Election Laws NALDOZA vs.

LAVILLES ( 254 SCRA 286 ) ( 254 SCRA 286 ) “Election Off

ense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election Offenses”
1
Facts: Complainant Alberto Naldoza, accused in the aforestated cases ran for ree
lection in the May 8 Barangay elections. The spouses Generoso Flame and Lucia Fl
ame and the spouses Marlon Piedad and Rosemarie Piedad thereafter accused compla
inant of vote-buying in winning the election. Accordingly, the Chief of Police o
f Miagao with whom the charge was lodged, filed two separate complaints against
Naldoza for vote-buying. Respondent examined the private complainants, adopting
for the purpose the transcript of the question-and-answer type of examination co
nducted by the Chief of Police and sworn before him by the parties. Respondent i
ssued an order finding probable cause to believe complainant Naldoza committed t
he crime charged, and respondent thereupon issued the warrants for complainant’s a
rrest. Subsequently, respondent issued another order, reconsidering his order, i
nsofar as it referred the cases to the Comelec. The cases were instead remanded
to the Chief of Police of Miagao, Iloilo with instructions to file the same dire
ctly with the provincial prosecutor. The warrants of arrest were lifted and comp
lainant’s release was ordered. Issue: Whether or not there is ignorance of the law
for failure to comply with Section 4 of Comelec resolution No. 2695, authorizin
g chiefs of police to conduct the preliminary investigation of charges for viola
tion of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: Yes, service in the judiciary means a c
ontinuous study and research on the law from beginning to the end. A judge owes
it to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis of the co
mplaint and the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. A reduc
ed fine is deemed proper where there is no malice or evil intent in a judge’s actu
ations in unwarrantedly conducting a preliminary investigation and in ordering t
he issuance of warrants of arrest.
Election Laws
2
KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997 ) “Election Offense, B. Ju
risdiction Over Election Offenses” Facts: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywi
de Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a specific amou
nt of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activi
ties. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the f
ollowing mandatory requirements: (1) Approval by the President of the Philippine
s; (2) Release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; an
d (3) List of projects and activities. Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Se
cretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign Memoranda of Agr
eements with accredited NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize
them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Res
pondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementione
d request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regiona
l Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him,
respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agr
eement with an accredited NGO known as the “Philippine Youth Health and Sports Dev
elopment Foundation, Inc.” (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan
a letter informing the former of “two serious violations of election laws,” among th
em that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly
before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of “PYHSDFI” a private entity, which
had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections
and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, t
horoughly, impartially, without fear of favor. Issue: Based on recommendations b
y the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the letter-compla
int for lack of evidence. Held: The constitutional and statutory mandate for the
Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws transl
ates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in
cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information
in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry,
whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. Although only a low quantu
m and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause, the
same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentia
ry or probative value in this jurisdiction.
Election Laws
3
CORPUZ vs. TANODBAYAN ( 149 SCRA 281 ) “Election Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Ele
ction Offenses” Facts: Petitioners were members of the Citizens Election Committee
of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castil
lejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castille
jos was then a candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private r
espondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice-mayor of the same
municipality sent a letter to President Marcos charging the petitioners with vio
lation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and / or campa
igning inside the voting centers during the election. Regional Election Director
of San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on September 29
, 1981, submitted its report recommending to the Comelec the dismissal of the co
mplaint. Private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed with th
e Comelec stating his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. On November 26
, 1981 the Comelec dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Subseq
uently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary investigation of a
complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties and on
the same charges previously dismissed by the Comelec. The Tanodbayan asserted ex
clusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the Comelec Chair
man that a lawyer of the Comelec if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prose
cutor has not authority to conduct preliminary investigation s and prosecute off
enses committed by Comelec officials in relation to their office. Issue: Whether
or not the Tanodbayan has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute e
lection offenses. Held: Comelec, not the Tanodbayan, or Sandiganbayan, has exclu
sive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by a
private individual or public officer or employee. Nature of the offense, not the
personality of the offender, is important.
Election Laws COMELEC vs. NOYNAY ( 292 SCRA 254 ) “Election Offense, B. Jurisdicti
on Over Election Offenses”
4
Facts: In an Order issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, a
s presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to
be withdrawn and directed the Comelec Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of
B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. no. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no juris
diction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases
does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7691 h
as divested Regional Trial Courts or jurisdiction over election offenses, which
are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six years. Held: By virtue of
the exception provided for in opening sentence of section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, t
he exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts does not cover those criminal cases which b
y specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescr
ibed therefor. Pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election of
fenses also fall within the exception provided for in the opening sentence of Se
ction 32 of Batas Pambansa 129. Republic Act 7691 can by no means be considered
as a special law on jurisdiction – it is merely an amendatory law intended to amen
d specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and it does not
have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon the Regional trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to heart and decide the cases ther
ein specified. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases sh
ould be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law would be a speci
al law and must be construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction
of courts. However, Congress never intended that R. A. no. 7691 should repeal su
ch special provisions is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch
at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the ex
ception.
Election Laws PEOPLE vs. REYES ( 247 SCRA 328 ) “Election Offense, A. Election Off
enses”
5
Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collection Dist
rict II, Manila International Container Port (MICP) Customs Personnel Order assi
gned Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy
Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. Ebio filed with the C
omelec a letter – complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new ass
ignment violated Comelec Resolution No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 88
1, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the
civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local
elections. Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the informa
tion on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He conte
nded that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881
because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It
purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity
of Comelec Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Th
e trial court granted private respondent’s motion to quash and dismissed the crimi
nal case. Issue: Whether or not transfer is violative of section 261 (h) of B.P.
Blg. 881. Held: Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the tra
nsfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. If done to
promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No
. 2333 provides that the Comelec has to pass upon the reason for the proposed tr
ansfer or detail. Prescinding from this predicate, two elements must be establis
hed to prove a violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz: (1) The fact
of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period
as fixed by the Comelec; and (2) The transfer or detail was effected without pr
ior approval of the Comelec in accordance with its implementing rules and regula
tions. An officer cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P.
Blg. 881, a penal provision, before the effectivity of Comelec Resolution No. 2
333 promulgating the necessary implementing rules.
Election Laws MAPPALA vs. NUÑEZ ( 240 SCRA 600 ) “Election Offense, A. Election Offe
nses”
6
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Jacinto Mappala against Judg
e Crispulo A. Nuñez, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, C
abangan, Isabela for gross inefficiency, serious misconduct and violation of the
Code of Judicial Ethics. In his decision, respondent found that Alejandro shot
complainant inside Precinct No. 2, located at the elementary school building in
Sto. Tomas, Isabela, during the barangay elections. Respondent also found that A
lejandro was the one who surrendered the gun. To respondent, the surrender of th
e weapon was an implied admission that it was the one used by Alejandro in shoot
ing complainant. Inspite of all these findings, respondent acquitted Alejandro o
f illegally carrying a deadly weapon inside a precinct on the theory that the gu
n was not seized from him while he was inside the precinct. Issue: Whether or no
t respondent Judge erred in ruling that Alejandro was not in violation of illega
l possession of firearms. Held: To support a conviction under Sec. 261 (p) of th
e Omnibus Election Code, is not necessary that the deadly weapon should have bee
n seized from the accused while he was in the precinct or within a radius of 100
meters therefrom, as it is enough that he carried the deadly weapon “in the polli
ng place or within 100 meters thereof” during any of the specified days and hours.
Election Laws
7
JAVIER vs. COMELEC ( 144 SCRA 194 ) “Election Contests, G. Interpretation of Certa
in Words and Phrases” Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candid
ates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former
appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being
the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the ele
ctions, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers
of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven
suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murde
rs. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candida
te or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. It was in this atmosphe
re that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true
to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respond
ent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of
the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent w
as proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner the
reupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made o
nly by a division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution
. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec authorized to promulg
ate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner
in the election. Held: Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provi
des that: “The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases m
ay be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Ba
tasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.”
Election Laws
8
MALALUAN vs. COMELEC ( 254 SCRA 397 ) “Election Contests, F. Award of Damages” Facts
: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose Evangelista were both may
oralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private resp
ondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected M
ayor with a winning margin of 706 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest wi
th the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly ele
cted municipal mayor with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, th
e court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluan’s protest expenses b
ut also for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner filed a mo
tion for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court. Subsequently t
he First Division of the Comelec ordered Malaluan to vacate the office. The Come
lec en banc affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition for certiorari
and prohibition on May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that
the term of office of the local officials elected in the May 1992 elections exp
ired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar
as it concerns petitioner’s right to the mayoralty seat because expiration of the
term of office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering th
e same moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its d
iscretion in awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent. Hel
d: The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of damages is that th
e same is in accordance with law, specifically, the provisions of the Civil Code
pertinent to damages. The Omnibus Election Code provides that “actual or compensa
tory damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto proceedi
ngs in accordance with law.” Comelec Rules of Procedure provide that “in all electio
n contests the Court may adjudicate damages and attorney’s fees as it may deem jus
t and as established by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such cl
aims in his pleadings. Notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an e
lection protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the Comelec as
winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office and entered into the perfo
rmance of the duties of office is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and a
llowances legally provided for that position. The emolument must go to the perso
n who rendered the service unless the contrary is provided.
Election Laws
9
ATIENZA vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 108533, Dec. 20 1994 ) “Election Contests, F. Award
of Damages” Facts: Private respondent Antonio G. Sia was elected mayor of the Mun
icipality of Madrilejos, Cebu in the 1998 local elections. Following Sia’s proclam
ation, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court questi
oning the results of the elections in a number of precincts in the municipality.
Consequently, in the revision ordered by the lower court, petitioner obtained a
plurality of 12 votes over the private respondent. The Regional Trial Court ren
dered its decision declaring petitioner the winner of the municipal elections an
d ordering the private respondent to reimburse petitioner the amount of P300,856
.19 representing petitioner’s expenses in the election protest. Private respondent
appealed. Meanwhile, the Regional trial Court granted petitioner’s motion for exe
cution pending appeal, which was opposed by respondent. The Comelec issued a pre
liminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the order of execution. The Come
lec, en banc, on April 7, 1992 issued an Order setting aside the preliminary inj
unction and thereby allowing petitioner to assume as mayor of the Municipality o
f Madrilejos pending resolution of his appeal. However, following the synchroniz
ed elections of May 11, 1992, the Presiding Commissioner of the Comelec’s Second D
ivision issued an Order dated July 18, 1992 dismissing petitioner’s appeal for bei
ng moot and academic. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec acted with grave abuse o
f discretion in reversing the lower court’s judgment. Held: The dismissal of an ap
peal in an election protest case for having become moot and academic due to the
election of new municipal officials referred only to that part of the appealed j
udgment which was affected by the election and not to that portion relating to t
he award of damages. However, it would appear virtually impossible for a party i
n an election protest case to recover actual or compensatory damages in the abse
nce of a law expressly providing for situations allowing for the recovery of the
same. This, petitioner has been unable to do. The intent of the legislature to
do away with provisions indemnifying the victorious party for expenses incurred
in an election contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission clearly attr
ibutable to the losing party cannot be gainsaid – in fine, Section 259 of the Omni
bus Election Code merely provides for the granting of actual and compensatory da
mages “in accordance with law.” The intent, moreover, to do away with such provision
s merely recognizes the maxim, settled in law that a wrong without damage or dam
age without wrong neither constitutes a cause of action nor creates a civil obli
gation.
Election Laws ZACATE vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 144678, Mar. 1, 2001 ) “Election Conte
sts, E. Execution Pending Appeal”
10
Facts: Petitioner Javier E. Zacate and private respondent Thelma C. Baldado were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Sama
r, in the May, 1998 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, proclaimed pri
vate respondent as the duly elected mayor having garnered 2,958 votes as against
the 2,719 votes of petitioner, private respondent winning by 239 votes. Petitio
ner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Samar
. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected Mayor with only one vo
te as his winning margin. On the same date private respondent filed a notice of
appeal. The following day, petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal which private respondent opposed on the ground that she
had already perfected her appeal. The trial court rendered a Supplemental Decisi
on, correcting the winning margin of petitioner to 2 votes instead of 1 vote and
at the same time denied the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal fil
ed by petitioner and ordered further the transmission of the complete records of
the protest case to the Comelec. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Partial Rec
onsideration to reverse denial of his motion for execution pending appeal. After
hearing, the trial court issued a Resolution reversing its Supplemental Decisio
n. The Resolution ruled that the trial court still had jurisdiction over the mot
ion for execution pending appeal, that there are good and valid reasons for gran
ting the same. Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction of the cas
e and whether or not discretionary execution is proper. Held: Discretionary exec
ution is barred when the trial court loses jurisdiction and this occurs when all
the parties have filed their respective appeals or when the period to appeal ha
s lapsed for those who did not file their appeals and when the court is no longe
r in possession of the records of the case. The perfection of an appeal within t
he statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictiona
l and failure to so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and dep
rives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment mu
ch less to entertain the appeal. While petitioner timely filed motion for execut
ion pending appeal, petitioner belatedly filed the motion for reconsideration of
the denial of his motion for execution pending appeal rendering said denial fin
al and executory. While the Supplemental Decision wrongly denied petitioner’s moti
on for execution pending appeal, the remedy left for petitioner then was to time
ly seek relief from the erroneous ruling. This petitioner failed to do.
Election Laws
11
ASMALA vs. COMELEC ( 289 SCRA 746 ) “Election Contests, E. Execution Pending Appea
l” Facts: In the elections of May 8, 1995, eight candidates vied for the position
of Vice Mayor for the Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Basilan. The canvass
of votes by the Municipal Board of canvassers, indicated that Hadji Husni Mohamm
ad garnered 3,065 votes, Emmanuel “Manny” Alano 2,912 votes, and Halim Asmala got 2,
542 votes. On the basis of the aforesaid results of canvass of votes, Hadji Husn
i Mohammad was proclaimed, and later he assumed office as Vice Mayor of Tuburan.
On May 22, 1995, Halim Asmala filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court of Basilan. The protest alleged that election fraud and other irregularit
ies tainted the election and canvass of votes. During the hearing, the court a q
uo found that several ballots were written by just one hand while other ballots
were prepared by only two persons. Consequently, such ballots were invalidated.
The trial court rendered its decision crediting Halim Asmala, the herein petitio
ner, with 2,130 votes, Emmanuel Alano with 1,920 votes and Hadji Husni Mohammad
with 1,729 votes, and adjudging petitioner the duly elected Vice Mayor of Tubura
n, Province of Basilan. After the promulgation of the aforementioned decision, p
rivate respondent Hadji Husni Mohammed filed his Notice of Appeal with the same
Regional Trial Court. On the following day, the petitioner presented a Motion fo
r Execution Pending Appeal. Thereto, private respondent interposed his oppositio
n, theorizing that his perfected appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction
to resolve the Motion foe Execution Pending Appeal. Issue: Whether or not filin
g of notice of appeal divests a trial court of its jurisdiction over a case. Hel
d: The mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion for exe
cution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an
appeal, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of no moment
and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion fo
r immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because the court must hear
and resolve it for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal
. Filing by one party of an appeal on the same day the judgment was rendered doe
s not deprive the other party of the right to avail himself of the entire period
of five days within which to appeal, if he so desires including motions for exe
cution pending appeal. An appeal is perfected upon the expiration of the last da
y to appeal by any party – it is not perfected on the date the notice of appeal wa
s filed.
Election Laws
12
ROBERTO D. RAMAS vs. COMELEC ( 286 SCRA 189 ) “Election Contests, E. Execution Pen
ding Appeal” Facts: Petitioners and private respondents were the official candidat
es of the NPC Lakas-NUCD for elective municipal positions of Guipos, Zamboanga d
el Sur. After the canvass of election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as th
e duly elected municipal officials therein. Private respondents seasonably filed
an election protest with the RTC of Pagadian City which ruled in their favor. R
espondents thereafter filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision pending
Appeal, however, petitioner filed an Opposition to this Motion. The trial court
issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. COMELEC concu
rs with the trial court’s decision, hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not CO
MELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it concurs with the decision of t
he trial court. Held: The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized an
d given approval to execution of judgments pending appeal in election cases file
d under existing election laws. All that was required for a valid exercise of th
e discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution
should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The rationale w
hy such executionis allowed in election cases is “to give as much recognition to t
he worth of a trial judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the la
w to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.” To deprive trial courts of thei
r discretion to grant execution pending appeal would bring back the ghost of the
“grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by dev
ious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an ele
ctive office.” The following constitutes “good reasons,” and a combination of two or m
ore of them will suffice to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public inter
est involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining p
ortion of the term of the contested office; (3) the length of time that the elec
tion contest has been pending. In this case, all elements was present, consideri
ng that this has been pending for a year, the trial court did not commit grave a
buse of discretion.
Election Laws MANUEL C. SUNGA vs. COMELEC ( 288 SCRA 76 )
13
“Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in Elective and Appointive
office” Facts: Petitioner was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in
the Municipality of Iguig, Cagayan in the May 1995 Elections. Private respondent
Trinidad was then the incumbent Mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the s
ame municipality. Sunga filed a complaint accusing Trinidad of violation of the
Omnibus Election Code for using threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms
of coercion. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adduced evidence while Trinidad op
ted not to submit any evidence. The election results showed that Trinidad garner
ed the highest number of votes while Sunga trailed second. The complaint filed b
y Sunga was denied by COMELEC ruling that the petitions filed shall be deemed to
be the amended petition filed on May 11,1995 which was clearly filed after the
election mandates the dismissal of the disqualification case. Issue: Whether or
not COMELEC can hear and decide disqualification cases against winning candidate
s even after the election. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC is left wi
th no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the el
ection. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and has assumed the positi
on of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue
the hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified for the
office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
Hence, Sunga cannot claim the right to take the oath for the mayoral office bec
ause the Local Government Code clearly provides that in case of disqualification
of the one proclaimed for the said office, the vice-mayor shall assume office.
Election Laws BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs. COMELEC ( 201 SCRA 253 )
14
“Election Contests, D. Distinction between Quo Warranto in Elective and Appointive
office” Facts: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to int
ervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal fr
om running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her reside
nce in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she w
as in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualifie
d from running for the same office. The COMELEC granted the petition. However, w
hen the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the G
overnor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highe
st votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte
. Issue: Whether or not the candidate who got the second highest vote may be pro
claimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified. Held:
The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally
a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and
was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the loca
l elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazab
al considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her
in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of go
vernor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The
net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by th
e electorate.
Election Laws
15
BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC ( 243 SCRA 538 ) “Election Contests, C. Quo Warrant
o” Facts: It is averred that at the time respondent Rodriguez filed his certificat
e of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten counts of insurance fraud
or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court
of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claim
ed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” fr
om that country. Before the May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of r
espondent’s certificate of candidacy on the ground of the candidate’s disqualificati
on was filed by petitioner, but COMELEC dismissed the petition. Private responde
nt was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon. Petitioner instituted quo warranto p
roceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC but the latter dismisse
d the petition. Issue: Whether private respondent, who at the time of the filing
of his certificate of candidacy is said to be facing a criminal charge before a
foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive fro
m justice.” Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulat
ions implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: “Article 73. Disqual
ifications – The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elec
tive local position: “(a) xxxx
“(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fug
itive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.” I
t is clear from this provision that fugitives from justice refer only to persons
who has been convicted by final judgment. However, COMELEC did not make any def
inite finding on whether or not private respondent is a fugitive from justice wh
en it outrightly denied the petition for quo warranto. The Court opted to remand
the case to COMELEC to resolve and proceed with the case.
Election Laws
16
MELANIO SAMPAYAN, et al. vs. RAUL DAZA, et al. ( 213 SCRA 807 ) “Election Contests
, C. Quo Warranto” Facts: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza,
then incumbent congressman of their congressional district in Makati, from cont
inuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is
a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. They al
so alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status
as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) a
nd the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III). Respondent Congressman filed
his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United Stat
es as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization Servi
ce, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Ph
ilippines on August 12, 1985. Issue: Whether or not respondent Daza should be di
squalified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the ins
tant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident from the manif
estation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the
respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of offi
ce commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of
this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qu
alification of its members. The petitioner’s appropriate remedy should have been t
o file a petition to cancel respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before the
election for a quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten
days after Daza’s proclamation.
Election Laws
17
JIMMY S. DE CASTRO vs. COMELEC ( 267 SCRA 806 ) “Election Contests, B. Election Pr
otest” Facts: Petitioner De Castro was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindor
o during the 1995 Elections, so as the private respondent as Vice-Mayor of the s
ame municipality. The late Nicolas Jamilla filed an election protest before the
RTC of Pinamulayan, Oriental Mindoro. During the pendency of the said contest, h
e died. Shortly thereafter, the RTC dismissed the election protest ruling that “ a
s this case is personal, the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itsel
f.” When private respondent learned about the dismissal, he filed a motion for int
ervention and/or substitution in the same case which the petitioner opposed. The
motion of private respondent was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorar
i and mandamus with the COMELEC assailing that the trial court’s orders were issue
d with rave abuse of discretion. COMELEC grants the petition ruling that an elec
tion contest survives the death of the protestant or the protestee. Issue: Is an
Election Contest a personal action extinguished upon the death of the real part
y in interest? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Court held tha
t while the right to public office is personal and exclusive to the public offic
er, and election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant
or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all au
thority to continue the protest proceedings. The assertion of petitioner that pr
ivate respondent is not the real party in interest entitled to be substituted in
the election protest in place of the late Jamilla is Utterly without legal basi
s.
