TELEVISION IN A M E R I C A N

IDEOLOGICAL
HOPES A N D FEARS

ALBER T KREILING
Department of Communication Arts
Georgia Southern College
ABSTRACT
The Chicago School of Social Thought was characterized by a hope for a
Great Community fashioned through the new media technologies. The
communication theorists at Chicago reflected long-standing patterns of the
American imagination, assuming a consensual model of society in which
technologies would aid in producing abundance. This article examines
some of these themes, using the rise of television after World War II as the
focus. A new middle class is seen to emerge which viewed television as the
agency for creating their new community and an arena for struggling with
various status groups to become legitimate.

As the newest and seemingly the most potent medium of

mass communication on the scene since the Second World
War, television has been the subject of a great deal of debate,
stimulating views about its role in American life ranging from
the alarmist to the optimistic. The debate has reflected some
long-standing hopes and fears of Americans, and some
tensions among social groups whose aspirations may center
upon the control of a communications medium, and whose
struggles with their rivals may be fought around a medium.
Some of the hopes and fears parallel the responses to the
expanded mass media of the Communications Revolution of
the late nineteenth century. As Michael Schudson has shown,
one development of the time was a separation of the
newspaper-reading public into the workers and common
people who flocked to the Yellow Press, and the educated
upper-middle class, who turned to such respectable papers as
Requests for reprints should be sent to Albert Kreiling, Department of
Communication Arts,Georgia Southern College, Landrum Box 8155, Statesboro, GA
30460.
Qualitative Sociology, Voi, 5(3), Fall 1982
0162~436/82/150fk0199502.75 199 ® 1982 Human SciencesPress
200 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

the New York Times and scorned the common man and his
flamboyant press (1978:88-120). Thus, the enlarged urban
public organize itself around the expanding and changing
press, so that the history of the press was interrelated with the
formation of separate taste groups, and the development of
their respective sensibilities. In a later period, a similar
reorganization of the public around television and other
media would occur.
Intellectuals sometimes pictured the expanded mass press
as a dangerous influence upon the enlarged urban "crowd."
Ferdinand Toennies (1971:251-265) pointed to public opinion
as a powerful emergent force as people left the web of
custom in Gemeinschaft villages to enter the "big world" of
Gesellschaft. He saw the press as a powerful agency for
molding public opinion, and thus shaping the sensibilities of
the newly released population. Similarly, television has
appeared to many observers to possess enormous power to
orchestrate the sensibilities of rootless, volatile populations
detached from traditional sources of orientation.
Some American intellectuals, however, saw the new
technologies of the Communications Revolution as potential
agencies for spreading a new culture of enlightenment for a
progressive Great Community. The experiment that best
illustrates their hopes was a short-lived newspaper, Thought
News, published by John Dewey, Robert Park, and Franklin
Ford. The three men deplored the yellow press of their day,
but saw in its technology enormous potential for spreading
knowledge and establishing rational standards of judgment in
an enlarged democratic public (Carey and Sims, 1976). Dewey
and Park were central figures in the Chicago School of Social
Thought, which was characterized throughout by this hope
for a Great Community fashioned through the new
communications technologies. In this respect, this body of
thought was a characteristic expression of the American
tendency to interpret history around the development of
technologies--prominently including communications
technologies--and to look expectantly toward a future
community to be made through new media. This pattern of
expectation surfaced again with television.
Some members of the Chicago School were prominently
identified with the broader intellectual movement of the
reform Darwinism rising to challenge the reigning
conservative Social Darwinism of such figures as Herbert
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 201

Spencer. Often drawing the idea from German idealism, the

reform Darwinists shared with their conservative foes an
organic image of society, as well as a faith in technology and
progress, and a belief that the rising levels of abundance
would be endless. With the end of economic problems in
sight, the reformers thought society could turn its atLention to
"human," and "social" problems, including the redeployment
of the new communications technologies for making a new
cultural edifice. In the period of television's growth, a similar
myth of endless abundance likewise contributed to the belief
among proponents of change that the medium could be freed
of its dependence upon the commercial system.
The hopes of the reform Darwinists and the Chicago School
communications theorists need to be understood in relation
to some long-standing patterns of American imagination. As
joseph Featherstone (1979:7) noted, there are two old and
frequently recurrent lines of argument concerning the social
transformations of modernization:

... the "long revolution" and the "lost community." The first seesthe
progress of the West since the seventeenth century as a long
revolution, a march toward greater social and political equality. The
other interpretsmodernization in terms of a vision of lost community.
Proponents of the long revolution speak of gains in equality,
autonomy, and the standard of living, and proponents of the lost
community speak of alienation, disenchantment, the collapse of
authority, and anomie, pointing to the human cost of progress.

