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CONSTUTIONAL LAW 1
CASE DIGESTS
Atty. J. Arcilla
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
RE: PROCLAMATION NO. 3; MARCH 25, 1986; LEGITIMACY
OF CORAZON AQUINO GOVERNMENT
LAWYER’S LEAGUE vs. CORAZON AQUINO
GR no. 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
Lawyers League questioned the legitimacy of
President Corazon Aquino. They claimed that the said
government is illegal because its establishment was not in
accordance to the 1973 Constitution.
Issue:
W/N the government of President Corazon Aquino
was illegal.
Ruling:
NO, the government of Pres. Corazon Aquino not
illegal.
The SC provided that the question of legitimacy
regarding the government of President Corazon Aquino
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of
the Philippines are the Judge. The People have made the
judgment and they have accepted the government of Pres.
Aquino to be in effective control of the entire country.
The petition is dismissed because Lawyer’s
League have no locus standi or personality to sue and their
petition states no cause of action.
RE: PROCLAMATION NO. 3; MARCH 25, 1986;
DECLARATION OF CORAZON AQUINO AS THE PRESIDENT
IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
GR no. 76180, October 24, 1986
Facts:
Petitioner Saturnino Bermudez questioned
paragraph 1 of Section 5, Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution claiming that it is not clear as to whom it
refers. He asked the SC to declare and answer the question
of the construction and definiteness as to who, among
President Aquino (and VP Laurel), and President Marcos
(and VP Tolentino) is being referred under the said Section.
Issue:
W/N President Aquino and not President Marcos is
being referred to under Sec. 5, par.1, Art. XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution.
Ruling:
YES, It is the President C. Aquino (and her VP S.
Laurel) are being referred to under the aforesaid section.
Bermudez’ allegation of vagueness is manifestly
gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission
refers therein to incumbent Pres. C. Aquino and VP S.
Laurel and no other persons.
II. NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
EFFECTIVITY OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
ALFREDO DE LEON, Et. al vs.
BENJAMIN ESGUERRA, Et. al
GR no. 78059, August 31, 1987
Facts:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay Elections, Alfredo
De Leon was elected Brgy. Captain and the others as Brgy.
Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under BP 222
(Brgy. Election Act of 1982). On February 9, 1987, De Leon
received a Memorandum signed by the OIC Governor
Benjamin Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as Brgy.
Captain of Brgy. Dolores. The designation made by OIC
Governor Esguerra was “by authority of the Minister of
Local Government.”
De Leon filed an original action for Prohibition
before the SC praying that the subject Memoranda be
declared null and void, claiming that with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, OIC Governor Esguerra no longer
has authority to replace them and to designate their
successors. On the other hand, OIC Governor Esguerra
relies on Art. II, Sec. 3, of the Provisional Constitution and
contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished.
Issue:
1. W/N The Memorandum should be declared null and
void?
2. Whether or not the designation of Florentino Magno
to replace Alfredo De Leon was validly made?
Ruling:
1. YES, The Memorandum issued by OIC Governor
Esguerra is declared to have no legal effect and
force. Since the promulgation of the Provisional
Constitution, there has been no proclamation or
executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay Officials.
2. NO, Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Provisional Constitution is
deemed to have been overtaken by Sec. 27, Art.
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides; “This
Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast is a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede
all previous Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite
on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, OIC
Governor Esguerra could no longer rely on Sec. 2,
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Art. III thereof to designate Florentino Magno to the
elective positions occupied by Alfredo De Leon.
III. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
AMENDMENT OR REVISION;
QUALITATIVE TEST v. QUANTITATIVE TESTS
RAUL LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
505 SCRA 160, October 25, 2006
Facts:
Raul Lambino’s group commenced the gathering
of signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition.
Lambino’s group initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Secs. 1-7 of Art. VI (Legislative
Department) and Secs. 1-4 of Art. VII (Executive
Department). These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government.
COMELEC issued a Resolution denying Lambino
group’s petition for lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
Issue:
W/N Lambino Group’s initiative violates Sec. 2,
Art. XVII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES, A people’s initiative to change the
Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle
of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-
balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, Amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
principle involved.
Where the initiative clause allows amendments
but not revisions to the constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: (a) quantitative test, and (b)
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to
change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions.” The qualitative test ask whether the change
will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
our basic governmental plan as to amount to revision.”
Under both tests, the Lambino Group’s initiative is
a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively,
Lambino Group’s proposed changes overhaul two articles
(Art. VI and Art. VII) affecting a total of 105 provisions in
the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral
to a unicameral legislature.
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A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution. Lambino Group’s initiative is a
revision and not an amendment. Therefore, the present
initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates
Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a