Election Laws
18
ALAN M. LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 245 SCRA 477 ) “Election Contests, B. Electi
on Protest” Facts: In the barangay election of May 1994, petitioner was proclaimed
by the Barangay Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Pobl
acion, Tangalan, Aklan on May 10, 1994. Private respondent Fernandez filed an el
ection protest against the petitioner on May 18, 1994. However, the petition was
not accompanied by a certification of non- forum shopping required under Admini
strative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court. The following day, May 1994, t
he private respondent submitted to the MCTC his certification of non-forum shopp
ing. On May 25, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the protest due to pr
ivate respondents failure to strictly comply with the Circular. The MCTC issued
an order denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC of Aklan denied the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Issue: Whether Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory and jurisdictional, and whether it is applicabl
e in election cases. Held: The filing of the certification was within the period
for filing an election protest. When petitioner was proclaimed as the Punong Ba
rangay on May 10, 1994, respondent has ten days from such proclamation within wh
ich to file the election protest. In this case, when respondent filed his certif
icate of non-forum shopping on My 19, 1994, it was within the reglementary perio
d provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, thus, he still has until May 20, 19
94 to complete the requirements of his petition. Also, the fact that the Circula
r requires that it should be strictly complied with merely underserves its manda
tory nature in that it cannot dispensed with or its requirements altogether disr
egarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provi
sions under justifiable circumstances. There is nothing in the Circular that ind
icates that it does not apply to election cases. On the contrary, it expressly p
rovides that the requirements therein “shall be strictly complied with in the fili
ng of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all c
ourts and agencies other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
Election Laws
19
DANILO GATCHALIAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 245 SCRA 208 ) “Election Contests, B. Ele
ction Protest” Facts: Gatchalian and Aruelo were rivals for the office of the Vice
-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan in the May 11, 1992 Elections. Gatchalian was procla
imed Vice-Mayor by a margin of four votes on May 13, 1992. On May 22, 1992, Arue
lo filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking to annul the proclamation of Gatcha
lian. He also filed on June 2, 1992 with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan an election
protest. When Gatchalian received the summons, instead of filing an answer, he
filed a motion to dismissw on the following grounds: (a) the petition was filed
out of time; (b) there was a pending pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC, h
ence the protest was premature; and (c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed fees
. The pre-proclamation case was denied by COMELEC, but the Motion to Dismiss was
denied by the trial court, hence this petition. Issue: Should the proclamation
contest be denied? Also, should the election contest be dismissed for failure to
pay the filing fees? Held: On the first issue, the Court held that Aruelo filed
with the COMELEC preproclamation case against Gatchalian nine days after May 13
, 1992, the latter’s proclamation date. The filinf of the pre-proclamation case su
spended the running of the period within which to file the election protest whic
h was one day after June 22, 1992. He filed the election protest on June 2, 1992
with the trial court ex abudante cautela. On second the issue, the Court held t
hat, indeed, respondent failed to pay the required filing fee of P300,00 for the
election protest prescribed by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Hence, the petit
ion should be dismissed for it is the payment of the filing fee that vests juris
diction of the court over the election protest.
Election Laws
20
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. FIDEL RAMOS ( 253 SCRA 559 ) “Election Contests, B. E
lection Protest” Facts: The protestant lost in the May 1992 Election. In her Motio
n of 16 August 1995, reiterated in her Comment of 29 August 1995, Protestant Def
ensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot
areas be dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed co
mputed. The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the prote
stant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the election protest filed by Santiago is moot and academi
c by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of of
fice as such on June 30, 1995. Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the Affirmative.
The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned o
r considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office
as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof. The protestan
t abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Moreover, the dismiss
al of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of
uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhan
cing the all – too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery.
Election Laws
21
BENJAMIN F. ARAO vs. COMELEC ( 210 SCRA 290 ) “Election Contests, B. Election Prot
est” Facts: Petitioner Arao and private respondent Pulmones were candidates for th
e office of City Mayor of Pagadian City in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
After canvassing the votes, petitioner garnered 12,447 votes, while Pulmones go
t only 12,030 votes. Consequently on January 21, 1988, petitioner was proclaimed
City Mayor-elect of Pagadian City. Private respondent filed his Protest with CO
MELEC particularly alleging that fraud and anomalies were rampant in practically
all the voting centers in Pagadian City on January 28, 1988. He also filed an a
mended protest on February 15, 1988 or after the ten day period to file an elect
ion protest. The First Division of COMELEC denied the said amended protest. Ther
eafter, the COMELEC en banc granted the amended protest and declared Pulmones as
the duly elected mayor of Pagadian City and ordered petitioner to vacate his of
fice and surrender the same to private respondent. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Pulmones as the duly elected M
ayor of Pagadian City. Held: The extraordinary power of the Supreme Court to pas
s upon an order or decision of COMELEC should be exercised restrictively, with c
are and caution, while giving it the highest regard and respect due a constituti
onal body. For, not every abuse of discretion justifies the original action of c
ertiorari, it must be grave. Nor any denial of Due Process within its ambit, it
must be patent and it must be substantial. The test therefore is whether petitio
ner has demonstrated convincingly that COMELEC has committed grave abuse of disc
retion or exceeded its jurisdiction amounting to patent and substantial denial o
f due process in issuing the challenged decision. Here, petitioner has utterly f
ailed. The complaint of petitioner against the alleged omission of COMELEC to st
ate the reasons for its conclusion that certain ballots were with identical hand
writings, some marked and others stray, does not in any magnitude diminish the s
traight forward statement of the public respondent that “it painstakingly examined
and appreciated individually the contested ballots for both protestant and prot
estee in accordance with existing norms.” Consequently petitioner may be deemed to
have waived his right to question the Resolution when he failed to act accordin
gly despite the opportunity to do so. He should not be permitted, in other words
to remain mute and unaffected in the face of a perceived jurisdictional defect
and, worse, profit from his acquiescence only to grumble in the end when it turn
s out to be prejudicial to his interest.
Election Laws
22
GALIDO vs. COMELEC ( 193 SCRA 78 ) “Election Contests, A. Jurisdiction over Electi
on Contests” Facts: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidate
s during the January 1988 local elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.
Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an el
ection protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclama
tion of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC.
Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent th
e duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC he
ld that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C” aft
er the name “Galido” were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. Undaunted by his p
revious failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
and injunction before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary res
training order. In his comment to the petition, private respondent moved for dis
missal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitutio
n, that “Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests in
volving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable.
Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s d
ecision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition
for certiorari by the aggrieved party? Held: The fact that decisions, final orde
rs or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barang
ay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse
to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX
(A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, “Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or rulin
g of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on cer
tiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolv
e this issue in favor of the petitioner. “We do not, however, believe that the res
pondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inhere
nt power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and jus
tice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclu
sions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretio
n, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has bee
n abused to the prejudice of either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DIMISSSE
D.
Election Laws
23
Election Laws
24
FLORES vs. COMELEC ( 184 SCRA 484 ) “Election Contests, A. Jurisdiction over Elect
ion Contests” Facts: Petitioner Roque Flores was declared by the board of canvasse
rs as having the highest number of votes for kagawad on the March 1989 elections
, in Barangay Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus proclaimed punong barangay in acc
ordance with Section 5 of R.A. 6679. However, his election was protested by priv
ate respondent Rapisora, who placed second in the election with one vote less th
an the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum sustained Rapisora
and installed him as punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting
two votes as stray from the latter’s total. Flores appealed to the RTC, which aff
irmed the challenged decision in toto. The judge agreed that the four votes cast
for “Flores” only, without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all hav
e been considered invalid instead of being divided equally between the petitione
r and Anastacio Flores, another candidate for kagawad. The total credited to the
petitioner was correctly reduced by 2, demoting him to second place. The petiti
oner went to the COMELEC, which dismissed his appeal on the ground that it had n
o power to review the decision of the RTC, based on Section 9 of R.A. 6679, that
decisions of the RTC in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court
in barangay elections “on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable”. In
his petition for certiorari, the COMELEC is faulted for not taking cognizance of
the petitioners appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decisions of Municipal or Met
ropolitan Courts in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appe
llate jurisdiction of the COMELEC considering Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679? Held:
The dismissal of the appeal is justified, but on an entirely different and more
significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution, prov
iding that the COMELEC shall “Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all co
ntests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective reg
ional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all conte
sts involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general ju
risdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction”. Municipal or Metropolitan Courts being courts of limited ju
risdiction, their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exc
lusive appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC under the afore-quoted section. Hen
ce, the decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, should have been
appealed directly to the COMELEC and not to the RTC. Accordingly, Section 9 of
Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the municipal or
metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the RTC, mu
st be declared unconstitutional.
Election Laws RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA ( 243 SCRA 502 ) “Election Contests, A. Jurisdi
ction over Election Contests”
25
Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private re
spondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The la
tter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes ove
r the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election prote
st with the RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six vote
s over the private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The
petitioner, on 12 July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the trial court granted On 3 August 1994. The private resp
ondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of execution which was de
nied on 5 August 1994. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COM
ELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court g
ranting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. On 9
February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. Acc
ordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor, pe
nding resolution of the appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the resolutio
n, the petitioner filed this special civil action. Issue: Whether or not the COM
ELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus i
n election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction? Held: The Court
in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. 697 has no
t been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held that the COMELEC has the auth
ority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the trial court acted with pal
pable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the petitioner’s motion for ex
ecution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution. Any motion for exec
ution pending appeal must be filed before the period for the perfection of the a
ppeal. Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1
994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer vali
dly act thereon. COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the cha
llenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execu
tion issued by the trial court.
Election Laws
26
MALALUAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 254 SCRA 397 ) “Election Contests, A. Juris
diction over Election Contests” Facts: Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was p
roclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor of Kida
pawan, North Cotabato as against petitioner Luis Malaluan. The latter filed an e
lection protest with the RTC, which declared petitioner as the duly elected mayo
r. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only
for Malaluan’s protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attor
ney’s fees. Private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. Petitioner, f
or his part, filed a motion for execution pending appeal which was granted by th
e trial court. Petitioner then assumed and exercised the powers and functions of
said office. This did not last, because the First Division of the COMELEC order
ed Malaluan to vacate the office, having found private respondent to be the righ
tful winner and awarded damages, consisting of attorney’s fees, actual expenses fo
r zerox copies, unearned salary and other emoluments for the period, en masse de
nominated as actual damages, notwithstanding the fact that the electoral controv
ersy had become moot and academic on account of the expiration of the term of of
fice. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision. Hence, Malaluan filed this pet
ition. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awardi
ng the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent? Held: The decision of
a judicial body is a basis for a winning candidate’s right to assume office. We de
em petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer and is thus “legally entitled t
o the emoluments of the office.” Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only pro
vides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in a
ccordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnifi
ed for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of
a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the l
osing party. If any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the ex
ecution of judgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to
damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury infl
icted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, o
r a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy. That portion of th
e decision awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph Evangelista is h
ereby declared null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion
and in excess of jurisdiction.
Election Laws ALVAREZ vs. COMELEC (GR No. 142527 March 01, 2001 ) “Election Contes
ts, A. Jurisdiction over Election Contests”
27
Facts: On May 12, 1997, petitioner Arsenio Alvarez, with 590 votes, was proclaim
ed Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City, his opponent, private respondent A
bad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest
in the Metropolitan Trial Court claiming irregularities in the reading and appre
ciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After a recount of the b
allots in the contested precincts, the Trial Court ruled that the private respon
dent won the election, garnering 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes. On ap
peal, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled that private respondent won over petitio
ner. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Meanwhile, private responden
t filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. The COME
LEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of t
he Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petition
er brought before the Supreme Court this petition for Certiorari assailing the R
esolution of the COMELEC En Banc, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of here
in petitioner and affirming the Resolution of its Second Division alleging that
the COMELEC En Banc granted the respondents Motion for Execution pending appeal
when the appeal was no longer pending, thus the motion had become obsolete and u
nenforceable. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discre
tion when it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal? Held:
We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner
had a motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motio
n for reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Di
vision. Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsiderat
ion. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both petitioner’s motion for reconsid
eration and private respondent’s motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in
the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Correspondingly, we do no
t find that the COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pend
ing appeal. Petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC is
AFFIRMED.
Election Laws CASTROMAYOR vs. COMELEC (250 SCRA298) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy,
D. Procedure”
28
Facts: Petitioner Castromayor was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member San
gguniang Bayan of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held in M
ay 1995. The winners were proclaimed on the basis of the canvass which showed th
at petitioner received votes for the eighth place. When Alice Garin, Chairman of
the MBC, rechecked the totals in the Statement of Votes the following day, she
discovered that the number of votes cast for Nilda Demorito, as member of the Sa
nguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that credited to her. As Garin later explained
to the Provincial Election Supervisor, the returns from one precinct had been ov
erlooked in the computation of the totals, therefore, the total number of votes
cast for Demorito was 51 votes more than the votes cast for petitioner. Garin re
ported the matter to the Regional Election Director, who advised her to request
authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose of correcting the error.
A fax letter was sent to the Law Department of the COMELEC in Manila explaining
the problem and asking for the authority to reconvene and correct the error, to
annul the proclamation of petitioner and proclaim Demorito as the eighth member
of the Sangguniang Bayan. A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC and the
same issued a resolution annulling the proclamation of Castromayor and proclaim
ed Demorito as the duly elected eighth member. Petitioner protested the proposed
action and questioned the legality of the actuations of Garin. Issue: Whether o
r not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when he was not afforded
with right to refute the resolution of the COMELEC? Held: No. MBC proclamations
may be raised directly to the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutio
nal function to decide questions affecting elections. What has just been said al
so disposes of petitioner’s other contention that because his proclamation has alr
eady been made, any remedy of the losing party is an election protest. Where a p
roclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the
proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the pow
er to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation. The MBC’s action to reconve
ne for purposes of correction of errors is valid under Rule 27 Sec. 7 of the COM
ELEC Rules of Procedure. Though it pertains to preproclamation proceedings and h
ere proclamation of petitioner has been made, there is nothing to suggest the it
cannot be applied to the case at bar, in which the validity of the proclamation
is precisely in question.
Election Laws
29
DUREMDES vs. COMELEC ( 178 SCRA 746 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure” F
acts: Petitioner Ramon D. Duremdes, private respondent Cipriano B. Penaflorida,
and Rufino Palabrica ran for the office of Vice-Governor of the Province of Iloi
lo. During the canvass of votes by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo,
Penaflorida objected verbally to some 110 election returns from various precinc
ts, which he followed up with written objections. The Board overruled the same i
n separate Orders either because they were not timely filed or that the formal d
efects did not affect the genuineness of the returns, or that in case of allegat
ions of tampering, no evidence was presented to support the charge. COMELEC an “Ap
peal by Way of a Petition for Review,” from the aforesaid rulings of the Board ple
ading, among others, for the exclusion of the questioned election returns and fo
r Penaflorida ‘s proclamation as the elected Vice-Governor of Iloilo. Penaflorida
filed, also with the COMELEC, a Petition seeking the annulment of election retur
ns and the suspension of the proclamation of any candidate. The Board proclaimed
Duremdes as the duly elected Vice-Governor. Duremdes took his oath and assumed
office. COMELEC after hearing, issued a Per Curiam Resolution, sustaining the ru
lings of the Board of Canvassers on Penaflorida’s objections, as well as Duremdes’ p
roclamation. Duremdes faults the COMELEC with grave abuse of discretion for havi
ng disregarded the well-settled doctrines (1) that matters of protest, objection
s or issues not originally raised before the Board of Canvassers upon the openin
g of the returns, cannot be raised for the first time before the COMELEC; and (2
) that after a proclamation has been made, a preproclamation controversy is no l
onger viable, the proper recourse being an election protest. Issue: Whether or n
ot the COMELEC has jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies not raised b
efore the Board of Canvassers level? Held: Yes. The COMELEC has the power to dec
ide all questions affecting elections (Article IX[C] Section 2[3], 1987 Constitu
tion), a question pertaining to the proceedings of said Board may be raised dire
ctly with the COMELEC as a preproclamation controversy. When so elevated, the CO
MELEC acts in the exercise of its original jurisdiction for which reason it is n
ot indispensable that the issue be raised before the Board of Canvassers during
the canvassing. The COMELEC is not discharging its appellate jurisdiction under
Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, which has to do with contests regardin
g the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns, with a pres
cribed appellate procedure to follow. Matters of correction of the statement of
votes may be the subject of a pre proclamation case which may be filed directly
with the Commission.
Election Laws VILLAROYA vs. COMELEC ( 155 SCRA 633 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy
, D. Procedure”
30
Facts: Petitioner Villaroya and private respondent Roa were among the congressio
nal candidates in Cagayan de Oro City. Villaroya garnered 38,222 votes, while re
spondent Roa got a total of 38,196 votes, with a plurality of 6 votes, in favor
of petitioner Villaroya. Due to the protest of the lawyers of Roa, Villaroya was
not proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers. Roa filed a petition in the COMELEC
contesting the election claiming fraud, duress, falsification and other grounds.
Upon a formal request made by Roa, the Board of Canvassers furnished her a copy
of the Statement of Votes. Roa filed with the Board of Canvassers a protest for
the error or mistake in the tabulation of the election returns based on such co
py. COMELEC directed the Board of Canvassers to reconvene to verify the election
. After the verification of the election returns Roa was proclaimed. Petitioner
filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with pra
yer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary inj
unction alleging that Roa not having filed an objection with the Board of Canvas
sers during the canvassing, deprived the COMELEC of appellate jurisdiction to en
tertain Roa’s petition for the verification of the election return in question and
that the question was not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy but in an e
lection contest that should be brought before the house electoral tribunal. Vill
aroya further alleged that the direct filing of the protest with the COMELEC did
not make it a pre-proclamation controversy; that the decision of the COMELEC au
thorizing such verification by the Board of Canvassers was illegal, arbitrary an
d was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whet
her or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Cit
y Board of Canvassers to verify the election returns and that the subject protes
t must be filed with the electoral tribunal. Held: No. It must be observed furth
er, that there is no plausible reason to prohibit an aggrieved candidate from fi
ling an objection regarding the election returns directly before the Comelec its
elf if the election irregularities that vitiate the integrity of the election re
turns are not apparent upon their faces. What is therefore involved is the origi
nal jurisdiction of the Comelec rather than its appellate jurisdiction for preci
sely the objection is filed not before the Board of Canvassers because the irreg
ularities are not apparent upon the face of the election returns. The Commission
en banc rules, therefore, that the protest or objection filed by Petitioner Ber
nardita Roa after discovery of the discrepancy in the Statement of Votes was fil
ed seasonably.
Election Laws ALFONSO vs. COMELEC ( GR 107847, June 2, 1997 ) “Pre-Proclamation Co
ntroversy, D. Procedure”
31
Facts: In the May 11, 1992 elections, Pedro Alfonso ran for councilor in the Fir
st District of Manila, which is entitled to elect six councilors. On the eve of
the elections, Pedro Alfonso died. His daughter Irma Alfonso, petitioner herein,
filed her certificate of candidacy in substitution for her deceased father. Aft
er the canvassing of the election returns by respondent City Board of Canvassers
, the results of the elections for councilors for the First District of Manila w
ere announced as follows: 1st - Ernesto Nieva-60101, 2nd - Gonzalo Gonzales-4474
4, 3rd - Honorio Lopez-35803, 4th Pedro Alfonso-34648, 5th - Avelino Cailian-324
62, 6th - Roberto Ocampo-31264, 7th - Alberto Domingo-28715. Apparently, the Cit
y Board of Canvassers added the votes of Pedro Alfonso to those of petitioner’s th
ereby placing her in the fourth slot. Consequently, private respondent questione
d such action. He prayed that the votes cast for Pedro Alfonso be declared as st
ray votes and that, he be proclaimed as the sixth winner for councilor. The COME
LEC resolved private respondent’s petition declaring votes cast in favor of Pedro
Alfonso as stray votes and to CREDIT in favor of respondent Irma Alfonso only th
ose votes cast with the name “ALFONSO” or IRMA ALFONSO. Petitioner thereby questione
d said resolution before this Court, which dismissed the aforesaid petition in a
minute resolution, after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of th
e COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretio
n in denying the petitioner’s motion for recount? Held: No. At the outset, petitio
ner’s prayer for a reopening of the ballots is not a proper issue for a pre-procla
mation controversy. The issues raised by petitioner should be threshed out in el
ection protest. Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors
are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation o
f ballots. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a ‘proceed
ing of the board of canvassers’ for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under
Section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors wh
o are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules
of appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise state
d, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of ca
nvassers. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, m
ust be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and p
roclamation of the winning candidates.
