“EFFECT ON COERCION ON CONTRACT”

PROJECT WORK SUBMITTED IN FINAL FULFILMENT OF THE

COURSE TITLED-
LAW OF CONTRACTS -I

SUBMITTED TO:
Mrs. Sushmita Singh
Faculty of Law

SUBMITTED BY:

NAME: PULAK
COURSE: B.B.A. LLB (Hons.)

ROLL NO: 2031

SEMESTER: 2ND

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NYAYA

NAGAR, MITHAPUR, PATNA- 800001
 DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the project entitled “Effect of Coercion on Contract” submitted by me
at Chanakya National Law University is a record of bona fide project work carried out by me
under the guidance of Mrs Sushmita Singh. I further declare that the work reported in this
project has not been submitted and will not be submitted, either in part or in full, for the
award of any other degree or diploma in this university or any other university.

(Pulak)
Roll No: 2031

2
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research work is a culmination of efforts of lots of people who gave their intense support
and helped me in the completion of this project.

First, I am very grateful to my teacher Mrs Sushmita Singh, whose guidance and advice
helped me in completing my project. She explained the topic clearly and helped me proceed
in my project work. I would also like to thank her for her valuable suggestions towards the
making of this project.

I am highly indebted to my parents and friends for their co-operation and encouragement
which helped me in completion of this project. I am also thankful to the library staff of my
university who assisted me in acquiring the necessary sources for the completion of my
project.

Lastly, I would like to thank my grandparents for their constant support and faith in me,
which motivated me to concentrate on my project and to complete it in time.

I thank all of them!

Pulak

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... 4

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY........................................................................................... 5
HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................................................... 5
RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 6
2. FREE CONSENT .......................................................................................................... 8
3. COERCION IN CONTRACT ...................................................................................... 10
3.1 ACT FORBIDDEN BY THE PENAL CODE ........................................................ 10
3.2 THREAT OF BRINGING CRIMINAL CHARGES ............................................. 11
3.3 UNLAWFUL DETAINING OF PROPERTY ........................................................ 12
3.4 TO THE PREJUDICE OF ANY OTHER PERSON ............................................. 12
3.5 BURDEN OF PROOF ............................................................................................. 12
4. LAW IN ENGLAND: DURESS .................................................................................. 13
4.1 DURESS ................................................................................................................... 13
4.2 NATURE OF THREATS ........................................................................................ 14
4.3 ECONOMIC DURESS ............................................................................................ 14
5. COERCION IN SECTION 72, ICA, 1872.................................................................... 15
5.1 COERCION ............................................................................................................. 16
5.2 PAYMENTS MADE UNDER COMPULSION ..................................................... 16
6. CASE LAWS ............................................................................................................... 18
7. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................ 21
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................ 22

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 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

• The researcher wants to study consent and requirement for it to be free

• The researcher aims to explain the effect of coercion on contract
• The researcher also aims to differentiate coercion with undue influence
• The researcher wants to study the various defences, remedies available with regards to
coercion
• The researcher will also try to draw a comparison between laws in India and England
related to coercion.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher will do a doctrinal type of research in which he will study and work on the
primary as well as the secondary sources. The researcher through this method will go through
case laws, books, articles and various legal works on coercion in contract. The researcher
will, therefore, try to form a clear picture of the topic. The doctrinal method will help in
doing a comparative study of the topic. This methodology helps in going through many
works and cases in less time. This will also help in getting a bird’s eye view of the subject.
Critical examination of laws related to coercion while performance of a contract in Common
Law countries will be done. Emphasis will be laid on differential diagnosis of the topic
through various case laws.

HYPOTHESIS
The researcher presumes that the coercion and duress are similar to a great extent.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
• What is effect of coercion on contract?
• What is the difference between coercion and duress?
• What are the laws related to coercion in IPC?
• Distinguish between laws on coercion in India and England.

5
 1. INTRODUCTION

A contract is a type of legally binding agreement. This means that once you enter into a
contract, you are legally required to perform your contractual duties. The exception to this
rule is if you can prove that the contract is legally unenforceable.

Several different situations can create an unenforceable contract. One of the most common
reasons that a contract would be unenforceable is that one of the parties did not have legal
capacity. Lack of capacity means that a person is incapable of entering into a contract,
whether they are under the majority age or have some kind of mental impairment.

