REPUBLIC VS.

CA AND NAGUIT
FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks
judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas,
Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have
occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection
from any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name
of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his
formal opposition to the petition.
The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed
a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not
have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was
declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable
and disposable character of the land should have already been established
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.
RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is file
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject
property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive
possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or
proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and
disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property and the
possession of the land no matter how long would not ripen into ownership
through acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor General’s argument in the construction of Section

14 (1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it
would mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as
alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. In effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said
provision as it decides to reclassify lands as alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been

planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the
land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural.
There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the
continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land
since 1945.
CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN
FACTS:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel),
married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to
satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her
mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned
Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at
Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to
secure an Order dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales,
Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of
Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et al. and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and
recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor,
Lipa City, a Certification[if stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and
a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certificationattesting that Lot 13713 in the name
of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of
title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the
public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in
May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that
Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision
owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit
Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to
meet with its Vice President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did
not show her any document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit
Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste
family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF
PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT
RULING:
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the
positions held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City
Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular action was within
or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner
should have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was
being cancelled, she was not able to establish that such would be the
responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not
present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that
respondents should have done or not done a particular act. A perfect example
was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated
her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac.
However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the
annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any
reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with one
another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than
speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents were
consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a
concerted effort to cause petitioner prejudice. Respondents actions were only
consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred
by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and
accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y
ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D.
BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, V
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON,
VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN
PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS,
and LEONA SAN PEDRO, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
(Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
FACTS
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of,
against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[ on the basis of a
Spanish title, entitled Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894.
The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the
provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro
Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City
of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to
the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between Dingalan Bay in the
north and Tayabas Bay in the south
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up
and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in
various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, in
connection therewith. G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a
complaintfor recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision dated
July 7, 1989, the dispositive portionof which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against
the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and
ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs
of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or
reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was
filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator
of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G.
De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C.
dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco,
Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay,
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development
Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro
discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate,
particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977,
313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 and Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of
Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive
ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their
names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and
through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to
letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to
Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12,
1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and
genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers
the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a
decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1
of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No.
312-B.
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants,
namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador
Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint
against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel
Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the
registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic
Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung
Tiu.
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain
and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are
already the registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles
which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No.
4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban specifically stated in its dispositive portion
that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the
Torrens system by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
ISSUE: Whether the claim of 173hectares land is valid
HELD: NO. (1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and,
therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to
exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any
manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if
they or any of them are in possession thereof.

RATIO: The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal,
Quezon, and Quezon City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial
officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why?
The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private
ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title
but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil.
494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13
Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56;
Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a
Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be concretely measured
per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director,
62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888
used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the
land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos
Rejoinder to Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it
specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares
(Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May 13, 1964 in the same case,
it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is
which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos
ownership thereof then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least in these
proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription
under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796,
p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree,
applications for adjustment -- showing the location, boundaries and area of
land applied for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de
Administracion Civil, which then ordered the classification and survey of the
land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal representative
(Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications
for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the
Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the
Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within
the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here
are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which
limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with
trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil.
146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal
Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase
to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And,
at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadecos Titulo is held
out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
Legarda vs Saleeby,
Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby.
The said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens
system under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of
registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of
his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of
the latter included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has
been registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no
remedy. However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to
include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to
hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land;
to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into
the Torrens system.
Ratio: One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands
to unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all
such persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every
occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the
other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the
purpose and object for which the land registration law was enacted, and
imposes no burden upon any holder of a certificate of registered lands other
than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific occasions
wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of
Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to
the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of title in support
of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the innocent
purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such as
that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double
or overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles,
negligently or fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to
be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered
lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of
judicial proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any
appreciable degree to the security of thir titles, and merely to save them the
very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of appearance in the
court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact
that their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been
conclusively adjudicated.
Republic vs CA and Naguit
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels
of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she
is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase
from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been
in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of
her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever
kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June
1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that
the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or
not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of
little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original
registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in interest
had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of the said
land for more than 30 years.

Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-
grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons
became the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by the
Velazco.

They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be alienable

and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.

