CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
Constitutional Law II
Academic Freedom
Garcia v Faculty Admission
68 SCRA 277
Article III, 1987 Constitution
FACTS: Robert McIver it is "a right
claimed by the accredited educator, as
teacher and as investigator, to interpret
his findings and to communicate his
conclusions without being subjected to
any interference, molestation, or
penalization because these conclusions
are unacceptable to some constituted
authority within or beyond the
institution." 9 As for the educator and
philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his
version: "What is academic freedom?
Briefly put, it is the freedom of
professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the
truth as they see it in the field of their
competence. It is subject to no control
or authority except the control or
authority of the rational methods by
which truths or conclusions are sought
and established in these disciplines."
That is only one aspect though. Such
a view does not comprehend fully the
scope of academic freedom recognized by
the Constitution. For it is to be noted
that the reference is to the "institutions
of higher learning" as the recipients of
this boon. It would follow then that the
school or college itself is possessed of
such a right. It decides for itself its
aims and objectives and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere
of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students.
This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a
gradging fashion. That would be to
frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
Former President Vicente G. Sinco of
the University of the Philippines, in his
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
Philippine Political Law, is similarly of
the view that it "definitely grants the
right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as
distinguished from the academic
freedom of a university professor." 11 He
cited the following from Dr. Marcel
Bouchard, Rector of the University of
Dijon, France, President of the
conference of rectors and vice-
chancellors of European universities: "
"It is a well-established fact, and yet one
which sometimes tends to be obscured
in discussions of the problems of
freedom, that the collective liberty of an
organization is by no means the same
thing as the freedom of the individual
members within it; in fact, the two
kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the
problems of academic freedom one must
distinguish, therefore, between the
autonomy of the university, as a
corporate body, and the freedom of the
individual university teacher."
Also: "To clarify further the distinction
between the freedom of the university
and that of the individual scholar, he
says: "The personal aspect of freedom
consists in the right of each university
teacher — recognized and effectively
guaranteed by society — to seek and
express the truth as he personally sees
it, both in his academic work and in his
capacity as a private citizen. Thus the
status of the individual university teacher
is at least as important, in considering
academic freedom, as the status of the
institutions to which they belong and
through which they disseminate their
learning."' 13 He likewise quoted from
the President of the Queen's University
in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The internal
conditions for academic freedom in a
university are that the academic staff
should have de facto control of the
following functions: (i) the admission and
examination of students; (ii) the
curricula for courses of study; (iii) the
appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of
income among the different categories of
expenditure. It would be a poor prospect
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University Case Digests
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
for academic freedom if universities had the Resolution of expulsion of the DLSU-
to rely on the literal interpretation of CSB Joint Discipline Board .
their constitutions in order to acquire
for their academic members control of The following day, June 6, 1995,
these four functions, for in one respondent Judge issued a TRO directing
constitution or another most of these DLSU, its subordinates, agents,
functions are laid on the shoulders of representatives and/or other persons
the law governing body .'" 14 Justice acting for and in its behalf to refrain
Frankfurter, with his extensive and desist from implementing the
background in legal education as a Resolution. On June 19, 1995, petitioner
former Professor of the Harvard Law Sales filed a motion to dismiss in behalf
School, referred to what he called the of all petitioners, except James Yap. On
business of a university and the four June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a
essential freedoms in the following supplemental motion to dismiss the
language: "It is the business of a petitions-in-intervention. On September
university to provide that atmosphere 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an
which is most conducive to speculation, Order denying petitioners' (respondents
experiment and creation. It is an there) motion to dismiss and its
atmosphere in which there prevail "the supplement, and granted private
four essential freedoms" of a university respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for
— to determine for itself on academic a writ of preliminary injunction. Despite
grounds who may teach, what may be the said order, private respondent
taught, how it shall be taught, and who Aguilar was refused enrollment by
may be admitted to study." Thus is petitioner DLSU when he attempted to
reinforced the conclusion reached by us enroll on September 22, 1995 for the
second term of SY 19951996. Thus, on
September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with
DLSU v CA
541 SCRA 22 respondent Judge an urgent motion to
cite petitioners (respondents there) in
contempt of court. Aguilar also prayed
that mandamus does not lie in this case. that petitioners be compelled to enroll
FACTS: PRIVATE respondents Alvin him at DLSU in accordance with
Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, respondent Judge's Order dated
Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, September 20, 1995. On September 25,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi 1995, respondent Judge issued a writ of
Fraternity who were expelled by the De preliminary injunction. On May 14, 1996,
La Salle University (DLSU) and College the CHED issued its questioned
of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
Board because of their involvement in disapproving the penalty of expulsion for
an offensive action causing injuries to all private respondents. As for Aguilar,
petitioner James Yap and three other he was to be reinstated, while other
student members of Domino Lux private respondents were to be excluded.
Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner
controversy before Us pitting private DLSU again prevented private
respondents' right to education vis-a-vis respondent Aguilar from enrolling
the University's right to academic and/or attending his classes
freedom. On June 5, 1995, private
respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Prefatorily, there is merit in the
Manila, against petitioners a petition for observation of petitioners[53] that while
certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 CHED Resolution No. 181-96
of the Rules of Court with prayer for disapproved the expulsion of other
temporary restraining order (TRO) private respondents, it nonetheless
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. authorized their exclusion from petitioner
The petition essentially sought to annul DLSU. However, because of the dismissal
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
of the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now
faced with the spectacle of having two
different directives from the CHED and
the respondent Judge CHED ordering
the exclusion of private respondents
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.,
and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU
to allow them to enroll and complete their
degree courses until their graduation.
ISSUE: Can petitioner DLSU invoke its
right to academic freedom?
RULING:Petitioner DLSU, as an
institution of higher learning, possesses
academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This
institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint.
According to present jurisprudence,
academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution
to determine for itself (1) who may
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how
it shall teach, and (4) who may be
admitted to study. It cannot be gainsaid
that "the school has an interest in
teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling
discipline, the school teaches discipline.
Accordingly, the right to discipline the
student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." Indeed, while
it is categorically stated under the
Education Act of 1982 that students
have a right "to freely choose their field
of study, subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up
to graduation," such right is subject to
the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution. Petitioner DLSU,
therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
free choice of students for admission to
its school.
It is the CHED, not DECS, which has
the power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved
R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as An
Act Creating the Commission on Higher
Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof
and for other purposes. Section 3 of the
said law, which paved the way for the
creation of the CHED, provides: Section 3.
Creation of the Commission on Higher
Education. In pursuance of the
abovementioned policies, the Commission
on Higher Education is hereby created,
hereinafter referred to as Commission. The
Commission shall be independent and
separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
and attached to the office of the
President for administrative purposes
only. Its coverage shall be both public
and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree-granting
programs in all post secondary educational
institutions, public and private. The
powers and functions of the CHED are
enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No.
7722. They include the following: Sec. 8.
Powers and functions of the Commission.
The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions: x x x x n)
promulgate such rules and regulations
and exercise such other powers and
functions as may be necessary to carry
out effectively the purpose and objectives
of this Act; and o) perform such other
functions as may be necessary for its
effective operations and for the continued
enhancement of growth or development of
higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the
contention of petitioners that R.A. No.
7722 did not transfer to the CHED the
DECS power of supervision/review over
expulsion cases involving institutions of
higher learning. First, the foregoing
provisions are all-embracing. They make
no reservations of powers to the DECS
insofar as institutions of higher learning
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
are concerned. They show that the
authority and supervision over all public
and private institutions of higher
education, as well as degree-granting
programs in all post-secondary
educational institutions, public and
private, belong to the CHED, not the
DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS
which has authority to decide
disciplinary cases involving students on
the tertiary level would render nugatory
the coverage of the CHED, which is both
public and private institutions of higher
education as well as degree granting
programs in all post secondary
educational institutions, public and
private. That would be absurd. It is of
public knowledge that petitioner DLSU
is a private educational institution which
offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it
is under the CHED authority. Third, the
policy of R.A. No. 7722[61] is not only
the protection, fostering and promotion
of the right of all citizens to affordable
quality education at all levels and the
taking of appropriate steps to ensure
that education shall be accessible to all.
The law is likewise concerned with
ensuring and protecting academic
freedom and with promoting its exercise
and observance for the continued
intellectual growth of students, the
advancement of learning and research,
the development of responsible and
effective leadership, the education of
high-level and middle-level professionals,
and the enrichment of our historical and
cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when
Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its
members were aware that disciplinary
cases involving students on the tertiary
level would continue to arise in the
future, which would call for the
invocation and exercise of institutions of
higher learning of their right to academic
freedom. Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no
authority in its bare claim that the
Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED
replaced, never had authority over
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
student disciplinary cases. In fact, the
responsibilities of other government
entities having functions similar to those
of the CHED were transferred to the
CHED.[62]
Section 77 of the MRPS[63] on the
process of review in student discipline
cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7722. Fifth, Section
18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in
stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-
supervised or chartered state-supported
post-secondary degree-granting
vocational and tertiary institutions shall
be transferred to the Commission [On
Higher Education]. This provision does
not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the
formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs
and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have
us believe as the only concerns of R.A.