While lack of capacity and coercion are two of the most common reasons a contract would be
unenforceable, several other situations may remove a contract's validity, including:

• Undue Influence
• Misrepresentation
• Nondisclosure
• Unconscionability

Coercion in law of contract means threats or actual harm was used to force someone into
entering into a contract. If coercion is involved in the formation of a contract, the agreement
will not be legally enforceable. For a contract to be legally enforceable, both parties must
have willingly entered into the contract. On the other hand, if one party was coerced into the
contract, meaning threats were used to obtain their acceptance, the contract is not valid. This
rule related to coercion applies both to specific terms in a contract and the contract as a
whole. Basically, this means that contracted parties must agree to the entire contract and must
also agree to all the individual terms.

The Indian Contract Act was enacted in 1872, at the height of British Colonial influence over
India and many parts of the world. The Act was enacted with the aim of regulating the socio-
economic agreements relating to promises and their reasonable acceptances in British India.
Though enacted nearly 150 years ago, the Act is still very relevant today and is extensively
used by people of all walks of life. Since its enactment in 1872, the Act has been amended
only 5 times, the last being in 1997.

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Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines Coercion as – the committing, or
threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining,
or threating to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the
intention of causing the person to enter into an agreement. 1

If it is discovered that coercion was involved in the formation of the contract, the agreement
will almost always be rescinded. When contract rescission occurs, the entirety of the
agreement is cancelled. Both parties are released from their responsibilities as defined in the
contract.

The words of this section are far wider than anything in the English authorities. According to
the definition, coercion invalidating a contract need not proceed from a party to the contract 2
or be immediately directed against a person whom it is intended to cause to enter in to the
contract or any member of his household, or affect his property, or be specifically to his
prejudice. On the other hand, in England the topic of ‘duress’ under Common Law has been
almost rendered obsolete, partly by the general improvement in manners and morals, and
partly by the development of equitable jurisdiction under the head of ‘Undue Influence’.
Detaining property is not duress.

1
Section 15, Indian Contract Act, 1872
2
Chuni Lal v Maula Bakhsh 161 IC 347

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 2. FREE CONSENT

Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 states that:

Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by

(1) coercion, as defined in section 15; or

(2) undue influence, as defined in section 16; or
(3) fraud, as defined in section 17; or
(4) misrepresentation, as defined in section 18; or
(5) mistake, subject to the provisions of the sections 20, 21 and 22.

Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence
of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.

The term ‘free consent’ is also used in section 10 as necessary to the complete validity of a
contract. This section defines when consent is free. It declares in general the causes which
may exclude freedom of consent, later explained in different sections.

Consent is free when it works without obstacles to impede its exercise. Where there is no
consent or no real and certain object of consent,3 there can be no contract at all. Where there
is consent, but no free, there is generally a contract voidable at the option of the party whose
consent was not free.4 A general averment that consent was not freely obtained is not enough,
and it is necessary to set up one of the vitiating elements enumerated in this section. 5

Even if there be undue influence or coercion, but if it does not appear that it was instrumental
in making the promisor to do the act in question, the existence of coercion etc., would be of
no avail. The word 'cause' is not a term of art, but it is a term of science. Nothing can be said
to be the cause of a particular effect, unless it is the proximate and immediate cause of that
effect. When a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular factor, it must be clearly
and cogently established that the effect is the direct outcome of that particular cause. If the
alleged cause is remote and not proximate, is distant and not immediate, such a cause cannot
be said to be the cause in legal parlance. 6

3
Section 29, Indian Contract Act, 1872
4
Deo Nandan v Chhote, AIR 1983
5
Bal Gangadhar Tilak v Shrinivas Pandit, AIR 1915 PC 7
6
Vijaysinh Mohansinh Solank v Transport Manager, Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Services, AIR 1982 Guj
307

8
A father consenting to a settlement in respect of bank’s claim against his son who forged his
signatures on the pro-notes and thereby defrauding the bank although no threat of prosecution
was held out, was held to be not a free agent to consent to the settlement. 7

Consent can be regarded as informed when it is an act of reason accompanied with

deliberation of a mind which knows right from wrong and it postulates an active will on the
part of the person giving consent to permit the doing of the act complained of with full
knowledge of the nature of the act that is being done and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in the commission of the act. Where consent was given on the strength of a
representation which, when made, was not intended to be really acted upon, it was held to
have been obtained upon misrepresentation. 8

7
Kessowji Tulsidas v Harjivan Mulji 11 Bom 566
8
Nokhia v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1985 HP 88

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 3. COERCION IN CONTRACT

According to Section 15, Indian Contract Act, 1872:

‘Coercion’ is the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860), or the unlawful detaining, or threating to detain, any property,
to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to
enter into an agreement.