The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of
Republic v Hebierto.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed

Held:
No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need to dissect
them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14 (1) and (2)
of PD 1529 along with CA 141

It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b) vests the
right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD 1529 Sec
14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.

It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and disposable”
from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be registered, as we may
take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.

The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit,
not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:

The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is satisfied when
at the time of the application, the land is already classified as alienable and
disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption of the
right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact that at
the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.

The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation
or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. If
the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil Code.
It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the commerce of men
and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject to acquisitive or
extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion when no
longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if, as held in
Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the
executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.

Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a positive
act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and disposable, that the
land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:

Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948.
No other substantive evidence was presented.

Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as

alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
,
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land
situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15,
1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for
registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23
February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as
alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for
registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because
of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions
of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?
HELD:
The Petition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who
by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of,
and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin
to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—
the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Office of City Mayor of Parañaque City v. Mario D. Ebio
FACTS:
Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land
in Parañaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio.
Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez,
which was given to his son, Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro
continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966,
after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy. He also paid
taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s
daughter, Zenaida. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured
building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of
their house within the land. On April 21, 1987, Pedro transferred his rights
over the land in favor of Ebio.
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay
of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking assistance from
the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along
Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from
Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied
by the respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was
suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several
officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut eight
(8) coconut trees planted on the said lot.
On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to
the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30)
days, or be physically evicted from the said property. Respondents sent a
reply, asserting their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for
a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC
of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:
No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the
alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek.
This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted
portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in
effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. ART. 84. Accretions
deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and
lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands. Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters.
 It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial
deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as
the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired
by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has been,
there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public
domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as
against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the
land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.
Republic v. CA

FACTS:

Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which

was approved and issued an original certificate of title. Both the free patent
and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor
encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The
District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the
land and upon finding that the subject land is submerged in water during high
tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion
of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting

encumbering the land within the 5-year period?

2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD

1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free patent
or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation
from the date of approval of the application and for a term of 5 years from
and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The contracts of lease
and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as
contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act because such contracts
impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate and the
tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to
the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court
annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the
parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the Court voided
the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The
subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor be returned to
the public domain.
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
Facts:
Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (Implementing Rules).

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA

and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State's ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
 Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and
other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
community property of the indigenous peoples;
 Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples
in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals
and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their
ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with non-
indigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not
more than 25 years;
 Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover or reforestation.
 by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.

The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on
the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae
and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights
of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this
reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.

Issue: WON The provisions of IPRA violates the regalian doctine

Ruling:
No.

Justice Puno:
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right
of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership"
is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The ICCs/IPs are given the
right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds,
and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will
be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied
by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, Pora and fauna in the traditional
hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in
the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the
ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does
not cover "waters, mineral, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
all other natural resources” enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution-as belonging to the State. The non-inclusion of ownership by the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian
doctrine. The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the
IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/lPs the right to
"manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants
the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof.
Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority
rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and
this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to
whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian
doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural
resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Justice Kapunan:
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in
private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs.
Insular Government the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision
of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
. . . Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a
case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have
been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. . . . . The above ruling institutionalized the recognition
of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by
virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of jura regalia. A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine
enunciated therein applies only to lands which have always been considered
as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or
otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native
title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership
by virtue a of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its
successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government.
There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been
regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast,
ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to
private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private
person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private
land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor
General's thesis that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the
public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the
public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks under the Constitution is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño
doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral
domains.
The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor
General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any
misunderstanding. It simply declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State." Nowhere does it state that certain lands which
are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," including those
which are not part of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the
State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the provision should
be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of
the 1935 Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which
had existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were divested of
their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of the
natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the
fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by expressly
providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural
resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concessions." The "existing rights" that were intended to be protected must,
perforce, include the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over their
ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law should be given their
ordinary or usual meaning, and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned
an unduly restrictive definition.

RA 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT); SECTION 3(a) THEREOF

MERELY DEFINES COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL DOMAIN AND DOES NOT
CONFER OWNERSHIP OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 3(a) merely
defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines
in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and
within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a
yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains.
It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural
resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.