people’s initiative to “Amendments to this Constitution.”
CONGRESS ACTING AS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY v.
CONGRESS ACTING AS LEGISLATIVE BODY
IMBONG vs. COMELEC
35 SCRA 28, September 11, 1970
Facts:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales are interested
in running as a candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. They both impugn the
constitutionality of RA 6131, claiming that it prejudices
their rights as candidates.
On March 16, 1967, Congress (acting as a
Constituent Assembly) passed Resolution no. 2 which
called for a Constitutional Convention to propose
constitutional amendments to be composed of two
delegates from each representative district who shall have
the same qualification as those of Congressman, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November 1970. After
the adoption of Resolution no. 2 but before the November
Elections that year, Congress (acting as Legislative Body)
enacted RA 4914, implementing Resolution no. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress (acting as Constituent
Assembly) passed Resolution no. 4 amending Resolution
no. 2. On August 24, 1970, Congress (acting as legislative
body) enacted RA 6132 expressly repealing RA 4914.
Manuel Imbong impugns the constitutionality of
RA 6132.
Issue:
W/N the enactment of RA 6131 by the Congress
acting as a legislative body is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES, the SC sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of RA 6131 by Congress acting as a legislative
body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and
not as a Constituent Assembly.
Congress (acting as a Constituent Assembly) has
full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional
amendments or to call a Constitutional Convention for the
purpose. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly
of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention
includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise
of the principal power granted.
While the authority to call a constitutional
convention is vested by the Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly,
the power to enact the implementing details (such as RA
6132) does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are
matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise
of its comprehensive legislative power, which power
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encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary
implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action.
When Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly
omits to provide for such implementing details after calling
a constitutional convention, Congress acting as a
legislative body can enact the necessary implementing
legislation to fill in the gaps.
PEOPLE’S INITIATIVE; GOVERNING STATUTE
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
GR no. 127325, March 19, 1997
Facts:
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with Comelec a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People’s Initiative (Delfin Petition). Delfin and
the members of the Movement for People’s Initiative
intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Sec. 2, Art.
XVII of the Constitution. As required in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be
established all over the country.
On the other hand, Miriam Defensor-Santiago
filed a special civil action before the SC, arguing that the
Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed
by Congress. No such law has been passed, SB 1290 is still
pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments. Moreover, RA 6735 failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. RA 6735 covers
only laws and not constitutional amendments because the
latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication. The people’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, not revision thereof.
Issue:
W/N RA 6735 was intended to or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Ruling:
NO, RA 6735 is not intended to or cover initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. First, Sec. 2 of the RA
6735 does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The inclusion of the word “Constitution”
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane or relevant to the said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution.
Second, RA 6735 does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
Sec. 5(c) thereof requires statement of the proposed lw
sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be. It does not include the
provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in
the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third, there is no subtitle provided for initiative on
the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of RA 6735 is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws.
RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
REQUIREMENTS OF PEOPLE’S
INITIATIVE ON THE CONSTITUTION
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
505 SCRA 160, October 25, 2006
Facts:
Raul Lambino’s group commenced the gathering
of signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to
hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735 (Initiative and
Referendum Act).
Lambino’s group alleged that their petition had
the support of 6,327,952 individuals consisting at least 12%
of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least 3 % of its registered voters. These
proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
COMELEC issued a Resolution denying Lambino
group’s petition for lack of enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. COMELEC
invokes the ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.
Issue:
W/N Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies
with Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution on amendments
to the Constitution amendments to the Constitution
through a people’s initiative.
Ruling:
NO, Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution allows a
people’s initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution, stating: “Amendments to the Constitution
may x x x be directly proposed by the people though
initiative upon a petition x x x “
The essence of amendments “directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means 2 essential elements must be present; (1) The
people must author and sign the entire proposal. No agent
or representative can sign on their behalf; and (2) As an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied
in a petition.