As Featherstone added, Dewey was a characteristic example

of the American "fusion ticket," with his hope that the
benefits of the "long revolution" could be achieved while
avoiding the cost of the "lost community" by constructing a
new Great Community.
The urban-industrial society that needed to be turned into a
Great Community had been set in place by the rapid
economic and technological developments of the latter part
of the nineteenth century. Dewey and other reform Darwinists
and Chicago School theorists typically welcomed, instead of
opposing those developments, but underscored the need for
concomitant cultural progress. Thus they enunciated the
doctrine later called "cultural lag" which has been repeatedly
voiced since, and which has frequently served as an ideology
of creators and promoters of knowledge and culture.
202 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

The economic and technological developments had

weakened and made outmoded the small-town Protestant
culture of the nineteenth-century communities in which
Dewey and numerous other reform Darwinists had grown up.
Dewey and others typically celebrated their liberation from
the provincial towns in a characteristically modern posture of
heralding people's emancipation into a wider world of open
horizons. This outlook has contributed to the high
expectations Americans have held for numerous
communications media, including television. However, at the
same time Dewey and others looked to the wider progressive
culture of enlightenment to replace the waning religious and
small-town traditions. Thus, like many modern Americans in
the midst of secularization, they attached religious
significance to a secular edifice of science and humanistic
culture (Quandt, 1970;75, passim).
Several characteristic patterns of American imagination
contributed to the hopes of the reformers. To many
Europeans, the "long revolution" and the "lost community"
were inevitably antithetical because the foundation of a
community was tradition, which modernization shattered.
However, from the time the early settlers abandoned the Old
World to make a better life in the New, many Americans have
celebrated their liberation from tradition, and have conceived
of a community as something made in the present instead of
handed down from the past. One theoretical approach of the
Chicago School, symbolic interactionism, presents
psychological models of action guided by visions of a future,
instead of by traditional customs, and of the making of
communities in the present (Cooley, 1902; Dewey, 1922;
Mead, 1934). As Daniel Boorstin (1974:85-124; 1978:49-60)
argues, Americans characteristically have conceived of their
society as something unfinished, still in the making, and this
pattern of conception contributes to the high expectations of
communications media as agencies of a future community
aborning.
Another crucial underpinning of the faith in
communications technologies as agencies for making a wider
community was the assumption, so typical among Americans,
of a consensual rather than a conflict model of society. From
this standpoint, the differences among people appear to be
remediable matters of misunderstanding and ignorance rather
than fundamental differences of interest or value. The
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 203

assumption - - e v i d e n t in so many American social

movements--makes the means of social change a task of
moral education rather than European-style class conflict,
and contributes to the faith in such agencies of education and
persuasion as schools, and communications media.
As Gifford Phillips (1966:5-6) has pointed out, following the
Jacksonian Revolution and the triumph of the common man,
intellectuals and culture-bearing elites became displaced
patricians seldom seen in American public life. But central in
the social psychology of Dewey was the notion that thought
should be construed as an instrument of action instead of
withdrawn contempJation. Like so much else in the writings of
the reform Darwinists, this idea can be interpreted as part of
the ideology of a new activist intellectual stratum seeking a
public role in American life.
As the activist intellectuals were contemplating the
restructuring of institutions, other new status groups were
appearing among the ranks of journalists: the young college-
educated professionals who reveled in their superiority to the
uneducated reporters of the past, the aspiring writers who
created a literary journalism to render the cultural variety of
the expanded cities, and the reform-minded muckrakers.1 Like
the activist intellectuals, many of the young journalists
rejected the dominant life styles and career paths of the
nineteenth century, and sought to assume new identities and
public roles. As the activist intellectuals contemplated the
redirection of institutions toward the service of "human" and
"social" ends instead of economic interests, Lincoln Steffens
and other muckrakers assumed the banner of "disinterested"
professionals doing battle in the name of the "public" against
the venal "interests" of business and politics.
The activist intellectuals, the young professional
journalists, and the Progressive political reformers of the time
were all part of an expanded, educated new middle class
rising on the scene of the enlarged industrial city. All were
seeking new identity models, and attempting to assert their
visions of what the cultural edifice of the new world should
be (Kreiling and Sims, 1981). On the one hand, they were part
of the new upper-middle-class urban public which was
making education its badge of membership, losing
confidence in the common man of the democratic public, and
distancing itself from the common man's diversions such as
the mass press. At the same time, they were devising
204 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

ideologies revolving around "public," or "human," or

"social" ends to be taken up by the various sectors of an
enlarged New Class of professionals and intellectuals later in
the twentieth century. As these various status groups sought
to assert themselves in the expanded communications media
of their time, and saw those media as agencies for the
creation of their envisaged new communities, so too would
the most visible new communications technology of a later
time, television, become the imagined agency of new
communities, and the stage on which various status groups
would struggle for legitimacy.
The expansion of mass media in the Communications
Revolution, and the rise of various hopes and fears associated
with them, occurred in the period of rapid change and
development attending the emergence of an urban-industrial
order in America. Similarly, television was the most
conspicuous new communications technology thrust upon
the American scene during the wave of growth, development,
and change following World War I1. Consequently, its history,
as well as the history of the varied conceptions and
expectations of it held by various groups, is a record also, as
Park would have said, of the "natural history" of the status
groups arising and transforming in a stage of American life.
One widespread alarmist view of television, expressed in
numerous ways, might be called the "institutional
domination" argument. This perspective pictures television as
an omnipotent power that manufactures an illegitimate
culture which robs people of their freedom, spontaneity, and
individuality. Among the most popular writings on the media
in recent years have been the attacks upon subliminal
advertising levelled by Wilson Bryan Key (1973, 1976), who
charged that media manipulation posed a threat to people's
ability to govern their lives in accordance with their own free
will.
The "institutional domination" argument often reveals a
curious feature of the way Americans talk about the media, or
rather talk about the media as a way of indirectly talking
about a variety of other things. In a review of a group of
alarmist attacks upon television, Jeff Greenfield noted that
"each of them, to one degree or another, suggests that what
has happened since the advent of television has happened
because of television" (1978:29). Associated with the
tendency of Americans to hold mythically-laden hopes and
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 205

