VILLEGAS V.

HIU CHONG

FACTS

Section 1 of Ordinance no. 6537 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position, business or occupation, whether
permanent, temporary, or casual without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila with a P50 permit, except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and
any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members, of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.

Private respondentHiuShong Tsai PaoHo who was employed in Manila filed a petition restraining the order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 6537, and declaring the ordinance’s judgment null and void.

He said that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupation, since imposing a fixed P50 employment
permit is out of the proportion of the registration cost. Further, it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable being applied only to aliens who are
deprived of their rights to liberty, and property; hence violates the due process and equal protection clauses.

The respondent judge rendered judgment declaring the said ordinance null and void; hence contested by Mayor Villegas in his instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that Ordinance No. 6537 violated the due process and
equal protection clause of the constitution

RULING:

No.

The ordinance in question violated the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
and citizens.

KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary
injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the
receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation;
putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an
arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power.
In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police power. The police power of the City of Manila
to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes
the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion
of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect
customers of laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of
Manila are more familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)

In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any
other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection
for the implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on
the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for
failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

Yu Cong Eng

FACTS

The petitioners are Chinese merchants claiming to represent themselves and all other persons similarly situated and affected, particularly twelve
thousand Chinese merchants.

The allegations of the petition center on the unconstitutionality of Act No. 2972

Act No. 2972. — AN ACT TO PROVIDE IN WHAT LANGUAGE ACCOUNT BOOKS SHALL BE KEPT, AND TO ESTABLISH PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATION.

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other activity
for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than
English, Spanish or any local dialect.

SEC. 2. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos,
or by imprisonment for not more than two years or both.

On March 2, 1923, the agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the exercise of their legitimate functions, inspected the books of account of the
Chinese merchant Yu Cong Eng. Upon finding that said books were not kept in accordance with their understanding of the provisions of Act No.
2972, they took possession of the merchant's books and referred the matter to the city fiscal of Manila for appropriate action.

The city fiscal, considering that Yu Cong Eng had committed a violation of the law, on March 7, 1923, caused an information to be filed, subscribed,
and sworn to before Judge of First Instance Concepcion. This information alleged in substance that the accused merchant had kept his books of
account "only in Chinese, instead of keeping or causing them to be kept in English, Spanish, or any local dialect, thus rendering it difficult for the
agents and authorized representatives of the Government of the Philippine Islands and of the City of Manila, to examine and inspect the
aforementioned books of account, thereby preventing and hindering the investigation and determination of all the amount that said accused was,
is, or will be under obligation to pay for licenses, permits, and taxes." A warrant of arrest was issued by the Judge of First Instance before whom the
information was filed, and in compliance therewith, the accused merchant, now become the instant petitioner, was arrested.

ISSUE:

WON Act No. 2972 is constitutional

HELD:

The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the most favored nation. Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens, which means
that the life, liberty, or property of these persons cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, without regard to their race. Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit not only the Chinese, but all merchants of whatever
nationality from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than either the
English or Spanish language or a local dialect. The law only intended to require the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate
governmental inspection for tax purposes. The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation since
there are other aliens doing business in the Philippines. There will be no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There
will be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the extent that all tax laws
are oppressive, but not oppressive to the extent of confiscation. Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company, partnership, or corporation,
engaged in commerce, industry, or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of
sales books and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when this
action was begun in English, Spanish, or a local dialect, is thus valid and constitutional.

Ichong vs Hernandez

FACTS:

The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term.

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and
measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it
unconstitutional for the ff: reasons:

it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process

the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title

the Act violates international and treaty obligations

the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession

ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.

HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive
and fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted.

RATIO:

The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.

The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.

The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that
spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State,
and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.

While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the
State.

The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of
pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times
of crisis and emergency.

VINTA MARITIME CO., INC. and ELKANO SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LEONIDES C.
BASCONCILLO, respondents.

FACTS:

LeonidesBasconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal
against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and
incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.

The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.

Held:
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence,
enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s seaman’s book which states that his discharge was
due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private
respondent’s services were “highly recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such
remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to
such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such
misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.

Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing.Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code
requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee’s dismissal is decided upon. The employer must
furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision
to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be
eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.

Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the
employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of
the effectivity of his contract.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

______________________________________________________________________

STATE’S INHERENT POLICE POWER AND DUE PROCESS

FACTS:

On 1980, President Ferdinand E. Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626 such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fir, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

On January 13, 1984, Ynot (petitioner) had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The petitioner sued for recovery and the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin (an action or a writ issued to recover an item of
personal property wrongfully taken) upon petitioner’s filing of a supersedeas bond (defendant’s bond that suspends the authority of a trial court to
issue an execution on a judgment that has been appealed) of P12,000. The RTC sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of
authority and presumed validity.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court so the petitioner has come to the Supreme
Court to petittion for review on certiorari (judicial review).

ISSUE:

WON Executive Order No. 626-A is constitutional?

WON police power is properly enforced?

According to Petitioner, he said that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes ouright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid beacuse it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed,
and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.

RULING:
NO, the executive orders defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out fortright.
The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty
of elementary fair play.

The supreme court finds the measure an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law, and worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.

The court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless
not prevented from resolvingthe same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.

Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

JAVIER VS COMELEC

Due Process – impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election,
Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP.
On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the
canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board
to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the
SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a
winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation
was made by only the 2ndDivision but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play
calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according
to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Paderanga vs. Azura

Re: Impartial and Competent Court

FACTS
 Paderanga, mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, petitioned that Judge Azura should inhibit himself from deciding on pending cases
brought before him on the grounds that (1) they have lost confidence in him, (2) that he entertained tax suits against the city and had
issued TROs on the sales of properties when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy to stop auction is to pay tax,
and (3) that Judge Azura is biased, oppressive and abusive in his power.
 Respondent Judge denied the Petition for Inhibition on the ground that loss of trust and confidence by petitioner in his neutrality is
unfounded, notwithstanding the administrative charges filed against him, and that the plea for inhibition was prompted more because
the "City Attorney (petitioner's counsel) appears to have persisted in his grotesque arguments and haughty conduct in his subsequent
pleadings which already constitute direct contempt for which he may be cognizant of his inevitable punishment, and for which reason he
now entertains the resultant fears from his own indiscretions, to appear before this presiding judge.