Election Laws
32
MATALAM vs. COMELEC ( 271 SCRA 733 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, D. Procedure” Fa
cts: Petitioner Matalarn and Private Respondent Candao were both candidates for
Governor of the Province of Maguindanao in the May 1995 elections. During the ca
nvass of the election returns in the municipalities of Datu Piang and Maganoy, P
etitioner challenged before the respective Municipal Boards of Canvassers the au
thenticity of the election returns in said towns. The Provincial Board of Canvas
sers rejected the pleas of the petitioner, thus a petition for exclusion of the
results of the said municipalities were filed before the COMELEC. During the pen
dency of the action, respondent was proclaimed duly elected governor. The same p
roclamation was nullified by the second division of the COMELEC and thereafter r
einstated the proclamation. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
and for technical examination of signatures and thumbmarks of registered voters
. The same was denied, hence a petition for certiorari. Petitioner further claim
s that the returns in one municipality were falsified and spurious as there was
actually no election conducted in that place and in some precints, the number of
votes exceeded the number of voters. Issues: 1. Whether or not the questioned e
lection returns be the proper subjects of a preproclamation controversy? 2. Whet
her or not the COMELEC may go beyond the face of election returns in a preprocla
mation case? Held: 1. No. The Omnibus Election Code defines a pre-proclamation c
ontroversy as “any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the boar
d of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered politi
cal party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with th
e Commission, or any matter raised under Sections233, 234, 235 and 236 in relati
on to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the el
ection returns.” The issues raised by the petitioner are not among those enumerate
d under Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein is restri
ctive and exclusive. Petitioner did not claim and failed to characterize the ret
urns as incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with falsifi
ed, or contain discrepancies. 2. No. The COMELEC is not required to go beyond el
ection returns which are on their face regular and authentic. The proper remedy
available to the petitioner in this case is election protest. Pre-proclamation c
ontroversies are to be resolved in a summary proceedings and should not subject
the returns to meticulous technical examinations.Technical examination is not pr
oper in a pre-proclamation controversy.
Election Laws
33
MENTANG vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 11037, Feb. 4, 1994 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy
, D. Procedure” Facts: Petitioner Mentang was certified and proclaimed by the Prov
incial Board of Canvasser as the third and last winning candidate for Regional A
ssemblyman in the Second District of Maguindanao over private respondent Ali Ber
nan for garnering 2,000 more votes than the latter. He took his oath of office a
s a duly elected member of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Private respondent
learned of the proclamation on a Sunday. On the fifth day following the proclam
ation, he filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Correct Manifest Error and Annul t
he Proclamation of petitioner Mentang” and asked that he be proclaimed instead as
the third winning candidate for Assemblyman in the Second District of Maguindana
o. Petitioner questioned COMELEC’s jurisdiction to hear and decide private respond
ent’s petition on the ground that being a pre-proclamation controversy which relat
es to the correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass, the same
should have been filed within the reglementary period of 5 days counted from pet
itioner’s proclamation. The petition was, however, filed 8 days after petitioner’s p
roclamation. The COMELEC en banc held that the petition was filed by Ali Bernan
on time and sustained its jurisdiction over the petition in the exercise of its
broad administrative powers over the conduct of elections. It also directed the
retabulation of the votes for petitioner Mentang and private respondent Ali Bern
an. Petitioner Mentang petitioned the Supreme Court to set aside the decision of
COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in holding that it has jurisdiction to decide private respondent Ali Bernan’s peti
tion? Held: The Supreme Court sustained COMELEC’s jurisdiction and dismissed Menta
ng’s petition. The petition filed, although designates petition to correct manifes
t error and annul the proclamation of Mentang, is in reality a petition for annu
lment or declaration of nullity of proclamation, which need not be filed within
5 day reglamentary period but only within a reasonable time. Ali Bernan’s petition
which was filed 8 days after Mentang’s proclamation was filed within the 10-day p
eriod for filing an election protest or quo warranto petition.
Election Laws
34
JAMIL vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 123648, December 15, 1997 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controv
ersy, D. Procedure” Facts: Petitioner Jamil and Private respondent Balindong were
among the mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del
Sur during the May 1998 elections. During the canvassing of the election return
s by the MBC headed by Sansarona, private respondent objected to the inclusion o
f 4 election returns from 4 precincts on the grounds of duress, for being spurio
us returns and for not being an authentic copy. The Sansarona MBC issued its rul
ing on the 3 objection setting aside the election returns from a precinct for fu
rther investigation or to go deeper into the contradicting testimonies of the Ch
airman and the watchers or to summon the 2 BFIs who failed to affix their signat
ure and explain the alleged increase of votes of a candidate. The MBC compositio
n was changed with Macadato as its head. It denied the exclusion of return from
precinct. Private respondent Balindong appealed to the COMELEC the ruling of the
Macadato MBC. Petitioner also appealed to the COMELEC challenging the Sansarona
MBC rulings. While these 2 cases were still pending in the COMELEC, the Macadat
o MBC proclaimed petitioner Jamil and other winning candidates. The COMELEC Seco
nd Division issued an Order directing the MBC to reconvene and proclaim the winn
ing candidate for Mayor of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur. The Macadato MBC proc
laimed petitioner Jamil as duly elected Mayor. Private respondent filed with the
COMELEC an urgent motion to annul petitioner’s proclamation on the ground that th
e proclamation was without authority of the COMELEC, and to constitute a new Boa
rd of Canvasser. The COMELEC Second division annulled petitioner Jamil’s proclamat
ion and directed the constitution of a new MBC. The newly constituted MBC headed
by Cariga proclaimed private respondent Balindong as the newly elected Mayor. T
he COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division. Petitioner Jami
l asked the Supreme Court to revise and reverse the decision of the COMELEC en b
anc Issue: Which of the 2 proclamations is valid. Held: The Supreme Court held t
hat both proclamations are not valid. The Macadato and Cariga MBC did not make d
efinite rulings or pronouncement on the inclusion or exclusion of returns so tha
t there was no complete and valid canvass which is prerequisite to a valid procl
amation. Petitioner Jamil’s proclamation by the MBC had no authority from COMELEC.
The Omnibus Election Code prohibits the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers
of a candidate as winner where returns are contested, unless authorized by the
COMELEC.
Election Laws DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC ( G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20,2001 ) “Pre-Proc
lamation Controversy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised”
35
Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the po
sition in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During
the canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns
for 3 precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimid
ation and coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting o
f votes. The MBC denied petitioner’s objections and proceeded with the canvass whi
ch showed respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election returns from 3
precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of the remain
ing or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty candidate
. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Sec
ond Division with the COMELEC en banc. The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the
election. Private respondent Bernal filed an urgent motion to declare void peti
tioner’s proclamation. The duly proclaimed ViceMayor Betita, and private responden
t Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC of Il
oilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to cancel Bernal’s motion for
reconsideration and motion declare void petitioner’s proclamation on the ground t
hat respondent Bernal should be deemed to have abandoned said motion when he fil
ed quo warranto action. The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second
Division, annulled the petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new MBC
. Respondent Bernal was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elec
ted Mayor of the Municipality. Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set
aside the COMELEC en banc resolution. Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in
including in the canvass the returns of the contested precincts? election
Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by
the petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contrac
ts of his watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegation
s that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face
appear to be regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election
irregularities cited by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidenc
e which cannot be done in a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nat
ure.
Election Laws PATORAY vs. COMELEC ( 249 SCRA 440, 1995 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controv
ersy, C. Issues Which May Be Raised”
36
Facts: Petitioner Patoray and private respondent Disomimba were the mayoralty ca
ndidates of Tamporan, Lanao del Sur during the May 8, 1995 elections. During the
canvassing of the votes by the MBC, private respondent objected to the inclusio
n of election returns from 4 precincts “for being substituted, fraudulent and obvi
ously manufacture “ but the same was denied by the MBC. On appeal, the COMELEC Sec
ond Division ordered the exclusion from the count of election returns from 2 pre
cincts owing to discrepancy between the “taras” and the written figures and the inco
mplete data as to provincial and congressional candidates. The COMELEC en banc d
enied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the constitution of a ne
w MBC to implement the second Division’s resolution. Petitioner Patoray filed a pe
tition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the COMELEC. Issue: Wheth
er the exclusion of the 2 election returns was the proper remedy to answer the d
iscrepancy between the taras and the written figures and the incompleteness of t
he data as to provincial and congressional candidates? Held: The Supreme Court h
eld that the discrepancy between the taras and the written figure and the incomp
lete data as to the provincial and congressional candidates found in the exclude
d election returns constituted materials defects in the election return. While t
he COMELEC was correct in excluding the 2 election returns, in addition it shoul
d have also ordered a recount of the votes cast in the 2 precincts. Its failure
to do this resulted in the disenfranchisement of the voters in these precincts.
The recounting of the votes is consistent with the summary nature of proceedings
involving pre-proclamation controversies.
Election Laws
37
LAUDENIO vs. COMELEC ( 276 SCRA 705,1997 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, C. Issue
s Which May Be Raised” Facts: Respondent Longcop was proclaimed winner by the Muni
cipal Board of Canvasser (MBC) for the position of Mayor of Mapanas, Northern Sa
mar during the May 8, 1995 elections over another candidate, petitioner Laudenio
. Five days after, Laudenio filed with respondent COMELEC a petition to annul Lo
ngcop’s proclamation and to declare the constitution of the MBC and its proceeding
s illegal. He alleged that the MBC repeatedly adjourned the canvassing of votes
and secretly reconvened with a new Chairman who was appointed by the Provincial
Election Supervisior, not by the COMELEC. Petitioner Laudenio filed an election
protest before the Regional Trial Court. The COMELEC dismissed Laudenio’s petition
for lack of merit, stating that he was deemed to have consented to the new comp
osition of the MBC when he actively participated in the proceedings otherwise, h
e should have appealed the issue on appeal to the COMELEC and the pre-proclamati
on controversy was no longer possible since Longcop had already been proclaimed
and assumed office. Laudenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the COMELEC. Laudenio petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the COMELEC’s
decision. Issue: Whether the pre-proclamation controversy filed by Laudenio wit
h COMELEC was proper? the
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Under the COMELEC Rules of Proced
ure, a pre-election controversy which relates to the illegal composition of the
Board must be filed immediately when the Board begins to act as such or at the t
ime of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected t
o if it comes after the canvassing of the Board or immediately at the point wher
e the proceedings begin to be illegal. In the case of Laudenio, he filed his pet
ition 5 days after Longcop had been proclaimed. A pre-proclamation controversy b
efore the COMELEC is no longer possible and must be dismissed after a proclamati
on has been made. Besides, he can no longer question the Board’s composition after
having actively participated in the proceedings.
Election Laws
38
LAGUMBAY vs. COMELEC ( 16 SCRA 175, 1966 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, C. Issue
s Which May Be Raised” Facts: This is a petition for revision of the order of the
COMELEC refusing to reject returns of certain precincts of some municipalities i
n Mindanao which were “obviously manufactured”. It appeared that all the 8 candidate
s of the Liberal party garnered all the votes, with each of them receiving exact
ly the same number of votes while all the 8 candidates of the Nacionalista party
getting zero. Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in not rejecting “obviously
manufactured” election returns of certain questioned precincts. Held: The Supreme
Court ruled in the negative. There is no such thing as blockvoting now-a-days. T
he election returns showing all 8 candidates of the Liberal party getting all th
e votes, with each one of them getting the same number of votes while the 8 naci
onalista candidates got zero are evidently false or fabricated because of the in
herent improbability of such a result. It is against statistical improbabilities
especially because al least 1 vote should have been received by the Nacionalist
a candidates, i.e. the Nacionalista inspector. While it is possible that the ins
pector did not like his party’s senatorial live-up, it is not, however, possible t
hat he disliked all of such candidates and it is also not likely that he favored
all the 8 candidates of the Liberal party. Hence, most probably, he was made to
sign an obviously false return by force or duress. If he signed voluntarily, th
en he betrayed his party and any voting or counting of ballots was a fraud and a
mockery of the popular will. Rejecting such returns on the ground that they are
manifestly fabricated or falsified would constitute a practical approach to the
COMELEC’s mission to insure a free and honest elections.
Election Laws
39
OLFATO vs. COMELEC ( 103 SCRA 741, 1981 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, B. COMELE
C Jurisdiction” Facts: During the January 30, 1980 local elections, petitioner Olf
ato and the other petitioners were the official Nationalista Party (NP) candidat
es for Mayor and Sanggunian Bayan, respectively, of Tanauan, Batangas. On the ot
her hand, Lirio was the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL)
fo Mayor of said town. Three (3) days after the elections, private respondent Li
rio, together with the candidates in his ticket, filed with COMELEC a petition f
or suspension of the canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for the elec
tive positions of Tanauan, alleging disenfranchisement of voters, terrorism, fak
e ID’s of voters and flying voters. Based on the result of canvass of votes, Olfat
o and the rest of the petitioners were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and
Sanggunian members. Lirio filed a supplemental petition praying for the annulmen
t of petitioner Olfato’s proclamation citing fake voters and massive disenfranchis
ement which affects the very integrity of the election returns. He also filed an
election protest against Olfato in the CFI of Batangas citing fake voters, fake
voter’s identification cards, flying voters, substitute voters and massive disenf
ranchisement. Olfato assumed the office of Mayor. The COMELEC issued a Resolutio
n dismissing Lirio’s petition and reinstating the proclamation made by the MBC of
respondent Olfato and the entire ticket, without prejudice to other legal remedi
es under the Election Code. Issue: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
pre-proclamation Controversy filed by Lirio? Held: The Supreme Court riled in t
he affirmative citing previous rulings of the Court. The COMELEC has the power a
nd authority to inquire into the allegation of fake voters, with fake ID’s in a pr
e-proclamation controversy in order to determine the authenticity or integrity o
f election returns or whether such election returns faithfully record that only
registered or genuine voters were allowed to vote. Under the election Code, the
COMELC is the sole judge of all proclamation controversies. The COMELEC has vast
powers under the Election Code in consonance with its primordial task of insuri
ng free, orderly and honest elections. The Court dismissed the petition for revi
ew filed by Lirio and directed the COMELEC to proceed with dispatch on the pre-p
roclamation controversy (petition for suspension of canvass and proclamation of
winning candidates). The court noted that the COMELEC Resolution considered the
proclamation made in favor of Olfato and his ticket as temporary in nature as it
was made subject to the final outcome of the preproclamation case.
Election Laws
40
DIPATUAN vs. COMELEC ( 185 SCRA 86, 1990 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controversy, A. Defin
ed” Facts: Petitioner Dipatuan and private respondent Amanoddin were mayoralty can
didates of Bacolod, Grande during the 1988 special local elections in Lanao del
Sur. The Board of Canvassers chaired by a certain Mangray proclaimed petitioner
Dipatuan as Mayor. Five days thereafter, a separate Board headed by Minalang pro
claimed private respondent Amanoddin as the duly elected mayor. Both proclamatio
ns were set aside by the COMELEC en banc which convened a Special Board of Canva
ssers in Manila to recanvass the election returns from Bacolod Grande. During th
e recanvass, petitioner Dipatuan sought the exclusion of the election returns fr
om 2 precincts for being “spurious and obviously manufactured” citing the alphabetic
al and chronological sequence in the voting, which he considered as a preproclam
ation controversy. The Special Board denied petitioner Dipatuan’s objection, which
was affirmed on appeal by the COMELEC Second Division and COMELEC en banc. Peti
tioner Dipatuan asked the Supreme Court to set aside the decision of the COMELEC
(both the Second Division and COMELEC en banc). Issue: Whether the issue on que
stioned election returns from the 2 precincts raised by petitioner Dipatuan pres
ented a pre-proclamation controversy? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negat
ive. The questioned election returns were not obviously manufactured or not auth
entic, which is a requirement under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code to
qualify as a pre-proclamation controversy. Mere alphabetical and chronological v
oting does not constitute fraud which will justify the exclusion of election ret
urns. Petitioner Dipatuan does not claim that the election returns themselves we
re not authentic. What he argued is that where election returns, though genuine
or authentic in character, are reflective of fraudulent acts done before or carr
ied out by the Board of Election Inspectors, the return should be deemed as “obvio
usly manufactured”. On the other hand, private respondent Amanoddin was able to sa
tisfactorily explain why the Board of Election Inspectors adopted voting by alph
abetical order.
Election Laws RAMIREZ vs. COMELEC ( 270 SCRA 590, 1997 ) “Pre-Proclamation Controv
ersy, A. Defined”
41
Facts: The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Gipolos, Eastern Samar proclai
med petitioner Ramirez winner in the vice-mayoralty race over another candidate,
private respondent Go based on the results showing that Ramirez obtained more v
otes than Go. Go petitioned COMELEC for correction of manifest error claiming th
at owing to error in addition, he was credited with lesser votes. The COMELEC en
banc issued a Resolution directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the votes
in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate. Acting on separat
e motions filed by Ramirez and Go, the COMELEC en banc affirmed its earlier reso
lution. Ramirez petitioned the Supreme Court to annul the 2 COMELEC en banc reso
lutions and to reinstate his proclamation as the duly elected vice-mayor. He all
eged that the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over the controversy since it
was not yet acted upon by a division of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether the COMELEC
en banc has jurisdiction to act directly on the petition for correction of manif
est error filed by private respondent Go? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the a
ffirmative, citing Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules which provides c
orrection of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the
canvassing as one of the pre-proclamation controversies which maybe filed direc
tly with the COMELEC en banc. The Supreme Court annulled the COMELEC resolutions
but directed COMELEC to reconvene the MBC or if this is not feasible, to consti
tute a new MBC in Gipolos, Eastern Samar and to order it to promptly revise the
Statement of Votes based on the election returns from all the precincts of the M
unicipality and thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate.
Election Laws
42
ATTY. ROSAURO I. TORRES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 270 SCRA 315 ) “Pre-Proclama
tion Controversy, A. Defined” Facts: On 9 May 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvasse
rs of Tanza, Cavite, issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation o
f the Winning Candidates for Municipal Offices. Two (2) days after or on 11 May
1995 the same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the COMELEC for correction
of the number of votes garnered by petitioner who was earlier proclaimed as the
fifth winning candidate for councilor. Upon prior authorization, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers issued a corrected Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Procl
amation of the Winning Candidates which included private respondent Vicente Rafa
el A. de Peralta as the eighth winning councilor and excluded petitioner from th
e new list of winning candidates. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the powe
r to grant such authority. Held: In Duremdes v. COMELEC, this Court sustained th
e power of the COMELEC En Banc to order a correction of the Statement of Votes t
o make it conform to the election returns in accordance with a procedure similar
to the procedure now embodied in Sec. 7, Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Proce
dure. Since the Statement of Votes forms the basis of the Certificate of Canvass
and of the proclamation, any error in the statement ultimately affects the vali
dity of the proclamation. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per prec
inct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election return
s. What is involved in the instant case is simple arithmetic. In making the corr
ection in the computation the Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in an administ
rative capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to it
s constitutional function to decide questions affecting elections, the COMELEC E
n Banc has authority to resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of th
e Municipal Board of Canvassers.
Election Laws
43
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 211 SCRA 315 ) “Pre-Proclamation
Controversy, A. Defined” Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in
GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from r
unning for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed
an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the f
astest available means this Court’s Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional e
lection directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election
registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6) accredited political part
ies and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the
name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally shee
ts, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, C
havez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. N
o. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of
qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” vote
s in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez’ name in th
e list of qualified candidates. Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclam
ation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate. Held: A s
imple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of
action, the controversy presented being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation
. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controve
rsies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), neve
rtheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vic
e-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Repu
blic Act 7166 provides: “For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-Preside
nt, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation case
s shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt
, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass
, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appro
priate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested pe
rson to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election return
s before it.
Election Laws
44
GIL GALLARDO vs. FRANCO RIMANDO ( 187 SCRA 464 ) “Canvass and Proclamation, D. Pro
clamation” Facts: Petitioner Gil C. Gallardo and private respondent Franco F. Rima
ndo were rival candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of Naguilian, La Uni
on, in the local election of January 18, 1988. On January 19, 1988, Rimando was
proclaimed the winner over Gallardo by a margin of 12 votes. On January 22, 1988
, Gallardo filed in the COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of Rimando.
On December 8, 1988, the COMELEC dismissed the petition. On June 30, 1989, Gall
ardo filed an election protest. Rimando filed a motion to dismiss the protest on
the ground that it was not filed within ten (10) days after the proclamation of
the results of the election fixed in Sec. 51 of the Omnibus Election Code. Issu
e: Whether or not the petitioner’s election protest was filed on time. Held: Riman
do was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected munic
ipal mayor of Naguilian on January 19, 1988. Two (2) days later, or on January 2
1, 1988, Gallardo filed in the COMELEC a pre-proclamation petition to annul the
proclamation. Hence, only eight (8) days of the reglementary period for filing a
n election protest remained. This period was suspended during the pendency of th
e pre-proclamation case, i.e., while it was pending in the COMELEC and in the Su
preme Court, until Gallardo received on June 23, 1989 the Supreme Court’s final re
solution dismissing his petition for review of the COMELEC’s decision in said case
. After June 23, 1989, the eight-day remainder of the reglementary period to fil
e an election protest resumed running. The deadline was July 1, 1989. Gallardo s
easonably filed his election protest on the 7th day — June 30, 1989.