fears about communications media is a related tendency in

our discourse to use media as metaphors for talking about
broader social structures, processes, and relationships° As
illustrated by the writings of Key, the "institutional
d o m i n a t i o n " argument often amploys a radically
individualistic language, and pictures the media as threats to
individuality. To Europeans, this metaphoric use of an
individualistic language to describe power relationships and
social developments might seem paradoxical.
One social development registered in the concerns about
television was the expansion of "media power," not only as a
source of psychological manipulation, but also as a bastion of
institutional power. The recent fears about television and
other media arose amidst the vast expansion, concentration,
and intensified industrialization of the media industries. As a
result, the media appeared to become vastly more
concentrated and powerful forces on the American scene. As
concentrations of power always have frightened Americans
by threatening our commitment to individualism, the local
community, and the open society, so the media joined
political machines, big corporations, and other wielders of
concentrated power as villains in the American imagination.
[n contrast to the political power of the party machine, or the
economic power of the corporation, the media represented
knowledge-making or culture-making power. Conservative
critics like Kevin Phillips (1975) saw the media as part of the
emerging knowledge industry of the Post-Industrial Society.
Contributing to the concerns about "media power" was
television's role as an agent in, and a conspicuous symbol of,
the increasing nationalization of American life. "We have
become in the past thirty years, because of the revolutions in
transportation and communication, a national society,"
Daniel Bell observed (1978:37). The eclipse of distance, Bell
noted, has made possible the rise of a national "mobilization
politics," long characteristic of the more compact European
countries, and now carried out before the eyes of millions of
Americans on the enlarged stage of the national media
(1976:212).
Television has been not only a stage for national political
action and debate, but also an arena for the increasingly visi-
ble national culture and status order that have progressively
displaced regional cultures, and local status orders. As C.
Wright Mills (1956:253) pointed out, since the 1920s the local
206 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

status orders in American communities have progressively

weakened in the face of the rise of a national status market,
populated by the class of celebrities who have attained prom-
inence through radio, motion pictures, and television. Each
successive mass medium that has attempted to build a
heterogeneous national following has sparked alarmist reac-
tions from persons who have seen it as the instrument of a
threatening outside culture (Hirsch, 1978:400-401).
As the concerns about television have reflected the na-
tionalization of American life and the tensions between na-
tionally oriented and locally oriented groups, at the same
time they have reflected the overlapping and interrelated pro-
cess of modernization, and the associated tensions between
modernistic and traditionalist sectors of the population.
Historians looking back upon the turn-of-the-century period
now see one principal development to have been a general
modernization of the sensibilities and rhythms of life among
people moving from the genteel ethos of the nineteenth cen-
tury into the stepped-up rhythms of the industrial age (Ken-
nedy, 1975:453-468; O'Neill, 1975; Wiebe, 1973). Americans
have once again widely embarked upon a general process of
change, speed-up, and modernization of their sensibilities and
life styles, and, as noted by critics of the affair, that develop-
ment has been widely registered in the pace and rhythms of
television programming. However, tension between the
adherents of traditional and progressive tastes has resulted in
open controversy before over numerous forms of entertain-
ment and mass communication, including jazz music and mo-
tion pictures, so that television has merely provided an addi-
tional arena for a continuing conflict among Americans
(Leonard, 1962).
Coincidental with the appearance of television was the
general dislocation, physical and psychic mobility, and social
disorganization among vast sectors of the population since
the Second World War, with the suburban migration, the
move to the Sunbelt, the appearance of a mass college-
educated public, and other shifts. In this context, large
segments of the population felt detached from traditional
models of character and conduct, and sought new models
with which to identify, and new psychic worlds in which to
dwell. Various sociological studies of suburban life in the fif-
ties and sixties pictured suburban youth as turning to peer
groups and the mass media when they found a paucity of rele-
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 207

vant models for conduct available from their parents and-

other adults in the community. In the same period, com-
munications researchers and political scientists noted the ap-
pearance of a new group of politically independent but in-
terested voters, who might be susceptible to the influence of
television in political campaigns, tn this context, television
appeared to many observers to possess enormous power to or-
chestrate the sensibilities of volatile and rootless groups on
the scene. Underlying what was happening, however, was not
only the appearance of the new medium, but also, in a pat-
tern so characteristic of the upward mobility and general
restless movement of American life, the rise of new publics
that found the established media of older publics unrepresen-
tative of their own developing sensibilities.
If Americans' conceptions of television have been inter-
related with such broad social trends as nationalization and
modernization, they also have been interrelated with the for-
mation and development of status groups and taste publics
on the American scene. For years, social psychologists such as
Tamotsu Shibutani (1955, 1966), Orrin Klapp (1962, 1964), and
Donald Horton and Richard Wohl (1956) have talked about
the abstract groups and worlds formed in and through the
mass media. The media may become arenas in which people
find imaginative worlds in which to live, appealing styles of
life by which to live, and compelling images and visions
through which to identify with the social dramas of those
new-found worlds. Thus the population organizes itself into
various media publics--the New York Times readership, the
fans of Fellini films, the Johnny Carson audience, and so
forth--which become worlds of social experience in which
people find expressions of their sensibilities.
it is facile to point an accusing finger at the media for im-
posing worlds of sensibility upon their audiences, for the pro-
cess depends equally upon people using a medium as a
springboard for some psychic voyage. The roots of the seem-
ing potency of the media in modern society lie deep in the
American temper and outlook, and in the history and social
structure of America. Long ago, such observers as Alexis de
Tocqueville and Michel Chevalier saw America as standing in
the vanguard of modernization, with such bonds of social
identification as class and tradition overshadowed by a set of
looser, more fluid status groups, "the varied and shifting sec-
tors of society which, in the absence of true class, become the
208 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