SECTION 7 (a and b) THEREOF MAKES NO MENTION OF ANY RIGHT OF

OWNERSHIP OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OVER NATURAL RESOURCES. —
Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous
peoples over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes
the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting
and Mshing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within
the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of
the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral
domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural resources.

SECTIONS 7(b) AND 57 THEREOF REFER TO EXPLORATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES AND PRIORITY RIGHTS IN THE UTILIZATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES. — A careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights
given to the indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are
limited only to the following: "to manage and conserve natural resources
within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share the
proMts from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein;
to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources
in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to
an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project, and the
right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with, alienation and encroachment of these rights." It must be noted that the
right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains
only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only
to the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the
purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for
profit. The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be
equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization"
of natural resources which under the Constitution belong to the State. Section
57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the
utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority
rights do not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of
preference or Mrst consideration in the award of privileges provided by
existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of
indigenous peoples living in the area.

Justice Panganiban:
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO
BENEFICIAL USE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN MAY BE ACCORDED TO INDIGENOUS
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES; PRIVILEGE MUST BE
SUBJECT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW. — Our fundamental law mandates the
protection of the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral
lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." I
concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public
domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the
fundamental law.

R.A. NO. 8371 (INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS ACT OF 1997); SECS. 3(a and
b), 5, 6, 7 (a and b), 8 AND OTHER RELATED PROVISIONS, CONTRAVENE
REGALIAN DOCTRINE. — RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous
cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable
intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our
Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development."
Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that
run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and
authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and
other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic
foundation of the State's property regime. Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of
the public domain, minerals and natural resources - none of which, except
agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court has
consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a
positive act of the government. Mere possession or utilization thereof,
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.
The presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, . . . all applicants in
land registration proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by
composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must
present competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not
rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title."

CONTRAVENES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON ACQUISITION OF

ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS. — Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution
Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land,
whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding
500 hectares, they may hold by lease only. RA 8371, however, speaks of no
area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere
definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties
under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/
IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators." Already, as of June 1998,
over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral
domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. Based on
ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains
cover 80 percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of
the 30 million hectares of land in the country. This means that four fifths of
its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated
among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs, while over 60 million other
Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the
remaining. These Mgures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of
a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among
Filipinos. ACT

ABDICATES DUTY OF STATE TO TAKE FULL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF

NATURAL RESOURCES. — Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further
provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The
State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. Such
agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same
period and under terms and conditions as may be provided by law. But again,
RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of
ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are
concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may
develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. And they may
exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do
so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period.
Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and
utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
Alvarez v. PICOP Resources Inc.
Facts:
The government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then
President Ferdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.

PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources

(DENR) an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43
converted into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA). In the
middle of the processing of PICOP's application, however, PICOP refused to
attend further meetings with the DENR. Instead, PICOP filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against
then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez. PICOP seeks the issuance of a
privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to sign, execute
and deliver an IFMA to PICOP. RTC rendered a Decision granting PICOP's
Petition for Mandamus.

In its first decision, the SC held that such licenses concerning the harvesting
of timber in the country's forests cannot be considered contracts that would
bind the Government regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. To construe these investments as consideration in
a contract would be to stealthily render ineffective the settled jurisprudence
that "a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the
licensee or permittee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to
which the constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts may
extend."

In sum, the DENR Secretary has adequately proven that PICOP has, at this
time, failed to comply with the administrative and statutory requirements for
the conversion of TLA No. 43 into an IFMA. The Petition in G.R. No. 162243
should therefore be granted. To continue
Director of Lands vs. Reyes
Facts:
Alipio Alinsunurin, claiming ownership in fee simple by inheritance from the
late Maria Padilla, sought the registration of title under Act 496, as amended,
of a vast tract of land, containing an area of 16,800 hectares, more or less,
admittedly inside the boundary of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay.

Director of Lands, Director of Forestry, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was without sufficient title
and was not in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; that approximately 13,957 hectares of
said land consist of the military reservation of Fort Magsaysay.

The land subject of the application is included within the area reserved for
military purposes under Proclamation No. 237. The land is largely
uncultivated, mountainous and thickly forested with a heavy growth of timber
of commercial quantities. Except for a small area cultivated for vegetation by
homesteaders issued patents by the Director of Lands, there were no
occupants on the land.