Election Laws
45
LOONG vs. COMELEC (216 SCRA 760, 1992) “Canvass and Proclamation, D. Proclamation” F
acts: In the May 8, 1995 elections held in the Province of Sulu, petitioner Tupa
y T. Loong and private respondent Abdusakur Tan ran for the position of Governor
, while petitioner Kimar Tulawie and private respondent Munib Estino were candid
ates for the position of Vice-Governor. After the canvass of the election return
s of sixteen (16) of the eighteen (18) municipalities of Sulu, respondent Provin
cial Board of Canvassers (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC a recanvass of the ele
ction returns of Parang and Talipao. COMELEC, accordingly, relieved all the regu
lar members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) and ordered such recanvas
s by senior lawyers from the COMELEC office in Manila. During the re-canvass, pr
ivate respondents objected to the inclusion in the canvass of the election retur
ns of Parang. Respondent PBC, however, denied aforesaid objections of private re
spondents, on the ground that only the certificate of canvass was forwarded to i
t and that private respondents allegedly failed to object to the canvass of said
certificate. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Held: While, however, the COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction in taking cogni
zance of the private respondents’ petition to annul the election results of or to
declare failure of elections in Parang, Sulu, it committed grave abuse of discre
tion when confronted with essentially the same situation in petitioners’ own petit
ion to annul the elections of or to declare failure of elections in the municipa
lities of Tapul, Panglima Estino, Pata, Siasi and Kalinggalang Caluang. The COME
LEC arbitrarily and without valid ground dismissed the said petition respecting
the aforementioned five municipalities. The untimeliness of the petition is an u
ntenable argument for such dismissal, because as Commissioner Regalado Maambong
pointed out in his own dissenting opinion, no law provides for a reglementary pe
riod within which to file annulment of elections when there is as yet no proclam
ation.
Election Laws
46
FLOREZIL AGUJETAS, vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 261 SCRA 17 ) “Canvass and Proclamation,
D. Proclamation” Facts: In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincia
l Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao Oriental, proclaimed the winners
for the Governor, ViceGovernor, and Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental
in the January 18, 1988 election. The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pen
a, garnered 30,679 votes when another candidate for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, go
t 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena. Before the proclamation was made, when the
certificate of canvass and proclamation statements of winning candidates were f
inished, a verbal protest was lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter o
f candidate Irigo during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the Tabulation
Committee. The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda
V. Irigo filed her written protest with the Board of Canvassers. A complaint aga
inst the three board members for violation of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and
RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987) was filed. The trial court found the
m guilty. On appeal petitioners alleged that, it is the failure to make a procla
mation on the basis of Certificate of Canvass, and not mere erroneous proclamati
ons, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231(2) of the Omnibu
s Election Code. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are correct in their contenti
ons. Held: To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tanta
mount to tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to “make an erroneous procl
amation” and still be exculpated by just putting up the inexcusable defense that t
he “foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates” in o
ne municipality or that “the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking
made by the tabulation committee”. That would be a neat apology for allowing the
board to be careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot
be held liable because they did their “duty” of proclaiming the winning candidates
on the basis of the certificate of canvass — even “erroneous” certificates — which they
made.
Election Laws
47
SALACNIB F. BATERINA, et al., vs. COMELEC, et al., ( 205 SCRA 1 ) “Canvass and Pro
clamation, D. Proclamation” Facts: Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina was a candidate
for Governor of Ilocos Sur in the special local elections held on 25 January 19
88. The other petitioners were candidates for Vice Governor and Provincial Board
Members, in the same local elections. In the course of the canvass proceedings,
verbal objections were raised by petitioners to certain election returns based
on the grounds mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236, in relation to the p
reparation, transmission, receipt and custody of the election returns. The objec
tions were aimed at excluding the election returns from the canvass. Petitioners
submitted to the BOARD their objections in written form within twenty four (24)
hours from the time the verbal objections were made as required in Section 245
of the Omnibus Election Code. On September 6, 1990, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution affirming the Resolutions dated 23 March 1988 and 5 June 1989, conta
ining rulings adversely against petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC c
an be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its en banc Resolution d
ated September 6, 1990. Held: The Court thinks not. The date “21 January 1988” appea
ring in the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is plainly a typographical
error. The correct date is 31 January 1988. This fact does it ipso facto annul a
proclamation which may have been already made. In this regard, petitioners’ relia
nce on Section 245 to support their claim of nullity of the proclamation made by
the BOARD for lack of authorization from the COMELEC is misplaced. In which cas
e, no proclamation can be made by the Board of Canvassers without authorization
of the COMELEC until after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party. In the case at bar, when the proclamation was mad
e by the BOARD on 31 January 1988, there was no pending appeal filed by petition
ers before the COMELEC from the rulings made by the BOARD on their objections to
election returns rendered on 29, 30 and 31, 1988. What was filed by petitioners
on 30 January 1988, before the proclamation, was a petition seeking merely to r
estrain the canvass and proclamation or suspend the effects of any proclamation.
This petition, however, is clearly not the appeal referred to in Section 245 th
at will operate to bar the BOARD from making any proclamation of the winning can
didates without authority from the COMELEC after the latter has ruled on the obj
ections elevated to it on appeal. Consequently, there was no legal impediment to
the proclamation of private respondents by the BOARD on 31 January 1988.
Election Laws
48
MICHAEL O. MASTURA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( 285 SCRA 493 ) “Canvass and Procl
amation, C. Nature of Proceedings” Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and privat
e respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first d
istrict of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of vot
es, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Mu
nicipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Upon e
xamination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge
and the COMELEC, the latter found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of t
he Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Sec
ond Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the
Certificate of Canvass of Matanog, and which also created a new Municipal Board
of Canvassers for the Municipality of Matanog. Mastura objected to the inclusion
of fifty (50) out of the fifty-seven (57) election returns on the ground that t
he COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results u
nless compared with the copy of the original Municipal Board of Canvassers. But
the new Municipal Board of Canvassers believed otherwise; hence, it included in
the canvass the fifty (50) election returns objected to by Mastura. As a result,
private respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the Hou
se of Representatives, First District of Maguindanao. Mastura now comes to us im
puting to public respondent COMELEC Second Division grave abuse of discretion am
ounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders of 29 February 1996, 5 Mar
ch 1996, 14 March 1996, and 20 March 1996. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committ
ed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the February 29, 2996 Order and in using
the COMELEC Copy of the returns instead of the copy of the original MBC. Held:
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is se
ttled jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its in
quiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election
returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns
were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal
canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners
on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members
of the board or proclaim the winners itself. It should also be noted that all t
he seven copies of the election returns are all original copies, although the co
py for the Municipal Board of Canvassers is designated as the first copy.
Election Laws
49
GRAND ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY vs. COMELEC ( 150 SCRA 665 ) “Canvass and Proclamatio
n, C. Nature of Proceedings” Facts: In this special civil action for certiorari, t
he petitioners seeks to restrain respondent COMELEC from canvassing the senatori
al elections just concluded and to declare a failure of such elections on the gr
ound of alleged irregularities in the conduct thereof. The said election body is
claimed to have conspired with the private respondents, official candidates of
the Lakas ng Bansa, to frustrate and falsify the will of the electorate. This pe
tition could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and substance, be
ing couched in general terms only, without precise indication of the time, place
and manner of the commission of the alleged irregularities as a basis for annul
ling the elections throughout the country, let alone the jurisdictional infirmit
y. Issue: Whether or not the Restraining Order against the COMELEC should be iss
ued. Held: The petition lacks merit and at best is premature until after the COM
ELEC has heard and resolved petitioner’s complained. The alleged irregularities su
ch as the omissions of the COMELEC in the distribution and protection of the ele
ction forms and paraphernalia, involved the discharge of its administrative duti
es and so do not come under the jurisdiction of this Court, which can review the
decisions, orders and rulings of the body only in cases of grave abuse of discr
etion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers. Moreover, t
he administrative shortcomings complained of should not and cannot operate to di
vest the people of their right of suffrage. The COMELEC is the body entrusted by
the Constitution to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of elections. It s
hould be permitted to discharge its constitutional role without obstruction or m
olestation, subject only to review by this Court when and as the occasion may wa
rrant in accordance with our own constitutional duty. That occasion is not now.
Hence, we hold that, as the canvass of the senatorial elections is still in prog
ress and there being no showing of any valid justification to restrain it in its
ascertainment of the electorate’s will.
Election Laws
50
NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (250 SCRA 298 ) “Canvass and Pr
oclamation, B. Duty of the BOC” Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in th
e eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the e
lections held on May 8, 1995. On May 10, 1995, the winners were proclaimed on th
e basis of the results of the canvass which showed that petitioner received 5,41
9 votes and took eighth place in the election for members of the Sangguniang Bay
an. However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the MBC, rechecked the totals in t
he Statement of Votes the following day, she discovered that the number of votes
cast for Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more tha
n that credited to her. The returns from one precinct had been overlooked in the
computation of the totals. As matters stood, therefore, the total number of vot
es cast for Demorito was 5,470, or 51 more than the 5,419 votes cast for petitio
ner. Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, the Regional Election Director advised Garin to requ
est authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose of correcting the er
ror. A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC on May 17, 1995. On May 23, 1
995, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95-2414, directing the Municipal board of
Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul the proclamation of Nicol
as C. Castromayor for the number 8 place for councilor; and to proclaim the winn
ing number eight (8) councilor, and to submit compliance hereof within five (5)d
ays from receipt of notice. Petitioner protested the proposed action in a letter
dated June 5, 1995 to COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra, questio
ning the legality of the actuations of Garin. Hence, this petition to annul COME
LEC Resolution No. 95-2414. Issue: Whether or not the MBC has the power to recon
vene to annul a proclamation upon prior authorization from the COMELEC. Held: Ye
s. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a
simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election r
eturns. In making the correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an ad
ministrative capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence a
ny question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to t
he COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide ques
tions affecting elections.
Election Laws
51
GUIAO vs. COMELEC ( 137 SCRA 366, 1985 ) “Canvass and Proclamation, B. Duty of the
BOC” Facts: After the canvass of the returns for assemblyman in Pampanga, petitio
ner Ben Guiao, who lost, submitted his written objections to the inclusion of se
veral returns in the canvass. He asked that a subpoena be issued to the members
of the citizens election committee. The Board of Canvassers denied the request f
or the subpoena and dismissed the objections for failure of petitioner to substa
ntiate them and proclaimed the winners. Petitioner questioned the proclamation o
f the private respondent but did not question the proclamation of other winners
who belonged to his political party. Issue: Whether or not the BOC should issue
a subpoena. Held: Petitioner cannot challenge the proclamation of any one of the
candidates. The proclamation cannot be void as to one and valid with respect to
the others. The written objection of the petitioner were not timely presented.
The time to object in writing in any election return is when it is being examine
d by the board of canvassers. The board of canvassers was correct in refusing to
subpoena the members of the citizen election committee. The function of the boa
rd of canvassers is purely ministerial. To have acceded to the request of the pe
titioner would have made the board a hearing body to ascertain the issue of dure
ss and other irregularities alleged by petitioner.
Election Laws CASIMIRO vs. COMELEC ( 171 SCRA 468, 1989 )
52
“Canvass and Proclamation, A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municip
al Board” Facts: In January 1988 local elections, Gabriel P. Casimiro a UNIDO cand
idate for Mayor of Las Pinas, metro Manila with other UNIDO party member filed v
arious petitions before the COMELEC which among others was the petition to enjoi
n board of canvassers from canvassing of votes or tabulating unofficial election
returns. The COMELEC in resolving the aforesaid cases rendered a consolidated d
ecision dismissing the petition declaring that they acquired no jurisdiction ove
r the petitions. With the lifting of the restraining order previously issued, re
spondent Riguera and other winning candidates were proclaimed. COMELEC en banc d
denied a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision. On August of 1988
, petitioner Casimiro and UNIDO party files an instant petition for certiorari a
nd mandamus against the COMELEC and Rosalino Riguera as principal respondent all
eging that the canvass proceedings in the COMELEC central office were illegal fo
r having been made without prior notice to them as to the date and time of canva
ssing for which reason they the left the proceedings and that many election retu
rns were canvassed more than once, tampered with, padded and were spurious relyi
ng on the affidavit of their own head watcher/representative. Issue: Whether or
not there is illegality in the canvass. Held: The court ruled that no grave abus
e of discretion could be attributed to the COMELEC in upholding the validity of
the canvassing at its main office. The letter having clearly referred also to tr
ansfer of the venue of the canvass, petitioner cannot justifiably claim the noti
ce was lacking or the said notice was meant only for the transfer of election re
turns. If petitioner were absent during the canvassing it was because they have
opted to leave the proceedings for reasons of their own. Furthermore, the eviden
ce relied upon mainly by petitioners to support their charges of fraud and irreg
ularities in the election returns and in the canvassing consisted of affidavits
prepared by their own representatives. As this court has pronounced reliance sho
uld not be placed on mere affidavits. Wherefore, petitions are hereby dismissed.
Election Laws AQUINO vs. COMELEC ( 22 SCRA 288, 1968 )
53
“Canvass and Proclamation, A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municip
al Board” Facts: For the purpose of filling twelve vacancies in the City Board of
Canvassers in Nov. 1967 local election in Butuan City, the COMELEC issued a reso
lution constituting the members of the said City Board of Canvassers. The petiti
oners Jose Aquino et.al. question in their petition the legality of the appointm
ent by the COMELEC of the chief of police, council secretary, chief of fire depa
rtment and others as substitute members of the City Board of Canvassers to take
the place of seven city councilors, upon the ground that those seven substitutes
are not persons who are referred to in Section 159 of the Revised Election Code
, in the event of the absence or incapacity of any member of a city board of can
vassers. They contended that the seven substitute should be persons to be appoin
ted by the President of the Phil. Not by COMELEC, pursuant to the provisions of
section 28 of the said code, hence they are not legally appointed and proclamati
on of whoever would be illegal and invalid. Issue: Whether or not the appointmen
t of the members of the board is valid. Held: The courts find the petition not m
eritorious. It was held that the City Board of Canvassers is an entity that is e
ntirely different and distinct from the city board or city council. While member
s of the city board or a provincial board or of a municipal council, are members
also of a city board of canvassers or a provincial or a municipal board of canv
assers, as the case may be, they do not act in the board of canvassers in the ca
pacity of city councilmen, or in the capacity of a member of the provincial or m
unicipal board but as an election officials to perform functions specifically pr
ovided by law. Moreover, the COMELEC must appoint as substitute s the officials
specifically mentioned in the Code, and if more substitutes are needed after tho
se officials have been appointed, the COMELEC may appoint other officials of the
province or city until provincial board of canvassers or the city, as the case
may be, had fully constituted.
Election Laws SABINIANO vs. COMELEC ( 101 SCRA 289, 1980 )
54
“Canvass and Proclamation, A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municip
al Board” Facts: Petitioners were Nacionalista Party candidate for Mayor, Vice-May
or and Sanguniang Panlunsod members of the City of Dagupan, while private respon
dents were KBL official candidates in 1980 local elections. Respondent City Boar
d of Canvassers proclaimed private respondents as duly elected candidates to var
ious aforesaid positions above-mentioned. Petitioners filed a petition with the
respondent COMELEC praying for annulment of the election, ex-parte canvassing an
d the proclamation of the private respondents on the ground of lack of notice an
d undue haste in the canvass and proclamation, tampering with, alteration and fa
lsification of election returns as well as other irregularities during and after
the elections. COMELEC resolved to suspend the effects of the proclamation of t
he private respondents. Petitioners filed a supplementary petition. Private resp
ondents, however filed a motion for reconsideration contending that COMELEC is w
ithout jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution. Petitioner Sabiniano h
erself filed an urgent motion for reconsideration and issuance of an order to su
spend the effects of the proclamation until after hearing is conducted . At the
end of all these petitions, the COMELEC declare the respondent Manaois as duly e
lected Mayor. Hence this recourse. Issue: Whether or not the proclamation is val
id. Held: Petition has no merit. It is clear therefore that the charge of petiti
oners of various irregularities of the election returns anchored mainly on the a
lleged excess votes is without basis. Had the petitioner taken the pain of addin
g correctly the votes obtained by them per tabulation, she would have discovered
it easily. The difference between the total number of votes of all the Mayoralt
y candidates and the number of votes who actually voted was but result of the in
nocent mistake in the addition of number of votes cast for Manaois and Sabiniano
in the 30 voting centers.
Election Laws QUILALA vs. COMELEC ( 188 SCRA 502, 1990 )
55
“Canvass and Proclamation, A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municip
al Board” Facts: Petitioner Cirilo M. Quilala was KBL candidate for Mayor in the M
unicipality of Currimao, Ilocos Norte while private respondent Wilbur Go was the
official administration candidate for the same position in Jan. 18, 1988 electi
ons. The Municipal Board of Canvassers completed its canvass in the afternoon of
Jan. 19, and immediately thereafter proclaimed the winning candidate in the per
son of Wilbur C. Go. On Jan. 21, 1988, petitioner filed a petition with the COME
LEC principally anchored on allegation that petitioner was not represented in th
e canvassing of election returns. Respondent COMELEC issued its decision dismiss
ing the petition and confirming the validity of the proceeding of the Board of C
anvassers. Petitioner filed a case for annulment of the proclamation on the grou
nd that he was not represented when the canvass of the election returns was resu
med, as he was not notified of the time and place of the resetting of the canvas
sing. Issue: Whether or not the canvass is valid. Held: Petitioner may not claim
ignorance of the aforesaid provisions as these are matters directly affecting h
is political fortune. Consequently, with or without notice, it was the duty of t
he petitioner and all candidates for that matter to assign their watchers or rep
resentatives in the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns in orde
r to insure the sanctity and purity of the ballots.
Election Laws ESPINO vs. ZALDIVAR ( 21 SCRA 1204, 1967 )
56
“Canvass and Proclamation, A. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municip
al Board” Facts: Private respondent Dumlao lodged with the COMELEC a petition pray
ing that COMELEC direct the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Nueva Viscaya to u
se COMELEC’s copies of the election returns from six precincts. COMELEC issued an
order from enjoining the board from canvassing the election returns without COME
LEC’s prior order. The Board nonetheless proceeded to canvass the returns from ent
ire province. COMELEC issued a resolution directing the board to canvass the vot
es using the Municipal Treasurer’s copies, instead of those of the Provincial Trea
surer, in the six precincts of Aglipay and thereafter proclaim candidates electe
d. This is because of the alleged finding of irregularities in the Provincial Tr
easurer’s copies of returns. The petition herein states that on the very same day,
the board of canvassers signed the certificate of canvass and proclamation and
proclaimed Corazon Espino over Dumlao. The return of Dumlao contrariwise avers t
hat no meeting of the board took place on the date specified, that the members s
igned the alleged certificate of canvass and proclamation did so in different pl
aces and on different dates. As a result new board has been constituted and tall
ied the votes using the figures appearing in the Municipal Treasurer’s copies as a
result Dumlao was proclaimed Governor-elect. The Office of the President thru A
ssistant Executive Secretary Zaldivar recognize Dumlao as newly elected governor
. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the Certificate of Canvass and Duml
ao’s proclamation is valid. Held: The court ruled that the Commission is, certainl
y, with power to direct a canvass with the use of genuine documents. For that, t
he proclamation of the original board is null and void. And , for the purpose of
a canvass, substitutes for erring members of the board of canvassers may be app
ointed. Considering that there are seven members of the provincial board of canv
assers, four constitute a quorum. Even if one is eliminated, still there is a qu
orum. The result is that the certificate of canvass and proclamation of Dumlao i
s valid.
Election Laws GARAY vs. COMELEC ( 261 SCRA 222, 1996 ) “Counting of Votes, B. BEI
to Issue Certificate of Votes to Watchers”
57
Facts: Petitioner Gerry B. Garay and respondent Jaime Gata Jr. were opposing can
didates for Vice-Mayor in the May,1995 elections in the Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon. After the results of the elections were canvassed in 73 pr
ecincts, petitioner Garay was leading by twenty votes. The canvassing excluded t
he results from one remaining precinct because armed men seized the ballot box,
the election returns and other election papers in that precinct. Respondent subm
itted a certificate of votes signed by the Board of Election Inspectors showing
that he won in that precinct by forty –eight votes, but the Municipal Board of Can
vassers refused to accept it as proof of the results. Respondent appealed to the
Commission on Election and submitted a copy of the tally showing that he won in
the remaining precinct by twenty-eight votes. Meanwhile, the Commission on Elec
tions held a special election in the remaining precinct because of the loss of t
he election documents. Petitioner won. Later on, the COMELEC ordered the proclam
ation of respondent on the ground that the results of the election in that preci
nct could be ascertained on the basis of the tally board, which was authentic. I
ssue: Whether or not a Certificate of Votes can be a valid basis for canvass. He
ld: A certificate of vote can never be a valid basis for canvass. It can only be
evidence to prove tampering or any other anomaly committed in the election retu
rns. In like manner, the tally board is not sufficient evidence of the results o
f the election. Only election returns are evidence of results of the election. T
he participation of the respondent in the special election estopped him from rel
ying on the certificates of votes and the tally board. The decision to hold spec
ial election had long become final. The COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction to set
aside the decision.
Election Laws BALINDONG vs. COMELEC ( 27 SCRA 567, 1969 ) “Counting of Votes, B. B
EI to Issue Certificate of Votes to Watchers”
58
Facts: During the 1967 general elections, the following , with their respective
party affiliations, were amongst the mayoralty candidates for Ganassi: Uso Dan A
guamofficial candidate for Liberal Party; Alim Balingong- Independent Liberal Pa
rty and a certain Daud Marohombsar for Nacionalista Party. Uso Dan Aguam was pro
claimed Mayor-elect of Ganassi by the municipal board of canvassers. Alim Balind
ong unaware of the proclamation of the former, filed suit in the court for annul
ment of elections in various precincts to restrain the canvass and proclamation
of the official municipal- elect. Court declared no jurisdiction over the case.