theaters of the unending and agonizing competition among

individuals for the attainment of the marks of status" (Nisbet,
1966:183). Chevalier (1839:380-385) noted the broad divide
between the Yankees and "the democracy," as well as the ap-
pearance of little status coteries that established "certain
fashionable distinctions," but in his eyes none of these groups
were true classes. De Tocqueville (1835:470-475, 517-520)
noted the role of the newspapers of the time in supplying the
shallow bonds of an ephemeral and accessible literature, to
tie together and express the sensibilities of the loose status
groups whose members lacked the deep fund of shared tradi-
tion of a class.
The tendency of Americans to forge shifting status groups,
already evident in the early nineteenth century, has been fur-
ther fueled by numerous developments since, and the increas-
ing presence of the mass media has made them ever more
readily available to supply the social bonds and expressive
symbolism for the groups so formed. Most obviously, the con-
tinued erosion of tradition has contributed to people's ever
greater dependence on the status order as a basis for social
identification. Moreover, with the routinization of
bureaucratized work roles, people have become ever more at-
tached to identifications severed from social structural roles,
and played out instead in the dramatic world of mass culture.
Klapp (1964:250-264; 1969) has noted how the amorphous
status groups primarily anchored in the public dramas of a
media environment have progressively displaced traditional
groups as the basis of people's allegiances.
As the media become the stages on which various status
groups celebrate their respective life styles, they also may
become metaphors by which the members of the groups talk
about one another, and register their mutual antagonisms.
Much of the criticism of television in its early years could be
described as the resistance of the "newspaper public" or the
"book-reading public" to the rising "television public," just as
the attack on tabloids by the readers of respectable
newspapers in an earlier period registered the hostility of
upper-middle-class people to the masses. In each case, the
medium is partly a metaphor for talking about a social group,
and the attack upon the medium is partly an attack upon the
group of people who read or watch it. Behind the public con-
troversies about the media, then, lie conflicts between social
groups possessing different sensibilities and inhabiting dif-
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 209

ferent mental worlds, with these tensions articulated in the

discussion of the media that synthesize the respective publics
and make their different worlds visible to each other.
In contrast to the optimists who have heralded expanded
media as the needed instruments for building a wider com-
munity, Park saw that mass communication did not necessari-
ly bring about consensus. Just as often it exacerbated tension,
as latent discord was ever more rapidly transformed into con-
scious conflict. With the media's continued growth, the status
conflicts long endemic in American life have increasingly
been fought around the channels and forms of mass com-
munication. With the progressive dissolution of traditional
repositories of meaning, Murray Edelman (1964, 1971, 1977)
has argued, politics has become a form of expressive
behavior, a kind of dramatic passion play for modern popula-
tions. Much the same thing has happened with the mass
media, another major forum of public drama, and source of
legitimacy in the modern secular world. Consequently, what
might be called the "politics of communication" has become
a central struggle of our time. As Irving Louis Horowitz has
written, "the entire twentieth century embodies a remarkable
turning away from the nineteenth-century focus on control-
ling modes of production to a more subtle struggle to
dominate the mass media"(1977:124).
As late as the 1930s, Arthur Marwick (1980:150, 155) noted,
Hollywood films pictured the American social landscape as
dominated by a small elite, consisting of a "shadow
aristocracy" and the Republican business elite, standing
above the rest of the population. Yet, by the 1920s a new mid-
dle class of managers and professionals already was rising in
American institutions. With the prosperity following the Se-
cond World War, this new "upper-middle class," or "success
elite," was increasingly seeking to enter or topple the old
elite. Consequently, Marwick (1980:316) contended, in the
post-war period the old elite increasingly shared status and in-
fluence with the expanding "college-educated professional
and managerial class."
With the social transformations of industrialization, the
Iocalistic, traditional, small-town persons who had dominated
the American scene in the nineteenth century lost status and
power to the rising urban~based, cosmopolitan, bureaucratic-
minded new middle class (Wiebe, 1967). As the occupants of
managerial, bureaucratic, and professional roles, the new
210 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

