Emotion © 2009 American Psychological Association

2009, Vol. 9, No. 6, 821– 837 1528-3542/09/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0017812

An S-Shaped Relationship Between Changes in Appraisals and

Changes in Emotions

Eddie M. W. Tong and Phoebe C. Ellsworth George D. Bishop

University of Michigan National University of Singapore

Previous research on appraisal theories of emotion has shown that emotions and appraisals are related but
has not specified the nature of the relationships. This research examined the functional forms of
appraisal-emotion relationships and demonstrated that for all seven appraisals studied, appraisals relate
to emotions in an S-shaped (ogival) fashion: Changes in appraisals at extreme levels are associated with
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only small changes in emotions, but changes at moderate levels are associated with substantial changes
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in emotions. With a few exceptions, ogival relationships were found for the relationships between seven
appraisals (Goal Achievement Expectancy, Agency, Control, Certainty, Fairness, Pleasantness, and
Motive Congruence) and numerous relevant emotions across different sample-types, cultures, and
methods.

Keywords: appraisal, emotions, S-shaped function

Spinoza (1992) envisioned a mathematical model of the
human emotional system in which psychological inputs, such as
thoughts and goals, combine to produce emotional responses.
Following his lead, several researchers have outlined models of
the way cognition interfaces with emotion, and a growing body
of evidence suggests that a linear relation between cognition
and emotion is too simplistic (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Cacioppo,
Gardner, & Berntson, 1999; Priester & Petty, 1996; Sander,
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005). These early indications of non-
linear relations between cognition and emotion may have im-
portant implications for appraisal theories, which state that
emotions correspond to specific patterns of appraisals. Consider
some possible relationships between joy and a bipolar appraisal
of Pleasantness ranging from extremely unpleasant to extremely
pleasant. A linear function (Figure 1A) implies that every unit
of change in Pleasantness is associated with the same amount of
change in joy. Concave (Figure 1B), convex (Figure 1C), or
ogival S-shaped (Figure 1D) functions imply that significant
Eddie M. W. Tong and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Michigan; George D. Bishop, Department of Psychol-
ogy, National University of Singapore.
We thank Barbara Fredrickson, Norbert Schwarz, and Stephen Taylor
for their helpful comments. We also thank Hwee Chong Enkelmann, Yong
Peng Why, Siew Maan Diong, Majeed Khader, and Jansen Ang for their
assistance in collecting the data for Study 2. The final write-up of this
research was completed while the second author was a Visiting Scholar at
the Russell Sage Foundation.
This research was funded by Grant No. R-581-000-065-112 and R-581-
000-065-133 from the National University of Singapore Academic Re-
search Fund, and Grant No. R-107-000-007-012 from the National Uni-
versity of Singapore, with supplemental funds from the Singapore Ministry
of Home Affairs, Singapore Police Force.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Eddie
M. W. Tong, PhD., Department of Psychology, National University of
Singapore, 9 Arts Link, Room 02-09, Singapore 117570. E-mail:
psytmwe@nus.edu.sg
variation in joy occurs only within a limited range of Pleasant-
ness. Finally, threshold functions (Figures 1E and 1F) imply
that joy emerges abruptly after Pleasantness reaches a certain
level.
The examples in Figure 1 raise questions about the operating
specifications of appraisal-emotion processes that are still un-
examined, questions like whether emotions vary with appraisals
equally across the entire range of the appraisals (Figure 1A),
primarily at one extreme (Figures 1B and 1C), or primarily at
intermediate levels (Figure 1D). On a more general note, schol-
ars have recognized the need to understand the computational
architecture of the emotion system. As Cacioppo and Berntson
(1999) noted, “research on the architecture and operating char-
acteristics of the affect system is still relatively recent” (p. 136).
Documenting the operating specifications of the emotion sys-
tem, however, is important for understanding and making pre-
dictions about the interface between cognition and emotion.
Similarly, as Kappas (2001) noted, without knowing the oper-
ating specifications by which the human mind computes ap-
praisal and emotion information, it is difficult to make accurate
predictions about how emotions change with appraisals. This
research is an initial attempt to discover the functional form of
appraisal-emotion relationships.
Appraisal Theories of Emotion
Appraisal theories of emotion can be traced to Magda Arnold
(1960), who conceptualized appraisals as direct, immediate, and
intuitive evaluations of the environment. People evaluate events
along several appraisal dimensions, such as pleasantness, agency,
certainty, and control. The basic prediction is that emotions are
associated with particular combinations of appraisals (Arnold,
1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988;
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984). For example, appraising an event
as unpleasant and caused by other people is associated with anger,