The Lambino Group submitted a copy of the
signature sheet before the SC, however, there is not a
single word, phrase, or sentence of the of their group’s
proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
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signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes
is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a
question whether the people approve a shift from the
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary
system of government. It does not show to the people the
draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not
the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in
Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION; PLEBISCITE;
SCHEDULE
GONZALES vs. COMELEC
GR no. L-28196, November 9, 1967
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing
that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, although each province shall have, at
least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention to
be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be "elected in the general
elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of
the same Constitution, be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became
Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections, which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
Issue:
May the proposed amendments be submitted at a
plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections?
Ruling:
YES. The term “election” in article XV of the 1935
Constitution does not indicate that the “election” therein
referred to is a “special”, not a general election. The
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circumstance that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then
obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC
41 SCRA 702, October 16, 1971
Facts:
Petition for prohibition to restrain the COMELEC
from holding a plebiscite on No. 8, 1971, at which the
proposed constitutional amendment “reducing the voting
age” in Art. V, Sec.1, Constitution to 18 years “shall be
submitted” for ratification by the people pursuant to
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 by declaring said resolution to be without the force
and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of the
plebiscite and by also declaring the act of the COMELEC
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the
aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violative of the Constitution.
The COMELEC issued a Resolution holding a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971.
Issue:
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for
the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to 18
years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Art. V,
Sec.1, Constitution proposed in the Convention’s Organic
Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided in said
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
resolution of the Convention?
Ruling:
NO, SC granted the petition of Tolentino. The
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971, insofar as it provide for the holding of a plebiscite
on November 8, 1971 as well as the resolution of the
COMELEC complying therewith are declared by the SC to
be null and void.
In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an
amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts
of the Constitution with which it has to from a harmonious
whole.
The SC is of the opinion that the present
Constitution does not contemplate in Art. XV, Sec. 1 as
plebiscite or “election” wherein the people are in the dark
as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AMENDMENTS
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SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333, October 12, 1976
Facts:
Pres. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum for the Citizen Assemblies (Barangays) to
resolve the issues of martial law, its replacement, the
period of its existence, the length of the period for tile
exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days
after, President issued PD 1031, amending PD 991,by
declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in Citizen
Assemblies applicable to the national referendum-
plebiscite. On the same date, President issued PD 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on Oct. 16, 1976.
Pablo and Pablito Sanidad commenced a Petition
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
declare without force and effect PD 991 and 1033. They
contend that under the 1935/1973 Constitution there is no
grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. Hence, the referendum-plebiscite on Oct. 16
has no constitutional or legal basis.
In its comment, the COMELEC (SOL-GEN)
maintains that the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of the SC and that only the incumbent
President has the authority to exercise constituent power.
Hence, the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
Issue:
W/N the issue raised is political in nature which is
beyond the ambit of the Supreme Court.
Ruling:
NO, the SC disagree with the contention of the
Solicitor General that the question at bar is political in
nature. The amending process both as to proposal and
ratification, raises a judicial question.
Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or
law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc
and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members.
..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not
only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The
amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in
form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that
power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of
the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or
non-political.
The SC cannot accept the view of the Solicitor
General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose
amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted
for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie
in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for
the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the
constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course who exercise no power of judicial but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested
that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for
amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry
must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the
submission to and ratification by the people.