On December 12, 1966, the oppositors Director of Lands, Director of Forestry

and the Armed Forces of the Philippines filed a Notice of Appeal from the said
decision to the Supreme Court. However, no copy was furnished to counsel
for Roman C. Tamayo, to whom one-third (1/3) portion of the land was
adjudicated. Pending the approval of the Record on Appeal, the applicant
Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation Gled a motion for the
issuance of a decree of registration pending appeal. Likewise, Roman C.
Tamayo, thru counsel, Gled a motion for the issuance of a decree of
registration.

The lower court, ruling that its decision of November 19, 1966 had become
Gnal as to the share of Roman C. Tamayo, directed the issuance of a decree
of registration of the entire land, one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso in favor of
Roman C. Tamayo, and two-thirds (2/3) pro-indiviso in favor of Parañaque
Investment and Development Corporation, subject to the final outcome of the
appeal.

Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
instituted before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction (L-27594), seeking to nullify the order dated March
11, 1967, the decree of registration issued pursuant thereto (Decree No.
113485 dated March 14, 1967) and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3151 of
the Register of Deeds for the province of Nueva Ecija, and to command the
respondent court to certify the entire proceedings and to allow appeal to the
Supreme Court from its decision.

Issue:
1. WON the Decree of registration entered was valid.
2. whether the applicant has a registerable title to the land applied for.

Ruling:

1. No. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is
a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after
the decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is
on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues
the corresponding certificate of title.
 Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or exceeded its
jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite
the appeal timely taken from the entire decision a quo.

Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of the appellants to

serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to the counsel for adjudicatee
Roman C. Tamayo is not fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he was
served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended Record on
Appeal in both of which the Notice of Appeal is embodied. 1100 Hence,
such failure cannot impair the right of appeal.

To begin with, the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which
must be approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence.
The submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character.

The applicant is not relieved from submitting in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan approved by the Director of Lands as required by law. One of the
distinguishing marks of the Torrens System is the absolute certainty of the
identity of a registered land. Consequently, the primary purpose of the
aforesaid requirement is to fix the exact or definite identity of the land as
shown in the plan and technical descriptions. Hence, the applicant is not
relieved of his duty of submitting the original tracing cloth of the survey plan
of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands.

2. No. The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria

issued in the name of Melecio Padilla. However, neither the original of
the said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy
thereof, was submitted in evidence, and there are serious Qaws on the
faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in the circumstances
surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat
copies of the said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the
date when said informacion posesoria was issued. One copy showed that
the said document was issued on March 5, 1895, while the other
indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5,
1883.

Moreover, according to the official records of the Register of Deeds of

Nueva Ecija, on the basis of the "List of Possessory Information Titles
(Spanish Titles) of Nueva Ecija", the name of Melecio Padilla does not
appear among those listed as holders of informacion posesoria titles as
of the year 1898 covering lands situated in Santor (now Laur), Nueva
Ecija. According to said document, the name Melecio Padilla appears
only in the list of holders of possessory information titles over lands
situated in Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija, but of a substantially smaller
acreage. In addition, the list of property owners in Santor (now Laur),
Nueva Ecija existing in the Division of Archives does not include the
name of Melecio Padilla. It is true that an alleged copy of an informacion
posesoria, in the name of Melecio Padilla, was recorded in the office of
the Register of Deeds on November 10, 1942 by one Rodolfo Baltazar,
Register of Deeds (Exhibit "H"), but the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
could not certify to its veracity, as the supposed document does not
exist in their records. There is another factor which weighs heavily
against the claim of the applicant. The alleged informacion posesoria
covers an area of "seis mil quiñones, poco mas e menos" or an
equivalent of 16,800 hectares. Under the Royal Decrees in force at the
time of the supposed acquisition, no one could acquire public land in
excess of 1,000 hectares. Thus, the Royal Decrees of November 25,
1880 and October 26, 1881, prohibited any grant of public land in excess
of one thousand (1,000) hectares. Besides, the document described in
Exhibit "H" is not the titulo de informacion posesoria, because it was
merely a certification of possession of Melecio Padilla over the property,
and was issued without prejudice to a third party or parties having a
better right.