821
 822 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP
Emotion
Emotion
Appraisal Appraisal
A B
Emotion
Emotion
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Appraisal Appraisal
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C D
Emotion
Emotion
Appraisal Appraisal
E F
Emotion
Appraisal
G
Figure 1. Examples of appraisal-emotion functional forms. In these hy-
pothetical examples, the appraisal is a bipolar variable (ranging, e.g.,
between extremely unpleasant and extremely pleasant) and the emotion
ranges from zero to maximum intensity.
whereas appraising an event as unpleasant and caused by oneself
is associated with guilt or shame.
Appraisal theories have evolved in several directions. First,
different theorists have proposed different sets of appraisals to
differentiate emotions, although there is considerable overlap
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony et al.,
1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985;
Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Second, while appraisal theorists
initially studied appraisals as antecedents of emotions (e.g.,
Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966), subsequent studies showed that
emotions can also shape appraisals (Keltner, Ellsworth, &
Edwards, 1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), which supports the
view that emotions and appraisals are components of the same
affective state (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Beyond these dif-
ferences, appraisal theories share the assumption that each
emotion is associated with a specific pattern of appraisals. This
concept was developed further by Smith and Lazarus (1993)
who conceptualized appraisals are molecular components that
combine to produce core-relational themes which are posited to
be a more proximal cause of emotions (Smith, Haynes, Lazarus,
& Pope, 1993).
Research has generally found support for many predicted
appraisal-emotion relationships (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith,
1988a, 1988b; Kuppens, van Mechelen, Smits, & de Boeck,
2003; Neumann, 2000; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990;
Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Smith & Laza-
rus, 1993; Tong et al., 2005, 2007). Despite this support,
appraisal research has provided almost no information about the
functional forms of appraisal-emotion relationships. Experi-
mental studies (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, 1988b; Smith &
Lazarus, 1993; van Reekum et al., 2004) have typically manip-
ulated appraisals over only two or three levels. However, spec-
ifying the exact form of these relationships requires that ap-
praisals be varied over many levels. Correlational studies (e.g.,
Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985,
1987) have produced significant appraisal-emotion relation-
ships. However, none of these studies has specified the precise
functional form of the relationships, and a significant correla-
tion is consistent with all of the functions in Figure 1.
Our aim is to provide some initial data on this issue. Our
approach is based on Ellsworth and Scherer’s (2003) appraisal
theories but is also relevant to other appraisal theories, all of which
are based on the assumption that emotions are related to the
appraisal of events (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Ortony et al., 1988; Rose-
man, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). We examined a wide range of
appraisals, so as to discover whether appraisal-emotion relation-
ships have the same or different functions. And, as a first step, we
only examined relationships between individual appraisals and
emotions, although emotions are better predicted by combinations
of appraisals (Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984).
Possible Appraisal-Emotion Functions
The theory most relevant to this issue is Kappas’s (2001)
Dynamic Appraisal Theory of Emotion (DATE), which pro-
poses transfer, functions by which information is transformed
across domains in the emotion system. Drawing from the
cognitive-neurological literature (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992),
Kappas argues that appraisal-emotion processes can be under-
stood as information transformation processes in ways consis-
tent with neurological activations across different cortical re-
gions. He proposed that four types of transfer functions should
be studied: transfer functions that connect objective attributes
(e.g., between task difficulty and objective probability of suc-
cess), functions that convert objective attributes into appraisals
(e.g., from objective task difficulty to perceived coping ability),
functions that relate appraisals to other responses (e.g., between
perceived coping ability and subjective feeling), and transfer
functions that connect these other responses (e.g., between
subjective feeling and respiratory rate).
In particular, Kappas proposed that appraisals transform in-
formation via ogival transfer functions (i.e., Figure 1D). To use
his example, imagine an experiment where the difficulty of a
task (e.g., an arithmetic task) varies. It is reasonable to assume
that as task difficulty increases perceived control over the task
decreases, but in an ogival fashion. At extremely low levels of
task difficulty (e.g., 2 ⫻ 2, 2 ⫻ 4, 2 ⫻ 6), the probability of
success will be close to one and, hence, most people should
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS
have complete confidence that they can accomplish the task. At
extremely high levels of task difficulty, the probability of
success should be close to zero and, thus, most people should
see themselves as completely incapable of handling it (e.g.,
2837462 ⫻ 434, 2837462 ⫻ 436, 2837462 ⫻ 438). However, in
the middle range there should be a linear decrease in perceived
control with increasing task difficulty.
In fact, ogival functions are common across many psycho-
logical processes, including psychophysical responses, neuro-
nal signals, risk-taking, cognitive development, consumer be-
haviors, and even the progress of technological advances
(Ausubel & Marchetti, 1997; Casti, 1995; Friedman & Savage,
1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Siegler & Crowley, 1991;
Treisman, 1999). However, little is known about whether
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appraisal-emotion processes (or emotion processes in general
for that matter) are characterized by ogival functions. Besides
cognitive-neurological processes, suggestions that appraisal-
emotion relationships might follow ogival functions are found
in psycho-physiological processes. Based on findings on auto-
nomic control, Berntson and colleagues (1991) propose that the
effects of sympathetic and parasympathetic activation on re-
lated organs should follow S-shaped patterns. Extending this
proposition, Cacioppo et al. (1992) posit that the effects of
emotional stimuli on sympathetic and somatic systems should
also show ogival forms. Indeed, modeling physiological re-
sponses using sigmoid functions holds promise in accounting
for individual differences in the reactivity, thresholds, and
maximal intensity of sympathetic and somatic outputs (e.g.,
Kasprowicz, Manuck, Malkoff, & Krantz, 1990). Although the
relationships between physiological indices and emotion are far
from clear (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, & Poehlmann, 2000)
and these models require empirical validation, these accounts
are consistent with ogival appraisal-emotion relationships.
However, there is no direct evidence of ogival functions be-
tween appraisals and emotions. An adequate study of this issue
would require that the variables of interest be manipulated and
measured over a wide range between their two extreme ends (e.g.,
between extreme unpleasantness to extreme pleasantness). This
crucial methodological feature is lacking in all appraisal studies we
know of.
A small handful of studies within and outside of appraisal
research have produced hints of ogival functions, but these studies
have several limitations. First, Kappas and Pecchinenda (2001)
had participants play a video game that varied across nine levels of
difficulty. The relationship between objective difficulty and self-
reported liking suggested an ogival function.1 However, given that
perceived difficulty was the only appraisal manipulated and dif-
fuse liking was the only affect-related variable, the generalizability
of the findings to other appraisal-emotion relationships is un-
known. Second, Leary and colleagues (1998) had participants read
vignettes that varied in small gradations from complete social
acceptance to complete rejection. The relationships between social
acceptance/rejection and self-reported emotions were ogival. How-
ever, social acceptance/rejection is not specified as an appraisal by
any of the major appraisal theories and, hence, the relevance of
these findings to appraisal-emotion processes is questionable. Fi-
nally, Priester and Petty (1996) had participants generate different
combinations of positive and negative thoughts on a variety of
issues and then rate how ambivalent they felt about these issues.
823
The relationships between manipulated conflicting thoughts and
attitudinal ambiguity approximated ogival functions. Again, the
relevance of these findings to appraisal-emotion processes is open
to question.
Other theorists have posited nonogival functions between cog-
nition and emotion. Drawing from catastrophe theory, Sander and
colleagues (2005) proposed the model illustrated in Figure 1G. An
emotion can vary linearly with an appraisal at low levels, but at a
certain point it makes an abrupt shift to higher intensities at which
it again varies linearly with the appraisal. While the catastrophe
theory seems to have some support from studies of flight/fight
behaviors in animals (Zeeman, 1976), it is not known whether it
can be applied to appraisal-emotion processes in humans. Also,
Cacioppo and colleagues (1999) propose that the relationships
between appetitive and aversive systems and global approach/
avoidance responses should follow negatively accelerating func-
tions like that in Figure 1C. However, it is unclear whether this
model applies to appraisals and emotions specifically. Note that
evidence supporting one model should not be taken as necessarily
disconfirming other models, since different models refer to differ-
ent types of affect variables. Also, the disparities among the
models are not surprising given that there is little prior data or
theory to build on.
Current Research Objectives and Strategies
The goal of the present research is to take a first step in
providing empirical evidence about the functional form of
appraisal-emotion relationships. This enterprise is important for
several reasons (Kappas, 2001). If emotions vary with appraisals in
some regions and not others, then this knowledge could be crucial
in assessing the impact of particular levels of the appraisals and
also in deciding how appraisals should be manipulated to produce
significant influence on emotions. The same considerations apply
to research on the effects of appraisals on behavioral and physio-
logical responses. Understanding functional forms may suggest
hypotheses about the brain structures, basic cognitive processes,
and physiological systems involved in emotions. However, since
the basis for predictions is not strong, we conducted this research
in an exploratory mode. There are hints that appraisal-emotion
relationships may follow ogival functions, but these hints are
tentative. And it is an open question whether the same function
characterizes most or all appraisal-emotion relationships, or
whether the functions are different for different appraisals. Our
strategy was to examine a fairly extensive range of appraisals and
emotions, so as to determine whether any function is common
across most appraisal-emotion relationships. If many appraisal-
emotion relationships exhibit the same function, we can be more
confident that that function characterizes appraisal-emotion pro-
cesses in general.
We examined seven appraisals: (a) Goal Achievement Expect-
ancy indicates how attainable one expects a goal to be; (b) Agency
reflects the extent to which an event is seen as caused by oneself
versus another person; (c) Control refers to the perceived ability to
control what is happening; (d) Certainty pertains to the sense of
1
This study was described in a poster and no statistical tests of these
functions were reported.
 824 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP

certainty or uncertainty about the event; (e) Fairness indicates how
fair or unfair the event is seen to be; (f) Pleasantness is the
perceived valence of the event; and (g) Motive Congruence con-
cerns the appraisal of how closely an outcome matches one’s goal.
These appraisals are common to most appraisal theories (e.g.,
Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Ortony et al., 1988;
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Al-
though some appraisal theorists do not consider Pleasantness as an
appraisal (e.g., Roseman, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), others do
(e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).
We included it despite these disagreements since all theorists
consider Pleasantness as an essential dimension distinguishing
emotions, whether or not they designate it as an “appraisal”
(Zajonc, 1998).
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this approach has shortcomings, and Study 2 was aimed at addressing
some of these shortcomings by using Ecological Momentary Assess-
ment.
Study I: Vignette Method
In Study 1, we used vignettes to manipulate Goal Achievement
Expectancy, Agency, and Control across 10 levels and measured
reported emotions (adapting the method by Leary et al., 1998). We
used a between-participants design instead of a within-participant
design primarily because in a within-participant design, where
each participant saw 10 variations of the same vignette differing
only on the appraisal information, our hypotheses would be obvi-
ous and demand characteristics would be strong. A between-

participants design, however, cannot reveal functions at the indi-

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For each appraisal, one or two relevant primary emotions were

examined. These are emotions for which past research suggests
clear predictions for that appraisal (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a,
1988b; Kuppens et al., 2003; Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992;
Neumann, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer,
1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith et al., 1993; Stipek, Weiner,
& Li, 1989; Tong et al., 2005, 2007). The predictions are presented
in Table 1. Since other emotions were also measured (as primary
emotions for other appraisals), we also examined how these sec-
ondary emotions might relate to the appraisal. For clarity, we
called the relationships involving the primary emotions primary
relationships (see Table 1, in bold) and those relationships involv-
ing the secondary emotions secondary relationships. By secondary
relationships, we do not necessarily mean that they are less im-
portant or less central than the primary relationships; this overly
simplified distinction only reflects our focus for each appraisal.
Secondary emotions may or may not be related to the appraisals,
but since we measured them, we analyzed them. Making predic-
tions for some of these secondary relationships was difficult, since
past evidence for many of them is mixed, weak, or nonexistent. We
made tentative predictions for them (sometimes giving our best
guesses) based on past findings and their plausibility in the context
of our studies. These predictions will be described in each study.
In addition, we employed a multimethod approach. In Study 1, we
manipulated appraisals using vignettes in a between-participants de-
sign and had participants rate their emotional responses. However,
vidual level. We will return to this issue later.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 88 (60 females) students from the University
of Michigan who participated for course credit in groups of 5 to 10.
The order of vignettes was randomized. We designed the vignettes
to describe situations undergraduates could relate to. The apprais-
als in all vignettes were manipulated in the same manner. Partic-
ipants were randomly assigned to one of 10 appraisal conditions.
They were told to read each vignette carefully and to imagine
themselves experiencing the event described. Emotions and ap-
praisals were rated after each vignette.
Materials
Goal Achievement Expectancy vignette. The Goal Achieve-
ment Expectancy vignette described the protagonist as infatuated
with someone (see Appendix). The appraisal was manipulated by
information about the protagonist’s chances of romantic success
(given by a close confidante of the beloved) that ranged from very
high expectation of failure to very high expectation of success.
Participants assigned to the lowest and highest Goal Achievement
Expectancy conditions saw that 1 and 10, respectively, were cir-

