TORTS AND DAMAGES

SECOND READING ASSIGNMENT

TORTS AND DAMAGES..................................................................1
SECOND READING ASSIGNMENT..................................................1
Chapter 2, Law and Jurisprudence on Torts and Damages (Dean JSL’s book, 2014 Edition); 1
A. ACT OR OMISSION....................................................................1
(1) Francisco v Chemical Bulk Carriers, GR No. 193577, 7 September 2011 1
(2) Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA, et al., GR No. L-51806, 8 November 1988 4
(3) Gaid v People. GR No. 171636, 7 April 2009..........................8
(4) R Transport vs. Yu, GR No. 174161, 18 February 2015........10
(5) Ylarde et al. vs. Aquino, et al., GR No. L-33722, 29 July 198812
(6) Phil Hawk Corp v Vivian Tan Lee, GR No. 166869, 16 February 2010 15
(7) Pacis v Morales, GR No. 169467, 25 February 2010............18
(8) Villareal vs People, GR No. 151258, 1 February 2012..........20
(9) Regala v Carin, GR No. 188715, 6 April 2011.......................31
B. Causal Relation Between the Act or Omission and the Damage; Doctrine of Proximate Cause 33
(1) Tison et al. v Sps. Pomasin, GR No. 173180, 24 August 201133
2 Ocean Builders v Sps. Cubacub, GR No. 150898, 13 April 201136
3 Dyteban v Jose Ching, GR No. 161803, 4 February 2008.......38
4 Taylor v Manila Electric, GR No. 4977, 22 March 1910...........44
5 Bataclan v Medina, 102 Phil 181.............................................50
6 Mercury Drug v Baking, GR No. 156037, 15 May 2007..........52
7 Fernando v Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714.........................54
8 Sanitary Steam Laundry v CA, 300 SCRA 2...........................58
9 Vallacar Transit v Catubig, GR No. 175512, 30 May 2011......63

The Facts

Chapter 2, Law and Jurisprudence on Torts and Damages Since 1965, Francisco was the owner and manager
(Dean JSL’s book, 2014 Edition); of a Caltex station in Teresa, Rizal. Sometime in March
1993, four persons, including Gregorio Bacsa (Bacsa), came
A. ACT OR OMISSION to Francisco's Caltex station and introduced themselves as
employees of CBCI. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a
CASES: certain quantity of CBCI's diesel fuel.
(1) Francisco v Chemical Bulk Carriers, GR No. 193577, 7 After checking Bacsa's identification card,
September 2011 Francisco agreed to purchase CBCI's diesel fuel. Francisco
SECOND DIVISION imposed the following conditions for the purchase: (1) that
[G.R. No. 193577. September 7, 2011.] Petron Corporation (Petron) should deliver the diesel fuel to
ANTONIO FRANCISCO, substituted by Francisco at his business address which should be properly
his heirs: NELIA E.S. FRANCISCO, indicated in Petron's invoice; (2) that the delivery tank is
EMILIA F. BERTIZ, REBECCA E.S. sealed; and (3) that Bacsa should issue a separate receipt
FRANCISCO, ANTONIO E.S. FRANCISCO, to Francisco.
JR., SOCORRO F. FONTANILLA, and
JOVITO E.S. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. The deliveries started on 5 April 1993 and lasted
CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS, for ten months, or up to 25 January 1994. 5 There were 17
INCORPORATED, respondent. deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions were complied
DECISION with.
CARPIO, J p: In February 1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to
Francisco regarding the diesel fuel delivered to him but
The Case which had been paid for by CBCI. 6 CBCI demanded that
Francisco pay CBCI P1,053,527 for the diesel fuel or CBCI
would file a complaint against him in court. Francisco
This is a petition for review 1 of the 31 May 2010 rejected CBCI's demand.
Decision 2 and 31 August 2010 Resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 63591. In its 31 May 2010 On 16 April 1996, CBCI filed a complaint for sum of
Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 21 August 1998 money and damages against Francisco and other unnamed
Decision 4 of the Regional Trial of Pasig City, Branch 71 defendants. 7 According to CBCI, Petron, on various dates,
(trial court), and ordered petitioner Antonio Francisco sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these were delivered to and
(Francisco) to pay respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers, received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel fuel to
Incorporated (CBCI) P1,119,905 as actual damages. In its 31 third persons from whom he received payment. CBCI
August 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied alleged that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel
Francisco's motion for reconsideration. DHSCEc without authority from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of
the diesel fuel it had paid for. CBCI demanded payment

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from Francisco but he refused to pay. CBCI argued that
Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell
and Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum
products in the Philippines, the diesel fuel came from
illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal, acts. CBCI asserted
that Francisco violated Articles 19, 8 20, 9 21, 10 and
22 11 of the Civil Code and that he should be held liable. In
the alternative, CBCI claimed that Francisco, in receiving
CBCI's diesel fuel, entered into an innominate contract
of do ut des (I give and you give) with CBCI for which
Francisco is obligated to pay CBCI P1,119,905, the value of
the diesel fuel. CBCI also prayed for exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation.
On 20 May 1996, Francisco filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. 12 CBCI filed its
Opposition. 13 In an Order dated 15 November 1996, the
trial court denied Francisco's motion. 14
Thereafter, Francisco filed his
Answer. 15 Francisco explained that he operates the Caltex
station with the help of his family because, in February
1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to sickness.
Francisco claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into
and verify the identity of Bacsa, who introduced himself as
a radio operator and confidential secretary of a certain Mr.
Inawat (Inawat), CBCI's manager for operations. Francisco
said he was satisfied with the proof presented by Bacsa.
When asked to explain why CBCI was selling its fuel, Bacsa
allegedly replied that CBCI was in immediate need of cash
for the salary of its daily paid workers and for petty cash.