Under Spanish law, in order that an informacion posesoria may be

considered as title of ownership, it must be proven that the holder
thereof has complied with the provisions of Article 395 of the Spanish
Mortgage Law. It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession
has been legally converted into a registration of ownership because
Melecio Padilla had not complied with the requirements of Article 393 of
the Spanish Mortgage Law, to wit: "that the applicant has been in open
possession of the land; that an application to this effect be filed after
the expiration of 20 years from the date of such registration; that such
conversion be announced by means of a proclamation in a proper official
bulletin; that the Court order the conversion of the registration of
possession into a record of ownership; and that the Registrar make the
proper record thereof in the Registry."

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five

(5) years after the inscription of the informacion posesoria, could not
have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years
after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage
Law.

It seems obvious, on the basis of the facts in the record, that neither
applicant Parañaque Investment and Development Corporation nor
Alipio Alinsunurin nor the latter's predecessors-in-interest have been "in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation"
of the property in question, "under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title."

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and

the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious
so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of
dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing
livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive
prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period may
have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.

It is obvious that the applicant has failed to submit convincing proof of

actual, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the
entire area in question during the period required by law.

Even more important, Section 48[b] of CA No, 141, as amended, applies

exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with
forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of
registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued
during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title.
Finally, the applicant urges that Proclamation No. 237 recognizes the
existence of private property within the military reservation. It is true
that the proclamation states that the same is subject "to private rights,
if any there be", but applicant must prove its private rights over the
property, which said party failed to do. For it is well-settled that, unless
the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was ever acquired by the applicant or his ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain.
Benin v. Tuazon
Facts:
plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of
agricultural lands, located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose)
in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal, having an
aggregate area of approximately; that they inherited said parcels of land from
their ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father,
Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had possessed
these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and peacefully, cultivated the
same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested therefrom;

The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective
complaint, that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the
peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly the defendant
J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents and representatives, with the
aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other
demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing
and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well
as the improvements.

The defendant is the owner of Original Cerfiticate of Title No. 735. It had
applied for the registration of two parcels of land namely Parcel 1 and Parccel
2. The proceedings was published in the official gazette describing the land
that is being registered. However, during the proceedings, amendments were
made in the description of the land by the Chief of the Survey Division of the
Court of Land Registration who made a recomputation of the total area of the
land. When the court asked him if there was an increase or decrease in the
land described in the application and that of the amended, the Chief of the
Survey Division of the Court of Land Registration said there was none so the
Decree of registration was made.

However, the plaintiffs now points out that there was indeed an increase in
the area. So, the area mentioned in the Decree was more than the area as
published in the Official Gazette. Thus, the issued decree should be null and
void.

Issue:
WON the said decree was null and void.

Ruling:
No. The decree was valid.

We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters is too minimal to be of

decisive consequence in the determination of the validity of Original Certificate
of Title No. 735. It was error on the part of the lower court to lay stress on
this circumstance and made it a basis for ruling that because in the amended
plan there is this increase in area as compared to the area appearing in the
application as published, the Land Registration Court did not have jurisdiction
to render the decision decreeing the registration of Parcel 1. Under the
foregoing circumstances, our inference is that the area of 27.10 square meters
was already included in the original plan, and that the computation of the area
in the original survey must have been inaccurate; and the error was corrected
in the recomputation of the area when the amended plan was prepared.

We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not
justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan .. included
additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in
the Official Gazette."
We have held that Original Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued as a result
of the registration proceedings in LRC No. 7681 which was regular and that
said certificate of title is valid and effective. The proceedings in LRC 7681
being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision
rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and
quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including
the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in
the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To
whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree
may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the
competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an
interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is
incontrovertible (Sec. 38, Act 496). In the case now before Us, the Decree of
Registration No. 17431 in LRC 7681 was entered on July 8, 1914. It is
undisputed that no person had filed any petition for review of the decree of
registration in LRC 7681 within the period of one year from July 8, 1914. That
decree of registration, and Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued pursuant
thereto, therefore, had been incontrovertible since July 9, 1915.

he possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be
unavailing against the holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the
parcels of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Original Certificate
of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the
lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent
transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could
defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate
of title.
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Republic vs Manna Properties

FACTS: Applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title

of two (2) parcels of land. Copies of the application, postal money orders
for publication purposes and record were forwarded to the Land Registration
Authority by the Court a quo. The Opposition to the application stated, among
others, that the applicant is a private corporation disqualified under the new
Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain. Applicant-
appellee presented its president Jose Tanyao, who testified on the acquisition
of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepeña, co-owner of the subject
property, who testified on the possession of the applicant-appellee’s
predecessors-in-interest.