ISSUE
WON Judge Azura should inhibit himself from the trial.
HELD
 As decided in the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), “All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously comes to the
fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of
circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. . .
 The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as
will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.
 Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to inhibit himself from hearing the cases enumerated in paragraph 4 of the Petition involving the
City of Gingoog or its officials, including petitioner. The venue of said cases is hereby transferred to Cagayan de Oro City each to be
assigned by raffle to the Regional Trial Courts thereat.

SO ORDERED.

Filemon David vs Judge Gregorio Aquilizan et al

Due Process – Hearing

CASE DIGEST

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in
1971. The land is estimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the
brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the
borthers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE.
Fewlomeno on the other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed
by the brothers against David and after three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. David averred he was
denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and
executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The
decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the
renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered
at all.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
LOURDES GASPAR BAUTISTA, THE DIRECTOR OF THE LANDS and THE NATIONAL TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

Jesus A. Avanceña for plaintiff-appellant.

Lourdes Gaspar Bautista in her own behalf as defendant-appellee.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio Torres, Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista and Special Attorney Daniel G. Florida for defendants-appelles Director of
Lands, et al.

FERNANDO, J.:

The question this appeal from a judgment of a lower court presents is one that possesses both novelty and significance. It is this: What is the right,
if any, of a creditor which previously satisfied its claim by foreclosing extrajudicially on a mortgage executed by the debtor, whose title was
thereafter nullified in a judicial proceeding where she was not brought in as a party?

As creditor, the Development Bank of the Philippines now appellant, filed a complaint against one of its debtors, Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, now
appellee, for the recovery of a sum of money representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness, which previously had been wiped out with the
creditor bank acquiring the title of the mortgaged property in an extrajudicial sale. Thereafter, the title was nullified in a judicial proceeding, the
land in question being adjudged as belonging to another claimant, without, however, such debtor, as above noted, having been cited to appear in
such court action.

The Development Bank was unsuccessful, the lower court being of the view that with the due process requirement thus flagrantly disregarded,
since she was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such a judgment could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a
claim by the appellant bank. The complaint was thus dismissed by the lower court, then presided by Judge, now Justice, Magno Gatmaitan of the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal by appellant bank.

Such dismissal is in accordance with law. There is no occasion for us to repudiate the lower court.

From the very statement of facts in the brief for appellant bank, the following appears: "On or before May 31, 1949, the defendant-appellee,
Lourdes Gaspar Bautista, who shall hereafter be referred to as Bautista, applied to the Government for the sale favor of a parcel of land with an
area of 12 has., 44 ares, and 22 centares, located at Bo. Barbara, San Jose, Nueva Ecija. After proper investigation, Sales Patent no. V-132 covering
said property was issued in her favor on June 1, 1949 (Exh. A-1) by the Director of Lands. Sales Patent No. V-132 was registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496 on June 3, 1949 (Exh. A), as a result of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-
389 was issued in her favor."1

How the loan was contracted by now appellee Bautista was therein set forth. Thus: "On July 16, 1949, Bautista applied for a loan with the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor in interest of the plaintiff-appellee Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), offering as
security the parcel of land covered by O.C.T. No. P-389. Aside from her certificate of title, Bautista also submitted to the RFC other documents to
show her ownership and possession of the land in question, namely, Tax Declaration No. 5153 (Exh. A-4) in her name and the blueprint plan of the
land. On the basis of the documents mentioned and the appraisal of the property by its appraiser, the RFC approved a loan of P4,000.00 in favor of
Bautista. On July 16, 1949, Bautista executed the mortgage contract over the property covered by O.C.T. No. P-389 and the promissory note for
P4,000.00 in favor of RFC (Exhs. C and C-1), after which the proceeds of the loan were released."2

The satisfaction of the mortgage debt with the acquisition of the title to such property by appellant Bank, by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, and such title losing its validity in view of a court proceeding, where however, appellee Bautista, was not made a party, was next taken up in
the brief of plaintiff-appellant. Thus: "Bautista failed to pay the amortization on the loan so that the RFC took steps to foreclose the mortgage
extra-judicially under Act 3135, as amended. In the ensuing auction sale conducted by the sheriff of Nueva Ecija on June 27, 1951, the RFC acquired
the mortgaged property as the highest bidder (Exh. D). On the date of the sale, the total obligation of Bautista with the RFC was P4,858.48 (Exh. I).
On July 21, 1952, upon failure of Bautista to redeem the property within the one (1) year period as provided bylaw, plaintiff-appellant RFC
consolidated its ownership thereon (Exhs. E and E-I). On July 26, 1952, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija cancelled O.C.T. No. P-389 and replaced
it with T.C.T. No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC (Exhs. F and F-1). On or about this time, however, an action (Civil Case No. 870) was filed by
Rufino Ramos and Juan Ramos in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the RFC
(as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of the land in question and seeking the annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in the name of the
Government, O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of Bautista and T.C.TG. No. NT-12108 in the name of the RFC. A decision thereon was rendered on June
27, 1955 (Exhs. G, G-1, and G-3) whereby the aformentioned certificates of title were declared null and void."3

Why the complaint had to be dismissed was explained thus in the decision now on appeal: "The Court after examining the proofs, is constrained to
sustain her on that; it will really appear that she had never been placed within the jurisdiction of the Nueva Ecija Court; as the action there was one
to annual the title, it was an action strictly in personam, if that was the case as it was, the judgment there could not in any way bind Lourdes who
had not acquired in said decision in any way for what only happened is that as to the mortgage, the Bank foreclosed, and then sold unto Conrada
and when the title had been annulled, the Bank reimbursed Conrada; stated otherwise, the annulment of Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex parte
as far as she was concerned and could not bind her at all; and her mortgage was foreclosed an the Bank realized on it, when the Bank afterwards
acquiesced in the annulment of the title and took it upon itself to reimburse Conrada, the Bank was acting on its own peril because it could not
have by that, bound Lourdes at all."4

As stated at the outset, the decision must be affirmed. The fundamental due process requirement having been disregarded, appellee Bautista could
not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the effects of such decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by
such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to
revive the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not made a party on the occasion
of such nullification.