middle class lacked the badge of membership of the old mid-

die class--property ownership--and made education an im-
portant badge of membership. Around the turn of the cen~
tury, the educated readers of respectable newspapers, who
scorned the common man and his Yellow Press, were a con-
spicuous sign of the new middle class. By the 1920s, a few
observers began to note a new shape in the American social
order, with a class of mobile, ambitious, cosmopolitan upper-
middle-class manipulators attempting to orchestrate the lives
of a class of more local, traditional lower-middle-class peo-
ple.
As the new middle class took up new career paths, some
sectors of it also pursued new life styles and cultural realms.
Detached from the bulwarks of conduct, value, and belief of
nineteenth-century small-town life, the new middle class was
seeking new models of conduct, new faiths, and new sources
of meaning in life. The paths taken up varied widely. Among
many, a new individualism of "self-expression" or "self-
realization" was developing in place of the old individualism
of "self-discipline" and "self-restraint" (Potter, 1965:92-112).
By the 1920s, a marked separation was evident between the
cosmopolitan life styles and codes of behavior of progressive
urban groups, and the ways of "small-town America." From
the time of the First World War, a new "cultural radicalism"
was evident on the urban scene, and from about the same
time, in Lawrence Chenoweth's (1974:4 and passim) terms, a
new ethic of liberal humanism was struggling for legitimacy
against the traditional moralism.
With the waning of religion and tradition, increasing
numbers sought meaning in life in the realms of art, literature,
science, and intellectual culture. As Hannah Arendt
(1961:44-45) noted, the dominant sector of the American mid-
dle class of the nineteenth century did not employ art and in-
tellectual culture as a public feature of its status life.
However, a segment of the middle class was busily engaged in
the promotion of cultural institutions on the urban scene by
the late nineteenth century (Horowitz, 1976). In the twentieth
century, their ranks would grow, as increasing numbers of
Americans, often self-consciously borrowing European
models of "culture," and "good society," made art and elite
culture central features of their status worlds. One result was
the tension between the "neo-elitists" of the small coteries of
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 211

traditional culture defenders and the surging ranks of

"democratic optimists," or "culture consumers," as Alvin Tof-
tier (1964) called them, who promoted various cultural institu-
tions in the midst of post-war prosperity (Phillips, t966:4-5).
Out of the rhetorical struggle between "the people" and "the
interests" invoked by Progressives at the turn of the century
came the role model of the "disinterested" professional wide-
ly taken up in the 1950s and 1960s by the "liberals" and "in-
dependents" who called for "change.'"
Some or all of these varied groups now are called the New
Class by numerous analysts and critics. However, different
writers have somewhat different people in mind in using the
term, and there is considerable debate about whether there is
a New Class.~ One reason for the vagueness of the term is the
increased separation of divergent status worlds, in contrast to
the greater apparent cohesiveness of American culture in
earlier times. By the middle of the twentieth century, Bernard
Bailyn (1977:1155-56) and his colleagues noted, the clash
among the several rival new models of individualism was on
the verge of explosion. In 1950, Russell Lynes identified eight
new forms of "snobbery" of various status worlds, including
the intellectual, the emotional, the sensual, and the political.
In the sense of what the term "class" usually implies, the
New Class is not a class, in my opinion, for numerous reasons.
Nevertheless, the term is useful as an ideal typical representa-
tion of certain trends. The idea of the emergence of a New
Class accurately captures the perceptions of numerous
Americans and thus serves, however imprecisely, to represent
the social imagery around which cultural and political con-
flicts have formed. Moreover, the arguments advanced by
Chevalier and De Tocqueville in the nineteenth century about
the formation of loose status groups in place of true classes in
America are still pertinent. What the term New Class registers
is the fact that various segments of the educated new middle
class, whose ranks have swelled in the post-war period, have
rejected the pieties of traditional America to worship instead,
as Michael Novak (1974a:125) put it, at "The Shrine of
Enlightenment, wherever Americans read journals of opinion,
speedread books, line up for the communal mysteries of
cinema and theater, struggle valiantly to stay 'in touch' and
be 'informed.'" Thus has emerged, paralleling the strife be-
tween the Yankees and "the democracy" observed by
212 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

Cl~evalier in the early nineteenth century, a major status

struggle or cultural conflict between the educated,
cosmopolitan New Class, and "Middle America," or "the
populists," or "the yahoos."
From the populists, who formerly attacked the Wall Street
"fat cats" of the business elite, has come a new crescendo of
sniping at federal bureaucrats, and at "the liberal univer-
salists of the airwaves and the universities" (Novak, 1974a:90).
In turn, some of the New Class strata of professionals have
been engaged in their own struggles with the business elite,
and with various political elites, managers, and bureaucrats
who constrain their autonomy. Consequently, as Alvin
Gouldner noted, within the American "establishment" there
has been something like a civil war as various New Class
strata have sought to join or displace older elites (Gouldner,
1979:61-62; Kristol, 1978:25-31). The struggle has assumed the
form of both interest-group bartering over tangible issues like
wages and working conditions, and the more subtle struggles
for cultural legitimacy. In television and other media, liberal
professionals have been condemning the "conservative bias"
of content for years, and some of the media professionals
have assumed the defiant pose of the "adversary culture."
Television and other national media have served as a stage
for various cultural conflicts between the New Class and Mid-
dle America, as well as between and among various
subgroups in each camp, for neither is a unified bloc. As
Novak (1974b:5-8, 26; 1975:9-21) has argued, national televi-
sion programming is produced by the educated upper-middle
class, and the cosmopolitan, change-oriented, vaguely liberal
tone of much of it may arouse animosity among the less af-
fluent, less educated, less mobile persons in other sectors of
the population.
The conflict between Middle America and the New Class
over the national media had been building for some time, as
revealed by the enthusiastic response to President
Eisenhower's gibe at columnists and commentators at the
Republican convention in 1964. By the late sixties, Theodore
H. White (1969-70:8-13) realized that the mounting hostility of
many Americans toward the national media reflected the in-
creasing separation of the nation into "two cultures." As the
positive reception in much of Middle America to Vice Presi-
dent Agnew's attacks on the "effete eastern liberals" in the
media revealed, regional rivalries were an element in the
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 213

