C 20 - 22

Presidential Commission on Good Government v. The Hon.

Sandiganbayan

Facts: World Universal Trading & Investment Co., S.A. *WUTIC( was a
sociedad anonima registered in Panama but not licensed to do business in
the Philippines. Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines,
now known as Philippine National Construction Corporation (CDCP/PNCC) is
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. PCGG ordered
the sequestration and provisional takeovers against assets and records of
Rodolfo Cuenca, Universal Holdings, Cuenca Investment, PNCC and San
Mariano Milling Corporation. In 1987 PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint against Cuenca for illegally acquiring assets in the Cuenca owned
corporations of CDCP/PNCC, Asia International Hardwood Limited (AHL), a
Hongkong based company and Construction Development Corporation
International Limited, Hongkong, a wholly owned subsidiary or alter ego of
CDCP/PNCC. In 1991, claiming to be an assignee of AHL, WUTIC filed with the
RTC against CDCP/PNCC to enforce a foreign judgement which WUTIC had
obtained in Hongkong against CDCPI, which is wholly owned by CDCP/PNCC.
After trial, the RTC found in favor of WUTIC, it considered CDCP/PNCC and
CDCPI as “one corporate entity” and liable to pay WUTIC. CDCP/PNCC
appealed, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and the Supreme Court
denied it on petition for review. Upon motion of WUTIC, the RTC issued a writ
of execution and Sheriff Harina issued notices of garnishment against the
accounts, shares of stocks and income of CDCP/PNCC with various banks and
corporations.

In October 197, PCGG Commissioner Mendoza attended the PNCC board

meeting and discovered the writ and notices of garnishment. After realizing
that WUTIC/AHL’s claim could be Cuenca’s in disguise, PCGG enjoined ONCC
and/or any person acting in its behalf from taking any action which would
dissipate or affect the assets of CDCP/PNCC. PCGG filed for certiorari with the
Sandiganbayan to annul the RTC decision, writ and garnishment. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition ruling that it had not jurisdiction to
annul the judgement of the RTC. It claimed to have only appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the RTC in criminal cases involving offenses
relating to public office.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of

discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for certiorari despite the
possibility that WUTIC is a dummy corporation or an alter ego of Rodolfo
Cuenca.

Held: The 3 corporations involved in this petition, PNCC/CDCP, AHL and

CDCPI, Hongkong are under sequestration are defendants in the
sequestration case pending before the Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims
against CDCPI and assigned the same to WUTIC. Eventually WUTIC obtained
a favorable judgement in a Hongkong court. Due to the closure of CDCPI in
Hongkong, WUTIC filed a case with RTC against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a
foreign judgement obtained against CDCPI. Both corporations are Cuenca-
owned and under sequestration. Hence there is valid ground for PCGG to
evaluate the validity of WUTIC’s claim as a legitimate assignee or merely a
dummy corporation set up to circumvent the sequestration case. As per the
Court, it should be noted that despite the initial sequestration orders and the
case filed with the Sandiganbayan against stockholdings of Rodolfo Cuenca
and th so-called Cuenca-owned corporations, AHL, ONCC/CDCP and CDCPI,
the PCGG was not made a party in the civil case in Hongkong and the case to
enforce the foreign judgement filled with the trial court. Considering the
interconnections between the participating corporations in the said
transactions and the existence of the sequestration case, the PCGG should
have been informed of the above cases to question and verify the veracity of
the claim.

The Court stated that it is aware of various schemes employed to circumvent

sequestration orders, dissipate sequestered assets and thwart PCGG’s efforts
to recover ill-gotten wealth. That there is a possibility that WUTIC is a
dummy corporation formed by Rodolfo Cuenca, or his alter ego, the reach the
sequestered assets, there is a need to vigorously guard these assets and
preserve them pending resolution of the sequestration case before the
Sandiganbayan.

LIANG v. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner is an economist for ADB who was charged by the

Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against her fellow worker w/ 2 counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC judge
then received an office of protocol from the Department of Foreign Affairs,
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the agreement bet ADB & the gov’t. MeTC judge, w/o notice,
dismissed the two criminal cases. Prosecution filed writ of mandamus &
certiorari and ordered the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest.

Issue: WON the petitioner is covered by immunity under the agreement and
that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were
filed in court.

Held: He is not covered by immunity because the commission of a crime is

part of the performance of official duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and
take on its face the communication from the DFA that a certain person is
covered by immunity. That a person is covered by immunity is preliminary.
Due process is right of the accused as much as the prosecution.

Slandering a person is not covered by the agreement because our laws do

not allow the commission of a crime such as defamation in the name of
official duty. Under Vienna convention on Diplomatic Relations, commission
of a crime is not part of official duty.

On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted,

suffice it to say that preliminary investigation isn’t a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory
right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear than no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling w/in the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation doesn’t affect the court’s
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective.

D1-6

Endencia v. David

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income

taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower
court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo
and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore
was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended
that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which
Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on
the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto
Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income
tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease
of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on
the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590
interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII
of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task
and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution,
which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the

Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out of the
provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret
and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can
determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion
of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the
two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the
salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the
Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto v.
Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.