It is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code is or is not in force in the place where the
coercion is employed.

3.1 ACT FORBIDDEN BY THE PENAL CODE

The words ‘act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code’ make it necessary for the court to decide
in a civil action, whether the alleged act of coercion is such as to amount to an offence. 9

In Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti,10 the High Court of Madras held that an adoption by a
Hindu widow was not binding upon her, when the relatives of the adopted boy obstructed the
removal of the corpse of her husband from her house until she consented to the adoption. The
decision proceeded on the ground that the widow's consent to the adoption was not free. The
Court seems to have held that the relatives' act in obstructing the removal of the corpse was
within the present section as being forbidden by the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but it does not
appear under what section of the Code the Court held it punishable. The section possibly
applicable to this act might be s. 297, which enacts, inter alia, that whoever with the intention
of wounding the feelings of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of a person
are likely to be wounded, offers an indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance of
any person assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies, is liable to imprisonment or
fine or both. On the facts of the case, there is no doubt that the act was done with the
intention to wound the widow's feelings, or at any rate with the knowledge that her feeling
would be wounded. The fact, therefore, would constitute an offence if obstructing the
removal of the corpse could be regarded as an indignity offered to the corpse, or as a
disturbance to the person assembled to perform the funeral ceremonies.

9
Chikkam Ammiraju v Chikkam Seshamma, AIR 1917 Mad 288; affirmed in 1918 41 Mad 33
10
1889 ILR 13 Mad 214

10
In any event, there would have been no difficulty in holding that the widow's consent was
obtained by undue influence within the meaning of s. 16 of the Act.

In a later case Ammiraju v. Seshamma,11 a question arose as to whether a release executed by

a wife and son in consequence of a threat of committing suicide had been obtained by
coercion within the meaning of this section. Wallis CJ. and Seshagiri Aiyar J. answered the
question in the affirmative, holding that the word 'forbidden' was wider than the term
punishable', and that though a threat to commit suicide was not punishable under The Indian
Penal Code, 1860, it must be deemed to be forbidden, as an attempt to commit suicide was
punishable under the Penal Code (s. 309). Oldfield J. answered the question in the negative,
on the ground that the present section should be construed strictly, and that an act that was
not punishable under, the Penal Code could not be said to be forbidden by that Code. This
view seems to be correct. A Penal Code forbids only what it declares punishable. The earlier
editors of the book opined that the section must be amended to include expressly acts ‘an
attempt to commit which is forbidden’.

It can also be inferred from the section that, a threat to commit an offence under any law
other than The Indian Penal Code, 1860, may not amount to coercion. Recognising this, the
Law Commission of India had recommended a wider expression to include penal laws other
than The Indian Penal Code, 1860.12

It has been held that an agreement to refer matters in dispute to arbitration entered into during
the pendency and in fear of criminal proceedings could not be avoided on the ground of
‘coercion’, though the agreement may be void as opposed to public policy within the
meaning of s. 23.13 Refusal to withdraw a prosecution, unless a bond was executed for the
amount due, was not covered by this section;14 nor a threat of strike. 15

3.2 THREAT OF BRINGING CRIMINAL CHARGES

Mere threat of bringing a criminal charge does not amount to coercion, as it is not per se
forbidden by the Penal Code.16 But threat of bringing a false charge with the object of making
another do a thing was coercion; for although threatening another with criminal prosecution
was not per se forbidden by the Indian Penal Code 1860, such act was forbidden by it when

11
1918 41 Mad 33
12
The Law Commission of India, 13th Report, 1958
13
Gobardhan Das v Jai Kishen Das, 1900 ILR 22 All 224
14
Rameshwar Marwari v Upendranath Das, AIR 1926 Cal 455
15
Workmen, Appin Tea Estate v Industrial Tribunal, Gauhati, AIR 1966 Assam 115
16
Widya Wanti v Jai Dayal, AIR 1932 13 Lah 356