Table 1
Predictions of Relationships Between Appraisals and Emotions

Self-conscious Positive control Negative control

Variable Joy Sadness Anger emotions emotions emotions Fear Hope

Goal Achievement Expectancy (Study I) Positive Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative
Agency (Study I) None None Positive Negative None None
Control (Study I) Positive Negative Open None Positive Negative
Certainty (Study II) Open Negative Negative
Fairness (Study II) Negative None None
Pleasantness (Study II) Positive Negative Negative
Motive Congruence (Study II) Positive Negative Negative

Note. “Positive” and “Negative” indicate that positive and negative relationships were expected, respectively. “Open” indicates no prediction was made.
“None” indicates that no relationship was expected. Those highlighted in bold were classified as main relationships; otherwise, they were classified as
secondary relationships. No predictions were made for other relationships that were not examined. High levels of Agency indicate events are attributed more
to other people than to oneself. For Study I, Joy comprised the items happy, glad, joyful, and delighted; Sadness comprised depressed and sad; Anger
comprised angry and frustrated; Self-Conscious Emotions comprised guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, and embarrassed; Positive Control Emotions
comprised encouraged, effective, and psyched; Negative Control Emotions comprised overwhelmed and troubled.
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS
cled. For those assigned to the other eight conditions, numbers
between 2 to 9 were circled.
Agency vignette. The Agency manipulation was designed to
direct attribution of responsibility for an undesirable event to the
protagonist and a partner (see Appendix). As a team, the protag-
onist and the partner failed to win a competition. Responsibility
was indicated by the number of questions each person answered
correctly. At one extreme, the protagonist answered all 10 ques-
tions correctly (10 was circled on the feedback scale titled “Your
score”) and the partner answered only one correctly (1 was circled
on the feedback scale titled “Your partner’s score”). In the next
condition, the protagonist got nine questions correct and the part-
ner only two, and so on.
Control vignette. In the Control vignette, the protagonist
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evaluated how well he or she could cope with the demands of
a difficult and important course. Control was manipulated by
assessment of personal control over academic workload (see
Appendix).
Emotion items. For each vignette, participants thought about
how they would feel if they were the protagonist and then an-
swered items which began with “I feel . . . .” The items measured
Joy (items: happy, glad, joyful, delighted), Anger (angry, frus-
trated), Sadness (depressed, sad), Self-Conscious Emotions
(guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, embarrassed), Positive Control
Emotions (encouraged, effective, “psyched”),2 and Negative Con-
trol Emotions (overwhelmed, troubled). All items were rated on
10-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).
Perceived appraisals. As manipulation checks, participants
rated the items “I feel that I can get what I want” (Perceived Goal
Achievement Expectancy), “I think that I am responsible for what
happens” (Perceived Agency-Self), “I think that other person(s) are
(is) responsible for what happens” (Perceived Agency-Others), and
“I feel that I can control what happens” (Perceived Control). The
same appraisal items were rated for each vignette and were rated
on 10-point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10
(strongly agree). We label these appraisal items with the prefix
“Perceived” to avoid confusion with the manipulated appraisals.
Results
Overview of Analytic Strategy
We describe our analytical strategy using Goal Achievement
Expectancy as an illustration; all other appraisals were examined
in the same way. For manipulation check analyses, we tested
whether the Goal Achievement Expectancy manipulation affected
Perceived Goal Achievement Expectancy linearly as intended. For
the main analyses, we tested whether the effect of the Goal
Achievement Expectancy manipulation on each emotion was lin-
ear or nonlinear, and if nonlinear, what form of nonlinearity. Thus,
both analyses were done in the same way since the aim was to
examine the linearity or nonlinearity of the relationships.
First, the dependent variable (perceived appraisal or emotion)
was regressed onto the linear Goal Achievement Expectancy term,
and the resulting residual plot was checked for nonlinearity. Lin-
earity (e.g., Figure 1A) would be indicated by a flat and horizontal
bend with a residual mean of zero. Indications of nonlinearity
would include a U-shaped residual bend below the zero axis
(indicative of Figure 1C), an inverted U-shaped bend above the
825
zero axis (e.g., Figures 1B and 1F), or a straight sloping bend that
crosses the zero axis (e.g., Figures 1D and 1E; Neter, Wasserman,
& Kutner, 2000). Second, the plot of the dependent variable
against Goal Achievement Expectancy was examined. A step
function (e.g., Figure 1E) should be straightforward, revealed as a
sharp change within two consecutive Goal Achievement Expect-
ancy levels; other forms should also be discernable visually. Third,
the statistical significance of any nonlinearity was tested in a
regression where the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of Goal
Achievement Expectancy were entered simultaneously. If only the
linear term (as indicated by the regression weight ␤L) was signif-
icant, a linear trend would be supported. Quadratic trends (e.g.,
Figures 1B and 1C) would be indicated if the quadratic term (␤Q)
was significant independently of the linear and cubic terms and if
the cubic term (␤C) was not significant. A significant cubic term
that is independent of the linear and quadratic terms would be
consistent with an ogival function (Figure 1D). Functions such as
that in Figure 1F would involve emotion scores not significantly
different from zero on one polarity and a monotonic function on
the other polarity, which could be tested in the same way as testing
functions across the full spectrum. All tests were two-tailed.
Manipulation Checks
The effect of Goal Achievement Expectancy on Perceived Goal
Achievement Expectancy was linear (see Figure 2A). The linear
term was significant (␤LⴱExpectancy ⫽ .62, p ⬍ .001) but not the
quadratic and cubic terms. The effects of Agency were tested on
Perceived Agency-Self, Perceived Agency-Other, and a Perceived
Agency variable that subtracted Agency-Self from Agency-Other.
In all cases, the linear term made a significant contribution
(␤LⴱAgency ⫽ ⫺.56, .35, and .53, for Perceived Agency-Self, Per-
ceived Agency-Others, and Perceived Agency respectively, all
ps ⬍ .01), whereas the quadratic and cubic terms did not. Thus, the
effects of Agency were linear (Figures 2B to 2D). Finally, the
effect of Control on Perceived Control was also linear; the linear
term was significant (␤LⴱControl ⫽ .67, p ⬍ .001) and the quadratic
and cubic terms were not (Figure 2E). In all cases, the residual
plots derived from the linear models did not support nonlinearity.
Main Analysis
The results of the main analyses are presented in Table 2 and
Figure 3. We present plots for all primary relationships. Plots for
the secondary relationships are presented whenever relevant.
Goal Achievement Expectancy. The relationships between
Goal Achievement Expectancy and the two primary emotions (Joy
and Sadness) were S-shaped (Figures 3A and 3B). For each emo-
tion, the residual plot from the linear model showed a straight
residual slope. Regression analyses confirmed the presence of
nonlinearity; for both emotions, ␤C was significant (see Table 2).
It is interesting to examine the secondary relationships as well.
The literature on goal-pursuit suggests that failure to reach goals
evokes negative emotions, such as sadness, anger, guilt, shame,
fear, and hopelessness, whereas success leads to positive emo-
2
“Psyched” is used by American undergraduates to describe feeling
excited, energetic, and ready to meet a challenge.
 826 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP

Perceived Goal Acheivemen t

10 10

Perceived Agency-Self
8 8

Expectancy
6 6
4 4
2 2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Goal Acheivement Expectancy Agency