divide among Americans. There was some truth in Kevin

Phillips' (1975:24-38) charge that, like the Yankee en-
trepreneurs of an earlier time, a new knowledge industry and
its allied class of professionals rising in the Northeast were
creating a sectional conflict between that region and the rest
of the country. In the eyes of many Americans, the new liberal
professional culture was at least symbolically headquartered
in the Northeast, with perhaps a conspicuous branch in
California, and lesser extensions elsewhere. The sectional ele-
ment in the conflict has subsided somewhat, in part due to the
spread of professionalism, and the adoption of new life styles
throughout the country.
However, if television programming is created by the
educated upper-middle class, the bulk of the audience
belongs to Middle America. Consequently, as Novak (1975:18)
charged, much of the programming "represents the educated
class's fantasies about the fantasies of the population."
Hence, much of the New Class scorns television, or at least
large parts of it, in a show of antagonism toward Middle
America much like that shown by the educated upper-middle
class toward the readers of the Yellow Press and tabloids in
earlier times. The same antagonism is revealed in the show of
alarm by some members of the New Class about the new
wave of religious programming on television, as Tom Bethell
(1978:86-90) has noted, for much of the New Class has aban-
doned religion, which thrives mainly in parts of Middle
America.
The varied enthusiasms of the reformers of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries collapsed during the
World War I years, to be followed by the frivolity of the twen-
ties, and the despair of the Depression. With post-war pros-
perity, however, a new optimism dawned in parts of the
enlarged new middle class, whose ideologues and activists
often were labeled, however inexactly, "liberals," and now
are called the New Class by their critics. Like the reformers of
the earlier time, many of the liberals were eager promoters of
the bureaucratic institutions and professional activities that
have expanded so markedly on the American scene in recent
decades. Like the earlier optimists who had seen the expand-
ed mass press as a potential agency for the creation of a new
culture, some of the liberals looked to the new medium of
television to spread a new culture of enlightenment.
214 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

The liberals' hopes and programs for television varied. The

artistically minded among them wanted drama and cultural
events. Educators, and others, called for educational pro-
gramming. Some New Class leaders, rallying under the banner
of rationalism, science, progress, and optimism, called for the
expanded use of television for the rational critique of society,
and the debate of political issues. Others wanted to use
television for the modification of American attitudes,
customs, and life styles. Nicholas Johnson, former FCC com-
missioner, and Erik Barnouw, emeritus professor at Columbia
University, faulted not only the power structures behind the
medium but also the values and life styles it celebrated, and
called for change in the direction of alternatives favored by
the New Class.
The television reformers tried various avenues of change.
Some looked to public television as the arena for the creation
of a televised world more to their liking than commercial pro-
gramming. Change in the commercial system through regula-
tion by the FCC, and other government agencies, found favor
with some. Challenges to station operators at license-renewal
time by public-interest groups seeking to take a license for
themselves or to force demands upon the operator were tried,
often with legal assistance from idealistic young public-
interest lawyers.
Scientific research to show the dangers in programming as
an impetus to change was another tactic. Like the Progressive
reformers who set up municipal research bureaus to marshall
facts in the service of social change, the Kerner Commission,
and other public bodies, called for the continual surveillance
of the nation's media system. Some social scientists looked to
the apparently definitive conclusions of the Surgeon
General's report on smoking as a possible model for a similar-
ly definitive attack upon televised violence. Given the scien-
tific optimism among proponents of change at the time, scien-
tifically defined standards of health and harm became the
chief legitimate standards for judging programming.
Much of the initial interest in television centered on the
local level, with enthusiasm for the educational and public
stations opening in the fifties. The aspirations of the liberals
surged dramatically onto the national stage in the sixties, with
the appointment of Newton Minow as FCC chairman in 1961,
a Court of Appeals decision that the public had a right to
representation in FCC proceedings in 1966, and the Carnegie
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 215