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the threat related to a false charge. A receipt for surrender of possession of the disputed site
under a threat that if the plaintiff did not do so, he would be arrested and detained under the
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 was vitiated by coercion. 17

3.3 UNLAWFUL DETAINING OF PROPERTY

Consent can be said to be caused by coercion, if it is caused as a result of unlawful detaining
of property, or a threat to do so. A refusal on the part of a mortgagee to convey the equity of
redemption except on certain terms, is not an unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any
property within the meaning of this section. 18 Where an agent, whose services were
terminated, detained accounts to obtain his release, the release was induced by coercion.19
Where in order to realise fine due from a son, the Government attached the property
belonging both to him and his father; payment then made by the father in order to save the
property from being sold was held to have been made under coercion. 20

3.4 TO THE PREJUDICE OF ANY OTHER PERSON

The section does not contemplate mere sentimental prejudice. Some legal injury must flow in
order that a person may be said to have been prejudiced. Where the threat by a husband to
commit suicide caused the wife to release the property, it was held that the wife was
prejudiced. The possibility of the husband leaving the wife and the child uncared for
sufficient in the eye of law to furnish a ground of prejudice. 21

3.5 BURDEN OF PROOF

The defendant relying on the defence of coercion, should set out all the facts constituting
these invalidating circumstances. The burden on him is heavy. A suspicion or mere
probability is not sufficient to support a plea of coercion.

The burden of proof does not lie on the innocent party to show that but for the threats, no
contract would have been signed. It is for the party using the alleged threats to establish that
the acts of alleged threats or unlawful pressure contributed nothing to the consent of the other
party to the contract.

17
Kishan Lal Kalra v NDMC, AIR 2001 Del 402
18
Bengal Stone Co. Ltd v Joseph Issac Joseph Hyam, AIR 1918 Cal 307, (detaining office books, etc, left in the
hands of an outgoing agent)
19
SPM Muthiah Chetti v Muthu KRAR Karuppan Chettiar, AIR 1927 50 Mad 786
20
Bansraj Das v Secretary of State, AIR 1939 All 373
21
Ibid. pg 10 [9]

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 4. LAW IN ENGLAND: DURESS
Coercion under s. 15 is much wider than what was duress in the English law. It include
unlawful detention of property, may be committed by any person not necessarily party to the
contract, and may be directed against any person, even a stranger; and unlike duress, causing
of immediate violence or unnerving a person of ordinary firmness of mind are not necessary
under the Indian Law.22

4.1 DURESS
Under the English law, actual or threatened violence to the victim's person has long been
recognised to amount to duress,23 but duress may consist of actual or threatened
imprisonment,24 now also includes wrongful threats to property or threats to seize goods, and
wrongful or illegitimate threats to his economic interests, where the victim has no practical
alternative but to submit. In Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland,25
all five members of the House of Lords rejected the notion that duress deprives person of his
free choice or makes his acts non-voluntary. Duress does not deprive the victim of all choice;
it leaves him with a choice of evils. A person acting under it intends to do what he does but
does so unwillingly. ‘Duress deflects without destroying the will of one of the contracting
parties.’26 Though earlier cases have required that the duress must negate true consent and
render the victim's actions non-voluntary, later cases have applied the test of whether the
victim had a practical choice.27

A contract obtained by means of duress exercised by one party over the other is at very least
voidable, 28 and not void; but if it is voluntarily acted upon by the party entitled to avoid, it
will become binding on him.

22
Karuppay Ammal v Karuppiah Pillai, AIR 1987 2 Mad LJ 138
23
Barton v Armstrong, 1975 2 All ER 465, (PC)
24
Cumming v Ince, 1847, 11 QB 112, (women forcibly taken to mental asylum)
25
1975 AC 653
26
1975 AC 653 per Lord Simon at 695
27
Chitty on Contracts, 28th Ed. pg 412
28
Ibid. pg 13 [25]

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4.2 NATURE OF THREATS
Not all threats are improper or illegitimate. A threat to commit a crime or tort is improper. A
threat to break a contract may not amount to duress on the ground simply that the victim was
influenced by the threatened breach of contract and could not avoid the threatened action.
Something more than commercial pressure is required.29 A threat to prosecute would be
unlawful if the charge is known to be false, and the threat is for improper motive, but a threat
to institute civil proceedings cannot amount to duress. 30