This is especially true in cases where the power of the

Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is
seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the
interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15,
Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The
normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the
National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly
the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments
and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing
Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly
purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon.

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PRINCIPLE OF SUGGESTION:

HOLY SEE vs. ERIBERTO ROSARIO (GR no. 101949, December 1, 1994)
Facts:
 Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the
Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. On the other hand, Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a
domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.
 This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of
petitioner. The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
 In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.
 Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of
the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the
Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants
 Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one
hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the
agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.
 On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the
motion was filed by private respondent.
 On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding
that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question"
 Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
 On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming
that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it
"adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments
relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit"

Issue:
1. W/N the DFA has legal personality to intervene in the complaint?
2. W/N the HOLY SEE is immune from suit?

Ruling:
1. YES – The DFA has legal personality to intervene in the complaint:
 In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court
that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

 In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination
as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit,
he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to
immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that
effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from
Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

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 In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure
an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign
Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja,
190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect.

 In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this
Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its
memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

2. YES – The HOLY SEE can invoke State immunity:

 The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

 The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and
Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the
Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign
Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly
accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to
all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country

 Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can
ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

 Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the
validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See

DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY BY THE DFA

JEFFREY LIANG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR no. 125865, January 28, 2000)
Facts:
 Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
 Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.
 Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per
criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
 Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the
DFA.
 When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued.
 After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before
the criminal cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt

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Issue:
W/N Jeffrey Liang, being an employee of the ADB, can invoke immunity from suit?

Ruling:
NO, the Supreme Court did not accept the contention of Jeffrey Liang that he is immune from suit due to the Agreement:
 First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by
any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no
binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases
without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated.

 Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides that the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to
rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.

 Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow
the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

 Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND AGENCIES

SEAFDEC vs. NLRC (GR no. 86773, February 14, 1992)

Facts:
 SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center,
organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1,
Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC)
 Private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-
AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III
and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.
 Petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent
informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be
terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986
 Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18,
1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees
with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
 Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the
SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the
proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which
clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent.
 The labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents: (1) To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon
computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment
benefits; and (2) To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney's fees.
 Said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the NLRC

Issue:
W/N the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune
from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained
without its consent.

Ruling:
YES, the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Lazaga’s complaint against SEAFDEC-AQD:

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 Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an

international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

 SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I", id.) to be established in Iloilo for the promotion
of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates:
1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be
vested in the Council.

 Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.
 Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a
considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political.
Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the
International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they
have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such,
according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their
own." (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])

IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND AGENCIES

GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHICAL COOPERATION vs. CA (GR no. 152318, April 16, 2009)
Facts:
 Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-
operation (Agreement).
 On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the
German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed
the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health Insurance—
Networking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to "enable Philippine families–especially poor ones–to
maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality.
 In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE. The
Philippines designated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth)
with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government "charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit[5 ] (GTZ[6 ]) GmbH, Eschborn, with the implementation of its contributions
 Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various dates between
December of 1998 to September of 1999. all the contracts commonly provided that "[i]t is mutually agreed and
understood that [Dr. Tollkotter, as employer] is a seconded GTZ expert who is hiring the Employee on behalf of GTZ
and for a Philippine-German bilateral project named ‘Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment
(SHINE)’ which will end at a given time.
 Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually
arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments
 In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter dated 21 June 2000, all similarly worded except for
their respective addressees. She informed private respondents that the "project’s orientations and evolution" were
decided in consensus with partner institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer subject to modifications.
She said : “it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible.”
 Private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not intended as a resignation
letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as vital issues. 17 Negotiations ensued
between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents received a letter from
Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of
"serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust.
 the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as respondents therein where
GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay.
 On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign
acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the
arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign

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Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered
into the contracts of employment.
 On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order 19 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among
others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to
secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status.
 On 7 February 2001, GTZ filed with the Labor Arbiter a "Reiterating Motion to Dismiss," again praying that the Motion
to Dismiss be granted on the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised.20 No
action was taken by the Labor Arbiter on this new motion. Instead, on 15 October 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision21 granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents were dismissed
without lawful cause, there being "a total lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic]."22 GTZ was faulted
for failing to observe the notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise proceeded from the premise that
GTZ had treated the letter dated 8 June 2000 as a resignation letter, and devoted some focus in debunking this theory.
 The Decision initially offered that it "need not discuss the jurisdictional aspect considering that the same had already
been lengthily discussed in the Order de[n]ying respondents’ Motion to Dismiss." 23 Nonetheless, it proceeded to
discuss the jurisdictional aspect, in this wise:
 Under pain of being repetitious, the undersigned Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint on the
following grounds:
Firstly, under the employment contract entered into between complainants and respondents,
specifically Section 10 thereof, it provides that "contract partners agree that his contract shall be subject to
the LAWS of the jurisdiction of the locality in which the service is performed."
Secondly, respondent having entered into contract, they can no longer invoke the sovereignty of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Lastly, it is imperative to be immune from suit, respondents should have secured from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents’ diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic
privileges including immunity from suits. Having failed in this regard, respondents cannot escape liability from
the shelter of sovereign immunity.[sic]24
 Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiter’s Decision or elevate said decision for
appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals.25 On 10 December 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution 26 dismissing GTZ’s petition,
finding that "judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he appropriate remedy of the petitioners
[being] an appeal to the NLRC x x x."27 A motion for reconsideration to this Resolution proved fruitless for GTZ.

Issue:
W/N the complaint for illegal dismissal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on account of GTZ’s
insistence that it enjoys immunity from suit.

Ruling:
NO, the illegal dismissal complaint cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because GTZ does not enjoys
immunity from suit.
 In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to
whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn,
asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England,
a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a
"suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign
Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

 In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an
executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office
conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130
(1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing
the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health
Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that
effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the
Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a
"suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and
Memorandum as amicus curiae

 The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys
the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both
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the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is
so immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to
properly appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court
of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiter’s decision been a "patent
nullity." Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZ’s claim of immunity,
we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a "patent nullity."

 As a result, there was no basis for petitioners in foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the Court of
Appeals the petition for certiorari. It then follows that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the petition
on that ground. As a further consequence, since petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision, the same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this case, such as whether or
not private respondents were illegally dismissed, are no longer susceptible to review, respecting as we do the finality
of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; FORMS OF CONSENT; GENERAL LAW

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs. NLRC (GR no. 104269, November 11, 1993)
Facts:
 Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract3 on 01 April 1989 for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards
were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.
 Several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages,4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-
90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.
 Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision
became final and executory
 the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit
Toyota Crown.6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner,
pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.
 A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ
issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that,
therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed
equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property
would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.
 The NLRC promulgated a resolution dismissing the petition for injunction. Lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
preciously issued.
 In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
 The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.

Issue:
W/N the Department of Agriculture waived its immunity?
Ruling:
 The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances.
On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its consent;" its
clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving

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the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits
to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim16 or when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without
qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity
 In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.
 But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay
and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act No. 3083,
aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree
("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
 We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with
respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the legal basis for the
State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
 When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against it.
tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove,
if it can, that the State has a liability.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; FORMS OF CONSENT; EXPRESS CONSENT; GENERAL LAW

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA (GR no. L-26400, February 29, 1972)
Facts:
 Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City.
 No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 square
meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had
been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the
Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the
defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public
Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.
 Defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following
affirmative defenses, that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's
fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued;
 RTC trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of
the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent;
 The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of
fact involved.

Issue:
W/N the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case?

Ruling:
 In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of
land used for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando,
held that where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through

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the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there
said: .
“... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had
the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been
filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned,
to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the judgment." If there were an observance of procedural
regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then that precisely because
there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to
be maintained. It is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it
submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked.”
 Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she
has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the
owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of
possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could
and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; FORMS OF CONSENT; EXPRESS CONSENT; SPECIAL LAW

E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (GR no.L-11154, March 21, 1916)
Facts:
 Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General
Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work.
 The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled.
 After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.

Issues:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to
the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

Ruling:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have
been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives
a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated
by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the
Government is not liable.

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WAIVER OF IMMUNITY; FORMS OF CONSENT; IMPLIED CONSENT;

WHEN THE STATE ENTERS INTO A CONTRACT

USA vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ (GR no. L-35645, May 22, 1985)
Facts:
 The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited
the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so
they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department
of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the
projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issue:
W/N the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state
immunity.

Ruling:
 The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the
United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public
International Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)
 The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the
defendants' (now petitioners) motion: " A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the
sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts (Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge
also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is
certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character.
 It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and,
therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States
and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

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