Uso Dan Aguam took his oath of office and started to act as mayor. It was only t
hereafter that Balindong went to COMELEC for the annulment of the previous canva
ss and proclamation declaring Aguam winner and for the opening of the ballot box
in precinct. It was assailed that the board of canvassers was illegally constit
uted since it was the municipal treasurer upon instruction of the COMELEC who ap
pointed members of the said board which was admittedly composed of recommendees
of the local chapter of the Liberal Party and alleged irregularities attending t
he said canvass of the board. Issue: Whether or not there is irregularity in the
appointment and in the canvass. Held: The canvassing board of Ganassi was illeg
ally constituted. Three substitute members thereof were recommended by the local
chapter of the Nacionalista Party to which the substituted members belonged at
the time of their disqualification. This violates the section 167 of the Revised
Election Code as clarified in certain Ibuna case which explains that the said s
ection 167 requires the substitute members of the municipal board of canvassers
to be recommendees of the political party to which the substituted members belon
ged at the time of their disqualification. Hence, where a member of the board of
canvassers designated by law is excluded from the canvass by reason of which he
did not take part therein, the canvass and the resulting proclamation are both
null and void.
Election Laws SILVERIO vs. CASTRO ( 19 SCRA 222, 1967 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rul
es for Appreciation of Ballots”
59
Facts: Private respondent Castro was proclaimed elected and thereafter assumed t
he office. Petitioner Silverio on the other hand, filed a protest before the cou
rt. Subsequently and before hearing of the said election case, Castro died , hen
ce, Vice-Mayor Clamor succeeded to the office of Mayor. After hearing, the trial
court declared Silverio winner. Appeal was taken therefrom, Castro having died,
required Vice-Mayor Clamor to intervene. Appellants presents for review 119 bal
lots. Accordingly, these ballots are allegedly prepared by one person, containin
g erasures, found to be marked and should thus have been rejected. Issue: Whethe
r or not the ballots should be rejected. Held: It was held that the issue raised
involves rules of appreciation of ballots in an election case. And the purpose
of election laws is to ,give effect rather than frustrate the will of the voter.
Thus extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated and in
the appreciation of ballots, doubts are to be resolved in favor of their validi
ty. Moreover applying the rule of liberality in the appreciation of ballots, it
should noted the general resemblance or pictorial effect is not enough to warran
t the conclusion that certain ballots were prepared by one person. With respect
to erasures which are plainly corrections of errors, not evidencing any purpose
of marking, did not invalidate the ballots. Judgment appealed from is hereby rev
ersed.
Election Laws TRAJANO vs. INCISO ( 19 SCRA 340, 1967 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rule
s for Appreciation of Ballots”
60
Facts: In the election for Mayor of Lawa-an, Samar on Nov.12, 1963, Mateo Inciso
was proclaimed Mayor-elect by the Board of canvassers. Trajano filed on Nov. 27
, 1963 an election protest with the court. After trial and appreciation of conte
sted ballots, the court rendered decision finding protestee Inciso winner. Traja
no appealed stating in his notice of appeal raising only questions of law. He pu
ts an issue 56 ballots alleging errors in their appreciation. He alleged that 31
ballots should all be rejected as marked ballots as they consists of ballots fi
lled by two persons before leaving, deposited in the ballot box and thus null an
d void under Rule 23 of Section 149 of the Revised Election Code. Seven ballots
consists of ballots purportedly with votes for Trajano as Mayor, however, were n
ot counted by the Board of Canvassers in his favor. Lastly, a group of 18 ballot
s, all of which were counted for protestee Inciso which contended also by Trajan
o as marked and thus should have been rejected. Issue: Whether or not the ballot
s should be rejected. Held: The court held respecting the first group of ballots
, that the allowance or rejection of a ballot filled in by more than one person
depends on its condition before it was cast in the ballot box. If at the time it
was cast it was filled by only one person, but thereafter it was tampered and e
ntries were made thereon by the other persons, the ballot is valid. If, on the o
ther hand, it already bore the fillings of two or more persons when cast, said b
allot is deemed marked and is thus void.
Election Laws
61
GEROMO vs. COMELEC ( 1982 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rules for Appreciation of Ballo
ts” Facts: In the local election held on 30 January 1980, petitioner Jose Geromo,
a mayoralty candidate under the banner of the Concerned Citizens Aggrupation (CC
A for brevity), garnered 4,993 votes as against 4,886 votes obtained by his oppo
nent, private respondent Paciano Guillen, the candidate of the Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) for the same position. On 31 January 1980, petitioner was proclai
med duly elected Mayor of Molave, with a plurality of 107 votes over private res
pondent and has assumed office. On 5 February 1980, private respondent filed an
election protest against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Zamboang
a del Sur. On 18 December 1980, the Trial Court rendered a Decision finding that
private respondent Guillen obtained a total of 5,219 votes as against 4,952 vot
es for petitioner Geromo, or a margin of 267 votes. Geromo now questions the act
ion of public respondent in its appreciation of the ballots. Issue: Whether or n
ot Comelec committed an error in the appreciation of ballots. Held: Respondent C
ourt and the COMELEC did not invalidate the ballots on which the spaces for Sang
guniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan were filled with names of non-candida
tes and, instead, considered the votes for those offices as stray. Petitioner co
ntends, however, that the ballots should have been declared marked and disregard
ed. Public respondents’ findings are in conformity with the rule for the appreciat
ion of ballots. It has been held that in the absence of evidence aliunde that na
mes of non-candidates were intended for purposes of identification, the same sha
ll be considered as stray votes such shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Furt
her, it is a well-settled rule in election contests that the marks which shall b
e considered sufficient to invalidate the ballots are those which the voter hims
elf deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereaft
er. Neither can public respondents be assailed for considering the ballots on wh
ich “KBL” was written on the wrong spaces, without other writings, as valid block vo
tes for the entire KBL ticket. Although written in the wrong spaces, the intenti
on of the voters to vote for the entire ticket is clear. No evidence aliunde had
been presented below to prove that the voters intended to identify their ballot
s or themselves, or otherwise violate the secrecy of the ballot.
Election Laws
62
DOMINGO vs. RAMOS ( 17 SCRA 749, 1966 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rules for Appreciat
ion of Ballots” Facts: In the mayoralty elections of Rosales, Pangasinan held on N
ovember 12, 1963, Fernando Ramos was proclaimed winner over Silvestre Domingo, h
is closest rival, by a majority of eleven votes. Domingo filed a protest and the
CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgment declaring him elected by a plurality of fif
teen votes. There were 31 questioned ballots for Domingo and 53 for Ramos. The C
ourt of Appeals rejected 4 and counted 26 for Domingo out of his questioned 31 b
allots, while out of the 50 questioned ballots for Ramos, 6 were rejected and 44
were counted in his favor. Ramos thus obtained a total of 2,618 votes. The Cour
t of Appeals reversed the decision of the CFI and declared Ramos as the winner.
Domingo filed an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court. He claims that 14 vo
tes that were counted for Ramos should be considered stray since “A. Ramos” was writ
ten in the space for mayor. Issue: Whether or not the votes are considered stray
. Held: The votes cast for “A.Ramos” for mayor are stray. Since the written name was
accompanied by an initial, paragraph 1, section 149 of the Revised Election Cod
e does not apply. This provision refers to a case when only the Christian name o
r one word, which is the Christian name of a candidate and the surname of his op
ponent, has been written by the voter. Neither does paragraph 6 of same section
apply, because the initial and the surname written are those of another candidat
e, although for another office, in which case the latter must be deemed to be th
e person voted for. The claim that the letter “A” in “A.Ramos” stands for “Ando”, the commo
contraction of the name “Fernando”, cannot be sustained. The Revised Election Code
speaks of initial of a name or surname, not of a nickname. As a matter of fact,
certificates of candidacy cannot contain nicknames of candidates.
Election Laws GADON vs. GADON ( 9 SCRA 652, 1963 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rules fo
r Appreciation of Ballots”
63
Facts: Protestant Sulpicio Gadon and protestee Pedro Gadon were the respective c
andidates of the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties for the position of Mayor of D
espujols, Romblon. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Pedro Mayorelect
with a plurality of 3 votes. The Sulpicio filed a protest, alleging fraud and i
rregularities in the counting of votes in two precints, while the Pedro filed a
counterprotest contesting the balloting and/or counting of votes in six precints
. After considering the ballots cast and uncontested, as well as those claimed b
y either party and protested by the other, the trial court adjudged Sulpicio win
ner by eleven votes. Both candidates appealed the decision, and claimed that cer
tain ballots should have been rejected or counted in their favor. Issue: Whether
or not the lower court made a correct appreciation of the ballots. Held: The fo
llowing circumstances were considered in declaring the ballots affected as marke
d and invalid: the unexplained presence of the letters “O.P.” after the name of thos
e voted for councilors, quite prominent letters written with a remarkably good h
and; the word “Daldo” written on the blank space opposite the word “councilors”, with no
reasonable explanation for its presence; an impertinent unnecessary and identif
ying expression below the last line for councilors, namely: “My vote is heartily d
edicated”; and, writing a big figure “O”, not the initial of the candidate. The follow
ing circumstances were considered innocent mistakes and not sufficient to render
the ballots marked: writing the name “Pajo”, a candidate for Senator, at a wrong pl
ace; writing “Eco Baranda” the name of two candidates, one for Senator and the other
of Provincial Board Member, on one line; desisting from filling all the spaces
on the ballot; writing prefixes to the name of the candidate like “Manong”, “Nong”, “Ping”,
on”, “Tio”, where there is no discernible pattern to the use of such prefixes which wo
uld reveal an intention to mark the ballots; writing the prefixes “manoy”, “mandoy”, and
“pare enoy” before the names voted for various positions, where the prefixes are ex
plained to be colloquial expressions in Visayan which connote respect, equivalen
t to the Tagalog “ka” or the English “Mr.”, and; writing the prefix “Dr.” before the name o
candidates who are either a Doctor of Medicine or a Doctor of Pharmacy.
Election Laws
64
PANGONTAO vs. ALUNAN ( 6 SCRA 853, 1962 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rules for Appreci
ation of Ballots” Facts: In the elections held on November 10, 1959, respondent Fl
ores Alunan and petitioner Anastacio Pangontao were among the candidates for may
or of Talakag, Bukidnon. The municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Pangontao
as mayor-elect with a plurality of 37 votes over Alunan. The latter filed an ele
ction protest in the CFI of Bukidnon. Said court re-affirmed the election of Pan
gontao but his winning margin was reduced. The Court of Appeals reversed the low
er court’s ruling and declared Alunan as the winner. Petitioner claimed that the f
ollowing should be considered as marked ballots: a) one where the word “Nubia” was w
ritten on the first line for councilors; b) one where the word “bulag” was written b
eside the name “Kiliron” on the space for councilors; c) those where numbers were wr
itten at the reverse side of the ballot; and d) those ballots where Alunan was a
lso voted for senator. Issue: Whether or not the ballots should be considered as
stray. Held: Where the word “Nubia”, which was the nickname of a person was written
in the first line for councilors, the vote cast is a stray vote, but the ballot
remained valid. The word “bulag” written after the name “Kiliron” on the first space fo
r councilors, was merely descriptio personae and does not invalidate the ballot.
Where a number written on the reverse side of a ballot does not appear to have
been written by the voter himself, the ballot is valid. The circumstance that th
e name of a candidate for mayor appears not only on the space for mayor but also
on the space for senator, does not invalidate the ballot. The vote cast for sen
ator should be considered as a stray vote.
Election Laws TAJANLANGIT vs. CAZEÑAS ( 5 SCRA 567, 1962 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Ru
les for Appreciation of Ballots”
65
Facts: Petitioner Tajanlangit and respondent Cazeñas were among the candidates for
the position of mayor of Dao,Antique, in the elections held on November 10, 195
9. The municipal board of canvassers declared that Tajanlangit won over Cazeñas by
three votes. Cazeñas filed an election protest before the CFI of Antique contesti
ng the result of the elections. Tajanlangit also filed a counter-protest. The lo
wer court ruled in favor of Cazeñas, but his winning margin was reduced to two vot
es. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but reduced respondents lead by
just one vote. Tajanlangit filed this appeal to contest the ruling made by the a
ppellate court with regards to sixteen ballots. Issue: Whether or not the appell
ate court erred in its appreciation of the ballots. Held: The use of two kinds o
f writing appearing in the ballot is a good example of the exemption provided in
paragraph 18, section 149 of the Election Code, which provides that unless it s
hould clearly appear that it has been deliberately put by the voter to serve as
identification mark, the use of two or more kinds of writing shall be considered
innocent and shall not invalidate the ballot. In the absence of evidence aliund
e that names of non-candidates were intended for purposes of identification, the
same shall be considered as stray votes which shall not invalidate the whole ba
llot. It is a well-settled rule in election contest that the marks which shall b
e considered sufficient to invalidate the ballot are those which the votes himse
lf deliberately placed in his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafte
r.
Election Laws GALIDO vs. COMELEC ( 193 SCRA 78, 1991 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rule
s for Appreciation of Ballots”
66
Facts: Petitioner Galido and respondent Galeon were candidates during the Januar
y 18, 1988 local elections for the position of mayor in Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.
Petitioner was proclaimed as winner by the municipal board of canvassers. Galeo
n filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol. The lower court upheld the
petitioner’s proclamation by a majority of eleven votes. Galeon appealed and the F
irst Division of Comelec reversed the decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsider
ation was denied by the Comelec en banc. The Commission ruled that fifteen ballo
ts containing the letter “C” after the name “Galido” were marked. Issue: Whether or not
the ballots were marked. Held: In several cases decided by the Supreme Court, it
was held that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliunde
of a purpose to identify the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as mar
ked ballots. The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded
the cited decisions of the Supreme Court and declared that the suffix “C” after the
name of Galido was in reality a countersign and not a mere erroneous initial.
Election Laws BAUTISTA vs. COMELEC ( 296 SCRA 480, 1998 ) “Counting of Votes, A. R
ules for Appreciation of Ballots”
67
Facts: Petitioner Cipriano “Efren” Bautista was a duly registered candidate for the
position of Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A cert
ain Edwin “Efren” Bautista also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same positi
on. Petitioner filed a petitioner praying that Edwin Bautista be declared nuisan
ce candidate. Comelec, in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Baut
ista as a nuisance candidate and accordingly, his name was not included in the l
ist of candidates for mayor. Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was still pending at the date of election. During the counting of votes, s
eparate tallies of ballots on which were written “Efren Bautista”, “Efren”, “E. Bautista”,
nd “Bautista” were made by the Board of Election Inspectors. The municipal board of
canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner theses se
parate tallies. Issue: Whether or not these votes should have been included to t
hose cast for petitioner. Held: It must be emphasized that the instant case invo
lves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the voters’ will and caus
es confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are
trying to protect. They give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the v
oter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated.
Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their
validity. A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the
real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at
bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper re
leases and other forms of notifications, the voters were informed of the Comelec’s
decision to declare Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate. It is improper and
strained to limit petitioner’s votes to the ballots which only indicate the name “Ci
priano” when it is of public knowledge that petitioner is also known by the appell
ation and nickname “Efren” which he in fact registered as his nickname.
Election Laws BAUTISTA vs. CASTRO ( 206 SCRA 305,1992 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rul
es for Appreciation of Ballots”
68
Facts: Both petitioner Bautista and respondent Miguel were candidates for the po
sition of Barangay Captain of Brgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City in the ba
rangay elections held on May 17, 1982. After canvass, Bautista was proclaimed as
the winner with a plurality of two votes. Miguel filed an election protest. The
City Court of Quezon City ruled that both candidates received the same number o
f votes. Upon appeal, the CFI of Rizal declared Miguel as the winner and set asi
de Bautista’s proclamation. The latter filed a petition to the Supreme Court alleg
ing that respondent judge committed mistakes in his appreciation of the conteste
d ballots. Issue: Whether or not there was error in the appreciation of ballots.
Held: The presence of an arrow in the contested ballots with the words “and party”
was meant to identify the voter, and such writings were not accidental. As a rul
e, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the o
ffices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions were provided for in the Revised El
ection Code, such as the prefixes “Sr.,” “Mr.,” and the like and the suffixes such as “hij
o,” “Jr.,” etc. will not invalidate the ballot. Initials, nicknames or appellation of
affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the n
ame or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means
to identify the voter. Respondent court correctly invalidated the ballot wherei
n the name of the candidate was written seven times. The writing of a name more
than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other pur
pose than to identify the ballot.
Election Laws SANCHEZ vs. COMELEC ( 153 SCRA 67, 1987 ) “Counting of Votes, A. Rul
es for Appreciation of Ballots”
69
Facts: Augusto Sanchez filed his petition praying that respondent Comelec be dir
ected to conduct a recount of the votes cast in the May 11, 1987 senatorial elec
tions to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him on the ground
that the votes intended for him were declared as stray votes because of the same
ness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name
had not been crossed out from the election returns. Issue: Whether his petition
for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be cons
idered a summary pre-proclamation controversy falling within the Comelec’s exclusi
ve jurisdiction. Held: Petitioner contends that the canvassed returns discarding
“Sanchez” votes as stray were “incomplete” and therefore warrant a recount or re-apprec
iation of the ballots under Section 234. A simple reading of the basic provision
s of the cited section shows readily its inapplicability. By legal definition an
d by the very instructions of the Comelec, an election return is incomplete if t
here is “omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his
corresponding votes” or “in case the number of votes for a candidate has been omitte
d.” Here, the election returns are complete and indicate the name of Sanchez as we
ll as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in hi
s favor by the boards of inspectors. The fact that the some votes written solely
as “Sanchez” were declared stray votes because of the inspectors’ erroneous belief th
at Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate, involves an erroneous a
ppreciation of the ballots. It is established by law as well as by jurisprudence
that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are prope
r subjects for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of ballot
s. The appreciation of ballots cast in the precincts is not a “proceeding of the b
oard of canvassers” for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, but of the board
of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in
accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in section 211 of the Omnibu
s Election Code.
Election Laws
70
ALBERTO A. VILLAVERT vs. TOBIAS FORNIER ( G.R. No. L-3050. October 17, 1949 ) “Cas
ting of Votes” Facts: This is an election contest involving the office of provinci
al governor of Antique, the contending parties being the registered candidates f
or said office in the election held on November 11, 1947. The provincial board o
f canvassers declared Alberto A. Villavert elected with a majority of 60 votes.
Tobias Fornier protested, and the trial court found that he had obtained a major
ity of 36 votes over Villavert and consequently declared him elected. Villavert
appealed to the Court of Appeals and the latter also found that Tobias Fornier h
ad won the election with a majority of 28 votes. Issue: Whether or not the 40 ba
llots were properly rejected by the Court of Appeals on the ground that Villaver
t’s name was written not on the dotted line following the words “Provincial Governor”
but on the double line immediately above said words and below the instructions t
o the voter. Held: The 40 ballots were valid. The provision of section 135 of th
e Revised Election Code that the voter shall fill his ballot by writing in the p
roper space for each office the name of the person for whom he desires to vote,
does not necessarily invalidate votes cast for a candidate for provincial govern
or whose name is written not on the dotted line following the words “Provincial Go
vernor” but on the double line immediately above said words and below the instruct
ions to the voter. The purpose of said provision is to identify the office for w
hich each candidate is voted. It cannot be doubted that the intention of the vot
er in writing the name of said candidate was to vote him for one of the offices
specified on the ballot. Neither can there be any reasonable doubt that the offi
ce for which the voter intended to vote said candidate was that of provincial go
vernor (1) because that was the office for which he was a registered candidate,
(2) because the space on which his name was written was such that the vote could
not have been intended for a member of the provincial board or for any other of
fice specified farther down in the ballot, and (3) because no other name was wri
tten on the dotted line immediately following the words “Provincial Governor.” If th
e intention of the voter can be ascertained in an indubitable manner, as in this
case, it should be given effect not frustrated.
Election Laws
71
CANUTO F. PIMENTEL vs. PEDRO FESTEJO ( G.R. No. L-2327. January 11, 1949) “Casting
of Votes” Facts: Pedro Festejo was proclaimed elected as mayor of Santa Lucia, Il
ocos Sur, in the elections of November 11, 1947, with 1,108 votes against 1,101
votes in favor of Canuto F. Pimentel. The latter protested. The trial court foun
d that Festejo received 1,107 votes and Pimentel 1,101 votes and, consequently,
dismissed the protest. Appellant appealed, contending that the lower court erred
in not crediting to him the fifty-nine ballots mentioned in his first three ass
ignments of error as votes in his favor, with which he would appear to have rece
ived a total of 1,160 votes and, therefore, enough majority to win the election.
