G.R. NO.

184537 April 23, 2010 In a Memorandum4 dated July 1, 2003, the Ombudsman directed the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) to study the possibility of having the information amended and re-filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners,
vs.
The HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE Thus, the OSP re-filed the Information5 dated August 17, 2007, this time, docketed as
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, with the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan,
charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government.
DECISION

The information, subject of the petition, now reads:

MENDOZA, J.:

The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO,
on Civil Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
for the violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
temporary restraining order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263, denying the Motion for Preliminary Investigation
filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, and the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration done in open court on August That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of
13, 2008. Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA, a high ranking public official being then
the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while
An Information2 dated September 13, 2000 charging both petitioners with having violated
in the discharge of his official administrative function, conspiring and conniving with
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, by causing undue injury to the government, reads:
accused SPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with the late
OLIMPIO LEGUA, a private individual, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefit or advantage to the late Olimpio Legua,
accuses QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) a non-license contractor and non-
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT), committed as follows:
accredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there
entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the Municipality of Centers for barangays Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the
Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total
Honorable Court, above-named accused, public officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP of NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P97,000.00) Philippine Currency, without the benefit
Member of Lavezares, Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in of a competitive public bidding to the prejudice of the Government and public interest.
relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and with
the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith
CONTRARY TO LAW.
and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into a
Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-
arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, each in the amount of FORTY-EIGHT Petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation6 dated June 4, 2008 which was
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱48,500.00), Philippine Currency, or a total amount of strongly opposed by the prosecution in its Opposition7 dated June 18, 2008.
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱97,000.00), Philippine Currency, without conducting
a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best,
Petitioners contend that the failure of the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary
if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a
investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law
non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No.
because the latter charged a different offense–that is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving
7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-368, to the damage and
unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitution of the first
prejudice of the government.
Information. They argue that assuming that no substitution took place, at the very least,
there was a substantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should
CONTRARY TO LAW. have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly
discovered evidence mandates re-examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file
the case.
This case was initially raffled to the Third Division of Sandiganbayan and was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26319.
On July 14, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the assailed Resolution
denying the petitioners’ motion for preliminary investigation. The graft court found that
In a Resolution3 promulgated on June 14, 2002, the Third Division granted petitioners’
there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the
Motion to Quash and dismissed the information "for failure of the prosecution to allege and
conduct of a new preliminary investigation. It gave the following ratiocination:
prove the amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the
crime charged."
The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted
modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such benefit, advantage or preference constitute two distinct and separate offenses that would
modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation. warrant a new or another preliminary investigation.

Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused
upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new preliminary investigation is not in order.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
In its Comment12 dated January 12, 2009, respondent People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that there is no substituted
information in contemplation of law and jurisprudence that would require the conduct of
another preliminary investigation. There is no newly-discovered evidence that would lead
to a different determination should there be another preliminary investigation conducted.

Finding the arguments of accused-movants indefensible, the sufficiency of the information

In their Reply,13 dated April 24, 2009, petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the
must be sustained.
first and second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of
Information that required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there
WHEREFORE, having established the sufficiency of the Information, the motion under was no substitution, substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and
consideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the arraignment of both that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation.
accused shall proceed as scheduled.8
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration9 dated August 6, 2008, submitting that the
two Informations substantially charged different offenses, such that the present information
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
constituted a substitution that should have been preceded by a new preliminary
and Corrupt Practices Act which reads:
investigation.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public

On August 13, 2008, in a hearing for the arraignment of petitioners, the Sandiganbayan
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
denied the Motion10 in open court.
any public officer and are hereby declared to be 0unlawful:

Hence, petitioners interpose the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
xxx
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court anchored on the following grounds:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
I
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees charged with
The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a
quo, when the second Information in the instant case constituted substituted Information
The essential elements of the offense are as follows:
whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

II
official functions;

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the conduct of a preliminary investigation of
negligence; and
the case a quo, since the second Information therein contained substantial amendments
whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
III
preference in the discharge of his functions.14

The Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a
quo, although the newly discovered evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding
that prima facie cause existed to file the case a quo.11 R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the
public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
From the arguments raised by petitioners, the core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways
in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes that either
of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any
act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in Santiago, as two
(2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however indicate that each
mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be charged under
either mode or under both.15
The afore-stated ruling is consistent with the well-entrenched principle of statutory
construction that "The word or is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word."16
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The
Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the
same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of
commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan,17 provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense,
thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does not
mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged
under either mode18 or under both should both modes concur.19
Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,20 ruling that, "in substitution of
information another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead
anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present case because, as already
stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the
offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle enunciated in Villaflor v. Vivar, 21 that
failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights.
While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded
to the accused before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however,
did not deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the
case discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners
actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial amendments
warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.1avvphi1
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first
Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are
two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit
constituted, at the very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the
Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering
into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays
Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements
for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
To bolster their claim for a reinvestigation of the offense, petitioners cited the case of
Matalam v. Sandiganbayan.22 The same is inapplicable to petitioners’ case. In Matalam,
there was indeed a substantial amendment which entitled the accused to another
preliminary investigation. The recital of facts constituting the offense charged therein was
definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by the
petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private
complainants, whereas in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants. In the case at bar, there is no substantial amendment
to speak of. As discussed previously, the Information in Criminal Case No. 26319 was
already dismissed by the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan in view of the petitioners’
Motion to Quash. As such, there is nothing more to be amended.
The Court is not unaware of the case of People v. Lacson,23 where it was written:
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.
However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a
new preliminary investigation must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a new
Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the
accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be
accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence.
No such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because there was no modification in the
nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1 Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-
examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves scant
consideration. For petitioners, it is necessary that a new investigation be conducted to
consider newly discovered evidence, in particular, the Affidavit of COA Auditor Carlos G.
Pornelos, author of the audit report. We are not convinced.
Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered
evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation);
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching,
and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.24
The Pornelos affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was executed by affiant
way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it
cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in existence prior to
the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered
during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’
Supplement to Motion for Reinvestigation,25 offered to dispute the charge that no public
bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the subject project.
More important is the prosecution’s statement in its Memorandum that, "after a careful re-
evaluation of the documentary evidence available to the prosecution at the time of the filing
of the initial Information, and at the time of the re-filing of the Information, the prosecution
insists on the finding of probable cause, an exercise within the exclusive province of the
Office of the Ombudsman."26
Worthy of note is the case of Soriano v. Marcelo,27 viz:
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office during
a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its attendant
facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call.

Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the exercise by the
Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.28 The only ground
upon which it may entertain a review of the Office of the Ombudsman’s action is grave
abuse of discretion.29

Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a

duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is
not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.30

The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended to
correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial function that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to
be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.31

The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no error in refusing to order the conduct
of another preliminary investigation. As sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new
preliminary investigation is not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature
of the offense charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation anew
will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in futility in as much as
there was a complete preliminary investigation actively participated by both petitioners.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution of July 14, 2008, denying petitioners’ motion for
preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.


G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE,
SR., Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail
the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent)
– Order1 of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended Information
indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution2 of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration
of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez3 (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf
of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen
Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),4 a criminal complaint,5
before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355
in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia
Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja,
Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto,
Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie
Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the
administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific
Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation,
also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had previously purchased
traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation
with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need
plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for
their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the
address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot6 under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo
e-group7 at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily accessible to the
public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various
dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles
[numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused]
containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."8 He cited an article which was
posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan
kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any
criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the
nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC
AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues
to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin
ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again
convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga
ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a negotiation for
amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT
BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL
US NA. x x x 9 (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,10 the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, finding probable cause
to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations11 charging them with libel.
The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876, which
was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal
title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication
to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together with
John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character
and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect
to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website
www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan
kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com
is attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above
defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-
cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication
of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the
object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor’s Resolution by a petition for
review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,13 reversed the
finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for
libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-
existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.14
Petitioners, as co-accused,15 thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public
respondent, a Motion to Quash16 the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of
the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense charged
and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,17 petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a
particular place within the trial court’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and
first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,18 the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause
existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.19 It found that the
Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati
at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the
complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous
article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,20 insisting that the
Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v.
Panganiban21 which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out
that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution
alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal
amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia,
that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel
pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.22
By Order of March 8, 2007,23 the public respondent granted the prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information
to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20,
2007,24 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal
title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication
to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character
and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly
Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect
to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website
www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory
article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City,
as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information25 which, they alleged, still failed to
vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous
articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found
the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration26 having been denied by the public respondent by
Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE
BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS
CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.27
With the filing of Gimenez’s Comment28 to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether
petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible;
and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s admission of
the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,29 as a rule,
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.30 A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in
the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals.31 The rule is
not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.32
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its discretionary
authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners
raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under
Article 360 of the RPC –whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge
for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.—Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided
for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any
of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense:
Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office
is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is
a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element
of jurisdiction.33 This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article
360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,34 the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo35
which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate
to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed
and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual
is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article
was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay
the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first
publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati
becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article
360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals36 explained the nature of these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal
libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for
written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited,
regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360
originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary
investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that
rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free
Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the
justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil.
933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific
rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which
became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time,
Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung
areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended
party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or
the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege
with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced
or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case
of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in
order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs
of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access
to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first
publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought
to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would
ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts
messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the
courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition
website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1

Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez37 are instructive:

For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule
providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing
and first publication, or at the complainant’s place of residence. We would also have to
abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin,
and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical action. These
limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially
as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective
places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine
with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’
motion to quash the Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint
Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case
No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009
RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions dated 10 February 20042 and 3 May
20043 of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecution’s
Motion to Admit the Amended Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion
For Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).
The Facts
On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S.
Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231.
The Information alleged:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao
hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for
(sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A.
ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and
Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the
performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D.
SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect
of duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the
government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-
7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the
Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax
Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well
knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-
151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of ₱4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land
could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against
petitioner and his co-accused.
On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the
following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the
Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3)
the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy
trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty
of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence.5
On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a
Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not
object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally"
arraigned.6 On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001,
the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution
dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Amend
Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.
On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and
ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner.
In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation
recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for
lack of probable cause. However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003,
disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed
with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the Ombudsman.
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for
reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October
2003.
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the
Ombudsman’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On even date, the
prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October
2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of
filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of
petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.7
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information.
The Amended Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic)
violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A.
ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and
Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the
performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking
advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D.
SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue
injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration
Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described
in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax
Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well
knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-
151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accused’s misrepresentation, the NHMFC
released the amount of ₱4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land
could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is
substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution’s
Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that
"gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross
inexcusable negligence" under Section 3(e), and held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect
or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable
negligence where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to this effect constitutes
substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert
from the one originally intended.
It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation
of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under
said section of the law should suffice to warrant conviction.10
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the
information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event
that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the
arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution
may still amend the information either in form or in substance.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition.
The Issues
The issues raised in this petition are:
1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND
2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE
THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On Whether the Sandiganbayan
Should Admit the Amended Information
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx
Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the
information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made
during a "provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a
plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the information may be
amended only in form.
An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him.11 The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.12
The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments
is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular
Rules of Court.13 However, in People v. Espinosa,14 this Court tangentially recognized such
practice, provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable,
express, informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in
the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed
simple and unconditional.15
In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the
Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused
when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the
usual terms and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16 In the
Resolution of 16 April 2001,17 the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner
and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be
Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which, however, were
limited only to petitioner’s itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the
required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return
to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of
the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of
petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional.
The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information
may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused.
Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable
negligence" is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights.
He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not
act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the
original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes substantial
amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one
originally intended."18lawphil.net
We are not convinced.
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.— In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
This crime has the following essential elements:19
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed,
that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable
negligence."20 In Uriarte v. People,21 this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019
may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.22 "Evident bad
faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive
or ill will.23 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24
"Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected.25
The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on
the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality
and/or gross inexcusable negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross
neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall
under different paragraphs of RA 3019—specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section
3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3(e) of the statute—the question
remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of
petitioner.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as
amended.26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to
form that can be made at anytime.27lavvphil
In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from
the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is
allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused.28 As a
replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a
modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes
an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,29 the Information charged the accused
with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and
"evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held
that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have
alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed
included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.30 In so ruling, this Court applied by
analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan31 where an accused charged with
willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through
negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense.
The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information
exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater
includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of "gross inexcusable
negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad
faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an
amendment in form.
On Whether Petitioner’s
Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated
Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but
it was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or
after a period of almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon
reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for
lack of probable cause, but this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Information was later filed by the prosecution and granted by
the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner
maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing
of the complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended
Information, in violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.