If it were otherwise, then the cardinal requirement that no party should be made to suffer in person or property without being given a hearing
would be brushed aside. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court whenever such a question arises in a series of decisions is that a denial
of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity. 5

A recent decision, Macabingkil v. Yatco,6 possesses relevance. "A 1957 decision, Cruzcosa v. Concepcion, is even more illuminating in so far as the
availability of the remedy sought is concerned. In the language of this Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes: 'The petition is clearly
meritorious. Petitioners were conclusively found by the Court of Appeals to be co-owners of the building in question. Having an interest therein,
they should have been made parties to the ejectment proceedings to give them a chance to protect their rights: and not having been made parties
thereto, they are not bound and can not be affected by the judgment rendered therein against their co-owner Catalino Cruzcosa. Jr. ....' Two due
process cases deal specifically with a writ of execution that could not validly be enforced against a party who was not given his day in court, Sicat v.
Reyes, and Hamoy v. Batingoplo. According to the former: 'The above agreement, which served as basis for the ejectment of Alipio Sicat, cannot be
binding and conclusive upon the latter, who is not a party to the case. Indeed, that order, as well as the writ of execution, cannot legally be
enforced against Alipio Sicat for the simple reason that he was not given his day in court.' From the latter: 'The issue raised in the motion of Rangar
is not involved in the appeal for it concerns a right which he claims over the property which has not so far been litigated for the reason that he was
not made a party to the case either as plaintiff for a defendant. He only came to know of the litigation when he was forced out of the property by
the sheriff, and so he filed the present motion to be heard and prove his title to the property. This he has the right to do as the most expeditious
manner to protect his interest instead of filing a separate action which generally is long, tedious and protracted.'"

Reinforcement to the above conclusion comes from a codal provision. According to the Civil Code: 7 "The vendor shall not be obliged to make good
the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at the instance of the vendee. "While not directly in point, the principle on
which the above requirement is based sustains the decision of the lower court. In effect, appellant bank would hold appellee Bautista liable for the
warranty on her title, its annullment having the same effect as that of an eviction. In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil Code that
appellee Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend herself. In view of her being denied her day in
court, it would to be respected, that she is not "obliged to made good the proper warranty."

In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made defendants by appellant
bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds
no support in the applicable, law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any
loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act. 8This certainly is not the case here,
plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the light in which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of
the Philippines are likewise exempt from any liability.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Lorenzana v. Cayetano

Due Process – Hearing

Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later purchased the land (San
Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her
tenant. On the other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land. Cayetano was renting the same from
the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzana’s ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to forcibly eject her tenants
but she included to eject Cayetano’s property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her property
be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetano’s petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is now a
party to the ejectment cases as she already brought herself to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due process has been violated.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment
cases wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the pendency of these ejectment cases.
Cayetano only went to court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and executory.
Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind her; nor can
its writ of execution be informed against her since she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

People vs. Beriales

[No. L-39962 April 7, 1976]
Judicial Due Process: Notice and Hearing

Facts:
Ricardo Beriales, BenedictoCustodio and PablitoCustodio were convicted of the crime of murder by CFI of Leyte. They have allegedly
murdered one Saturnina Gonzales Porcadilla on September 14, 1974. Upon the hearing, appellants’ counsel moved for a reinvestigation
of the case which was granted. Trial court postponed hearing until December 17 and 18, 1974. The fiscal filed a motion to defer the
hearing until such time as the reinvestigation shall have terminated. The trial court, however, motuproprio cancelled the Dec. 17 & 18
hearing and reset the arraignment and trial to December 10 and 11, 1974. At the December 10 hearing, counsel of
appellants manifested to the court that the city fiscal had set the reinvestigation on December 12, 1974 and had already sent subpoenas
to the witnesses. The court nevertheless proceeded to hearing the next day, December 11. Upon appellants’ counsels insistence, the
court relying on constitutional mandate of the right to a speedy trial, re-scheduled the hearing to December 13.

On the day of the trial, counsel asked to the court to wait for the City Fiscal to appear since the Fiscal might be able to report on the
reinvestigation. However, the court insisted on arraigning the appellants. Appelants refused to give a plea because they are waiting for
the fiscal, the trial court entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for each of them. Appellants counsel manifested that they could not go to trial
without the City Fiscal. For the same reason, counsel refused to cross-examine the witnesses presented. Counsel reiterated that they do
not agree with the trial when defense was called to present evidence. Trial court considered the case to be submitted for decision and
announced promulgation of the decision on December 17.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the trial court should hold the trial until after there investigation

(2) Whether or not appellants were denied due process

(3) Whether or not the fiscal should be present during proceedings

Held:
(1) After the trial court granted the appellants’ motion for reinvestigation, it became incumbent upon the court to hold in abeyance
the arraignment and trial of the case until the City Fiscal shall have conducted and made his report on the result of such reinvestigation.

(2) When the trial court ignored the appellants’ manifestations objecting to the arraignment and trial of the case, it committed a serious
irregularity which nullifies the proceedings because such procedure is repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution.

(3) Although fiscal turns over active conduct of trial to private prosecutor, he should be present during the proceedings. While there is
nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases which denies the right of the fiscal to turn over the active conduct of the
trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be
present during the proceeding.

DISPOSITION:

The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the trial court for another arraignment and trial.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS:

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to
sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration
order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such
order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at
least 2 PCGG Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as
seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the
sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting
as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was
sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not
by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.
HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a
showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does
not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic
presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives
were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The
Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how
Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel.
The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void,
the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with
respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

PEDRO CALANO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO CRUZ, respondent-appellee.