A B
Perceived Agency-Others

10 4
8

Perceived Agency
2
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6
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0
4
-2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2
-4
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 -6
Agency Agency

C D

10
Perceived Control

8
6
4
2
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Control

Figure 2. Effects of manipulated appraisals on perceived appraisals (Study 1). The appraisals are bipolar and
range between 0 and 10 to conform to the appraisal-feedback participants saw. Regression analyses suggest that
linear patterns describe these distributions better than nonlinear patterns.

tional outcomes, such as joy, hope, confidence, and subjective
well-being (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Hence, we predicted that
Goal Achievement Expectancy should have negative effects on the
Anger, the Self-Conscious Emotions, and the Negative Control
Emotions, and a positive effect on the Positive Control Emotions.
These predictions also seemed plausible in the context of the
vignette: If one expects that winning the love of a desired person
is improbable, one may feel angry, discouraged, and engage in
self-blame. If one expects one’s feelings to be reciprocated, one
may be more encouraged, less angry, and less likely to blame
oneself. Analyses indicated that Goal Achievement Expectancy
was indeed negatively associated with Anger, the Self-Conscious
Emotions, and the Negative Control Emotions but positively as-
sociated with the Positive Control Emotions. Examination of the
cubic terms and the plots suggest significant ogival patterns for all
these emotions (Table 2 and Figures 3C to 3F). However, the
pattern for the Self-Conscious Emotions (Figure 3D) does not
seem to be ogival. Finally, in all cases, there was no clear indica-
tion of linearity from the residual plots of the linear models.
Agency. The primary relationships here concern Anger and the
Self-Conscious Emotions. For the Self-Conscious Emotions, a clear
straight residual slope was found from the linear model. The cubic
term was an independent predictor apart from the linear and quadratic
terms (see Table 2). As shown in Figure 3H, the Self-Conscious
Emotions showed an ogival relationship with Agency.3 However,
there was no effect of Agency on Anger (Table 2, Figure 3G).
Next, we examined the secondary relationships. Joy and Sad-
ness are generally not posited by appraisal theorists to be related to
human Agency (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Also, we did not
expect them to vary across different versions of the Agency
vignette. The Agency vignette describes a negative event across
all 10 Agency conditions, which suggests that Joy and Sadness
should be low and high, respectively, across all 10 Agency
3
Another interpretation for Self-Conscious Emotions is that a step
function such as that in Figure 1E, is possible, since the scores for
Self-Conscious Emotions seem to cluster around a high value between
Agency levels 1 to 4 and around a low value between Agency levels 6 to
10. However, Self-Conscious Emotions were intermediate at Agency level
5. Also, the scores were generally higher at levels 6, 7, and 8 than at levels
9 and 10, indicating the low end of an ogival pattern.
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS 827

Table 2
Regression Weights Predicting Emotion by the Linear, Quadratic, and Cubic Terms of the Appraisal (Study I)

Self-conscious Positive control Negative control

Variable Joy Sadness Anger emotions emotions emotions

Goal achievement expectancy

Linear ⴚ1.45ⴱⴱⴱ ⴚ.31 ⫺.60 ⫺.06 ⫺.95ⴱ ⫺.56
Quadratic 5.05ⴱⴱⴱ ⴚ.22t ⫺1.69 ⫺2.56t 4.23ⴱⴱⴱ ⫺1.75
Cubic ⴚ2.80ⴱⴱⴱ 1.71ⴱ 1.50ⴱ 2.23ⴱ ⫺2.49ⴱⴱⴱ 1.52ⴱ
Agency
Linear ⫺.69 ⫺.24 .95 1.31 .35 .66
Quadratic .89 ⫺1.56 ⴚ3.45 ⴚ5.66ⴱⴱ ⫺.39 ⫺3.25
Cubic .08 1.50 2.74 3.66ⴱⴱ .42 2.25
Control
Linear ⫺1.37t 1.32ⴱ .66 .22 ⴚ1.18 .67
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Quadratic 3.83ⴱ ⫺5.77ⴱⴱⴱ ⫺3.97ⴱⴱ ⫺2.50 4.05ⴱ ⴚ3.97ⴱⴱ

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Cubic ⫺1.69 3.67ⴱⴱⴱ 2.49ⴱⴱ 1.65 ⴚ2.08ⴱ 2.49ⴱⴱ

Note. All tests were two-tailed. Those highlighted in bold were classified as primary relationships; otherwise, they were classified as secondary
relationships. See Table 1 for items that made up the emotion measures.
t
p ⬍ .10. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

conditions. We also did not expect Agency to be related to the
Control Emotions. The vignette concerns an event whose out-
come is already known. The Control Emotions (e.g., encour-
aged, “psyched”), however, tend to occur in situations where
one is still in pursuit of a goal. Also, as far as we know, no past
studies have examined self-other agency appraisals in relation
to the Control Emotions examined here. Consistently, our anal-
yses showed that Agency was not related to Joy, Sadness, or the
two Control Emotions (see Table 2).
Control. For both Control Emotions, the cubic terms were
significant and they showed S-shaped relationships with Control
(Table 2, Figures 3I and 3J).
Control has been found in past studies to be positively related
to Joy and negatively related to Sadness (e.g., Scherer, 1997)
and these findings were replicated here (see Table 2). Both
relationships appeared ogival (Figures 3K and 3L), but only the
ogival pattern for Sadness was significant (see Table 2). Past
studies showed mixed results with regard to the relationship
between Anger and Control, with some findings indicating a
negative relationship (e.g., Tong et al., 2007) and others sug-
gesting a positive relationship (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a).
Hence, no prediction was made for this relationship. Our study
produced a negative Control-Anger relationship and found this
relationship to be ogival (Table 2, Figure 3M). Finally, past
research has hardly ever found any relationship between Con-
trol and the Self-Conscious Emotions (e.g., Roseman et al.,
1990; Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and consis-
tently, we found none in our study (see Table 2).4
Discussion
Study 1 provides the first empirical evidence regarding the
functional forms of appraisal-emotion relationships. The data sug-
gest that appraisal-emotion relationships tend to be ogival in form.
Considering first the primary relationships, changes in Goal
Achievement Expectancy produced S-shaped changes in Joy and
Sadness (all in directions consistent with appraisal theories). Sim-
ilarly, changes in Agency and Control were associated with intel-
ligible S-shaped patterns in most of the primary emotions. An
unexpected finding is that Agency was unrelated to anger (there
was not even a linear relationship). Reported Anger was consis-
tently high across all levels of Agency. It is possible that the
Agency vignette might have been so strong that everyone reported
feeling angry, regardless of the level of Agency, or participants
might have rated anger high because they were angry with them-
selves (they were not given a self-anger scale; Ellsworth & Tong,
2006). In addition, several secondary relationships, particularly
those with a priori predictions, were also ogival.
With a few exceptions, the appraisal-emotion relationships con-
sistently exhibited ogival functions. Nonetheless, some questions
remain. First, these ogival structures might simply be due to the
procedure, in that any two variables would form an ogival rela-
tionship regardless of whether they are theoretically related. This
appears unlikely. Some appraisals and emotions were not predicted
to be related (e.g., between Agency and Joy), which means that
these nonrelationships should not exhibit the same functional
forms as the predicted relationships. Our analyses indicated that
4
We also regressed each emotion onto the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms
of the corresponding perceived appraisals. However, no terms reached statis-
tically significant levels in any of the analyses, whereas the linear, quadratic,
and cubic terms by themselves were significantly and predictably related to the
emotions. This was indicative of multicollinearity problems, which was con-
firmed by the Condition Indices and the Variance Proportions of the regression
models (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, for procedures to detect multicol-
linearity). As far as we know, there are no reliable ways to eradicate multi-
collinearity problems (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Standardizing the linear,
quadratic, and cubic terms, which are among the typical ways to reduce the
impact of multicollinearity effects, did not help. Curve-estimation techniques
suggest ogival functions in most relationships and yet all produced nonsignif-
icant linear, quadratic, and cubic terms. Hence, we cannot provide the con-
ventional statistical confirmation of the functions relating the emotions to the
perceived appraisals. Despite this, all of the residual plots derived from linear
models in which the emotions are predicted from perceived appraisals showed
very clear signs of nonlinearity. All of them showed straight downward
sloping bends crossing the zero-axes which are indications that relationships
cannot be linear but are more likely to be ogival (see Overview of Analytical
Strategy).
 828 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP

their linear, quadratic, and cubic terms were nonsignificant and, of

10 10 course, did not exhibit ogival patterns. In sum, theoretically mean-
8 8
ingful appraisal-emotion relationships generally exhibited ogival