Petitioner’s contentions are futile.

The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This
right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried.32 A simple mathematical computation of
the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a
vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.33

After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy
trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the
complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original
Information against petitioner was raised in petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, and was duly
addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that
the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to file various
pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioner’s co-accused, and that no actual
preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held
that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the reinvestigation
inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have been
dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is
well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a
case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the
altar of expediency.34 The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular
course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious,
capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioner’s contention of violation of his right
to a speedy trial must fail.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004
and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 172476-99 September 15, 2010
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution2 of
the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution
denied petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending
resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
against him.
The Facts
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of the AFP-
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to 27 July
1998.3
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS
approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City
for development as housing projects.4
On 1 August 1997, AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as
attorney-in-fact of the 12 individual vendors,5 executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale
over the subject property, at the agreed price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner
forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of ₱10,500.00
per square meter of the property.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only ₱3,000.00 per
square meter instead of the actual purchase price of ₱10,500.00 per square meter. On 24
September 1997, Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The
unilateral deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.6
On 18 December 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first
district of South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit7 against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
(2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. The
case was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-98-0020.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman, in its 20 January 1999 Resolution,8 found
petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public
documents, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds and so holds that the following
crimes were committed and that respondents, whose names appear below, are probably
guilty thereof:
xxxx
4. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., WILFREDO PABALAN, NILO FLAVIANO, conspirators for twelve (12)
counts of falsification of public documents relative to the twelve (12) unilateral Deeds of
Sale;
xxxx
6. JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. WILFREDO PABALAN, and NILO FLAVIANO twelve (12) counts of
violation of section 3(e) of RA 3019 for short-changing the government in the correct
amount of taxes due for the sale of Lot X to AFP-RSBS;9
On 28 January 1999, the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations10 for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations11 for falsification of public
documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration dated 12 February 1999,12 with a
supplemental motion dated 28 May 1999,13 of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause
against him. In its 11 June 1999 Order,14 the Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioner’s first
motion for reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to evaluate its
evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose
Ramiscal and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and
recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
In a memorandum dated 22 November 2001, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-
OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office
of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA), in a memorandum dated 18 December 2001, recommended
the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for
the purchase of the subject property.15
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of
the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). In a memorandum dated 21 August 2002, the
OMB-Military adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of
petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved
the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-
Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s
first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors16 was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough
review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his
signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of ₱10,500.00 per square
meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the
execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of
₱3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause
existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution. In its 19 December 2005 memorandum,17
the panel of prosecutors recommended the following:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside
and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal (petitioner) be DENIED;
2. Another information for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 be filed against Ramiscal
and all the other accused for causing damage to the government when it caused the
payment of the amount of Php 10,500.00 per square meter for the subject lots when the
actual amount should only be Php 3,000.00 per square meter.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors. Upon receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan
scheduled the arraignment of petitioner.
Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for reconsideration19 of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the
Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner filed
a motion to set aside his arraignment20 pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should
be ventilated in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21
The Issue
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion
to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him?
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman should have excluded him from the informations.
He claims lack of probable cause to indict him considering the prior findings of the
Ombudsman recommending the dropping of the cases against him. Petitioner claims that
heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and that there
should be grounds other than the mere signature appearing on a questioned document to
sustain a conspiracy charge.
Respondent Sandiganbayan counters that it correctly denied petitioner’s motion to set aside
his arraignment. Respondent court argues that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed
on 26 January 2006 and pending with the Ombudsman at the time of his arraignment,
violated Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended. Respondent court maintains that the memorandum of the panel of prosecutors
finding probable cause against petitioner was the final decision of the Ombudsman.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 15, Series of 2001,22 sanction the immediate filing of an information in the
proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution
shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office
of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with
corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the
resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot
bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of
the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of
the information.
An arraignment is that stage where, in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an
accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he
enters a plea of guilty or not guilty.23
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493,24 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of
1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the
filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in
which the charge is pending, whichever is later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days
from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the
justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of RA 8493,
provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the
arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7 of RA 8493
mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted from the time the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, which is when the accused appears
before the court.
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily in matters not provided under the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman or the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.25
Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a valid ground for suspension
of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan committed no error when it
proceeded with petitioner’s arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Further, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Resolution,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on 26 January 2006 was already his second
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him. The
Ombudsman, in its 19 December 2005 memorandum, has already denied petitioner’s first
motion for reconsideration,26 impugning for the first time the Ombudsman’s finding of
probable cause against him. Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman, petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration
questioning yet again the same finding of the Ombudsman. Otherwise, there will be no end
to litigation.
We agree with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner’s defenses are evidentiary in nature and
are best threshed out in the trial of the case on the merits. Petitioner’s claim that the
Ombudsman made conflicting conclusions on the existence of probable cause against him
is baseless. The memorandum of the OMB-Military, recommending the dropping of the
cases against petitioner, has been effectively overruled by the memorandum of the panel
of prosecutors, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, undersigned prosecutors recommend the following:
1. The August 2002 approved Recommendation of the Ombudsman-Military be set aside
and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Ramiscal be DENIED;27 (Emphasis supplied)
As the final word on the matter, the decision of the panel of prosecutors finding probable
cause against petitioner prevails. This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause.28 The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide
latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass
upon criminal complaints.29 As this Court succinctly stated in Alba v. Hon. Nitorreda:30
Moreover, this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers.
Otherwise stated, it is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion
of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. Such initiative
and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.31
In Ocampo, IV v. Ombudsman,32 the Court explained the rationale behind this policy, thus:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.33
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed
with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full
control of the case.341avvphi1
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion
to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in
an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.35
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it. The
Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.36
There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should
continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,37
where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan,
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition [for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus] is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings,
and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ
of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioner’s motion to set
aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to
P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson4 for violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-
affidavit.6 Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the
case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover,
like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he
was
offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's
business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed
out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He
also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed
to be Cawili's business associate.8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a
partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili
was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding
that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately
altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the
Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case
had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that
violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on
24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from
1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet
been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already
prescribed.13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor
to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from petitioner himself
and not the investigating prosecutor.14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had no
dealings with petitioner.15
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant
to Act No. 3326.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3
April 2003,17 the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
was directed to file three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information20 charging
petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,22 the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion
for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed
and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22"
against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326
applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the
offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art.
90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme
Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ
attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.27 Still, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would
not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of Appeals added,
the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial
to require consideration.28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe
in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err
in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay,
attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases.30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals
substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number
of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect
being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are true and correct–the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules
in order that the ends of justice may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at
bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3
April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August
2004,33 a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court
of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation
of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing
of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco
v. Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
petitioner notes.37 He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals'
pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case
were clearly beyond his control.38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not
provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes
in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the
filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus,
the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with
the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is
halted.40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226
was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus,
the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v.
Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the complaint
signifies the
institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed
by our declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the
investigation or examination of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which
suspends the prescription of the offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender,48 and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved No costs.
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the SO ORDERED.