As stated in appellant’s brief, his name in the thirty-seven ballots mentioned in
his first assignment of error “was written on the line corresponding to vice-mayo
r,” in the eight ballots mentioned in his second assignment of error “was written on
the line corresponding to the second space for member of the provincial board,” a
nd in the fourteen ballots mentioned in his third assignment of error “was written
in the space for councilor.” Either names of other persons, not candidates for ma
yor, are written in the space for mayor in said ballots, or said space appears t
o be in blank. Issue: Whether or not appellant can claim as votes in his favor b
allots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for may
or. Held: For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispen
sable that his name is written by the voter in the proper space for mayor, which
word is clearly printed in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who, a
s provided by the Constitution, is able to read. A name can be counted for any o
ffice only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the
vote for such office (Lucero vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil., 852). It is impossible to
count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly writ
ten in the space reserved for another office.
Election Laws
72
RAFAEL I. AMURAO vs. INDALECIO CALANGI, ET AL. ( G.R. No. L-12631. August 22, 19
58 ) “Casting of Votes” Facts: In the general elections of November 8, 1955, Rafael
I. Amurao and Indalecio Calangi were candidates for the office of mayor of Mabin
i, Batangas. After a canvass of the votes, the municipal board of canvassers fou
nd that Calangi had obtained 2,015 votes and Amurao 2,010 votes, and proclaimed
Calangi mayor-elect by a majority of five (5) votes. Amurao filed a protest in t
he CFI of Batangas impugning the returns from nine precincts of Mabini on the gr
ounds of fraud, error and irregularities. After trial, the lower court rendered
a decision declaring Amurao mayor-elect of Mabini with a majority of six (6) vot
es, having received 2,101 votes as against 2,095 adjudicated to Calangi. The Cou
rt of Appeals to which the decision was appealed by Calangi reversed this decisi
on and declared Calangi the duly elected mayor of Mabini with a total of 2,140 v
otes, or a plurality of 74 votes over Amurao, who obtained 2,066 votes. Issue: W
hether or not the votes cast in certain ballots which were appreciated by the Co
urt of Appeals are invalid for not having been written on the proper space for m
ayor. Held: The votes cast were invalid. The voter should write the name of the
person he intends to vote for in the proper space indicated in the ballot for th
e office for which he is a candidate in order to avoid any doubt or confusion as
to the candidate he intends to vote for. The provision of the law on this point
should be strictly followed so that a deviation therefrom would render the vote
invalid and of no effect. Indeed, section 135 of the Revised Election Code prov
ides that the voter, on receiving his ballot, shall fill the same “by writing in t
he proper space for each office the name of the person for whom or the name of t
he party for which he desires to vote”… The philosophy behind the rulings above adve
rted to is to make of these legal provisions mandatory in order to avoid any con
fusion in the minds of the officials in charge of election as to the candidates
actually voted for and stave off any scheming design to identify the vote of the
elector thereby defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is the cardinal featu
re of our Election Law.
Election Laws FELIX V. KATIPUNAN vs. ( G.R. No. 43043. December 19, 1935 ) “Castin
g of Votes” JULIO A.
73 ANTIPORDA
Facts: The Court of First Instance in this case declared Antiporda municipal pre
sident-elect of Binañgonan, Rizal, with a majority of 10 votes over the protestant
Katipunan. The Supreme Court, upon appeal, affirmed said decision, having found
, after considering the grounds of the appeal, that the protestee still had a ma
jority of four votes over the protestant. A petition for reconsideration of the
decision of SC was filed and it was granted. Consequently, the SC decision rende
red on July 30, 1935, was set aside and the case was set for rehearing. The peti
tioner and appellant assigns as the court’s first error its failure to count in hi
s favor 73 of the 89 ballots cast in precinct No. 3 after 6 o’clock in the afterno
on of the election day by voters who were unable to vote at that time but were w
ithin a radius of 50 meters from the precinct. Issue: Whether or not 89 ballots
cast in precinct No. 3 after 6 o’clock in the afternoon of the Election Day by vot
ers who were unable to vote at that time but were within a radius of 50 meters f
rom the precinct were valid. Held: The 89 ballots were valid. Evidence was prese
nted by the appellant to the effect that 89 voters, whose names appear in the li
st Exhibit C, were within the radius of 50 meters at the closing of the precinct
. It is, therefore, undisputed that there were voters within the radius of 50 me
ters at the closing of the voting. The law provides that in such case these vote
rs should be allowed to vote, even after 6 o’clock in the afternoon.
Election Laws PIO VALENZUELA vs. JUAN B CARLOS ( G.R. No. 17565. December 7, 192
1 ) “Casting of Votes”
74
Facts: At the general election held in the Province of Bulacan on June 3, 1919,
three persons presented themselves as candidates for the office of provincial go
vernor, to wit, Juan B. Carlos, Pio Valenzuela, and Silvino Lopez. When the elec
tion was over, it was found that, Juan B. Carlos had been elected provincial gov
ernor. Dissatisfied with the result, Pio Valenzuela, in due time filed a motion
to contest the election. Upon submission of the case for decision, CFI of Bulaca
n, decided that Carlos had been elected and accordingly dismissed the contest. F
rom this decision the contestant appealed. One of the assigned errors was that t
he action of the judge in repairing to the municipality of Bustos was unauthoriz
ed and that the judicial acts there done are devoid of legal effect. The matter
was regards the taking of testimonies from the numerous voters from the first pr
ecinct of Bustos presented in the CFI. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in
admitting as evidence the testimonies of voters. Held: The lower court was corre
ct in admitting the testimonies of voters as evidence. Where the returns from a
certain precinct are impugned as fraudulent, and it is found upon opening the bo
xes that they have been violated, the candidate in whose interest the act of vio
lation is alleged to have been committed may introduce as witnesses voters who,
waiving their privilege of secrecy, will swear that they voted for him. Such evi
dence is admissible for the purpose of rehabilitating the returns.
Election Laws
75
JOSE LINO LUNA vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ ( G.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918 ) “Castin
g of Votes” Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal
was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio
Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The elec
tion was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a return was made by the inspe
ctors of said municipalities to the provincial board of Canvassers, who, after a
canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said vote
s, as duly elected governor of said province. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest
in the CFI and a new trial was ordered. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge
McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 o’clo
ck p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge the
n directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how
many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. Issue: Whether or not t
he ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid. Held: The ballots w
ere valid. The law provides that “at all elections, the polls shall be open from s
even o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the afternoon.” The polls should be o
pen and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear a
nd offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted
to vote if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if t
he voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitte
d to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, cer
tainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of
the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the re
gular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he shou
ld not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of his government when he
was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors should be held t
o comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be punished
and not the innocent voter.
Election Laws
76
ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ( G.R. No. 126669. April 27, 199
8 ) “Casting of Votes” Facts: Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punza
lan were among the four (4) candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico,
Pampanga during the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as the duly elected mayor. Dani
lo Manalastas and Ernesto Punzalan filed an election protest before the Regional
Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. After hearing the election protests, the
trial court rendered judgment on September 23, 1996 declaring Punzalan as the d
uly elected mayor. Thereafter, Meneses filed a notice of appeal from the aforesa
id decision On December 8, 1997, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution setting as
ide the trial court’s decision and affirming the proclamation of Meneses by the MB
C as the duly elected mayor of Mexico, Pampanga. Punzalan filed a motion for rec
onsideration of the aforesaid resolution. Punzalan maintains that the COMELEC ac
ted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to
Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI chairman at the back thereo
f, invoking the ruling of the Supreme Court in Bautista v. Castro wherein it was
held that the absence of the signature of the BEI chairman in the ballot given
to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said
ballot is fatal. Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s sig
nature are valid. Held: A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is v
alid. While Section 24 11 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as “An Act Pro
viding For Synchronized National and Local Elections and For Electoral Reforms,” r
equires the BEI chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, the m
ere failure to do so does not invalidate the same although it may constitute an
election offense imputable to said BEI chairman. Nowhere in said provision does
it state that the votes contained therein shall be nullified. It is a well-settl
ed rule that the failure of the BEI chairman or any of the members of the board
to comply with their mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, auth
enticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disen
franchisement, thereby frustrating the will of the people.
Election Laws MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET ( G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
) “Casting of Votes”
77
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were amo
ng the candidates for the lone congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 19
95 elections. After the canvass of the returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Prov
incial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to hav
e been duly elected Representative of the District. Petitioner Libanan filed an
election protest before the HRET claiming, among other things, that the absence
of the BEI Chairman’s signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate
that the ballots were not those issued to the voters during the elections thus,
indicating that they were spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would re
quire the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing
it to the voter. Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s sign
ature are valid. Held: A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is va
lid and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other authenticati
ng marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the CO
MELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and bl
ue fibers in the ballots. What should, instead, be given weight is the consisten
t rule laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for a
s long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELE
C watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of
the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not
readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red or blue fibers in the bal
lots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be
considered spurious and subject to rejection.
Election Laws
78
JUAN SUMULONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION ( G.R. No. 47903. November 29, 1940 ) “Bo
ard of Election Inspectors, A. Composition” Facts: In a petition addressed to the
Commission on Elections, Juan Sumulong, as president of “Pagkakaisa ng Bayan” (Popul
ar Front Party), claims minority representation on the boards of election inspec
tors in the impending general election for provincial and municipal officials an
d not Pedro Abad Santos, thus requesting that the Commission recognize him as su
ch. The Commission dismissed the petition contending that it has no jurisdiction
to decide whether the petitioner or Pedro Abad Santos is the real head of Pagka
kaisa ng Bayan. Issue: Whether or not respondent Commission is empowered to dete
rmine on the issue of who among the parties has the right to minority representa
tion on the board of election inspectors. Held: The Commission on Election is em
powered to decide on who shall have the right to minority representation on the
board of election inspectors. Specifically and categorically stated, the right t
o minority representation on the board of election inspectors is tested by the f
ollowing rules and is subject to the following conditions: (1) The political org
anization in whose behalf the claim is made must be a political party in the sen
se that it is “an organized group of persons pursuing the same political ideals in
a government” (sec. 76, Comm. Act No. 357). This is a question of fact, or a mixe
d question of fact and law. (2) The political party must have taken part at the
immediately preceding election and obtained the next largest number of votes at
said election (sec. 70, ibid.) In concurrence with a “political group” in the locali
ty, the political party is entitled to preferential recognition, if it had taken
part in the immediately preceding election and had received votes and the claim
of the party to representation is made in good faith. (3) The inspectors of ele
ction must be proposed by the authorized representatives of the national directo
rates of the parties (sec. 73, ibid.). Who constitute the party directorate and
who are its authorized representatives for this purpose involve an ascertainment
of fact which must be made by the appointing power, subject to the supervisory
and reviewing authority of the Commission on Elections (sec. 2 of Comm. Act No.
607.).
Election Laws
79
JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTION ( G.R. No. 115245. July 11, 1995. 24
5 SCRA 759 ) “Campaign, D. Statement of Contributions and Expenses”
Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of c
andidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Provi
nce of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candid
acy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 19
94 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pe
sos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitio
ner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC. I
ssue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of con
tributions and expenditures notwithstanding his having withdrawn his certificate
of candidacy three days after his filing. Held: The petitioner is liable. Secti
on 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that wh
ere the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non dis
tinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the applica
tion of a law where none is indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy
or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to
a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidac
y.
Election Laws COLLADO vs. ALONZO (15 SCRA 562) “Campaign, C. Lawful Expenditures”
80
Facts: Juan A. Alonzo and Marcelino G. Collado both ran as candidates for mayor
of Ballesteros, Cagayan for the 12 November 1963 elections. Alonzo won. Collado
commenced an action to disqualify Alonzo on the ground, among others, that the l
atter had incurred or made excessive expenditures, contrary to the Election Law,
when he promised to donate his salary as mayor of the town for the education of
indigent but deserving students during his campaign speeches. Issue: Whether Al
onzo committed excessive or unlawful expenditures. Held: Alonzo did not spend, i
n his election campaign, more than the total emoluments attached to the office f
or one year. The promise (or donation) was not an expenditure during the campaig
n. Though it has been held previously that “Direct promises, or statements made by
candidates for election, that they will, if elected, serve for less than the re
gularly established salary or fees of the office frequently have been held to be
within the denunciation of not only provisions of corrupt practices, but also c
onstitutional, statutory, or common-law inhibitions against bribery”; the current
situation is differentiated. Alonzo did not promise to waive collection of his s
alary but intended to collect it. He merely undertook to spend it in such a way
as to help bright and deserving students — not necessarily voters — whose identity c
ould not be known at the time of the elections. It may not be said that this or
that voter had been influenced by the scholarship offer, for Alonzo to violate S
ection 49 of the Election Law (Unlawful expenditures).
Election Laws
81
HALILI vs. CA (83 SCRA 633) “Campaign, B. Prohibited Contribution” Facts: Federico S
untay was a gubernatorial candidate in Bulacan in the 1951 elections. Fortunato
F. Halili, was the incumbent governor, the Liberal Party head, Suntay’s campaign m
anager, and was also a public utility operator. Suntay needed funds to finance h
is campaign. Halili agreed to make cash advances to Suntay. The parties encounte
red certain obstacles brought about by Articles 47, 48, 183, 184 and 185 of the
Revised Election Code. Section 47 (Unlawful contributions) provides that “it shall
be unlawful for any corporation or entity operating a public utility or which i
s in possession of or is exploiting any natural resources of the nation to contr
ibute or make any expenditure in connection with any election campaign.” On the ot
her hand, Section 48 (Limitation upon expenses of candidates) provides that “No ca
ndidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the total amount of the
emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate.” To go
around the law, a scheme was hatched for the concealment or for the laundering
of the loans and advances of Halili for Suntay’s campaign; and to implement, the a
dvances or loans were made in the names of Halili’s trusted employees as dummies.
Suntay “leased” his fishpond to Halili’s employees for a four-year period, with stipul
ated rental of P8,000 per year. Certain promissory notes were made during the tr
ansactions. After the expiration of the “lease contract,” Suntay filed a case agains
t Halili and others, praying that the notes be declared void pursuant to Article
1409 of the Civil Code for lack of consideration and for being contrary to Sect
ion 47 and 48 of the Election Law. Issue: Whether Section 47 applies to a natura
l person and whether Section 48 applies to a non-candidate. Held: If a corporati
on operating a public utility is prohibited from making a political contribution
or expenditure, there is no valid reason for not applying the prohibition (Sect
ion 47) to a natural person operating a public service business. Furthermore, Se
ction 48 applies to a non-candidate like Halili because Section 184 of the Revis
ed Election Code (Persons criminally responsible for election offenses) speaks o
f principals and accomplices. Halili was no ordinary lender and lessee as knew t
hat the rental and the loans would be spent for Suntay’s candidacy. He was not onl
y Suntay’s financial backer but, as campaign manager, he had a hand in the expendi
ture of the funds supplied by him to Suntay. He was Suntay’s co-principal.
Election Laws NATIONAL PRESS CLUB vs. COMELEC (207 SCRA 1) “Campaign, A. Lawful /
Prohibited Election Propaganda”
82
Facts: Representatives of the mass media which were prevented from selling or do
nating space and time for political advertisements, some candidates for office i
n the May 1992 elections, and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to
be informed of election issues and of credentials was being curtailed, filed pe
titions raising the issue of the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of RA 6646.
Section 11 (b) provides that “In addition to the forms of election propaganda pro
hibited under Section 85 of BP 881, it shall be unlawful xxx for any newspapers,
radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any person makin
g use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air tim
e for campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided
under Sections 90 and 92 of BP 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, annou
ncer or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take
a leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.” Issue: Whet
her the prohibition has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of med
ia operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of spee
ch and freedom of the press. Held: Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of
its applicability and enforceability, i.e. within election period. It does not c
ut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary about candidates, thei
r qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper, radio broadcasting and t
elevision stations remain quite free to carry out their regular and normal infor
mation and communication operations. It does not authorize any intervention and
much less control on the part of Comelec in respect of the content of the normal
operations of media, nor in respect of the content of political advertisements
which the individual candidates are quite free to present within their respectiv
e allocated Comelec time and Comelec space. There is no “officious functionary of
a repressive government” dictating what events or ideas reporters, broadcasters, e
ditors or commentators may talk or write about or display on TV screens. There i
s here no censorship, whether disguised or otherwise. The provision merely limit
paid partisan political advertisements to fora other than modern mass media, an
d to “Comelec time” and “Comelec space” in such mass media; in an attempt to equalize th
e situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying
the undue advantage offered by huge campaign “war chests.”
Election Laws
83
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC (181 SCRA 529) “Campaign, A. Lawful / Prohibited Election Prop
aganda” Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for t
he Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was schedu
led 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Cons
titution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent electi
on laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on
the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad,
a newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier” assailed the consti
tutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers
) of the said resolution, which provides “During the plebiscite campaign period, o
n the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, an
nouncer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campa
ign for or against the plebiscite issues.” Issue: Whether columnists are prohibite
d from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during
plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was gr
anted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyme
nt of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transporta
tion or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reaso
nable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among c
andidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b
, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, w
ho is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence
from his work during the campaign period”) can be construed to mean that the Come
lec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by me
dia practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite peri
ods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscit
e periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there a
re no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Reso
lution 2167 has no statutory basis.
Election Laws
84
BADOY vs. COMELEC (35 SCRA 285) “Campaign, A. Lawful / Prohibited Election Propaga
nda” Facts: Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. avers that he is a candidate for delegate to th
e Constitutional Convention for the lone district of North Cotabato. He prays th
at Section 12(F) of RA 6132 be declared unconstitutional as the same denies indi
viduals, who are not candidates, their freedom of speech and of the press; and c
andidates the right to speak and write, discuss and debate in favor of their can
didacies or against the candidacies of others. Section 12 (F) provides that the
Comelec “shall endeavor to obtain free space from newspapers, magazines and period
icals which shall be known as Comelec space, and shall allocate this space equal
ly and impartially among all candidates within the areas in which the newspapers
are circulated. Outside of said Comelec space, it shall be unlawful to print or
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any advertisement, paid comment o
r paid article in furtherance of or in opposition to the candidacy of any person
for delegate, or mentioning the name of any candidate and the fact of his candi
dacy, unless all the names of all other candidates in the district in which the
candidate is running are also mentioned with equal prominence.” Comelec Resolution
RR-724, as amended, merely restates the ban in Section 12 (F). Issue: Whether t
he ban in Section 12 (F) is valid or constitutional. Held: Under Section 12 (F),
the moneyed candidate or individual who can afford to pay for advertisements, c
omments or articles in favor of his candidacy or against the candidacy of anothe
r or which mention his name and the fact of his candidacy, is required to mentio
n all the other candidates in the same district with equal prominence, to exempt
him from the penal sanction of the law. The evident purpose of the limitation i
s to give the poor candidates a fighting chance in the election. The restriction
is only one of the measures devised by the law to preserve suffrage pure and un
defiled and to achieve the desired equality of chances among all the candidates.
Considering the foregoing limitation in Section 12(F) in the light of the other
provisions of RA 6132 designed to maximize, if not approximate, equality of cha
nces among the various candidates in the same district, the said restriction on
the freedom of expression appears too insignificant to create any appreciable de
nt on the individual’s liberty of expression. It should be noted that Section 8(a)
of the same law, prohibiting political parties from aiding candidates and thus
was more restrictive than Section 12(F), was previously upheld to be valid. The
limitation in Section 12(F) is a reasoned and reasonable judgment on the part of
Congress. It is not unconstitutional.
Election Laws
85
MARCOS vs. COMELEC ( 248 SCRA 300 ) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Candidacy” Facts:
On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, indicating that
she was a resident of said constituency for seven months. Faced with petition fo
r cancellation and disqualification by the incumbent representative Cirilo Roy M
ontejo, Marcos filed an amended certificate changing the entry “seven months” to “sinc
e childhood.” The Commission on Elections, on 24 April, ordered the disqualificati
on of Marcos from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Le
yte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered the most votes in the 8 May electi
on. The Commission on Elections, thus, suspended her proclamation. Issue: Whethe
r the statement in the certificate of candidacy (“seven”) determines whether an indi
vidual satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement, to warran
t Marcos’ disqualification. Held: It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in
a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification require
ment. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise r
ender a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
would lead to his or her disqualification. A close look at said certificate woul
d reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence is follow
ed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the wo
rd “seven,” obviously resulting from the confusion which prompted Marcos to write do
wn the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of resid
ence in the First district, which was “since childhood” in the space provided. It mu
st be noted again that “residence” is used to indicate a place of abode, whether per
manent or temporary, while “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. Residence for election purposes
is used synonymously with domicile.
Election Laws SUNGA vs. COMELEC (288 SCRA 76) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Candi
dacy”
86
Facts: Manuel C. Sunga and Ferdinand B. Trinidad (incumbent mayor) were candidat
es for the position of Mayor in the Iguig, Cagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections.
