation and Opposition to
Drop Rosita Sy as a Party. 2 7 They said that it would be ridiculous for Rosita to give up
her share in Sy Bang's estate, amounting to hundreds of millions of pesos, which had
already been ordered partitioned by the trial court, to the prejudice of her seven full-
blooded children. They alleged that Rosita was not in possession of her full faculties
when she a xed her thumbmark on the Sinumpaang Salaysay considering her age, her
frequent illness, and her lack of ability to read or write. Hence, they led a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City for guardianship over her person
and properties. They also alleged that Enrique and some of Jose Sy Bang's children
would stealthily visit Rosita in Rosauro's house while the latter was away. On one of
those occasions, she was asked to a x her thumbmark on some documents she could
not read and knew nothing about. They claim that Rosita has never received a single
centavo of the P1 million allegedly given her.
In their Reply to Counter-Manifestation, 2 8 petitioners countered that
respondents failed to present any concrete evidence to challenge the Sinumpaang
Salaysay. Since the same was duly notarized, it was a public document and presumed
valid. They, likewise, alleged that the Counter-Manifestation was led without Rosita's
authorization as, in fact, she had written her counsel with instructions to withdraw said
pleading. 2 9 Further, they averred that Rosita executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay while
in full possession of her faculties. They alleged that Rosita intended to oppose the
petition for guardianship and they presented a copy of a sworn certi cation from
Rosita's physician that "she (Rosita) is physically t and mentally competent to attend
to her personal or business transactions". 3 0
On the other hand, petitioners led a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's
September 23, 1996 Resolution. It alleged that Rosita and Enrique executed their
Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 29, 1996. However, this development was made
known to the Court only on October 1, 1996; hence, the Court was not aware of this
when it issued its Resolution. Petitioners prayed for the reconsideration of the
September 23, 1996 Resolution and dropping Rosita and Enrique as parties to the case.
31
In their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents maintained

that the Court should not consider the Motion for Reconsideration. Respondents
alleged that Rosita thumbmarked the Sinumpaang Salaysay without understanding the
contents of the document or the implications of her acts. Respondents also tried to
demonstrate that their mother would thumbmark any document that their children
asked her to by exhibiting four documents each denominated as Sinumpaang Salaysay
and thumbmarked by Rosita. One purported to disown the earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay. The second was a reproduction of the earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with the
amount changed to P100.00, the Transfer Certi cate of Title number changed to
12343567, and the size of the property to "as big as the entire Lucena City". The third
purported to bequeath her shares in the conjugal partnership of gains to Rosauro,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Rosalino, while refusing to give any inheritance to Florecita,
Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique. Lastly, the fourth contradicted the third in that it was in
favor of Florecita, Lourdes, Julieta, and Enrique, while disinheriting Rosauro, Bartolome,
Rolando, and Rosalino. These, respondents assert, clearly show that their mother would
sign any document, no matter the contents, upon the request of any of her children. 3 2
acEHSI
The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration on November 18, 1996. 3 3
Petitioners led a Supplement to their Memorandum, additionally arguing that
the Third Partial Decision did not only unduly bind the properties without due process,
but also ignored the fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles. 3 4
G.R. No. 150797
Meanwhile, on September 30, 1996, respondents led a Joint Petition for the
Guardianship of the Incompetent Rosita Ferrera-Sy before the RTC of Lucena City,
Branch 58 (Guardianship court), docketed as Special Proceedings No. 96-34. On May
19, 1997, Rosauro Sy, who sought to be named as the special guardian, led before the
Guardianship court a Motion to Order Court Deposit of Widow's Allowance Ordered by
the Supreme Court. 3 5 Then, he led a Motion before this Court seeking an Order for
petitioners to pay Rosita P2,150,000.00 in widow's allowance and P25,000.00 every
month thereafter, as ordered by this Court in its September 23, 1996 Resolution. He
also prayed for petitioners' imprisonment should they fail to comply therewith. 3 6
On July 8, 1997, the Guardianship court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Mr. Jose Sy Bang and his wife Iluminada Tan; and their
children, Zenaida Sy and Ma. Emma Sy; and Julian Sy and his wife Rosa Tan, are
hereby ordered to deposit to this Court, jointly and severally, the amount of
P250,000.00 representing the widow's allowance of the incompetent Rosita
Ferrera Sy corresponding the (sic) periods from September 1, 1996 to June 30,
1997, and additional amount of P25,000.00 per month and every month
thereafter, within the first ten (10) days of each month. 3 7
ICcaST
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Rosauro, the appointed

guardian, then asked the Guardianship court to issue a writ of execution. Meanwhile, on
December 10, 1997, petitioners led a Petition for Certiorari with the CA docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 46244 to annul the July 8, 1997 Order and October 9, 1997 Resolution
of the Guardianship court. 3 8
In a Decision 3 9 dated February 28, 2001, the CA ruled in respondents' favor,
nding "nothing legally objectionable in private respondent Rosauro Sy's ling of the
motion to order the deposit of the widow's allowance ordered by the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 114217 or, for that matter, in the public respondent's grant thereof in the order
herein assailed. More so, when the public respondent's actions are viewed in the light of
the Supreme Court's denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its resolution
dated September 23, 1996". 4 0 Thus it held:
WHEREFORE,
WHEREFORE the petition is D ENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
resolution dated September 23, 1996 (sic) is A F F I R M E D in toto. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED .
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied on November 5, 2001, 4 1
petitioners led this Petition for Review 4 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying
for this Court to reverse the CA's February 28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying
the Motion for Reconsideration, and to declare the Guardianship court to have
exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit of the widow's allowance in Special
Proceedings No. 96-34. 4 3 They argued that the Guardianship court's jurisdiction is
limited to determining whether Rosita was incompetent and, upon nding in the
a rmative, appointing a guardian. Moreover, under Rule 83, Section 3, of the Rules of
Court, a widow's allowance can only be paid in an estate proceeding. Even if the
complaint for partition were to be considered as estate proceedings, only the trial court
hearing the partition case had the exclusive jurisdiction to execute the payment of the
widow's allowance. 4 4
They raised the following issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in a rming the Guardianship Court's Order
dated 8 July 1997, and Resolution dated 9 October 1997, in that:
The trial court, acting as a Guardianship Court, and limited jurisdiction, had
no authority to enforce payment of widow's allowance.
II
The payment of widow's allowance cannot be implemented at [the] present

because the estate of Sy Bang — the source from which payment is to be taken —
has not been determined with finality.
III
The Order of the trial court purporting to enforce payment of widow's

allowance unduly modi ed the express terms of this Honorable Court's
Resolution granting it. 4 5
Petitioners, likewise, question the Guardianship court's omission of the phrase

"to be taken from the estate of Sy Bang" from the July 8, 1997 Order. They interpreted
this to mean that the Guardianship court was ordering that the widow's allowance be
taken from their own properties and not from the estate of Sy Bang — an "undue
modification" of this Court's September 23, 1996 Resolution. 4 6 cTDIaC
On January 21, 2002, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 114217 and G.R.
No. 150797. The parties submitted their respective Memoranda on May 21, 2003 and
June 19, 2003, both of which were noted by this Court in its August 11, 2003
Resolution.
Pending the issuance of this Court's Decision in the two cases, respondent
Rosauro Sy led, on November 11, 2003, a Motion to Order Deposit in Court of
Supreme Court's Ordered Widow's Allowance Effective September 23, 1996 and Upon
Failure of Petitioners Julian Sy, et al. to Comply Therewith to Order Their Imprisonment
Until Compliance. He alleged that his mother had been ill and had no means to support
herself except through his nancial assistance, and that respondents had not complied
with this Court's September 23, 1996 Resolution, promulgated seven years earlier. 4 7
He argued that respondents' de ance constituted indirect contempt of court. That the
Guardianship court had found them guilty of indirect contempt did not help his mother
because she was still unable to collect her widow's allowance. 4 8
Petitioners opposed said Motion arguing that the estate from which the widow's
allowance is to be taken has not been settled. They also reiterated that Rosita, together
with son Enrique, had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay waiving all claims against
petitioners. Hence, there was no legal ground to cite them in contempt. 4 9
On April 4, 2005, this Court granted Rosauro's Motion, to wit:
WHEREFORE,
WHEREFORE the Court nds and so holds petitioner Iluminada Tan
(widow of deceased petitioner Jose Sy Bang), their children and co-petitioners
Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, Julian Sy and the latter's wife Rosa Tan,
GUILT Y of contempt of this Court and are collectively sentenced to pay a FINE
equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due and unpaid to Rosita
Ferrera-Sy by way of a widow's allowance pursuant to this Court's Resolution of
September 13, 1996, and accordingly OR D ER S their immediate imprisonment
until they shall have complied with said Resolution by paying Rosita Ferrera-Sy
the amount of TWO MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P2,600,100.00), representing her total accumulated unpaid widow's allowance
from September, 1996 to April, 2005 at the rate of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P25,000.00) a month, plus six (6%) percent interest thereon. The Court
further D IR E CT S petitioners to faithfully pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy her monthly
widow's allowance for the succeeding months as they fall due, under pain of
imprisonment.
This Resolution is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED . 5 0
Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the court ne of P260,010.00 on April 5,
2005. 5 1
Respondents, except Rosauro Sy (who had died), led a Motion for Execution 5 2
before this Court on April 25, 2005. On the other hand, petitioner Rosa Tan led a
Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Clari cation. 5 3 She alleged that, in
accordance with Chinese culture, she had no participation in the management of the
family business or Sy Bang's estate. After her husband's death, she allegedly inherited
nothing but debts and liabilities, and, having no income of her own, was now in a
quandary on how these can be paid. She asked the Court to consider that she had not
disobeyed its Resolution and to consider her motion.
Other petitioners, Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma, also led a Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for Clari cation. 5 4 They stressed that the P1 million and
the piece of land Rosita had already received from Jose Sy Bang in 1996 should form
part of the widow's allowance. They also argued that whatever allowance Rosita may be
entitled to should come from the estate of Sy Bang. They further argued the unfairness
of being made to pay the allowance when none of them participated in the
management of Sy Bang's estate; Zenaida and Ma. Emma being minors at the time of
his death, while Iluminada and Rosa had no significant role in the family business.
Respondents then led a Motion for Issuance of Order Requiring Respondents to
Deposit with the Supreme Court's Cashier its Ordered Widow's Allowance 5 5 and a
Motion for Execution of Resolution dated April 4, 2005. 5 6 Petitioners opposed the
same. 5 7 aHTDAc
On July 25, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution granting both of respondents'
motions and denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 5 8

Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma led, on August 15, 2005, a
Manifestation of Compliance and Motion for Clari cation. 5 9 They maintained that the
issues they had raised in the motion for reconsideration had not been duly resolved.
They argued that when this Court issued its September 23, 1996 Resolution, it was not
yet aware that Rosita had executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay, wherein she waived her
claims and causes of action against petitioners. They also informed this Court that, on
April 17, 1998, the Guardianship court had issued an Order which recognized a
"temporary agreement" based on the voluntary offer of Jose Sy Bang of a nancial
assistance of P5,000.00 per month to Rosita while the case was pending. Moreover, as
a manifestation of good faith, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma paid the
P430,000.00 out of their own funds in partial compliance with the Court's Resolution.
However, the same did not in any way constitute a waiver of their rights or defenses in
the present case. They underscored the fact that the allowance must come from the
estate of Sy Bang, and not from Jose Sy Bang or any of the latter's heirs, the extent of
which remained undetermined. They further asked the Court to adjudicate the liability
for the widow's allowance to be equally divided between them and the other set of
petitioners, the heirs of Julian Sy.
On August 30, 2005, respondents led a motion asking this Court to issue an
Order for the immediate incarceration of petitioners for refusing to comply with the
Court's resolution. 6 0 They aver that the period within which petitioners were to comply
with the Court's Resolution had now lapsed, and thus, petitioners must now be
incarcerated for failure to abide by said Resolution. They likewise asked the Court to
refer petitioners' counsel, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violations of the Canons of Professional Responsibility or to
declare him in contempt of court. They alleged that despite the nality of the Court's
denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, Atty. Joyas still led a Manifestation
with compliance arguing the same points. Further, Atty. Joyas is not petitioners'
counsel of record in this case since he never formally entered his appearance before
the Court. 6 1
In a Resolution dated September 14, 2005, the Court denied the motion to refer
Atty. Joyas to the IBP for being a wrong remedy. 6 2
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma then led an Omnibus Motion, 6 3
seeking an extension of time to comply with the Court's Resolution and Motion to
delete the penalty of " ne" as a consequence of voluntary compliance. They insist that
their compliance with the order to pay the widow's allowance should "obliterate,
expunge, and blot out" the penalty of ne and imprisonment. They alleged that for their
failure to comply with this Court's Resolution, the RTC, Lucena City, found them guilty of
indirect contempt and imposed on them a ne of P30,000.00. They had appealed said
order to the CA.
They also tried to make a case out of the use of the terms "joint and several" in
the September 23 Resolution, and "collectively" in the April 5, 2005 Resolution. They
argued that "joint and several" creates individual liability for each of the parties for the
full amount of the obligation, while "collectively" means that all members of the group
are responsible together for the action of the group. Hence, "collectively" would mean
that the liability belongs equally to the two groups of petitioners. They requested for an
additional 60 days to raise the necessary amount. They also asked the Court to hold
their imprisonment in abeyance until their "just and reasonable compliance" with the
Court's orders.
Barely a month later, petitioners, through their new counsel, led another
Manifestation stressing that Sy Bang's marriage to Rosita Ferrera is void. They claimed
that respondents have falsi ed documents to lead the courts into believing that
Rosita's marriage to Sy Bang is valid. HScDIC
The Omnibus Motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Thereafter, respondents led a Motion to Immediately Order Incarceration of
Petitioners, 6 4 which petitioners opposed. 6 5
In a Resolution dated December 12, 2005, 6 6 the Court issued a Warrant of Arrest
6 7 against petitioners and directed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to detain
them until they complied with this Court's April 4, 2005 and July 25, 2005 Resolutions.
Petitioner Rosa Tan led a Manifestation with Motion. 6 8 She informed the Court
that, to show that she was not obstinate and contumacious of the Court and its orders,
she had begged and pleaded with her relatives to raise money to comply, but concedes
that she was only able to raise a minimal amount since she has no source of income
herself and needs nancial support to buy her food and medicines. She obtained her
brother's help and the latter issued six checks in the total amount of P650,000.00. She
also alleged that she was not informed by her husband's counsel of the developments
in the case, and remained unconsulted on any of the matters or incidents of the case.
She reiterated that she had no participation in the management of the Sy Bang estate
and received nothing of value upon her husband's death. She prayed that the Court
would not consider her failure to raise any further amount as contempt or de ance of
it's orders.
The motion was denied in a Resolution dated January 16, 2006.
In an Urgent Manifestation of Compliance with the Contempt Resolutions with
Payment of Widow's Allowance with Prayer Reiterating the Lifting of Warrant of Arrest
on Humanitarian Grounds, 6 9 petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma asked the
Court to delete the penalty of inde nite imprisonment considering their partial
compliance and the partial compliance of Rosa Tan. They expressed willingness to
deposit the widow's allowance with the Supreme Court's Cashier pending the
determination of Sy Bang's estate. They reasoned that the money to be deposited is
their own and does not belong to Sy Bang's estate. The deposit is made for the sole
purpose of deleting the penalty of inde nite imprisonment. They claim that they are not
willfully disobeying the Court's order but are merely hesitating to comply because of
pending incidents such as the falsi cation charges against Rosita, the resolution of the
partition case, the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Rosita, and the pendency of
Rosita's guardianship proceedings, as well as humanitarian considerations. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to reconsider the order of contempt and to recall the warrant of
arrest.
On February 15, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 7 0 lifting the warrant of
arrest on petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, and Rosa Tan on the condition that
they issue the corresponding checks to settle the accrued widow's allowance of Rosita
Ferrera-Sy. They were also directed to submit proof of their compliance to the Court
within ten (10) days from notice.
In a Manifestation 7 1 dated February 28, 2006, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and
Ma. Emma informed the Court that they had deposited the checks in favor of Rosita
with the RTC, Lucena City, Branch 58, during the proceedings on February 28, 2006. 7 2
Respondents led a Comment to the Manifestation arguing that the deposit of
said checks, amounting to P1,073,053.00, does not amount to full compliance with the
Court's order considering that the accrued widow's allowance now amounted to
P4,528,125.00.
Then, petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma led a Motion to include
Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for
the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang as they may also hold Assets-
Properties of the Estate of Sy Bang. 7 3 They argued that it is denial of the equal
protection clause for the Court to single out only the two children of the rst marriage
— Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy — and their heirs, as the ones responsible for the widow's
allowance. This ruling, they aver, does not take into consideration the numerous and
valuable properties from the estate of Sy Bang being held in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. They alleged that two compromise agreements, both
approved by the trial court, transferred properties to Rolando and Renato. They further
alleged that respondents Rolando, Maria Lourdes, Florecita, Rosalino, Enrique, and
Rosita Ferrera-Sy have executed separate waivers and quitclaims over their shares in
the estate of Sy Bang for certain considerations. However, out of respect for the Court
and their fear of incarceration, they complied with the Court's orders using their
personal funds which they claim is unfair because they have never participated in the
management of the properties of Sy Bang. They prayed that the Court pronounce that
the liability for the widow's allowance be divided proportionately among the following
groups: Iluminada, Zenaida, and Ma. Emma; Rosa Tan; Rosalino Sy and wife Helen Loo;
Bartolome Sy and wife Virginia Lim; Rolando Sy and wife Anacorita Rio orido; and the
heirs of Enrique Sy, namely, Elaine Destura and Edwin Maceda. CSHEca
On March 23, 2006, petitioners led an Urgent Reply to respondents' Comment

on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition 7 4 to the motion led by
respondents for the Court to reiterate its order for the NBI to arrest petitioners for
failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. They argued that they had fully
complied with the Court's orders. They alleged that on three occasions within the
period, they had tried to submit 12 postdated checks to the Court's cashiers, but the
same were refused due to the policy of the Court not to issue receipts on postdated
checks. They then led a motion before the RTC of Lucena City praying for authority to
deposit the checks with the trial court. The motion was denied but, on reconsideration,
was later granted. The checks are now in the custody of the RTC. The only issue
respondents raise, they claim, is the amount of the checks. Hence, there is no basis for
the Court to direct the NBI to effect their arrest.
The Court, in a Resolution dated March 29, 2006, required respondents to
comment on the motion to include some of them in the payment of widow's allowance.
Petitioners, on the other hand, were required to comment on a motion led by
respondents for the Court to reiterate its order to the NBI to arrest petitioners for
failure to comply with the February 15, 2006 Resolution. 7 5
Petitioners led their Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
March 29, 2006 Resolution. 7 6 They reiterated their arguments in their Urgent Reply to
respondents' Comment on the manifestation of compliance with Opposition. They
further alleged that there is now a Resolution by the Regional State Prosecutor, Region
IV, San Pablo City, nding probable cause to charge respondents with falsi cation of
three marriage contracts between Sy Bang and Rosita Ferrera. According to them, this
development now constitutes a "highly prejudicial question" on whether they should
comply with the order to pay widow's allowance. They claim that, while the ling of the
information is merely the rst step in the criminal prosecution of respondents, it
already casts doubt on whether Rosita is legally entitled to the widow's allowance. They
now seek partial reconsideration of the Resolution inasmuch as it requires them to
deposit with the Clerk of Court, RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58, new checks payable to
Rosita Ferrera.
Respondents, on the other hand, led a Comment and Manifestation 7 7 on why
they should not be made to pay the widow's allowance. They argued that the RTC had
already decided that the estate of Sy Bang was comprised of properties in the names
of Jose Sy Bang, Iluminada Tan, Zenaida, Ma. Emma, Julian Sy, and Rosa Tan, and the
same was a rmed by the CA. Pending the resolution of the appeal before this Court,
this Decision stands. Thus, petitioners' claim that the estate of Sy Bang is yet
undetermined is false. They also claim that, contrary to petitioners' claims of being
poor, they still hold enormous properties of the Sy Bang estate, which had been
transferred in their names through falsi cation of public documents, now subject of
several cases which respondents led against them before the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Respondents further claim that the validity of their mother's marriage to Sy Bang
has been recognized by the courts in several cases where the issue had been raised,
including the case for recognition of Rosita's Filipino citizenship, the guardianship
proceedings, and the partition proceedings.
On June 23, 2006, respondents led a Motion for Substitution of Parties. 7 8 They
averred that Jose Sy Bang died on September 11, 2001, leaving behind his widow
Iluminada and 14 children, while Julian Sy died on August 28, 2004, leaving behind his
widow Rosa and eight children. The claims against Jose and Julian were not
extinguished by their deaths. It was the duty of petitioners' counsel, under Rule 3,
Section 16 of the Rules of Court, to inform the Court of these deaths within 30 days
thereof. Petitioners' counsel failed to so inform this Court, which should be a ground for
disciplinary action. Hence, respondents prayed that the Court order the heirs of the two
deceased to appear and be substituted in these cases within 30 days from notice. EHTCAa
In a Resolution 7 9 dated July 5, 2006, the Court granted the motion for
substitution and noted the Comment and Manifestation on the Motion to include
Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for
the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
Respondents then led a Manifestation and Motion to Implement the Supreme
Court's Resolutions of September 23, 1996, April 4, 2005, July 25, 2005, December 12,
2005, and February 15, 2006. 8 0 They prayed that petitioners be given a last period of
ve days within which to deposit with the Supreme Court Cashier all the accrued
widow's allowances as of June 2006.
Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma opposed respondents'
manifestation and motion. 8 1 They argued that the resolutions sought to be
implemented were all issued prior to the DOJ Resolution nding probable cause to le
the falsi cation charges against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases
for falsi cation expose Rosita as a mere common-law wife and not a "widow"; hence,
there is no legal justi cation to give her the widow's allowance. They also reiterated
their earlier arguments against the grant of widow's allowance.
Meanwhile, Rosa Tan led a Comment on the Substitution of Parties with Motion
for Reconsideration. 8 2 She argued that since the trial court had already appointed a
judicial administrator for the estate of Sy Bang, which includes Julian Sy's estate, the
proper party to be substituted should be the administrator and not Julian's heirs who
never exercised ownership rights over the properties thereof.
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration to the Resolution granting
substitution of parties for lack of merit on November 20, 2006.
The Court's Ruling
G.R. No. 114217
Finding no reversible error therein, we affirm the CA Decision.
The Third Partial Decision of the RTC
To review, the CA held, to wit:
The respondent Judge acted correctly inasmuch as his decision to defer
the resolution on the question concerning the properties in the name of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando and Enrique, all surnamed Sy, will not necessarily affect the
decision he rendered concerning the properties in the names of Jose Sy Bang and
wife, Julian Sy and wife, Zenaida Sy and Maria Sy, considering that the properties
mentioned were separable and distinct from each other, such that the claim that
said properties were not their own, but properties of the late Sy Bang, could have
been the subject of separate suits. 8 3
We agree with the CA.