Sadness
6 6
Joy

4 4 structures and theoretically nonmeaningful relationships did not,

2 2 which suggests that the results were not a by-product of the
0 0 measurement procedure.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Goal Achievement Expectancy Goal Achievement Expectancy
There are other concerns that Study 1 could not address. First,
the vignette findings may only reflect naı̈ve representations of how
A* p B* n appraisals and emotions are related rather than real appraisal-
10 Self-Focused Emotions 10 emotion relationships (Parkinson, 1997). In other words, they do
8 8
6 6
not demonstrate that real-life appraisals and emotions relate to
Anger

4 4 each other in ogival ways. Second, it is not clear whether these

2 2 ogival patterns would generalize beyond American undergradu-
0 0 ates, beyond laboratory conditions, beyond the situations described
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Goal Achievement Expectancy Goal Achievement Expectancy

in the vignettes, or beyond the three appraisals examined. Finally,
the between-participants design did not permit examination of
Cn Dn appraisal-emotion relationships within individual participants.
Negative Control Emotions

Study 2 addresses these issues.

Positive Control Emotions

10 10
8 8
6 6
4 4
Study II: Ecological Momentary Assessment
2 2
Study 2 employed Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) in
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 which appraisals and emotions were repeatedly assessed, in natural-
Goal Achievement Expectancy Goal Achievement Expectancy istic contexts, as they occurred or immediately afterward. Study 2
included two samples (Samples A and B). Both Samples used the
Ep Fn
same basic EMA design and, hence, are described together. They
Self-Focused Emotions

10 10
8 8
differed in some respects, extending a number of issues that could be
addressed. First, the appraisals of Certainty and Fairness were exam-
Anger

6 6
4 4 ined in Sample A, whereas Pleasantness and Motive Congruence
2 2
were examined in Sample B. Second, Sample A comprised Singa-
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
porean undergraduates who participated during their daily activities,
Agency Agency whereas Sample B comprised Singaporean police officers who par-
G* p H* n ticipated while working. Third, in Sample A, the appraisals were
measured with 7-point scales; with Sample B, they were measured
Negative Control Emotions
Positive Control Emotions

10 10
with 5-point scales. Finally, the appraisal items in Sample A were
8 8
6 6
rated in reference to an event that had just happened. With Sample B,
4 4 they were rated in reference to current inner thoughts. The two
2 2 samples were similar in other respects. Participants in both samples
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
gave online or immediate ratings of appraisals and emotions on
Control Control hand-held computers, in their natural environments, at approximately
every half-hour intervals over 6 to 9 hours during the day.
I* p J* n The EMA data from these two samples should help to address
10 10 the three issues raised in Study 1: Were the ogival functions
8 8 reflecting only naı̈ve representations? How generalizable are the
Sadness

6 6 ogival functions? Do these ogival functions occur within individ-

Joy

4 4
uals? The data were obtained in a wide variety of natural activities
2 2
0 0 related to undergraduates’ lives and police work. Daily activities of
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 undergraduates ranged from classes to social activities and work
Control Control
routines of police officers ranged from desk jobs to street patrol.
Kp Ln Thus, we could test whether ogival appraisal-emotion relationships
10
8
6
Anger