On 22 April and 7 May, Sunga filed with the Comelec complaints for disqualifica
tion against Trinidad (later consolidated in an amended petition), accusing him
of using local government vehicles in his campaign, the use of threats, intimida
tion, terrorism or other forms of coercion, vote buying, and other details. The
Comelec Second Division referred the complaint to its Law Department for investi
gation. Meanwhile, Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes. Sunga moved fo
r the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad, but the latter was proclaimed
nevertheless. Later on, the Comelec En Banc approved the findings of the Law Dep
artment in its report of 28 June and directed the filing of the corresponding in
formations in the Regional Trial Court against Trinidad. On 2 May 1996 Sunga fil
ed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspend the Effects and Annul the Proclamation with
Urgent Motion for Early Resolution of the Petition, but such was dismissed by t
he Comelec’s Second division. Issue: Whether a disqualification case filed before
the election should be dismissed if the case remained unresolved after the elect
ion. Held: There is nothing in Comelec Resolution 2050 (to which the Comelec rel
ied heavily on, besides the case of Silvestre vs. Duavit, in its comment) declar
ing, ordering, or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filed befor
e the election but which remained unresolved after the election. The legislative
intent in RA 6646 (Section 6, Effects of Disqualification Case) is that the Com
elec should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its c
onclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. A quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The fact that Trinidad w
as already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor did not divest the C
omelec of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually deci
de the disqualification case. A candidate has been proclaimed elected does not s
ignify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the sub
ject of a separate investigation. The Court ordered the Comelec to reinstate the
disqualification case against Trinidad and to act upon it in light of its prono
uncements. Thus, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a pe
rmanent vacancy will be created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for
the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed
as provided by law.
Election Laws NOLASCO vs. COMELEC (275 SCRA 762) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Ca
ndidacy”
87
Facts: Florentino P. Blanco and Eduado A. Alarilla both vied for the mayoral pos
ition of Meycauayan, Bulacan during the election held 8 May 1995. Blanco garnere
d the highest number of votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected vice-mayor. On 9 May,
Alarilla filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Blanco on grounds that
the latter committed acts in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Co
de, i.e. for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public o
fficials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enha
nce his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by the Election Code (P10 million against 97,000 registered vot
ers). On 15 August, the Comelec disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-buying
and ordered the Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan to reconvene and to
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be imme
diately proclaimed. Blanco moved for reconsideration while Nolasco, as vice mayo
r, intervened in the proceedings. Nolasco urged that as vice-mayor he should be
declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. Both motions were d
enied. Hence, the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the disqualification o
f the mayor-elect warrants the declaration of any of the remaining qualified may
oral candidates, upon the canvassing of votes, as mayor. Held: In a mayoralty el
ection, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Permanent vacan
cies (i.e. when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses
to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily r
esigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office) in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor
are governed by Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Article 38 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code o
f 1991. Vice-Mayor Edgardo C. Nolasco was adjudged as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulac
an in view of the disqualification of mayor-elect Florentino P. Blanco.
Election Laws AQUINO vs. COMELEC (248 SCRA 400) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Can
didacy”
88
Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy fo
r the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Maka
ti City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident o
f the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualif
ication, he amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy t
o 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 Ma
y and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a mo
tion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election late
r issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission res
olved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible
and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualificatio
n of residence. Issue: Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually
connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in t
he electoral district. Held: The place “where a party actually or constructively h
as his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given tim
e, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of electio
n law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the cond
itions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstanc
es existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidac
y in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registere
d voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that ele
ction. Aquino’s connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lea
se agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a
permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit inst
ead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati
(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residenc
es in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as
a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino was
thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.
Election Laws
89
ORTEGA vs. COMELEC (211 SCRA 297) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Candidacy” Facts: R
amon Labo, Jr., who again, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched his
candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in the 11 May 1992 elections by filing his c
ertificate of candidacy on 23 March. Roberto Ortega also filed his certificate o
f candidacy for the same office on 25 March. On 26 March, Ortega filed a disqual
ification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec seeking to cancel Labo’s cert
ificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he
stated therein that the latter is a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. On 9
May, the Comelec resolved the petition, denied due course and cancelled Labo’s ce
rtificate of candidacy. The next day, acting on Labo’s ex-parte motion, the Comele
c allowed Labo to be voted upon as Mayoral candidate until the final resolution
of the issue, in the event the case is raised to the Supreme Court. On 13 May, C
omelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event
he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. On 15 May, Labo filed a p
etition for review with the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Labo garnered the highest
number of votes. Issue: Whether the resolution canceling Labo’s certificate of can
didacy (hence, his disqualification) warrants the candidate receiving the next h
ighest number of votes to be declared Mayor of Baguio City. Held: The 9 May 1992
Comelec resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy had already become
final and executory on 14 May, a day before Labo filed his petition in the Supre
me Court. The Comelec’s ruling is final and executory with 5 days, after the parti
es the copy thereof, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. This is pursuant to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 3 of Rule 39 of the Comele
c Rules of Procedure. Labo, thus, cannot be proclaimed as Mayor of Baguio City.
His disqualification, however, does not necessarily entitle Ortega to be proclai
med as mayor. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office. Having lost in the election for mayor, Ortega was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City. As a consequence of both parties’ ineligibili
ty, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. In view of such va
cancy, the vice-mayor elect of the city in the said elections was declared Mayor
of Baguio City after being proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers.
Election Laws GO vs. COMELEC ( 357 SCRA 739, 2001 ) “Candidates, C. Certificate of
Candidacy”
90
Facts: Petitioner was the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, provin
ce of Leyte when she filed on February 27, 2001 with the municipal election offi
cer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor o
f the said municipality. On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed w
ith the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, a
nother certificate of candidacy for governor. Simultaneously therewith, she atte
mpted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal
of her candidacy for mayor. However, the provincial election supervisor refused
to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to COMELEC R
esolution No. 3253-A, she should file it with the municipal election officer of
Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. Private re
spondents filed similar petitions to disqualify petitioner on the ground that pe
titioner filed certificates of candidacy for two positions, namely, that for may
or, and that for governor, thus, making her ineligible for both. The COMELEC gra
nted the petition and disqualified the petitioner from running for both position
. Issue: Whether or not an affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy should be filed
with the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was fi
led. Held: No. There is nothing in Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code which
mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office wh
ere the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be file
d directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional elect
ion director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the
province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the munici
pal election officer of the said municipality. While it may be true that Section
12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that the withdrawal be filed befor
e the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed
, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience.
Election Laws GARVIDA vs. SALES, JR. ( 271 SCRA 767, 1997 ) “Candidates, C. Certif
icate of Candidacy”
91
Facts: On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member and vote
r of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Th
e Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the ground that
petitioner, who was then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old, exceeded the
age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. On April 23, 1996, petiti
oner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sanggunian
g Kabataan. However, respondent Election Officer Dionisio F. Rios disapproved pe
titioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however, app
ealed to the COMELEC Regional Director who set aside the order of respondents an
d allowed the petitioner to run. Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a r
ival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC
en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” again
st petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her cert
ificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en banc granted the petition. Issue: Whether o
r not the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or
cancel the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. Held: No. Under the Rules of Pr
ocedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may o
nly be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to r
each a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Mo
reover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of
the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It therefore acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained the p
etition and issued the questioned order.
Election Laws
92
LOONG vs. COMELEC (216 SCRA 760, 1992) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Candidacy” Fac
ts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certific
ate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Re
gion in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after
the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a pet
ition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional ViceGovernor,
on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of
candidacy as to his age. Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition o
n the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dism
iss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petit
ion. Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the cer
tificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was
filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribe
d by law. Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the r
espondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter m
ade a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearl
y does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25
but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing
petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 whic
h allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filin
g of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is m
erely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a consti
tutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
Election Laws
93
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. NLRC ( 222 SCRA 831 ) “Candidates, C. Cert
ificate of Candidacy” Facts: In November, 1987, while holding the position of Geot
hermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction Department, at Tongo
nan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City, Manuel S. Pineda decided to run for councilo
r of the Municipality of Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in Jan
uary, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for the positio
n. Objection to Pineda’s being a candidate while retaining his job in the PNOC-EDC
was shortly thereafter registered by Mayor Arturo Cornejos of Kananga, Leyte. S
ection 66 of the Election Code provides among others that officers and employees
of GOCCs are considered as ipso facto resigned upon the filing of their certifi
cate of candidacy. It was the argument of Pineda that PNOC-EDC was not created t
hrough a special law, it is not covered by the Civil Service Law and, therefore,
not contemplated under Section 66 of the Election Code. Issue: Whether or not a
n employee in a government- owned or controlled corporation without an original
charter falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. Held:
Yes. If a corporation’s capital stock is owned by the Government, or it is operat
ed and managed by officers charged with the mission of fulfilling the public obj
ectives for which it has been organized, it is a government-owned or controlled
corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special
statute. Employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the
Labor Code, are nonetheless “employees in government-owned or controlled corporat
ion,” and come within the letter of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, decla
ring them ipso facto resigned from their office upon the filing of their certifi
cate of candidacy.
Election Laws
94
JURILLA vs. COMELEC ( 232 SCRA 758 ) “Candidates, C. Certificate of Candidacy” Facts
: On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission o
n Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats for coun
cilors in the Second District of Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate h
e gave as his address “B 26 L 1 New Capitol Estates, Quezon City.” However, he did n
ot indicate in the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his Precinct Number and
the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata submitted
together with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as “Acacia Street, Mar
iana, Quezon City,” which is a part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. In othe
r words, his certificate of candidacy and his biodata filed with the COMELEC did
not expressly state that he was a registered voter of Quezon City or that he wa
s a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of Sec. 39, par.
(a), of the Local Government Code of 1991. Issue: Whether or not the failure of
a candidate to indicate his Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he
was a registered voter invalidates his certificate of candidacy. Held: No. It m
ay be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government
Code of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that a
candidate must state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the
Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it is enough that he is actually r
egistered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which should be w
ithin the district where he is running for office. In the case at bar, his failu
re to state in his certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactoril
y explained by him in that at the time he filed his certificate he was not yet a
ssigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of Quezon City. He w
as formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years pr
ior to the elections he was already a resident of “B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates,” a
dmittedly within the Second District of Quezon City
Election Laws RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC ( 259 SCRA 296, 1996 ) “Candidates, B. Disqual
ifications”
95
Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the P
rovince of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said
position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private res
pondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principal
ly on the allegation that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Private respondent
revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempt
ed grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the
Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive from justice” which
is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the
Local Government Code according to Marquez. Rodriguez, however, submitted a cer
tification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US
on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the crimi
nal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court. Issue: Whether or
not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated t
hat a “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to a
void punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The
definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can on
ly be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by th
e fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgem
ent of conviction.
Election Laws
96
MARQUEZ, JR. vs. COMELEC ( 243 SCRA 538, 1995 ) “Candidates, B. Disqualifications” F
acts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Gove
rnor in the Province of Quezon in the May 11, 1992 elections filed this petition
for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission of
Election which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candi
date, herein respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from j
ustice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate
of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fra
ud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Co
urt of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California
, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet t
o be served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that count
ry. The private respondent contended, however, that under Article 73 of the Rule
s and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, the term “fugitive from
justice” refers to one who has been convicted by final judgement. Issue: Whether o
r not a conviction by final judgement is necessary to fall within the term “fugiti
ve from justice” contemplated by Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code. Held
: No. The Supreme Court held that Article 73 of the Implementing Rules, to the e
xtent that it confines the term “fugitive from justice” to refer only to a person (t
he fugitive) “who has been convicted by final judgement,” is an ordinate and undue c
ircumscription of the law. The term “fugitive from justice” includes not only those
who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being cha
rged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisp
rudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotati
on of the term.
Election Laws
97
GREGO vs. COMELEC ( 274 SCRA 481, 1997 ) “Candidates, B. Disqualifications” Facts: O
n October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991,
private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheri
ff by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor i
n the Second District of the City of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local electi
ons. He won and assumed office. He was successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.
It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on t
he ground that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under
said section, those removed from office as a result of an administrative case ar
e disqualified to run for any elective local position. Issue: Does Section 40(b)
of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those removed from
office before it took effect on January 1, 1992? Held: The Supreme Court held th
at its refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40(b)
is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reason for the Court t
o depart therefrom. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify
the date of a candidate’s removal from office and that it is couched in the past t
ense should not deter the Court from applying the law prospectively. A statute,
despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach
acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.
Election Laws
98
DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC ( 258 SCRA 483, 1996 ) “Candidates, B. Disqualifications” Fac
ts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elect
ions from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 199
5 elections. The ground cited by the COMELEC was Section 40(a) of the Local Gove
rnment Code of 1991. Said section provides that those sentenced by final judgeme
nt for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are di
squalified from running for any elective local position. It was established by t
he COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. It was contended by the petitioner that Sect
ion 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted probation by the MTC.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. 2. Whet
her or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability. Held: The S
upreme Court held that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property rec
eived is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightfu
l property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very natu
re, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to say tha
t the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence
. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which already declared as a crime of moral tu
rpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40
(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probat
ion.
Election Laws
99
CAASI vs. COMELEC ( 191 SCRA 229, 1990 ) “Candidates, B. Disqualifications” Facts: P
rivate respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Panga
sinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, howe
ver, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Sect
ion 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao. Issues: 1. Whether or not a green card is proof that th
e holder is a permanent resident of the United States. 2. Whether respondent Mig
uel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.
prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988. Held: The Supreme Court held t
hat Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.
and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof
that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to th
e Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as h
is application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver
of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. aut
horities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18,
1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public o
ffice, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
Election Laws
100
VILLABER vs. COMELEC ( 369 SCRA 126 ) “Candidates, B. Disqualifications” Facts: Both
petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 20
01 elections. Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualif
y Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy, alleging that Vill
aber was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Cagas further allege
d that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnib
us Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. COMELEC issue
d the resolution declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate. The latter file
d a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whet
her or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, which would disqu
alify Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any public office. Held: COME
LEC believed it is, applying Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code that any pe
rson who has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense for which he has b
een sentenced for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vile
ness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and dut
y between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or go
od morals. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumst
ances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elem
ents of the crime for which he was convicted. There was no grave abuse of discre
tion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
Election Laws
101
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC ( 95 SCRA 392 ) “Candidates, A. Qualifications” Facts: Petitioner
Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certi
ficate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections o
f January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionali
ty of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution which provides t
hat “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received p
ayment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to whi
ch he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective lo
cal office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision is d
irected insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary grounds, theref
ore, class legislation. Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 2
2 is valid. Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has
retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disquali
fy him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided f
or in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The ti
redness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of m
ind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality w
ill neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as tha
t provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denia
l. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That consti
tutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon sub
stantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the
low and applies to all those belonging to the same class. WHEREFORE, the first
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
Election Laws
102
CO vs. COMELEC ( 199 SCRA 692 ) “Candidates, A. Qualifications” Facts: The HRET decl
ared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resi
dent of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election f
or the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied
for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the p
etitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grou
nds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not
a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose
Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the priva
te respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and est
ablished his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the p
rivate respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by O
ng Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for natu
ralization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent
married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose O
ng, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during t
hose elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and
those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing
. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private responden
t did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his li
fe here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a
person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It
is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in th
at of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligib
le to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Cons
titution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements.
Election Laws
103
LABO vs. COMELEC ( 176 SCRA 1 ) “Candidates, A. Qualifications” Facts: Petitioner Ra
mon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was
married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared
void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage h
ad been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian c
itizen. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. H
eld: The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 19
76 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. The
re is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because
of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as
such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he w
as married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he
formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance,
renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.
Election Laws
104
FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC ( 174 SCRA 245 ) “Candidates, A. Qualifications” Facts: Petitio
ner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time
. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment o
f Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino ci
tizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the alleg
ation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization w
as merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting pro
secution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivald
o was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Sectio
n 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, amon
g other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensabl
e requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even
if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not an
d could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Ph
ilippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are co
ntinuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment
or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Frival
do declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from ser
ving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
Election Laws
105
LEGASCA vs. DE VERA ( 79Phil. Reports 376 ) “Political Parties, B. Political Parti
es” Facts: Legasca, herein petitioner, signed himself as President of Goodwill Par
ty, asking that the latter be recognized as a duly organized political party. CO
MELEC denied petitioner’s prayers upon conclusion that it is not a political party
contemplated in the Election Code. Respondents answered alleging that petitione
r did not have a permanent address whatsoever; that so-called Goodwill Party is
neither organized nor is composed of a group of persons pursuing the same politi
cal ideals in the government, it having no members than petitioner himself; that
petitioner has not presented any other proof of membership or organizations asi
de from his gratuitous and unsubstantial claim. Issue: Whether or not Goodwill P
arty is a political party under the purview of the Election Code. Held: There ca
nnot be any quarrel that the platform of the Goodwill Party embodies many ideals
of a political character. But nowhere appears the existence of “an organized grou
p of persons” pursuing said ideals. Petitioner’s claim of 453,989 individuals is not
enough. It is necessary that there should be “an organized group.” There is no evid
ence on record as to the existence of an organized group, it is necessary that a
ll of them be joined in a corporate body, articulate, with the attributes of a s
ocial personality. A constitution, by-laws, rules, or some kind of character is
needed so as to give existence to the organization. The so-called Goodwill Party
is not a political party.
Election Laws
106
NACIONALISTA PARTY vs. BAUTISTA ( 85 SCRA 101 ) “Political Parties, A. Party Syste
m” Facts: Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registere
d under the laws of the Philippines, brought this action praying that a writ of
prohibition issue commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever
from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under the designatio
n rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed as regula
r member of the said Commission on Elections. Issue: Whether or not petitioner,
a political party is entitled to bring an action in the courts of justice. Held:
It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commissi
on on Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No.
180), but for the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such or
ganization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be incorporated under
Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action,
but this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real
parties in interest for the petitioner. The petitioner is granted five days wit
hin which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in interest
for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to in
stitute these proceedings. Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its pe
tition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the petition will be dism
issed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ
prayed for will issue.
Election Laws
107
UTUTALUM vs. COMELEC ( 181 SCRA 335 ) “Voters, C. Annulment of Book of Voters” Facts
: Petitioner Untalum obtained 482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581 vo
tes out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi were excluded, petitioner
would have lead of 5,301 votes. Petitioner filed written objections to the retur
ns from Siasi on the ground that they “appear to be tampered with or falsified” owin
g to the “great excess of votes” appearing in the said returns. COMELEC issued annul
ling the Siasi List of Voters “on the ground of massive irregularities committed i
n the preparation and being statistically improbable”, and ordering a new registra
tion of voters for the local elections. Petitioner contends that the issue he ra
ised referred to “obvious manufactured returns,” a proper subject matter for a pre-p
roclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by the COMELEC; that election r
eturns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the results since its o
riginal List of Voters had already been finally annulled. Issue: Whether or not
the election returns from Siasi should be excluded from the canvass of the resul
ts since the original List of Voters had been finally annulled. Held: The Siasi
returns, however, do not show prima facie that on the basis of the old List of V
oters, there is actually a great excess of votes over what could have been legal
ly cast considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted out of the 39,801 vo
ters. Petitioner’s cause of action is not a listed ground for a pre-proclamation c
ontroversy. To allow the COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower it t
o annul a previous election because of the subsequent annulment of a questioned
registry. The list must then be considered conclusive evidence of persons who co
uld exercise the right of suffrage in a particular election. The preparation of
a voter’s list is not a proceeding before the Board of Canvassers. A pre-proclamat
ion controversy is limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvasser
s, not the Board of Election Inspectors and such challenge should relate to spec
ified election returns against which the petitioner should have made verbal elec
tions.
Election Laws
108
US VS SANCUYA ( 13 Phil Reports 729 ) “Voters, B. Registration” Facts: Defendants, i
nspectors of election, refused to permit Rufino Isturis to register as an electo
r. Isturis claimed the right by virtue of his ownership of real property worth P
500, as prescribed in subsection (b), section 13, of Act No. 1582. Issue: Whethe
r or not the inspectors of election can refuse registration of an unqualified vo
ter. Held: When an elector claims the right to vote by virtue of the above provi
sion of law the inspectors are authorized to exercise a quasi-judicial power in
deciding the question involved, and unless they knowingly, willfully, and malici
ously refuse to register a qualified voter they are not criminally liable. Evide
nce insufficient to sustain conviction. Judgment reversed and defendants acquitt
ed.
Election Laws
109
AKBAYAN YOUTH vs. COMELEC ( G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001 ) “Voters, B. Registra
tion” Facts: Petitoners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the Comelec
to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections of
new voters. According to the petitioners around 4 Million youth failed to regist
er on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent Commission
under R.A. 8189. On January 29, 2001 Commissioners Tantangco and Lantion submitt
ed Memorandum No. 2001-027 requesting for a two-day additional registration of n
ew voters, to be set on February 17 and 18, 2001 nationwide. Subsequently, Comel
ec issued Resolution No. 3584 denying said request, it was the consensus. Aggrie
ved by the denial, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, whi
ch seeks to nullify respondent Comelec’s resolution and / or to declare Sec. 8 of
R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the dise
nfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Issue: Whether or n
ot respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 3584 dated Feb. 8, 2001 as it denies petitioners’ right to vote. Held: The act
of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable elemen
t in the election process. Section 8 of R.A. 8189, provides that no registration
shall be conducted 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a spec
ial election. In the light of the foregoing the assailed resolution must be uphe
ld. The so-called “stand-by powers” or “residual” powers of the Comelec, as raised by th
e petitioners is provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29 of R.A. No
. 6646 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436, wherein the commissi
on shall fix other periods and dates for the accomplishment of pre-election acts
if it is no longer possible to observe the dates and periods prescribed by law,
cannot be applied in this case. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 of R.A. 8
189 applies for the purpose of upholding the resolution. Section 28 of R.A. 8436
, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of and not other
wise. In the case at bar the Comelec stated the “operational impossibility” of holdi
ng the additional two-day registration, and therefore Section 8 of R.A. 8436 may
not apply. Comelec acted within the confines of the applicable law in denying t
he petitioners’ request.