Francisco maintained that Bacsa assured him that the
diesel fuel was not stolen property and that CBCI enjoyed a
big credit line with Petron. Francisco agreed to purchase the
diesel fuel offered by Bacsa on the following conditions:
1) Defendant [Francisco] will not
accept any delivery if it is not company
(Petron) delivered, with his name and
address as shipping point properly printed
and indicated in the invoice of Petron, and
that the product on the delivery tank is
sealed; [and]
2) Although the original invoice is
sufficient evidence of delivery and payment,
under ordinary course of business,
defendant still required Mr. Bacsa to issue a
separate receipt duly signed by him
acknowledging receipt of the amount stated
in the invoice, for and in behalf of CBCI. 16
During the first delivery on 5 April 1993, Francisco
asked one of his sons to verify whether the delivery truck's
tank was properly sealed and whether Petron issued the
invoice. Francisco said all his conditions were complied
with. There were 17 deliveries made from 5 April 1993 to 25
January 1994 and each delivery was for 10,000 liters of
diesel fuel at P65,865. 17 Francisco maintained that he
acquired the diesel fuel in good faith and for value.
Francisco also filed a counterclaim for exemplary damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees. aCITEH
In its 21 August 1998 Decision, the trial court ruled
in Francisco's favor and dismissed CBCI's complaint. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's 21 August 1998
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint dated
March 13, 1996 with
costs.
2. Ordering plaintiff (CBCI), on the
counterclaim, to pay
defendant the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral
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damages and P50,000.00
as and by way of
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 18
CBCI appealed to the Court of Appeals. 19 CBCI
argued that Francisco acquired the diesel fuel from Petron
without legal ground because Bacsa was not authorized to
deliver and sell CBCI's diesel fuel. CBCI added that
Francisco acted in bad faith because he should have
inquired further whether Bacsa's sale of CBCI's diesel fuel
was legitimate.
In its 31 May 2010 Decision, the Court of Appeals
set aside the trial court's 21 August 1998 Decision and
ruled in CBCI's favor. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals' 31 May 2010 Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Antonio Francisco is ordered to
pay Chemical Bulk Carriers, Incorporated
the amount of P1,119,905.00 as actual
damages.
SO ORDERED. 20
On 15 January 2001, Francisco died. 21 Francisco's
heirs, namely: Nelia E.S. Francisco, Emilia F. Bertiz, Rebecca
E.S. Francisco, Antonio E.S. Francisco, Jr., Socorro F.
Fontanilla, and Jovito E.S. Francisco (heirs of Francisco) filed
a motion for substitution. 22 The heirs of Francisco also
filed a motion for reconsideration. 23 In its 31 August 2010
Resolution, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for
substitution but denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that Francisco was not liable
for damages in favor of CBCI because the 17 deliveries
were covered by original and genuine invoices. The trial
court declared that Bacsa, as confidential secretary of
Inawat, was CBCI's authorized representative who received
Francisco's full payment for the diesel fuel. The trial court
stated that if Bacsa was not authorized, CBCI should have
sued Bacsa and not Francisco. The trial court also
considered Francisco a buyer in good faith who paid in full
for the merchandise without notice that some other person
had a right to or interest in such diesel fuel. The trial court
pointed out that good faith affords protection to a purchaser
for value. Finally, since CBCI was bound by the acts of
Bacsa, the trial court ruled that CBCI is liable to pay
damages to Francisco.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court's 21
August 1998 Decision and ruled that Bacsa's act of selling
the diesel fuel to Francisco was his personal act and, even if
Bacsa connived with Inawat, the sale does not bind CBCI.
The Court of Appeals declared that since Francisco
had been in the business of selling petroleum products for a
considerable number of years, his blindness was not a
hindrance for him to transact business with other people.
With his condition and experience, Francisco should have
verified whether CBCI was indeed selling diesel fuel and if it
had given Bacsa authority to do so. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals stated that Francisco cannot feign good faith since
he had doubts as to the authority of Bacsa yet he did not
seek confirmation from CBCI and contented himself with an
improvised receipt. Francisco's failure to verify Bacsa's
authority showed that he had an ulterior motive. The
receipts issued by Bacsa also showed his lack of authority
because it was on a plain sheet of bond paper with no
letterhead or any indication that it came from CBCI. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Francisco cannot invoke
estoppel because he was at fault for choosing to ignore the
tell-tale signs of petroleum diversion and for not exercising
prudence. CTIDcA
The Court of Appeals also ruled that CBCI was
unlawfully deprived of the diesel fuel which, as indicated in
the invoices, CBCI had already paid for. Therefore, CBCI had
the right to recover the diesel fuel or its value from
Francisco. Since the diesel fuel can no longer be returned,
the Court of Appeals ordered Francisco to give back the
actual amount paid by CBCI for the diesel fuel.
The Issues
 
The heirs of Francisco raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THAT DEFENDANT
ANTONIO FRANCISCO EXERCISED
THE REQUIRED DILIGENCE OF A
BLIND PERSON IN THE CONDUCT
OF HIS BUSINESS; and
II. WHETHER ON THE BASIS OF THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
AND ADMITTED FACTS, IT CAN BE
CONCLUDED THAT THE PLAINTIFF
APPROVED EXPRESSLY OR TACITLY
THE TRANSACTIONS. 24
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Required Diligence of a Blind Person
The heirs of Francisco argue that the Court of
Appeals erred when it ruled that Francisco was liable to
CBCI because he failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family when he bought the diesel fuel. They
argue that since Francisco was blind, the standard of
conduct that was required of him was that of a reasonable
person under like disability. Moreover, they insist that
Francisco exercised due care in purchasing the diesel fuel
by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his son to check
the identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery
from Petron; (3) Francisco required that he be named as the
consignee in the invoice; and (4) Francisco required
separate receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual payment.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected
conduct that is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and
place. 25 The most common standard of conduct is that of
a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent
person. 26 To determine the diligence which must be
required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract
average standard corresponding to a normal orderly
person. 27
However, one who is physically disabled is
required to use the same degree of care that a reasonably
careful person who has the same physical disability would
use. 28 Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as
blindness or deafness, are treated as part of the
circumstances under which a reasonable person must act.
Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes
that of a reasonable person who is blind.
