G. R. No.

76371 - January 20, 2000

MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA substituted by his
Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO
TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL
MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO, Petitioners, v. ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT
of APPEALS, Respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

More than half a century ago,1 private respondent applied for the registration of two parcels of land
located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908
square meters. The first lot (hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters
whereas the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her application,
private respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single, she bought Lot 1
during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were
allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it
in their name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept
of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the application for registration
were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and
posted in the proper places.

The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons2 opposed the application of private
respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order of general default issued by the lower
court on June 16, 1950.3 In the course of the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands)
aver that their lands were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name.
In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was bought by private
respondent is not the same land covered in her application for registration. To avoid confusion,
oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct boundary limits of the
lands they respectively claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the
Director of Lands' opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the subject lands
were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than the herein petitioners were
likewise denied for various reasons including failure to present their evidence.

After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the application for
registration as follows:

In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan Valera, a resident of
Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of
210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of the
Philippine National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an area of
22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Juan Valera.

After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be entered and the corresponding
title issue in accordance with law.4

Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned, arguing, among
others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for new trial and their demand for ocular
inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded
the case to the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection.
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This case shall be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection of the land applied with
a view to determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter have been included in
Lot 1 of the applicant's plan to warrant their exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names
of the oppositors who have presented evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter judgment shall be
accordingly rendered.5

In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the trial court to conduct
the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:

That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561 was relocated and the extent
and bounds of the portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by them personally or by their
supposed representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying sketch plan
marked as Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding names, area and dimensions.

That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29, 1967.

OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and Eugenio Medrano as
shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the original survey plan Psu-119561;

2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta
Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and
Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A"
although three of these claims bear different identifying names in the sketch Annex "A";

3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-119561, the
remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex "A" is 69,683 square
meters;

4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of Appeals and is stoutly
maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the property of the
applicant on the South side is existing and still is the boundary on the South and on the Southeast
side, as shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A";

That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicant's property sought to be registered on
the South sides, at present as was the case during the original survey.6

The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioner's report, whereupon a second ocular inspection
was ordered by the trial court. After the second inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again
rendered judgment reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of
PSU 119561 with an area of 210,7677 square meters in the name of private respondent. The judge
made the following observations based on the ocular inspection:

The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found out a visible
boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is represented in the
relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to
point 18. This, in the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred to by
the applicant Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into ricefields
by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of Francisco Santua as
boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former proceedings that the
"Calle para Collago" was on the South but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the "Calle
para Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the
existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the South than to the East.

With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D which the Court
inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of the applicant.8
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-
119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of
Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same municipality. The
encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P1,000.00 having already been
settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.

Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue.

The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two hours from notice hereof the
sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation survey.9

The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 40796-R) by the oppositors, some of
whom are now the petitioners in this case. 10 They argue that the lower court erred in not excluding
the areas they claimed as their own which were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered
registered in private respondent's name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the registration of Lot 1 of appellees
(private respondent herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed
to the Commissioner's report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the landholding of the oppositors,
as indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

The decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of judgment was issued by
the Court of Appeals. 12 Later, private respondent filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of
writ of possession over two lots respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were
likewise respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land registration case) and
Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). 13 In an Order issued on September 14, 1981, the court a
quo denied the motion. 14 When her subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another
Order dated November 25, 1981, 15 private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the following
disposition:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are hereby REVERSED and
judgment is hereby entered ordering:

1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant covering the landholding

claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato;

2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R
as singular and referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen
as the only landholding excluded from lot 1; and

3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the applicant-appellant covering the
landholdings opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated
August 28, 1967.

Without any special pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED. 16

Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 17 Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in the trial court. The
petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case
was reinstated and respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition. 18

After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering the ambiguous
discussions in the petition, 19 the assailed ruling of the respondent court cannot be sustained. The
burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant 20 who must show that he is
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. 21 On him also rests the burden to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain 22 considering that the inclusion in a of the public domain nullifies the title. 23 Undoubtedly, a
land registration proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the
court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, 24 except those who have
appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case. 25 In the case at bar, those exempted from
the order of general default are the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in footnote number
2.

There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners Segundina and Otilio
Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1 and cannot be registered in private
respondent's name. In other words, the Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable
right over their claims of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that she be
installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these two, only
Baltar entered his opposition to private respondent's application for land registration. Being a
proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the application of private respondent since
the notice was published in accordance with law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a writ of possession of
that portion of Lot 1 occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No evidence was shown that private respondent
had a rightful claim whether possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan
was excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial court's decision
of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that she has registrable rights over the
land which must be grounded on inconvertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The
declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-
interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh inconvertible" and "conclusive"
evidence required in land registration. 26 Allegations of her predecessors' ownership of the lot during
the Spanish period is self-serving 27 and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on
the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. 28 It should be noted that tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land registration
cases. 29 Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence
specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own
possession in relation to that of her predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require
further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over real
property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. 30

Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies on some documents
enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also the
identity of the land therein referred to, 31 inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case
pertains to the correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind what
defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein
laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. 32 Considering that the writ of possession was
sought by private respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of
ownership," the latter's possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership. 33 This unrebutted
resumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially considering the evidentiary
rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent,
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 34

Private respondent's contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on April 30, 1979 in CA
GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not "landholdings", thus referring only to that
area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing
discussion clearly indicates that the land to be registered in private respondent's name is limited to a
certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioner's report. It categorically excluded
those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private respondent failed to show that she has a
proprietary right over the excluded areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the
writ of possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the
same has no basis.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.