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary

investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change
in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which
may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-
year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period
of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all,
he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only
to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of
Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE, Petitioner ,
-versus-
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, Respondent .
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2189-RTJ]
Present: PANGANIBAN, Chairman,SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,
and GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated: December 13, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB, 'People v. Vice Mayor
Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to
present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical treatment at
the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during the proceedings on
the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October 1, 15
and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses,
despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted on
August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004 before
the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20, 2004, and
reiterating his position that Judge Ayco's act of allowing the defense to present evidence in
his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be
'coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and that their testimonies be
stricken off the record.
By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the Manifestation,
considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor Pinote
(complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for 'Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.
By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the
complaint 'to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical handling of
the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the request of the
Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the case by the Secretary
of Justice.
And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the prosecutor
in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for hearing.
On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on November
12, 2004, respondent brands the same as 'misleading and 'highly questionable,
complainant's having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center on
August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only on said date.
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent
justifies the same on complainant's failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution
despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose.
Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution
for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused
to do so.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with 'Contempt of Court and
'Grave Misconduct and/or 'Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar and as an Officer
of the Court.
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to have breached
said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of
the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall
continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no
public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject
to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to
prosecute the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not
merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. [1] It
is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is
necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the
rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. [2]
Respondent's act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of
complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a
clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the
prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.

Respondent's intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the
case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused
is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Respondent's lament about complainant's failure to inform the court of his inability to attend
the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to
subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the defense to present
its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve respondent of his
utter disregard of the Rules.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B. Pinote,

respondent is advised that the same should be lodged before the Secretary of Justice.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39962 April 7, 1976
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO BERIALES, BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO, accused-appellants.
Francisco D. Abas for appellants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, in
Criminal Case No. 562-0, convicting the accused Ricardo Beriales Benedicto Custodio and
Pablito Custodio of the crime of murder, sentencing each one of them to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Saturnina Gonzales
Porcadilla the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. 1
It appears that in Criminal Case No. 562-0 the herein appellants were charged with the
crime of murder in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Ormoc City on November 22,
1974, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th of September, 1974, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning at
Barrio Mahayahay, this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, RICARDO BERIALES BENEDICTO CUSTODIO and PABLITO CUSTODIO,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab the person of SATURNINA
PORCADILLA, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend herself, thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death. ... 2
At the hearing of November 26, 1974, appellants' counsel moved for a reinvestigation of
said ease, along with two other related cases 3 which the court a quo granted, in its Order
reading as follows:
On motion of Atty. Abas counsel for the accused and without objection on the part of Fiscal
Ramon So Jr., let the reinvestigation of this case immediately take place at the Office of
the City Fiscal and let the arraignment and trial be postponed until December 5 and 6, 1974
at 7:30 a.m. of each day, if and when the Fiscal shall recommend that the case shall proceed
after it shall have been reinvestigated, with notice to Attys. Abas and Cornejos as well as
Fiscal Solis in open court. 4
On December 3, 1974, the trial court postponed the hearing of the case to December 17
and 18, 1974. 5 in view of the City Fiscal's motion "for a deferment of the hearing or trial
set for December 5 and 6, 1974 until such time the REINVESTIGATION shall have been
terminated for which the result of said reinvestigation will be submitted to this Honorable
Court for its resolution in the premises." 6
On December 6, 1974, however, the trial court, motu proprio cancelled the aforesaid
hearings on December 17, and 18, 1974, and, instead, reset the arraignment and trial of
the case to December 10 and 11, 1974. 7
At the hearing of December 10, 1974, appellants counsel manifested to the court that
pursuant to its approval of his motion for reinvestigation, the City Fiscal had set the
reinvestigation for December 12, 1974 and had already issued the corresponding subpoena
to secure the attendance of the witnesses. 8 Nevertheless, the court a quo, issued an order
setting the hearing of the case to the next day, December 11, 1974, 9 at which hearing,
appellants' counsel reiterated his manifestation that since the City Fiscal had already
ordered the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974, the said reinvestigation should first be
finished and the corresponding resolution rendered thereon and submitted to the court
before any trial of the case should take place. 10
The trial court, however, relying on the mandate of the New Constitution that "All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies" 11 re-scheduled the hearing to December 13, 1974. 12
Immediately thereafter, Special Counsel Rosario R. Polines, in representation of the City
Fiscal, manifested that the private prosecutor, Atty. Procadilla, be authorized to conduct
the case for the prosecution.
When the case was called for hearing on December 13, 1974, counsel for the appellant
asked the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear, since the reinvestigation of the case
had already been terminated and the Fiscal, if given a chance, might be able to report on
said reinvestigation. 14 The trial court, however, insisted in arraigning the appellants. 15
When arraigned, the three appellants declined to plead, saying: "I am not going to answer
the question because the Fiscal is not yet around." 16 Thereupon, the trial court entered a
plea of "Not Guilty" for each of them. 17
Thereafter, appellants' counsel again manifested that the City Fiscal was absent and that
they could not go to trial without the fiscal and his report on the reinvestigation conducted
by him. 18 Nonetheless, the trial court, ordered the presentation of evidence by the private
prosecutor since he had been previously authorized by the City Fiscal to handle the case.
19
After the direct examination of the witnesses presented by the private prosecutor, the trial
court asked the counsel for the defense if he desired to cross-examine the witnesses.
Appellants' counsel, however, reiterated his manifestation that they would not go to trial
until the City Fiscal shall have submitted the result of the reinvestigation to the court, and
the court each time ruled that it considered such manifestation as a waiver on the part of
the appellants to cross-examine the witnesses. 20
Thereafter, the private prosecutor rested the case for the prosecution and the court called
for the evidence of the defense. Again, appellants' counsel manifested that the appellants
were not agreeing to the trial of the case unless they first received the result of the
reinvestigation conducted by the City Fiscal. 21 Whereupon, the court considered the case
submitted for decision and announced the promulgation of the decision on December 17,
1974. 22
When the case was called on December 17, 1974, appellants' counsel manifested that the
accused were not in conformity with the promulgation of the decision on the ground that
they did not agree to the trial of the case. 23 Nonetheless, the trial court promulgated its
judgment on the same day. 24
Hence, the appellants interpose this appeal, upon the principal ground that they were
denied due process of law. 25 The Solicitor General agrees with such contention and
recommends that the judgment under review be set aside and the case remanded to the
lower court for another arraignment and trial. 26
 it not only that the guilty should be convicted, but that the innocent should be acquitted —
We sustain the appellants. After the trial court granted the appellants' motion for a duty that can only be effectively and sincerely performed if they actively participate in
reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance the arraignment the conduct of the case, especially in the examination of the witnesses and the presentation
and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the of documentary evidence for both parties." 34
result of such reinvestigation. That was a matter of duty on its part, not only to be
consistent with its own order but also to do justice aid at the same time to avoid a possible WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the
miscarriage of justice. It should be borne in mind, that the appellants herein were charged trial court for another arraignment and trial. Costs de oficio.
with the serious crime of murder, and considering that their motion for reinvestigation is
based upon the ground that it was Felipe Porcadilla (husband and father, respectively, of SO ORDERED.
the two deceased, Saturnina Porcadilla and Quirino Porcadilla) who was the aggressor for
having attacked and seriously wounded appellant Pablito Custodio 27 it was entirely
possible for the City Fiscal to modify or change his conclusion after conducting the
reinvestigation. When the trial court, therefore, ignored the appellants' manifestations
objecting to the arraignment and the trial of the case, until after the City Fiscal shall have
rendered a resolution on his reinvestigation, but instead considered such manifestations on
their part as a plea of riot guilty and proceeded to try the case, received the evidence for
the prosecution, and then rendered judgment against them on the basis thereof, it
committed a serious irregularity which nullifies the proceedings below because such a
procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. 28

