CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Background

It had been more than fifty years since the Communist Party of the Philippines

(CPP) was founded, yet it remained to be the primary armed threat to the government.

The CPP-NPA leaders claimed that they have increased its mass base, controlled

territory, and guerrilla fronts by a significant number. With these developments, many are

still amazed why insurgency in the Philippines has survived this long despite the collapse

of the communist ideologies in Eastern Europe.

The purpose of this study is to assess the current insurgency situation in the Bicol

Region. I will assess by phase how the insurgency has evolved over the years starting

with post war insurgency in 1946 up to 1987 when the insurgency reached its peak in

strength. Then I will look at how insurgent influence tapered off from 1988 to 1994 when

it reached rock bottom. Finally, I will study the events from 1995 to 2005 when it slowly,

but steadily began to rise. Certain events outside the Philippines unfolded during this term

that may have had a substantial effect on the cycle and these will also be part of the

assessment. This study will seek to determine what factors have shaped the insurgency

situation and caused it to rise again. The purpose is to review the current strategy,

recommend changes if necessary, or determine what new strategy may be implemented

to fast track solutions and finally push for a secure and stable Philippine economy,

government, and society.

In the course of this study I hope to answer the thesis question: How can this

insurgency in the Philippines be defeated? The following secondary questions will also

help lead to this study’s conclusions:

1. What is the current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the government?

2. Is the doctrine being followed in the current counterinsurgency strategy?

3. Is there an end in the Philippine insurgency conflict in the near future?

4. What will it take to win?

The following tertiary questions may help in the analysis of the situation:

1. What is the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA’s)

endstate in the fight for control of the masses?

2. What has the enemy learned in the fight for popular support of the masses? Is winning

the hearts and minds of the people still a valid strategy in the insurgency warfare?

3. What did past campaigns do wrong that allowed the insurgency to drag on?

4. Is there a cultural characteristic in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) leadership

and organizational ethics that has affected the way it handles insurgency?

5. Has the CPP/NPA changed the Maoist doctrine previously being followed by the

communist movement? Is there a new doctrine the insurgents are using following the

emergence of the Reformist Faction?

6. Is the political battle being waged by the National Democratic Front (NDF) through

leftist sectoral groups in the House of Representatives gaining ground? 3

The following assumptions shall help facilitate the conduct of this study: 1) that

government programs to alleviate poverty shall remain a priority over defense; 2) that the

Armed Forces of the Philippines will not effect a major reduction in current strength and

resource allocation; 3) the Filipino society in general will remain pro-democracy.