RULE 115 - RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
PEOPLE
Section 1
All criminal prosecutions shall, the accused shall be entitled to the
following rights:
a. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
beyond reasonable doubt
b. To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him
c. To be present and defend in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgement
d. To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to
cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination.
e. To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness
against himself
f. To confront and cross-examine the witness against
him at trial
g. To have compulsory process issued to secure
attendance of witnesses and production of evidence in
his behalf
h. To have speedy, impartial and public trial
i. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner
prescribed by law
Constitutional Rights
Section 15.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence without due
process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have a compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable.
Purpose: to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet
what and in the end could be a baseless accusation.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE and OVERCOMING THE
PRESUMPTION
 Cannot be overcome by the presumption of regularity, by mere
suspicion or conjecture
o Can only be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable doubt
 Mere moral certainty is required
o Proof must survive against the test of reason
o In order to convict: must exclude all and each and
every hypothesis consistent with his innocence >> court
to review the totality of evidence presented by the
parties
 Identity of the offender/s must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt
o Absence of it does not overcome the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty and must therefore result
to acquittal
The constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to
every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of
the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but
on the strength of evidence for the prosecution.
Equipoise rule - Where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in
favor of the accused.
 It is basic constitutional right of the accused persons to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against them
 Qualifying and aggravating circumstances shall be alleged
 Minor variance between the information and the evidence does not
alter the nature of the offense nor does it determine or qualify the
crime of the penalty.
 Failure to file a motion to quash the information cannot amount to
a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed.
 In Criminal cases, the right of an accused to be assisted by a
member of the bar is immutable. Even if the judgment has become
final and executory, it may still be recalled and the accused be
afforded of the opportunity to be heard.
 Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall
at all times be assisted by counsel.
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DEL CASTILLO v.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 185128, January
- 30, 2012
(Formerly UDK No. 13980)
- violation of Section 16 (Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs), Article
III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425
- based on a confidential information
- PO conducted surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of
Castillo and secured a SW from the RTC to search the house
- seized 4 packets of shabu were found by the Tanods from the
nipa hut 5-10 meters away from the house (allegedly, Castillo
ran to the nipa when the raid was conducted)’; nothing was found
from the house
- RTC and CA: Castillo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Arguments:
1. Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer
who applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale
of drugs during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application
of the same search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the
petitioner, aside from failing to file the necessary motion to quash the
search warrant pursuant to Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, did not introduce clear and convincing evidence
to show that Masnayon was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or
representation.
SC: NO MERIT
2. Petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located about 20 meters away
from his house is no longer within the "permissible area" that may be
searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search
warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to be
searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only
against government authorities and not to private individuals such as
the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of
shabu inside the nipa hut.
SC: By virtue of the above provisions, the police
officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of
the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the
confiscated items is considered a private individual,
thus, making the same items admissible in evidence,
petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed
to establish constructive possession of the regulated
drugs seized, would still be meritorious.
3. Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he
could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just because
they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed
the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and
regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person
is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding
the same is sufficient to convict.
SC: NO PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
While it is not necessary that the property to be
searched or seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is issued, there
must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellant’s control or possession. The CA, in its
Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs
by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it
is found. The records are void of any evidence to show
that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was
it established that he used the said structure as a
shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed
that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being
an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision,
noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor,
thus:
 x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband
is an electrician by occupation. As such, conclusion
could be arrived at that the structure, which housed
the electrical equipment is actually used by the
respondent. Being the case, he has control of the
things found in said structure.
DOCTRINE:
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure
to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion,
there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal
case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and
satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence
RIGHT TO BE HEARD
 In case of unjustified failure of witness to comply with subpoena,
the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
 An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review and the
appellate court may correct even unassigned errors.
o IN CIVIL CASE: Unassigned error will not be considered
by the appellate court.