Besides, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "what is more deplorable and
which renders patently irregular all the proceedings taken in this case, was the total
absence of the City Fiscal and/or any of his assistants or special counsel on December 13,
1974, when the appellants were arraigned and when the private prosecutor presented
evidence and rested the case supposedly for the People.

Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal." 29 In the trial
of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appeal for the government. 30
As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor has been entrusted with the investigation
of a case and has acted thereon by filing the necessary information in court he is b law in
duty bound to take charge thereof until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes
full responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to
pursue it to its termination." 31 While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure
in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
to turn over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor,32 nevertheless, his duty
to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be present
during the proceedings. Thus, in the case of People vs. Munar 33 this Court upheld the right
of the private prosecutor therein to conduct the examination of the witnesses because the
government prosecutors were present at the hearing; hence, the prosecution of the case
remained under their direct supervision and control.

In the present case, although the private prosecutor had previously been authorized by the
special counsel Rosario R. Polines to present the evidence for the prosecution, nevertheless,
in view of the absence of the City Fiscal at the hearing on December 13, 1974, it cannot be
said that the prosecution of the case was under the control of the City Fiscal. It follows that
the evidence presented by the private prosecutor at said hearing could not be considered
as evidence for the plaintiff, the People of the Philippines. There was, therefore, no evidence
at all to speak of which could have been the basis of the decision of the trial court.

