NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF STUDY AND

RESEARCH IN LAW

RESEARCH PAPER

CONSTITUTION - II

DOMINANCE OF UNION OVER STATES - A CRITICAL

VIEW

SUBMITTED TO- SUBMITTED BY-

DR. SYAMALA KANDADAI, VISHAL
RAJVANSH
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR-CUM-DIRECTOR, SEMESTER III- B
NUSRL RANCHI. ROLL- 843
1
“A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to the full accomplishment of
the objects committed to its care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is
responsible, free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to the sense of
the people.”

~ Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers

ABSTRACT

In the words of K.C. Wheare, “The Indian Union is a unitary State with subsidiary federal
features rather than a federal State with subsidiary unitary features.” This research aims on
curbing the quandaries thrown upon the status of Indian federalism over the years. Some say
it’s federal while others disagree pinpointing it to be quasi-federal in nature. Some even go to
the extend of classifying it as a unitary one. These questions are to be dealt in the research.
The true nature of the Indian federalism will be discussed with a critical view owing to
determine the degree of accuracy in the existing system. Further, this research aims at
providing suggestions required for the improvisation the ongoing way of distribution of
power between the union and the state.

It is evident that Indian federalism is centrally biased, this research intends to analyse that
biasedness with a critical view. Whether conferring the union with the dominant position is
really a requirement or this principal has illusionary backings. The state has nowhere been
conferred with the power to have a stake at any union matters but the union can even go to
the length to legislate for the states. The true meaning of co-operative federalism holds a part
in this research along with an analysation whether Indian federalism qualifies to be called a
co-operative federalism or not. The article is concluded with some suggestion that might
prove to be worthy for distribution of power between union and the states.

INTRODUCTION

In the context of Centre-State relations, an assessment of the federal structure of government

in the Constitution is essential. In fact, a federal structure is a design of government in which
there is division of power on territorial basis between the Centre and States. This limits the
concentration of power and authority in the hands of only one government as the country’s
powers get divided between the Centre and States. Thus, both are limited governments.

The Constituent Assembly members were convinced that a vast country like India could not
be efficiently governed from a single Centre and thought it desirable to adopt a federal

2
system of government. The diversity of race, religion, and language also impelled them to go
for a federal policy, because it could ensure unity of the country while assuring autonomy in
matters of local importance. It may be observed that the Indian Constitution does not possess
all the features of a typical federation and makes many deviations.

In view of these deviations the critics have challenged the federal character of the
Constitution, and described it as ‘quasi-federal’. For example, K.C. Wheare says: “The Indian
Union is a unitary State with subsidiary federal features rather than a federal State with
subsidiary unitary features.”1 Granville Austin agrees with this view when he describes the
Indian federation as a new kind of federalism to meet Indian’s peculiar needs.2

The Indian Constitution provides for a federal system of government but the term ‘federation’
has nowhere been used in the Constitution. On the other hand, Article 1 of the Indian
Constitution describes ‘India, that is Bharat’ as a ‘Union of States’, an expression which
implies two things. Firstly, unlike the USA the Indian federation is not the result of an
agreement between the units. Secondly, the units have no right to secede from the federation.
In fact, the States of the Indian federation have no independent existence of their own.
Parliament can alter their names and territories without their consent.

Articles 245 to 255 of the Constitution of India contain a charter of the distribution of
legislative powers between the Union and the State. There is a three-fold distribution of
legislative power represented by three lists - Union, State and Concurrent. The Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution embodies these lists, viz. the Union List, the State List and the
Concurrent List consisting of 97, 66 and 47 items respectively. Even after the changes in the
Schedule brought about by Constitution Amendment acts, the numbers of entries in the three
lists have remained the same.3

INCEPTION OF CENTRALIZED BIASEDNESS

Apart from the constitution of States, there is the problem of division of functions between
the Centre and the States. The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution gave a Constitution
which was federal but with a strong Centre because of the prevailing centrifugal tendencies in
the country. However, the balance tilted increasingly towards centralised administration for
several years after independence for a variety of reasons. The Indian federation started
1
K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 20 (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 1953).
2
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, LONDON,86 (Oxford
University Press, 1966).
3
SUBHASH C KASHYAP, OUR CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIA'S CONSTITUTION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (3rd ed 1994).