(B) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him
 Objective of a written accusation:
1. To furnish the accused with a description of the charge
against him that will enable him to make his defense
2. To avail of his conviction or acquittal (for protection against
DJ)
3. Inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction
 Accused is solemnly and ceremonially informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him during the arraignment in which a
copy of the information is furnished to him and the same is read to
him in a language or dialect known to him >> so that he may
adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process
clause of the Constitution
 There is a presumption that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense
An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information for,
constitutionally, he has the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
(C, 2) To be heard in defense
 Right to be present and defend in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings (from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment)
o Limitation: Upon motion, the accused may be allowed
by the court to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel
o *(G) Right to compulsory process*
 An inviolable constitutional right >> accused cannot be deprived of
this right
 Can be waived: right to present evidence (impliedly or expressly)
(C, 3) To be present at every stage of the proceedings
 from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment
 Trial in absentia:
o Can waive: presences at trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in bail, unless the court specifically
ordered for his presence for purposes of identification
o Absence wo justifiable cause shall be considered as
a waiver of his right to be present
o If escapee: deemed to have waived his right to be
present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over
him is regained
 Presence cannot be waived:
o At arraignment and plea, whether if innocence or guilt
o Trial necessary for identification purposes
o Promulgation of sentence (XPN: light offenses – counsel
or representative only is allowed)
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 Upon motion: accused can be allowed to defend himself in person
when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protest his rights without the assistance of counsel
(D) To testify on his behalf
 Right to be heard entitles the accused of the right to testify as a
witness on his behalf but subject to cross-examination on maters
covered by direct examination
 His silence shall not in any manned prejudice him
(F) Right of Confrontation and cross-examination
 Right of the accused to confront and cross examine the witnesses
against him at the trial – fundamental right
o it is the opportunity to x-examine that is important >>
Need not really x-examine
o does not apply to PI
 2 purposes of the Right to confront:
1. To secure opportunity of cross-examination
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying
 Waiver: express or implied waiver by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination
o failure of the party to take advantage the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness that is only attributable to him
alone (implied)
o escapee (trial in absentia) – does not retain his rights to
cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf >
by his failure to appear during the trial of which he was
notified, he virtually waived these rights
 Testimony of a deceased witness: either party may utilize it,
out of or cannot with due diligence be found in PH provided that it
involves the same parties, SM and the adverse party had the
opportunity to X-examine >> testimony of a deceased in a
separate process can be utilized as long as the it has the same
parties, SM etc. and that there was x-examination
 Effects: absence or incomplete X-examination
o GR: testimony of a witness, given on direct examination,
should be stricken where there is not an adequate
opportunity for X-examination
 as where the witness by reason of his death,
illness, or absence cannot be subjected to x-
examination
 direct testimony of a person who dies before
the conclusion of the x-examination if not
covered by the x-examination
 deprived of the opportunity to x-examination
wo the fault on his part (illness or death of a
witness after direct examination) >> no
evidence should be admitted but what was or
might be under the examination of both
parties, and the ex parte statements are too
uncertain and unreliable to be considered in
the investigation of controverted facts
(People v Seneres, 99 SCRA 92, 1980)
 Partial x-examination: cannot be stricken off the
record
 When accused filed a motion for leave to file BILL OF
PARTICULARS and was granted, and such demurrer was
eventually denied >> STILL HAS THE RIGHT TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE
 To secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf
 “law which hears before it condemns, which process upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial”
 Court should not delegate to the accused the responsibility of
getting his witnesses >> court to subpoena a defense witness if
the accused should ask for it
 No qualified and competent interpreter means a denial of the
compulsory process
 Processes available to the accused
1. Subpoena ad testificandum: a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of
an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent
authority, for the taking of his deposition (Sec.1, Rule 21,
CivPro)
2. Subpoena duces tecum: process requiring a person to bring
with him any books, documents, or other things under his
control (Sec. 1, Rule, 21, CivPro)
3. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession or
prosecution: upon motion of the accused showing good cause
and with notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent
surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the
 prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing of any written statement given by the
complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the
offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating
officers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things not
otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the case and which are in
the passion or under the control of the prosecution, police, or
other law investigating agencies (Sec. 10, Rule 116)
4. Application for examination of witness for accused before trial:
when the accused has been held to answer for an offense, he
may, upon motion with notice to the other parties, have
witnesses conditionally examined in his behalf (Secs. 12-13,
Rule 119)
 In case of unjustified failure of witness to comply with subpoena,
the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
 An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review and the
appellate court may correct even unassigned errors.
o IN CIVIL CASE: Unassigned error will not be considered
by the appellate court.