Moreover, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General, "to permit such prosecution of a
criminal case by the private prosecutor with the fiscal in absentia can set an obnoxious
precedent that can be taken advantage of by some indolent members of the prosecuting
arm of the government as well as those who are oblivious of their bounden duty to see to
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative.
This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal
de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only
when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en
condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes —
"una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay
legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And,
as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes
executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party
defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds
the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal
Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense
that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means
judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this
case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered
must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs.
Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil.,
626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge
Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of
which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil
liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil
liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss,
as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where
the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista,
et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a
civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court
in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal
in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering
that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal
and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art.
89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo
and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v.
Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention
of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,
Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to
be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only
basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from
the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of
the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based
on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of
his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal,
"the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee
and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as
defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to
the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego
because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action
in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the
criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment
in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to
inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs
or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial
administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as
the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in
Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled
rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in
Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction
due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action.
In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil
case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which
is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate
the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory
authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability
ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in
the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render
fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of
the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that
when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under
Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does
not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary
judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent
one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution
of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law,
this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice
Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego
which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the
strained implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the
criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal
liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's
judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the
summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of
the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego
was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of
Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness,
judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that
money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision
of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator.
— No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other
than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained
of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158177 January 28, 2008
SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE SIOK CHING TENG, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente
Balboa (respondent) with forum shopping.
On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(Branch 34), Civil Case No. 97-82225 for Collection of Sum of Money against petitioners.
The amount sought covers three post-dated checks issued by petitioner Caroline Siok Ching
Teng (Caroline), as follows: Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57546 dated December 30, 1996
for P2,000,000.00; Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57547 dated January 15, 1997 for
P1,200,000.00; and Asia Trust Check No. BNDO57548 dated January 31, 1997 for
P1,975,250.00 - or a total of P5,175,250.00.1
On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(B.P. No. 22) were filed against Caroline before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila
(Branch 10), covering the said three checks. These cases were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 277576 to 78.2
On August 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225 finding
petitioners liable, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter:
1. To play the plaintiff the sum of P5,175,250.00 plus 6% interest per annum until full
payment;
2. To pay the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
3. To pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001 rendered in Criminal Case Nos. 277576
to 78, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found Caroline civilly liable in
favor of respondent for the amounts covered by these checks, to wit:
WHEREFORE, accused Caroline Siok Ching Teng is acquitted of the charge for violation of
BP Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused is ordered civilly liable to the offended party for the amounts of the checks subject
of the three informations herein, i.e., P1,200,000.00, P1,975,250.00 and P2,000,000.00.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner sought partial reconsideration of the MTC Decision praying for the deletion of the
award of civil indemnity, but it was denied by the MTC per Order dated April 12, 2002.
Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC, which docketed the case as Criminal Case Nos. 02-
204544-46.
In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal the RTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 97-82225, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61457. In the assailed
Decision dated November 20, 2002, the CA5 dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and finding no reversible error in the appealed
Decision dated August 11, 1998 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 97-82225, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and said Decision is
affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but this was denied per Resolution
dated April 21, 2003.7
On May 8, 2003, the RTC as an appellate court, rendered its Decision in Criminal Case No.
02-204544-46, modifying the MTC Decision by deleting the award of civil damages.8
Now before the Court for resolution is the Amended Petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, questioning the CA Decision dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution dated April
21, 2003, on the lone ground that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ALLOWING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER TWICE
FOR THE SAME OBLIGATION ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
DELIBERATE FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO INFORM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT THE
CIVIL OBLIGATION BEING SUED UPON IS THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS WITH
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, AND FOR WHICH THE CIVIL OBLIGATION WAS
SUBSEQUENTLY ADJUDGED.9
Petitioners contend that the assailed CA Decision and Resolution should be reconsidered
and the RTC Decision dated August 11, 1998 dismissed as respondent's act of filing Civil
Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78 constitutes forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable
disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order
has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion
in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.10
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or,
at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and
(3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis
pendentia.11
In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.,12 the Court ruled
that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case for the recovery
of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the
prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so
as to prevent double payment of the claim. The Court stated:
x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the
civil action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party
for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused. Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No.
00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery
of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner, represents the amount to be
paid by respondent for its purchases. x x x
This was reiterated in Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corp. v. Demetria,13 where the civil
case for the recovery of the amount covered by the bouncing checks was also ordered
dismissed.
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective
September 16, 1997, which provides:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include
the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as
the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover
liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay
the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but
any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the
latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The foregoing, however, are not applicable to the present case. It is worth noting that Civil
Case No. 97-82225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78
on July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September
16, 1997. Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos.
277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense
charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express
waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the
civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.14 Since respondent instituted the civil
action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed independently
of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in
cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal
case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court noted, viz.:
x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ] was enacted
to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the
courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual
damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit
gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number
of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected
to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one
for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the
civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means
that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court.
The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose
of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners' rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate
action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the RTC, in its Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 02-204544-46, already deleted the
award of civil damages. Records do not disclose that appeal had been taken therefrom.
There is, therefore, no double recovery of the amounts covered by the checks or unjust
enrichment on the part of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 20,
2002 and Resolution dated April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago,
Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted
by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil
liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the
appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private
respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support,
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of
P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province
of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816,
willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at
Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner,
without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him
to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon,
thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben
Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch
shrimps at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they
(should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon.
The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to
(come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the
Manantan Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using
the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At
about 12:00 o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that
afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused
returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the
same with one more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when
the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota
Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini,
Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant
alley they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became
vacant the accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks
and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded
to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the
accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the
deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind
the accused. The accused was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the
Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway
(although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a
tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately
tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from the steering wheel but
he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other
at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of
the highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the
jeep swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car
while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of impact
as shown by a sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the
Police Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When
he regained consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased
on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car
by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the
car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased
died that night (Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and
legs.2
The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that
of the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan
did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:
…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of
the road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the
opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped
the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while
the jeep stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident
(Exhibit "1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony.
The car was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel
Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic
where they were all brought for treatment.3
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided
Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of
the trial court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas
spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered
to pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the
Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby
held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the
amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.5
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a
total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m."6 It found that
petitioner's act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil
Code,8 a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of
violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itself "because the mishap, which occurred, was
the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation."9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24,
1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for
our consideration:
FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER
INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND THEREFORE THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES
AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-
DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONER'S
ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH
THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR
RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
TRIAL COURT.
THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND
MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE
REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING
THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as