Election Laws
110
ABELLA vs. COMELEC ( 201 SCRA 253 1991 ) “Voters, A. Qualifications / Disqualifica
tions” Facts: Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Libe
ral Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local election held on Februar
y 1, 1988. The private respondent, Adelina Larrazabal, is the wife of Emeterio V
. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was dis
qualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack of reside
nce, filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband, the
day before the election. The following day, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered v
oter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election supervisor
of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of ca
ndidacy regarding her residence. Abella intervened in the disqualification case
and the following day filed a criminal complaint charging the private respondent
with falsification and representation of her residence in her certificate of ca
ndidacy. The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that respondent L
arrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she
claimed but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city of t
he province of Leyte. On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that s
he was a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. On February 14, 1991
, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying Larrazabal
as governor. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kana
nga, Leyte Held: The COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the req
uired residence on the evidence of record to the effect that despite protestatio
ns to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at
Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to pu
rportedly change her residence one year before the election by registering at Ka
nanga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc Ci
ty. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provi
sions of the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The
petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her husband maintain s
eparate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
Election Laws
111
ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC OF TACLOBAN ( 266 SCRA 406, 1997 ) “Voters, A. Qualifications /
Disqualifications” Facts: The petitioner Philip Romualdez, is a natural born citiz
en of the Philippines. Sometime in the early part of 1980, the petitioner, in co
nsonance with his decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte, caused the construction of his residential house therein. He soon
thereafter also served as a Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan
Election and 1986 “snap” Presidential Election, Romualdez acted as the Campaign Mana
ger of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. When “EDSA Peopl
e’s Power Revolution of 1986″ took place on 21st to the 24th of February, 1986, some
relatives and associates of the deposed President, fearing for their personal s
afety, “fled” the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one, together with his immediat
e family, left the Philippines and sought “asylum” in the United. While abroad, he t
ook special studies on the development of Leyte-Samar and international business
finance. In the early part of 1987, Romualdez attempted to come back to the Phi
lippines to run for a congressional seat in Leyte. When Romualdez arrived in the
Philippines, he did not delay his return to his residence at Malbog. During the
registration of voters conducted by COMELEC for the Synchronized National and L
ocal Election scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself anew as a
voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog. The Chairman of the Board of Election Inspec
tors, who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place and, in fact, an ele
cted Barangay Chairman of Malbog in 1982, allowed him to be registered. Private
respondent Donato Advincula filed a petition for exclusion with the MTC of Tolos
a, Leyte. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court erred in finding the petiti
oner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte. Held: The political situation brought about by the “People’s Power R
evolution” must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well a
s a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their immediat
e families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would
have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure fr
om the country cannot be described as “voluntary”, or as “abandonment of residence” at l
east in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of “domicile
by choice.” We have closely examined the records, and we find not that much to co
nvince us that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his residence in the Phili
ppines and established his domicile elsewhere.
Election Laws EVANGELISTA vs. SANTOS ( 86 P.R. 387 ) “Voters, A. Qualifications /
Disqualifications”
112
Facts: Plaintiff’s are minority stockholders of the Vitali Lumber Company, Inc., a
Philippine corporation organized for the exploitation of a lumber concession in
Zamboanga, Philippines; that defendant holds more than 50 per cent of the stock
s of said corporation and also is and always has been the president, manager, an
d treasurer thereof; and that defendant, in such triple capacity, through fault,
neglect, and abandonment allowed its lumber concession to lapse and its propert
ies and assets to disappear, thus causing the complete ruin of the corporation a
nd total depreciation of its stocks. Their complaint therefore prays for judgmen
t requiring defendant: (1) to render an account of his administration of the cor
porate affairs and assets: (2) to pay plaintiffs the value of their respective p
articipation in said assets on the basis of the value of the stocks held by each
of them; and (3) to pay the costs of suit. The complaint does not give plaintif
fs’ residence, but, for purposes of venue, alleges that defendant resides at 2112
Dewey Boulevard, corner Libertad Street, Pasay, province of Rizal. Having been s
erved with summons at that place, defendant filed a motion for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of improper venue and also on the ground that the co
mplaint did not state a cause of action in favor of plaintiffs. In support of th
e objection to the venue, defendant states that he is a resident of Iloilo City
and not of Pasay, defendant also presented further affidavit to the effect that
while he has a house in Pasay, where members of his family who are studying in M
anila live and where he himself is sojourning for the purpose of attending to hi
s interests in Manila, yet he has his permanent residence in the City of Iloilo
where he is registered as a voter for election purposes and has been paying his
residence certificate. Issue: Whether or not defendant is a resident of Iloilo,
therefore, there was no proper venue when he was served with summons in Pasay. H
eld: The facts in this case show that the objection to the venue is well-founded
. Where the plaintiff is a nonresident and the contract upon which suit is broug
ht was made in the Philippine Islands it may safely be asserted that the conveni
ence of the defendant would be best served by a trial in the province where he r
esides. The fact that defendant was sojourning in Pasay at the time he was serve
d with summons does not make him a resident of that place for purposes of venue.
Residence is “the permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for busines
s or pleasure, one intends to return.
Election Laws UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC ( 95 P.R. 890 ) “Voters, A. Qualifications / D
isqualifications”
113
Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Or
iental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary educ
ation. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled i
n the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the same yea
r he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact
, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthw
ith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemica
l engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this course in Ju
ly 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Petitione
r contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as used in the afor
esaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, o
nce acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtaine
d, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a res
ident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that t
ime, being, merely to study therein. Issue: Whether or not the application for n
aturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return unti
l several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. Held: While,
generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residenc
e combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established a
bode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a
residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to
the true domicile. Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after t
he filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several mo
nths after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his expli
cit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “fro
m the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Phil
ippine citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Com
monwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favo
r.
Election Laws
114
MASTURA vs. COMELEC ( 285 SCRA 493, 1998 ) “COMELEC, C. Independence of the Commis
sion” Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilan
galen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during
the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to th
e inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the
ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELE
C Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns
of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballo
t boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies
of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Div
ision found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Mata
nog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the
herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass
of Matanog. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pendi
ng its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between the various copies of
election returns from the disputed voting centers. Held: We find no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence tha
t COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exi
sts a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disput
ed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsi
fied or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the B
oard of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the gen
uine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or procla
im the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Ma
tanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing
of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refr
ain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves.
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed b
y courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantia
l evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when
it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place t
he COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself
- on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. F
or the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence
.
Election Laws SUMULONG vs. COMELEC ( 73 P.R. 288, 1942 ) “COMELEC, C. Independence
of the Commission”
115
Facts: Under the authority of Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, Comelec ado
pted a resolution providing for the appointment of election inspectors to be pro
posed by the political parties and persons named therein. Petitioner, Juan Sumul
ong, President of the political party Pagkakaisa ng Bayan, claims the exclusive
right to propose the appointment of such inspectors. He contends that the resolu
tion of the Comelec, by giving the so-called rebel candidate or free-zone factio
n of the Nationalista Party the right to propose one election inspector for each
of the precincts in each of the 53 legislative districts, contravenes Section 5
of the Commonwealth Act No. 657. He argues that under that section the National
ista Party has the right to propose one, and only one inspector for each precinc
t, and that the resolution has the effect of giving that party two inspectors in
each and every precinct within those legislative districts. Petitioner maintain
s that the discretion given by Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 657 to the Come
lec in the Choice of election inspectors is not absolute, but limited by the pro
vision of the Act that the majority party shall have the right to propose only o
ne inspector. Issue: Whether or not the Comelec, in giving the so-called rebel c
andidates and freezone factions of the Nationalista Party the right to propose e
lection inspectors, has acted within the limits of the discretion granted to it
by law. Held: The present case is not an appropriate case for review by the Supr
eme Court. The Comelec is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distin
ct and important part in our scheme of government. It should be allowed consider
able latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment
of the great objective for which it was created – free, orderly, and honest electi
ons. The Supreme Court may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal / constitute grave abuse of discretion, this court sho
uld not interfere. The Comelec because of its fact-finding facilities, its conta
cts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience
in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous positi
on to decide complex political questions. Due regard to the independent characte
r of the Commission, as ordained in the Constitution requires that the power of
the Supreme Court to review the acts of that body should, as a general propositi
on, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.
Election Laws
116
DE JESUS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ( 120 SCRA 760, 1983 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers
and Functions” Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo,
defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of mayor of the Mun
icipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging pet
itioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of
the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their
capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prim
a facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x]
and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The fo
llowing information, was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a moti
on to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the Sand
iganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In it
s opposition, the prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan’s exclusive authority to i
nvestigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to tr
y and decide the charges against petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbaya
n and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and try electi
on offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office. Held: The e
vident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administe
r all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to
investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the fre
e, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the
sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC
of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public offi
cials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness
in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the c
onstitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceive neither e
xplicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the
authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by pub
lic officers in relation to their office, as contradistinguished from the clear
and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and
the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the E
lection Code of 1978.
Election Laws
117
JARDIEL vs. COMELEC ( 124 SCRA 650, 1983 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions” Facts:
In the local elections of Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, held on January 30, 1980, pet
itioner Cesar Jardiel, a Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) candidate for Mayor seeki
ng re-election, prevailed over private respondent Benjamin Aves, a Nacionalista
Party (NP) candidate, by a plurality of 1,678 votes and was proclaimed by the Mu
nicipal Board of Canvassers on the same date. The day after the elections, or on
January 31, 1980, the COMELEC received a telegraphic report from its Special Ac
tion Team, and a letter-request from private respondent recommending the suspens
ion of the canvass for Mayor and Vice Mayor and the annulment of those already c
ompleted. The letter alleged that armed goons supporting the petitioner disrupte
d the counting of votes and caused the transfer of the ballot boxes and the canv
assing of votes to the Municipal Hall where accredited NP watchers were denied a
ccess, and that ballots were tampered with and blank unused ballots were filled
up in favor of KBL candidates. After hearing the position of the adverse parties
the COMELEC declared the elections or the results thereof, annulled for they do
not reflect the true or popular will of the electorate. Issue: Whether or not C
OMELEC is estopped to investigate and prosecute violations of the election laws
during the January 30, 1980 elections. Held: Petitioner’s contention that the find
ings of the Ministry of Justice Election Task Force dismissing the complaint aga
inst petitioner for insufficiency of evidence is res judicata is untenable. The
Task Force was deputized by the COMELEC to the end that violators throughout the
Philippines of laws relative to elections would be charged in Court and corresp
ondingly penalized. The charges filed before it were for election offenses which
are criminal in nature. It was not a body exercising judicial functions. To the
COMELEC belongs the prerogative to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and to see to it that elections are free, honest and orderly. It canno
t be “estopped” by any finding or recommendation by any Task Force organized to assi
st it in the performance of its functions.
Election Laws
118
AGUAM vs. COMELEC ( 23 SCRA 883, 1968 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions” Facts: In
the November, 1967 elections, amongst the aspirants for Mayor of Ganassi, Lanao
del Sur, were: petitioner Uso Dan Aguam, respondent Alim Balindong, and Ali Dau
d B. Marohombsar. At the canvassing held in Marawi City on November 20, 1967, pe
titioner Aguam was proclaimed Mayor-elect of Ganassi, with a margin of only two
votes. Petitioner took his oath and thereafter assumed office as Mayor of Ganass
i. On January 6, 1968, respondent Balindong went to Comelec with a petition for
the annulment of the November 20, 1967 canvass and proclamation, and for the ope
ning of the ballot box in Precinct 8. Respondent averred that the election retur
n for Precinct 8 was tampered with by making it appear that Alim Balindong obtai
ned 8 votes in said precinct when in fact he obtained 13 votes; and that as a re
sult of such tampering, petitioner Uso Dan Aguam herein was made to win against
respondent Alim Balindong by a margin of 3 votes. Petitioner Aguam seeks to annu
l the resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) of April 27
, 1968 declaring that it has jurisdiction to open the ballot box in Precinct 8 o
f the municipality of Ganassi, Lanao del Sur, and to conduct an investigation in
to the authentic electoral return therefrom, upon petition of respondent Alim Ba
lindong. Issue: Whether or not Comelec has the jurisdiction to inquire into the
nullity of the Nov. 20, 1967 proclamation & consequently to inquire into the tam
pering of the election return in Precint 8. Held: By constitutional mandate, Com
elec “shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all law
s relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions wh
ich may be conferred upon it by law.” The Constitution enjoins Comelec to “decide, s
ave those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting e
lections.” And, all of these are aimed at achieving an ideal: “free, orderly, and ho
nest elections.” Implementing the constitutional precept, Congress legislated in S
ection 3 of the Revised Election Code that, in addition to the powers and functi
ons conferred by the Constitution, Comelec has “direct and immediate supervision o
ver the provincial, municipal, and city officials designated by law to perform d
uties relative to the conduct of elections.”
Election Laws
119
SANCHEZ, vs. COMELEC ( 114 SCRA 454, 1987 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions” Facts
: Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be
directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections
to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further
for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of th
e last four (4) winning senatorial candidates on the ground that votes intended
for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname wit
h that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed ou
t from the Comelec election returns and other election forms. On July 16, 1987,
the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing pet
itioner Sanchez’ petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent Comel
ec, by a vote of five to two, reversed its order of dismissal and granted Sanche
z’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots. Issue: Whether his peti
tion for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be
considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest. Held:
The Court rules that Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the
ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a s
ummary pre-proclamation controversy. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy i
s limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation con
troversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or p
roof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defe
cts (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under d
uress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candi
date, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), whi
ch are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, gr
anted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanc
hez’ petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not i
n question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing t
he same and proclamation of the winning candidates. The law and public policy ma
ndate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the Co
mmission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided.
Election Laws PEOPLE vs. DELGADO ( 189 SCRA 715, 1990 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers and Fu
nctions”
120
Facts: On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Elec
tion Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation
of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Super
visor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventuall
y recommended the filing of an information against each of the private responden
ts for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to f
ile the information against the private respondents as recommended. Private resp
ondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of
arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation
was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COM
ELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvesti
gation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is onl
y the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutio
ns of the COMELEC. This was denied by the court. Issue: Whether or not the Regio
nal Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses
filed in said court. Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election C
ode, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the
COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also ve
sted the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct th
e preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable
under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its d
uly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an electio
n offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the informat
ion in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to th
e approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the cas
e without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.
Election Laws
121
PEOPLE vs. INTING ( 187 SCRA 788 ) “COMELEC, B. Powers and Functions” Facts: Mrs. Ed
itha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanj
ay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remo
te barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law. After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lit
uanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the
respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), O
mnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988
, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arre
sted, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that
Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the i
nformation. Hence, this petition. Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conduc
ted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be c
oursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may ta
ke cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause e
xists? Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary i
nvestigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping th
e Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This po
wer is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowin
g this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of
the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their offic
e would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitu
tional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respon
dent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the i
nformation filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
Election Laws
122
BRILLANTES vs. YORAC ( 192 SCRA 358, 1990 ) “COMELEC, A. Qualification of Members” F
acts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman o
f the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had b
een named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 19
89 coup d’ etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrar
y to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission o
n Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision tha
t “(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Brillantes contends that the choice
of the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter tha
t should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the Pre
sident of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the
designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustai
ned for reasons of “administrative expediency,” to prevent disruption of the functio
ns of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting
Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Co
nstitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”
They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discha
rge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own pr
oceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its
own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on
certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a tempo
rary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion
. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the Pres
ident of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at
bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void b
y extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation
could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves
without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice
of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most l
ikely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appre
ciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not
the President to make.
Election Laws
123
CAYETANO vs. MONSOD ( 201 SCRA 210, 1991 ) “COMELEC, A. Qualification of Members” Fa
cts: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC on April 25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Mo
nsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the p
ractice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity of the confirmat
ion by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner filed a p
etition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the co
nsequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be dec
lared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having practi
ced law for the last ten years. Issue: Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requi
rement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Held: The practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the b
usiness of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their righ
ts under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proc
eedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle contro
versies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so enga
ged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpos
e, is engaged in the practice of law.” Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the P
hilippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%
. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines sinc
e its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fee
s as lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a l
awyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-n
egotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — ver
ily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Election Laws
124
TAULE vs. SANTOS ( 200 SCRA 512, 1991 ) “General Principles, B. Election/Period” Fac
ts: On June 18, 1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members convened in Virac, Catanduanes
with six members, including Taule, in attendance for the purpose of holding the
election of its officers. The group decided to hold the election despite the abs
ence of five (5) of its members. The Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to re
spondent the Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the offic
ers of the FABC and seeking its nullification due to flagrant irregularities in
the manner it was conducted. The Secretary nullifed the election of the officers
of the FABC and ordered a new one to be conducted to be presided by the Regiona
l Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government. Taule, contested t
he decision contending that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdic
tion upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election
of officers of the FABC and that the Constitution provides that it is the COMEL
EC which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay official
s. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to entertain an election p
rotest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association o
f Barangay Councils; Held: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involvi
ng elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisio
ns of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting the electio
n of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan
Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the
results. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organi
zational setup of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected pu
nong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respe
ctive members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay i
s limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the kat
ipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own
respective organization.
Election Laws PERALTA vs. COMELEC ( 82 SCRA 30 ) “General Principles, B. Election/
Period”
125
Facts: Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period sha
ll be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article
XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty
-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the
day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day
campaign perion because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Comm
ission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period
should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XI
I-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety
days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.” Issue: Whet
her or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional Held: The 45-day campaign perio
d is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Electio
n Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa
is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission
on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the
same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of
election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and re
gulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continu
e to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreov
er, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in
a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President h
as the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condi
tion of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conduct
ed in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commiss
ion on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mand
ate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcin
g the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.
Election Laws GARCHITORENA vs. CRESCINI ( 39 PR 258, 1918 ) “General Principles, B
. Election/Period”
126
Facts: In June 6, 1916, an election was held in the Province of Ambos Camarines,
for governor and other provincial and municipal officers. Garchitorena, Crescin
i, Imperial, and Botor were candidates for the office of governor. The provincia
l board of inspectors proclaimed Crescini as the elected and issued to him a cer
tificate to that effect. Immediately upon notice of said proclamation, Garchitor
ena presented a protest against said election, alleging that many frauds and irr
egularities had been committed in various municipalities of said province, and t
hat he had, in fact, received a majority of all legal votes cast. After trial, t
he court declared that Garchitorena had, in fact, received a majority of the leg
al votes cast, and ordered the provincial board of inspectors to correct its rep
ort. Later, a new trial was ordered but the same decision was arrived at and iss
ued the same order to the provincial board of inspectors to correct their report
or canvass in accordance with said decision. From that decision, Crescini and I
mperial appealed to this Court, briefs were presented, and the cause was finally
submitted for decision on the 16th day of December, 1918. Issue: Whether or not
the court’s decision is correct. Held: Judges Mina and Paredes, after discussion
of the various frauds committed in said municipalities arrived at the same concl
usion, to wit: that said frauds and irregularities were such as to absolutely de
feat the honest expression of the desires of the voters of said municipalities.
The evidence adduced during the trial shows an unmistakable intention and design
on the part not only of the election inspectors but of many of the voters, to d
efeat, by the methods adopted, the true expression of opinion, through the ballo
t, of the people of said municipalities. The presumption is that an election is
honestly conducted, and the burden of proof to show it otherwise is on the party
assailing the return. But when the return is clearly shown to be wilfully and c
orruptly false, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. When the election ha
s been conducted so irregularly and fraudulently that the true result cannot be
ascertained, the whole return must be rejected. It is impossible to make a list
of all the frauds which will invalidate an election. Each case must rest upon it
s own evidence. The rule, however, is so well established that authorities need
no longer be cited in its support, that whenever the irregularities and frauds a
re sufficient to defeat the will of the people of the particular municipality or
precinct, the entire vote should be rejected, and those who are guilty of such
frauds and irregularities should be punished to the very limit of the law.
Election Laws ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC ( G.R. No. 104960 September 14, 1993 ) “General Pr
inciples, A. Suffrage”
127
Facts: Philip Romualdez was a resident of Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and in
1982 was elected and served as barangay chairman. In 1986 “fled” the country and sou
ght “asylum” in the United States which was granted. In 1991, Romualdez returned to
the Philippines and upon arrival, he returned to his residence at Malbog and reg
istered himself anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9. Donato Advincula challenged t
he registration before the trial court praying that Romualdez be excluded from t
he list of voters alleging that Romualdez was a resident of U.S.A.; that he had
just recently arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the required
one-year residence in the Philippines and the six-month residence in Tolosa to q
ualify him to register as a voter in Barangay Malbog. Romualdez contended that h
e has been a resident of Tolosa since the early 1980’s, and that he has not abando
ned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom during the period from
1986 up to 1991. Issue: Whether or not Romualdez has voluntarily left the countr
y and abandoned his residence in Tolosa, Leyte and, therefore may not register a
s a voter. Held: No. The term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous
with “domicile”, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such in
tention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for bus
iness or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. That residence, i
n the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980’s to be at Bar
angay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by ad
opting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile
by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new localit
y, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old dom
icile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animu
s non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.