MIGUEL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent
G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012
- violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the
consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the
proposed Koronadal City public market (project)
- Miguel was acting in his capacity as a Municipal Mayyor of Korondal,
South Cotabato
- Information filed then 2 separate Motions for reinvestigation was
conducted and Miguel was given 10 days to file his counter—affidavit
>> Requested 2 30-days extension then another 20-day extension but
still failed to file the counter-affidavit
- Prosec Ruiz asked Sandigan for the arraignment (pleaded not guilty)
and trial
- Miguel fined another petition for a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation of the cases filed against him – Sandigan denied this
because of the pending OSP’s reinvestigation – Miguel did not question
the denial
- OSP decision: suspension from office >> Miguel filed vigorous
opposition based on the obvious fatal defect of the information in failing
to allege that he giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was
done through manifest partiality, evident BF or gross inexcusable
negligence
ISSUE: Miguel demanded for a pre-suspension hearing (is the pre-
suspension order valid even if wo hearing? YES)
SC: The pre-suspension order is valid.
GR: While the suspension of a public officer under this
provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior
hearing to determine "the validity of the information "filed
against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official
even before his conviction." The accused public official’s right
to challenge the validity of the information before a
suspension order may be issued includes the right to
challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to
the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of
his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not
constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on
bribery of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing
held to determine the validity of the Information that had been
filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous
pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of
this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied nor just by
an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the
court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position
papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement,
when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be
heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under
R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain that
no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard"
does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
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arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due
process exists.
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to
the OSP’s Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving
an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed
a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. Given
this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the
conduct of an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same
alleged "defect in the information," which we have found wanting – has
legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure
whose duration shall in no case exceed ninety (90) days, the adequacy
of the opportunity to contest the validity of the information and of the
proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits of the defenses
of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence
of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses,
however unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by
law equally and sufficiently serves both the due process right of the
accused and the mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
 Right to be present and defend in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgment (Sec. 1(C))
 Implemented by Secs. 6-8, Rule 116; Sec. 13, Rule 112; Sec. 2,
Rule 124
 Revised guidelines for continuous trial of Criminal Cases: if
a party fails to qualify of the availment of the services of the PAO
>> IBP Local chapter shall provide for the free legal assistance to
said party
o IBP local chapter shall submit to the Exec. Judges as list
of IBP local lawyers who may be appointed by the courts
to acts as counsel de officio in such cases.
 Basis:
o From the fundamental principle of due process (person
must be heard before being condemned)
o May elect his own representative of choice or a court-
appointed lawyer
 Before arraignment: court to inform the accused of his right to
counsel and ask him if he desires to have one
o Court can assign him a counsel de officio to defend him
 What is required is that he is informed of the right to counsel, and
if he wants to avail of the same (either ask for counsel or to be
provided by the court) - accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the
defense and acts accordingly.
 The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings >> sworn duty of fidelity to the client by the lawyer
o Limitation: option to secure the service of counsel de
parte is not absolute >> court may restrict the accused’s
option to retain a counsel de parte if the accused insist
on an attorney he cannot afford, or the chosen counsel
is not a member of the bar, or the attorney declines to
represent the accused for a valid reason (ex. Conflict of
interest), or his insistence on acquiring the services of
counsel de parte was merely a strategy to prolong the
proceedings of the case
Right to counsel in administrative cases
 It is not indispensable irrespective of the nature of charges and
of respondent’s capacity to represent himself
 Extrajudicial confession must be made with voluntariness and
that it was given freely and without any coercion (for it to be
valid)
PEOPLE V. LARA
G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTURO
LARA y ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant.
- case of robbery with homicide
- Joselito Mendoza was armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating
together with one unidentified person who is still at-large, and both of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M.