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We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had
been managing and operating the Caltex station for 15
years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact
business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule
that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person who is blind. First,
Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa
to determine if he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did
not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his
misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be
stolen property, 29 yet he did not verify with CBCI the
authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third, Francisco
relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were
typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. 30 If
Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have
asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the
delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron's invoice, does
not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel
to Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the
standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is
blind.
Express or Tacit Approval of the Transaction
The heirs of Francisco argue that CBCI approved
expressly or tacitly the transactions. According to them,
there was apparent authority for Bacsa to enter into the
transactions. They argue that even if the agent has
exceeded his authority, the principal is solidarily liable with
the agent if the former allowed the later to act as though he
had full powers. 31 They insist CBCI was not unlawfully
deprived of its property because Inawat gave Bacsa the
authority to sell the diesel fuel and that CBCI is bound by
such action. Lastly, they argue that CBCI should be
considered in estoppel for failure to act during the ten
month period that deliveries were being made to
Francisco. ACDIcS
The general principle is that a seller without title
cannot transfer a better title than he has. 32 Only the
owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell
can transfer title to the buyer. 33 Therefore, a person can
sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and the buyer
can, as a consequence, acquire no more than what the
seller can legally transfer. 34
Moreover, the owner of the goods who has been
unlawfully deprived of it may recover it even from a
purchaser in good faith. 35 Thus, the purchaser of property
which has been stolen from the owner has been held to
acquire no title to it even though he purchased for value
and in good faith.
The exception from the general principle is the
doctrine of estoppel where the owner of the goods is
precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell. 36 But
in order that there may be estoppel, the owner must, by
word or conduct, have caused or allowed it to appear that
title or authority to sell is with the seller and the buyer must
have been misled to his damage. 37
In this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the
owner of the diesel fuel. Francisco was aware of this but he
claimed that Bacsa was authorized by CBCI to sell the diesel
fuel. However, Francisco's claim that Bacsa was authorized
is not supported by any evidence except his self-serving
testimony. First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if
it was indeed selling its diesel fuel since it is not one of the
oil companies known in the market to be selling petroleum
products. This fact alone should have put Francisco on
guard. Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by some direct
and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of
ownership or apparent authority to sell CBCI's diesel fuel.
Francisco did not state if the identification card presented
by Bacsa indicated that he was CBCI's agent or a mere
employee. Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa was
 typewritten on a half sheet of plain bond paper. There was
no letterhead or any indication that it came from CBCI. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that this was a personal
receipt issued by Bacsa and not an official receipt issued by
CBCI. Consequently, CBCI is not precluded by its conduct
from denying Bacsa's authority to sell. CBCI did not hold out
Bacsa or allow Bacsa to appear as the owner or one with
apparent authority to dispose of the diesel fuel.
Clearly, Bacsa cannot transfer title to Francisco as
Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel fuel nor was he
authorized by CBCI to sell its diesel fuel. CBCI did not
commit any act to clothe Bacsa with apparent authority to
sell the diesel fuel that would have misled Francisco.
Francisco, therefore, did not acquire any title over the
diesel fuel. Since CBCI was unlawfully deprived of its
property, it may recover from Francisco, even if Francisco
pleads good faith.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM the 31 May 2010 Decision and 31 August 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.

Brion, Peralta, * Perez and Mendoza, ** JJ., concur.

|||  (Francisco v. Chemical Bulk Carriers, Inc., G.R. No.

193577, [September 7, 2011], 672 PHIL 795-806)

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(2) Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. CA, et al., GR
No. L-51806, 8 November 1988
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 51806. November 8, 1988.]
CIVIL AERONAUTICS
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ERNEST E.
SIMKE, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Ledesma, Guytingco, Velasco & Associates for
respondent Ernest E. Simke.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY; CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION. — If the
power to sue and be sued has been granted without
qualification, it can include a claim based on tort or quasi-
delict.
2. ID.; ID.; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT DETERMINED BY
THE OBJECTS FOR ITS CREATION. — Not all government
entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune
from suits. Immunity from suits is determined by the
character of the objects for which the entity was organized.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT
BY THE TRIAL COURT, BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT.
— The trial court's findings during its ocular inspection of
the MIA terrace that the elevation where plaintiff slipped
was a dangerous sliding step and the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury are factual findings binding upon the
Supreme Court.
4. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; QUASI-
DELICT; BASIS OF LIABILITY. — Article 2176 of the Civil Code
which provides the basis for liability for quasi-delict. CAA
knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation. Its failure
to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the
existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a
finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAA.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGLIGENCE; TEST TO DETERMINE
EXISTENCE THEREOF. — As formulated in the case of Picart
v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918) the test by which to determine
the existence of negligence may be stated as follows: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; LACK OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE. — No contributory negligence can be imputed
to the private respondent, considering the following test
formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
(1918). The private respondent could not have reasonably
foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the
attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step
in question could not easily be noticed because of its
construction.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES IMPLIED
FROM THE GRANT OF POWER TO SUE AND BE SUED. — The
liability of CAA to answer for damages, whether actual,
moral or exemplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of
the conferment of the power to sue and be sued upon it.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGE. — Article 2199 of the Civil Code, with respect to
actual or compensatory damages, mandates that the same
be proven. Private respondent claims P15,589.55
representing medical and hospitalization bills P20,000.00
spent as transportation expenses of two layers who
represented private respondent abroad and the publication
of the postponement notices of the wedding, were found by
the court to have been duly proven.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES. — The court
holds private respondent entitled to the award of
P30,000.00 as moral damages because of the physical
suffering and physical injuries caused by the negligence of
the CAA (Arts. 2217 and 2R 19 (2), New Civil Code.)
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; AWARD
DUE TO DEFENDANT'S GROSS NEGLIGENCE. — Gross
negligence is equivalent to the term "notorious negligence"
and consists in the failure to exercise even slight care
(Caunan v. Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542
(1932)) can be attributed to the CAA for its failure to
remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned
elevation. The award of P40,000.00 by the trial court as
exemplary damages appropriately underscores the point
that as an entity charged with providing service to the
public, the CAA, like all other entities serving the public, has
the obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe
service.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES. — The award of
attorney's fees is also upheld considering that under Art.