No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus: Where the law does
not distinguish, neither should we. To Our
mind, this provision, if not an explicit
grant of jurisdiction to the CHED,
CSC v SOJOR
554 SCRA 160
necessarily includes the transfer to the
CHED of any jurisdiction which the
DECS might have possessed by virtue of
B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for
that matter.
II. In administrative cases, such as
investigations of students found violating
school discipline, [t]here are withal
minimum standards which must be met
before to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process and these are:
that (1) the students must be informed
in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the
charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they
shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.[67] Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process,
the right to which is among the primary
rights that must be respected even in
administrative proceedings.[68] The
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.[69]
So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or
defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of
due process.
Private respondents were duly informed
in writing of the charges against them
by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
through petitioner Sales. They were given
the opportunity to answer the charges
against them as they, in fact, submitted
their respective answers. They were also
informed of the evidence presented against
them as they attended all the hearings
before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to
adduce evidence on their behalf and
they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence
submitted to it by all the parties before
rendering its resolution in Discipline Case
No. 9495-3-25121.
FACTS: On August 1, 1991, respondent
Sojor was appointed by then President
Corazon Aquino as president of the
Central Visayas Polytechnic College
(CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June
1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or
the “Higher Education Modernization Act
of 1997,” was enacted. This law
mandated that a Board of Trustees
(BOT) be formed to act as the governing
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
body in state colleges. The BOT of
CVPC appointed respondent as
president, with a four-year term
beginning September 1998 up to
September 2002. Upon the expiration
of his first term of office in 2002, he
was appointed president of the
institution for a second four-year term,
expiring on September 24, 2006.
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted
into the Negros Oriental State University
(NORSU). A Board of Regents (BOR)
succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate
administrative cases against respondent
were filed by CVPC faculty members
before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO)
No. VII in Cebu City, namely: (1)
Dishonesty, Misconduct, and
Falsification of Official Document; (2)
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service; and (3) Nepotism.
ISSUE: Does the assumption by the
CSC of jurisdiction over a president
of a state university violate academic
freedom?
RULING: HELD: Respondent, a state
university president with a fixed term
of office appointed by the governing
board of trustees of the university, is a
non-career civil service officer. He was
appointed by the chairman and members
of the governing board of CVPC. By
clear provision of law, respondent is a
non-career civil servant who is under
the jurisdiction of the CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline
officials and employees is not exclusive.
CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a
president of a state university. Section
4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher
Education Modernization Act of 1997,
under which law respondent was
appointed during the time material to
the present case, provides that the
school’s governing board shall have the
general powers of administration granted
to a corporation. In addition, Section 4
of the law grants to the board the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
power to remove school faculty
members, administrative officials, and
employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of
Governing Boards. – The governing
board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its
general powers of administration and the
exercise of all the powers granted to the
board of directors of a corporation under
Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68,
otherwise known as the Corporation
Code of the Philippines:
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty
members and administrative officials
and employees subject to the provisions
of the revised compensation and
classification system and other pertinent
budget and compensation laws governing
hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper;
to grant them, at its discretion, leaves
of absence under such regulations as it
may promulgate, any provisions of
existing law to the contrary not
withstanding; and to remove them for
cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.
(Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently
reproduced as Section 7(i) of the
succeeding law that converted CVPC into
NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in
contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No.
9299 now provides that the
administration of the university and
exercise of corporate powers of the board
of the school shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration. – The University
shall have the general powers of a
corporation set forth in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 68, as amended, otherwise known
as "The Corporation Code of the
Philippines." The administration of the
University and the exercise of its
corporate powers shall be vested
exclusively in the Board of Regents and
the president of the University insofar
as authorized by the Board.
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
Measured by the foregoing yardstick,
there is no question that administrative
power over the school exclusively belongs
to its BOR. But does this exclusive
administrative power extend to the power
to remove its erring employees and
officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A.
No. 9299, respondent’s argument that
the BOR has exclusive power to remove
its university officials must fail. Section
7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the
power to remove faculty members,
employees, and officials of the university
is granted to the BOR "in addition to
its general powers of administration."