J. R. Nuguid for appellant.

Emilio A. Gangcayco for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

For purposes of the present appeal the following facts, not disputed, may be briefly stated. As a result of the 1951 elections respondent Pedro Cruz
was proclaimed a councilor-elect in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, by the Municipal Board of Canvasser. Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a
complaint or petition for quo warranto under section 173 of the Revised election code (Republic Act No. 180), contesting the right of Cruz to the
office on the ground that Cruz was not eligible for the office of municipal councilor. In his prayer petitioner besides asking for other remedies which
in law and equity he is entitled to, asked that after declaring null and void the proclamation made by the Municipal Board of Canvasser in
November, 1951, to the effect that Cruz was councilor-elect, he (Calano) be declared the councilor elected in respondent's place.

Acting upon a motion to dismiss the petition, the Court of First Instance of Bataan issued the order of December 27, 1951, dismissing the petition
for quo warranto on the ground that it was filed out of time, and also because petitioner had no legal capacity to sue as contended by respondent.
On appeal to this Court by petitioner from the order of dismissal, in a decision promulgated on may 7, 1952, we held that the petition was filed
within the period prescribed by law; and that although the petition might be regarded as somewhat defective for failure to state a sufficient cause
of action, said question was not raised in the motion to dismiss because the ground relied upon, namely, that petitioner had no legal capacity to
sue, did not refer to the failure to state a sufficient cause of action but rather to minority, insanity, coverture, lack of juridical personality, or nay
other disqualification of a party. As a result, the order of dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
Upon the return of the case to the trial court, respondent again moved for dismissal on the ground that the petition failed to state a sufficient
cause of action, presumably relying upon the observation made by us in our decision. Further elaborating on our observation that the petition did
not state a sufficient cause of action, we said that paragraphs 3 and 8 of the petition which reads thus —

8. Que el recurrente tenia y tiene derecho a ocupar el cargo de concejal de Orion, Bataan, si no habia sido proclamado electo concejal de
Orion, Bataan, al aqui recurrido.

3. Que el recurrente era candidato a concejal del municipio de Orion, Bataan con el certificado de candidatura dedidamente presentado,
y registrado asi como tambien fue votado y elegido para dicho cargo, en la eleccion del 13 de noviembre de 1951. (Emphasis supplied)

were conclusions of law and not statement of facts.

The trial court sustained the second motion to dismiss in its order of September 30, 1952, on the ground that the petition failed to state a sufficient
cause of action. Again petitioner has appealed from that order to this court.

Appellant urges that the trial court erred not only in not holding that the motion to dismiss was filed out of time but also in declaring that the
complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action. In answer respondent-appellee contends that the appeal should not have been given due
course by the trial court because under the law there is no appeal from a decision of a court of First Instance in protests against the eligibility or
election of a municipal councilor, the appeal being limited to election contests involving the offices of Provincial governor, Members of the
Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, this under section 178 of the Revised Election Code.

In the past we had occasion to rule upon a similar point of law. In the case of Marquez vs. Prodigalidad, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 11, p. 204, we held
that section 178 of the Revised election code limiting appeals from decisions of Courts of First Instance in election contests over the offices of
Provincial Governor, members of the Provincial Board, City Councilors and City Mayors, did not intend to prohibit or prevent the appeal to the
Supreme Court in protests involving purely questions of law, that is to say, that protests involving other officers such as municipal councilor may be
appealed provided that only legal questions are involved in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal in the present case involving as it does purely
questions of law is proper.

Going to the question of sufficiency of cause of action, it should be stated that our observation when the case came up for the first time on appeal
was neither meant nor intended as a rule or doctrine. We were merely considering the main prayer contained in appellant's petition, namely, that
he be declared councilor-elect in the place of the respondent-appellee. In other words, we only observed that petitioner could not properly ask for
his proclamation as councilor-elect without alleging and stating not mere conclusions of law but facts showing that he had the right and was
entitled to the granting of his main prayer.

Considering the subject of cause of action in its entirety, it will be noticed that section 173 of the Revised Election Code provides that when a
person who is not eligible is elected, any registered candidate for the same office like the petitioner-appellant in this case, may contest his right to
the office by filing a petition for quo warranto. To legalize the contest this section just mentioned does not require that the contestant prove that
he is entitled to the office. In the case Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 727, wherein petitioner Llamoso who claimed to have received the
next highest number of votes for the post of Mayor, contested the right of respondent Ferrer to the office for which he was proclaimed elected, on
the ground of ineligibility, we held that section 173 of the Revised election Code while providing that any registered candidate may contest the
right of one elected to any provincial or municipal office on the ground of ineligibility, it does not provide that if the contestee is later declared
ineligible, the contestant will be proclaimed elected. In other words, in that case, we practically declared that under section 173, any registered
candidate may file a petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility, and that would constitute a sufficient cause of action. It is not
necessary for the contestant to claim that if the contestee is declared ineligible, he (contestant) be declared entitled to the office. As a matter of
fact, in case ofLlamoso vs. Ferrer, we declared the office vacant.

In view of the foregoing, the failure of Calano to allege that he is entitled to the office of councilor now occupied by the respondent Cruz does not
effect the sufficiency of his cause of action. Reversing the order of dismissal, the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
No costs.

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, Petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party’s
right to due process and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in G.R. SP No. 85541 which
granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment3 filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17, 2000 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for the principal amount of the loan respondent
obtained from her.

This Petition likewise assails the CA’s June 26, 2006 Resolution5 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage6 over
their 202-square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296.7 When the debt
became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint8 praying
that respondents be ordered:

(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March 1991 until
the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case be less thanP10,000.00; P25,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.

(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned parcel of land, and for the disposition of the
proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure of the respondents to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the sums set
forth in this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C.
Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorney’s Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the requested extension, however,
respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed petitioner
to present her evidence ex parte.10

Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.