The documentary evidence presented were: 1.) Survey Plan 2.) Technical
Description of lots; 3) Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyor’s Certificate; 4)
Certificate of Latest Assessment;5) Notice of Initial Hearing; 6) Certificate of
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA, by the National Printing
Office; and by the Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald; 7) Clipping of the
Notice of Initial Hearing; 8) Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12,
1995; 9) Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; 10) Sheriff’s Return
of Posting; 11) Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice
of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.

Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision granting the application.

The OSG, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the Philippines
("petitioner"), promptly appealed the trial court’s decision to the CA. CA
dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its

possession of the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner
alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely
on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties.
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna
Properties that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is
disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except
by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of
Article XII in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in
question is still part of the public domain.

On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that
the land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of
its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was
already private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its
predecessors-in-interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manna Properties Sufficiently Established Possession

of the Land For the Period Required by Law.

HELD: NO – The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The governing law is Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) Sec. 48(b): Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-
interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question
since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for
confirmation of title to the land. SC ruled that the land in question has
not become private land and remains part of the public domain.

The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of

possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest,
Manuel Sobrepeña ("Manuel"), transferee’s affidavits, and several tax
declarations covering the land in question.

While a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may

serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. However, the tax
declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause.
Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting the
tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945, a scrutiny of the tax
declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties
claimed it to be. It was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly
issued on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax
declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax
declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.

The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12
June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12
June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a
previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is
unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or
after 12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax
declaration issued in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless
the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the
reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.

Also, the tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as it bears
several irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom of the back page
states that it cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the
cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945, it does not provide any of the
required information that will enable this Court or any interested party to
check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.

The form used to prepare the tax declaration states that it was "FILED UNDER
SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160." Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government
Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly
prepared the tax declaration reads, "Subscribed and sworn before me this 28
day of Nov. 1950…" This means that the tax declaration was issued more than
forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna Properties
gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at
the time of the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these
circumstances leads this Court to conclude that the tax declaration was
fabricated for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna Properties’
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question since
12 June 1945.
Roxas v. CA
GR 127876
December 17, 1999

Facts: This case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu Batangas owned by

petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these by the government under
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 9188. Petitioner Roxas
and Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway. The events of this
case occurred during the incumbency of then President Aquino, in the exercise
of legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No.
131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive
Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to initially implement the
program. Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657; the Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s
effectivity, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of EO No. 229. Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent
DAR in accordance with the CARL.

Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico
were subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government
under the CARL. Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied
with the DAR for conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural
to non-agricultural lands under the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioner’s
application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of
the two Haciendas. The Land Bank of the Philippines trust accounts as
compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash
and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the title of the Hacienda,
respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 6654. On
October 30, 1993, CLOA’s were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. On
December 18, 1991, the LBP certified certain amounts in cash and LBP bonds
had been earmarked as compensation for petitioner’s land in Hacienda
Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas
Palico and Banilad. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the
government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. Nevertheless,
on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, sent a
letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was
applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the
land would not exempt it from agrarian reform.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted a case with respondent DAR
Adjudication Board praying for the cancellation of the CLOA’s issued by
respondent DAR in the name of the farmers. Petitioner alleged that the
Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been declared
a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-
agricultural. Respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial
question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform; hence, this
question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
for determination.
Petitioner filed a petition with the CA. It questioned the expropriation of its
properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of
its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas
was denied. Petitioner’s petition was dismissed by the CA. Hence, this
recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were
valid and in accordance with the law.

Held: No, for a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are
required first the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary
conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP,
farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties and second, the Notice of
Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The
importance of the first notice, the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative
due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s
police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
taking under the power of eminent domain.