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 4. Several judgments. — In an action against several defendants,
the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or
more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. aCcHEI
The trial court's Third Partial Decision is in the nature of a several judgment as
contemplated by the rule quoted above. The trial court ruled on the status of the
properties in the names of petitioners (defendants below) while deferring the ruling on
the properties in the names of respondents pending the presentation of evidence.
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable
and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could
have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will
not necessarily affect the other. 8 4
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable
interest in the properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not
affect the determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the
names of petitioners were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any
further ndings or judgment on the status or nature of the properties in the names of
the other heirs.
The trial court's June 2, 1982 Order reads:
IN view of the importance of the issue concerning whether all the
properties in the name (sic) of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and
Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives (as well as those in the names of the
other parties litigants in this case), (sic) shall be declared or included as part of
the Estate of Sy Bang, and in view of the numerous documentary evidences (sic)
presented by Attys. Raya and Camaligan after the said question was agreed to be
submitted for resolution on May 26, 1982, the Court hereby sets for the reception
or for the resolution of said issue in this case on June 8 and 9, 1982, both at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon; notify all parties litigants in this case of these settings. 8 5
It is obvious from the trial court's order 8 6 that the June 8, 1982 hearing is for the
purpose of determining whether properties in the names of Enrique Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Rosalino Sy, and Rolando Sy and/or their respective wives are also part of the Sy Bang
estate.
Hence, in the assailed Decision, the trial court said:
[I]n fact, the Court will require further evidence for or against any of the
parties in this case in the matter of whatever sums of money, property or asset
belonging to the estate of Sy Bang that came into their possession in order that
the Court may be properly guided in the partition and adjudication of the rightful
share and interest of the heirs of Sy Bang over the latter's estate; this becomes
imperative in view of new matters shown in the Submission and Formal Offer of
Reserve Exhibits and the Offer of Additional Documentary Evidence led
respectively by Oscar Sy and Jose Sy Bang, et al., thru their respective counsels
after the question of whether or not the properties in the names of Enrique,
Bartolome, Rosalino, and Rolando, all surnamed Sy, should form part or be
included as part of the estate of Sy Bang, had been submitted for resolution as of
May 26, 1982; the Court deems it proper to receive additional evidence on the part
of any of the parties litigants in this case if only to determine the true extent of the
estate belonging to Sy Bang. 8 7
The trial court painstakingly examined the evidence on record and narrated the
details, then carefully laid out the particulars in the assailed Decision. The evidence that
formed the basis for the trial court's conclusion is embodied in the Decision itself —
evidence presented by the parties themselves, including petitioners. ISCTcH
However, notwithstanding the trial court's pronouncement, the Sy Bang estate

cannot be partitioned or distributed until the nal determination of the extent of the
estate and only until it is shown that the obligations under Rule 90, Section 1, 8 8 have
been settled. 8 9
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties
can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said
obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum xed by the
court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. 9 0
Settling the issue of ownership is the rst stage in an action for partition. 9 1 As
this Court has ruled:
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must rst be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the
action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to
divide the property, unless it rst makes a determination as to the
existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of
ownership, the rst stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an
action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over
the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party ling
the action to state in his complaint the "nature and extent of his title" to the
real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is de nitely resolved, it
would be premature to effect a partition of the properties . . . ." 9 2

Moreover, the Third Partial Decision does not have the effect of terminating the
proceedings for partition. By its very nature, the Third Partial Decision is but a
determination based on the evidence presented thus far. There remained issues to be
resolved by the court. There would be no nal determination of the extent of the Sy
Bang estate until the court's examination of the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court will
have to make a pronouncement whether the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique indeed belong to the Sy Bang estate. Only after the full
extent of the Sy Bang estate has been determined can the trial court nally order the
partition of each of the heirs' share.
Appointment of Receiver
As to the issue of the judge's appointment of a receiver, su ce it to say that the
CA conclusively found thus:
The records show that the petitioners were never deprived of their day in
court. Upon Order of the respondent Judge, counsel for the petitioners submitted
their opposition to [the] petition for appointment of a receiver led by private
respondents. . . . .
Moreover, evidence on record shows that respondent Judge appointed the

receiver after both parties have presented their evidence and after the Third Partial
Decision has been promulgated. Such appointment was made upon veri ed
petition of herein private respondents, alleging that petitioners are mismanaging
the properties in litigation by either mortgaging or disposing the same, hence, the
said properties are in danger of being lost, wasted, dissipated, misused, or
disposed of. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the appointment of
a receiver in Civil Case No. 8578, in order to preserve the properties in litis
pendentia and neither did he abuse his discretion nor acted arbitrarily in doing s. n
On the contrary, We nd that it was the petitioners who violated the status quo
sought to be maintained by the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 61519, by their
intrusion and unwarranted seizures of the 3 theaters, subject matter of the
litigation, and which are admittedly under the exclusive management and
operation of private respondent, Rosauro Sy. 9 3 THIASE
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens

Next, petitioners question the trial court's Order canceling the notice of lis
pendens. 9 4
Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree,
provides:
SEC. 77. Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before nal judgment, a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it
is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It
may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon veri ed petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after nal judgment in favor of the defendant, or other
disposition of the action such as to terminate nally all rights of the plaintiff in
and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or
notice of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the
notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon the registration of
certi cate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
The ling of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the nal judgment
in order to prevent the nal judgment from being defeated by successive alienations;
and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona de or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the
judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. 9 5
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such
power is to be exercised within the express con nes of the law. As provided in Section
14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting
the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the
title of the party who caused it to be recorded. 9 6
This Court has interpreted the notice as:
The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own
risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary
transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and
subordinate to those which may be nally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the
action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time.
And its continuance or removal-like the continuance or removal of a preliminary
attachment of injunction-is not contingent on the existence of a nal judgment in
the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. 9 7
The CA found, and we a rm, that Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were able to
prove that the notice was intended merely to molest and harass the owners of the
property, some of whom were not parties to the case. It was also proven that the
interest of Oscar Sy, who caused the notice to be annotated, was only 1/14 of the
assessed value of the property. Moreover, Rosalino, Bartolome and Rolando were
ordered to post a P50,000.00 bond to protect whatever rights or interest Oscar Sy may
have in the properties under litis pendentia. 9 8 CAaSED
G.R. No. 150797

In G.R. No. 150797, petitioners are asking this Court to reverse the CA's February
28, 2001 Decision and its Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and to
declare the Guardianship court to have exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the deposit
of the widow's allowance in Special Proceedings No. 96-34.
We find merit in petitioners' contention.
The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited jurisdiction. It had no
jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow's allowance ordered by this Court.
Reviewing the antecedents, we note that the claim for widow's allowance was
made before the Supreme Court in a case that did not arise from the guardianship
proceedings. The case subject of the Supreme Court petition (Civil Case No. 8578) is
still pending before the RTC of Lucena City.
Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate,
shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
Correlatively, Article 188 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to
the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried
property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be
deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents
pertaining to them.
Obviously, "the court" referred to in Rule 83, Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is the
court hearing the settlement of the estate. Also crystal clear is the provision of the law
that the widow's allowance is to be taken from the common mass of property forming
part of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, as evident from the foregoing provisions, it is the court hearing the
settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow's allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of all other courts. 9 9
In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court, this Court has
pronounced that:
Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and limited jurisdiction
cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found to be
embezzled, concealed, or conveyed. In a categorical language of this Court, only
in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title
thereto has been already judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the
guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or return of the embezzled,
concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is
clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be embezzled,
concealed or conveyed is in dispute, . . . the determination of said title or right
whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a
guardianship proceedings. 1 0 0 CacTIE
Further, this Court has held that the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
deceased incompetent is a function pertaining properly, not to the guardianship
proceedings, but to another proceeding in which the heirs are at liberty to initiate. 1 0 1
Other Unresolved Incidents
Payment of Widow's Allowance
It has been 13 years since this Court ordered petitioners to pay Rosita Ferrera-Sy
her monthly widow's allowance. Petitioners Iluminada, Zenaida and Ma. Emma have
since fought tooth and nail against paying the said allowance, grudgingly complying
only upon threat of incarceration. Then, they again argued against the grant of widow's
allowance after the DOJ issued its Resolution nding probable cause in the falsi cation
charges against respondents. They contended that the criminal cases for falsi cation
proved that Rosita is a mere common-law wife and not a "widow" and, therefore, not
entitled to widow's allowance.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
A nding of probable cause does not conclusively prove the charge of
falsification against respondents.
In a preliminary investigation, probable cause has been de ned as "the existence
of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted". It is well-settled that a nding of probable
cause needs to rest only on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt , neither on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and de nitely not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. 1 0 2
Hence, until the marriage is nally declared void by the court, the same is
presumed valid and Rosita is entitled to receive her widow's allowance to be taken from
the estate of Sy Bang.
We remind petitioners again that they are duty-bound to comply with whatever
the courts, in relation to the properties under litigation, may order.
Motion to Include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs
of Sy Bang
On March 14, 2006, petitioners led a Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome
Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow's
Allowance as Heirs of Sy Bang.
The Motion is denied.
The widow's allowance, as discussed above, is chargeable to Sy Bang's estate. It
must be stressed that the issue of whether the properties in the names of Rosalino,
Bartolome, Rolando, and Enrique Sy form part of Sy Bang's estate remains unsettled
since this Petition questioning the trial court's Third Partial Decision has been pending.
On the other hand, there has been a categorical pronouncement that petitioners are
holding properties belonging to Sy Bang's estate.
That the full extent of Sy Bang's estate has not yet been determined is no excuse
from complying with this Court's order. Properties of the estate have been identi ed —
i.e., those in the names of petitioners — thus, these properties should be made to
answer for the widow's allowance of Rosita. In any case, the amount Rosita receives for
support, which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to her, will be deducted from her
share of the estate. 1 0 3 IEHDAT
A Final Note
We are appalled by the delay in the disposition of this case brought about by
petitioners' propensity to challenge the Court's every directive. That the petitioners
would go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the
orders of this Court is truly deplorable. Not even a citation for contempt and the threat
of imprisonment seemed to deter them. Their contumacious attitude and actions have
dragged this case for far too long with practically no end in sight. Their abuse of legal
and court processes is shameful, and they must not be allowed to continue with their
atrocious behavior. Petitioners deserve to be sanctioned, and ordered to pay the Court
treble costs.
WHEREFORE , the foregoing premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No.
150797 is GRANTED,
GRANTED while the Petition in G.R. No. 114217 is DENIED.
DENIED The Regional
Trial Court of Lucena City is directed to hear and decide Civil Case No. 8578 with
dispatch. The Motion to include Rosalino Sy, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy, and Heirs of
Enrique Sy as Likewise Liable for the Payment of Widow's Allowance as Heirs of Sy
Bang is DENIED.
DENIED Treble costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Carpio, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. The Petition was originally filed by Spouse Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, Spouses
Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy, Ma. Emma Sy, and Oscar Sy. Respondents filed a
Motion for Substitution of Parties on June 23, 2006, informing this Court of the deaths
of Jose Sy Bang and Julian Sy. The Court granted the Motion in a Resolution dated July
5, 2006.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of this Court),

with Associate Justices Luis A. Javellana (ret.) and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (a retired
member of this Court), concurring; rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 154-164.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (a retired member of this Court),
with Associate Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo (ret.) and Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (a
retired member of this Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 186-187.
4. Other respondents became complainants; rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 155.
5. Rollo, p. 155.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 155-156.
10. Penned by Judge Benigno M. Puno, id. at 77-101.
11. Id. at 157.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 110-113.
14. Id. at 118-119.
15. Id. at 114.
16. Id. at 155-159.
17. Supra note 2.
18. Supra note 3.
19. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 39.
20. Id. at 29-32.

21. Id. at 16-17.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id. at 644-645.
24. Id. at 658.
25. Id. at 659.
26. Sinumpaang Salaysay, id. at 661.
27. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 664-668.
28. Id. at 689-691.
29. Id. at 689-690.
30. Id. at 685-686.
31. Id. at 679-670.
32. Id. at 697-702.
33. Id. at 684-685 (unnumbered pages).
34. Id. at 617.
35. Rollo, (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 43-44.
36. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 719.
37. Rollo, (G.R. No. 150797), p. 271.
38. Id. at 45.
39. Penned by Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. (ret.), with Associate Justices Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; id. at 11-20.
40. Rollo, (G.R. No. 150797), p. 69. (Citations omitted.)
41. CA Resolution penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (ret.), concurring; id. at 73.
42. Rollo, (G.R. No. 150797), pp. 33-59.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 49-50.
45. Id. at 46-47.
46. Id. at 53.
47. Id. at 451.
48. Id. at 488-494.
49. Id. at 467-474.
50. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), pp. 762-763.
51. Rollo, (G.R. No. 150797), p. 511.
52. Id. at 512-516.
53. Id. at 517-526.
54. Id. at 527-538.
55. Id. at 565-568.
56. Id. at 573-577.
57. Id. at 578-590, 617-622.
58. Id. at 611-616.
59. Id. at 657-690.
60. Id. at 709-715.
61. Id. at 712.
62. Id. at (between 715-716).
63. Id. at 787-802.
64. Id. at 900-905.
65. Id. at 908-922.
66. Id. at 924-925.
67. Id. at 926-928.
68. Id. at 933-946.
69. Id. at 992-1001.
70. Id. at 1073-1074.
71. Id. at 1023-1024.
72. Id. at 1025.
73. Id. at 1032-1043.
74. Id. at 1076-1084.
75. Id. at 1067-1069.
76. Id. at 1100-1114.
77. Id. at 1141-1159.
78. Id. at 1162-1167.
79. Id. at 1168-1169.
80. Id. at 1170-1178.
81. Id. at 1173-1207.
82. Id. at 1258-1263.
83. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
84. Fernando v. Santamaria, 487 Phil. 351, 357 (2004).
85. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 161.
86. Id. at 76.
87. Id. at 100.
88. SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on
the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled,
and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.
89. See Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 590, (1996).
90. Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, id., citing Castillo v. Castillo, 124 Phil. 485 (1966);
Edmands v. Philippine Trust Co., 87 Phil. 405 (1952).
91. Heirs of Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126996, February 15, 2000, 325 SCRA
552, 566, citing de Mesa v. CA, 231 SCRA 773.
92. Reyes-de Leon v. del Rosario, 479 Phil. 98, 107 (2004).
93. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 162.
94. Id. at 118-119.
95. Romero v. Court of Appeals, 497 Phil. 775, 784-785 (2005), citing Heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 146262, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 173.
96. Romero v. Court of Appeals, id. (Citations omitted.)
97. Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-60323, April
17, 1990, 184 SCRA 325, 330; Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA
53.
98. Rollo, (G.R. No. 114217), p. 163.
99. Rule 73, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant

of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Regional Trial
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
100. Paciente v. Dacuycuy, etc., et al., 200 Phil. 403, 408-409 (1982), citing Cui, et al. v.
Piccio, et al., 91 Phil. 712 (1952); Parco and Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 240
(1982).
101. Gomez v. Imperial, 134 Phil. 858, 864 (1968); Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 465
(1998), where the Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's jurisdiction over a case for guardianship holding that the reliance on Gomez was
misplaced, since in that case, the petition was only for guardianship; while in Garcia, the
action was for both guardianship and settlement of the estate.
102. Lastrilla v. Granada, G.R. No. 160257, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 324, 340.
(Citations omitted.)
103. See Article 188 of the Civil Code.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108538. January 22, 1996.]
LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE , petitioners, vs .

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA
DIMALANTA respondents.
DIMALANTA, cdasia
Alfredo D. Valmonte and Cirilo E. Doronia, for petitioners.

Balgos & Perez, for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; SERVICE REQUIRED IN

ACTION IN PERSONAM. — In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if
this is not possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in
Rule 14, § 7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If
defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but
otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made
by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who
cannot be personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of
substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, § 8 or by publication as provided in § 17
and 18 of the same Rule.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT MUST BE RESIDENT OF PHILIPPINES. — In all of
these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise
an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential
to make a binding decision.
3. ID.; ID.; ACTION IN REM; NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT MAY BE SERVED WITH
SUMMONS EXTERRITORIALLY. — On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a
nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served exterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, § 17. In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action
in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the
plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. — Service of summons in the manner provided in §
17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in
which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MODES. — As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident
who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with
Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)
by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order
of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant;
or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON DEFENDANT'S HUSBAND AND
COUNSEL IN PHILIPPINES, NOT VALID. — Since in the case at bar, the service of summons
upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the rst two
modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte,
can be justi ed under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem
su cient." We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the rst two, must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country
where the defendant resides. Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of
summons on Atty. Alfredo A. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons
on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the rst place, service of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17
and certainly was not a mode deemed su cient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in
default for her failure to le an answer. In the second place, service in the attempted
manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in
Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by a davit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the
grounds for the application.
DECISION
MENDOZA J :
MENDOZA, p
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. The question is whether in an

action for partition led against her and her husband, who is also her attorney, summons
intended for her may be served on her husband, who has a law o ce in the Philippines. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, said no and refused to declare Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default, but the Court of Appeals said yes. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte are husband and wife.
They are both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices
his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the
state of Washington and Manila, where he holds o ce at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A.
Mabini, Ermita, Manila. cdasia
On March 9, 1992, private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of

petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, led a complaint for partition of real property and
accounting of rentals against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. The subject of the action is a three-
door apartment located in Paco, Manila.
In her Complaint, private respondent alleged:
The plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823
Conway Road, Chester eld, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses, of
legal age and at present residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive, South Seattle,
Washington, U.S.A., but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with
summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where
defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte's spouse
holds office and where he can be found. cdtai
Apparently, the foregoing averments were made on the basis of a letter previously sent
by petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondent's counsel in which, in regard to
the partition of the property in question, she referred private respondent's counsel to
her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent.
The letter reads:
July 4, 1991
Dear Atty. Balgos:

This is in response to your letter, dated 20 June 1991, which I received on 3
July 1991. Please address all communications to my lawyer, Atty. Alfredo D.
Valmonte, whose address, telephone and fax numbers appear below. cdasia
c/o Prime Marine

Gedisco Center, Unit 304
1564 A. Mabini, Ermita
Metro Manila
Telephone: 521-1736
Fax: 521-2095
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who at the
time, was at his o ce in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons,
insofar as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, Lourdes A.
Valmonte, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf.
Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint
for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter led his Answer with Counterclaim.
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not le her Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a
special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent's motion. cdtai
In its Order dated July 3, 1992, the trial court, denied private respondent's motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A motion for reconsideration was
similarly denied on September 23, 1992. Whereupon, private respondent led a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
On December 29, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the
petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. A copy of the appellate court's
decision was received by petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte on January 15, 1993 at his Manila
office and on January 21, 1993 in Seattle, Washington. Hence, this petition.
The issue at bar is whether in light of the facts set forth above, petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was validly served with summons. In holding that she had been, the Court of
Appeals stated: 1 cdt

[I]n her above-quoted reply, Mrs. Valmonte clearly and unequivocally
directed the aforementioned counsel of Dimalanta to address all communications
(evidently referring to her controversy with her sister Mrs. Dimalanta over the Paco
property, now the subject of the instant case) to her lawyer who happens also to
be her husband. Such directive was made without any quali cation just as was
her choice/designation of her husband Atty. Valmonte as her lawyer likewise
made without any quali cation or reservation. Any disclaimer therefore on the
part of Atty. Valmonte as to his being his wife's attorney (at least with regard to
the dispute vis-a-vis (sic) the Paco property) would appear to be feeble or tri ing,
if not incredible.
This view is bolstered by Atty. Valmonte's subsequent alleged special

appearance made on behalf of his wife. Whereas Mrs. Valmonte had manifestly
authorized her husband to serve as her lawyer relative to her dispute with her
sister over the Paco property and to receive all communications regarding the
same and subsequently to appear on her behalf by way of a so-called special
appearance, she would nonetheless now insist that the same husband would
nonetheless had absolutely no authority to receive summons on her behalf. In
effect, she is asserting that representation by her lawyer (who is also her
husband) as far as the Paco property controversy is concerned, should only be
made by him when such representation would be favorable to her but not
otherwise. It would obviously be inequitable for this Court to allow private
respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte to hold that her husband has the authority to
represent her when an advantage is to be obtained by her and to deny such
authority when it would turn out to be her disadvantage. If this be allowed, Our
Rules of Court, instead of being an instrument to promote justice would be made
use of to thwart or frustrate the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Turning to another point, it would not do for Us to overlook the fact that the
disputed summons was served not upon just an ordinary lawyer of private
respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte, but upon her lawyer husband. But that is not all,
the same lawyer/husband happens to be also her co-defendant in the instant
case which involves real property which, according to her lawyer/husband/co-
defendant, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the defendants (the spouses
Valmonte). It is highly inconceivable and certainly it would be contrary to human
nature for the lawyer/husband/co-defendant to keep to himself the fact that they
(the spouses Valmonte) had been sued with regard to a property which he claims
to be conjugal. Parenthetically, there is nothing in the records of the case before
Us regarding any manifestation by private respondent Lourdes A. Valmonte about
her lack of knowledge about the case instituted against her and her
lawyer/husband/co-defendant by her sister Rosita. . . . aisadc
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamus is given due course. This Court hereby Resolves to nullify the orders
of the court a quo dated July 3, 1992 and September 23, 1992 and further
declares private respondent Lourdes Arreola Valmonte as having been properly
served with summons.
Petitioners assail the aforequoted decision, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) in refusing to apply the provisions of Rule 14, § 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and
applying instead Rule 14, § 8 when the fact is that petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14, § 8 is the applicable provision,
there was no valid substituted service as there was no strict compliance with the
requirement by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte. Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts that petitioners are invoking a
technicality and that strict adherence to the rules would only result in a useless ceremony.
We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte.
To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine rst the nature of the action
led against petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private
respondent, whether it is an action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is because the
rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is
one or the other of these actions. cdta
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and
he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, § 7-8 2 is
essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. 3 If defendant cannot be
served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine
resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication. 4 Otherwise
stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally served
with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance
with Rule 14, § 8 or by publication as provided in § 17 and 18 of the same Rule. 5
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the
Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over
his person is essential to make a binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in
the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, § 17,
which provides: cdasia
§ 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside

and is not found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines,
in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under Section 7; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem su cient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem is
that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled
in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in § 17 is not for the purpose of vesting
it with jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that
property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect
his interest if he is so minded. 6 cdtai
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's action, which is
for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such
an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a speci c
property and not to render a judgment against him. As explained in the leading case of
Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca: 7
[An action quasi in rem is] an action which while not strictly speaking an
action in rem partakes of that nature and is substantially such. . . . The action
quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the
former an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the
property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the

Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such
service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any
other manner which the court may deem sufficient. cdtai
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the rst two modes, the question is whether
the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justi ed under the third
mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the rst two, must be made outside the
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the
defendant resides. 8 Moreover, there are several reasons why the service of summons on
Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte. In the rst place, service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and
certainly was not a mode deemed su cient by the court which in fact refused to consider
the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default
for her failure to file an answer.
In the second place, service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19,
such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by a davit of the plaintiff
or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application. cdt
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave,
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to le her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. It must be noted
that the period to le an Answer in an action against a resident defendant differs from the
period given in an action led against a nonresident defendant who is not found in the
Philippines. In the former, the period is fteen (15) days from service of summons, while in
the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Strict compliance with these requirements alone can assure observance of due
process. That is why in one case, 9 although the Court considered publication in the
Philippines of the summons (against the contention that it should be made in the foreign
state where defendant was residing) su cient, nonetheless the service was considered
insu cient because no copy of the summons was sent to the last known correct address
in the Philippines.
Private respondent cites the ruling in De Leon v. Hontanosas , 67 SCRA 458, 462-463
(1975), in which it was held that service of summons upon the defendant's husband was
binding on her. But the ruling in that case is justi ed because summons were served upon
defendant's husband in their conjugal home in Cebu City and the wife was only temporarily
absent, having gone to Dumaguete City for a vacation. The action was for collection of a
sum of money. In accordance with Rule 14, § 8, substituted service could be made on any
person of su cient discretion in the dwelling place of the defendant, and certainly
defendant's husband, who was there, was competent to receive the summons on her
behalf. In any event, it appears that defendant in that case submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court by instructing her husband to move for the dissolution of the writ of attachment
issued in that case. aisadc
On the other hand, in the case of Gemperle v. Schenker, 1 0 it was held that service on
the wife of a nonresident defendant was found su cient because the defendant had
appointed his wife as his attorney-in-fact. It was held that although defendant Paul
Schenker was a Swiss citizen and resident of Switzerland, service of summons upon his
wife Helen Schenker who was in the Philippines was su cient because she was her
husband's representative and attorney-in-fact in a civil case, which he had earlier led
against William Gemperle. In fact Gemperle's action was for damages arising from
allegedly derogatory statements contained in the complaint led in the rst case. As this
Court said, "[i]n other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued, on
behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits led
against him, particularly in a case, like the one at bar, which is a consequence of the action
brought by her on his behalf." 1 1 Indeed, if instead of ling an independent action Gemperle
led a counterclaim in the action brought by Mr. Schenker against him, there would have
been no doubt that the trial court could have acquired jurisdiction over Mr. Schenker
through his agent and attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Schenker.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her
husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent's attorney that "all
communications" intended for her should be addressed to her husband who is also her
lawyer at the latter's address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive summons for her
can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter was written seven months before the ling of
this case below, and it appears that it was written in connection with the negotiations
between her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the
property in question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority given to
petitioner's husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed as also including
an authority to represent her in any litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was no valid service on petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in this case. cdta
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the orders dated July 3,
1992 and September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Per Serafin Guingona, J., with whom Santiago Kapunan (now member of the Supreme
Court) and Oscar Herrera, JJ. concurred.
2. Rule 14, § 7 provides: "Personal service of summons. — The summons shall be served by
handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or if, he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him."
Rule 14, § 8 provides: "Substituted service. — If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof." cdta
3. Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305, 312 (1987), citing Pantaleon v. Asuncion,
105 Phil. 761; Sequito v. Letrondo, 10 Phil. 1134.
4. Rule 14, § 18 provides: "Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action
is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but
who is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines, as under the preceding section."
5. See Montalban v. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070 (1968). cdasia
6. Banco Español-Filipino Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918); Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186
(1939); Sahagun v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 44 (1991).
7. 37 Phil. 921, 928 (1918). See also Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186, 192 (1939).
8. E.g., De Midgely v. Ferrandos, 64 SCRA 23 (1975).
9. Sahagun v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 44 (1991). Compare the strict observance of rule
required for substituted service under Rule 14, § 8 in Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 215
(1977). cdtai
10. 125 Phil. 458 (1967).
11. Id. at 47.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163584. December 12, 2006.]
REMELITA M. ROBINSON , petitioner, vs . CELITA B. MIRALLES ,

respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ J :
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, p
Before us is the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions
dated February 11 1 and May 11, 2004 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274,
Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 00-0372. ScTaEA
On August 25, 2000, Celita Miralles, respondent, led with the said court a
complaint for sum of money against Remelita Robinson, petitioner, docketed as Civil
Case No. 00-0372. Respondent alleged that petitioner borrowed from her
US$20,054.00 as shown by a Memorandum of Agreement they both executed on
January 12, 2000.
Summons was served on petitioner at her given address. However, per return of
service of Sheriff Maximo Potente dated March 5, 2001, petitioner no longer resides at
such address.
On July 20, 2001, the trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19
Baguio St., Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City, petitioner's new address.
Again, the summons could not be served on petitioner. Sheriff Potente explained
that:
The Security Guard assigned at the gate of Alabang Hills refused to let me
go inside the subdivision so that I could effect the service of the summons to the
defendant in this case. The security guard alleged that the defendant had given
them instructions not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is not around. I
explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the summons to the
defendant, and if the defendant is not around, summons can be received by any
person of suitable age and discretion living in the same house. Despite of all the
explanation, the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche still refused to let me
go inside the subdivision and served (sic) the summons to the defendant. The
same thing happened when I attempted to serve the summons previously.
Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof together
with the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche,
who refused to a x his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the
one to give the same to the defendant.
Eventually, respondent led a motion to declare petitioner in default for her

failure to file an answer seasonably despite service of summons.
On February 28, 2003, the trial court granted respondent's motion declaring
petitioner in default and allowing respondent to present her evidence ex parte.

On June 20, 2003, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against defendant ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff as follows:
1. The sum of US$20,054.00 as the unpaid obligation, plus the

stipulated interest of 3% a month from May 2000 (date of default)
until fully paid;
2. Php100,000.00 for moral damages;
3. Php50,000.00 plus Php1,500.00 per appearance as attorney's fees;
4. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
A copy of the Order was sent to petitioner by registered mail at her new address.
Upon respondent's motion, the trial court, on September 8, 2003, issued a writ of
execution.
On September 26, 2003, petitioner led with the trial court a petition for relief
from the judgment by default. She claimed that summons was improperly served upon
her, thus, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her and that all its proceedings
are void. HCTDIS
On February 11, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution denying the petition for
relief. Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in
a Resolution dated May 11, 2004.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the trial court correctly ruled that a
substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is noti ed of the action brought
against him or her. 3 In a civil action, service of summons is the means by which the
court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 4 Any judgment without
such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void. 5 Where the action is in
personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be
made through personal or substituted service in the manner provided for in Sections 6
and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, 6 thus:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justi able causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section,
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein;
or (b) by leaving the copies at the defendant's o ce or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof.
Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over

substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary in
character. 7 For substituted service to be justi ed, the following circumstances must
be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was
served upon a person of su cient age and discretion residing at the party's residence
or upon a competent person in charge of the party's o ce or place of business. 8
Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
9
Petitioner contends that the service of summons upon the subdivision security
guard is not in compliance with Section 7, Rule 14 since he is not related to her or
staying at her residence. Moreover, he is not duly authorized to receive summons for
the residents of the village. Hence, the substituted service of summons is not valid and
that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person.
We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that
authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. 1 0 However, we frown upon an overly
strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
rules, that governs.
In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security
guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from
allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was
impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff's declaration. Nor did she
deny having received the summons through the security guard.
Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its
consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly
served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and we AFFIRM the assailed Orders of the
RTC, Branch 274, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 00-0372. Costs against petitioner. SaITHC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 24. Per Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.

2. Id., p. 25.
3. Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 762, 769.
4. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 98, 102, citing
Licaros v. Licaros, id.
5. Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 243, 247, citing
Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 156 SCRA 305 (1987).
6. Oaminal v. Castillo, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 189, 196.
7. Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 736, citing Keister v.
Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).
8. Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., supra, 249, citing Laus v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 688 (1993).
9. Samartino v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 670, citing Madrigal v.
Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 331 (1999).
10. Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank v. King, G.R. No. 78252, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA
60, citing Keister v. Navarro, supra, Arevalo v. Quilatan, 116 SCRA 700 (1982).

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217617. April 5, 2017.]
CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN , petitioner, vs. BANCO DE ORO (formerly

BANK) respondent.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK),
[G.R. No. 218540. April 5, 2017.]
ELISEO C. BORLONGAN, JR. , petitioner, vs. BDO UNIBANK, INC.

BANK) respondent.
(formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK),
RESOLUTION
JR. J :
VELASCO, JR., p
Nature of the Case

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions invariably assailing the
foreclosure sale of a property without properly serving the summons upon its owners.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired
a real property located at No. 111, Sampaguita St., Valle Verde II, Pasig City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 0421 (the subject property). In 2012, they went to
the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in preparation for a
prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title contained an
annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an execution sale in
Civil Case (CC) No. 03-0713 pending before Branch 134 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (Makati RTC).
Petitioner immediately procured a copy of the records of CC No. 03-0713 and
found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), formerly Equitable PCI Bank, led a
complaint for sum of money against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan
obligations obtained from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons,
including Carmelita, who supposedly signed four (4) security agreements totaling
P13,500,000 to guarantee the obligations of Tancho Corporation.
It appears from the records of CC No. 03-0713 that on July 2, 2003, the Makati
RTC issued an Order directing the service of summons to all the defendants at the
business address of Tancho Corporation provided by BDO: Fumakilla Compound,
Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Brgy. Dela Paz, Pasig City (Fumakilla Compound). CAIHTE
Parenthetically, the records of CC No. 03-0713 show that respondent BDO

already foreclosed the Fumakilla Compound as early as August 21, 2000, following
Tancho Corporation's failure to pay its obligation, and BDO already consolidated its
ownership of the property on November 16, 2001.
Understandably, on July 31, 2003, the process server led an O cer's Return
stating that summons remained unserved as the "defendants are no longer holding
office at [Fumakilla Compound]."
On October 27, 2003, after the single attempt at personal service on Carmelita
and her co-defendants, BDO moved for leave to serve the summons by publication. On
October 28, 2003, the RTC granted the motion.
On August 10, 2004, BDO led an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Attachment against the defendants, including Carmelita. During the hearing on the
motion, BDO submitted a copy of the title of the subject property. The Makati RTC
thereafter granted BDO's motion and a Writ of Attachment was issued against the
defendants in CC No. 03-0713, effectively attaching the subject property on behalf of
BDO.
On December 20, 2005, BDO led an ex-parte motion praying, among others, that
the summons and the complaint be served against Carmelita at the subject property.
The Makati RTC granted the motion. On February 9, 2006, the Sheriff led a return
stating that no actual personal service was made as Carmelita "is no longer residing at
the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information gathered from
the security guard on duty."
On May 30, 2006, however, BDO led a manifestation stating that it had complied
with the October 28, 2003 Order of the Makati RTC having caused the publication of the
alias summons and the complaint in People's Taliba on May 15, 2006.
Thereafter, upon BDO's motion, the Makati RTC declared the defendants in CC
No. 03-0713, including Carmelita, in default. BDO soon after proceeded to present its
evidence ex-parte.
On November 29, 2007, the Makati RTC rendered a Decision holding the
defendants in CC No. 03-0713 liable to pay BDO P32,543,856.33 plus 12% interest per
annum from the time of the ling of the complaint until fully paid and attorney's fees.
The Makati RTC decision was published on June 9, 2008.
On August 20, 2008, the Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon BDO's
motion. The Order states that in the event that the judgment obligors cannot pay all or
part of the obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the defendants to
satisfy the award.
On October 28, 2008, the Makati RTC's sheriff led a Report stating that he tried
to serve the Writ of Execution upon the defendants at Fumakilla Compound but he was
not able to do so since the defendants were no longer holding o ce thereat. The
Sheriff also reported that, on the same day, he went to the subject property to serve the
execution but likewise failed in his attempt since Carmelita was no longer residing at
the said address.
On November 11, 2008, BDO led a Motion to Conduct Auction of the subject
property. The motion was granted by the Makati RTC on May 5, 2009 so that the
subject property was sold to BDO, as the highest bidder, on October 6, 2009.
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an a davit
of adverse claim and, on January 21, 2013, led a Complaint for Annulment of Surety
Agreements, Notice of Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents,
docketed as CC No. 73761, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Pasig RTC). 1
He alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that
belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains he established with his wife. He further
averred that the alleged surety agreements upon which the attachment of the property
was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and did not redound to
bene t their family. Thus, he prayed that the surety agreements and all other
documents and processes, including the ensuing attachment, levy and execution sale,
based thereon be nullified.
BDO led a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has
no jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's Complaint, the case was barred by res judicata given the
Decision and orders of the Makati RTC, and, finally, the Complaint failed to state a cause
of action.
In an Order dated May 31, 2013, the Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that it could not pass upon matters already brought before
the RTC Makati and, citing Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals , 2 the husband of a
judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can le a separate and independent
action to determine the validity of the levy and sale of a property.
On a motion for reconsideration filed by Eliseo, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case
with quali cation. Relying on Buado v. Court of Appeals , 3 the Pasig RTC held that since
majority of Eliseo's causes of action were premised on a claim that the obligation
contracted by his wife has not redounded to their family, and, thus, the levy on their
property was illegal, his ling of a separate action is not an encroachment on the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC, which ordered the attachment and execution in the rst
place.
The Pasig RTC clari ed, however, that it cannot annul the surety agreements
supposedly signed by Carmelita since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements and
the validity and e cacy of these contracts had already been decided by the Makati
RTC.
Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA).
In its petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133994, BDO contended that it was an
error for the Pasig RTC to apply Buado as it does not apply squarely to the
circumstances of the case and has not superseded Ching. BDO maintained that by
reinstating the complaint, Pasig RTC has violated the rule prohibiting non-interference
by one court with the orders of a co-equal court.
In its January 20, 2015 Decision, 4 the appellate court granted BDO's petition and
ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from hearing CC No. 73761 commenced by Eliseo. In
so ruling, the CA held that Eliseo is not a stranger who can initiate an action
independent from the case where the attachment and execution sale were ordered.
Thus, the CA concluded that in opting to review the validity of the levy and execution
sale of the subject property pursuant to the judgment of the Makati RTC, the Pasig RTC
acted without jurisdiction.
Eliseo moved for, but was denied, reconsideration by the appellate court. Hence,
he came to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 218540.
On August 19, 2015, the Court issued a Resolution denying Eliseo's petition.
Eliseo begs to differ and takes exception from the said holding in his motion for
reconsideration dated October 5, 2015, which is presently for Resolution by this Court.
Meanwhile, on an ex-parte omnibus motion led by BDO, the Makati RTC ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the issuance of a new TCT covering the
subject property in favor of the respondent bank.
Arguing that the Makati RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as the
service of the summons and the other processes of the court was defective, Carmelita
led a Petition for Annulment of Judgment (With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) with the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 134664.
Before the CA can act on the Petition for Annulment, the Borlongans found
posted on the subject property a Writ of Possession dated August 1, 2014 and a
Notice to Vacate dated August 29, 2014.
In its Resolution dated November 12, 2014, 5 the appellate court denied
Carmelita's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction (WPI). HEITAD
Aggrieved, Carmelita interposed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA's

November 12, 2014 Resolution. On March 23, 2015, however, the appellate court
denied her motion for reconsideration, holding that "upon the expiration of the
redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed
property becomes absolute."
Thus, on April 27, 2015, Carmelita led a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R.
No. 217617 , before this Court, ascribing to the appellate court the commission of
serious reversible errors. The Court denied the petition on June 22, 2015. Hence, on
September 1, 2015, Carmelita interposed a Motion for Reconsideration urging the
Court to take a second hard look at the facts of the case and reconsider its stance.
Considering that both cases originated from the same facts and involved
interrelated issues, on January 25, 2016, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No.
218540 with G.R. No. 217617.
Issues
The question posed in G.R. No. 217617 is whether or not the CA erred in refusing
to issue a TRO and/or WPI stopping the consolidation of BDO's ownership over the
subject property. On the other hand, the issue in G.R. No. 218540 revolves around
whether the Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case led by the non-
debtor husband to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property ordered by
the Makati RTC against his wife.
Our Ruling
A reexamination of the antecedents and arguments in G.R. Nos. 217617 and
218540 compels the reversal of the appellate court's resolutions in both cases.
G.R. No. 217617
The Issuance of a TRO/WPI is not
a prejudgment of the main case
On the propriety of CA's refusal to issue a TRO/WPI, it is worthy to note that
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, viz.:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of
an act or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act
or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is
warranted where there is a showing that there exists a right to be protected and that
the acts against which the writ is to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise
stated, for a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only
inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.
I n Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. v. Vogue Traders Clothing Company , 6 the
Court already explained that the issuance of a TRO is not conclusive of the outcome of
the case as it requires but a sampling of the evidence, viz.:
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial
and incomplete evidence adduced by the applicant (herein petitioner). The
evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not
conclusive, for only a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an
idea of the justi cation for its issuance pending the decision of the
case on the merits. As such, the ndings of fact and opinion of a court when
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature. Moreover,
the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Since Section 4 of Rule 58
of the Rules of Civil Procedure gives the trial courts su cient discretion to
evaluate the con icting claims in an application for a provisional writ which
often involves a factual determination, the appellate courts generally will not
interfere in the absence of manifest abuse of such discretion. A writ of
preliminary injunction would become a prejudgment of a case only
when it grants the main prayer in the complaint or responsive
pleading,
pleading so much so that there is nothing left for the trial court to try except
merely incidental matters. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the primary prayer of the Petition for Annulment before the appellate
court is the declaration of the nullity of the proceedings in the RTC and its Decision
dated November 29, 2007; it is not merely con ned to the prevention of the issuance of
the writ of possession and the consolidation of the ownership of the subject property
in BDO's name — the concerns of the prayer for the TRO and/or WPI.
Indeed, the petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI was
intended to preserve the status quo ante, 7 and not to pre-empt the appellate court's
decision on the merits of her petition for annulment. Thus, it was a grievous error on the
part of the CA to deny her of this provisional remedy.
The appellate court's error is readily apparent given the stark existence of the
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On the rst ground, petitioner has a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property but her
constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be deprived of her
property. No less than Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law,
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws. (emphasis supplied)
In its classic formulation, due process means that any person with interest to the
thing in litigation must be noti ed and given an opportunity to defend that
interest. 8 Thus, as the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of her defense,
she must be properly served the summons of the court . In other words, the
service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process 9 and
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of
due process as it is of jurisdiction. 1 0 Unfortunately, as will be discussed, it would seem
that the Constitutional right of the petitioner to be properly served the summons and be
notified has been disregarded by the officers of the trial court.
At this very juncture, the existence of the second ground for the issuance of a
TRO and/or WPI is self-evident. Without a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the respondent
bank from continuing in the possession and consolidating the ownership of the subject
property, petitioner's right to be afforded due process will unceasingly be
violated.
It need not be stressed that a continuous violation of constitutional rights is by
itself a grave and irreparable injury that this or any court cannot plausibly tolerate.
Without a doubt, the appellate court should have acted intrepidly and issued the
TRO and/or WPI posthaste to protect the constitutional rights of petitioner, as it is
duty-bound to do.
The performance of official
duty was not regular
Regrettably, the appellate court fell short in the ful llment of its mandate and
instead relied on the disputable presumption that "o cial duty has been regularly
performed." The Court cannot subscribe to the position taken by the appellate court.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, substituted
service may be resorted to. Service of summons by publication can be resorted to only
if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry." The relevant sections of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provide, thus:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's o ce or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown. — In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and
for such time as the court may order.
It is, therefore, proper to state that the hierarchy and rules in the service of
summons are as follows:
(1) Personal service;
(2) Substituted service, if for justi able causes the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time; and
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
Simply put, personal service of summons is the preferred mode. And, the rules on
the service of summons other than by personal service may be used only as
prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by statute. Thus, the
impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts
have been made to nd the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed
before substituted service may be availed. 1 1 Furthermore, their rules must be followed
strictly, faithfully and fully as they are extraordinary in character and considered in
derogation of the usual method of service.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals , 1 2 the Court enumerated and explained the
requirements to effect a valid service of summons other than by personal service, viz.:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service TIADCc
xxx xxx xxx

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons
to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to
personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one
month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of
prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries,
preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that
impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to nd the defendant and the reasons behind the failure
must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the
attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the
name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all
other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be
speci ed in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff's
Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for
Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of
the efforts made to nd the defendant personally and the fact of failure.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires
that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to nd the defendant personally and the failure of such
efforts," which should be made in the proof of service.
In the case now before Us, the summons was served on the petitioner by
publication.
publication Yet, the circumstances surrounding the case do not justify the resort.
Consider: in July 2003, the sheriff attempted to serve the summons on the
defendants, including petitioner Carmelita, at Fumakilla Compound, i.e., at the property
already foreclosed, acquired, and possessed by the respondent bank as early as
August 2001. Immediately after this single attempt at personal service in July 2003,
the respondent bank moved in October 2003 for leave to serve the summons by
publication (and not even substituted service), which motion the RTC granted.
Clearly, there was no diligent effort made to nd the petitioner and properly
serve her the summons before the service by publication was allowed. Neither was it
impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her whereabouts.
It should be noted that the principal obligor in CC No. 03-0713 was Tancho
Corporation and petitioner Carmelita was impleaded only because she supposedly
signed a surety agreement as a director. As a juridical person, Tancho Corporation is
required to le mandatory corporate papers with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), such as its General Information Sheet (GIS). In 1997 and 2000, the
GIS led by Tancho Corporation with the SEC provided the names of its directors and
their addresses. One of these directors included petitioner Carmelita with her address
listed at 41 Chicago St., Quezon City. The GIS of Tancho Corporation was readily
available to the public including the RTC's process server and respondent bank. cSEDTC
Patently, it cannot be plausibly argued that it was impossible to nd the

petitioner and personally serve her with summons. In like manner, it can hardly be
stated that the process server regularly performed his duty.
The subject property was not
foreclosed by the respondent
bank; right of BDO to the
possession of the subject
property is questionable
Still unwilling to issue the TRO and/or WPI fervently prayed for by petitioner, the
appellate court held that "upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the
purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute." This Court
cannot affirm the appellate court's ruling.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the subject property was never
mortgaged to, much less foreclosed by, the respondent bank. Thus, it was error for the
CA to refer to the subject property as "foreclosed property."
Rather, as disclosed by the records, the possession of the subject property was
acquired by BDO through attachment and later by execution sale. However, it is
presumptive to state that the right of BDO over the possession of the subject property
is now absolute considering that there is an action that questions the validity of the
bank's acquisition over the same property.
I n Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court , 1 3 we explained that the
expiration of the redemption period does not automatically vest in the auction
purchaser an absolute possessory right over the property, viz.:

From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that the writ of possession
may issue in favor of a purchaser in an execution sale when the deed of
conveyance has been executed and delivered to him after the period of
redemption has expired and no redemption has been made by the judgment
debtor.
A writ of possession is complementary to a writ of execution (see Vda. de
Bogacki v. Inserto , 111 SCRA 356, 363), and in an execution sale, it is a
consequence of a writ of execution, a public auction sale, and the ful llment of
several other conditions for conveyance set by law. The issuance of a writ of
possession is dependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages
preceding it. Any aw a icting any of its stages, therefore, could affect the
validity of its issuance.
In the case at bar, the validity of the levy and sale of the properties
is directly put in issue in another case by the petitioners. This Court
nds it an issue which requires pre-emptive resolution. For if the respondent
acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the levy and sale, then,
he is not entitled to its possession.
The respondent appellate court's emphasis on the failure of the petitioner
to redeem the properties within the period required by law is misplaced because
redemption , in this case, is inconsistent with the petitioner's claim of
invalidity of levy and sale. Redemption is an implied admission of the
regularity of the sale and would estop the petitioner from later
impugning its validity on that ground. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, even given the expiration of the redemption period, a TRO and/or WPI is
still obtainable and warranted where the validity of the acquisition of the possession is
afflicted by Constitutional and procedural infirmities.
G.R. No. 218540
Eliseo can file an independent action
for the annulment of the attachment
of their conjugal property
As to the question of the Pasig RTC's jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint, we
cannot subscribe to BDO's contention that Eliseo cannot le a separate and
independent action for the annulment of the levy on their conjugal property.
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of
properties under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action
with another court. It states, thus:
SECTION 16. Proceedings Where Property Claimed by Third Person.
— If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent, and such person makes an a davit of his title thereto or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and
serves the same upon the o cer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the
judgment obligee, the o cer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless
such judgment obligee, on demand of the o cer, les a bond approved by the
court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of
the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall
be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages
for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond.
SDAaTC

The o cer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of
the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is led. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action , or prevent the
judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action
against a third-party claimant who led a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
(emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision
requires only that that the claim is a third-party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser
then is this: is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property
was executed on account of the other spouse's debt, a "stranger" to the suit? In Buado
v. Court of Appeals, 1 4 this Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue,
it must rst be determined whether the debt had redounded to the bene t of the
conjugal partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can
le an independent separate action, distinct from the action in which the writ was
issued. We held, thus:
A third-party claim must be led [by] a person other than the judgment
debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may le a third-
party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the
suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other
spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the bene t of the
conjugal partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article
122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the
civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the
personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage
or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
partnership .
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the ling of a separate action by respondent is proper and
jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is not disputed that the conjugal property was attached on
the basis of a surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita for and in behalf of
Tancho Corporation. In our 2004 Decision in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals , 1 5 we
elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal partnership is
benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety,
surety holding thusly:
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal
partnership of the petitioners was bene ted by the petitioner-husband's act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private
respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the
private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the bene t of the latter. No
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of
surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be bene ted. The
private respondent was burdened to establish that such bene t
redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the
Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and
that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that
the petitioner-husband's career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive
because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the bene ts
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The bene ts must be
those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-
product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or
receives services to be used for his own business or profession. In the Ayala
case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term "obligation for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-
Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are not controlling because the husband, in those
cases, contracted the obligation for his own business. In this case, the
petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the
PBMCI from the private respondent. (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, it is not apparent from the records of this case that BDO had
established the bene t to the conjugal partnership owing from the surety agreement
allegedly signed by Carmelita. Thus, Eliseo's claim over the subject property lodged
with the RTC Pasig is proper, with the latter correctly exercising jurisdiction thereon. acEHCD
Besides, BDO's reliance on Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals 1 6 (2003) is

improper. In the present case, Eliseo and his wife discovered the attachment of their
conjugal property only after the nality of the decision by the RTC Makati. There was,
therefore, no opportunity for Eliseo to intervene in the case before the RTC Makati
which attached the conjugal property, as a motion to intervene can only be led "at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court." 1 7 This spells the whale of
difference between the case at bar and the earlier Spouses Ching. Unlike in the present
case, the debtor in the case cited by BDO was properly informed of the collection suit
and his spouse had the opportunity to question the attachment of their conjugal
property before the court that issued the levy on attachment, but simply refused to do
so. Thus, to now deny Eliseo the opportunity to question the attachment made by the
RTC Makati in a separate and independent action will be to, again, refuse him the due
process of law before their property is taken. As this Court is duty-bound to protect
and enforce Constitutional rights, this we cannot allow.
WHEREFORE , the petitions are GRANTED.
(1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133994 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 155 is ordered to continue with the proceedings
and decide Civil Case No. 73761 with reasonable dispatch.
(2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining,
prohibiting, and preventing respondent Banco De Oro, its assigns, transferees,
successors, or any and all other persons acting on its behalf from possessing, selling,
transferring, encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the property
subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid and effective until such time as
the rights and interests of the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 shall have been
determined and finally resolved.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Reyes, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. The Complaint was raffled to Branch 155 of the Pasig RTC.

2. G.R. No. 118830, February 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 88.
3. G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 396.

4. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebecca Guia-Salvador and Ramon A. Cruz.
5. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices
Magdangal M. De Leon and Stephen C. Cruz.
6. G.R. No. 132993, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 52.

7. Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa, G.R. No. 143994, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 535.
8. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, November 26, 2014, 743
SCRA 52.
9. Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 184333, April 1, 2013, 694 SCRA 302.
10. Samartino v. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 670.
11. Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, supra note 9; citing Casimina v. Legaspi, 500 Phil.
560, 569 (2005) and B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ampeloquio Realty
Development, Inc., G.R. No. 169919, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 468, 474-475. See
also Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21.
12. Supra note 11.
13. No. L-69294, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 563.

14. Supra note 3.
15. G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004.

16. Supra note 2.
17. RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Section 2.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172242. August 14, 2007.]
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. , petitioner, vs . DAKILA

CORPORATION respondent.
TRADING CORPORATION,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
The case before this Court is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision, 2
dated 4 April 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78981, which a rmed the
Orders, dated 4 November 2002 3 and 20 June 2003, 4 of the Mandaluyong City Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212, in Civil Case No. MC99-605, which, in turn, denied the Motion
to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioner Perkin Elmer
Singapore Pte Ltd.
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Singapore.
It is not considered as a foreign corporation "doing business" in the Philippines. Herein
respondent Dakila Trading Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws, and engaged in the business of selling and leasing out laboratory
instrumentation and process control instrumentation, and trading of laboratory chemicals
and supplies.
The antecedents of the present case are as follows:
Respondent entered into a Distribution Agreement 5 on 1 June 1990 with Perkin-
Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA), a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing,
selling or distributing various laboratory/analytical instruments. By virtue of the said
agreement, PEIA appointed the respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the
Philippines. The respondent was likewise granted the right to purchase and sell the
products of PEIA subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Distribution
Agreement. PEIA, on the other hand, shall give respondent a commission for the sale of its
products in the Philippines. ADCEcI
Under the same Distribution Agreement, respondent shall order the products of
PEIA, which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin-Elmer
Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP), an a liate of PEIA. PEIP is a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, and involved in the business
of wholesale trading of all kinds of scienti c, biotechnological, and analytical instruments
and appliances. PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP.
On 2 August 1997, however, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement,
prompting respondent to le before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, a
Complaint 6 for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a
Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP, docketed as Civil Case No. MC99-605.

The RTC issued an Order, 7 dated 26 March 1999, denying respondent's prayer for
the issuance of a writ of attachment. The respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
said Order but it was denied in another Order, dated 11 January 2000. 8
Respondent then led Ex-Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of
Court to Deputize Respondent's General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons
Outside of the Philippines, 9 which the RTC granted in its Order, dated 27 April 2000. 1 0
Thus, an Alias Summons, dated 4 September 2000, was issued by the RTC to PEIA. But the
said Alias Summons was served on 28 September 2000 and received by Perkinelmer
Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a
separate and distinct entity from PEIA.
PEIP moved to dismiss 1 1 the Complaint led by respondent on the ground that it
states no cause of action. Perkinelmer Asia, on the other hand, through its counsel, sent
letters, dated 12 October 2000 1 2 and 15 November 2000, 1 3 to the respondent and to the
RTC, respectively, to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon Perkinelmer
Asia.
Accordingly, respondent led an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,
together with the Amended Complaint claiming that PEIA had become a sole
proprietorship 1 4 owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its name to
Perkinelmer Asia. Being a sole proprietorship of the petitioner, a change in PEIA's name
and juridical status did not detract from the fact that all its due and outstanding
obligations to third parties were assumed by the petitioner. Hence, in its Amended
Complaint 1 5 respondent sought to change the name of PEIA to that of the petitioner. In an
Order, dated 24 July 2001, 1 6 the RTC admitted the Amended Complaint led by the
respondent. Respondent then filed another Motion 1 7 for the Issuance of Summons and for
Leave of Court to Deputize Respondent's General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve
Summons Outside the Philippines. In another Order, dated 4 March 2002, 1 8 the RTC
deputized respondent's General Manager to serve summons on petitioner in Singapore.
The RTC thus issued summons 1 9 to the petitioner. Acting on the said Order, respondent's
General Manager went to Singapore and served summons on the petitioner.
Meanwhile, in an Order, dated 10 October 2001, the RTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss filed by PEIP, compelling the latter to file its Answer to the Amended Complaint.
Petitioner subsequently led with the RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to
Dismiss 2 0 respondent's Amended Complaint on 30 May 2002 based on the following
grounds: (1) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner; (2) the
respondent failed to state a cause of action against the petitioner because it is not the real
party-in-interest; (3) even assuming arguendo that the respondent correctly led the case
against the petitioner, the Distribution Agreement which was the basis of its claim grants
PEIA the right to terminate the contract at any time; and (4) the venue was improperly laid.
The RTC in its Order, dated 4 November 2002, denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
ratiocinating as follows:
Prescinding from the above arguments of both parties, the [RTC] is inclined
to DENY the Motion to Dismiss.
A careful scrutiny on (sic) the allegation in the (Amended) Complaint
would show that [herein respondent] alleges ownership by the [herein petitioner]
of shares of stocks in the [PEIP]. Such allegation of ownership of shares of stocks
by the [petitioner] would reveal that there is an allegation of personal property in
the Philippines. Shares of stocks represent personal property of the shareholder.
Thus, it follows that even though the Amended Complaint is primarily for
damages, it does relate to a property of the [petitioner], to which the latter has a
claim interest (sic), or an actual or contingent lien, which will make it fall under
one of the requisite (sic) for extraterritorial service under Section 15, Rule 14, of
the Rules of Court. Thus, it could be gainfully said that the summons had been
validly served for [RTC] to acquire jurisdiction over the [petitioner]. EcaDCI
The [petitioner] hinges its dismissal on the failure of the [respondent] to

state a cause of action. The [RTC] would like to emphasize that in a Motion to
Dismiss, it hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in a complaint.
When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint .
. . and from no other . . . and the Court cannot consider other matters aliunde . . . .
This implies that the issue must be passed upon on the basis of the allegations
and declare them to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and a denial
of due process to the [respondent] . . . .
The three (3) essential elements of a cause of action are the following:
a) The plaintiff's legal rights;
b) A correlative obligation of the defendant;
c) The omission of the defendant in violation of the legal rights.
A cursory reading of the Amended Complaint would reveal that all of the
essential elements of a cause of action are attendant in the Amended Complaint.
As for the contention that venue was improperly laid, . . ., the [RTC] in its
ultimate desire that the ends of justice could be served in its fullest, cannot rule
that venue was improperly laid.
xxx xxx xxx
The stipulation as to the venue of a prospective action does not preclude

the ling of the suit in the residence of the [respondent] under Section 2, Rule 4,
Rules of Court, especially where the venue stipulation was imposed by the
[petitioner] for its own benefits.
xxx xxx xxx
The [RTC] further believes that it is imperative that in order to ferret out the
truth, a full-blown trial is necessary for parties to be able to prove or disapprove
their allegations. 2 1 TADaCH
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Order but, it was denied by
the RTC in its Order, dated 20 June 2003.
Consequently, petitioner led a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure with application for temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. The Court of Appeals never issued any temporary restraining order
or writ of injunction. On 4 April 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision a rming
the RTC Orders of 4 November 2002 and 20 June 2003.
This brings us to the present Petition before this Court wherein petitioner raised the
following issues.
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON PETITIONER WAS DEFECTIVE AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT THUS FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING

THAT THE "SOLE ISSUE" IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BEFORE IT IS THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
THE PETITIONER THROUGH THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS.
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND REVERSED THE RTC ORDERS ON THE GROUND THAT THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER.
1. BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE EX-PARTE MOTION TO ADMIT AMENDED COMPLAINT,

AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND ALL DOCUMENTS ATTACHED AND/OR RELATED THERETO,
PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST DEFENDANT IN THE CASE BELOW.
2. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT DAKILA FILED THIS CASE AGAINST THE
CORRECT [PARTY], INASMUCH AS THE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENT DATED 1 JUNE 1990
GRANTS [PEIA] THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE CONTRACT AT ANY TIME, RESPONDENT
DAKILA FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE CASE BELOW.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND REVERSED THE RTC ORDERS ON THE GROUND OF IMPROPER VENUE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR

WRIT OF INJUNCTION. cIACaT
The foregoing issues raised by petitioner essentially requires this Court to make a
determination of the (1) proper service of summons and acquisition of jurisdiction by the
RTC over the person of the petitioner; (2) existence of a cause of action against petitioner
in respondent's Amended Complaint; and (3) proper venue for respondent's civil case
against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that Civil Case No. MC99-605 involves an action for collection
of sum of money and damages arising from the alleged breach of the Distribution
Agreement. The action is one in personam, or an action against a person based on his
personal liability; and for the court a quo to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, personal service of summons, and not extraterritorial service of summons, must
be made within the state even if the petitioner is a non-resident. Petitioner avers that
extraterritorial service of summons stated under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, is only proper in in rem and quasi in rem cases; thus, resort to an
extraterritorial service of summons in the case at bar was erroneous. Petitioner
asseverates that the allegations in the respondent's Amended Complaint that the
petitioner has personal properties within the Philippines does not make the present case
one that relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines warranting the
extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Petitioner states that for an action to be considered as one that relates to,
or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, the main subject matter of the
action must be the property within the Philippines itself, and such was not the situation in
this case. Likewise, the prayer in respondent's Amended Complaint for the issuance of a
writ of attachment over the personal property of PEIP, which is 99% owned by petitioner
(as the supposed successor of PEIA), did not convert the action from one in personam to
one that is quasi in rem. Also, the petitioner points out that since the respondent's prayer
for the issuance of a writ of attachment was denied by the RTC in its Order, dated 26
March 1999, then the nature of Civil Case No. MC99-605 remains in personam, contrary to
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that by the attachment of the petitioner's interest in PEIP
the action in personam was converted to an action quasi in rem. Resultantly, the
extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioner was not validly effected, and did not
give the RTC jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Petitioner further argues that the appellate court should have granted its Petition for
Certiorari on the ground that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss respondent's Amended Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action against petitioner which was not the real party-in-interest
in Civil Case No. MC99-605. Petitioner claims that it had never used the name PEIA as its
corporate name, and neither did it change its name from that of PEIA. Petitioner stresses
that PEIA is an entirely different corporate entity that is not connected in whatever manner
to the petitioner. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner is the real party-in-interest in Civil
Case No. MC99-605 or that petitioner and PEIA are one and the same entity, petitioner still
avows that the respondent failed to state a cause of action against it because the
Distribution Agreement expressly grants PEIA the right to terminate the said contract at
any time.
Lastly, it is the contention of the petitioner that the appellate court should have
granted its Petition for Certiorari because the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss Civil Case No. MC99-605
for having been led in an improper venue. Petitioner asserts that in the Distribution
Agreement entered into between the respondent and PEIA, both had mutually agreed to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore or of the Philippines as elected by
PEIA. Absent any waiver by PEIA of its right to choose the venue of the dispute, the
Complaint led by the respondent before the RTC in the Philippines should have been
dismissed on the ground of improper venue. EcHTDI
The Petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice;
that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties. 2 2
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It is determinable on the basis of allegations in the complaint. 2 3
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the ling of the complaint, while
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of
summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance
in court and their submission to its authority. If the defendants have not been summoned,
unless they voluntarily appear in court, the court acquires no jurisdiction over their persons
and a judgment rendered against them is null and void. To be bound by a decision, a party
should first be subjected to the court's jurisdiction. 24
Thus, one of the modes of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
respondent in a civil case is through service of summons. It is intended to give notice to
the defendant or respondent that a civil action has been commenced against him. The
defendant or respondent is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the
petitioner. 2 5
The proper service of summons differs depending on the nature of the civil case
instituted by the plaintiff or petitioner: whether it is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
Actions in personam, are those actions brought against a person on the basis of his
personal liability; actions in rem are actions against the thing itself instead of against the
person; and actions are quasi in rem, where an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his or her interest in a property to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. 2 6
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are
only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the
country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. 27 IDEHCa
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in

rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam.
When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. 2 8 Thus, in such
instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant. The said
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the
defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility
that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect
his interest if he is so minded. 2 9 On the other hand, when the defendant or respondent
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, 3 0 and the action involved is in
personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility
of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court. 31
In the case at bar, this Court sustains the contention of the petitioner that there can
never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because the case before the
court a quo involving collection of a sum of money and damages is, indeed, an action in
personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by
reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement.
Even the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 4 April 2004, upheld the nature of the
instant case as an action in personam. In the said Decision the appellate court ruled that:
In the instant petition, [respondent's] cause of action in Civil Case No.
MC99-605 is anchored on the claim that petitioner unilaterally terminated the
Distribution Agreement. Thus, [respondent] prays in its [C]omplaint that "Upon the
ling of the Complaint, issue an Order xing the amount of the bond and issue a
writ of attachment requiring the sheriff to attach the properties of [Perkin-Elmer
Philippines], which are not exempt from execution, and as much as may be
sufficient to satisfy [respondent's] demands."
The action instituted by [respondent] affects the parties alone, not the
whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. EaICAD
xxx xxx xxx
The objective sought in [respondent's] [C]omplaint was to establish a claim

against petitioner for its alleged unilateral termination of [D]istribution
[A]greement. Hence, to repeat, Civil Case No. MC99-605 is an action in
p erson a m because it is an action against persons, namely, herein
petitioner, on the basis of its personal liability. As such, personal
service of summons upon the [petitioner] is essential in order for the
court to acquire of ( sic ) jurisdiction over [its person]. 3 2 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, being an action in personam, personal service of summons within the Philippines is
necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner, and this is not possible in the present case because the petitioner is a non-
resident and is not found within the Philippines. Respondent's allegation in its Amended
Complaint that petitioner had personal property within the Philippines in the form of
shares of stock in PEIP did not make Civil Case No. MC99-605 fall under any of the four
instances mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, as to convert the action
in personam to an action in rem or quasi in rem and, subsequently, make the
extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner valid.
It is incorrect for the RTC to have ruled that the allegations made by the respondent
in its Amended Complaint, which is primarily for collection of a sum of money and
damages, that the petitioner owns shares of stock within the Philippines to which the
petitioner claims interest, or an actual or contingent lien, would make the case fall under
one of the aforesaid instances wherein extraterritorial service of summons under Section
15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, would be valid. The RTC in arriving
at such conclusions relied on the second instance, mentioned under Section 15, Rule 14 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (i.e., when the action relates to, or the subject of
which is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent), where extraterritorial service of summons can be properly made.
However, the aforesaid second instance has no application in the case before this Court.
Primarily, the Amended Complaint led by the respondent against the petitioner was for
the collection of sum of money and damages. The said case was neither related nor
connected to any property of the petitioner to which it claims a lien or interest. The action
for collection of a sum of money and damages was purely based on the personal liability
of the petitioner towards the respondent. The petitioner is correct in saying that "mere
allegations of personal property within the Philippines does not necessarily make the
action as one that relates to or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines as to
warrant the extraterritorial service of summons. For the action to be considered one that
relates to, or the subject of which, is the property within the Philippines, the main subject
matter of the action must be the property itself of the petitioner in the Philippines." By
analogy, an action involving title to or possession of real or personal property — such as
the foreclosure of real estate or chattel mortgage where the mortgagor does not reside or
is not found in the Philippines — can be considered as an action which relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent; and in such instance, judgment will be limited to the res. 33 DHTCaI
Moreover, the allegations made by the respondent that the petitioner has property
within the Philippines were in support of its application for the issuance of a writ of
attachment, which was denied by the RTC. Hence, it is clear from the foregoing that the
Complaint led by the respondent against the petitioner does not really relate to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines of the petitioner.
This Court also nds error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals. It is provided for
in the said Decision, thus:
However, let it be emphasized that in the [C]omplaint led before the trial
court, [respondent] prayed that "Upon the ling of the Complaint, issue an Order
xing the amount of the bond and issue a writ of attachment requiring the sheriff
to attach the properties of [Perkin-Elmer Philippines], which are not exempt from
execution, and as much as may be sufficient to satisfy [respondent's] demands.
In other words, although the [C]omplaint before the trial court does not
involve the personal status of the [respondent], nevertheless, the case involves
property within the Philippines in which the [petitioner] has or claim an interest, or
which the [respondent] has attached, which is one of the instances where
extraterritorial service of summons is proper.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, it is submitted that one of the instances when exterritorial service of

summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is proper may be
considered to have been met. This is because the [C]omplaint for collection of
sum of money which is an action in personam was converted into an action quasi
in rem by the attachment of [petitioner's] interest in [Perkin-Elmer
Philippines].
Philippines] 3 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent's allegation in its Amended Complaint that petitioner had personal