3
working as a Unitary state—thanks to growing encroachment of the Centre on the States’
functions, the fiscal imbalance between the Centre and States, a centralised planning process
and, above all, frequent imposition of Central Rule on the State under Article 356 of the
Constitution. All this, created misgivings in some States and led to a rise of regionalism and
students’ demand for State autonomy and radical changes in the Indian Constitution. One
reason for such a demand was the disparities in the social and economic development.

In view of this principle of the federal structure, K.C. Wheare observed that the Indian
Constitution provides a system of government which is quasi-federal. D.D. Basu observed:
“The Constitution of India is neither purely Federal nor purely Unitary but is a combination
of both. It is a Union or composite State of novel type. It enshrines the principles that inspite
of federation the national interest ought to be paramount.”4 Lipson has observed:
“Centralisation of powers in the hands of the Central Government is a universal phenomenon
and virtually all the great driving forces in modern society combine in a centralist direction.”5

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS BETWEEN UNION AND STATE

The main characteristic of a federal constitution is the distribution of powers between the
union and the states. The Indian constitution provides for a new kind of federalism to meet
India’s peculiar needs. In the matter of distribution of powers, the framers followed the
pattern of the Government of India Act, 1935. Thus, predominance has been given to the
union parliament over the state legislatures or assemblies regarding the distribution of
legislative powers.

The legislative powers are subject to the scheme of distribution of powers between the union
and state legislatures (as provided in three lists under the constitution), fundamental rights
(i.e. legislative powers cannot contravene the fundamental rights) and other provisions of the
constitution (articles 245-254).

There are three lists which provide for distribution of legislative powers under 7th Schedule
to the Constitution: -

(1) Union List (List 1) – It contains 97 items and comprises of the subjects which are of
national importance and admit of uniform laws for the whole of the country. Only the union
parliament can legislate with respect to these matters. For example, Defence, foreign affairs,
banking, currency, union taxes, etc.
4
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (8th ed, 2010).
5
Lesile Lipson, The Great Issues of Politics: An Introduction of the Political Science, New York: Prentice Hall,
315, (1953).

4
(2) State List (List 2) – It contains 66 items and comprises of subjects of local or state interest
and thus lie within the legislative competence of the state legislatures, viz. public order and
police, health, agriculture, forests, etc.

(3) Concurrent List (list 3) – It contains 47 items, with respect to which; both union
parliament and the state legislature have a concurrent power of legislation. The concurrent list
(not found in any federal constitution) was to serve as a device to avoid excessive rigidity to a
two-fold distribution. It is a ‘twilight zone’, as for not so important matters, the states can
take initiative, while for the important matters, the parliament can do so. Besides, the states
can make supplementary laws in order to amplify the laws made by union parliament. The
subjects include general laws and social welfare – civil and criminal procedure, marriage,
contract, planning education, etc.

ANALYSIS OF UNION DOMINANCE OVER STATES

The provisions that shows bias towards Center and the reasons why our Constitution Framers
had chosen in favour of centre. These are - (1) Parliament’s power to make laws for the
whole or any part of the country with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State list
during the proclamation of Emergency. (2) The dual role of the Governor of a State as its
Constitutional head as well as an agent of the Union Government, (3) An unequal
representation of the States in the Rajya Sabha, (4) a number of other provisions reveal the
Constitutional imbalance between the Union and the States such as - the amending process of
the Indian Constitution, the single judiciary system, the All India Services, the single Election
Commission and the provisions for reservation of certain State bills for Presidential assent.

Although the States are given exclusive powers over the subject in the State list, there are two
exception to this general rule.

1. Under Article 249, if the Rajya Sabha declares by a resolution supported by two-thirds of
the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest that
Parliament should make laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the State List,
Parliament is competent to make laws on that matter for the whole or any part of India.