4
2 Figure 3. Effects of manipulated Goal Achievement Expectancy,
0
Agency, and Control on emotions (Study 1). ⴱ Primary relationship, oth-
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Control
erwise it is a secondary relationship; p positive relationship predicted;
n
negative relationship predicted; o no prediction made; otherwise, nonre-
Mo lationship was expected. Each x-axis is bipolar and ranges between 0 and
10 to conform to the appraisal-feedback participants saw.
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS
also occur in a variety of real-world situations. Appraisals and
emotions were reported as they occurred (Sample B) or immedi-
ately afterward (Sample A). Thus, contamination due to memory
biases and semantic representations should be minimal and accu-
rate assessments of appraisals and emotions should be more likely
(Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999; Robinson & Clore, 2002). Data from
police officers would verify whether the results could be general-
ized to a nonundergraduate sample. Participants in both samples
included Chinese, Indian, and Malay ethnicities (the three major
ethnic groups in Singapore), providing tests of cross-cultural gen-
eralizability. If the ogival patterns from the vignette studies reflect
only naı̈ve representations and not real appraisal-emotion relation-
ships, they are likely to be culturally and contextually specific. But
if the same ogival patterns are obtained with immediate assess-
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ments of actual emotions in a very different environment, sample,
and culture, it seems less likely that the functions are simply naı̈ve
representations. These same features also allowed us to examine
the generalizability of ogival functions across different sample-
types, different kinds of events, and additional appraisals. Finally,
EMA data could test appraisal-emotion relationships at the within-
participant level. As noted, the risk of demand characteristics in
using a within-participant in Study 1 was unacceptably high.
Although this risk is not fully eradicated with EMA, it should be
lower than when participants could easily figure out the purpose of
the study when they noticed conspicuous variations in appraisals.
Study 2 could address additional issues. In Sample A, the
appraisals and emotions were assessed with reference to recent
events. However, participants might not be paying attention to
these events. Thus, Sample B participants rated their appraisals
and emotions in reference to issues they were currently thinking
about, which should have a more proximal influence on emotions.
Further, Sample A used a 7-point scale. But a lengthy scale might
make it more likely that responses will level out at the end points.
To counter this, Sample B used a 5-point scale.
Finally, despite the advantages of Study 2, we are mindful not to
overstate its value. Even with EMA, the data were still derived
from self-reports. Hence, our current findings are more suitably
cast as self-report findings of emotions and appraisals. We will
return to this issue later.
Method
Participants
Sample A. Participants were 120 (84 females) undergraduates
from the National University of Singapore (NUS), with 109 Chinese,
8 Indians, and 3 Malays. Mean age was 22.5 years.
Sample B. Participants were 118 male police officers from the
Singapore Police Force. Mean age was 27.3 years. There were 39
Chinese, 46 Indians, and 33 Malays.
Procedure and Materials
Sample A. Participants were recruited by campus notices that
promised monetary compensation for participation in a study. Partic-
ipants reported between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. for a briefing. They were
loaned a handheld palm computer and were told that it would give an
audio signal at random times, during which they were to fill out the
questionnaire in the computer. If the signal came when they were
829
busy, they could postpone answering the questionnaire for up to 10
min. During the briefing, participants were given ample practice in
using the palm computer, and their questions were answered. The
questionnaire was in English, which NUS undergraduates speak flu-
ently. The palm was set to signal at half-hour intervals. Participants
were paid about US$0.53 (S$1.00) each time they completed the palm
questionnaire. Data collection began at 9 a.m. that day and ended at
6 p.m. After data collection, participants were debriefed and thanked.
The questions were mainly about appraisals and emotions. Par-
ticipants were told to focus on the event that had engaged their
attention most in the past 15 min. They rated how they felt during
that event on items that began with “I feel/felt . . .” These emotion
items (fear, hope, and anger) were rated on seven-point scales that
ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). They also rated “During
this event, how uncertain or certain were you about what was
happening?” (Certainty) and “During this event, how fair or unfair
did you think this event was?” (Fairness) on bipolar seven-point
scales that were labeled accordingly (e.g., from very unfair to very
fair). They were also told that if no event had attracted their
attention, their response would be “neutral.” There were fewer
items than in Study 1 because participants had to interrupt their
daily activities to respond. Hence, single items were used, which is
standard practice in appraisal studies.
Sample B. Data for Sample B were part of the ambulatory
section of a larger study on cardiovascular reactivity to stress
among police officers. Participation was encouraged by a presen-
tation on the importance of the study for police work and the
incentive of a lottery with a first prize of shopping vouchers worth
approximately US$412 (S$700). Participation was fully voluntary.
For the purpose of another study, a blood pressure monitor was
attached to each officer throughout his morning-shift, which in-
cluded a variety of police activities like patrolling and desk work.
The monitor was activated at approximately half-hour intervals,
after which a questionnaire in a palm computer was to be filled out.
Data collection began at 8 a.m., and ended between 3 p.m. and
6 p.m., depending on the participant’s availability. Before 8 a.m.,
each participant was hooked up to the monitor while usage of the
palm-top computer was explained. The officers practiced using the
palm computer, and their questions were answered. They were told
that they need not respond to the questionnaire if the monitor was
activated when their work was particularly demanding. Confiden-
tiality was stressed. After data collection, participants were thor-
oughly debriefed and thanked.
The appraisal and emotion items were located at the end of a
questionnaire designed for multiple purposes. Participants were asked
to focus on their feelings and thoughts at that exact moment. First,
they rated how they were currently feeling on a few emotion items
(joy, anger, and sadness) on 5-point scales that ranged from 1 (not at
all) to 5 (extremely). For the appraisal items, they were to “focus on
whatever is on your mind at exactly this point in time,” and then rate
the items “How pleasant/unpleasant is this event?” (Pleasantness) and
“To what extent are you getting what you desire/expect?” (Motive
Congruence). These appraisal items were rated on bipolar five-point
scales that were labeled accordingly (e.g., from very unpleasant to
very pleasant). If nothing was on their mind, their response would be
“neutral.” Again, single items were used since our participants were
police officers who responded while they were working, which meant
 830 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP
we had to be very economical in terms of the number of items we
could include.5
Results
Although Study 2 involved a different design from Study 1, the
basic analytical strategy was still to predict emotions from the
linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of the appraisal predictors.
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992)
was used, which involved modeling within-participant relation-
ships between each emotion and the linear, quadratic, and cubic
terms of the relevant appraisals. However, the distributions for the
negative emotions were extremely skewed to the right because
they were very infrequently reported. With Sample A, Anger and
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Fear were reported (i.e., rated between 2 to 7) only 19.4% and
22.6% of the time, respectively. With Sample B, Anger, Sadness,
and Fear were reported (i.e., rated between 2 to 5) only 23.7%,
18.9%, and 12.4%, of the time, respectively. This low frequency is
commonly found in studies that assess negative emotions in nat-
uralistic contexts (e.g., Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nessel-
roade, 2000; Williams et al., 1991) but creates a problem since
analyses that assume normality are not appropriate. One way to
deal with this is to convert the emotion data into binary codes and
apply binary logistic regression. The positive emotions, Joy and
Hope, were more frequently reported (51.1% and 45.3%, respec-
tively) and had more normal distributions. Hence, either logistic or
ordinary linear regression is sufficient. For comparability, we
applied logistic regressions to both positive and negative emotions.
Logistic regression analyses estimate the probability of the depen-
dent variable occurring. Hence, the analyses amount to estimating
whether the probability of an emotion occurring is a linear or
nonlinear function of the appraisal. For clarity, we present the raw
emotion scores, instead of the odds scores, in our graphs.
Main Analyses
The results are presented in Table 3 and Figures 4 and 5. Plots
for all primary relationships are presented. Plots for secondary
relationships are presented whenever relevant.
Certainty (Sample A). We selected Fear and Hope as the main
emotions for Certainty. However, only Fear was related to Cer-
tainty in an ogival way (Table 3, Figure 4A). Hope, on the other
hand, showed a slightly quadratic relationship with Certainty (Ta-
ble 3, Figure 4B).
Prior evidence for the relationship between Certainty and Anger is
mixed, with some showing a negative relationship (Smith & Ells-
worth, 1987) and others showing no relationship (Roseman et al.,
1990). Hence, we did not make a prediction for Certainty and Anger.
Our analyses indicated that Certainty was negatively related to Anger
and that the relationship was ogival (Table 3, Figure 4C).
Fairness (Sample A). Our prediction that Fairness is nega-
tively related to Anger was supported. Also, this main relationship
was ogival in form (Table 3, Figure 4D).
Past studies have produced no convincing evidence that apprais-
als pertaining to fairness, moral violation, and legitimacy are
related to fear and hope (e.g., Roseman et al., 1990; Scherer,
1997). Hence, we expected them to be nonrelationships. None of
the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of Fairness predicted Hope
(see Table 3). The cubic term predicted Fear independently (see
Table 3). However, the plot of this relationship did not show an
ogival pattern (Figure 4E).
Pleasantness (Sample B). We predicted Joy, Anger, and Sad-
ness to be related to Pleasantness. Our analyses suggest significant
ogival relationships in all three emotions (Table 3, Figures 5A to 5C).
Motive congruence (Sample B). All predicted primary emo-
tions—Anger, Sadness, and Joy— exhibited ogival relationships
with Motive Congruence (Table 3, Figures 5D to 5F).
Discussion
Study 2 was conducted with the aim of addressing some
limitations of Study 1. We had Asian undergraduates and police
officers rate their emotions and appraisals as they occurred or
immediately afterward while going about their daily activities
in their natural environments. This EMA data revealed that
most predicted appraisal-emotion relationships exhibited ogival
patterns. If the ogival patterns reflect semantic representations,
they should vary with cultural and contextual variables. How-
ever, ogival patterns were found across different methods,
environments, samples, and cultures. This also indicates con-
siderable generality of the ogival pattern. Finally, Study 2 found
these ogival appraisal-emotion relationships at within-
individual levels.
General Discussion
The evidence in favor of ogival functions for appraisal-emotion
relationships seems strong. Across all studies, we expected to find
24 (primary and secondary) appraisal-emotion relationships. Of
these, 20 exhibited significant ogival functions.6 Although it is
unclear why a few relationships failed to exhibit ogival patterns,
and these exceptions should be further examined, it seems likely
that most appraisal-emotion relationships follow ogival functions.
Nonetheless, this claim ought to be considered tentative since there
are a few unresolved issues, which we now turn to.
Methodological Concerns
How possible is it that the results are simply due to biases in the
use of the response scales? In other words, people may tend to
respond to any scale in a way that lends itself to ogival patterns
between any pair of variables. However, the functional form for
the theoretically meaningful (primary and secondary) relationships
differed from those obtained for the nonrelationships and the
relationships between manipulated appraisals and measured ap-
praisals. Further, response biases in scale usage within a class of
5
Other appraisals were also measured in Study 2. However, these other
appraisals were measured with unipolar scales and, hence, did not satisfy
our requirement in this paper of studying only appraisals that are manip-
ulated or measured across their full spectrum between the two extreme
ends (Kappas, 2001).
6
Ceiling and floor effects are unlikely to account for the findings in
Study 1 since additional analyses indicated that the emotion scores at the
end-points were significantly lower (and higher) than the highest (lowest)
points of the emotion scales. Ceiling effects are much less of an issue in
Study 2 where the negative emotions leveled off at their maximum level
before they reached the end of the scale.
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS 831

Table 3
Regression Weights From HLM Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Emotion by the Linear,
Quadratic, and Cubic Terms of the Appraisal (Study II)

Variable Fear Hope Anger Sadness Joy

Certainty (Sample A)
Linear .42t .54ⴱ 1.13ⴱⴱⴱ
Quadratic ⴚ.18ⴱⴱ ⴚ.14ⴱ ⫺.49ⴱⴱⴱ
Cubic .01ⴱ .01 .03ⴱⴱⴱ
Fairness (Sample A)
Linear ⫺.25 .83 1.88ⴱⴱⴱ
Quadratic .20ⴱ ⫺.12 ⴚ.55ⴱⴱⴱ
Cubic ⫺.03ⴱⴱⴱ .01 .04ⴱⴱⴱ
Pleasantness (Sample B)
Linear 2.98ⴱⴱⴱ 1.60ⴱⴱ .21ⴱⴱⴱ
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Quadratic ⴚ1.38ⴱⴱⴱ ⴚ.78ⴱⴱⴱ .04

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

Cubic .15ⴱⴱⴱ .08ⴱⴱⴱ .03ⴱⴱ

Motive congruence (Sample B)
Linear 1.86ⴱⴱ 1.30ⴱ 2.14ⴱⴱⴱ
Quadratic 1.00ⴱⴱⴱ ⴚ.78ⴱⴱⴱ ⴚ.64ⴱ
Cubic .11ⴱⴱⴱ .09ⴱⴱ .08ⴱⴱ