property within the Philippines in the form of shares of stock in PEIP does not convert Civil
Case No. MC99-605 from an action in personam to one quasi in rem, so as to qualify said
case under the fourth instance mentioned in Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure (i.e., when the non-resident defendant's property has been attached
within the Philippines), wherein extraterritorial service of summons upon the petitioner
would have been valid. It is worthy to note that what is required under the aforesaid
provision of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not a mere allegation of the existence
of personal property belonging to the non-resident defendant within the Philippines but,
more precisely, that the non-resident defendant's personal property located within the
Philippines must have been actually attached. This Court in the case of Venturanza v. Court
of Appeals 3 5 ruled that when the attachment was void from the beginning, the action in
personam which required personal service of summons was never converted into an
action in rem where service by publication would have been valid. Hence, the appellate
court erred in declaring that the present case, which is an action in personam, was
converted to an action quasi in rem because of respondent's allegations in its Amended
Complaint that petitioner had personal property within the Philippines. HAaDcS
Glaringly, respondent's prayer in its Amended Complaint for the issuance of a writ of
attachment over petitioner's purported shares of stock in PEIP located within the
Philippines was denied by the court a quo in its Order dated 26 March 1999.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order was likewise denied by the
RTC in its subsequent Order, dated 11 January 2000. Evidently, petitioner's alleged
personal property within the Philippines, in the form of shares of stock in PEIP, had not
been attached; hence, Civil Case No. MC99-605, for collection of sum of money and
damages, remains an action in personam. As a result, the extraterritorial service of
summons was not validly effected by the RTC against the petitioner, and the RTC thus
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The RTC is therefore bereft
of any authority to act upon the Complaint led before it by the respondent insofar as the
petitioner is concerned.
If there was no valid summons served upon petitioner, could RTC have acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by the latter's voluntary appearance? As a rule,
even if the service of summons upon the defendant or respondent in a civil case is
defective, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over his person when he voluntary appears
in court or submits himself to its authority. Nonetheless, voluntary appearance, as a mode
of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this
case.
It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court for the purpose of
challenging the jurisdiction of said court, based on the invalidity of the service of
summons, cannot be considered to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. 3 6 In the present case, petitioner has been consistent in all its pleadings in
assailing the service of summons upon it and the jurisdiction of the RTC over its person.
Thus, the petitioner cannot be declared in estoppel when it led an Answer ad cautelam
with compulsory counterclaim before the RTC while the instant Petition was still pending
before this Court. The petitioner was in a situation wherein it had no other choice but to le
an Answer; otherwise, the RTC would have already declared that petitioner had waived its
right to le responsive pleadings. 3 7 Neither can the compulsory counterclaim contained in
petitioner's Answer ad cautelam be considered as voluntary appearance of petitioner
before the RTC. Petitioner seeks to recover damages and attorney's fees as a
consequence of the unfounded suit led by respondent against it. Thus, petitioner's
compulsory counterclaim is only consistent with its position that the respondent
wrongfully led a case against it and the RTC erroneously exercised jurisdiction over its
person. IDCHTE
Distinction must be made in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to the jurisdiction of the
RTC over respondent's complaint and over petitioner's counterclaim — while it may have no
jurisdiction over the former, it may exercise jurisdiction over the latter. The compulsory
counterclaim attached to petitioner's Answer ad cautelam can be treated as a separate
action, wherein petitioner is the plaintiff while respondent is the defendant. 3 8 Petitioner
could have instituted a separate action for the very same claims but, for the sake of
expediency and to avoid multiplicity of suits, it chose to demand the same in Civil Case No.
MC99-605. 3 9 Jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter and the parties in the
counterclaim must thus be determined separately and independently from the jurisdiction
of the same court in the same case over the subject matter and the parties in respondent's
complaint.
Moreover, even though the petitioner raised other grounds in its Motion to Dismiss
aside from lack of jurisdiction over its person, the same is not tantamount to its voluntary
appearance or submission to the authority of the court a quo. While in De Midgely v.
Ferandos, 4 0 it was held that, in a Motion to Dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, including a prayer "for such other
reliefs as" may be deemed "appropriate and proper" amounted to voluntary appearance,
such ruling must be deemed superseded by the declaration of this Court in La Naval Drug
Corporation v. Court of Appeals 4 1 that estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and
intentional. It would be absurd to hold that petitioner unequivocally and intentionally
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be
entitled when the only relief that it could properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal
of the complaint against it. 4 2 Thus, the allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction
with a prayer "for such other reliefs" as may be deemed "appropriate and proper" cannot be
considered as unequivocal and intentional estoppel. Most telling is Section 20, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, which expressly provides:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. 4 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In sum, this Court nds that the petitioner did not submit itself voluntarily to the
authority of the court a quo; and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC
utterly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Anent the existence of a cause of action against petitioner and the proper venue of
the case, this Court upholds the findings of the RTC on these issues.
Dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action is provided for by the
Rules of Court. 4 4 When a Motion to Dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of
action, a ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The
court must pass upon this issue based solely on such allegations, assuming them to be
true. For it to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of plaintiff's right to
due process. 4 5 While, truly, there are well-recognized exceptions 4 6 to the rule that the
allegations are hypothetically admitted as true and inquiry is con ned to the face of the
complaint, 4 7 none of the exceptions apply in this case. Hence, the general rule applies. The
defense of the petitioner that it is not the real party-in-interest is evidentiary in nature
which must be proven in trial. The appellate court, then, cannot be faulted for not granting
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. EcTIDA
In the same way, the appellate court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. MC99-605 on the ground of improper venue. In arriving at such
conclusion, this Court quotes with approval the following ratiocination of the RTC:
As for the contention that venue was improperly laid, . . ., the [trial court] in
its ultimate desire that the ends of justice could be served in its fullest, cannot rule
that venue was improperly laid.
xxx xxx xxx
The stipulation as to the venue of a prospective action does not

preclude the ling of the suit in the residence of the [respondent] under
Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court, especially where the venue stipulation
was imposed by the [petitioner] for its own bene ts. 4 8 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Despite the venue stipulation found in the Distribution Agreement stipulating that
the exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from the same shall lie in the courts of
Singapore or of the Territory (referring to the Philippines), whichever is elected by PEIA (or
petitioner, as PEIA's alleged successor), the RTC of the Philippines cannot be considered
as an improper venue. Truly, the venue stipulation used the word "exclusive," however, a
closer look on the Distribution Agreement would reveal that the venue stipulation was
really in the alternative i.e., courts of Singapore or of the Territory, meaning, the Philippines;
thus, the court a quo is not an improper venue for the present case.
Nonetheless, it bears to emphasize that despite our ndings that based on the
allegations in respondent's Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605, respondent appears to
have a cause of action against the petitioner and that the RTC is the proper venue for the
said case, Civil Case No. MC99-605 is still dismissible, for the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The extraterritorial service of summons upon
the petitioner produces no effect because it can only be done if the action is in rem or
quasi in rem. The case for collection of sum of money and damages led by the
respondent against the petitioner being an action in personam, then personal service of
summons upon the petitioner within the Philippines is essential for the RTC to validly
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. Having failed to do so, the RTC can
never subject petitioner to its jurisdiction. The mere allegation made by the respondent
that the petitioner had shares of stock within the Philippines was not enough to convert
the action from one in personam to one that was quasi in rem, for petitioner's purported
personal property was never attached; thus, the extraterritorial service of summons upon
the petitioner remains invalid. In light of the foregoing ndings, this Court concludes that
the RTC has no power to hear and decide the case against the petitioner, because the
extraterritorial service of summons was not validly effected upon the petitioner and the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person. THaCAI
Finally, as regards the petitioner's counterclaim, which is purely for damages and
attorney's fees by reason of the unfounded suit led by the respondent against it, it has
long been settled that the same truly falls under the classi cation of compulsory
counterclaim and it must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it is barred. 4 9 In the
case at bar, this Court orders the dismissal of the Complaint led by the respondent
against the petitioner because the court a quo failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the latter . Since the Complaint of the respondent was dismissed, what will
happen then to the counterclaim of the petitioner? Does the dismissal of the complaint
carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim?
In the cases of Metal Engineering Resources Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 5 0
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 5 1 and BA Finance
Corporation v. Co., 5 2 the Court ruled that if the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
the main action of the case and dismisses the same, then the compulsory counterclaim,
being ancillary to the principal controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no
jurisdiction remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim. 5 3 If we follow the
aforesaid pronouncement of the Court in the cases mentioned above, the counterclaim of
the herein petitioner being compulsory in nature must also be dismissed together with the
Complaint. However, in the case of Pinga vs. Heirs of German Santiago, 5 4 the Court
explicitly expressed that:
Similarly, Justice Feria notes that "the present rule rea rms the right of the
defendant to move for the dismissal of the complaint and to prosecute his
counterclaim, as stated in the separate opinion [of Justice Regalado in BA
Finance]. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hererra pronounces that the
amendment to Section 3, Rule 17 [of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure] settles that "nagging question "whether the dismissal of the
complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, and opines
that by reason of the amendments, the rulings in Metals Engineering,
International Container, and BA Finance "may be deemed abandoned." . .
..
. . ., when the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
including the amended Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that were
inconsistent with the new rules incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
were implicitly abandoned insofar as incidents arising after the effectivity of
the new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even the doctrine that a
counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along with the complaint, clearly
con icts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The abandonment of BA Finance
as doctrine extends as far back as 1997, when the Court adopted the new Rules
of Civil Procedure. If, since then, abandonment has not been a rmed in
jurisprudence, it is only because no proper case has arisen that would warrant
express con rmation of the new rule. That opportunity is here and now, and we
thus rule that the dismissal of a complaint due to fault of the plaintiff
is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute any
pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate
action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court
that are inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.
abandoned. 5 5
[Emphasis supplied]. TESDcA
It is true that the aforesaid declaration of the Court refers to instances covered by
Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure 5 6 on dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, it does not also preclude the
application of the same to the instant case just because the dismissal of respondent's
Complaint was upon the instance of the petitioner who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction
over its person.
Also in the case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, the Court discussed the
situation wherein the very ling of the complaint by the plaintiff against the defendant
caused the violation of the latter's rights. As to whether the dismissal of such a complaint
should also include the dismissal of the counterclaim, the Court acknowledged that said
matter is still debatable, viz:
Whatever the nature of the counterclaim, it bears the same integral
characteristics as a complaint; namely a cause (or causes) of action constituting
an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. The main
difference lies in that the cause of action in the counterclaim is maintained by the
defendant against the plaintiff, while the converse holds true with the complaint.
Yet, as with a complaint, a counterclaim without a cause of action cannot survive.
. . . if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates the cause(s) of
the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Yet that hardly is the
case, especially as a general rule. More often than not, the allegations that form
the counterclaim are rooted in an act or omission of the plaintiff other than the
plaintiff's very act of ling the complaint. Moreover, such acts or omissions
imputed to the plaintiff are often claimed to have occurred prior to the ling of the
complaint itself. The only apparent exception to this circumstance is if it
is alleged in the counterclaim that the very act of the plaintiff in ling
the complaint precisely causes the violation of the defendant's rights.
Yet even in such an instance, it remains debatable whether the
dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint is su cient to obviate the
pending cause of action maintained by the defendant against the
plaintiff. 5 7
Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal of the complaint
somehow eliminates the cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive.
Conversely, if the counterclaim itself states su cient cause of action then it should stand
independently of and survive the dismissal of the complaint. Now, having been directly
confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by reason of the
unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed, we rule in
the affirmative. TEHIaA
It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is for

damages and attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's
Complaint against petitioner is already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already
incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's fees since it was forced to
engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of
jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons
upon it. Hence, the cause of action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by the
mere dismissal of respondent's complaint.
It may also do well to remember that it is this Court which mandated that claims for
damages and attorney's fees based on unfounded suit constitute compulsory
counterclaim which must be pleaded in the same action or, otherwise, it shall be barred. It
will then be iniquitous and the height of injustice to require the petitioner to make the
counterclaim in the present action, under threat of losing his right to claim the same ever
again in any other court, yet make his right totally dependent on the fate of the
respondent's complaint.
If indeed the Court dismisses petitioner's counterclaim solely on the basis of the
dismissal of respondent's Complaint, then what remedy is left for the petitioner? It can be
said that he can still le a separate action to recover the damages and attorney's fees
based on the unfounded suit for he cannot be barred from doing so since he did le the
compulsory counterclaim in the present action, only that it was dismissed when
respondent's Complaint was dismissed. However, this reasoning is highly awed and
irrational considering that petitioner, already burdened by the damages and attorney's fees
it may have incurred in the present case, must again incur more damages and attorney's
fees in pursuing a separate action, when, in the rst place, it should not have been involved
in any case at all.
Since petitioner's counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action
survives that of the dismissal of respondent's complaint, then it should be resolved based
on its own merits and evidentiary support.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 4 April 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78981, a rming
the Orders, dated 4 November 2002 and 20 June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in Civil Case No. MC99-605, is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Respondent's Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as against the
petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and all the proceedings against petitioner in the
court a quo by virtue thereof are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID. The Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, is DIRECTED to proceed without further delay with
the resolution of respondent's Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to defendant
PEIP, as well as petitioner's counterclaim. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 10-69. EDCTIa
2. Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa with Associate Justices Andres B.

Reyes, Jr. and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; id. at 76-90.
3. Penned by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali; id. at 315-318.

4. Id. at 371-372.
5. Id. at 180-188.
6. Id. at 97-105.
7. The reason of the trial court in denying the prayer of the respondent for the issuance of a writ
of attachment was: "Based on the records, [respondent] is desirous of attaching the
property of [Perkin-Elmer Philippines] by invoking that [petitioner] owns 99% of [Perkin-
Elmer Philippines]. . . ., let this Court emphasize that a corporation such as [Perkin-Elmer
Philippines] has a personality separate and distinct from shareholder, [the petitioner].
Hence, the property belonging to [Perkin-Elmer Philippines] cannot be attached to pay for
the obligation incurred by its shareholder." (Id. at 731-732.)
8. Id. at 733.
9. Id. at 156-159.
10. Id. at 96.
11. Id. at 160-164.

12. Id. at 151.
13. Id. at 152.

14. A sole proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a juridical person under Article 44 of the
Civil Code. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of
business organization conducted for profit. It does not vest juridical or legal personality
in the sole proprietorship or empowers it to file or defend an action in court. (Yao Ka Sin
Trading v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53820, 15 June 1992, 209 SCRA 763, 780.)
Likewise, a sole proprietorship does not possess any juridical personality separate and
apart from the personality of the owner of the enterprise and the personality of the
persons acting in the name of such proprietorship. Hence, any case filed against a sole
proprietorship must be brought against its owner.
15. Rollo, pp. 170-179.
16. Id. at 225-226.
17. Id. at 227-230.
18. Id. at 238.

19. Id. at 155.
20. Id. at 239-264.

21. Rollo, pp. 316-318.
22. Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Japzon, G.R. No. 68037, 29 July 1992, 211 SCRA 879, 884-
885.
23. De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 140, 150 (1995). aTEADI
24. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Evangelista, 441 Phil. 445, 453 (2002).
25. Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Japzon, supra note 22 at 885.

26. Banco Do Brasil v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 87, 99-100 (2000).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 96, 106 (1996).

30. Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824, 833 (2003).
31. Banco Do Brasil v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26.

32. Rollo, pp. 85-87.
33. Civil Law Commentaries by Justice Jose Y. Feria, Vol. 1, 2001 Edition, p. 138, citing therein
El Banco Español-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 927 (1918).
34. Rollo, pp. 88-89.
35. G.R. No. L-77760, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 305, 312.
36. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590, 18
October 2004, 440 SCRA 498, 516.
37. Id.
38. Civil Procedure Commentaries by Justice Jose Y. Feria, Vol. 1 (2001 Edition), p. 277, citing
the case of Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc. v. Santos, 52 O.G. 1477 (1955); Civil
Procedure Commentaries by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vol. 1 (Seventh Revised
Edition), p. 128.
39. Section 6, Rule 6 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
148 Phil. 135, 149 (1971); Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement
Corporation, G.R. No. 155173, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 522, 533.
40. G.R. No. L-34314, 13 May 1975, 64 SCRA 23, 31.
41. G.R. No. 103200, 31 August 1994, 236 SCRA 78, 86.
42. Millennium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan, 383 Phil. 468, 478 (2000).
43. 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
44. Section 1 (g), Rule 16, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
45. Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, 4 April
2001, 356 SCRA 367, 385.
46. There is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to
judicial notice, or if such allegations are legally impossible, or if these refer to facts
which are inadmissible in evidence, or if by the record or document included in the
pleading these allegations appear unfounded. Also, inquiry is not confined to the
complaint if there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the
parties, or in the course of hearings related to the case.
47. Dabuco v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 939, 950 (2000). CTAIHc
48. Rollo, pp. 317-318.
49. Tiu Po vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-55514, 17 March 1981, 103 SCRA 388, 391; Alday vs. FGU
Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 138822, 23 January 2001, 350 SCRA 113, 123.
50. G.R. No. 95631, 28 October 1991, 203 SCRA 273, 282.
51. G.R. No. 90530, 7 October 1992, 214 SCRA 456.
52. G.R. No. 105751, 30 June 1993, 224 SCRA 163, 167.
53. Supra note 50.
54. G.R. No. 170354, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 393, 414-415.
55. Supra note 54.
3 Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
56. SEC. 3.
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or
any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
57. Pinga vs. Heirs of German Santiago, id. at 418-419.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167545. August 17, 2011.]
ATIKO TRANS, INC. and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO., LTD. ,

petitioners, vs . PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.,
INC.
respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
Where service of summons upon the defendant principal is coursed thru its co-
defendant agent, and the latter happens to be a domestic corporation, the rules on
service of summons upon a domestic private juridical entity 1 must be strictly complied
with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person
of both defendants. And insofar as the principal is concerned, such jurisdictional aw
cannot be cured by the agent's subsequent voluntary appearance.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the December 10, 2004 Decision 2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82547 which a rmed the April 8, 2003
Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City. Said Decision of
the RTC a rmed the August 6, 2002 Decision 4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 63, Makati City, which disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring defendants Cheng Lie
Navigation Co., Ltd. and Atiko Trans, Inc. solidarily liable to pay plaintiff
Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. the following amounts:
1. P205,220.97 as actual damages with interest of 1% per month from
14 December 1999 until full payment;
2. P10,000.00 as Attorney's fees; and
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Likewise assailed is the CA's Resolution 6 dated March 16, 2005 which denied
the Motion for Reconsideration of the said December 10, 2004 Decision.
Factual Antecedents
On December 11, 1998, 40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board
M/S Katjana in Kaohsiung, Taiwan for shipment to Manila. The shipment was covered
by Bill of Lading No. KNMNI-15126 7 issued by petitioner Cheng Lie Navigation Co., Ltd.
(Cheng Lie) with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Oriental) as the
notify party. The cargoes were insured against all risks per Marine Insurance Policy No.
20RN-18749/99 issued by respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
(Prudential). TCaSAH
On December 14, 1998, M/S Katjana arrived in the port of Manila. Upon discharge
of the cargoes, it was found that one of the tinplates was damaged, crumpled and
dented on the edges. The sea van in which it was kept during the voyage was also
damaged, presumably while still on board the vessel and during the course of the
voyage.
Oriental then led its claim against the policy. Satis ed that Oriental's claim was
compensable, Prudential paid Oriental P205,220.97 representing the amount of losses
it suffered due to the damaged cargo.
Proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court
On December 14, 1999, Prudential filed with the MeTC of Makati City a Complaint
8 for sum of money against Cheng Lie and Atiko Trans, Inc. (Atiko). In addition to the
above undisputed facts, Prudential alleged that:
1. Plaintiff (Prudential) is a domestic insurance corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with o ce address at
Coyiuto House, 119 Carlos Palanca[,] Jr. St., Legaspi Village, Makati City;
2. Defendant Cheng Lie Navigation Co. Ltd., is [a] foreign shipping

company doing business in the Philippines [thru] its duly authorized shipagent
defendant Atiko Trans, Inc. which is a domestic corporation duly established and
created under the laws of the Philippines with o ce address at 7th Floor, Victoria
Bldg., United Nation[s] Ave., Ermita, Manila, where both defendants may be served
with summons and other court processes;
3. At all times material to the cause of action of this complaint,

plaintiff was and still is engaged in, among others, marine insurance business;
Whereas Defendant Cheng Lie Navigation Co. Ltd. was and still is engaged in,
among others, shipping, transportation and freight/cargo forwarding business,
and as such, owned, operated and/or chartered the ocean going vessel M/S
"Katjana" as common carrier to and from any Philippine [port] in international
trade [thru] its duly authorized shipagent defendant Atiko Trans Inc. (Both
defendants are hereinafter referred to as the "CARRIER");
xxx xxx xxx

9. Plaintiff, as cargo-insurer and upon nding that the consignee's
insurance claim was in order and compensable, paid the latter's claim in the
amount of P205,220.97 under and by virtue of the aforesaid insurance policy,
thereby subrogating herein plaintiff to all the rights and causes of action
appertaining to the consignee against the defendants; 9
On March 20, 2000, Prudential led a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, 1 0

alleging among others that on March 1, 2000 a copy of the summons was served upon
petitioners thru cashier Cristina Figueroa and that despite receipt thereof petitioners
failed to le any responsive pleading. Acting on the motion, the MeTC issued an Order
1 1 declaring Cheng Lie and Atiko in default and allowing Prudential to present its
evidence ex-parte.
On August 6, 2002, the MeTC rendered its judgment by default. Atiko then led a
Notice of Appeal 1 2 dated November 4, 2002. SDTIaE
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
In its Memorandum of Appeal, 1 3 Atiko argued that Prudential failed to prove the
material allegations of the complaint. Atiko asserted that Prudential failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence that it is a domestic corporation with legal personality to
le an action; that Cheng Lie is a private foreign juridical entity operating its shipping
business in the Philippines thru Atiko as its shipagent; that Cheng Lie is a common
carrier, which owns and operates M/S Katjana; that Prudential was subrogated to the
rights of Oriental; and, that Atiko can be held solidarily liable with Cheng Lie.
Although assisted by the same counsel, Cheng Lie led its own Memorandum of
Appeal 1 4 maintaining that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person.
On April 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the appeal and
a rming the Decision of the MeTC. Atiko and Cheng Lie challenged the RTC Decision
before the CA via a Petition for Review 1 5 under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court but the
appellate court affirmed the RTC's Decision.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
In their Memorandum, 1 6 petitioners raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER . . . THE DECISION OF MAKATI [MeTC] WHICH WAS AFFIRMED
BY MAKATI RTC AND THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NULL AND VOID FOR
FAILURE TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSONS OF THE
PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS CONSIDERING THAT THE SUMMONS WERE
NOT PROPERLY SERVED ON THEM AS REQUIRED BY RULE 14 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
2. WHETHER . . . THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF IS REQUIRED TO PROVE THE

MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT EVEN IN DEFAULT
JUDGMENT OR WHETHER OR NOT IN DEFAULT JUDGMENT, ALL
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT ARE DEEMED CONTROVERTED,
HENCE, MUST BE PROVED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
2.1. WHETHER . . . RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF IS OBLIGED TO PROVE

ITS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE EVEN IN DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
2.2. WHETHER . . . RESPONDENT PLAINTIFF IS OBLIGED TO PROVE

THAT PETITIONER-DEFENDANT ATIKO IS THE SHIPAGENT OF
PETITIONER-DEFENDANT CHENG LIE EVEN IN DEFAULT
JUDGMENT.
2.3. WHETHER . . . THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES AND THE

DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS CAN BE CONSIDERED FOR PURPOSES
OTHER THAN THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE OFFERED. HIACac
2.4. WHETHER . . . A MOTION TO DECLARE DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT

ADDRESSED AND SENT TO ONLY ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS
WOULD BIND THE OTHER DEFENDANT TO WHOM THE MOTION
WAS NOT ADDRESSED AND NOT SENT. 1 7
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious. We shall rst tackle the factual matters
involved in this case, then proceed with the jurisdictional issues raised.
Petitioners raised factual matters which
are not the proper subject of this appeal.
Petitioners contend that the lower courts grievously erred in granting the
complaint because, even if they were declared in default, the respondent still has the
burden of proving the material allegations in the complaint by preponderance of
evidence. Petitioners further argue that respondent miserably failed to discharge this
burden because it failed to present su cient proof that it is a domestic corporation.
Hence, respondent could not possibly maintain the present action because only natural
or juridical persons or entities authorized by law can be parties to a civil action.
Petitioners also claim that respondent failed to present competent proof that Cheng
Lie is a foreign shipping company doing business in the Philippines thru its duly
authorized shipagent Atiko. Lastly, petitioners assert that respondent failed to prove
that Cheng Lie is a common carrier which owned, operated and/or chartered M/S
Katjana thru its duly authorized shipagent Atiko. Petitioners emphasize that there is no
proof, testimonial or otherwise, which would support the material allegations of the
complaint. They also insist that respondent's witnesses do not have personal
knowledge of the facts on which they were examined.
Respondent, for its part, assails the propriety of the remedy taken by the
petitioners. It posits that petitioners advanced factual matters which are not the proper
subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, the lower courts consistently held
that the allegations in respondent's complaint are supported by sufficient evidence.
We agree with respondent.
A cursory reading of the issues raised readily reveals that they involve factual
matters which are not within the province of this Court to look into. Well-settled is the
rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law can be
raised. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, 1 8 none is present in this
case. "[A]s a matter of . . . procedure, [this] Court defers and accords nality to the
factual ndings of trial courts, [especially] when such ndings were [a rmed by the
RTC and the CA. These] factual determination[s], as a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, deserve great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal . . . . [I]t is
not the function of the Court to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of the factual holding of the lower courts." 1 9
MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Atiko.
Petitioners also argue that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Atiko as the summons was received by its cashier, Cristina Figueroa. They maintain
that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the defendant is a domestic
corporation like Atiko, summons may be served only upon its president, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. DHSACT
We are not persuaded. True, when the defendant is a domestic corporation,

service of summons may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. 2 0 However, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
can be acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant's
voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to the court's jurisdiction, as
embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
In the case at bench, when Atiko led its Notice of Appeal, 2 1 Memorandum of
Appeal, 2 2 Motion for Reconsideration 2 3 of the April 8, 2003 Decision of the RTC, and
Petition for Review, 2 4 it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.
The ling of these pleadings seeking a rmative relief amounted to voluntary
appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot. In Palma v.
Galvez, 2 5 this Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that "the ling of motions seeking
a rmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to le answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court."
Moreover, petitioners' contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their
Memorandum 2 6 led with this Court where they claimed, for the rst time, that Atiko
was not properly served with summons. In La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 2 7 it was held that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
must be seasonably raised. Failing to do so, a party who invoked the jurisdiction of a
court to secure an a rmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such jurisdiction
after unsuccessfully trying to obtain such relief. 2 8
It may not be amiss to state too that in our February 13, 2006 Resolution, 2 9 we
reminded the parties that they are not allowed to interject new issues in their
memorandum.
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Cheng Lie.
Petitioners likewise challenge the validity of the service of summons upon Cheng
Lie, thru Atiko. They claim that when the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity
which has transacted business in the Philippines, service of summons may be made,
among others, upon its resident agent. In this case, however, there is no proof that
Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie.
On this score, we nd for the petitioners. Before it was amended by A.M. No. 11-
3-6-SC, 3 0 Section 12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in accordance
with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government o cial
designated by law to that effect, or on any of its o cers or agents within the
Philippines.
Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in
Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr. 3 1 that when the defendant is a foreign juridical
entity, service of summons may be made upon:
1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose; cSITDa
2. The government o cial designated by law to receive summons if the

corporation does not have a resident agent; or,
3. Any of the corporation's officers or agents within the Philippines.
In the case at bench, no summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner
prescribed above. It should be recalled that Atiko was not properly served with
summons as the person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina Figueroa, is
not one of the corporate o cers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko not thru valid service of
summons but by the latter's voluntary appearance. Thus, there being no proper service
of summons upon Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. To rule otherwise would create an absurd
situation where service of summons is valid upon the purported principal but not on the
latter's co-defendant cum putative agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru
said agent. Indeed, in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a
defendant foreign private juridical entity under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
there must be prior valid service of summons upon the agent of such defendant.
Also, the records of this case is bereft of any showing that cashier Cristina
Figueroa is a government o cial designated by law to receive summons on behalf of
Cheng Lie or that she is an o cer or agent of Cheng Lie within the Philippines. Hence,
her receipt of summons bears no signi cance insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned. At
this point, we emphasize that the requirements of the rule on summons must be strictly
followed, 3 2 lest we ride roughshod on defendant's right to due process. 3 3
With regard to Cheng Lie's ling of numerous pleadings, the same cannot be
considered as voluntary appearance. Unlike Atiko, Cheng Lie never sought a rmative
relief other than the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over its person. From the very beginning, it has consistently questioned the validity of
the service of summons and the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.
It does not escape our attention though that Cheng Lie's pleadings do not
indicate that the same were led by way of special appearance. But these, to our mind,
are mere inaccuracies in the title of the pleadings. What is important are the allegations
contained therein which consistently resisted the jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus,
Cheng Lie cannot be considered to have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the
courts. 3 4
In ne, since the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie,
its decision insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned is void. 3 5
Cheng Lie was improperly declared in
default.
Applying the above disquisition, the MeTC likewise erred in declaring Cheng Lie in
default. Settled is the rule that a defendant cannot be declared in default unless such
declaration is preceded by a valid service of summons. 3 6
WHEREFORE , the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED . The assailed
December 10, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82547 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the judgment insofar as Cheng Lie
Navigation Co., Ltd. is concerned is declared VOID for failure to acquire jurisdiction
over its person as there was improper service of summons. cTCaEA
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Section 11. It reads:
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with
a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
2.CA rollo, pp. 160-181; penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred
in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Danilo B. Pine.
3.Id. at 35-39; penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
4.Id. at 49-50; penned by Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.

5.Id. at 50.
6.Id. at 205-207.
7.Id. at 46.
8.Id. at 42-45. Docketed as Civil Case No. 68976.
9.Id. at 42-44.
10.Id. at 46-47.
11.Id. at 48; penned by Judge Socorro B. Inting.
12.Id. at 51.
13.Id. at 54-65.
14.Id. at 75-83.
15.Id. at 2-34.
16.Rollo, pp. 204-225.
17.Id. at 207.
18."[S]uch as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the ndings
of fact are con icting; (6) there is no citation of speci c evidence on which the factual
ndings are based; (7) the ndings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence
of evidence on record; (8) the ndings of the [Court of Appeals] are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the [Court of Appeals] manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10)
the ndings of the [Court of Appeals] are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
ndings are contrary to the admissions of both parties." (International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 161539, June 27, 2008,
556 SCRA 194, 199.)
19.Tapuroc v. Loquellano Vda. de Mende, G.R. No. 152007, January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 97,
105-106.
20.Supra note 1.
21.CA rollo, p. 51.
22.Id. at 54-65.
23.Id. at 98-108.
24.Id. at 2-34.
25.G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 86, 99.
26.Rollo, pp. 204-225.
27.G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78, 91.
28.Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556, 564 (1968).
29.Rollo, pp. 202-203.
30.AMENDMENT OF SECTION 12, RULE 14 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON SERVICE UPON

FOREIGN PRIVATE JURIDICAL ENTITY. As amended, said provision of the Rules of Court
now reads:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a foreign
private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be
made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if
there be no such agent, on the government o cial designated by law to that effect, or on
any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no resident
agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through any of
the following means:
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with
the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the

defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by-
registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service;
or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.
31.G.R. No. 156848, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 584, 601.
32.Id. at 600.
33.Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 288, 291.
34.See also the similar case of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v.
Catalan, 483 Phil. 525 (2004).
35.Pascual v. Pascual, supra at 306.
36.Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 269, 307 (1999).

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165273. March 10, 2010.]
PALMA petitioner, vs . HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity

LEAH PALMA,
as PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO
CITY, BRANCH 24; and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO , respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA J :
PERALTA, p
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
Orders dated May 7, 2004 1 and July 21, 2004 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 24, granting the motion to dismiss led by private respondent Psyche
Elena Agudo and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
On July 28, 2003, petitioner Leah Palma led with the RTC an action for damages
against the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz,
alleging that the defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for
having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues
extracted from her during the surgery; and that although the specimens were
subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as
the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Defendants led their respective
Answers. Petitioner subsequently led a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint, praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the
PHC, namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. Thus,
summons were subsequently issued to them.
On February 17, 2004, the RTC's process server submitted his return of
summons stating that the alias summons, together with a copy of the amended
complaint and its annexes, were served upon private respondent thru her husband
Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the same as private respondent was out of the
country. 3
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent led a Notice of Appearance
and a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer 4 stating that he was just engaged by
private respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was
already due. TIEHSA
On March 15, 2004, private respondent's counsel led a Motion for Another
Extension of Time to File Answer, 5 and stating that while the draft answer was already
nished, the same would be sent to private respondent for her clari cation/veri cation
before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the counsel prayed for another 20 days
to file the Answer.
On March 30, 2004, private respondent led a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground
that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with
summons, since she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on
her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner led her
Opposition 7 to the motion to dismiss, arguing that a substituted service of summons
on private respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons
under Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of
service, i.e., by personal or substituted service. Private respondent led a Comment 8
on petitioner's Opposition, and petitioner filed a Reply 9 thereto.
On May 7, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent's
motion to dismiss. It found that while the summons was served at private respondent's
house and received by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid
service of summons on her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was
served, thus, she was not personally served a summons; and even granting that she
knew that a complaint was led against her, nevertheless, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person as she was not validly served with summons; that
substituted service could not be resorted to since it was established that private
respondent was out of the country, thus, Section 16, Rule 14 provides for the service of
summons on her by publication.
Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order
dated July 21, 2004.
Petitioner is now before us alleging that the public respondent committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he ruled
that:
I. Substituted service of summons upon private respondent, a
defendant residing in the Philippines but temporarily outside the country is
invalid;
II. Section 16, Rule 14, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the
mode of service of summons upon a defendant residing in the Philippines, but
temporarily outside the country, exclusively to extraterritorial service of summons
under section 15 of the same rule;
III. In not ruling that by ling two (2) motions for extension of time to
le Answer, private respondent had voluntarily submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of respondent court, pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, hence, equivalent to having been served with summons;
IV. The cases cited in his challenged Order of May 7, 2004 constitute
stare decisis despite his own admission that the factual landscape in those
decided cases are entirely different from those in this case. 1 0
TcEAIH
Petitioner claims that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that Section 16, Rule 14, limits the service of summons upon the defendant-resident
who is temporarily out of the country exclusively by means of extraterritorial service,
i.e., by personal service or by publication, pursuant to Section 15 of the same Rule.
Petitioner further argues that in ling two motions for extension of time to le answer,
private respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
In her Comment, private respondent claims that petitioner's certiorari under Rule
65 is not the proper remedy but a petition for review under Rule 45, since the RTC ruling
cannot be considered as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion; that the
petition was not properly veri ed because while the veri cation was dated September
15, 2004, the petition was dated September 30, 2004. She insists that since she was
out of the country at the time the service of summons was made, such service should
be governed by Section 16, in relation to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; that
there was no voluntary appearance on her part when her counsel led two motions for
extension of time to le answer, since she led her motion to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction within the period provided under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court.
In her Reply, petitioner claims that the draft of the petition and the veri cation
and certi cation against forum shopping were sent to her for her signature earlier than
the date of the nalized petition, since the petition could not be led without her signed
veri cation. Petitioner avers that when private respondent led her two motions for
extension of time to le answer, no special appearance was made to challenge the
validity of the service of summons on her.
The parties subsequently filed their respective memoranda as required.
We shall first resolve the procedural issues raised by private respondent.
Private respondent's claim that the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a
wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is not persuasive. A petition for
certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or o cer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. 1 1 There is "grave abuse of discretion" when
public respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its
judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may
be taken only from a nal order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal
may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an
order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order
denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an
order of execution; (g) a judgment or nal order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-
party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an
appeal therefrom;
therefrom or (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the
above instances where the judgment or nal order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. acCITS
In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss led by private
respondent is a nal order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but it
falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the
complaint for damages against these defendants is still pending. 1 2 Since there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the remedy of a special civil
action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party
from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal. 1 3
Anent private respondent's allegation that the petition was not properly veri ed,
we nd the same to be devoid of merit. The purpose of requiring a veri cation is to
secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith,
or are true and correct, not merely speculative. 1 4 In this instance, petitioner attached a
veri cation to her petition although dated earlier than the ling of her petition.
Petitioner explains that since a draft of the petition and the veri cation were earlier sent
to her in New York for her signature, the veri cation was earlier dated than the petition
for certiorari led with us. We accept such explanation. While Section 1, Rule 65
requires that the petition for certiorari be veri ed, this is not an absolute necessity
where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions raised are
mainly of law. 1 5 In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.
Now on the merits, the issue for resolution is whether there was a valid service of
summons on private respondent.
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and
submission to the authority of the former. 1 6 Private respondent was a Filipino resident
who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus,
service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an
action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the
Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may , by leave of court, be
also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis
supplied)
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which
speaks of extraterritorial service, thus:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of
the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines,
in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem su cient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer. aCSEcA
The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the
service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus,
service of summons may be made only by publication.
We do not agree.
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez, 1 7 we said that because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses
the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons
allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving o cer on a defendant-
resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2)
personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also
with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 1 8
In Montalban v. Maximo , 1 9 we held that substituted service of summons under
the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against
residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of
service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In
the same case, we expounded on the rationale in providing for substituted service as
the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the Philippines.
. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a de nite place of
residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any
inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one
temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be
reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to
protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident
of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for
such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as
to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If
he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against
him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes
of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being led against him upon a claim
that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his o ce or
regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to

contest a suit against him. There are now advanced facilities of communication.
Long distance telephone calls and cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind
to communicate with him. 2 0
Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the
summons and complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's o ce or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. IaESCH
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even
though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. 2 1 It is, thus, the service of
the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable
age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules
regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that
of jurisdiction. 2 2
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be
left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of con dence exists between the person
with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person
will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof. 2 3
In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband,
Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable
age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to
receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.
Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place where
the summons was served was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the
country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance
and motion for extension of time to le answer submitted by private respondent's
counsel, he con rmed the Sheriff's Return by stating that private respondent was out of
the country and that his service was engaged by respondent's husband. In his motion
for another extension of time to le answer, private respondent's counsel stated that a
draft of the answer had already been prepared, which would be submitted to private
respondent, who was in Ireland for her clari cation and/or veri cation before the
Philippine Consulate there. These statements establish the fact that private respondent
had knowledge of the case led against her, and that her husband had told her about
the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her counsel.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction
over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his appearance
on private respondent's behalf, without quali cation and without questioning the
propriety of the service of summons, and even led two Motions for Extension of Time
to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the
RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to
le answer be granted. We have held that the ling of motions seeking a rmative relief,
such as, to admit answer, for additional time to le answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 2 4 When private
respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure a rmative relief in her
motions for additional time to le answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction
of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise. 2 5
Considering the foregoing, we nd that the RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Orders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
GRANTED The Orders dated May 7, 2004 and July
21, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, are hereby SET ASIDE .
Private respondent is DIRECTED to le her Answer within the reglementary period
from receipt of this decision. cAaETS
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Judge Danilo P. Galvez; rollo, pp. 27-28.
2.Id. at 30.
3.Rollo, p. 144.
4.Id. at 146-147.
5.Id. at 148-149.
6.Id. at 150-154.
7.Id. at 155-158.
8.Id. at 159-163.
9.Id. at 164-168.
10.Id. at 8-9.
11.Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
12.See Jan-Dec Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146818, February 6,
2006, 481 SCRA 556, 565-566.
13.See People's Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc.) v. Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 724, 760.
14.Sari Sari Group of Companies, Inc. v. Piglas Kamao (Sari Sari Chapter), G.R. No. 164624,
August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 569, 579, citing Torres v. Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation, 433 SCRA 455, 463 (2004).
15.Herrera, Vol. 1, p. 718 (2007), citing 42 Am. Jur., Sec. 42, p. 177.
16.Oaminal v. Castillo, 459 Phil. 542 (2003).
17.G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513, 522.
18.See Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA
539, 553 (1998).
19.No. L-22997, March 15, 1968, 22 SCRA 1070.
20.Id. at 1079-1080.
21.Keister v. Navarro, No. L-29067, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 209, 215.
22.Id.
23.Id. at 216.
24.HongKong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, 483 Phil. 525 (2004);
Orosa v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 67 (1996).
25.Id.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 84195. December 11, 1989.]
LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD

P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN,
ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HION, (Represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG
POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME
KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO C. RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA AND WILLY CO , petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, (Represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government) respondents.
Government),
Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina & Associates for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS;

BECOMES PART OF THE PLEADINGS ONCE ACCEPTED. — A bill of particulars
becomes part of the pleadings once accepted, thus: (a) Bill a part of pleading — A bill of
particulars becomes a part of the pleading which it supplements. It shall be governed
by the rules of pleading and the original shall be filed with the clerk of the court.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IF SEASONABLY FILED, INTERRUPTS THE PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH TO SERVE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS. — A seasonable motion therefor
interrupts the period within which to answer: (b) Stay of period to le responsive
pleading. — After service of the bill of particulars or of a more de nite pleading, or after
notice of denial of his motion, the moving party shall have the same time to serve his
responsive pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which he was entitled
at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO SERVE RESPONSIVE PLEADING IF
MOTION IS FILED ON TIME. — If the motion is led beyond that period, it should rightly
be denied. 6 Where it is, however, led on time, whether or not the movant succeeds in
his motion, he, the movant, has, as above-indicated, "the same time to serve his
responsive pleading . . . as that to which he was entitled . . . but not less than ve (5)
days in any event."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO ATTEND SUBSEQUENT HEARINGS PENDING ITS
RESOLUTION; DOES NOT AMOUNT TO FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. — Pending the
resolution of these questions, the issues of the case can not be said to have been
joined, and a party's failure to attend subsequent hearings does not amount to failure to
prosecute.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER REMEDY AGAINST A DEFICIENT PLEADING. — A
motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, is the proper remedy against a
de cient pleading. In one case, it was held that in that event, a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action should be treated as a motion for a bill of particulars.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SAME MAY BE GRANTED. — In a recent case, it was held
that a motion for a bill of particulars may be granted where the complaint fails to state
in what capacity the plaintiffs sue.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTIVE. — The proper o ce of a bill of particulars is "to
inform the opposite party and the court of the precise nature and character of the
cause of action .. the pleader has attempted to set forth, and thereby to guide his
adversary in his preparations for trial and reasonably protect him against surprise at
the trial." It complements the rule on pleadings in general, that is, that the complaint
should consist of a "concise statement of the ultimate facts." Its admission, nally, is
subject to the sound discretion of the judge, unless discretion has been exercised with
palpable abuse. The complaint for which a bill for a more de nite statement is sought,
need only inform the defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to enable him, the
defendant, to prepare an intelligent answer. As we indicated, its primary objective is to
apprise the adverse party of what the plaintiff wants — to preclude the latter from
springing a surprise attack later. Any more "particulars", in that event, would be
evidentiary in character, which must be adduced at the trial proper.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — It has also been held that: . . . It is the o ce or function, as
well as the object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to amplify or limit a pleading,
specify more minutely and particularly a claim or defense set up and pleaded in general
terms, give information, not contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the
court as to the precise nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or
defense relied on by the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he
has to meet, to the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters
speci ed, and in order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be
avoided, and that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading
and preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill
of particulars to de ne, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues in the
case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or purpose of a bill of
particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be
accomplished without the aid of such a bill. It is not the o ce of a bill of particulars to
supply material allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause
of action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense
other than the one stated. Also it is not the o ce or function, or a proper object, of a bill
of particulars to set forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of
evidence on which he intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information whether such
information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to introduce or of facts
which constitute a defense or offset for the other party or which will enable the
opposite party to establish an affirmative defense not yet pleaded.
9. ID.; ID.; COMPLAINT; HELD SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE; CASE
AT BAR. — We are satis ed in this case that the PCGG has made out a su cient
complaint against the petitioners. It was led pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 as
amended, and is to be tried on the theory that the petitioners are guilty of accumulating
ill-gotten wealth. But as we put it in the COCOFED case, supra, and as we stated above,
the su ciency of the complaint is one thing and the merits thereof are another. The
latter is not the question before us. We also sustain the Sandiganbayan because the
PCGG's complaint (as amended); from our vantage point, does set out allegations,
however confusingly put in print, which, interrelated to one another, are enough to
support a formal civil charge. If the petitioners are not aware of the PCGG's
asseverations, the remedy, so we hold, is to deny the same in their answer for lack of
"knowledge or information su cient to form a belief as to the truth of" the said
averments. They can not, however, demand for any more particulars without actually
making the PCGG expose its evidence unnecessarily before the trial stage. A reading,
indeed, of paragraphs four through six, and paragraph fourteen, of the PCGG's
Complaint illustrates enough semblance of logic, as to what Republic wants from the
petitioners.
DECISION
SARMIENTO , J : p
We give DUE COURSE to this petition led by the petitioners. We also consider
the comment filed by the Solicitor General as the Government's answer.
The petitioners, twenty-two in number, assail the action of the Sandiganbayan,
denying their "Motion for a More De nite Statement or a Bill of Particulars" directed
against the Complaint led by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). prLL
The Complaint, dated July 17, 1987, was led in July, 1987, by the PCGG against
the twenty-two petitioners, together with the late Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Marcos, Don Ferry, and Federico Moreno. The same prayed for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court render
judgment adjudging and ordering Defendants as follows:
29. AS TO THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION — To

return and reconvey to Plaintiff all funds and other property impressed with
constructive trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, as well as funds
and other property acquired by Defendants by abuse of right and power and
through unjust enrichment; or alternatively to jointly and severally pay Plaintiff the
value thereof with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full
payment.
30. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION — To show to the

satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such
funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for
this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to
account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or bene cial interests in funds,
properties and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the
lawful earnings or lawful income from legitimately acquired property.
31. AS TO THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH CAUSES