Bautista cash money amounting to ₱ 230,000.00 more or less
and belonging to San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. represented
by Enrique Sumulong; that on the occasion of said robbery, the said
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot said Joselito M. Bautista with the
said gun, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly
caused his death.
- Lara was positively identified by the witnesses in a police line
up
- Lara pleaded not guilty during arraignment
- Prosecution: positive identification during a police line-up +
testimonies of the witnesses
- Lara’s Defense: (a) he was a plumber who resided at Dr. Pilapil Street,
San Miguel, Pasig City; (b) on May 31, 2001, he was at his house,
digging a sewer trench while his brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a
comfort room; (c) they were working from 8:00 in the morning until
3:00 in the afternoon; (d) on June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the
evening, while he was at the house of one of his cousins, police officers
arrived and asked him if he was Arturo Lara; (e) after confirming that
he was Arturo Lara, the police officers asked him to go with them to the
Barangay Hall; (f) he voluntarily went with them and while inside the
patrol car, one of the policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to
caught you in your house, if in another place we will kill you" (sic); (g)
he was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he
was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide;
(h) when he told the police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i)
when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers told
them to come back the following day; (j) while he was at the police line-
up holding a name plate, a police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru
nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the
following day, they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest. 8
ISSUE: WON assistance of a counsel is needed in a police-line up and
absence of it violate the accused’s right to counsel - NO
RULING:
As to whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is
inadmissible as his right to counsel was violated, the CA ruled that
there was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a
police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial
investigation.
Appellant’s assertion that he was under custodial investigation at the
time he was identified in a police line-up and therefore had the right to
counsel does not hold water. Ingrained in our jurisdiction is the rule that
an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-
up considering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation.
An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the
focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. In the
case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution
witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However,
there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted from him. A priori, We refuse to
hearken to appellant’s hollow cry that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel given the hard fact that during the police
line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming ex hypothesis that appellant was subjected to interrogation
sans counsel during the police line-up, it does not in any way affect his
culpability. Any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused
becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted
based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Republic Act No. 7438, Section 2
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of
issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION - Where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into the custody by the police who carry
out process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statement
 It shall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who
is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed.
 Custodial investigation report shall be in writing.
 If the person arrested does not know how to read and write, it shall
be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel in the
language or dialect known to him. If it is not done, it shall be null
and void.
 COUNSEL: The suspect must also be advised that he has the
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option to reject the counsel provided for him by the police
authorities
 Absence of any lawyer/counsel: no custodial investigation shall
be conducted.
 Limitation:
o Failure to inform the suspect of her right to counsel
during custodial investigation attains significance
only if the person under investigation makes a
confession in writing without aid of counsel
o The choice of counsel by the accused is not a
plenary one. If chosen counsel deliberately makes
himself scarce, the court is not precluded from
appointing a de officio counsel.
o Competent or independent lawyer should be
present from the beginning to end, at all stages of
interview, counseling or advising caution
reasonably at every turn of the investigation
o Failure to meet the qualifications of being
competent and independent, confession shall be
inadmissible
o If the participation of the lawyer was confined to
the notarization of the confession alone, it is not the
assistance that the law contemplates
 The moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions
or even plain information from a suspect, the latter at this juncture
be assisted by counsel unless he waives this right in writing and in
the presence of the counsel
 A police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation
o Barangay chairman is not deemed a law
enforcement officer. Suspect’s uncounseled
statement before the barangay chairman is
admissible.