Note. All tests were two-tailed. Those highlighted in bold were classified as primary relationships; otherwise,
they were classified as secondary relationships.
t
p ⬍ .10. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

relationships are likely to vary as a function of cultures, occupa-
tions, situations, and methods. However, the ogival function found
for the theoretically meaningful appraisal-emotion relationships
was found in both American and Singaporean samples, in both
undergraduates and police samples, in both laboratory and natural
contexts, and using two very different methods, suggesting that
methodological artifacts are an unlikely alternative explanation
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
All findings were based on self-reports of appraisals and emo-
tions. Future studies may examine the current issue with nonverbal
measures (e.g., autonomic responses and facial movements). The
only study we know of this sort is by Kappas and Pecchinenda
(2001) who manipulated task difficulty in a video game and found
approximately ogival results for self-report liking and physiolog-
ical variables. However, the problems involving nonverbal mea-
sures should not be underestimated. Most nonverbal measures
generally cannot match the precision or subtlety of language.
Research to date suggests that physiological and neurological
measures are useful for measuring valence and arousal but not for
making finer distinctions among emotional experiences (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 2000; Stemmler, 1989, 1992). Vocal measures are
useful for measuring some emotions (e.g., sadness, anger) but not
others (e.g., disgust, contempt; Pittam & Scherer, 1993). Further,
not all emotional processes are accompanied by distinguishable or
visible facial reactions, and many different emotional expressions
may accompany a given emotion (e.g., anger). Since emotions
involve loosely coupled multicomponent processes, it is not sur-
prising that no single index is an unequivocally valid indicator of
emotion. This validity problem is exacerbated if nonverbal mea-
sures are used to index appraisals. Although there is some evidence
suggesting physiological and facial indices for appraisals pertain-
ing to goal-relevance and effort (Aue, Flykt, & Scherer, 2006;
Smith, 1989; van Reekum, et al., 2004), there are not enough
studies to establish any reliable indices for most appraisals.
The problem with self-report is that participants may be unwill-
ing or unable to report inner processes accurately. However, self-
report items of current emotions can be valid (Larsen & Fredrick-
son, 1999) and can tap into phenomenal feelings of emotions
(Barrett, 2004). Our appraisal items were based directly on those
that past studies have shown to be related to emotions in predicted
ways (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). By measuring ap-
praisals and emotions as they occurred or immediately after, the
negative effects of memory biases and cultural, semantic stereo-
types could be minimized (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Finally,
convergent results were obtained from multiple methods, samples,
and environments. These considerations suggest that the current
results cannot be explained away simply by invoking the unreli-
ability of self-reports.
Theoretical Implications
Sigmoid functions are quite common in nature (Casti, 1995;
Friedman & Savage, 1948; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Siegler &
Crowley, 1991; Treisman, 1999), but direct evidence of them in
emotion is rare. The current findings are the first to show that
appraisal-emotion relationships follow ogival forms. Findings
from psycho-physiological (Cacioppo et al., 1992), neurological
(Kappas, 2001; Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992), and social acceptance/
rejection (Leary et al., 1998) studies are consistent with this
conclusion. In sum, multiple lines of research converge to indicate
that the relationships between appraisals and emotions are stronger
at moderate levels than at the extreme ends. But this still begs the
question of what drives ogival appraisal-emotion relationships?
What adaptive functions might they serve?
Past researchers who discovered ogival effects have offered
explanations that may be relevant here. Leary et al. (1998) found
similar ogival relationships between social acceptance/rejection
and emotions. Their explanation is that responding to moderate
levels of social acceptance/rejection is more likely to produce
adaptive changes than responding to extreme levels. Granted that
ogival functions may simply be nonconsequential by-products of
evolution, it might still be worth considering how responding to
 832 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP

2.4 3
2.2
2 2.5

Hope
Fear
1.8
2
1.6
1.4 1.5
1.2
1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Certainty Certainty

n n
A* B*
2 3
1.8 2.5
Anger

Anger
1.6
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2
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1.4
1.2 1.5

1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Certainty Fairness

o
C D* n

2.4
2.2
2
Fear

1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fairness

Figure 4. Relationships between Certainty and Fairness and emotions (Study 2; Sample A). ⴱ Primary
relationship, otherwise it is a secondary relationship; p positive relationship predicted; n negative relationship
predicted; o no prediction made; otherwise, nonrelationship was expected. Each x-axis is bipolar and ranges
between 1 and 7 to conform to the appraisal-feedback participants saw.

changes in appraisals in the moderate range can be more adaptive
than responding to changes in the extreme ends. In developing an
account for the ogival effects, it seems reasonable to consider that
people cope with different levels of difficulties, and that appraisals
and emotions are important components of the coping process
(Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
We assume that appraisals usually provide reasonably reliable
signals of situational contingencies (Kappas’s, 2001, second trans-
fer function), so that they provide feedback, which guides further
responses.
One end of the appraisal continuum generally implies complete
or near-complete benefits and well-being to the individual. Here,
events are appraised as strongly pleasant, conducive to personal
goal attainment, certain, within personal control, or fair. In this
highly secure state, there is little need to mobilize resources or to
activate coping mechanisms. Negative emotions are not elicited
even if the respective appraisals change a little, and positive
emotions, already at their highest levels, are also unaffected. But
once the appraisals pass a certain point (e.g., where events begin to
appear less and less pleasant, controllable, certain, or fair), impor-
tant goals become increasingly at risk. At this point, the person
feels a need to respond, and more and more coping resources are
activated. Along with this, negative emotions begin to increase and
positive emotions start to decrease. This process resembles the
tendency for stressors not to elicit responses until they become
threatening enough (Dickerson & Kenemy, 2004).
More in need of explanation is why the negative emotions reach
their highest levels and the positive emotions their lowest before
the appraisals shift completely to the opposite extreme. One ex-
planation is that this reflects a preemptive strategy to avoid con-
sequences that would be even more destructive if the person reacts
fully only when the situation is at its worst. In other words, it is
more adaptive to mobilize all coping resources before events
become maximally unpleasant, uncontrollable, or uncertain, be-
cause there is a chance to take corrective action before the situation
becomes hopeless. Therefore, the enhanced sensitivity is adaptive;
better to react in full and decisively before events deteriorate
further. Elements of this account are consistent with the notions
of evolutionary preparedness, hyper-excitability (Rosen &
Schulkin, 1998), and vigilance (Krohne, 2003), all of which
 OGIVAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN APPRAISALS AND EMOTIONS 833

2 1.6
1.8 1.5

Sadness
1.4

Anger
1.6
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.2 1.1
1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pleasantness Pleasantness

A* n B* n
3.5 1.8
3 1.6
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Anger
2.5
Joy

1.4
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

2
1.5 1.2

1 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pleasantness Motive Congruence

C* P D* n
1.8 3.5

1.6
3
Anger

Joy

1.4
2.5
1.2

1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Motive Congruence Motive Congruence

E* n F* p

Figure 5. Relationships between Pleasantness and Motive Congruence and emotions (Study 2; Sample B).
ⴱ
Primary relationship, otherwise it is a secondary relationship; p positive relationship predicted; n negative
relationship predicted. Each x-axis is bipolar and ranges between 1 and 5 to conform to the appraisal-feedback
participants saw.