2208 (1) of the Civil Code, the same may be awarded
whenever exemplary damages are awarded, as in this case,
and, at any rate, under Art. 2208 (11), the Court has the
discretion to grant the same when it is just and equitable.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is
the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court
decision which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the amount of P15,589.55 as full
reimbursement of his actual medical and
hospital expenses, with interest at the legal
rate from the commencement of the suit;
the amount of P20,200.00 as consequential
damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral damages; the amount of P40,000.00
as exemplary damages; the further amount
of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
costs [Rollo, p. 24].
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen
and at the time of the incident was the Honorary Consul
General of Israel in the Philippines.
In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private
respondent with several other persons went to the Manila
International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order
to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his
group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the
airport.
While walking on the terrace, then filled with other
people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about
four (4) inches high at the far end of the terrace. As a
result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his
thigh bone.
The next day, December 14, 1963, private
respondent was operated on for about three hours.
Private respondent then filed an action for
damages based on quasi-delict with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VII against petitioner Civil
Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered
"to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and
develop the Manila International Airport . . ." [Sec. 32
(24), R.A. 776].
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 Said claim for damages included, aside from the
medical and hospital bills, consequential damages for the
expenses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in private
respondent's stead to finalize certain business transactions
and for the publication of notices announcing the
postponement of private respondent's daughter's wedding
which had to be cancelled because of his accident [Record
on Appeal, p. 5].
Judgment was rendered in private respondent's
favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of
Appeals. The latter affirmed the trial court's decision.
Petitioner then filed with the same court a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court raising the
following assignment of errors:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely
erred in not holding that the present suit
against the CAA is really a suit against the
Republic of the Philippines which cannot be
sued without its consent, which was not
given in this case.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely
erred in finding that the injuries of
respondent Ernest E. Simke were due to
petitioner's negligence — although there
was no substantial evidence to support such
finding; and that the inference that the
hump or elevation in the surface of the floor
area of the terrace of the (old) MIA building
is dangerous just because said respondent
tripped over it is manifestly mistaken —
circumstances that justify a review by this
Honorable Court of the said finding of fact of
respondent appellate court (Garcia v. Court
of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622; Ramos v. CA, 63
SCRA 331.)
3. The Court of Appeals gravely
erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual,
consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees to
respondent Simke — although there was no
substantial and competent proof to support
said awards [Rollo, pp. 93-94].
I roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
Invoking the rule that the State cannot be sued
without its consent, petitioner contends that being an
agency of the government, it cannot be made a party-
defendant in this case.
This Court has already held otherwise in the case
of National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. [91 Phil. 203
(1952)].
Petitioner contends that the said ruling does not
apply in this case because: First, in the Teodoro case, the
CAA was sued only in a substituted capacity, the National
Airports Corporation being the original party. Second, in
the Teodoro case, the cause of action was contractual in
nature while here, the cause of action is based on a quasi-
delict. Third, there is no specific provision in Republic Act
No. 776, the law governing the CAA, which would justify the
conclusion that petitioner was organized for business and
not for governmental purposes. [Rollo, pp. 94-97].
Such arguments are untenable.
First, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the
point that the CAA was only substituted for the National
Airports Corporation, in fact treated the CAA as the real
party in interest when it stated that:
xxx xxx xxx
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. . . To all legal intents and practical
purposes the National Airports Corporation
is dead and the Civil Aeronautics
Administration is its heir or legal
representative, acting by the law of its
creation upon its own lights and in its own
name. The better practice then should have
been to make the Civil Aeronautics
Administration the third party defendant
instead of the National Airports Corporation.
[National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra,
p. 208.]
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the Teodoro case did not make any
qualification or limitation as to whether or not the CAA's
power to sue and be sued applies only to contractual
obligations. The Court in the Teodoro case ruled that
Sections 3 and 4 of Executive Order 365 confer upon the
CAA, without any qualification, the power to sue and be
sued, albeit only by implication. Accordingly, this Court's
pronouncement that where such power to sue and be sued
has been granted without any qualification, it can include a
claim based on tort or quasi-delict [Rayo v. Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, G.R. Nos. 55273-83, December 19,
1981, 110 SCRA 456] finds relevance and applicability to
the present case.
Third, it has already been settled in
the Teodoro case that the CAA as an agency is not immune
from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a
private entity.
xxx xxx xxx
The Civil Aeronautics
Administration comes under the category of
a private entity. Although not a body
corporate it was created, like the National
Airports Corporation, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to
run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the
convenience of the travelling public. It is
engaged in an enterprise which, far from
being the exclusive prerogative of state,
may, more than the construction of public
[National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, supra,
p. 207.]
xxx xxx xxx
True, the law prevailing in 1952 when
the Teodoro case was promulgated was Exec. Order 365
(Reorganizing the Civil Aeronautics Administration and
Abolishing the National Airports Corporation). Republic Act
No. 776 (Civil Aeronautics Act of the Philippines),
subsequently enacted on June 20, 1952, did not alter the
character of the CAA's objectives under Exec. Order 365.
The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case,
particularly Secs. 3 and 4 of Exec. Order 365, which led the
Court to consider the CAA in the category of a private entity
were retained substantially in Republic Act 776, Sec. 32
(24) and (25). Said Act provides:
Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the
Administrator. — Subject to the general
control and supervision of the Department
Head, the Administrator shall have among
others, the following powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(24) To administer, operate,
manage, control, maintain and develop the
Manila International Airport and all
 government-owned aerodromes except
those controlled or operated by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including such
powers and duties as: (a) to plan, design,
construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or
alter aerodromes or such structures,
improvement or air navigation facilities; (b)
to enter into, make and execute contracts of
any kind with any person, firm, or public or
private corporation or entity;. . . .