2. Again under Article 250, Parliament is empowered to make laws on any item included in
the State List for the whole or any part of India while a proclamation of Emergency is in
operation. The Union can, in an emergency, actual or apprehended, withdraw all powers from
the States and also the financial support it gives and functions as a Unitary State. In the US
and Australian Constitutions, even the declaration of war does not impinge on the distribution

5
of power between the Federation and the States, nor does it empower the Federal Legislature
to legislate on any subject exclusively in the State List.

Further, in case of any inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and those made by
the Legislature of the State in respect of items in the Concurrent List, the Union law shall
prevail and the State law shall be void to the extent of inconsistency except where a State law
is reserved for the consideration of the President and receives his assent (Art. 254).

The Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, substantially altered the original federal
character of the Indian system. This has unquestionably reaffirmed the intent of the
Constitution Makers to establish a lasting Union in which the States will have no right to
secede. Significant changes have occurred in the Seventh Schedule which have affected the
original distribution of powers between the Centre and the States. The entries transferred
from the State List to the Concurrent List include, (a) administration of justice, constitution
and organization of all courts except the Supreme and the High Courts, (b) education, (c)
weights and measures, (d) forests, and (e) protection of wild animals and birds. Taxes on
advertisements, broadcast by radio or television were also excluded from the purview of entry
55 of the State List.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS: PREDOMINANCE OF UNION LAW AND LIMITATIONS OF STATE

LEGISLATURES

(1) In case of an overlapping between the three lists, regarding a matter, the predominance is
given to the union (Article 246). Thus, entries in state list have to be interpreted according to
those in the union and concurrent lists.

(2) In the concurrent sphere, in case of a repugnancy or inconsistency between union and
states law relating to the same subject – the union law prevails (Article 254).

(3) Extensive nature of Union List — Some subjects normally intended to be in the
jurisdiction of states are in the union list example industries, universities, election and audit,
inter-state trade and rivers, etc.

(4) Residuary powers (Article 248) – Power to legislate with respect to any matter not
enumerated in any of the three lists (example imposition of taxes) is given to the union.

(5) Expansion of powers of union legislature under certain circumstances – in the following
situations, parliament can legislate with respect to “state list” subjects:

6
(a) when the Rajya Sabha declares by a resolution of 2/3rd majority (members present and
voting) that it is necessary for national interest; it shall be lawful for parliament to make laws
for the whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to that matter while the
resolution remains in force. (Article 249)

(b) Under a proclamation of emergency; it shall be lawful for parliament to make laws for the
whole or any part of the territory of India with respect to matter in the state list (Article 250).
Thus, during emergency, the parliament can legislate on subjects in all the three lists and the
federal constitution gets converted into unitary one.

Nothing in articles 249 and 250 shall restrict the power of state legislature to make any law
which under this constitution it has the power to make, but if any provision of a law made by
the legislature of a state is repugnant to any provision of a law made by parliament which
parliament has under either of the said articles power to make, the law made by parliament,
whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of the state, shall prevail, and
the law made by the legislature of the state shall to the extent of the repugnancy, but so long
only as the law made by parliament continues to have effect, be inoperative (Article. 251).

(c) by agreement between the states i.e. with the consent of state legislatures; if it appears to
the legislatures of two or more states to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to
which parliament has no power to make laws for the states (except as provided in articles.
249 and 250) should be regulated in such states by parliament by law, and if resolutions to
that effect are passed by all the house of the legislatures of those states, it shall be lawful for
parliament to pass an act for regulating that matter accordingly, and any act so passed shall
apply to such states and to any other state by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution
passed in that behalf by the states’ house. the parliament (not state legislature) also reserves
the right to amend or repeal any such act (Article. 252).

(d) To implement treaties: - Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this

chapter, parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of
India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or
countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other bodies
(Article 253). Treaties are not required to be ratified by parliament. They are, however, not
self-operative. Parliamentary legislation will be necessary for implementing them. But laws
enacted for the enforcement of treaties will be subject to the constitutional limits i.e. such a
law cannot infringe fundamental rights.