4.3 ECONOMIC DURESS

Economic duress is now recognised in England as a factor vitiating the contract, and a
contract can be set aside also for economic duress. In a contractual situation, commercial
pressure is not enough. The commercial pressure alleged to constitute duress must be such
that the victim entered into the contract against his will and must have had no alternative
course open to him and must have been confronted with coercive acts. In determining
whether there was a coercion of will such that there was no true consent, it is material to
enquire whether the person alleged to have coerced did or did not protest; whether, at the
time he was allegedly coerced into making the contract, he had an alternative course open to
him such as an adequate legal remedy; whether he was independently advised; and whether
after entering the contract, he took steps to avoid it. Thus, where after considering the matter
thoroughly and with a view to avoid litigation, the defendants formed the opinion that the risk
in giving the guarantee was more apparent than real, it was held by the Privy Council that
though there was commercial pressure, it did not amount to coercion and the guarantee was
not void on the ground that it was induced by economic duress on the plaintiff's part. 31

The danger of the doctrine of economic duress being widely used to invalidate contract
requires some limits on its use. First, the threat must be strongly coercive, leaving the
innocent party with no effective alternative but to submit. Secondly, the challenge should
come at the outset and the innocent party should take the immediate opportunity to thrash out
the issue in the court.32

29
Pao On v Lau Yiu, 1980 AC 614
30
Powell v Hoyland, 1851 6 Exch 67
31
Ibid. pg 14 [29]
32
PS Atiyah, An Introduction to the Laws of Contract, 5th Ed. pg 269

14
 5. COERCION IN SECTION 72, ICA, 1872

The definition contained in s. 15 is for the purpose of considering whether the consent to a
contract was free under s. 14. It does not govern the meaning of the term as used in s.72,
where every kind of compulsion would be covered, even if it did not measure up to the
definition under s.15.33

Section 72 states that:

A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under
coercion, must repay or return it.

Money paid under a mistake or under compulsion, or on a consideration which has wholly
failed fell under the general head of money ‘had and received’. An action for money ‘had and
received’ was an action ‘founded on simple contract’, which been called quasi contract or
restitution.34 A person, paying money under a mistake of fact, which if true, would make him
legally liable to pay, can recover from other, the money paid. 35

The claim for money had and received is a claim to recover money which, in the eyes of the
law, the defendant is liable to repay to the plaintiff. The claim cannot be said to be based on
some rule of aequum et bonum (what is right and just) by virtue of which a man must not be
allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another, and the claim is based upon an
imputed promise to repay. 36

An action for money had and received is a practical and useful instrument to prevent an
unjust enrichment. The law implies an obligation to repay the money which is an unjust
benefit.37

33
TGM Asadi v Coffee Board, AIR 1969 Mys 230
34
Re Diplocks Estate, Diplock v Wintle, (1948) Ch 465 at 514
35
Winfield, (1943) 59 LQR 327
36
Morgan v Ashcroft, (1938) 1 KB 49
37
Thomas Abraham v National Tyre and Rubber Co. of India Ltd. AIR 1974 SC 602

15
5.1 COERCION
The word ‘coercion’ in this section is used in its general and ordinary sense, and its meaning
is not controlled by the definition of ‘coercion’ in s. 15. Payment under coercion under this
section means payment under compulsion, which the defendant has no right to claim.

For instance, where A who had obtained a decree against B, obtained an attachment against
C’s property, and took possession of it to obtain satisfaction for the amount of the decree, and
C on being ousted from his property paid the sum claimed under protest, C was held entitled
to recover the sum as money paid under ‘coercion’ within the meaning of this section. 38

It was formerly held in India that ‘coercion’ in this section meant the same being as coercion
in s. 15 and therefore, no act was ‘coercion’, unless it was done with the intention of causing
any person to enter into an agreement as required by the definition in that section;
nevertheless, where the defendant had received money which in justice and equity belonged
to the plaintiff under circumstances which rendered the payment involuntary, and the receipt
by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff, the plaintiff could recover the money. This view is
now superseded; as the action is maintainable under s. 72.

