Case No. 23 – People v.

Arrojado
(Topic: Canon 4 – Duty to support the improvement of legal system;
Canon 5 – Duty to keep abreast of legal developments)

Facts
Jesus Arrojado, was charged with Murder. He filed a Motion to dismiss the Information against him on the
ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the Information did not indicate the number and date
of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by
Bar Matter No. 1922. The Office of the City Prosecutor opposed the MTD, contending that the lack of
proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and signed the Information should not
prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons who have violated the law. She
contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include criminal Informations
filed in court; (2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number and
date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to
dismiss the subject Information which is otherwise complete in form and substance. However, the MTD
was granted. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
W/N the Motion to dismiss the Information was proper for failure of the Investigating Prosecutor to
indicate her MCLE Certificate of Compliance? YES

Ruling:

B.M. No. 1922 provides that practicing members of the bar are REQUIRED to INDICATE in all pleadings
filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the
expunction of the pleadings from the records. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines
pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the
court for appropriate judgment. Under Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined
as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with
the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading since the
allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil
action which alleges a plaintiff's cause or cause of action.

Petitioner cannot invoke the principle on liberal construction of procedural rules by arguing that such
liberal construction "may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown
any reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when the
motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required
number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still not
included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested
leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot
be granted. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the parties'
respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the prosecution could have simply re-filed the
Information containing the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly insist
on its position and question the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time
and effort and the State's resources.

(TN: The SC issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by
repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required
information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action.")

Case No. 39 – Bonifacio v. Era

Topic: Canon 9 – Duty to shun unauthorized practice of law

Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests. On July 16,
2013, he was found guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for two years.

On January 26, 2006, a Writ of Execution was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision, a case
where the client of Atty. Era, Abucejo Group, won against Bonifacio. From November to December 2013,
Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas committed the following acts: (1) appeared on behalf of their winning clients in
the public auction of the condemned properties; (2) tendered bid in the auction for their clients; (3)
secured the certificate of sale and presented the said document to the corporation's officers and
employees present in the premises at that time; (4) insisted that their clients are now the new owners of
the subject properties, hence, should be allowed entry in the premises; (5) initiated the pull out of the
properties; and (6) negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law office as regards the payment of the
judgment award with interest instead of pulling out the properties.

This prompted Bonifacio to file the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Era and Atty. Bragas.
Atty. Era argued that he did not violate the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law as he
merely acted as his clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated May 3,
2006. With such SPA, he was not engaged in the practice of law in representing his clients in the
implementation of the alias writ. He never signed any document or pleading on behalf of his clients during
his suspension. For Atty. Bragas, she argued that being an associate of Era and Associates Law Firm, she
was merely representing the Abucejo Group as said law firm's clients.

Issues:
Did Atty. Era engage in the practice of law during his suspension therefrom that would warrant another
disciplinary action against him? YES
Is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of law that would
likewise warrant this Court's exercise of its disciplining authority against her? YES

Ruling:

1. Atty. Era's acts constituted "practice of law." Black defines "practice of law" as "The rendition of
services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
 actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients.

In this case, it is true that being present in an auction sale and negotiating matters relating to the
same may not be exclusively for lawyers. However, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the determination
by a trained legal mind of the legal effects and consequences of each course of action in the
satisfaction of the judgment award. Precisely, this is why his clients chose him to represent them in
the public auction and in any negotiation/settlement with the corporation arising from the labor case
as stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty. Era. Such trained legal mind is what his clients were relying
upon in seeking redress for their claims. This is evident from the fact that they agreed not to enter
into any amicable settlement without the prior written consent of Atty. Era, the latter being their
lawyer. It could readily be seen that the said SPA was executed by reason of Atty. Era being their legal
counsel. Thus, the said SPA cannot be invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was not engaged
in the practice of law in performing the acts above-cited as such SPA cunningly undermines the
suspension ordered by this Court against Atty. Era.

Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law during his suspension. His acts constitute
willful disobedience of the lawful order of this Court, which under Section 27, 44 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Further, Atty. Era's intentional
maneuver to circumvent the suspension order not only reflects his insubordination to authority but
also his disrespect to this Court's lawful order which warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above
anyone else, are called upon to obey court orders and processes. Graver responsibility is imposed
upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their
processes.

2. Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in his unauthorized practice of law and, thus, must likewise
be reproved. There is no question that Atty. Bragas has knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the
practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice. Clearly,
Atty. Bragas violated the CPR, specifically: CANON 9 — A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist
in the unauthorized practice of law.

Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice
of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be
limited only to individuals found duly qualified in education and character.

As correctly observed by the Board, Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts constitutive of
law practice could be performed only by a member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was
not at that time. Hence, she should have not participated to such transgression. Being an associate
in Atty. Era's law firm cannot be used to circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances
of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or
the law firm's clients during the latter's suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.
Case No. 49 – Bueno v. Rañeses
Topic: Canon 13 – Duty to refrain from acts giving appearance of influencing the court

Facts:
Bueno hired Atty. Rañeses to represent her in Civil Case. In consideration for his services, Bueno paid Atty.
Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him P300.00 for every hearing he attended.
No receipt was issued for the retainer fee paid. Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf.
He also attended hearings. On several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late. Bueno
alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10k, which would allegedly be divided
between him and Judge hearing their case, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno
not to tell anyone about the matter. Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5k because the amount she had
previously given was inadequate. Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses
to comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but
Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from
her. In fact, when a court sheriff arrived to execute the decision against them, she was shocked. She
immediately went to Atty. Rañeses office to ask him about what the case. But the latter told her that he
had not received any decision.

Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the hearings
scheduled.

Issue:
WON the act of Atty. Rañeses is warranted for disbarment? YES

Ruling:

Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) instructs lawyers to refrain from any impropriety
tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of influencing, the court.

In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. He committed a fraudulent exaction, and
at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. By its very nature, the act of soliciting money
for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in secrecy with only Atty. Rañeses and Bueno privy to
it. Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in
hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Atty. Rañeses, for his part, has not even seen
it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in any hearings scheduled in this
investigation.

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate
administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he
did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client,
to the court and to the Integrated Bar. First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both
false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the
case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond
these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on
the merits, but through deceitful means — a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the
least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary
proceedings.