(25) To determine, fix, impose,
collect and receive landing fees, parking
space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries,
direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use
of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants,
spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools,
other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of
any of the property under its management
and control.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, It can be seen that the CAA is
tasked with private or non-governmental functions which
operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State
immunity from suit. For the correct rule as set forth in
the Teodoro case states:
xxx xxx xxx
Not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects
for which the entity was organized. The rule
is thus stated in Corpus Juris:
Suits against State
agencies with relation to matters in
which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental
capacity, and various suits against
certain corporations created by the
state for public purposes, but to
engage in matters partaking more
of the nature of ordinary business
rather than functions of a
governmental or political
character, are not regarded as
suits against the state. The latter is
true, although the state may own
stock or property of such a
corporation for by engaging in
business operations through a
corporation, the state divests itself
so fan of its sovereign character,
and by implication consents to
suits against the corporation. (59
C.J., 313) [National Airports
Corporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp.
206-207; Emphasis supplied.]
This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent
case of Malong v. Philippine National Railways [G.R. No. L-
49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held
that the Philippine National Railways, although owned and
operated by the government, was not immune from suit as
it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and
business functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to
undertake the management of airport operations which
primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the
immunity from suit accorded to government agencies
performing strictly governmental functions.
II
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Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground
that there was no basis for a finding of negligence. There
can be no negligence on its part, it alleged, because the
elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on
the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and
injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain
water on the floor area of the terrace" [Rollo, p. 99].
To determine whether or not the construction of
the elevation was done in a negligent manner, the trial
court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . This Court after its ocular
inspection found the elevation shown in
Exhs. A or 6-A where plaintiff slipped to be a
step, a dangerous sliding step, and the
proximate cause of plaintiffs injury . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This Court during its ocular
inspection also observed the dangerous and
defective condition of the open terrace
which has remained unrepaired through the
years. It has observed the lack of
maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace,
typical of many government buildings and
offices. Aside from the litter allowed to
accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause
by missing tiles remained unrepaired and
unattented. The several elevations shown in
the exhibits presented were verified by this
Court during the ocular inspection it
undertook. Among these elevations is the
one (Exh. A) where plaintiff slipped. This
Court also observed the other hazard, the
slanting or sliding step (Exh. B) as one
passes the entrance door leading to the
terrace [Record on Appeal, U.S., pp. 56 and
59; Italics supplied.]
The Court of Appeals further noted that:
The inclination itself is an
architectural anomaly for as stated by the
said witness, it is neither a ramp because a
ramp is an inclined surface in such a way
that it will prevent people or pedestrians
from sliding. But if, it is a step then it will
not serve its purpose, for pedestrian
purposes. (tsn, p. 35, id.) [Rollo. p. 29.]
These factual findings are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Hence, the CAA cannot disclaim its liability
for the negligent construction of the elevation since
under Republic Act No. 776, it was charged with the duty of
planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding,
improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such
structures, improvements or air navigation facilities
[Section 32, supra, R.A. 776]. In the discharge of this
obligation, the CAA is duty-bound to exercise due diligence
in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the
viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
It must be borne in mind that pursuant to Article
1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault or negligence of the
obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the
place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the
viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that
CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these
people come to the viewing deck to watch the planes and
passengers, their tendency would be to look to where the
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look
down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck. The
CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous
obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to
prevent any undue harm to the public.
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-
delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
provides that "(w)hoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. . . ." As the CAA knew of the
existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims
though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans
and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the
open terrace [See Record on Appeal, pp. 13 and 57; Rollo,
p. 39], its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to
eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence
as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict
upon CAA.
The Court finds the contention that private
respondent was, at the very least, guilty of contributory
negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may
recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under
Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act
or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not
the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own
damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury
being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case,
no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private
respondent, considering the following test formulated in the
early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent man would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of the negligence in a given case
is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by
that.
The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in
a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculations
cannot be here of much value but this much
can be profitably said: Reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn
of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist . . . [Picart v.
Smith, supra, p. 813; emphasis supplied.]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case
before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen
the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant
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factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had
been looking where he was going, the step in question
could not easily be noticed because of its construction. As
the trial court found:
In connection with the incident
testified to, a sketch, Exhibit O, shows a
section of the floorings on which plaintiff
had tripped. This sketch reveals two
pavements adjoining each other, one being
elevated by four and one-fourth inches than
the other. From the architectural standpoint
the higher pavement is a step. However,
unlike a step commonly seen around, the
edge of the elevated pavement slanted
outward as one walks to the interior of the
terrace. The length of the inclination
between the edges of the two pavements is
three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had
stepped on the inclination because had his
foot landed on the lower pavement he
would not have lost his balance. The same
sketch shows that both pavements including
the inclined portion are tiled in red cement,
and as shown by the photograph Exhibit A,
the lines of the tilings are continuous. It
would therefore be difficult for a pedestrian
to see the inclination especially where there
are plenty of persons in the terrace as was
the situation when plaintiff fell down. There
was no warning sign to direct one's
attention to the change in the elevation of
the floorings. [Rollo, pp. 28-29.]
III
Finally, petitioner appeals to this Court the award
of damages to private respondent. The liability of CAA to
answer for damages, whether actual, moral or exemplary,
cannot be seriously doubted in view of the conferment of
the power to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the
case of Rayo v. Court of First Instance, supra, includes
liability on a claim for quasi-delict. In the aforestated case,
the liability of the National Power Corporation to answer for
damages resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and
simultaneous opening of the Angat Dam, which caused the
death of several residents of the area and the destruction of
properties, was upheld since the grant of the power to sue
and be sued upon it necessarily implies that it can be held
answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that
matter.
With respect to actual or compensatory damages,
the law mandates that the same be proven.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by
law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved. Such compensation is referred
to as actual or compensatory damages
[New Civil Code].
Private respondent claims P15,589.55 representing
medical and hospitalization bills. This Court finds the same
to have been duly proven through the testimony of Dr.
Ambrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private
respondent (Rollo, p. 26 ) and who identified Exh. "H" which
was his bill for professional services [Rollo, p. 31].