OF ACTION — To solidarily pay Plaintiff:
a) Actual Damages in such amount as are proven during the

trial;
b) Moral Damages in the amount of FIFTY BILLION

(P50,000,000,000.00) PESOS;
c) Temperate Damages in such amount as may be determined

by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound discretion;
d) Nominal Damages in such amount as may be determined by

the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound discretion;
e) Exemplary Damages in the amount of ONE BILLION

(P1,000,000,000.00) PESOS;
f) Attorney's Fees in such amount to be proven during the trial;
g) Litigation expenses in such amount as may be proven during

the trial;
h) Treble judicial costs.
Plaintiff further prays for such further relief as may appear to the
Honorable Court to be just and equitable under the premises. 1
Subsequently, the PCGG led a "Complaint Expanded per Court-Approved

Plaintiff's Manifestation/Motion dated December 8, 1987." That notwithstanding, the
twenty-two petitioners (the Marcoses never joined them, neither did Don Ferry nor
Federico Moreno) moved, as indicated above, for a bill of particulars. Cdpr
The pertinent portions of the Complaint for which a bill of particulars is sought,
and insofar as material to this petition, are hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
VI
CAUSES OF ACTION
16. First Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER. —

(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed
abuse of right and power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to
Plaintiff. Defendants violated, among others, Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines;
(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired title to and

bene cial interest in funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and
interest through the use of relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or
dummies. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff to
return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully acquired by
them or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, jointly and severally by way of indemnity,
the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such funds or the
value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon
from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.
17. Second Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT — Defendants

illegally accumulated funds and other property in violation of the laws of the
Philippines and in breach of their o cial functions and duciary obligations .
Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and
irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at
law, independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power and, as an
alternative, are jointly and severally liable to return to Plaintiff such funds and
other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad faith, have unjustly
enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of such
funds and the value of the other property including those which may have been
wasted, and/or lost with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition
until full payment thereof.
18. Third cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST — A public

o ce is a public trust. By committing all the acts described above. Defendants,
repeatedly breached public trust and the law, making them liable jointly and
severally to Plaintiff. The funds and other property acquired by Defendants
following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, are deemed to have been
acquired for the bene t of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive
trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, Defendants are
solidarily liable to restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus
impressed with constructive trust for the bene t of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
19. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING — The Commission, acting

pursuant to the provisions of applicable law, respectfully maintain that
Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another,
acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency of Defendant public
o cers, or while acting in unlawful concert with public o cers, manifestly out of
proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from
legitimately acquired property. Consequently, they are required to show to the
satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such
funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for
this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to
account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or bene cial interests in funds,
properties and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the
lawful earnings of lawful income from legitimately acquired property.
20. Fifth Cause of Action: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES — (a) By reason
of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have
suffered actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained
by the latter as a result of Defendants' unlawful acts, plus expenses which
Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to
recover Defendants' ill-gotten wealth all over the world, Defendants are, therefore,
jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages and to reimburse
expenses for recovery of Defendants' ill-gotten wealth all over the world in such
amounts as are proven during the trial.
(b) As a result of Defendants' unlawful, malicious, immoral and

wanton acts described above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people had, for more than
twenty long years, painfully endured and suffered and continue to endure and
suffer anguish, fright, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock, as well as besmirched reputation and social humiliation before the
international community, for which Defendants are jointly and severally liable to
Plaintiff and the Filipino people for moral damages;
(c) In addition, Plaintiff and the Filipino people are entitled to

temperate damages for their sufferings which, by their very nature, are incapable
of pecuniary estimation but which this Honorable Court may determine in the
exercise of its sound discretion;
(d) Defendants, by reason of the above described unlawful acts, have

violated and invaded the inalienable right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people to a
fair and decent way of life be tting a Nation with rich natural and human
resources. This basic and fundamental right of Plaintiff and the Filipino people
should be recognized and vindicated by awarding nominal damages in an
amount to be determined by the Honorable Court in the exercise of its sound
discretion.
(e) By way of example and correction for the public good and in order
to ensure that Defendants' unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts are not
repeated, said Defendants are solidarily liable to Plaintiff for exemplary damages.
2
On April 14, 1988, the respondent Court promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioners' motion. On July 13, 1988, it issued a second one denying reconsideration.
The petitioners submit, in a nutshell, that the PCGG's averments are made up of
bare generalizations, presumptuous conclusions of fact and law, and plain
speculations, for which a motion for a more de nite statement or for a bill of
particulars allegedly lies.
The Sandiganbayan's dispositions are as follows:
From the foregoing it can readily be seen that We have set out fully and in
detail the particulars and speci cations being sought by defendants-movants in
order to show in a much broader perspective the factual basis relied upon to
justify the relief sought in their motion. A careful and meticulous examination
thereof, as well as the pertinent portions of the Expanded Complaint (Pp. 673-692,
Ibid.) readily shows that Paragraphs 1 to 9, inclusive, fall under the headings
"Nature Of The Action," "The Parties" and "Averments Common To All Causes of
Action" hence, they do not constitute an inherent or integral part of the causes of
action, similarly as in Paragraphs 10 to 13 inclusive, which fall under the heading
"IV. General Averments Of Defendants' Illegal Acts". Hence, as aptly pointed out by
plaintiff, they serve merely to present the factual backdrop or scenario leading to
Paragraphs 14 to 15, inclusive which set out in detail the "Speci c Averments Of
Defendants' Illegal Acts" and to which latter paragraphs the motion may,
therefore, be properly addressed.
Correlating the speci c averments in Paragraphs 14 to 15, inclusive, to the

ve (5) Causes of Action described in Paragraphs 16 to 20, inclusive, We are of
the considered opinion that Paragraphs 14 to 15, inclusive, of the Expanded
Complaint had already supplied or provided the speci cations and particulars
theretofore lacking in the original Complaint. Therein, defendants-movants herein,
particularly defendants Lucio C. Tan, Willy Co, Florencio T. Santos, Mariano Tan
Eng Lian, Domingo Chua and Mariano Khoo, together with their co-defendants-
movants, are alleged to have actively collaborated and willingly participated in
multi-varied and inter-related business/corporate/individual acts and practices
involving the General Bank and Trust Company (now Allied Banking Corporation),
the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Asia Brewery, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Co.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Foremost Farms, Inc., Himmel Industries, Inc., Grandspan
Development Corporation, Silangan, Inc., Maranaw Hotel and Resorts, Corp.,
Sipalay Trading Corporation, The Development Corporation of the Philippines,
Northern Redrying Co., Inc. and the Virginia Tobacco Administration. The nature,
scope and consequences of such acts and practices, insofar as they involve or
affect the operations of the above-named rms, entities or corporations, again
insofar as they constitute alleged violations of plaintiff's rights and interests, are
outlined in vivid detail, complete with names, dates, facts and gures in
Paragraph 14 (a) (1-3), (b), (c), (d), (e) (1-5), (f), (g) and (h). The speci c roles and
participation of defendants-movants are likewise averred in the particular sub-
paragraphs which relate to the rms, entities and corporations affected. In short,
each and every defendant-movant can clearly see where, how and why he or she
is being held liable or responsible for the particular act or acts attributed to them,
singly or collectively. 3
We sustain the respondent, the Sandiganbayan.

Under section 1, of Rule 12, of the Rules of Court, supra, thus:
SECTION 1. Motion for bill of particulars. — Before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, within ten (10)
days after service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for a more de nite
statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
su cient de niteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. Such motion shall point out the defects
complained of and the details desired.
A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleadings once accepted, thus:

(a) Bill a part of pleading — A bill of particulars becomes a part of the
pleading which it supplements. It shall be governed by the rules of pleading and
the original shall be filed with the clerk of the court. 4
A seasonable motion therefor interrupts the period within which to answer:

(b) Stay of period to le responsive pleading . — After service of the bill
of particulars or of a more de nite pleading, or after notice of denial of his
motion, the moving party shall have the same time to serve his responsive
pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which he was entitled at the
time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event. 5
If the motion is led beyond that period, it should rightly be denied. 6 Where it is,
however, led on time, whether or not the movant succeeds in his motion, he, the
movant, has, as above-indicated, "the same time to serve his responsive pleading . . . as
that to which he was entitled . . . but not less than five (5) days in any event." 7
Pending the resolution of these questions, the issues of the case can not be said
to have been joined, and a party's failure to attend subsequent hearings does not
amount to failure to prosecute. 8
A motion for a bill of particulars, not a motion to dismiss, is the proper remedy
against a de cient pleading. 9 In one case, 1 0 it was held that in that event, a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should be treated as a motion for a bill of
particulars. 1 1
In a recent case, 1 2 it was held that a motion for a bill of particulars may be
granted where the complaint fails to state in what capacity the plaintiffs sue.
The proper o ce of a bill of particulars is "to inform the opposite party and the
court of the precise nature and character of the cause of action . . . the pleader has
attempted to set forth, and thereby to guide his adversary in his preparations for trial
and reasonably protect him against surprise at the trial." 1 3 It complements the rule on
pleadings in general, that is, that the complaint should consist of a "concise statement
of the ultimate facts." 1 4 Its admission, nally, is subject to the sound discretion of the
judge, unless discretion has been exercised with palpable abuse. 1 5
It has also been held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It is the o ce or function, as well as the object or purpose, of a bill of

particulars to amplify or limit a pleading, specify more minutely and particularly a
claim or defense set up and pleaded in general terms, give information, not
contained in the pleading, to the opposite party and the court as to the precise
nature, character, scope, and extent of the cause of action or defense relied on by
the pleader, and apprise the opposite party of the case which he has to meet, to
the end that the proof at the trial may be limited to the matters speci ed, and in
order that surprise at, and needless preparation for, the trial may be avoided, and
that the opposite party may be aided in framing his answering pleading and
preparing for trial. It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill
of particulars to de ne, clarify, particularize, and limit or circumscribe the issues
in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court. A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case
when that cannot be accomplished without the aid of such a bill.
It is not the o ce of a bill of particulars to supply material allegations

necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense
stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or defense other than the one
stated. Also it is not the o ce or function, or a proper object, of a bill of
particulars to set forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of
evidence on which he intends to rely, or to furnish evidential information whether
such information consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to introduce or
of facts which constitute a defense or offset for the other party or which will
enable the opposite party to establish an affirmative defense not yet pleaded. 1 6
The complaint for which a bill for a more de nite statement is sought, need only
inform the defendant of the essential (or ultimate) facts to enable him, the defendant,
to prepare an intelligent answer. 1 7 As we indicated, its primary objective is to apprise
the adverse party of what the plaintiff wants — to preclude the latter from springing a
surprise attack later. Any more "particulars", in that event, would be evidentiary in
character, which must be adduced at the trial proper.
It is noteworthy that in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government 1 8 we upheld the sequestration of the Bataan
Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc., upon a prima facie showing that the PCGG had a good
case against the shipping firm, or otherwise, that:
xxx xxx xxx
1) that "(i) ill-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and

supporters of the previous regime;"
a) more particularly, that "(i) ill-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by

former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad, . . .
(and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them,
during . . . (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public o ce and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship;
b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties purportedly

pertaining to former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly
or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or
properties owned by the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or nancial institutions, or by taking undue
advantage of their o ce, authority, in uence, connections or relationship,
resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts,
deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers,
condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and
personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and
2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over

by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to
former President Marcos." 1 9
It must be stressed, however, that the above conclusions are but prima facie
demonstrations, which must be proved at the trial.
We are satis ed in this case that the PCGG has made out a su cient complaint
against the petitioners. It was led pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 as amended, and
is to be tried on the theory that the petitioners are guilty of accumulating ill-gotten
wealth. But as we put it in the COCOFED case, supra, and as we stated above, the
sufficiency of the complaint is one thing and the merits thereof are another. The latter is
not the question before us. LLphil
We also sustain the Sandiganbayan because the PCGG's complaint (as

amended); from our vantage point, does set out allegations, however confusingly put in
print, which, interrelated to one another, are enough to support a formal civil charge. If
the petitioners are not aware of the PCGG's asseverations, the remedy, so we hold, is to
deny the same in their answer for lack of "knowledge or information su cient to form a
belief as to the truth of" 2 0 the said averments. They can not, however, demand for any
more particulars without actually making the PCGG expose its evidence unnecessarily
before the trial stage. Cdpr
A reading, indeed, of paragraphs four through six, and paragraph fourteen, of the
PCGG's Complaint illustrates enough semblance of logic, as to what Republic wants
from the petitioners. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Defendant LUCIO C. TAN was a business partner of Defendant

Ferdinand E. Marcos. Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Lucio C. Tan had
agreed that the former would own 60% of Shareholdings, Inc., which in turn,
bene cially held and/or controlled substantial shares of Fortune Tobacco, Asia
Beer Brewery, Allied Banking Corporation and Foremost Farms. Apart from said
60% bene cial interest of Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, Defendant Lucio Tan
yearly paid the former sums of money from 1980 to 1986, in exchange for
privileges and concessions which said Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos gave
Defendant Lucio C. Tan, as more particularly described in paragraph 13 of this
Complaint. The latter, Defendant Lucio C. Tan, is a resident of Quezon City and
may be served with summons and other court processes at 30 Bias-na-Bato St.,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
5. Defendants FERDINAND E. MARCOS and IMELDA R. MARCOS are

spouses. They may be served with summons and other court processes either (i)
at their last known address at Don Mariano Marcos St., Cor. P. Guevarra Street,
San Juan, Metro Manila; (ii) at 6577 Kalanianaole Highway, Honolulu, Hawaii,
United States of America, at which two Hawaii addresses they now temporarily
reside, even as they remain residents and citizens of the Philippines.
6. The following Defendants acted as dummies, nominees, or agents,
by allowing themselves to be incorporators, directors, board members and/or
stockholders of corporations held and/or controlled by Defendants Lucio C. Tan,
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. Said Defendants enumerated below
may be served with summons and other court processes at the respective
addresses appearing opposite their names:
xxx xxx xxx
14. Defendant Lucio C. Tan, by himself and/or in unlawful concert

with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of his relationship and in uence with Defendant Spouses, among
others:
(a) without su cient collateral and for a nominal

consideration, with the active collaboration, knowledge and willing
participation of Defendant Willy Co, arbitrarily and fraudulently
acquired control of the General Bank and Trust Company which
eventually became Allied Banking Corporation, through then Central
Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, as shown by, but not limited to, the
following circumstances:
(1) In 1976, the General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC, for short) got
into nancial di culties. The Central Bank then extended an emergency loan of
P350 million to GBTC. In extending this loan, the CB however took control of
GBTC when the latter executed an Irrevocable Proxy of 2/3 of GBTC's outstanding
shares in favor of the CB and when 7 of the 11-member Board of Directors were
CB nominees. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of CB issued
a Resolution declaring GBTC insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it
under receivership.
(2) In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GBTC assets and
liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the conditions
of the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of Letter of Credit issued by a
bank acceptable to CB to guaranty payment or as collateral of the CB emergency
loan; and (b) a 2-year period to repay the said CB emergency loan. On March 29,
1977, CB thru a Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of
Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among other things, offered to pay only
P500,000.00 for GBTC assets estimated at P688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of
P103,984,477.55; Cash of P25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the GBTC Head
O ce and branch o ces. The required Letter of Credit was not also attached to
the bid.
(3) As already stated, GBTC eventually became the Allied Banking

Corporation in April, 1977. The defendants Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T.
Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they are also the major
shareholders of this new bank.
(b) delivered to Defendant Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda

Marcos, sometime in July, 1979 or thereafter, substantial bene cial
interests in shares of stock worth about P50 million pesos in the Asia
Brewery, Inc. through dummies, nominees or agents, with the active
collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of Defendants
Florencio T. Santos as then President, Mariano Tan Eng Lian as then
Treasurer, and Domingo Chua and Mariano Khoo as then Directors, of
the Asia Brewery, Inc. in consideration of substantial concessions
which their varied business ventures were unduly privileged to enjoy,
such as but not limited to, the grant of dollar allocation amounting to
about U.S. $6,934,500.00.
(c) gave improper payments such as gifts, bribes,
commissions, and/or guaranteed "dividends" to said Defendant
spouses in various sums, such as P10 M in 1980, P10 M in 1981, P20
M in 1982, P40 M in 1983, P40 M in 1984, P50 M in 1985, P50 M in
1986, in consideration of Defendant Spouses continued support of
Defendant Lucio Tan's diversi ed business ventures and/or Defendant
Spouses ownership or interest in said diversi ed business ventures,
such as Allied Banking Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Fortune
Tobacco Co., Shareholdings, Inc., among others. Even earlier, Tan gave
the amounts of P11 million in 1975, about P2 million in 1977, and P44
million in 1979, among other amounts.
(d) sometime in May, 1979, applied for and was granted by
the Central Bank "free dollar allocation" in millions of US Dollars for the
use and bene t of Asia Brewery Inc., such as for the importation of the
whole machinery set up for the proposed brewery and glass
manufacturing plants. Defendants were major stockholders and/or in
which they held substantial beneficial interest;
(e) established Shareholdings, Inc., a holding company,
which in turn bene cially held and/or controlled substantial shares of
stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Foremost
Farms, Inc., Himmel Industries, Inc., Grandspan Development
Corporation, Silangan, Inc., and Allied Banking Corporation, with the
active collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of Defendants
Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad N. Santos, Domingo
Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee
Hiong (represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry
C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo,
Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo and Elizabeth Khoo, who are or acted as
dummy-shareholders of the Shareholdings, Inc., as well as directors in
the case of Harry Tan and Manuel Khoo , in order to prevent disclosure
and recovery of illegally obtained assets. Moreover, for the same
purpose, in December, 1980, said Defendants transferred to
Shareholdings, Inc. their purported shares of stocks in Foremost Farms,
Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Himmel
Industries, Inc., Grandspan Development Corp., and Silangan Holdings,
Inc.
(f) caused losses in millions of pesos to the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), a government lending institution, by
unlawfuly selling DBP's controlling interest in Century Park Sheraton
Hotel (Manila), owned by Maranaw Hotel and Resorts Corp., a grossly
undercapitalized company bene cially held and controlled by Lucio C.
Tan, said transaction having been facilitated with the active
collaboration, knowledge and willing participation of defendants Harry
Tan and Don Ferry while the latter was then serving as Vice-Chairman
of DBP, as shown by, but not limited to, the following facts and
circumstances:
(i) Sometime in 1984, Lucio C. Tan wrote defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos informing him among other things that "new
business prospect to buy out from DBP Holding" includes the Century
Park Sheraton Hotel (Sheraton, for short). Apparently receiving
favorable reaction from Marcos, Lucio Tan organized and established
on October 5, 1984 the Sipalay Trading Corporation (Sipalay, for short),
with a capitalization of P5 million. Defendant Harry C. Tan became
Chairman and President of the corporation.
(2) Sipalay in a letter dated January 29, 1985 wrote defendant Don
Ferry, as then Vice-Chairman of the DBP, offering to buy for U.S. $8.7 million 79%
of the voting shares of the Maranaw Hotel and Resorts Corp. (MHRC, for short),
owned by DBP. On January 30, 1985, the DBP Board approved "in principle" the
above proposal to buy.
(3) On February 26, 1985, Sipalay requested DBP to waive its
requirement "to provide a comptroller pending full payment of the purchase price".
Defendant Ferry agreed to this waiver.
(4) On March 1, 1985, DBP represented by defendant Ferry and Sipalay
represented by defendant Harry C. Tan, executed an Agreement to buy and sell —
DBP to sell 78.3% of its controlling interest in MHRC to Sipalay for a
consideration of U.S. $8.5 million with 20% of the purchase price as
downpayment. At the same time, DBP and Sipalay also executed an escrow
agreement which stipulated that the interest earned by the escrow account would
be for the bene t of Sipalay (rather than DBP). Defendants Ferry and Harry Tan
again signed for their respective agency and corporation.
(5) On April 22, 1985, the corresponding Deed of Sale was executed by
the parties, defendant Ferry again signing for DBP, and defendant Harry C. Tan
for Sipalay. A Pledge Agreement was likewise signed on the same date, the
subject shares being pledged by Sipalay to DBP, and the pledge to remain in full
force until the full payment of the purchase price or until Sipalay may have
substituted as collateral a stand-by letter of credit to secure the unpaid balance.
Sipalay however did not turn over the subject shares to DBP.
(g) printed in or about 1981, without legal authority, BIR
strips (sic) stamps worth about P7 billion pesos and a xed them on
packs of cigarettes produced by Fortune Tobacco Corporation, in
violation of Section 180 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1977, thereby
defrauding the Plaintiff and the Filipino people of billions of pesos in
tax receipts.
(h) established in May, 1985 the Northern Redrying Co., Inc.
(NRCI), a Virginia Tobacco Company, which on several instances in
1986 made importations and purchases of about 9,607,482.9 net kilos,
in excess of the ceiling set by law, with the active collaboration of
Defendants Celso C. Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin
T. Albacita who are all Directors of NRCI and at the time of the
establishment of NRCI, were employees of defendant Lucio Tan.
Defendant Federico Moreno, as Chairman of the Virginia Tobacco
Administration, supervised, approved and/or permitted such
importations and purchases.
15. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and in unlawful
concert with one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority,
agrant breach of public trust and duciary obligations, brazen abuse of right
and power, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and
the Filipino people. 2 1
In essence, these are what the PCGG says:

1. The petitioner Lucio Tan was Mr. Marcos' business partner;
2. Through undue in uence, coercion, and abuse of right they acquired
shareholdings from various firms, and built a business empire therefrom;
3. The remaining petitioners acted as their "dummies, nominees, or agents";
4. Together with the Marcoses, they maneuvered their way into these rms
and acquired control thereof;
5. The same were accomplished through unacceptable machinations such as
insider trading and similar acts, in violation of existing laws;
6. They also unjustly enriched the petitioners at the expense of the Republic
of the Philippines and the Filipino people.
The foregoing, so we find, are actionable wrongs that are proper for a complaint.
We can not accept the petitioners' pleadings that:
xxx xxx xxx
8. As will be noted from the above, the ultimate facts upon which each
cause of action is based are not alleged directly and particularly. Instead, they are
described as "the unlawful acts described above", "the foregoing acts", "all of the
acts described above", "the unlawful acts set forth above", and "defendants'
unlawful, malicious, immoral and wanton acts described above".
9. What the complaint does is to compel petitioners to determine

which allegations in the rst fteen paragraphs pertain to each cause of action.
Petitioners are made to guess and speculate which allegations in the rst fteen
paragraphs pertain to the " rst cause of action", the "second cause of action", the
"third cause of action", the "fourth cause of action" and the "fifth cause of action".
10. It is petitioners' submission that due process requires that before a
defendant is required to answer a complaint, a common understanding must exist
among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the court as to the ultimate facts
comprising each cause of action. What respondent court has done, in denying
petitioners' "Motion for a More De nite Statement or a Bill of Particulars" (of the
statement of the Causes of Action), is to allow a situation whereby the plaintiff
may have one understanding of the ultimate facts comprising each cause of
action, the defendants, possibly another understanding, and the court another
view. Not only would it be grossly unfair to compel a defendant to answer and to
go to trial in such a situation but would likely invite protracted, and perhaps,
endless controversy on what the issues really are. 2 2
We agree that the PCGG's Complaint/Expanded Complaint is garbled in many

respects, but this is no excuse for sloth on the part of the petitioners. The
Sandiganbayan, furthermore, has taken pains — on the behest of the petitioners — to
interconnect, paragraph by paragraph, the allegations of the Complaint/Expanded
Complaint in question. They, the petitioners, can not any more be heard to insist that
they are still left at a loss and in the dark. The Complaint/Expanded Complaint is
complete enough to perish fears of the PCGG pulling a surprise subsequently. LLpr

We therefore order the remand of the case against the twenty-two petitioners
and heard without any further delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Prayer of Complaint, Rollo, 48-50.