In this case, respondent DAR claims that it sent a letter of invitation to

petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda
Palico but he was not authorized as such by the corporation. The SC stressed
that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process
in the acquisition proceedings does not give the SC the power to nullify the
CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries.

The Court said, to assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative

process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be
given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition
proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been
cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness
and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land
they till. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over
the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due
process.
Roxas v Enriquez

Doctrine:
Upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service upon
and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be
specially served, the court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and said property and of the person and every one claiming any
estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any part
thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of
said property, for the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete
jurisdiction to render judgment therein, which is provided for in the law

Facts:
On 12 Jan. 1906, petitioner Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas presented
a petition in the Court of Land Registration (CLR) to registere under the
Torrens system four parcels of land, known as Parcel A, Parcel B, Parcel C,
and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila.

The petition contained a statement of the names of the adjoining owners

of the land in question, Parcel A, as well as their addresses, and the heirs of
Antonio Enriquez.

After the examiner made a careful examination of the said land, he

prepared a report recommending the said parcels’ registration in the name of
Roxas. Accordingly, the clerk of the CLR sent a copy of the notice of hearing
to each of the persons mentioned in the Order of publication by registered
mail. The clerk also had the same published in a newspaper of gen. Circulation.

Later, Atty. Modesto Reyes, in behalf of the city of Manila, called the
court’s attention to the fact there was an alleged “error of closure” in the plan
of Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the same. However, no such
correction was ever made.

Due to the failure of the defendants to appear to impugn the application

within the period fixed by law, the court declared them in default and had
Parcel A registered as the absolute property of Roxas.

Roxas then sold Parcel A and all buildings thereon to the Masonic Temple
Assoc of Manila. The latter then requested the judge of the CLR to issue a new
certificate to it. During the various hearings for such, the heirs of Don Enriquez
objected to the same.

Notwithstanding, the CLR ruled in favour Roxas and the Monastic

Temple. Still, the objectors filed a motion for new trial on the ground that they
had no notice of the pendency of the original action to confirm the title of said
property.

Issue: W/N the CLR erred when it did not give personal notice to each of the
appellants.

Held: No
Contrary to the position of the appellants, personal notice was not
absolutely necessary in order to justify the court’s action of rendering
a decree in favor of Roxas. The Court stated that personal notice of the
pendency of the original petition had been given and that a publication of the
same had been made in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 and 32
of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during which notice must be
given, the original cause was set down for hearing.
Furthermore, Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that: "The court shall, so far
as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining
owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the
land included in the application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in
registration cases is not by law required to give any notice to any person.

Lastly, the proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496,
are in rem and not in personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a
tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without
personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by
name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the
court over the res. Logically speaking, to require personal notice to all
possible claimants would impossible for how could personal notice be
ever given to “unknown claimants.”

Thus, in actions in rem, personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to

give the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the same, and meant
that the CLR did not err in registering the land in favor Roxas.
Republic v Court of Appeals and Arquillo

Procedural history:
This is a petition for certiorari for the consolidated decision of the CA which
affirmed the decision of the RTC of Ilocos Norte ordering the registration of
the parcels of land applied for in favor of herein appellants-private
respondents

Statement of facts:
The appeal stemmed from two (2) applications for original registration of two
(2) different parcels of land situated in the barrio of Umnas, Municipality of
Vintar, Province of Ilocos Norte by herein private respondents Jose Arquillo,
Pastor Valdez, Nicolas, German and Clemente, all surnamed Manayan applied
for the original registration of a parcel of land containing a total area of
972,016 square meters and private respondents Salvacion D. Arquillo and
Cosme Daguio also applied for the original registration of a parcel of land
containing 297,348 square meters.