Concerning the P20,200.00 alleged to have been
spent for other expenses such as the transportation of the
two lawyers who had to represent private respondent
abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of
the wedding, the Court holds that the same had also been
duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown the
existence of such losses and the amount thereof in the
testimonies before the trial court [CA decision, p. 8]. At any
rate, the findings of the Court of Appeals with respect to
this are findings of facts [One Heart Sporting Club, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 53790-53972, Oct. 23, 1981 ,
108 SCRA 416] which, as had been held time and again,
are, as a general rule, conclusive before this Court [Sese v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66186, July 31,
1987, 152 SCRA 585].
With respect to the P30,000.00 awarded as moral
damages, the Court holds private respondent entitled
thereto because of the physical suffering and physical
injuries caused by the negligence of the CAA [Arts. 2217
and 2219 (2), New Civil Code].
With respect to the award of exemplary damages,
the Civil Code explicitly states:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
Gross negligence which, according to the Court, is
equivalent to the term "notorious negligence" and consists
in the failure to exercise even slight care [Caunan v.
Compania General de Tabacos, 56 Phil. 542 (1932)] can be
attributed to the CAA for its failure to remedy the
dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to even
post a warning sign directing the attention of the viewers to
the change in the elevation of the floorings notwithstanding
its knowledge of the hazard posed by such elevation [Rollo,
pp. 28-29; Record on Appeal, p. 57]. The wanton disregard
by the CAA of the safety of the people using the viewing
deck, who are charged an admission fee, including the
petitioner who paid the entrance fees to get inside the
vantage place [CA decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 25] and are,
therefore, entitled to expect a facility that is properly and
safely maintained — justifies the award of exemplary
damages against the CAA as a deterrent and by way of
example or correction for the public good. The award of
P40,000.00 by the trial court as exemplary damages
appropriately underscores the point that as an entity
charged with providing service to the public, the CAA, like
all other entities serving the public, has the obligation to
provide the public with reasonably safe service.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees is also upheld
considering that under Art. 2208 (1 ) of the Civil Code, the
same may be awarded whenever exemplary damages are
awarded, as in this case, and, at any rate, under Art. 2208
(11), the Court has the discretion to grant the same when it
is just and equitable.
However, since the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) has taken over the management and
operations of the Manila International Airport [renamed
Ninoy Aquino International Airport under Republic Act No.
6639] pursuant to Executive Order No. 778 as amended by
executive Orders Nos. 903 (1983), 909 (1983) and 298
(1987) and under Section 24 of the said Exec. Order 778,
the MIAA has assumed all the debts, liabilities and
obligations of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), the liabilities of the CAA have now
been transferred to the MIAA.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the
Petition for review on Certiorari is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez Jr., Feliciano and Bidin
JJ ., concur.
||| (Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
51806, [November 8, 1988], 249 PHIL 27-41)
(3) Gaid v People. GR No. 171636, 7 April 2009
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171636. April 7, 2009.]
NORMAN A. GAID, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari 1 assailing the 12 July 2005 Decision 2 of the
Court of Appeals and its subsequent Resolution 3 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. ScAIaT
Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an
information which reads as follow:
That on or about 12:00 high noon
of October 25, 2001, infront of the
Laguindingan National High School,
Poblacion, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused
mentioned above while driving a
passenger's jeepney color white bearing
plate no. KVG-771 owned by barangay
captain Levy Etom has no precautionary
measure to preempt the accident, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously ran [sic] over Michael Dayata
resulting of [sic] his untimely death as
pronounced by the attending physician of
Northern Mindanao Medical Center Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001,
petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-
lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is
located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental.
His jeepney was filled to seating capacity. 5 At the time
several students were coming out of the school
premises. 6 Meanwhile, a fourteen-year-old student,
Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman
Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of
the road. From where he was at the left side of the road,
Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner's
jeepney 7 which was traveling on the right lane of the
road. 8 However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor,
Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the
jeepney to ride at that point. 9
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was
pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid
flat on the ground behind the jeepney. 10 Another
prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also
situated on the left side of the street but directly in front of
the school gate, heard "a strong impact coming from the
jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order
to hurdle an obstacle." 11 Dayata was then seen lying on
the ground 12 and caught in between the rear
tires. 13 Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney
had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side. 14
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over,
prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim.
Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of
the victim. 15 Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle
and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to
the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos
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then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of
its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead
on arrival. 16
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating
cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death. 17 She
testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been
caused by having run over by the jeepney. 18
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Laguindingan 19 found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner
negligent in his driving considering that the victim was
dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of
impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle
after noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing
the vehicle to tilt towards the right." 20 On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) 21 affirmed in toto the decision
of the MCTC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment with modification in that it found petitioner guilty
only of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from
the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on
the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of
the accident. However, the appellate court still found him to
be negligent when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to
check what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire." 22
In its 6 February 2006 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 23
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred
in finding that "there is (sic) absolutely lack of precaution
on the part of the petitioner when he continued even after
he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep tilted to
its right side." 24 Petitioner stressed that he, in fact,
stopped his jeep when its left rear tire bounced and upon
hearing that somebody had been ran over. ADTCaI
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in
convicting him of the offense of simple negligence resulting
in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to promptly
stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man
placed in the same situation could have foreseen the
vehicular accident or could have stopped his vehicle in time
when its left rear tire bounced due to the following reasons:
(1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioner's
attention was focused on the road and the students outside
the school's gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with
passengers and cargoes and it was impossible for the
petitioner to promptly stop his vehicle. 25
The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)
maintained that petitioner was negligent when he
continued to run towards the direction of Moog,
Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from the
point of impact, despite hearing that a child had been run
over. 26
The presence or absence of negligence on the part
of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading
to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two
phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata
flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side
of the road and ended when he was run over by the
jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the
moment immediately after the victim was run over and the
point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to
be negligent.
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing
or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
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damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act. 27
In Manzanares v. People, 28 this Court convicted
petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and serious physical injuries when he was
found driving the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed
into a jeepney. 29 Likewise, in Pangonorom v. People, 30 a
public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed to slow
down and hit a swerving car. He was found negligent by this
Court.
