Apacible, Pamela Kristina P.

1E

I.
a) NO, Rico’s defense is not meritorious. Despite having no intention to kill the woman, based on
jurisprudence, intent to kill is conclusively presumed when there is someone killed during the
occurrence of an unlawful act.1

b) Red and Rod’s defense is not meritorious. Based on the facts, there exist a conspiracy between
the three men. A conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point
to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 2 Hence, it is necessary
that a conspirator should have performed some overt acts as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his con-
conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators.3

The conspiracy being established, each member of the group performed specific and coordinated
acts as to indicate beyond doubt a common criminal design or purpose. 4 Thus, even assuming
arguendo that Red and Rod had no role in the unlawful act, them being conspirators are equally
liable for the crime as it is unnecessary to determine who inflicted the fatal wound because in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.5

1
People v Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003
2
People v. Datun, 272 SCRA 380 [1997].
3
People v. Ramil Dacibar, et al., G.R. No. 111286, 17 February 2000, pp. 13-14, citing People v. Berroya, 283 SCRA
111 [1998]; italics supplied.
4
People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310 [1997].
5
People v. Maldo, G.R. No. 131347, 19 May 1999, 307 SCRA 424, citing People v. Magallano, supra.; People v.
Palomar, 278 SCRA 114 [1997]; People v. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26 [1997]; People v. Cabiles, Sr., 268 SCRA 271
[1996]
 II.
a) Yes, they are liable under Sec. 4 , paragraph 8(e) of Republic Act No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing
Law.6 Said section provides that, “The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie
evidence of participation therein as principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts
punishable herein. Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.”

b) Good faith cannot be used as a defense in this case because the charge constitutes a violation
of a special penal law, thus it being a crime mala prohibita. The Court held that a when crime
under consideration is malum prohibitum, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not
exempt the accused from criminal liability.7

III.
a) Rica is criminally liable for impossible crime of theft. Impossible crime is defined under
Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of
accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further
explained by the Court in Intod v CA8 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. That the
offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must
be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended
act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

6
Anti-Hazing Act of 1995, sec. 4, par. 8(e)
7
People v Que Ming Kha, G.R. No. 133265, May 29, 2002
8
Intod v CA, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992
 Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. Thus in this case, there exists a legal impossibility because the commission of theft
would be inherently impossible because you cannot steal what you already own.

b) Rica would be liable for theft. Despite her defense of having no intent to gain, the Court posits
that, “Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation”9. Thus, the act of Rica surreptitiously
taking the necklace from the store already contradicts her defense, and establishes intent to
gain. There exists then all elements of theft as per Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

IV.
a) Robbie is a quasi-recidivist. Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a quasi-
recidivist is a one who has been convicted by a final judgment of any crime whether the first
conviction is for a felony or an offense punished by a special law but after finality of judgment
before serving the first sentence or while serving sentence he commits a felony. Whereas a
recidivist is an offender has been convicted by two felonies that has been embraced in the same
title of the Revised Penal Code. In this case, Robbie was charged with robbery and murder.
These two allegations are embraced in different titles of the RPC under Crimes Against
Property and Persons, respectively. Not having convicted by a final judgment and being
accused of two felonies under separate titles, Robbie is therefore a quasi-recidivist.

b) The mitigating circumstances will not be appreciated. As regards provocations, it is not one of
the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
with regard to the voluntary surrender, an ordinary mitigating circumstance cannot offset an
indivisible penalty, such as that is prescribed with the crime of murder. The Supreme Court
stated that, “this mitigating circumstance could not serve to lower the penalty meted against
accused-appellant because reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty.”10

9
Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA 622, 631-632 and Philippine National Bank v.
Tria, G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 440, 453.
10
People v Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2019