posit enhanced sensitivity to environmental stimuli that produce
disproportionately large outcomes in response to comparatively
small elicitors.
While this account awaits empirical confirmation, it is consis-
tent with some theoretical accounts of autonomic and somatic
processes. According to Scherer’s (1984, 2001) Component Pro-
cess Model, the autonomic and expressive systems, together with
appraisals, are inseparable components of the entire emotion
mechanism, all of which reinforce each other to serve adaptive
purposes. Therefore, their operations should generally be congru-
ent with each other. Consistently, the effects of the sympathetic
and parasympathetic systems on somatovisceral organs are known
to obey sigmoid functions (Bernston et al., 1991). And current
knowledge on the relationships between psychosocial factors and
physiological responses suggests S-shaped effects in how emo-
tional stimuli affect sympathetic and somatic outcomes (Cacioppo
et al., 1992).
This also means that an agenda for future research is to test how
physical processes contribute to ogival appraisal-emotion relation-
ships. Together with findings on the physical correlates of some
appraisals, our results provide testable hypotheses about the rela-
tionships between appraisals and physical responses. For example,
variations in anticipated effort should be accompanied by less
variation in heart rate at extreme levels than at moderate levels
(Smith, 1989); changes in autonomic indices, such as skin con-
ductance and finger temperature, might be more pronounced with
changes in goal-relevant appraisals in the moderate range than in
the extreme ranges (van Reekum, et al., 2004); changes in the
corrugator supercilii (in frowning) should correlate with changes
in goal-obstacle appraisals in ogival ways, as should changes in the
zygomaticus major (in smiling) with changes in perceived pleas-
antness (e.g., Aue et al., 2006; Pope & Smith, 1994). However,
these hypotheses should be treated cautiously as they depend on
fairly shaky assumptions about the link between these physical
variables and emotions.
The ogival function is a heuristic that may shed light on certain
controversies. An example is the relationship between laboratory
stressors and distress or flight/fight responses. Hundreds of studies
have shown that the effects of laboratory stressors on sympathetic
and cortical responses are notoriously inconsistent (Chida &
 834 TONG, ELLSWORTH, AND BISHOP
Hamer, 2008; Dickerson & Kenemy, 2004); some studies find
strong effects, others find none. The stressors used differ both in
type and in intensity, and researchers have not fully considered the
possibility that different studies obtain inconsistent results because
they unknowingly choose manipulations at different points on the
stress spectrum. Consistently, recent meta-analytic reviews sug-
gest that laboratory stressors do not necessarily elicit stress re-
sponses unless they provoke an adequate level of negative apprais-
als, such as uncontrollability and goal unattainability (Dickerson &
Kenemy, 2004). On a similar note, if appraisal-emotion relation-
ships are ogival, experimental manipulation of appraisals should
not produce their predicted effects on emotions at the extreme
ends. Hence, experimenters who manipulate appraisals at the ex-
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treme ends and who find nonsignificant effects might erroneously
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
conclude that no relationships exist. Also, intervention techniques
aimed at changing emotions by changing thinking patterns should
be more successful if they are targeted at the moderate range of
appraisals. As Kappas (2001) emphasized, understanding the func-
tional forms of appraisal-emotion processes is important for gaug-
ing the impact of appraisals.
There are possible individual and situational differences to be
examined in the operating characteristics of ogival appraisal-
emotion processes. Ogival appraisal-emotion functions can be
dissected and analyzed in several distinct parameters. Each ogival
function has a baseline that refers to the minimum level of the
emotion (this need not be zero). Threshold of the function refers to
the point where appraisals begin to vary significantly with emo-
tions. Slope indicates the strength of the relationship. And asymp-
tote reflects the maximum level of the emotion (which need not be
the highest point of the scale). Appraisal studies have been very
successful in showing predicted appraisal-emotion relationships,
but they rarely examine how aspects of these relationships differ
across individuals and situations. But other research suggests that
these differences matter. Individuals differ in the type or level of
stimuli that evoke emotional responses (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991),
and this may reflect differences in thresholds. Variability in the
magnitude of appraisal-emotion relationships highlights differ-
ences in the slope parameter of the process (Gunthert et al., 1999;
Kuppens, van Mechelen, Smits, de Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007).
Individual differences in the experiential intensity of emotions are
well-known and in some cases may reflect differences in baselines,
thresholds, and/or asymptotes. For example, chronic emotionality
is known to differ as a function of Neuroticism and Extroversion;
in clinical research, anhedonia is characterized by the inability to
experience strong positive affect (Rado, 1953), and certain forms
of schizophrenia are associated with emotional blunting (Beren-
baum & Oltmanns, 1992). The speed of recovery from an emo-
tional episode is known to differ across individuals (Hemenover,
2003; Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998), which may be explained by
differences in slopes and/or asymptotes. And some negative events
(e.g., ostracism) are so extremely aversive that variations within
them produce no significant effects on emotions (e.g., Buckley,
Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000); this
suggests that properties of the asymptote (such as its length and
intensity) deserved to be examined. Overall, these disparate find-
ings are consistent with emerging evidence that the relation of an
emotion to an appraisal is contingent on personality and situational
factors (Kuppens et al., 2007).
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to produce clean
manipulations of all appraisals. Because appraisals are related to
each other (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987), it is almost
inevitable that the manipulation of an appraisal (e.g., Control) will
affect related appraisals (e.g., Goal Achievement Expectancy).
Indeed, in Study 1, the manipulation of Control had linear effects
on Perceived Goal Achievement Expectancy. Also, manipulating
Goal Achievement Expectancy produced linear effects on Per-
ceived Control and Perceived Agency, and manipulating Agency
had a linear effect on affected Perceived Control. However, when
these alternative appraisals were controlled as covariates (e.g.,
Perceived Goal Achievement Expectancy was controlled in the
analyses for Control), the ogival effects remained. These results
suggest that the effects of the manipulated appraisals were inde-
pendent of the related appraisals (at least those measured here).
An important future research question is how combinations of
appraisals affect emotions. Appraisal theories posit that multiple
appraisals act in concert to produce emotions and past studies have
shown that combinations of appraisals predict corresponding emo-
tions independently of individual appraisals (Tong et al., 2007).
Further, it is unclear how related appraisals interact with the target
appraisal in producing the ogival effects. That is, it is entirely
possible that the flattened effects are the end-points are in part due
to the dampening effects of other appraisals. Similarly, the slope
section could be in part due to the activating effects of positively
related appraisals and/or the inhibiting effects of negatively related
appraisals. Finally, future research might consider the competing
or enhancing effects of alternative emotions. For example, the
increase in guilt that comes with an increase in self-agency might
depend on the reduction in anger.
Finally, it is not clear why a few relationships failed to show
ogival patterns (e.g., between Agency and Anger and between
Certainty and Hope. A simple explanation is that these are just due
to chance; even robust processes that are tested enough times will
sometimes not be supported by data. And it is possible that the lack
of relationship between Agency and Anger was due to the strength
of the vignette or the insensitivity of the anger scale, as mentioned
above. Currently, there is no credible theoretical basis for why
these relationships are not ogival and other relationships are. In
any case, future studies can examine these relationships again to
ascertain their functional form.
To conclude, there is still a lot to learn about how cognition
interfaces with emotion. Our research suggests a general for of the
relation between appraisals and emotions, with changes in ap-
praisal having a much greater influence at moderate levels than at
the high and low extremes, and we have sketched out some
directions for future research. We have made an initial step toward
Spinoza’s goal of mapping the computational operations of the
human affective processes, but there is much more to be done.
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Appendix

Vignettes Materials for Study I

Expectancy Vignette
Recently, you have gotten to know a person you really like. For
a while, you have been going out with this person and your liking
for this person has grown a lot. You now have a serious and sincere
wish to get involved in a long-term relationship with this person.
As with most relationships, whether or not a person is willing to
accept you as such depends on many factors; some factors you can
control, some you can’t. You talk to the roommate of this person,
with whom your friend confides deeply. This is what this room-
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
questions given to each participant and all participants receive the
same questions. Thus, each member can score a range of 0 to 10
points.
As a result of the interview, your team loses. Later you asked the
judges the reasons for your loss. You find out how you and your
partner fare in the interview, as represented below.
Your score:
No of question answered correctly:

mate tells you about your chances of your friend accepting you. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Your partner’s score:

Insurmountable No problems at all: No of question answered correctly:

problems: S/he S/he probably
probably will will accept me 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not accept me
Control Vignette
Agency Vignette
Imagine that you are taking a course in which you really want to
Imagine a competition held by the most prestigious business do well. As always, whether or not you can do well in a course
school in the United States. The competition is for the most depends on many factors, such as the amount of time you can
innovative idea for a business startup. Participants enter the com- devote to the course, the amount of reading assigned, and other
petition as part of a pair. The top prize (the only prize in the non-academic commitments. Half way through the course, you
competition) is very attractive. Each of the two members of the carefully assess yourself in terms how well you think you can do
winning team will get US$30, 000 cash, a fully sponsored 3-week in this course. After careful consideration, you come up with have
tour in Europe, and a guaranteed place in the business graduate the following assessment of how well you can cope with the
school after graduation. As a business student, this competition is course.
very attractive to you. You and a friend come up with a very
innovative idea, and enter the competition.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
As it turns out, after a series of deliberations by the judges, the
top prize is tied between one of two competing ideas, one of which Doing well is Doing well is
belongs to your team and the other belongs to another team. totally totally
However, the top prize will only go to one team. To decide to beyond my within my
control control
which competing team the top prize will go, the panel of judge
interviews all participating members of these two teams. Points are
allocated to each team as the summation of the points earned by
each member during the interview. The team with the higher Received January 14, 2008
overall point wins. The points are awarded based on the number of Revision received March 2, 2009
questions answered correctly by the participant. There are 10 Accepted July 7, 2009 䡲