The WESCO extracted arrears of the electricity bill of the previous consumer from the
subsequent purchaser of the property by refusing to supply them with electricity unless they
paid, contrary to the statute. It was held to be an unjust enrichment by depriving a man of his
money without authority of law.39

5.2 PAYMENTS MADE UNDER COMPULSION

Where the owner of a market realised tolls from a shopkeeper by seizing his goods and it
being subsequently held that he had no such authority, the shopkeeper was allowed to reclaim
the toll money. 40 But where any such fee or toll is paid without improper pressure or
compulsion, there would be no right of recovery; so also, where the payment is in response to
summons issued by a court of law. Payments extorted under colour of authority which is
unfounded are recoverable.41

38
Seth Kanhaya Lal v National Bank of India Limited, (1913) 40 Cal 598
39
Ajay Kumar Agarwal v OSFC, AIR 2007 Ori 37
40
Maskell v Horner, (1915) 3 KB 106
41
Newdigate v Davy, (1694)

16
Where a party has in the performance of his contract done some work or rendered some
service and the further performance has been made useless by the other party, he may recover
reasonable compensation for the work or service. Plinche v Colburn42 is an authority for this
principle.

The plaintiff was the author of several dramatic entertainments. H was engaged by the
defendants, who were the publishers of a work called “The Juvenile Library” to write for that
work an article to illustrate the history of armour and costumes from the earliest times, for
which he was to be paid 100 guineas. The plaintiff made various drawings and prepared a
considerable portion of manuscript when the defendants dis continued the Juvenile Library.
The plaintiff claimed a sum of 50 guineas for the part which he had prepared, and the trouble
he had taken in the business. He was held entitled to it.

The obligation to pay reasonable remuneration for the work done when there is no binding
contract between the parties is imposed by a rule of law, and not by an inference of fact
arising from the acceptance of services or goods.

Though the remedy is independent of contract, but the contract, if any, shall not be wholly
irrelevant. Thus, where a ship was delivered for repairs and the contractor used more
expensive material than that authorised by the was delivered for repairs contract, he could not
recover under the contract because he has not carried precisely, nor under quasi-contract,
because the shipowner had no chance to reject the expensive material. He could not have
rejected the ship it was already repaired and the mere taking of his own property was the
same thing as an acquiescence in or acceptance of the work done.

Where adequate relief is available under the contract itself, the court may not provide any
relief under quasi-contract.

42
(1831) 5 C&P 58

17
 6. CASE LAWS

Ranganayakamma v Alwar Setti 43

The question before the Madras High Court was regarding the validity of the adoption of a
boy by a widow, aged 13 years. On the death of her husband, the husband’s dead body was
not allowed to be removed from her house for cremation, by the relatives of the adopted boy
until she adopted the boy. It was held that the adoption was not binding on the widow as her
consent had been obtained by coercion.

According to Mulla and Pollock, by obstructing the removal of the corpse the possible tried
to be committed was under Section 297, Indian Penal Code, which provides punishments to a
person for wounding the feelings of a person by offering indignity to any human corpse.44

45
Chikkan Ammiraju v Chikkam Seshama
In this case, A, a Hindu, by a threat of suicide, induced his wife and son to execute a release
deed in favour of A’s brother in respect of certain properties claimed as their own by the wife
and the son. The question before the court was whether a threat to commit suicide could be
considered to be an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code.

It was held by Wallis, C.J. and Seshagiri Ayyar, J. that a threat to commit suicide amounted
to coercion within the meaning of Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act and therefore the
release deed was voidable. It was observed that the threat to commit suicide could be
considered to be an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code and also the threat to kill oneself
was an act where a person was acting to his own prejudice and also to the prejudice of his
wife and the son, and thus the requirements of Section 15 were satisfied.

Oldfield, J., who dissented, was, however, of the view that suicide is not an act forbidden by
the Indian Penal Code (only an attempt to commit suicide is punishable under Section 309,
Indian Penal Code) and a threat to do that could not be considered to be a threat to do a
forbidden act within the meaning of Section 15 of the Contract Act.

43
I.L.R. (1889) 13 Mad 214
44
Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 9th Ed., p.134
45
I.L.R (1918) 41 Mad 33

18
Workmen of Appin Tea Estate v Industrial Tribunal 46

The demand of the workers for bonus was accepted after a threat of strike. The question
which had arisen was, whether such a decision between the union of the workers and the
Indian Tea Associate, could be declared void on the ground that there was coercion. It was
held that because of the doctrine of collective bargaining under the Industrial Disputes Act,
the demand of the workers could be backed by a threat of strike. Such a threat was neither a
threat commit an offence under the Indian Penal Code, nor was it unlawful detaining or
threatening to detain any property and hence it did no amount to coercion and as such the
agreement was valid.