In both applications, the Director of Lands filed oppositions alleging that

neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient
title; that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest can avail of
the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act, it appearing that the
application was filed after December 31, 1968; and that the parcels applied
for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines. And on the ground that certain portions thereof were within the
Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared as such by Executive
Proclamation No. 338, dated October 24, 1938 which . On the other hand, The
Bureau of Lands claimed that said land was intended as a Group Settlement
Subdivision known as Gss366 for award to certain applicants before 1968.
However, such aforesaid group settlement subdivision was protested by the
applicants and which protest was favorably considered by the Director of
Lands; thus, the said plan was disapproved

Issue:
Whether or not the land involved in a land registration case is a forest land or
forest reserve

Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that the parcels sought to be
registered are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared under
Presidential Proclamation No. 338 has not been clearly established. The party,
whether plaintiff or defendants, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law
to obtain a favorable judgment. The herein petitioner relies much on the report
and testimony of Forest Warden Pedro Barreras to prove that some portions
of the parcel sought to be registered are within the Northern Ilocos Norte
Forest Reserve. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence on record which
shows that the parcel of land applied for is alienable and disposable and has
been in the possession of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial while the alleged Presidential Proclamation No. 338
was issued only on October 24, 1938.

If in this instance, the court give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be
noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest
reserves of public lands can be established as provided by law. When the claim
of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in
reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural
than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should and
undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert
who speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition
on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported
by satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.

Finally, Granting in gratia argumenti that the land sought to be registered in

fact lies within in Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve, private respondents'
rights cannot be prejudiced. ... . While the Government has the right to class
portions of public land, the primary right of a private individual who possessed
and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be
recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have
been anticipated. Thus, we have held that the Government, in the first
instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made.

Holding:
the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds, City of Manila
G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941.

The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the
registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the
Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential

land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that
was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is
applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens
of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the
provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership
of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental
law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections
120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of
reciprocity. It is to be observed that the phrase "no land" used in this section
refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or
otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired
by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be
transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were
granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao v. LRC (1957)
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
Lesson Applicable: Exploitation of Natural Resources (Corporate Law)

FACTS:
October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of
Davao, executed a deed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole
organized and existing in accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis
Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent.

The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous

resolution of the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an
affidavit to the effect that 60% of the members of their corp. were Filipino
citizens when they sought to register in favor of their congregation of deed of
donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar affidavit declaring
the same.

June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an

affidavit but not in the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five
incorporators while as a corporation sole it has only one and it was ownership
through donation and this was purchased

As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has

some doubts as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land
Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic
Act No. 1151)

LRC:
In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the
Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital,
property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao,
Inc., was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no
question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole was a Canadian
citizen ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed
of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition action for
mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the
benefit of the Catholic population of a place

ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the

Philippines pursuant to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the
deed of sale.
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will
always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by
law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly
that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.
In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct
from their several chapters
corporation sole
composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a
unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any
percentage whatsoever
only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the
territory comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are
administered for and on behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or
territory of the corporation sole
has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has
nothing to do with the operation, management or administration of the
corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of
Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith
within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens
presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this
religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the
Constitution
fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars
had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear
indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for
charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the
legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the
revitalization of religious landholdings.
as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand
in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as
in other cases of trust
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No. L-27873.
November 29, 1983 public domain, public forest land, Revised Administrative
Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the
CA which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling
in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application
for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as
Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703
square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to
the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed
that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the
land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed
an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan
and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons
for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said
lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the
name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of
absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision
that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over
the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised

Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as “public
forest.”

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No. L-27873.
November 29, 1983 public domain, public forest land, Revised Administrative
Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the
CA which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling
in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application
for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as
Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703
square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to
the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed
that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the
land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed
an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan
and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons
for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said
lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the
name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of
absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision
that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over
the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised

Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as “public
forest.”

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY G.R. No. L-27873.
November 29, 1983 public domain, public forest land, Revised Administrative
Code
OCTOBER 6, 2017
FACTS:

These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the
CA which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling
in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an application
for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as
Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703
square meters.

Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to
the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed
that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747
square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the
land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and
interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed
an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have said lot registered in his
name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel Alpasan
and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private persons
for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No. 1942, said
lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the
name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land
Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque
Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of
absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the Heirs of
Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s decision
that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question
the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over
the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of
the public domain classified as forest land.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
registration in the names of the private applicants.

RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It bears
emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised

Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of its
being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain. The
appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as
stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as
1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by Jaime Bertolde.
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and
even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut
timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was
converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District
Forester that the same could not be done because it was classified as “public
forest.”

The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.