In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s Complaint. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents to pay the petitioner as follows:

a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% per month
[sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid;

b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit;

c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be issued accordingly for the sale at
public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for the
satisfaction of the petitioner’s claim.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution,13 alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former
counsel of the RTC’s Decision on November 13, 2000. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment14 dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had
no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision
be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17, 2000 Decision. However, since the writ
could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property,16 which the RTC granted.17 In an auction sale conducted
on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of Sale18 was issued in her favor and
accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale 19 dated December 17, 2001, claiming that the
parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly, their indebtedness
inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.

In an Order20 dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to
12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign Judgment Obligation21 in the total amount
of P126,650.00.22

Displeased with the RTC’s May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari 23 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision24 declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at
the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling,
the CA ratiocinated:

Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of the 12% per annum prayed
for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation (Leonor vs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights
can emanate from a resolution that is null and void (Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).
From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of the judgment providing for a higher interest than
that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any action to declare its nullity
does not prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged May 7, 2002 and
September 5, 2000 orders of Public Respondent Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.25 (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.26 They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly interest rate
is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to respondents, the loan did not carry
any interest as it was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s family can continue occupying respondents’ residential
building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition. 27 Upon respondents’ motion, however, it reinstated and granted the Petition. In setting aside
portions of the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the monthly interest rate of 5% was
not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12% per annum. Following the mandate of
Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void for being in excess of the relief sought in the
Complaint. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated October 13, 2004 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the ANNULMENT OF:

(a) public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5% monthly interest in favor of petitioner; and

(b) all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in respondents’ names under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.

The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment is, likewise, ordered RECOMPUTED at the rate of 12%
per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28 (Emphases in the original.)

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution. 29

Issues

Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST APPEAL.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS
WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17, 2000 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 241-V-99, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME
FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT. 30

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision. She contends that a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment may be availed of only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the claimant. In the present case, however, respondents had all the opportunity to question the October 17, 2000
Decision of the RTC, but because of their own inaction or negligence they failed to avail of the remedies sanctioned by the rules. Instead, they
contented themselves with the filing of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside Execution
Sale.

Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. However,
the allegations in respondents’ Rule 47 petition do not constitute extrinsic fraud because they simply pass the blame to the negligence of their
former counsel. In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass the buck to their erstwhile counsel considering that when they filed their Motion
to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale they were already assisted by their new lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A. Ruiz, who did not
also avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner posits that there is no reason to doubt that the
RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the persons of the respondents.

While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest, petitioner nonetheless invokes the doctrine of
immutability of final judgment and contends that the RTC Decision can no longer be corrected or modified since it had long become final and
executory. She likewise points out that respondents received a copy of said Decision on November 13, 2000 but did nothing to correct the same.
They did not even question the award of 5% monthly interest when they filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgment which they anchored on the sole
ground of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the persons of some of the respondents.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof. They only seek quittance from the 5% monthly
interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC. Respondents contend that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that when the
defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a relief more than what is being prayed for in the Complaint. A judgment which
transgresses said rule, according to the respondents, is void for having been issued without jurisdiction and for being violative of due process of
law.

Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence of their former counsel, Atty. Coroza, that the
remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment were lost. They allege that after filing a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, Atty.
Coroza did not file any pleading resulting to their being declared in default. While the said lawyer filed on their behalf a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment dated January 26, 2001, he however took no steps to appeal from the Decision of the RTC, thereby allowing said judgment to lapse into
finality. Citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals,31 respondents aver that clients are not always bound by the actions of their counsel, as in the present
case where the clients are to lose their property due to the gross negligence of their counsel.

With regard to petitioner’s invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said doctrine applies only to valid and not to void
judgments.

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party,
without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final,
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."32

While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. 34 In Arcelona v. Court of
Appeals,35 this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be
shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant
a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to
and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 36 this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings,
absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules.37 But the
same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the
relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that
prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and
allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in
the Complaint.38 No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to due process against
unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies "the sporting
idea of fair play"39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record.
The Real Estate Mortgage40 executed by the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC,
she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12%
per annum"41 and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor
testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due
process requirement because respondents were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived
of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking
for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable under the premises x x x."42 To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in the Complaint or related
thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action. 43 Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per
annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in
accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,44 this Court held:

In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v. Pilar
Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per month or 36% interest per
annum as excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or
12% interest per annum. (Citations omitted)

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run
away from their just and valid obligation."45 Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest patently
erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as applicable jurisprudence.

Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial,
petition for relief, etc. through their own fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.1âwphi1 This is based on the rule that any act performed by a
counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the
lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client’s property without
due process of law.46 In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. 47

The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the cause of his client was already present even from the beginning. It should
be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass
without filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by the fact that he did not
question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000.48 A simple reading of the dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what is being prayed for by
the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel
carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention and compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client.
But he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside Judgment 49 dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of
jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients’ deprivation of property without due
process of law. Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief
therefrom. It was only a year later that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when
respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted
that it "made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very different from what
was prayed for by the plaintiff."50

"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law."51 Judging from
how respondents’ former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligent in protecting their rights, to the
extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be
attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannot also blame
respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would amply protect their
interest during the trial of the case.52 Here,

"respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so,
they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may lawfully warrant and require."53

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents’ principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to their former counsel’s gross negligence in
handling their cause, coupled with the RTC’s erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property
and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:

x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end up losing their property but will additionally owe
private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had, in the meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we
cannot, in good conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.54

Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. Petitioner does not contest as she even admits
that the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest.55Amazingly, she wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court
cannot allow this injustice to happen.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.

ANG TIBAY V CIR

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off.
NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its
right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR,
filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC,
were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained
records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. L-49711 November 7, 1979
2nd Division Aquino

FACTS:

Zambales Chromite Mining Corp., Inc. (ZCM, Inc.) sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in
Zambales. ZCM filed their claims with then Director of Mines Benjamin Gozon. ZCM, Inc., were asserting their claim against the mining claims of
Martinez and Pabilona. Director Gozon decided in favor of Martinez and Pabilona and dismissed the claims of ZCM, Inc., ruling that ZCM, Inc. did
not discover any mineral nor located any mining claims in accordance with law. ZCM appealed the decision before the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources. During the pendency of the appeal, Director gozon was appointed Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. Gozon
in his capacity as Secretary affirmed his decision as Director of Mines and dismissed the appeal of ZCM, Inc.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon.