Commission's call the following year for a national program

of action on public television. Presently, however, in the
amorphous constellation that might be called the "public-
interest television-reform movement," enthusiasm for na-
tionally based action seems to have abated. A conference of
persons interested in media reform called by the Aspen In-
stitute in 1976 favored a transfer of responsibility to local
groups (Schneyer and Lloyd, 1976:17).
The limited success and present frustration of the media-
reform movement parallel the malaise among the reformers
who tried to restructure various American institutions. In
television as in its other targets, the movement often scored
limited successes due to the tactical failings noted by one of
the reformers, Simon Lazarus (1974). Moreover, like other
generations of reformers, the activists often appeared elitist
to other sectors of the population, who saw the liberals' agen-
das as remote from their own interests. Like the Progressives,
the liberal reformers presumed to speak and act for "the
public," and only belatedly discovered that the public was
not listening or was not with them. Much of the public lost in-
terest, or never had any, in the rationalist critique of society
and its ills by New Class ideologues.
Perhaps most devastatingly, the movement lacked consen-
sus in its own ranks. As Jeane Kirkpatrick (1979:44) has
pointed out, New Class activists tend to share "a rationalistic,
moralistic, and reformist approach to politics," but differ in
the substantive goals they seek. One of the chief reasons the
persons at the Aspen Institute media-reform conference
recommended the transfer of responsibility to the local level
was their discovery that they shared only a dissatisfaction
with present television performance, not any consensus on
the alternatives they wanted (Schneyer, 1976:viii).
Another show of New Class action in television and other
media was the rise of a new style of adversary journalism. Like
the young professionals who entered journalism in the late
nineteenth century, a wave of college-educated reporters visi-
ble in the sixties sought to give a more intellectual and critical
tone to journalism (Grant, 1979:291-313). Consequently, "the
new television teams of the 1960's, moving from riot to bat-
tlefield, demonstration to sit-in," brought to the screen the
zeal of the reform-minded British reporters of the mid-
nineteenth century who were in the vanguard of the engine of
British social change (Smith, 1978:163).
216 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

Yet, to the journalists' surprise, their new-found militance,

which scored some dramatic successes in exposing corruption
and injustice, also resulted in some public animosity. As
William Rivers (1971:23) observed, "It is ironic that just when
the mass media have won important victories over their
historic adversary, government, they are deep in trouble with
their historic ally, the public." The clash between reporters
and the public resulted, in part, from the differences in the
meaning of the role they assigned to the press. The "new
muckrakers" and other professional journalists shared the
spirit of the wider wave of crusaders against environmental
pollution, and other issues, who, like the Progressives, were
turning to the ideal of the "hero of justice" as a new model of
individualism in an organized society. However, much of the
public applauds when the press exposes iniquity in other
centers of power but has no enthusiasm for shows of ar-
rogance by the press either.
Moreover, much of the protest and exposure had the scent
of a moral war being waged by the New Class against other
sectors of the population. There was some truth in Daniel
Moynihan's (1971:41-52) charge that "adversary journalism"
was an attack by an educated elite on persons perceived as
their inferiors, as there is some truth in William Tucker's
(I 980:141-I 52) argument that the environmental movement is
a conservative strategy of the New Class that works to the
disadvantage of other groups. Similarly, the Progressives
faulted other groups for failing to support their reform can-
didates in municipal races, but many workers and others cor-
rectly perceived that the reformers' favorite programs worked
to their own disadvantage.
By the late sixties, various things were happening to alter
the reform efforts in television and other arenas. The small
coteries of elitist liberals suddenly found that far larger
numbers of middle-class people were taking up the call for
change in the "new politics" and "consumer" movements.
However, the newer activists sometimes brought different ob-
jectives and tactics more in tune with their own interests. In
some cases, reform efforts conceived by elitists, who saw
themselves as standing above the middle class, were being
overshadowed or transformed by a wider sector of the middle
class that was redirecting reform in line with its own spirit.
One result was a proliferation of citizen action groups, in-
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 217

c]uding media watch organizations, while another was the in-

evitable clashes and standoffs.
Meanwhile, sizable numbers in the movement were turning
away from American society, including some who were rejec-
ting individualism in favor of various "communitarian"
ideologies (Lodge, 1975). Numerous former liberals, embit-
tered by the society that had turned a deaf ear upon their
critique of its institutions and their plans for its future, turned
to Freudo-Marxism, and other forms of "adversary culture"
criticism. Like the recent wave of modernization in which the
Post-Industrial Society was laid in place, every historical wave
of modernization has been followed by cries of rejection,
despair, and the "lost community" from intellectuals (Brown,
1980:1-23). This time, however, Bernard Brown noted, the in-
tellectuals are deeply divided, for while some are the severest
critics of the new society, others stand at the helm of the "in-
tellectual technology" upon which it is so heavily dependent.
One reason for the embitterment of former liberals is that,
for a time, they thought they had more support than they had
due to the turmoil of the "cultural revolution" in the wider
society. As Jean-Francois Revel (1971) and Ralf Dahrendorf
(1975) argued, wide sectors of the middle classes in the in-
dustrialized nations were engaged in a process of cultural
reconstruction and reorientation often expressed in doctrines
of new freedom and liberation. But as Revel realized, and as
Orrin Klapp (1969:57-70) argued, what liberals sometimes
mistook for an interest in political issues and an enthusiasm
for institutional change was actually a search for new iden-
tities and life styles appropriate to the altered rounds of life
of the Post-Industrial Society.
The result of the restless psychic voyage by large numbers
of Americans has been the weakening or break-up of old ties
to the cultural worlds of departing communities, with a
widespread individualization of behavior that has sometimes
taken the form of the aimless "quest for thrills" noted by Park
when the "cake of custom" is broken. The turmoil of the
cultural revolution included attacks on economic in-
dividualism, sometimes in the name of communal or public
values, but more often in the name of alternative models of
individualism (Glazer, 1979:131-32). As David DeLeon
(1978:117-133) argued, the American tradition of radical in-
218 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