7
(e) Failure of constitutional machinery in a state (Article 356). The president can authorize
the parliament to exercise the powers of the state legislature during the proclamation of
emergency due to the breakdown of constitutional machinery in a state.

(6) Distribution of legislative powers does not apply to union territories, in which parliament
can legislate with respect to ‘any subject’ including those in the state list. Parliament has
power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not
included (in a state) notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the state list
[Article. 246(4)].

THE QUANDARY OF INDIAN FEDERALISM

It is significant to note that the Constitution of India does not use the term ‘federal’ to
describe India.6 Article 1 (1) of our Constitution though provides “India, that is Bharat, shall
be a union of States”. It is also pertinent to note that Dr. B.R Ambedkar said in the
Constituent Assembly that the word ‘Union’ instead of the word ‘Federal’ is used for two
definite advantages, viz. Indian federation is not the result of an agreement by the units, and
that the component units have no freedom to secede from it.7

Despite, this Constitution of India prescribes a structure of governance which is essentially

federal in nature:

1. Separation and Clear Demarcation of Powers: Constitution has clearly demarcated the
jurisdictions, powers and functions of the Union and the State Governments.

2. Separate Governments: Constitution has provided separate governments at the Union and
the States with separate legislative, executive and judicial wings of governance.

3. Bicameral legislature: the Indian Parliament has two Houses, with the Upper House
Known as the Rajya Sabha and the Lower House being known as the Lok Sabha. Upper
house constitutes with the representatives from the states.

4. Clear provisions regarding legislative, administrative and financial relations between the
Union and the States.

JUDICIAL VIEW ON FEDERALISM IN INDIA

6
As per the preamble India is a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic. Further, nowhere in the
Constitution, India is described as a federal nation.
7
Federalism in India: A Critical Appraisal, Volume 3, (JBM & SSR), 2014.

8
A 13 judge Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in the landmark judgment of
Kesavananda Bharati8 case for the first time had propounded the theory of basic structure of
constitution. In a same judgment, it was also observed in the minority opinion that federal
character of the Constitution was one of the basic features of the Constitution. 9 Further,
another Constitution Bench in S.R Bommai10 held that Indian Constitution has, in it, not only
features of a pragmatic federalism which, while distributing legislative powers and indicating
the spheres of governmental powers of State and Central Governments, is overlaid by strong
unitary features. Also, in Samsher Singh11 the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted various unitary
features in the Constitution of India. Later, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana
v. State of Punjab12 the words “semi federal” was used to describe the Indian Constitution. It
would be interesting to note the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court:

“In a semi-federal system of Government, which has been adopted under the Indian
Constitution, all the essential powers, both legislative and executive have been conferred
upon the Central Government. True federalism means the distribution of powers between a
Central authority and the constituent units. Dicey's concept of federalism is a national
constitution for a body of States, which desire union and do not desire unity. According to
him, a federal State is a political contrivance intended to reconcile national unity and power
with the maintenance of State rights. The essence of a federation is, therefore, existence of a
Union and its States and the division of power between the Union and the States. If the
component parts of a State have no power of policy decision in any field, but are confined to
carrying out the Central Government directives through the medium of an institutional fabric
of federal form, it is not a federal but a unitary State. Political integrity of the Union and each
State seems to be essential to the federal concept.

In State of West Bengal13 the Supreme Court observed that Indian Constitution is not true to
any traditional pattern of federation. Supreme Court also observed that there is no warrant for
the assumption that the Provinces were sovereign, autonomous units which had parted with
such power as they considered reasonable or proper for enabling the Central Government to
function for the common good. The legal theory on which the Constitution was based was the

8
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
9
Id
10
S.R Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1.
11
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 S.C.C. 831: A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2192.
12
State of Haryana v. State of Punjab, (2002) 2 S.C.C. 507.
13
State of W.B v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1241.