RULING OF CFI:
The disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative
bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from
a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.

RULING OF CA:
CA after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision remanded the case to the Minister of Natural Resources.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gozon can review and validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process?

HELD:
Secretary Gozon cannot review his decision as Director of Mines. A Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own
decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.

RATIO:
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The
decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case.

ANZALDO VS CLAVE

Due Process – Administrative Due Process

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the position Scientist Research
Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was
previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointed
Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to
Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or
the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing
Venzon to the contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Anzaldo
appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC
chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was “inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil
Service Commission”, what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is
evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself)
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

TOPIC: Administrative Due Process - review of the decision by the same officer who rendered it previously in a different capacity

C19 - Better Buildings v. NLRC, GR 109714, December 15, 1997

Facts: Halim Ysmael and Eliseo Feliciano, sales manager and chief supervisor respectively of the petitioner herein were illegally dismissed. A memo
was sent then and there informing the two employees of their immediate termination. Unable to accept their termination, the two filed a
complaint against BBI for illegal termination. The labor arbiter issued a decision in favor of the two employees directing BBI to reinstate them,
award backwages and damages for the illegal termination. The decision was also affirmed by NLRC except minimizing the damages. Petitioner, not
satisfied with the decision, has filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the decision of March 3, 1989 and the resolution of December 11, 1992. Ysmael entered into a compromise
agreement with the petitioner, thus removing him from the case. The resolution will therefore only affect Feliciano.

Issue: Whether or not BBI illegally dismissed Feliciano.

Held: The petitioner contends that Feliciano was dismissed for breach of trust and confidence as the latter has engaged in the same line of business
as that of the petitioner, and even getting the latter’s clients, and employing BBI’s former employees. In termination of employment cases, we have
consistently held that two requisites must concur to constitute a valid dismissal: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art.
282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, the elements of which are the opportunity to be heard and defend
himself. First, on the substantive aspect, petitioner contends that private respondent was dismissed from his employment for engaging in business
in direct competition with its line of service. Hence, said conduct constitutes a willful breach of trust which is justifiable cause for termination of
employment.

We sustain BBI.

Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that an employer can terminate the services of an employee only for valid and just causes
which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was indeed for a valid and
just cause

In this jurisdiction, we have consistently ruled that in terminating an employee, it is essential that the twin requirements of notice and hearing
must be observed. The written notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and at the same
informs the employee concerned of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.

In the case at bar, the record is bereft of any showing that private respondent was given notice of the charge against him. Nor was he ever given
the opportunity under the circumstances to answer the charge; his termination was quick, swift and sudden.

Evidently, the decision to dismiss respondent was merely based on the fact that petitioner was already convinced at the time that the private
respondents were engaged in disloyal acts. As regards the procedural aspect, the failure to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing
taints the dismissal with illegality. He was dismissed for a just cause but, the manner of terminating his employment was done in complete
disregard of the necessary procedural safeguards. A man’s job being a property right duly protected by our laws, for depriving private respondent
the right to defend himself, petitioner is liable for damages.

ANTONIO CARAG vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 147590 April 2, 2007

FACTS: National Federation of Labor Unions and Mariveles Apparel Corporation Labor Union (collectively, complainants), on behalf of all of
Mariveles Apparel Corporation’s rank and file employees, filed a complaint against MAC for illegal dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of
business. In their position paper dated 3 January 1994, NAFLU and MACLU moved to implead Atty. Antonio Carag and Armando David, being
owners of the MAC Corporation, to guarantee the satisfaction of any judgment award on the basis of Article 212(c) of the Philippine Labor Code.
Atty. Joshua Pastores, as counsel for respondents, submitted a position paper dated 21 February 1994 and stated that complainants should not
have impleaded Carag and David because MAC is actually owned by a consortium of banks. Carag and David own shares in MAC only to qualify
them to serve as MAC's officers. Without any further proceedings, Arbiter Ortiguerra rendered her Decision dated 17 June 1994 granting the
motion to implead Carag and David. In the same Decision, Arbiter Ortiguerra declared Carag and David solidarily liable with MAC ruling that
corporate officers who dismissed employees in bad faith or wantonly violate labor standard laws or when the company had already ceased
operations and there is no way by which a judgment in favor of employees could be satisfied, corporate officers can be held jointly and severally
liable with the company. Carag, through a separate counsel, filed an appeal dated 30 August 1994 before the NLRC. He also filed a motion to
reduce bond. In a Resolution promulgated on 5 January 1995, the NLRC Third Division denied the motion to reduce bond. The NLRC stated that to
grant a reduction of bond on the ground that the appeal is meritorious would be tantamount to ruling on the merits of the appeal. On February 13,
1995, Carag filed his petition for certiorari before CA. The CA affirmed the decision of Arbiter Ortiguerra and the resolution of NLRC. Motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Antonio Carag shall be held personally liable for the payment of illegally dismissed employees.

RULING: Section 31 makes a director personally liable for corporate debts if he wilfully and knowingly votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts
of the corporation. Section 31 also makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation.

Complainants did not allege in their complaint that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC.
Complainants did not present any evidence showing that Carag wilfully and knowingly voted for or assented to any patently unlawful act of MAC.
Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any finding to this effect in her Decision.

Complainants did not also allege that Carag is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of MAC. Complainants did not present
any evidence showing that Carag is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of MAC. Neither did Arbiter Ortiguerra make any
finding to this effect in her Decision.

After stating what she believed is the law on the matter, Arbiter Ortiguerra stopped there and did not make any finding that Carag is guilty of bad
faith or of wanton violation of labor standard laws. Arbiter Ortiguerra did not specify what act of bad faith Carag committed, or what particular
labor standard laws he violated.