Andhra Sugar Ltd. v State of A.P 47

When a statute requires a contract to be entered into, consent in such a case is not deemed to
be caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake. In this case, if
any cane grower offered to sell his sugarcane to a factory in a certain zone, the factory was
bound to accept the offer under the Andhra Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and
Purchase) Act, 1961, and accordingly the agreement was entered into. It was held that in such
a case even though there was a legal compulsion for the factory to make the agreement, the
agreement could not be said to be entered into by the lack of free consent, and there was no
coercion either.

Skeate v Beale48

In this case, a landlord threatened to sell his tenant’s goods, having a distress of 19 Pounds,
10 Shillings against the tenant for rent. The landlord withdrew this distress in exchange of the
tenant paying 3 Pounds, 7 Shillings and 6 Dimes, immediately and promising to pay the
remaining amount of 16 Pounds 2 Shillings and 6 Dimes, within a month. In the action by the
landlord to recover the sum, the tenant pleaded that this promise had been obtained under
duress by threatening sale of the property in so far as the distress was wrongful. The tenant’s
plea was rejected, and he was made to pay the account in accordance with the promise
because threat regarding goods cannot constitute duress.

46
A.I.R 1966 Assam 115
47
A.I.R 1968 SC 599
48
(1840) 11 A&E 983

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Krishan Lal Kalra v N.D.M.C 49

The plaintiff was given license by the New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) to run an
open air restaurant in Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The lease was to expire on 31 st May,
1978. The plaintiff, who started running the restaurant under the name of “Rumble Open Air
Restaurant”, was thrown out of the premises after taking forcible possession thereof without
due process of law by the defendant who sent demolition squad with police force on 7th
August, 1976. There was also a threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA, if he
did not hand over the possession of the property.

The plaintiff alleged that there was coercion and he filed the present suit claiming damages of
Rs 10 Lacs.

It was held that a person is not bound by any act done under duress or coercion. In this case
the threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA amounted to coercion. The
plaintiff’s suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 9,11,525.12 with cost as well interest @12%
w.e.f. 7th August 1979, i.e., the date of filing the suit till the payment of the decreed amount.

49
A.I.R 2001 Del 402

20
 7. CONCLUSION
It can be said that coercion is one of the major factor which influences decisions of any
individual with regards to the contract he is compelled to enter, which otherwise he wouldn’t.
the section also enumerates how a person can distinguish an act from coercion or not. In the
case of coercion, the burden of proof lies on the person taking the defence of coercion. The
reason behind this is that if it was anybody could have approached saying that he has been
coerced into a particular contract.

There is a fine line between the narrower aspect of duress under the English Law and the
wider aspect of coercion under the Indian Contract Act.

In most legal systems, the use of physical specific coercion by a private individual is a
criminal offence in all cases not involving self-defence or similar situations.

The picture is less simple for psychological specific coercion, owing to the general difficulty
in finding clear evidence for it. In most systems psychological coercion is treated as a
criminal offence when it is aimed at extortion, as is typical of blackmail. It is also punished
when it leads to undue influence, defined as a master slave relationship.

Finally, economic coercion is generally unlawful under most systems of anti-trust legislation,
where it can amount to either a criminal offence as under the Sherman Act of the US or an
administrative offence liable to a mere fine - as under EU legislation on the abuse of a
dominant position. It is important however to remember that trade unions and other groups of
organised workers are mostly exempted from this general principle for acts of economic
coercion (like strikes) against their employer. Legal methods themselves may employ
coercion, such as when a lawsuit is threatened if a person does not comply with the wishes of
the plaintiff. Specific coercion may be used as a legal defence in criminal cases for acts
committed under threat of injury. Similarly, one may claim the legal nullity of a contract
signed under duress.

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 8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Mulla & Pollock, Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 14 th Edition, Lexis Nexis
2. V Kesava Rao, Contract I: Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition, Lexis Nexis
3. Dr R. K. Bhangia, Contract I, 7th Edition, Allahabad Law Agency
4. Dr Avtar Singh, Contract & Specific Relief, 12th Edition, EBC
5. Dutt on Contract, 11th Edition, Eastern Law House

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