2. Id., 8-11; emphasis in the original.
3. Id., pp. 121-122.
4. RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 12, sec. 1, par. (a).
5. Supra, par. (b); also, Amante v. Sunga, No. L-40491, May 28, 1975, 64 SCRA 192; Arcega
v. Court of Appeals, No. L-20869, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 229.
6. Woodcraft Works, Ltd. v. Moscoso, 92 Phil. 1021 (1953).

7. Supra, Rule 12, sec. 1, par. (b); also, Borromeo v. COMELEC, No. L-29839, July 17, 1969,
28 SCRA 772.
8. Itchon v. Galigod, No. L-20962, May 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 268.

9. Borromeo v. COMELEC, supra.
10. Salvador v. Frio, No. L-25352, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 315.
11. Supra.
12. Bantillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75311, October 18, 1989.
13. 61A Am. Jur 2d, Pleading S 296.
14. RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 16, sec. 3.

15. 61A Am Jur id., S 297.
16. 71 C.J.S. Pleading S 376.

17. Pajares v. Abad Santos, No. L-29543, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 741. According to
Francisco: "Under the rule providing for a bill of particulars, a party may properly seek
disclosure only of matters which de ne the issues and become a part of the pleadings,
as distinguished from the rule providing for interrogatories under which a party may
properly seek disclosure of matters of proof which may later be made a part of the
record as evidence. A party may not be compelled to disclose his evidence or the names
of his witnesses in a bill of particulars." See FRANCISCO, REVISED RULES OF COURT OF
THE PHILIPPINES 707 (1973).
18. G.R. No. 75885, May 27, 1987, 150 SCRA 181.
19. Supra, 205-206; see also Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 75713, October 2, 1989.
20. RULES OF COURT, supra, Rule 8, sec. 10.
21. Id., 58-79, emphasis in the original.

22. Rollo, id., 11-12.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.]
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO

SANTOS petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR.
DELOS SANTOS,
SANTOS respondents.
and JUANA DELOS SANTOS,
Jose C. Patalinjug for petitioners.

Leonardo O. Mancao for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; SUMMONS; DEFENDANT'S VOLUNTARY

APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION EQUIVALENT TO SERVICE OF SUMMONS; CASE AT BAR. —
At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a
favorable response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon
petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for
resorting to substituted service. Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the
statutory norms on service of summons have not been strictly complied with, still, any
defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased
when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed a
subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution (Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA
541 [1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136). Indeed,
such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court
within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of
appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons,
absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to
protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant (Carballo vs.
Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
[1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473 Sison, et al. vs.
Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467).
Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable
disposition as a special appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of
summons since the application therefor raised another ground on failure to state a cause
of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly bypassed,
nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
2. ID.; APPEAL; ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW MAY BE RAISED IN PETITION FOR REVIEW
ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45; CASE AT BAR The fact that petitioners are supposedly
occupying a parcel of land other than the realty claimed by private respondent deserves
scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is proscribed by
the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel
for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the
grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully on a question of law" (p. 32 Rollo) is
a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar for us to dwell into the truth or
falsehood of such factual premise (Article 1431, New Civil Code; Section 4, Rule 129;
Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence).
3. ID; JUDGMENT; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; PREVAILING PARTY MOVING FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL OBLIGED TO SERVE COPY OF MOTION ON ADVERSE
PARTY'S COUNSEL. — Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered
without any prior notice to them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of
substance since it erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners
of the immediate enforcement of the appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing
party moving for execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court who is obliged to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which,
on the face of the subject motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs.
Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p.
288).
DECISION
MELO , J : p
In the suit for desahucio initiated below by herein private respondent against petitioners,
the court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in question to pay P5,000.00 per
year as reasonable rental from 1985 until possession is surrendered, and to pay P1,000.00
as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit (pp. 37-38, Rollo). Upon appeal, Branch XIX of
the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region stationed in Malolos and presided over
by herein respondent judge, granted private respondents motion for execution pending
appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond (p. 21, Rollo). To set
aside the proceedings below, the petition at hand was instituted anchored on the
supposition that petitioners were deprived of their day in court.
LexLib
Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns Lot
39 of the Cadastral survey of Bustos with an area of 5,358 square meters covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. U-7924 a portion of which petitioners entered and
occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction. Summons was
served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of
petitioners to submit the corresponding answer, judgment was rendered pursuant to the
rules on summary procedure (pp. 2-3, Decision; pp. 37-38, Rollo).
Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that
they were never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as
the summons. They insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of
realty because petitioners actually occupied Lot No. 3568 owned by Nicolas delos Santos
under Original Certificate of Title No. F-10418. Moreover, petitioners advanced the
proposition that Dolores' husband should have been impleaded. All of these arguments
were to no avail. As indicated earlier, execution pending appeal was ordered due to
petitioners' failure to post a supersedeas bond.
To stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on
April 28, 1986 directed against the reviewing authority and private respondent until further
orders (p. 52, Rollo).
At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a
favorable response from us in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon
petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for
resorting to substituted service. Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the
statutory norms on service of summons have not been strictly complied with, still, any
defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were nonetheless erased
when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed a
subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution (Boticano vs. Chu. Jr., 145 SCRA
541 [1987]); 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1988 Fifth Rev. Ed., p. 136). Indeed,
such demeanor is tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court
within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of
appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons,
absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner was precisely to
protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant (Carballo vs.
Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383; 1 Regalado, supra, p. 144; Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
[1918]; 1 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1989 Rev. Ed., p. 473 Sison, et al. vs.
Gonzales, 50 O.G. 4756; 1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 467).
Neither can We treat the motion for reconsideration directed against the unfavorable
disposition as a special appearance founded on the sole challenge on invalid service of
summons since the application therefor raised another ground on failure to state a cause
of action when conciliation proceedings at the barangay level were allegedly bypassed,
nay, disregarded (Republic vs. Ker and Co., Ltd., 64 O.G. 3761; Regalado, supra, p. 152).
The fact that petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land other than the realty
claimed by private respondent deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a
factual query of this nature is proscribed by the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Verily, counsel for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal
filed with respondent judge that the grievance to be elevated to this Court will focus "fully
on a question of law" (p. 32 Rollo) is a self-defeating posture and operates as a legal bar
for us to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual premise (Article 1431, New Civil
Code; Section 4, Rule 129; Section 2(a), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence).
Petitioners argue next that execution pending appeal was ordered without any prior notice
to them (p. 3, Petition; p. 7, Rollo). This notion is also devoid of substance since it
erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of the immediate
enforcement of the appealed appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
who is obliged to serve a copy of such motion on the adverse party's counsel, which, on
the face of the subject motion, was effected by personal delivery (p. 23, Rollo; Lao vs.
Mencias, 21 SCRA 1021 [1967]; 2 Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1973 Ed., p.
288).
In fine, petitioners may not press the idea that they were deprived of their day in court
amidst the implicit forms of waiver performed by their lawyer in submitting every
conceivable defense for petitioners via the two motions for reconsideration below. LLjur
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order
issued on April 28, 1986 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 101021. April 6, 1993.]
CORPORATION petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
BRAGANCIA respondents.
RELATIONS COMMISSION and MARIO BRAGANCIA,
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; APPEALS FROM

DECISIONS, AWARDS OR ORDERS OF LABOR ARBITER; TEN-DAY PERIOD FIXED
CONTEMPLATES "CALENDAR" DAYS; ACT STILL DUE EVEN IF LAST DAY TO APPEAL
FALLS ON SATURDAY. — The ten-day period fixed by Article 223 of the Labor Code,
concerning appeals from decisions or orders of the Labor Arbiter contemplates "calendar"
days and not "working" days (Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. NLRC, 115 SCRA 347
[1982]; Ernesto Dizon, Jr. vs. NLRC, et al., 181 SCRA 477 [1990]); and that if the last day to
appeal falls on a Saturday, the act is still due on that day, Saturday being a business day
(Olacao v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 38 [1989]).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERFECTION OF APPEAL WITHIN REGLEMENTARY PERIOD NOT
ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL. — We have consistently ruled that perfection of
an appeal within the ten-day reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
Thus, in the case of Paramount Vinyl Corp. vs. NLRC, et al. (190 SCRA 533 [1990]), we
stated: Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a
timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or
award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel
Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. L-39686, June 28, 1980, 98 SCRA 314; Acda v. Minister of Labor,
G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 73140, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
73662, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987,
155 SCRA 199; John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29, 1988,
157 SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 552;
Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational Institution, G.R. No. 82312,
April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597].
DECISION
MELO , J : p

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Resolution dated June 14, 1991
(Annex "K", p. 115, Rollo) of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC, hereafter) in NLRC NCR CA No. 000933-90, as well as the Resolution dated July 19,
1991 (Annex "M", p. 141 Rollo), which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, both
for having been allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
We shall rely on the narration of facts of the NLRC.
On February 6, 1990, private respondent Mario Bragancia, a machine operator in the
Feeding Section, Main Bottling Department of petitioner San Miguel Corporation was
dismissed from service. The cause of the termination, per version of petitioner, was that
Bragancia, together with a, certain Cornelio Caoili, assaulted Florentino Sevilla, a co-
employee, when the latter refused to join a boycott of overtime work. cdrep
Bragancia denied the charge, claiming that his role in the incident was merely to pacify the
protagonists, Caoili and Sevilla, and sought, through the CBA-established grievance
committee, a reconsideration of his dismissal. When the grievance committee sustained
his termination, private respondent filed, on July 4, 1990, a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal, with prayer for actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
On September 17, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for alleged lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter over the subject matter of the complaint,
claiming that since Bragancia had sought reconsideration of his dismissal from the
grievance machinery established pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the CBA, then any
recourse therefrom should be before a panel of voluntary arbitrators in accordance with
the same CBA, citing in support thereof Article 261 of the Labor Code, as amended, which
provides:
The voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances . . . arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to
in the immediately preceding Article . . .
Petitioner's motion was favorably viewed by Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol who issued on
October 9, 1990, an Order (Annex "H", p. 83, Rollo) disposing:
Wherefore, all the foregoing premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss being
impressed with merit, is hereby granted, and this case, conformably with
paragraph 1(c) of Article 217 of the Code, is hereby referred to the voluntary
arbitration as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Records (Annex "I", p. 86, Rollo) show that Bragancia's counsel received a copy of the
aforesaid order on October 23, 1990. He filed his Appeal-Memorandum on November 5,
1990, maintaining that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over his complaint. Following
NLRC rules, however, he should have filed his appeal on November 2, 1990, the tenth
calendar day.
Nonetheless, the NLRC ruled in his favor and remanded the case to the arbitration branch
for further proceedings (p. 121, Rollo).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit on July 19, 1991.
Hence, the instant petition, with petitioner contending that:
I
Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in resolving individual
respondent's appeal considering that the appealed order had already become
final and executory.
II
Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor
arbiter's order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and remanding the
case to the grievance machinery. (p. 12, Rollo.)
Petitioner is correct in pointing out that the ten-day period fixed by Article 223 of the Labor
Code, concerning appeals from decisions or orders of the Labor Arbiter contemplates
"calendar" days and not "working" days (Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. NLRC, 115
SCRA 347 [1982]; Ernesto Dizon, Jr. vs. NLRC, et al., 181 SCRA 477 [1990]); and that if the
last day to appeal falls on a Saturday, the act is still due on that day, Saturday being a
business day (Olacao v. NLRC, 177 SCRA 38 [1989]).
Moreover, we have consistently ruled that perfection of an appeal within the ten-day
reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Thus, in the case of
Paramount Vinyl Corp. vs. NLRC, et al. (190 SCRA 533 [1990]), we stated: cdll
Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to
interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed
decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of
any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-39686,
June 28, 1980, 98 SCRA 314; Acda v. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December
15, 1982, 119 SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73140,
May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No, 73662, June
18, 1987, 151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155
SCRA 199; John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29,
1988, 157 SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988, 158
SCRA 552; Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon Educational
Institution, G.R No. 82312, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 597]. (at pp. 533-534.)
On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that the NLRC abused its discretion when it
entertained Bragancia's appeal. Labor Arbiter Ernesto Dinopol's decision had already
become final and executory when the Union/Bragancia filed their Appeal-Memorandum on
November 5, 1990, 3 days too late.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions of June 14,
1991 and July 19, 1991 are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of Labor Arbiter Ernesto
Dinopol referring the case to Voluntary Arbitration is hereby REINSTATED. cdrep
The temporary restraining order issued on March 2, 1992 is hereby LIFTED. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163287. April 27, 2007.]
ORION SECURITY CORPORATION , petitioner, vs . KALFAM

INC. respondent.
ENTERPRISES, INC.,
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING , J : p
For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated February 17, 2004 and Resolution 2
dated April 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70565, which reversed the
Decision 3 dated March 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in
Civil Case No. Q-97-32024.
The facts, borne by the records, are as follows:
Petitioner Orion Security Corporation is a domestic private corporation engaged in
the business of providing security services. One of its clients is respondent Kalfam
Enterprises, Inc.
Respondent was not able to pay petitioner for services rendered. Petitioner thus
led a complaint 4 against respondent for collection of sum of money. The sheriff tried to
serve the summons and a copy of the complaint on the secretary of respondent's
manager. However, respondent's representatives allegedly refused to acknowledge their
receipt. The summons and the copy of the complaint were left at respondent's office. 5
When respondent failed to le an Answer, petitioner led a motion to declare
respondent in default. 6 The trial court, however, denied the motion on the ground that
there was no proper service of summons on respondent. 7
Petitioner then led a motion for alias summons, which the trial court granted. 8 The
process server again left the summons and a copy of the complaint at respondent's o ce
through respondent's security guard, who allegedly refused to acknowledge their receipt. 9
Again, respondent failed to le an Answer. On motion 1 0 of petitioner, respondent
was declared in default. 1 1 Thereafter, petitioner was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte.
ISHCcT
Respondent led a motion for reconsideration 1 2 of the resolution declaring it in

default. Respondent alleged the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person due
to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. 1 3
On March 15, 2000, the trial court rendered a default judgment, the decretal portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Orion
Security Corporation and against defendant Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., ordering
said defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts as follows:
a) FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
NINE PESOS AND TWENTY SIX CENTAVOS (P513,839.26), Philippine Currency,
as the total amount of the balance due to the plaintiff, plus interest thereon at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from August 29, 1997, the date
of the filing of this case until said obligation is fully paid;
b) FIFTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS

AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (P51,383.92), Philippine Currency, which is ten
percent (10%) of the outstanding obligation, as attorney's fees;
c) FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, as

litigation expenses; and THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS
AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P3,563.25) for the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1 4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that summons was not validly served on
respondent, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.ASIDE The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings upon valid service of summons to the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED. 1 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision was

denied. Hence, the instant petition raising the following as issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION
DATED FEBRUARY 17, 2004 AND ITS RESOLUTION DATED APRIL 22,
2004 ARE NULL AND VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SEC. 14,
ART. VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS IN
FACT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT DUE TO THE LATTER'S VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE IN
THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SUBSTITUTED
SERVICE OF SUMMONS EFFECTED UPON THE SECURITY GUARD OF
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE DEEMED SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULE ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS, IN VIEW
OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT IN THE
PRESENT CASE. 1 6
Simply put, the sole issue is whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
respondent either by (1) valid substituted service of summons on respondent; or (2)
respondent's voluntary appearance in the trial court and submission to its authority. CTSAaH
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals completely brushed aside

respondent's voluntary appearance in the proceedings of the trial court. According to
petitioner, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent due to the latter's voluntary
appearance in the proceedings before the said court. Petitioner insists substituted service
of summons on respondent's security guard is substantial compliance with the rule on
service of summons, in view of the exceptional circumstances in the present case.
Respondent, however, counters that the special appearance of its counsel does not
constitute voluntary appearance. Respondent maintains that its ling of an opposition to
petitioner's motion to declare respondent in default and other subsequent pleadings
questioning the trial court's jurisdiction over it does not amount to voluntary appearance.
Respondent stresses it was not properly served with summons via substituted service
since the security guard on whom it was purportedly served was not the competent
person contemplated by Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
We find the petition without merit.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the ling of the complaint. On the
other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the
service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority. 1 7
In case of domestic private juridical entities such as respondent in the instant case,
Section 11 of Rule 14 states:
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws
of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
in-house counsel.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when

summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted
service may be resorted to. In this connection, Section 7 of Rule 14 provides:
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's o ce or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
In this case, records show that respondent's president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons
against respondent, either in person or by substituted service.
Note that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant's behalf was one with whom the
defendant had a relation of con dence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons. 1 8 Here, petitioner failed to show that the security guard who received the
summons in respondent's behalf shared such relation of con dence that respondent
would surely receive the summons. Hence, we are unable to accept petitioner's contention
that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance with the
requirements of substituted service.
Neither did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over respondent by the latter's
voluntary appearance in court proceedings. Note that a party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of
invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. 1 9 In this case, records show that respondent, in its special appearance,
precisely questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of invalid service of
summons. Thus, it cannot be deemed to have submitted to said court's authority.
Since the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over respondent, either by valid
substituted service of summons or by respondent's voluntary appearance in court and
submission to its authority, respondent cannot be bound by the trial court's judgment
ordering it to pay petitioner a sum of money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 17, 2004
and Resolution dated April 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70565 are
AFFIRMED. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon valid
service of summons to respondent. CETDHA
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 58-63.

2. Id. at 86.
3. Id. at 88-91.
4. Records, pp. 2-5.
5. Id. at 41.
6. Id. at 42-43.
7. Id. at 53.
8. Id. at 54.
9. Id. at 58.
10. Id. at 62-66.
11. Id. at 84-85.
12. Id. at 139-145.
13. Id. at 167-168.
14. Id. at 181.
15. Rollo, p. 63.
16. Id. at 177.
17. Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 171, 177.
18. Id. at 179.
19. United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA
464, 470.

Civil Procedure Cases - Rule 9 To 14

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Civil Procedure Cases - Rule 9 To 14

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 168914. July 4, 2007.]

0-10 cu. m. P125.00 (min. charge)

[G.R. No. 138884. June 6, 2002.]

LEON petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES

Gil Venerando R. Racho for petitioner.

1. JUDGMENT LAW; REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; SEVERAL

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL JUDGMENT; BETWEEN TWO JUDGMENTS RENDERED,

4. ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN COURT OF APPEALS; GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and appellee is

On January 22, 1999, petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration 1 7 of the

WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted for decision

1. CA, Rollo, pp. 116-117.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

22. Supra, note 6.

27. Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

28. RULE 50 — DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the

(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record on

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief, or of page

29. G.R. No. L-27005, 26 SCRA 712, 715 (1969).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 227222. August 20, 2019.]

VIRGILIO P. VILLALONGHA, LUZVIMINDA P. VILLALONGHA-

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari 1 led by petitioners Virgilio P.

xxx xxx xxx

** Per Special Order No. 2700 dated August 15, 2019.

*** On official business.

5. Dated July 21, 1999; id. at 31-44.

6. "Diogracias" in some parts of the records.

10. See rollo, p. 33.

11. Exhibit "D-1," folder of exhibits, pp. 7-11.

12. See rollo, p. 34.

14. Exhibit "G," id. at 17-18, including dorsal portion.

15. Exhibit "H," id. at 19-20, including dorsal portion.

16. See rollo, pp. 35-38.

18. See id. at 56-57.

19. See id. at 86-87.

20. Records, Pieza 2, pp. 411-431. Penned by Judge Wenceslao E. Ibabao.

21. See id. at 430-431.

23. CA rollo, pp. 138-163.

24. See id. at 162.

27. Id. at 60-61.

30. See id. at 64-A.

32. Id. at 10.

33. Dated July 28, 2015; id. at 73-75.

37. CA rollo, pp. 282-291.

38. See id. at 267.

39. See rollo, p. 80.

40. Id. at 25-28.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

42. See Entry of Judgment; id. at 29.

43. Dated August 3, 2016; id. at 82-90.

44. Id. at 30.

46. See id. at 106-109.

48. See Delos Santos v. Elizalde, 543 Phil. 12, 26 (2007).

50. See id. at 57.

52. See Soriano v. Soriano, 558 Phil. 627, 642 (2007).

53. See mailing envelope; CA rollo, p. 166-A.

54. See rollo, p. 67.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2019 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 125383. July 2, 2002.]

FORTUNATA N. DUQUE , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.