To hold a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, and thus pierce the veil of corporate fiction, the bad faith or wrongdoing of the
director must be established clearly and convincingly. Bad faith is never presumed. Bad faith does not connote bad judgment or negligence. Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose. Bad faith means breach of a known duty through some ill motive or interest. Bad faith partakes of the nature of
fraud. Neither does bad faith arise automatically just because a corporation fails to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company
closure or dismissal of employees. The failure to give notice is not an unlawful act because the law does not define such failure as unlawful. Such
failure to give notice is a violation of procedural due process but does not amount to an unlawful or criminal act. Such procedural defect is called
illegal dismissal because it fails to comply with mandatory procedural requirements, but it is not illegal in the sense that it constitutes an unlawful
or criminal act.

For a wrongdoing to make a director personally liable for debts of the corporation, the wrongdoing approved or assented to by the director must
be a patently unlawful act. Mere failure to comply with the notice requirement of labor laws on company closure or dismissal of employees does
not amount to a patently unlawful act. Patently unlawful acts are those declared unlawful by law which imposes penalties for commission of such
unlawful acts. There must be a law declaring the act unlawful and penalizing the act.

In this case, Article 283 of the Labor Code, requiring a one-month prior notice to employees and the Department of Labor and Employment before
any permanent closure of a company, does not state that non-compliance with the notice is an unlawful act punishable under the Code. There is no
provision in any other Article of the Labor Code declaring failure to give such notice an unlawful act and providing for its penalty. Complainants did
not allege or prove, and Arbiter Ortiguerra did not make any finding, that Carag approved or assented to any patently unlawful act to which the law
attaches a penalty for its commission. On this score alone, Carag cannot be held personally liable for the separation pay of complainants.

QUINTO v. COMELEC (December 1, 2009 Decision)

FACTS
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010
elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8678,* which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from
office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.*** Petitioners
averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are
not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period
when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any
person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature
and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also
argued that petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the
exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its
Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as
ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional (with regard to equal protection)
HELD
The second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. “In
considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.” There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon
substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must
apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective
ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. “(W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by
the measure remain.” An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both
may be motivated by political considerations rather than the public’s welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or
neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether
they occupy high positions in government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he
files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the
activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale
On their Legal Standing: While petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the legal standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because
they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged provisions, affects the rights of voters to choose their public officials.
Both candidates and voters may question challenge, on grounds of equal protection, the assailed provisions, on grounds of equal protection,
because of its impact on voting rights. At any rate, the Supreme Court “has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has observed a liberal policy
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.”

QUINTO v. COMELEC (February 22, 2010 Resolution)

*Same Facts

ISSUE
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of
the equal protection clause
HELD
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor
vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the
law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member
of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government,
and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in
the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954
when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP
which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally
accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it
represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

VICTORINO VS ELIZALDE

Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member
of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is
being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said
factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an
exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a
member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then
moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop
agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the
fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-
membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It
recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or
not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right.

BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION G.R. NO. 192935

FACTS

 This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assailing Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" for violating Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution;
 On May 10, 2010, Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III was elected President of the Philippines. Often repeated during his campaign for the
presidency was the uncompromising slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap."
 Barely a month after his assumption to office, and intended as fulfillment of his campaign promise, President Aquino, on July 30, 2010,
issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
 Without delay, petitioners Biraogo and Congressmen Lagman, Albano, Datumanong, and Fua filed their respective petitions decrying the
constitutionality of the Truth Commission, primarily, for being a usurpation by the President of the legislative power to create a public
office.
 Expectedly, in its Memorandum, the OSG traverses the contention of petitioners and upholds the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 arguing
that petitioners have not and will not suffer direct personal injury with the issuance of executive order no. 1. Petitioners do not have legal
standing to assail the constitutionality of executive order no. 1.

ISSUES

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; and
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

RULING

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in
the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS OF NACHURA, J.

He agrees with the ponencia that, given the liberal approach in David v. Arroyo and subsequent cases, petitioners have locus standi to raise the
question of constitutionality of the Truth Commission’s creation. He also concurs with Justice Mendoza’s conclusion that the Truth Commission will
not supplant the Office of the Ombudsman or the DOJ, nor impermissibly encroach upon the latter’s exercise of constitutional and statutory
powers.

He also agrees with the ponencia that the President of the Philippines can create an ad hoc investigative body. But more than that, he believes
that, necessarily implied from the President’s power of control over all executive departments and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws, as well as his statutory authority under the Administrative Code of 1987, the President may create a public office.

However, he finds himself unable to concur with Justice Mendoza’s considered opinion that E.O. No. 1 breaches the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws.

“Petitioner Members of the House of Representatives are not proper parties to challenge the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 on equal protection
grounds. Petitioner Members of the House of Representatives cannot take up the lance for the previous administration. Under all three levels of
scrutiny earlier discussed, they are precluded from raising the equal protection of the laws challenge. The perceptive notation by my esteemed
colleague, Justice Carpio Morales, in her dissent, comes to life when she observes that petitioner Members of the House of Representatives cannot
vicariously invoke violation of equal protection of the laws. Even assuming E.O. No. 1 does draw a classification, much less an unreasonable one,
petitioner Members of the House of Representatives, as well as petitioner Biraogo, are not covered by the supposed arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.

If we applied both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the nakedness of petitioners’ arguments are revealed because they do not claim violation of any
of their fundamental rights, nor do they cry discrimination based on race, gender and illegitimacy. Petitioners’ equal protection clause challenge
likewise dissolves when calibrated against the purpose of E.O. No. 1 and its supposed classification of the administration which the Truth
Commission is tasked to investigate. Nowhere in the pleadings of petitioners and their claim of violation of separation of powers and usurpation of
legislative power by the executive is it established how such violation or usurpation translates to violation by E.O. No. 1 of the equal protection of
the laws. Thus, no reason exists for the majority to sustain the challenge of equal protection if none of the petitioners belong to the class, claimed
by the majority to be, discriminated against.”

He submits for the dismissal of the petition.

DISSENTING OPINION OF CARPIO-MORALES, J.