9
withdrawal or resumption of all the powers of sovereignty into the people of this country and
the distribution of these powers.

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain 14 noted that “while
introducing the Draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar said that our
Constitution avoided the tight mould of federalism in which the American Constitution was
caught and could be “both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time
and circumstances”. We have what may perhaps be described by the phrase, “cooperative
federalism”, a concept different from the one in vogue when the federations of United States
or of Australia were set up. Further, in State of Rajasthan 15, Supreme Court notes the
observation of Granville Austin16 wherein she is of the view that “the Constitution of India
was perhaps the first constituent body to embrace from the start what A.H Birch17 and others
have called “cooperative federalism”. In the same judgment, Chief Justice Beg called the
Constitution ‘amphibian’, in the sense that it can move either on the federal or on the unitary
plane, according to the needs of the situation and circumstances of a case.”

CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM:

The solution to the problem of the Centre-State tensions lies in cooperative federalism and
that calls for a continual consultation between the Centre and the States. The excessive
autonomy for the States would lead to a steady weakening of the Centre. According to Nani
Palkhiwala,18 there is no doubt about the injustice done by the Centre to the States but we
should not forget that the injuries done to the States are, in a sense, self-inflicted. The Centre
is nothing but the States in their federal garb. The Parliament and the Central Government
consist of none but the elected representative of the States. The real authors of the injustice's
are the self-centred representatives of the States who, after being elected to Parliament, have
betrayed the true interests of the very States which returned them. Over Constitution aims at
co-operative federalism, which undoubtedly appears to be a panacea for the grievances of the
States.

E. Corwin19 defines Co-operative federalism as a model where national government and the
states are mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism all of whose

14
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp. S.C.C. 1.
15
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 S.C.C. 592.
16
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, New York, Oxford University
Press, (1966).
17
A.H BIRCH, FEDERALISM, FINANCE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1955).
18
NANI PALKHIWALA , WE, THE PEOPLE INDIA: THE LARGEST DEMOCRACY. (12th ed. 1997).
19
EDWARD S. CORWIN, WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS TODAY, (Princeton University Press, 1978).

10
powers are intended to realize the current purposes of government according to their
applicability to the current problems. Peter W. Hogg20 explains, “the related demands of
interdependence of governmental policies, equalization of regional disparities, and
constitutional adaptation have combined to produce what is generally described as
“cooperative federalism”.

It is understood that in Co-Operative Federalism, National and State Governments tackle

issues together in a cooperative fashion as opposed to a system in which policy is imposed on
local administrators by an all-powerful federal regime. As a consequence, both national and
state governments are simultaneously inter-dependent. Paras Diwan21 in this regard has
observed that “It is essentially a cooperative federation, where two sets of governments are
not antagonistically independent of each other but coordinate, cooperate and collaborate in
each other's efforts “to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political, liberty
of thought expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity; and to
promote fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the
Nation.”

RECENT TRENDS TOWARDS CO-OPERATIVE FEDERALISM

Recent trends have indicated an enhanced co-operation between the Centre and the States and
slow but steady shift towards co-operative federalism.

In response to an insistent demand to review the Centre-State relations, the Central

Government in 1983 appointed a Commission called the Sarkaria Commission under the
Chairmanship of Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court. The
commission was mandated to examine and review the working of the existing arrangements
between the Union and States in regard to powers, functions and responsibilities in all
spheres and recommend such changes or other measures as may be appropriate keeping in
view “the social and economic development that have taken place over the years and have
due regard to the scheme and framework of the Constitution which the founding fathers have
designed to protect the independence and ensure the unity and integrity of the country which
is of paramount importance for promoting the welfare of the people”. 22 The Commission
presented its' report in the year 1987-1988.

20
PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, (5th Students Edition, Toronto: Carswell, 2012).
21
PARAS DIWAN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (Sterling Publishers Pvt. Limited, 1979).
22
INTER-STATE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, SARKARIA COMMISSION REPORT, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, 1988.