In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at
the time of the accident, as testified to by two
eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this fact
on cross-examination, thus:
ATTY. MACUA:
(to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, when the passenger jeepney
passed by the gate of the
Laguindingan National High School,
is it running slowly, am I correct?
A Yes, he was running slowly. 31
The slow pace of the jeepney was seconded by
Mellalos:
Q You testified that you heard somebody
outside from the vehicle shouting
that a boy was ran over, am I
correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, before you heard that shouting, did
you observe any motion from the
vehicle?
A The jeep was moving slowly and I noticed
that there was something that [sic]
the jeep a little bit bounced up as if
a hump that's the time I heard a
shout from outside. 32
Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15
kilometers per hour. 33
It appears from the evidence Dayata came from
the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the
jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him
down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the
left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the
road ahead. In Dayata's haste to board the jeep which was
then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear
tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after
he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.
With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held
liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as
found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the
accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own
negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to
get a ride.
In the instant case, petitioner had exercised
extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having
seen the victim who came from behind on the left
side. TCIEcH
However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner
guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing
to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of
his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to the
second stage of the incident.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. 34
The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that
there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. 35
The standard test in determining whether a person
is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a
prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist. 36
In Philippine National Construction Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 37 the petitioner was the franchisee that
operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for
motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the
highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay
scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the
juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner
should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway
would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee
hours of the morning. 38 Consequently, it was held liable
for damages.
In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas, 39 a
motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was
possible to avoid striking a child who was then six years old
only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood where
children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions.
The court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver
did not exercise due care. The evidence showed that the
driver was proceeding in lawful manner within the speed
limit when the child ran into the street and was struck by
the driver's vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency
situation thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.
In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact
that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the
bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate
court equates with negligence. Petitioner contends that he
did not immediately stop because he did not see anybody
go near his vehicle at the time of the incident. 40
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been
negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is
defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. 41 In order to establish a motorist's liability
for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown
that there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor
in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause
of an injury. 42
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point
of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as
indicated in the post-mortem findings. 43 His skull was
crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner
immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have
Page 11 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were
fatal.
The evidence on record do not show that the
jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over by
the jeepney. Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that
the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is the other way
around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw
Dayata left behind the jeepney. 44 Actub saw Dayata in a
prone position and bleeding within seconds after
impact. 45 Right after the impact, Mellalos immediately
jumped out of the jeepney and saw the victim lying on the
ground. 46 The distance of 5.70 meters is the length of
space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground
and the spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the
trial judge during the ocular inspection at the scene of the
accident. 47
Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that
the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can
never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. 48 The
Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the accused had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 49 Conviction must
rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of
the accused. The overriding consideration is not whether
the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether
it entertains doubt as to his guilt. 50 aIcSED
Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to
establish that the proximate cause of the victim's death
was petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all, even during
the second stage of the incident.
If at all again, petitioner's failure to render
assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of
one's victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the
information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable under
the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due
process.
Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on
reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be
deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which
states that when the plaintiff's own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2005 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Resulting in
Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals and of the
charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1937 of the MCTC of Laguindingan,
Misamis Oriental.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio-Morales and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., pls. see dissent.
||| (Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, [April 7, 2009], 602 PHIL
858-876)
(4) R Transport vs. Yu, GR No. 174161, 18 February 2015
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174161. February 18, 2015.]
R TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUISITO G.
YU, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated
September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84175.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 8:45 in the morning of December 12, 1993,
Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front
of Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA), was hit and run over by a bus driven
by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed by petitioner R
Transport Corporation. Loreta was immediately rushed to
Medical City Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival. 3
On February 3, 1994, the husband of the deceased,
respondent Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City against petitioner R
Transport, Antonio Gimena, and Metro Manila Transport
Corporation (MMTC) for the death of his wife. MMTC denied its
liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the
bus involved in the incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R
Transport. 4 It explained that under the Bus Installment
Purchase Program of the government, MMTC merely purchased
the subject bus, among several others, for resale to petitioner R
Transport, which will in turn operate the same within Metro
Manila. Since it was not actually operating the bus which killed
respondent's wife, nor was it the employer of the driver thereof,
MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should be
dismissed. 5 For its part, petitioner R Transport alleged that
respondent had no cause of action against it for it had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
and drivers and that its buses are in good condition. Meanwhile,
the driver Antonio Gimena was declared in default for his failure
to file an answer to the complaint. DcAaSI
After trial on the merits, wherein the parties presented
their respective witnesses and documentary evidence, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that
petitioner R Transport failed to prove that it exercised the
diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its driver, who, by its negligence, ran over
the deceased resulting in her death. It also held that MMTC
should be held solidarily liable with petitioner R Transport
because it would unduly prejudice a third person who is a victim
of a tort to look beyond the certificate of registration and prove
who the actual owner is in order to enforce a right of action.
Thus, the trial court ordered the payment of damages in its
Decision 6 dated June 3, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants Rizal Transport and
Metro Manila Transport Corporation to be
primarily and solidarily liable and defendant
Antonio Parraba Gimena subsidiarily liable
to plaintiff Luisito Yu as follows:
1. Actual damages in the amount
of Php78,357.00 subject
to interest at the legal
rate from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid;
2. Loss of income in the amount of
Php500,000.00;
3. Moral damages in the amount of
P150,000.00;
4. Exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00;
5. Attorney's fees in the amount of
P10,000.00; and
6. Costs of suit. 7
Page 12 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
On September 9, 2005, the CA affirmed the Decision of
the RTC with modification that defendant Antonio Gimena is
made solidarily liable for the damages caused to respondent.