dividualism had lain dormant for some time amidst the rise of
increasing bureaucratic controls in American life, but recent-
ly surfaced poignantly again.
The identities, ideologies, and life styles that appeared or
gained widened followings in the cultural revolution were
many and varied. The Protestant ethic and the old in-
dividualism of self-restraint lost much ground to a hedonist
ethic and the individualism of self-realization, contributing to
greater triumphs for the consumer society now celebrated
even more baldly on the television screen. Professional role
models were widely taken up, as was the style of an "authen-
tic self" seeking to liberate itself from an oppressive social
structure. This style--which bears similarities to earlier
American models of individualism that stressed the rejection
of civilization--has been taken up by numerous professionals
in rebellion against institutions.
Like successive generations of American reformers, the
liberal activists had their hopes of elevating the American
people and of restructuring American institutions dashed as
others turned a deaf ear to their plans, preferring to elevate
themselves in their own way. A central drama of American
life remains the upward ascent of successive social strata,
whose members are generally indifferent to the calls of
reformers for institutional change, communitarian values, or
a culture of enlightenment, and take up instead the long-
standing American pattern of forging communities of in-
dividuals in the present. As Leo Rosten (1961:71-84) argued
years ago, intellectual critics of the mass media are simply
wrong in thinking that large numbers of people would favor
their own preferred uses of the media or share their own
aspirations for the elevation of American culture.
One consequence of the recent cultural turmoil has been
the widespread erosion of the authority of institutions, and of
the legitimacy of the American way of life (Bellah, 1975;
Nisbet, 1975). In the resulting cultural vacuum, numerous
cults, ideologies, and secular religions have flourished,
leading to a fragmentation or "Europeanization" of the
American cultural and political scene. As a major arena for
cultural conflict and status group struggle, television is
sometimes a target for the clash and confrontation of the
various ideological factions, some of which are now
represented by permanent media Watch groups. Moreover,
the breakdown of any widespread consensus on a cultural
 TV IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGICAL HOPES AND FEARS 219

framework of legitimacy has been met by rapid change in net-

work program line-ups, and varied experimentation with pro-
gram types, as the industry has sought to connect with the
uncertain tastes and sensibilities of its audience, Surviving the
breakdown in frameworks of legitimacy, however, and even
more dominant than before in the overall ethos of television
programming, are the consumer life styles that the industry
promotes among the "mass class" that arose with post-war
prosperity.
Over the past century, America has been transformed into
an increasingly complex interconnected marketplace of com-
merce, politics, bureaucracy, professions, and so forth. With
the failure of the recent reform efforts to turn the system to
some alternative values, the marketplace reigns supreme, and
an intensification of individualistic ambition and com-
petitiveness prevails. Conspicuous among the new in-
dividualists, in television as elsewhere, are the professionals,
for large sectors of the new middle class have taken up an in-
tensified professionalism. In her studies of television pro-
ducers, Muriel Cantor (1974:103-118) has found the spirit of
professional militance and independence widespread, and the
intensified struggles between managers and professionals in
the industry match those in other institutions.
Ben Stein (1979) used interviews to show that many televi-
sion writers and producers share an ideology that defines
themselves as a class struggling against the class of
businessmen, corporate managers, and bearers of inherited
wealth standing above them. But Stein noted the paradox of
persons who generally earn upwards of $100,000 a year, and
in many ways behave like businessmen, who define
themselves as a class fighting their enslavement by the
business class. Nevertheless, as Stein argued, the television
producers have infused a heady dose of their individualistic
spirit into television programming, which generally celebrates
and idealizes the triumph of individualism and consumerism
in the American way of life.
In this respect, much of television programming reflects the
rootless, mobile, transient life styles of the new middle class,
from whose ranks its producers come. The aimless drift and
rootless quality of television programming mirror the con-
tinued erosion of community life and, as Aubrey Singer
(1966:303-309) argued, the cultural vacuum of the age. In the
spirit of Dewey's public philosophy, some of the recent
220 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

reform efforts were attempts to retrieve some of the moral

certainty and communal involvement of local communities in
the "big world" of modern institutions. However, as Park
recognized, the "big world" is not a community or a public. It
lacks the shared cultural resources to retrieve either the moral
certainty or the communal involvement of more local, tradi-
tional, communal settings.
As De Tocqueville saw, the newspapers mushrooming in
the Age of Jackson were supplying thin and evanescent social
bonds. But those were the only bonds possible in vague status
worlds that had cut themselves off from any deep fund of
shared cultural resources. Similarly, Park (1955:71-104) saw
that the take-up of newspaper reading was associated with
people's entry into wider worlds of experience, but as those
worlds became ever wider the bonds possible within them
became ever thinner. In the recent past, television has been
the most conspicuous agency and symbol of the continued
widening process. Television is an organ of the "big world,"
and it can provide only flimsy bonds for the vast and vague
status world, and the shallow consumer communities it
serves.

NOTES

1An interesting group of literary journalists of the time is discussed in Sims (1978).
2See the special issue on the concept of the New Class in Society 16 (January-
February 1979), especially the articles by Daniel Bell and Andrew Hacker.

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