 WAIVER: must be in writing and signed in the presence of a
counsel
Requisites of extrajudicial confession under custodial
investigation
1. In writing and signed by the person arrested.
2. Signed in the presence of his counsel or in the latter’s absence,
upon a VALID WAIVER
3. The waiver must be signed in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers, and sisters, spouse, the municipal mayor,
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest
o Admissions made without assistance of the
lawyer are inadmissible
o An extrajudicial confession made by an accused
shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti
o The accused’s confession to a bantay-bayan is
inadmissible in evidence if done without the
assistance of a counsel
• Bantay-bayan are recognized by the local
government to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the
barangay level
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
 Right to be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself (Sec. 1, (e))
 WAIVER: It is not self-executing and not automatic. It must be
claimed.
o Allowed to refuse to take the witness stand (on the
assumption that his interrogation will be to incriminate
him) >> can be done at the on set
o It must be raised in response to each specific inquiry or
it is waived.
o takes the witness stand and offers testimony on his
behalf effectively waives his right against self-
incrimination
o may be asked incriminating questions on any matter he
testified on direct examination
 Scope:
o Proscribes the sue of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material
 If it is merely a compulsion to exhibit his
physical characteristics, not part of the
privilege
 Line up, repeating words, fingerprinting,
photography pr measurements to write or
speak for identification, to stand, assume a
stance, walk, make particular gesture ARE
NOT PART OF THE PROTECTED RIGHT. It
 may be validly done. (MERE MECHANICAL
ACTS)
 Writing is not a purely mechanical act
because it requires application of intelligence
and attention. Compelling a person to write
for the purpose of comparing it with the
handwriting in a document is not allowed. It
is within the scope of the prohibition against
self-incrimination (BELTRAN CASE)
 The privilege can be assessed in any
proceeding, civil or criminal,
administrative, judicial, investigatory
or adjudicatory
o “testimonial compulsion”: giving evidence against
himself through a testimonial act >> No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself.
o The court may not extract from a defendant’s own lips
and against his will an admission of his guilt
o Privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to
answers that would themselves support a conviction
but also to those which would furnish a link in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant in the
privilege.
o It is not necessary that a witness explain how his
answer will tend to incriminate him since this would
compel him to surrender the protection to which the
privilege is designed for.
o Privilege extends to lawyers advising a witness to invoke
the privilege
 Limitation:
o It does not give the witness to disregard a subpoena or
decline an appearance before the court
o It only applies to natural persons
o Withdrawal of blood for testing is not in the scope of the
privilege
o Wear particular clothing - not part of the privilege
o The papers and effects which the privilege protects must
be the private property of the person claiming the
privilege or at least in his possession in a purely personal
capacity
o A labor union cannot refuse to produce books and
records in his custody
o Court rejected a claim of privilege when the accused in
a criminal action for acts of lasciviousness was stripped
of his clothing after his arrest and in his body was found
a substance consistent with gonorrhea.
o Obtaining DNA Samples will not violate the right against
self-incrimination
o Forced re-enactments come within the ban against self-
incrimination
o In MARCELO VS SANDIGANBAYAN, the purpose for
securing the signature of the petitioner on the envelopes
was merely to authenticate the envelope as the one’s
seized from him. Thus it was upheld to be outside the
scope of right against self-incrimination
o Persons who are mere custodian cannot claim the
privilege
CLAIM BY ACCUSED AND ORDINARY WITNESS
 An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand
and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer
 An accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and
refuse to answer any and all questions
 An accused cannot be compelled to be a witness for the
prosecution, co accused or even for himself
 An ordinary witness only has the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question
 This right is waivable. Thus an accused can testify in his own
behalf and may be cross examined on the matters covered by
direct examination
 If a person freely answered an incriminating question, he could
not refuse to answer further questions which would possibly
subject him to a danger of incrimination
FORMS OF IMMUNITY:
1. Transactional immunity/ Blanket or total immunity
 Completely protects the witness from future prosecution for
crimes related to his or her testimony. Cannot be prosecuted
for any other offenses arising out of the act or transaction
which the testimony relates.
2. Use and derivative use
 Prevents only the prosecution from using the witness’ own
testimony or any evidence derived from the testimony against
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the witness. However, should the prosecutor later on acquire
evidence of a crime committed by a witness independent of
the testimony of the witness, he may be prosecuted.
STATE WITNESS PROGRAM
 If granted, the court shall order the discharge and expulsion
of the accused from the information
PEOPLE V. AYSON
G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having
allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales
of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation
to be conducted into the matter and that the investigation was
scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On
the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten notes reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO
SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT.
OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED
BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos
Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken
down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he
had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit
Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that
although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been
prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing
to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same
place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by
"Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign
his statement (as he in fact afterwards did).
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against
Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly
committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12,
1986 to January 29, 1987.
DOCTRINE:
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to
"be compelled to be a witness against himself".
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It
prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and
not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he
be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular
incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only
when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a
witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before
the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the
stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular
question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him
for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does
not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing
or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right
against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or
should know, in accordance with the well-known axiom that
everyone is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the
law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither
the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance the
character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the
witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right
may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the
appropriate time.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was
not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be
properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into
the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did
not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is
also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to
him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986
and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the
note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory
requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be
imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant
that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him
and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side.
The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or
written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The
employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the
investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so,
in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd
to reject his statements, whether at the administrative
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought
against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his
making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence
and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to
repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it
is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called
"position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely
so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the
investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of
his liability.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
 Right to have speedy, impartial and public trial (Sec. 1(h))
 Limitation: Should not be utilized to deprive the state of a
reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals
 Factors to consider if there is a violation:
o Length of delay
o Reason for the delay
o Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
o Prejudice caused by the delay
 WAIVER: waiver must be asserted
 When it is deemed violated?
o When there is unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive
delay without participation or fault of the accused
o When unjustified postponements are sought which
prolong
 Defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its purpose being to assure that an innocent person may
be free from the anxiety and expense of court litigation.
 It is flexible. It depends upon the circumstances
 Although a speedy determination of an action or proceeding
implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of a trial. A
genuine respect for the rights of all the parties is more important
 Right extends to both parties
 It is violated when the proceedings are attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays
 It took them 4 years to finish the preliminary investigation. SC:
The respondent was prejudiced by the delay.
 Delay of 6 years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
action violated the right to speedy trial
 A judge’s illness should not be an excuse for his failure to render
the corresponding decision
 A heavy work load due to additional work as acting presiding judge
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in other courts is not a sufficient justification for the delay
because judges are allowed to file extensions in deciding cases.
 Absence of clerk of court or stenographer should not affect the
prompt disposition of cases. The incompleteness of the transcript
of stenographic notes is not a ground for delay
GR: Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts be done are
ABSOLUTELY INDISPENSABLE to the prevention of needless delays.
However, This right is flexible in nature. Delay shall be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings.
 A dismissal based on violation of speedy trial is equivalent to an
acquittal and double jeopardy may attach even if the dismissal is
with consent of the accused.
 To exercise right to speedy trial, the accused should ask for the
trial of the case first instead of moving for its dismissal outrightly
RA 8493 – THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1998
APPROACHES TO SPEEDY TRIAL
1. Fixed time period - Constitution requires a criminal defendant to
be offered a trial within a specified period
2. Demand waiver rule - A defendant waives any consideration of
his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not
demanded trial
3. Balancing Test - conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are
weighed.
VILLA V. ESCALONA II, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, Feb 1, 2012
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO
ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo
de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the
Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation
rites. After the second day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-
resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation
rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then
subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was
so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then
slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon
dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting.
When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of
the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped
him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
But the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano were
dismissed for violating their right to speedy trial.
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert
their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points
out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the
criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after
the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused
Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted for
the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and
the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the
Court of Appeals.”
ISSUE: W/N the CA err in dismissing the case for violation of the
accused's right to speedy trial – NO
RULING: The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined
in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right
requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or
oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is
attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period
of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause
or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also
to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion
or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the

case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount
to acquittal. As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the
case is capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on double jeopardy is not
triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal
instead of the correctness thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that

the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings
in the case below:
xxx xxx xxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors
that contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable,
We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly
violated in this case x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that
the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the
prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring
from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the
court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through
the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case
from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said
Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in
an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on
the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the
lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5,
2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all
on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29,
1996, followed by petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on
August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained
dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns
upon x x x.

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended
Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S.
Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29
November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the initial trial
of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years
after arraignment.

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R.

SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was
violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the
subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon,
and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

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