BLAS F. OPLE

v.
 RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA,
CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR
SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT

Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator

Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the
revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: (1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and (2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads
of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No.
308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YE S. As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the

threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve
our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate.
As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit
raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot
cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as
January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed
the guidelines for the national identification system.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement
A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass
judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result
would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental
right.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs NEDA Director General

Facts: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420
that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and
Government owned and controlled corporations in order to have a uniform ID
for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents
assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by
the president and it infringes the citizens right to privacy.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid.

Decision: Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance

under the presidents constitutional power of control over government entities
in the executive department, as well as the presidents constitutional duty to
ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order is not a
usurpation of legislative power. Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative
power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of some
necessary information to imprint in them do not require a legislation. What
needs legislation is the system of appropriation to enforce the unified ID
system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal data
that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID.

United States v. Nixon (1974)

Historical Background

The early 1970s was a time of growing distrust in the National Government.
The Pentagon Papers exposed the intentional deception of the American
people about Vietnam. Americans were shocked when the National Guard
opened fire at a Kent State University protest following President Nixon's
authorization for the United States to attack Cambodia. Four students were
killed. Nixon would soon add more fuel to the fire, attempting to cover up
illegal actions by himself and his administration.

Circumstances of the Case

In June 1972, five men armed with cameras and bugging equipment were
arrested inside the Democratic National Committee's offices in the Watergate
complex in Washington, D.C. Police soon discovered that the burglars
worked, directly or indirectly, for the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
President Nixon and leaders of his campaign denied any connection with the
incident.

The five men were convicted of burglary, along with E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a
former Nixon aide, and G. Gordon Liddy, a lawyer for the Committee to Re-
elect the President. Shortly afterward, the presiding judge received a letter
from one of the convicted men. It spoke of payoffs to the burglars in return
for their silence—the men had perjured themselves to protect others involved
in the break-in.

In 1973, a Senate select committee began an investigation, and it became

clear that top members of the Nixon administration were involved in a cover-
up of the break-in and several other illegal actions. It was also discovered
that Nixon had installed a taping system that automatically recorded all of his
conversations with his advisors. A special prosecutor appointed to probe the
Watergate scandal subpoenaed the tapes. Nixon refused to release them,
claiming they were protected under executive privilege. Nixon eventually
released some of the tapes, but portions of them had been erased. Finally,
another special prosecutor asked the United States Supreme Court to compel
Nixon to release all of the tapes in their entirety.

Constitutional Issues

Does the separation of powers created by the Constitution provide the

President with an absolute power to withhold information from other
branches of government? If the power is not absolute, should President Nixon
be able to claim executive privilege under the aforementioned
circumstances? Does the separation of powers allow for the settlement of this
dispute to reside in the executive branch or should it be settled by the
judicial branch? Does the claim of executive privilege damage the precedent
set by the 5th Amendment, which ensures due process?

Arguments

For the United States: The President's power to claim executive privilege is
not an absolute one. Executive privilege may not be invoked to deny the
courts access to evidence needed in a criminal proceeding. This is a dispute
that can properly be heard in the federal courts.

For President Nixon: The constitutional scheme of separation of powers

grants to the President the privilege of withholding information from the
other branches of government. Furthermore, this power is absolute, and it is
vital where high-level communications are involved. In addition, this dispute
should be resolved within the executive branch, not by the courts.

Held

The Court ruled unanimously that President Richard Nixon had to surrender
the tapes. Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the Court.
Burger wrote, “The impediment that an absolute, unqualified [executive]
privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts under Art[icle] III.”

Burger then turned his attention to the damage that a privilege of

confidentiality would cause to citizens' constitutional rights: “The right to the
production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional
dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in
a criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' and
'to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover,
the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of
liberty without due process. It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate
those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and
admissible evidence be produced.” The Court made it clear that the President
could not withhold evidence from an ongoing criminal prosecution of another
person simply because he was the President.

Several days before, the House Judiciary Committee had approved three
articles of impeachment. On August 9, 1974, Nixon became the first President
in U.S. history to resign from the presidency. He did so in order to avoid going
through the likely prospect of being impeached by the full House of
Representatives and convicted by the Senate.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners
pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees
of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed
in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud
in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-
called “Gloriagate Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the
President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public
officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:

Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:

No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the
fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition,
an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch

whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
 Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic (G.R. No. 174689, 22
October 2007)

-- The petitioner sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from”Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female”, after
having undergone sex reassignment surgery.

Facts: The petitioner alleged that his name was registered as “Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his birth certificate, while his sex was registered as
“male.” He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. He also underwent sex
reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex
from “male” to “female.”

The petition was granted by trial court, but was reversed by the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA.

Issue: WON sex reassignment is a valid ground for change of name and
gender in the birth certificate.

Held: A person's first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex

reassignment

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides that: “No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.” This Civil Code provision was amended by RA
9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of

First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

In other words, the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done, and not with the trial
court. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name, providing for the following
grounds (Sec. 4) for which change of first name may be allowed:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper
or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the
public interest.

No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the
ground of sex reassignment.

Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that: “No entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order.” Together with Article 376
of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical
or typographical errors are involved. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a
“clerical or typographical error” is:

Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the

performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an
entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries
envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code.

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error fromâ€ while to change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.â€ The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain
acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery
of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes
of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal
consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a
person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.