This provision is essentially a
reproduction of Section 4 of its
predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the
lawmakers did not change even with the
enactment of the new law. For clarity,
the text of the said section is
reproduced below: Sec. 7. Powers and
Duties of the Board of Regents. – The
Board shall have the following
specific powers and duties in addition to
its general powers of administration and
the exercise of all the powers granted to
the Board of Directors of a corporation
under existing laws: i. To fix and adjust
salaries of faculty members and
administrative officials and employees,
subject to the provisions of the Revised
Compensation and Position Classification
System and other pertinent budget and
compensation laws governing hours of
service and such other duties and
conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant them, at its discretion, leaves of
absence under such regulations as it
may promulgate, any provision of
existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding; and to remove them for
cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.36
(Emphasis supplied) Verily, the BOR of
NORSU has the sole power of
administration over the university. But
this power is not exclusive in the matter
of disciplining and removing its
employees and officials. Although the
BOR of NORSU is given the specific
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline
its employees and officials, there is no
showing that such power is exclusive.
When the law bestows upon a Court has held that the guaranteed
government body the jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.37 All
members of the civil service are under
the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless
otherwise provided by law. Being a non-
career civil servant does not remove
respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service
official or employee is within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
III. Academic freedom may not be
invoked when there are alleged violations
of civil service laws and rules. Certainly,
academic institutions and personnel are
granted wide latitude of action under the
principle of academic freedom. Academic
freedom encompasses the freedom to
determine who may teach, who may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.42 Following
that doctrine, this Court has recognized
that institutions of higher learning has
the freedom to decide for itself the best
methods to achieve their aims and
objectives, free from outside coercion,
except when the welfare of the general
public so requires.43 They have the
independence to determine who to
accept to study in their school and they
cannot be compelled by mandamus to
enroll a student.44 That principle,
however, finds no application to the
facts of the present case. Contrary to
the matters traditionally held to be
justified to be within the bounds of
academic freedom, the administrative
complaints filed against Sojor involve
violations of civil service rules. He is
facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty,
falsification of official documents, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service. These
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Nikki Louise O. Tan
Case Digests
are classified as grave offenses under
civil service rules, punishable with
suspension or even dismissal.45 This
academic freedom does not give an
institution the unbridled authority to
perform acts without any statutory
basis.46 For that reason, a school
official, who is a member of the civil
service, may not be permitted to commit
violations of civil service rules under the
justification that he was free to do so
under the principle of academic
freedom. Lastly, We do not agree with
respondent’s contention that his
appointment to the position of president
of NORSU, despite the pending
administrative cases against him, served
as a condonation by the BOR of the
alleged acts imputed to him. The
doctrine this Court laid down in
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.47 and
Aguinaldo v. Santos48 are inapplicable
to the present circumstances.
Respondents in the mentioned cases are
elective officials, unlike respondent here
who is an appointed official. Indeed,
election expresses the sovereign will of
the people.49 Under the principle of vox
populi est suprema lex, the re-election
of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case.
The same cannot be said of a re-
appointment to a non-career position.
There is no sovereign will of the people
to speak of when the BOR re-appointed
respondent Sojor to the post of
university president.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given
the specific power under R.A. No. 9299
to discipline its employees and officials,
there is no showing that such power is
exclusive.
When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be
proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. All members
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 Ateneo de Davao University Case Digests
Atty. Gil Garcia College of Law
of the civil service are under the
jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise
provided by law. Being a noncareer
civil servant does not remove
respondent from the ambit of the CSC.
Career or non-career, a civil service
official or employee is within the
jurisdiction of the CSC. Academic
institutions and personnel are granted
wide latitude of action under the
principle of academic freedom. Academic
freedom encompasses the freedom to
determine who may teach, who may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study. Following
that doctrine, this Court has recognized
that institutions of higher learning has
the freedom to decide for itself the best
methods to achieve their aims and
objectives, free from outside coercion,
except when the welfare of the general
public so requires. They have the
independence to determine who to
accept to study in their school and they
cannot be compelled by mandamus to
enroll a student. That principle, however,
finds no application to the facts of the
present case. Contrary to the matters
traditionally held to be justified to be
within the bounds of academic freedom,
the administrative complaints filed
against Sojor involve violations of civil
service rules.

He is facing charges of nepotism,

dishonesty, falsification of official
documents, grave misconduct, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service. These are classified as
grave offenses under civil service rules,
punishable with suspension or even
dismissal. This Court has held that the
guaranteed academic freedom does not
give an institution the unbridled
authority to perform acts without any
statutory basis. For that reason, a
school official, who is a member of the
civil service, may not be permitted to
commit violations of civil service rules
under the justification that he was free
to do so under the principle of academic
freedom.

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