to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester
doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise
of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither
imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He
submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that
petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court
acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases,
if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings
of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity
placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused,
the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.11 This is double
jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.12 In
the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case
No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal
became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals
by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not
charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first
offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to
petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not
modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to
speak of. Petitioner's claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.14 The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,16 where
the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions
have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot
be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though
both actions involve the same act or omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties
are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence,
notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether
Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's
negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on
the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the
judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of
petitioner's negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed
based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion
of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's
civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration
that did not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it
found that "a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court" and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind
cannot rest on a verdict of conviction."18 The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's
acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with
moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit
to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages
and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their
claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
149 SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers
that since Manchester held that "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear
and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case.
They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted,
was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees
took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988.
Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that
the civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in
assessing the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the
Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the
damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the
Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions
with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20
As correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that
the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. With
the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111,
Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July
7, 1988, it is now required that:
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided
in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.
The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time
private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo
in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and
affects pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such
as moral, nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or
information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21
Recall that the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of
damages. Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the
filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the
enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore
find no basis for petitioner's allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid
and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well
as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176795 June 30, 2008
SPS. CAROLINA and REYNALDO JOSE, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. LAUREANO and PURITA SUAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioners filed this case assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP
No. 00397 dated 17 August 2006 which affirmed the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 19 restraining Branches 2 and 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City from proceeding with the criminal cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) filed against respondent Purita Suarez.
The facts of the case follow.
Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of petitioner Carolina Jose’s
(Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina
and her husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose, later on increased the interest to 5% per day,
which respondents were forced to accept because they allegedly had no other option left.
It then became a practice that petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the
latter would deposit the same in her and her husband’s account to cover the maturing
postdated checks they had previously issued in payment of their other loans. Purita would
then issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment of the amount borrowed from them
with the agreed 5% daily interest.
On 7 May 2004, respondents filed a Complaint3 against petitioners seeking the declaration
of "nullity of interest of 5% per day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments"4 and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging that the interest rate of 5% a day
is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent and imposed using undue
influence by taking improper advantage of their financial distress. They claimed that due to
serious liquidity problems, they were forced to rely on borrowings from banks and individual
lenders, including petitioners, and that they had to scramble for funds to cover the maturing
postdated checks they issued to cover their other borrowings. In their prayer, respondents
stated:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that upon the filing of the instant case and in accordance with the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure[,] a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary
restraining order be issued restraining defendant from enforcing the checks as listed in
Annex "E" including the filing of criminal cases for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22 and restraining
defendants from entering plaintiffs’ store and premises to get cash sales and other items
against plaintiffs will [sic] under such terms and conditions as this Court may affix.5
Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 226 were filed
against respondent Purita before the MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5. Purita, in turn
filed motions to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, on
the theory that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are void for being contra bonos
mores or for having been issued in payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest
imposed by petitioners. The motions were denied.7
Respondents thereafter filed before the RTC a "Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Temporary Restraining Order"8 seeking to restrain the MTCCs from further proceeding
with the B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the ground of prejudicial question. Petitioners opposed the
motion. Nevertheless, the RTC through its 20 December 2004 Order9 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction, thereby enjoining the MTCCs from proceeding with the cases against
Purita. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied due
course in the RTC’s 3 February 2005 Order.10
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals11 and questioned the propriety of the
RTC’s issuance of a preliminary injunction based on a prejudicial question. The appellate
court stated that respondents had sought to annul the checks for being void pursuant to
Article 1422 of the Civil Code which provides that "a contract which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent." Accordingly, the appellate court
concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal cases were later on declared null and
void, then said checks could not be made the bases of criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg.
22. In other words, the outcome of the determination of the validity of the said checks is
determinative of guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case.12
The appellate court also observed that respondents’ resort to an application for preliminary
injunction could not be considered as forum shopping since it is the only remedy available
to them considering the express proscription of filing a petition for certiorari against
interlocutory orders issued in cases under B.P. Blg. 22 which are governed by the rules on
summary procedure.13
Before us, petitioners submit that because under Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure a petition to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question
should be filed in the same criminal action, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
preliminary injunction as it is not the court where the B.P. Blg. 22 cases were filed.
Moreover, they argue that respondents are guilty of forum shopping because after the
denial of their motion to suspend the proceedings before Branches 2 and 5 of the MTCC,
they resorted to the filing of a motion for preliminary injunction before the RTC also on the
ground of prejudicial question; therefore, they succeeded in getting the relief in one forum
(RTC) which they had failed to obtain in the first forum (MTCCs). Likewise, petitioners claim
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the civil case poses a prejudicial question to
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, thus resulting in the erroneous suspension of the proceedings the
latter cases. Finally, petitioners posit that the RTC erred in issuing the preliminary injunction
because respondents have no clear and unmistakable right to its issuance.14
Respondents, for their part, state that the possibility of a ruling in the civil case to the effect
that the subject checks are contra bonos mores and hence null and void constitutes a
prejudicial question in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. Thus, proceeding with the trial in the criminal
cases without awaiting the outcome of the civil case is fraught with mischievous
consequences.15 They cite the case of Medel v. Court of Appeals,16 wherein the Court
nullified the interest rate of 5.5% per month for being contra bonos mores under Article
1306 of the Civil Code, and recomputed the interest due at the rate of 1% per month.17
Thus, if their loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks subject
of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid. They also
invoke the case of Danao v. Court of Appeals18 wherein the Court allegedly ruled that there
is no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if the dishonored checks have been paid.19 They claim that
since the 5% interest per day was not contained in any written agreement, per Article
195620 of the Civil Code, petitioners are bound to return the total interest they collected
from respondents. Respondents point out that they incorporated in their complaint an
application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to restrain Carolina
from enforcing the interest and from filing criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Quoting the RTC, respondents explain:
Since there was no proof at that time that plaintiff sustain or are about to sustain damages
or prejudice if the acts complained of are not enjoined, the application was not acted upon
by the Court. When the attention of the Court was invited by the plaintiffs of the refusal of
the MTC, Branches 2 and 5, to suspend the criminal proceedings despite being appraised
of the pendency of this case, the Court has to act accordingly.21
Respondents maintain that they are not guilty of forum shopping because after the denial
by the MTCCs of their motion to suspend proceedings, their only available remedy was the
filing of an application for preliminary injunction in the existing civil case filed earlier than
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. In any case, respondents argue that the rule on forum shopping is
not intended to deprive a party to a case of a legitimate remedy.22 Finally, they claim that
the case falls under the exceptions to the rule that the prosecution of criminal cases may
not be enjoined by a writ of injunction, considering that in this case there is a prejudicial
question which is sub judice, and that there is persecution rather than prosecution.23
The case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question which
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCCs.
We find that there is none and thus we resolve to grant the petition.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.24
Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this: whether the daily interest
rate of 5% is void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are
likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no
longer prosper.
The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.
In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the
guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the
cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal
culpability under B.P. Blg. 22.25 In several instances, we have held that what the law
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a
worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are
properly proved.26
The nature and policy of B.P. Blg. 22 were aptly enunciated by the Court in Meriz v.
People,27 when it stated:
x x x. [B.P. Blg.] 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned
by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial
value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be
eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative
enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the act of
making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment. The act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only
valid query then is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a
bad check, without so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.28
Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void
for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because
what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the
primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the
law has been breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.
The issue has in fact been correctly addressed by the MTCCs when respondents’ motion to
suspend the criminal proceedings was denied upon the finding that there exists no
prejudicial question which could be the basis for the suspension of the proceedings. The
reason for the denial of the motion is that the "cases can very well proceed for the
prosecution of the accused in order to determine her criminal propensity … as a
consequence of the issuance of several checks which subsequently … bounced" for "what
the law punishes is the issuance and/or drawing of a check and upon presentment for
deposit or encashment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or] account closed." 29
There being no prejudicial question, the RTC and, consequently, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred when they allowed the suspension of the proceedings in the B.P. Blg. 22
cases.
Now, on to other matters.
We find that respondents are guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping when a
party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited,
and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of
one party against another, when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of
seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or
by special civil action of certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.30
Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in the MTCCs hearing the B.P. Blg.
22 cases but unfortunately, the same were denied. Failing to get the relief they wanted,
respondents sought before the RTC, the suspension of the criminal proceedings which was
granted. Respondents tried to extricate themselves from the charge of forum shopping by
explaining that after the denial of their motions to suspend, their only remedy was the
application for preliminary injunction in the civil case—a relief which they had already asked
for in their complaint and which was also initially not granted to them. Any which way the
situation is viewed, respondents’ acts constituted forum shopping since they sought a
possibly favorable opinion from one court after another had issued an order unfavorable to
them.
The Court notes that three cases, namely, Ras v. Rasul,31 Medel v. CA32 and Danao v.
Court of Appeals33—finding no application to the instant case—were mentioned by the RTC,
the Court of Appeals and by respondents themselves in support of their position.
Ras v. Rasul cropped up in the order of the RTC which was quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals. According to the RTC, the ruling in the said case allegedly "can be squarely
applied in this case which nullified and set aside the conviction in a criminal case because
of a prejudicial question."34 We do not agree. The Ras case involves a petition for
nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of forgery. While the civil case was pending, an
information for estafa was filed against the respondent in the civil case. The Court ruled
that there were prejudicial questions considering that the defense against the charge of
forgery in the civil case is based on the very same facts which would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the estafa case. The instant case is different
from Ras inasmuch as the determination of whether the 5% daily interest is contra bonos
mores and therefore void, or that the total amount loaned from petitioners has been
sufficiently paid, will not affect the guilt or innocence of Purita because the material question
in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether Purita had issued a bad check, regardless of the purpose
or condition of its issuance.