11
In its report while the Commission suggested some adjustment in the Centre-State
relationship in several ways, although it did not make any suggestion for any fundamental
change in the structure of the constitutional provisions relating to federalism. 23 Sarkaria
Commission emphasized on need of co-operation between Centre and State. Sarkaria
Commission also recommended more empowerment of Zonal Council and other inter-state
bodies. It also gave suggestions like center should consult state before legislation on
concurrent list.

Government constituted another Commission called Punchhi commission on Centre-State

Relations under the chairmanship of Justice Madan Mohan Punchhi, former Chief Justice of
India, on 27th April 2007, to look into the new issues of Centre-State relations keeping in
view the changes that have been taken place in the polity and economy of India since the
Sarkaria Commission had last looked at the issue of Centre-State relations over two decades
ago. The Commission examined and reviewed the working of the existing arrangements
between the Union and States, various pronouncements of the Courts in regard to powers,
functions and responsibilities in all spheres including legislative relations, administrative
relations, role of governors, emergency provisions, financial relations, economic and social
planning, Panchayati Raj institutions, sharing of resources including inter-state river water
etc. The Commission made a number of recommendations in its seven-volume report
presented to Government on 30 March 2010.24

CONCLUSION

If we compare the Constitutional position of the Centre with the States, it becomes quite
obvious that there is a conscious Constitutional tilt in favour of the Centre. However, the
State’ Legislative powers, though not so broadly worded as those of the Centre, are,
nevertheless, significant. The State has to maintain law and order. Agriculture and irrigation
on which the prosperity of the depend country so much fall within the purview of the States.
The State regulates industry and mines, health, waterways, roads, trade and commerce etc.

From the point of view of maintaining the integrity of India, it has, therefore, become
necessary to have a second look at some of the basic issues relating to the constitutional
system of India including its federal system in the new context. The excessively centralised
system of governance and decision-making can no longer continue. Even though there is a

23
Shanti Swaroop, How much Federal is our Constitution, Vol 1, Commercial Tax ISSN 2394-9295.
24
INTER-STATE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, PUNCHHI COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA, 2010.

12
distribution of powers between the Union and States as under a federal system, the
distribution has a strong Central bias and the powers of the States are hedged in with various
restrictions which impede their sovereignty even within the sphere limited to them by the
distribution of powers basically provided by the Constitution.

Far from being a case of “cooperative federalism” or even “competitive federalism”— India
seems to be a case of “conflict federalism”, where states and the center have different and
competing visions of what federalism itself means. If one were to find a common thread
between the union-state tussles over various issues including recent controversies in Delhi,
and Uttarakhand, and the GST Council's structure, it is that the union government believes in
a “controlled federalism”, a system where the states are little more than mere appendages to
the union's overarching goals.25 It may be important to note that during the Rajya Sabha
debate on GST bill, members representing State of Tamil Nadu described the GST Bill as
violative of basic structure of the Constitution. It will be interesting to see whether GST,
which allows the Centre to determine and direct the tax policies of a State through a binding
‘recommendation’ of the Council will pass the ‘basic structure’ test. Success of GST may
pave way for further co-operation between Center and States in other areas. Having said that,
GST will have to first endure the test of time, before it is termed as a successful experiment
in Indian Federalism.

Recently, a directive issued by a state commissioner asked its officers to take action against
the tax defaulters without even bothering about the jurisdiction. Andhra Pradesh’s chief
commissioner of state tax on 23 Aug 2018 issued a a circular empowering its officers to take
stringent action if they detect tax evasion even in companies that fall under central tax
administration. This surely means that companies may have to face scrutiny from two
separate tax authorities. These turfs that arise between the Union and the State can totally be
curbed, if the real meaning of co-operative federalism is followed in India sidestepping the
existence of ordinate and sub-ordinate forms of government.

25
Goods and Services Tax, An Exercise in “Controlled Federalism”, Vol. 51, Economic and political weekly,
Issue No. 34, 20 Oct, 2018.

13