Louis Biraogo, does not raise the issue of equal protection. His Memorandum mentions nothing about equal protection clause. While
the ponencia "finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance," not even his successful invocation
of transcendental importance can push the Court into resolving an issue which he never raised in his petition. On the foregoing score alone,
the ponencia should not have dealt with the issue of equal protection. Such barriers notwithstanding, the claim of breach of the equal protection
clause fails to hurdle the higher barrier of merit.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others
allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

FACTS:

 The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
 Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section
1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to
be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

 Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
 Dumlao’s colleague Igot and Salapat, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidacy of a person who was convicted of a crime
given that there was a judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of filing charges for the commission of such crimes.
 Dumlao also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on
the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing.

2. Whether or not the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

HELD:

Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties
and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and
Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions.

1. No. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more
in the nature of a taxpayer's suit.

For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (a) the existence of an
appropriate case:, (b) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (c) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (d) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. It may be
conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their
pleadings.

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question
posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue.
b. No one has yet been affected by the operation of the statutes. No one has sustained direct injury as a result of the enforcement. In
the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for
Councilor. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus
standi in seeking judicial redress.
 d. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and
procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

2. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in
to politics. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared
himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the
very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection
that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been
filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a
person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office
during the term of the sentence. And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet,
there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty
from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was
meritorious.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the
first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. 2) That portion of the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.

CENIZA VS COMELEC

“Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering

**”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to
the party in power.” **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless
otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them)
from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So
when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS
(Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering
motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the
entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of
Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized
as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of
the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement
that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the
approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only
with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on 21 June 1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial
distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social,
economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying
the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are
allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the
Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN

“Equal Protection” – Creation of the Sandiganbayan

Nuñez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It
is the claim of Nuñez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He
claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuñez’s right to equal protection, because – appeal as a matter of right became minimized into
a mere matter of discretion; – appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence;
and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over
cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came
into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous
decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Read full text

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are
guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts – first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on
the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one
appeal – to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial
distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial
judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari,
likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or
conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are
reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial court’s judgment is
subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality
unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise
violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt
(Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

PASEI v. Drilon

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female
of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled
“Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states
where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards
to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty
or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question
that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined
to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of
Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN
MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 200

FACTS

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise
applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.

When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of
all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates
“to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not
merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with
equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions
of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires
have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the
local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the
latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.

Consti Topic: Police Power Tests of Valid Exercise – Lawful Subject (public interest)
DECS v San Diego, G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
Key Word: NMAT

Facts:The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that
he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis:
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972
h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not
be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.

In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended
petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972. The additional grounds raised
were due process and equal protection.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid and granting the petition. Judge
TeresitaDizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the
police power. DECS appealed the decision, hence this case.

Issue: Is MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 a valid exercise of police power by the state?

Held:The decision of the lower court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED and the petition is GRANTED.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the court ruled that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country” and is recognized as a valid exercises of governmental power. The country is entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

Police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule
is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.The private respondent
must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared.

No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an
absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for
another calling that has not excited his interest.

It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which
he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes,
not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

PHIL JUDGES ASSOC. VS PRADO

227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain government
agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the
postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS
a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said
provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it
is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in
contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would
intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from
all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all
agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others,
especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true that the
postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

TATAD V. SECRETARY OF ENERGY

(Taxpayer’s suit)

FACTS:

The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For
Other Purposes."[1] R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.

Prior to 1971- there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies
were free to enter and exit the market without any government interference. There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan Refining
Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the
country.[2]

1971- the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis; hence enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act.Oil Industry Commission was
created to regulate the business, operations and trade practices of the industry. Until the early seventies, the downstream oil industry was
controlled by multinational companies. Ferdinand E. Marcos boldly created the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to break the control by
foreigners of our oil industry. PNOC later put up its own marketing subsidiary -- Petrophil. It operated under the business name PETRON
CORPORATION.

1985- only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country -- Caltex, Shell and the government-owned PNOC.

1992- Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which created the Department of Energy. The thrust of the Philippine energy program under the law was
toward the deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants.

March 1996- Congress took audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil industry through enacting R.A. No. 8180, entitled the "Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996."

The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase.

 During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be
accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation, exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2) implementation of
 an automatic pricing mechanism, (3) implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of dealers and rates of haulers, water
transport operators and pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes.
 Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was to be
abolished.

August 12, 1996- The first phase of deregulation commenced on.

February 8, 1997- The President implemented the full deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No. 372.

The petitions at bar assail the constitutionality of various provisions of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 372.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order.

RULING:

The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be misunderstood, this
Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people.

In KapatiranngmgaNaglilingkodsaPamahalaanngPilipinas, Inc. v. Tan.

"x xx
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and
that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance
of these petitions."

There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180
deregulating our downstream oil industry.Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose
issueswhich are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.

PP V CAYAT

68 Phil. 12 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic
drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and
to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others,
that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them
as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-
Christians from Christians.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that
the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not
based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On
the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to
equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there
is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.
QUINTO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
 ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. RESOLUTION YUNG ASSIGNED CASE SA ATIN
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing
of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or
any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend
that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or
reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their
CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as
resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly
recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor
vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the
law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected
continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid
classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member
of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the
recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government,
and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true
and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that
it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that
“For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to
participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position,
including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is
that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness.
It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the
purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term,
it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the
sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the
term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely
to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also
thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this
Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
==============
Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil
or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of
certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to apply
the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any
election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the
pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., plaintiff-appellant

vs The Treasurer of Ormoc City, etc., defendants-appellees
Ponente: Bengzon

Facts:
January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 imposing a municipal tax for all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1
% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar Company.

Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response, defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the city's
power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the same did not violate constitutional limitations.

After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is within the charter of the city.

Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations. Appellant questions the
authority of the Municipal Board to levy such tax in view of the Revised dministrative Code which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.

Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of uniform taxation were infringed?

Held:
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially
identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

The ordinance is unconstitutional.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes
a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been
satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope
of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates
to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing
of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.