Medel v. CA is the case upon which respondents anchor their claim that the interest due on
their loans is only 1% per month and thus they have already overpaid their obligation to
petitioners. In Medel, the Court declared that the rate of 5.5% interest per month on a
P500,000.00 loan is iniquitous, unconscionable and hence contrary to morals, and must
equitably be reduced to 12% per annum. While the Medel case made a finding that the
stipulated interest rate is excessive and thus may be equitably reduced by the courts, we
do not see how a reduction of the interest rate, should there be any, or a subsequent
declaration that the amount due has been fully paid, will have an effect on the
determination of whether or not Purita had in fact issued bouncing checks.

Meanwhile, respondents misunderstood our ruling in Danao v. Court of Appeals, which they
claim to have ruled that there could be no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if the dishonored checks
have been paid. In Danao, the accused was convicted by the trial court for having issued
two checks which eventually bounced. The Court found that there was no proof of receipt
by the accused of any notice of nonpayment of the checks, and thus there was no way of
determining when the five-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start
and end. Thus, the presumption or prima facie evidence of knowledge of the insufficiency
of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the checks did not arise. While there was a
finding that the accused had already paid her obligations prior to receipt of the
complainant’s demand letter,35 there was no declaration from the Court that such payment
exonerated accused from liability for having issued bouncing checks. Instead, accused was
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, and not because she had paid the amount
covered by the dishonored checks36 or that the obligation was deemed paid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 August 2006 and its Resolution dated 27 February 2007, in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
00397, are SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19 in its Order dated 20 December 2004 in Civil Case No. CEB-30278
enjoining the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is LIFTED AND
SET ASIDE and the MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5 are ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch with the arraignment and trial in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases pending before them.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148193 January 16, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the May 31, 2001 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which
reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001 order 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondent's motion for
deferment of arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia
de la Cruz, 4 represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful
owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented
that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito
Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother,
PBI purchased the questioned lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over
the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said
lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599
was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan
Teng and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother
refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68,
an action for "Injunctive Relief" docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital
Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20
other John Does. 5 Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the
other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for
"Damages and Attachment," docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. 6 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759. 7
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document
was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. 8
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of
prejudicial question, i. e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381. 9 On
January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondent's motion.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001. 10
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to
enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case. 11 The Court of
Appeals granted respondent's prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution dated March 19, 2001. 12
On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the,
trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of
the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment
shall have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant
petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos.
SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a
prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court
or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a
civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 13
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related
to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the
other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will
not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up
the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 14
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief
is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz;
while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether
respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI
for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his
mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged
free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in
the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and
in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it
does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through SO ORDERED.
falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that
PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve
respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under
penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. 15 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It
shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People, 16 the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal
property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter,
the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the
causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while
the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil
case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal
proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on
the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and
ruled that:

. . . the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of
action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6
"Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances"
will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042
for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code . . . (i) That, even
granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact
remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh
cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal
cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code
which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to
in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of
the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI
is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May 31,
2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008
Decision1 in SCA No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas
City. The Decision affirmed the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in
Las Piñas City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated
October 5, 20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private
respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The
case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal
information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2,
2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe
S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065 for the rescission of
an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case
was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-
0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings
dated July 24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal
cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of
the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the
rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and
distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section
7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question
is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this
case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks
issued as the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged
violation of BP 22 must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein
accused did not detract from the correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension
of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule
111, Revised Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
dated November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter,
the RTC issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the
issue of the existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is
intended merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally,
no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal
proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact
that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the
issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED
TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions
dated June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained
in Rule 111, Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question,
as stated in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective
and the above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now
provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial
question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case
was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to
guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related
to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court
shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists
when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the
pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent
conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers
a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the
filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that it originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously
instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by the
insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical
explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal
actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits,
we hold that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending
final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must
precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action
must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information
was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by
the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed
not only to be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle
is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is
only when harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to
apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
are susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
"previously instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not
susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to
mean that the motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary
investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the
trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation or during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be
filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be
filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the
Civil Code that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the
filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by
reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to
delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action
for specific performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22,
as the resolution of the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the
civil case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil
case three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the
civil action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal
cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint
and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job
site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2
½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the
proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the
rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than three
(3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved
here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private
respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this
scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private
respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is,
still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7
of Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between
the parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in
consideration of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis
of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as
follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance
of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up
the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases21 that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution
for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution
and conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the
terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in
the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in
trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make
the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of
lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable
consideration. Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor of the party
who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject
check included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made
from said account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That
there was neither a pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of
petitioner when the subject check was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24,
1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989,
cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that
he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing
check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks
and putting them into circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution
of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent
indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this
fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.lawphil.net

Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the
criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case before us.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26,
2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders
dated October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC,
Branch 79 in Las Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.