According to the appellate court, considering that the
negligence of Antonio Gimena was sufficiently proven by the
records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever nature
was presented by petitioner to support its defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
petitioner, as the employer of Gimena, may be held liable for
the damage caused. The CA noted that the fact that petitioner is
not the registered owner of the bus which caused the death of
the victim does not exculpate it from liability. 8 Thereafter,
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was further denied by
the CA in its Resolution 9 dated August 8, 2006.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner essentially invokes the following ground to
support its petition:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES
CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS
EMPLOYEE, WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner insists that the CA and the RTC were
incorrect in ruling that its driver was negligent for aside from the
mere speculations and uncorroborated testimonies of the police
officers on duty at the time of the accident, no other evidence
had been adduced to prove that its driver was driving in a
reckless and imprudent manner. It asserts that contrary to the
findings of the courts below, the bus from which the victim
alighted is actually the proximate cause of the victim's death for
having unloaded its passengers on the lane where the subject
bus was traversing. Moreover, petitioner reiterates its argument
that since it is not the registered owner of the bus which
bumped the victim, it cannot be held liable for the damage
caused by the same. SAcaDE
We disagree.
Time and again, it has been ruled that whether a
person is negligent or not is a question of fact which this Court
cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as its
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law. 10 This Court is
not bound to weigh all over again the evidence adduced by the
parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial and the
appellate courts on the matter of petitioners' negligence
coincide. As a general rule, therefore, the resolution of factual
issues is a function of the trial court, whose findings on these
matters are binding on this Court, more so where these have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 11 save for the following
exceptional and meritorious circumstances: (1) when the factual
findings of the appellate court and the trial court are
contradictory; (2) when the findings of the trial court are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3)
when the lower court's inference from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) when there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when
the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (6) when there is a
misappreciation of facts; (7) when the findings of fact are
themselves conflicting; and (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are
contradicted by evidence on record. 12
After a review of the records of the case, we find no
cogent reason to reverse the rulings of the courts below for
none of the aforementioned exceptions are present herein. Both
the trial and appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in
hitting and running over the victim and ruled that his negligence
was the proximate cause of her death. Negligence has been
defined as "the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." 13 Verily, foreseeability is the
fundamental test of negligence. 14 It is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. 15
In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was
clearly running at a reckless speed. As testified by the police
officer on duty at the time of the incident 16 and indicated in
the Autopsy Report, 17 not only were the deceased's clothes
ripped off from her body, her brain even spewed out from her
skull and spilled over the road. Indeed, this Court is not
prepared to believe petitioner's contention that its bus was
travelling at a "normal speed" in preparation for a full stop in
view of the fatal injuries sustained by the deceased. Moreover,
the location wherein the deceased was hit and run over further
indicates Gimena's negligence. As borne by the records, the bus
driven by Gimena bumped the deceased in a loading and
unloading area of a commercial center. The fact that he was
approaching such a busy part of EDSA should have already
cautioned the driver of the bus. In fact, upon seeing that a bus
has stopped beside his lane should have signalled him to step
on his brakes to slow down for the possibility that said bus was
unloading its passengers in the area. Unfortunately, he did not
take the necessary precaution and instead, drove on and
bumped the deceased despite being aware that he was
traversing a commercial center where pedestrians were crossing
the street. Ultimately, Gimena should have observed due
diligence of a reasonably prudent man by slackening his speed
and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
Under Article 2180 18 of the New Civil Code, employers
are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence on the
part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly
arises that the employer was remiss in the selection and/or
supervision of the negligent employee. To avoid liability for the
quasi-delict committed by its employee, it is incumbent upon
the employer to rebut this presumption by presenting adequate
and convincing proof that it exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. 19 TaSEHC
Unfortunately, however, the records of this case are
bereft of any proof showing the exercise by petitioner of the
required diligence. As aptly observed by the CA, no evidence of
whatever nature was ever presented depicting petitioner's due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver, Gimena,
despite several opportunities to do so. In fact, in its petition,
apart from denying the negligence of its employee and imputing
the same to the bus from which the victim alighted, petitioner
merely reiterates its argument that since it is not the registered
owner of the bus which bumped the victim, it cannot be held
liable for the damage caused by the same. Nowhere was it even
remotely alleged that petitioner had exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.
Because of this failure, petitioner cannot now avoid liability for
the quasi-delict committed by its negligent employee.
At this point, it must be noted that petitioner, in its
relentless attempt to evade liability, cites our rulings in Vargas
v. Langcay 20 and Tamayo v. Aquino 21 insisting that it should
not be held solidarily liable with MMTC for it is not the registered
owner of the bus which killed the deceased. However, this
Court, in Jereos v. Court of Appeals, et al., 22 rejected such
contention in the following wise:
Finally, the petitioner, citing
the case of Vargas vs.
Langcay,  contends that it is the
registered owner of the vehicle, rather
than the actual owner, who must be
jointly and severally liable with the
Page 13 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
driver of the passenger vehicle for
damages incurred by third persons as a
consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of said
vehicle.
The contention is devoid of
merit. While the Court therein ruled
that the registered owner or operator
of a passenger vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver of the
said vehicle for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of the said
vehicle, the Court did so to correct the
erroneous findings of the Court of
Appeals that the liability of the
registered owner or operator of a
passenger vehicle is merely subsidiary,
as contemplated in Art. 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. In no case did the
Court exempt the actual owner of the
passenger vehicle from liability. On the
contrary, it adhered to the rule followed in
the cases of Erezo vs. Jepte, Tamayo vs.
Aquino, and De Peralta vs.
Mangusang, among others, that the
registered owner or operator has the right
to be indemnified by the real or actual
owner of the amount that he may be
required to pay as damage for the injury
caused.
The right to be indemnified being
recognized, recovery by the registered
owner or operator may be made in any
form-either by a cross-claim, third-party
complaint, or an independent action. The
result is the same. 23
Moreover, while We held in Tamayo that the
responsibility of the registered owner and actual operator of a
truck which caused the death of its passenger is not solidary,
We noted therein that the same is due to the fact that the action
instituted was one for breach of contract, to wit:
The decision of the Court of
Appeals is also attacked insofar as it holds
that inasmuch as the third-party defendant
had used the truck on a route not covered
by the registered owner's franchise, both
the registered owner and the actual owner
and operator should be considered as joint
tortfeasors and should be made liable in
accordance with Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.This Article is as follows: TcDAHS
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict is solidary.
But the action instituted in the
case at bar is one for breach of
contract, for failure of the defendant to
carry safely the deceased for her
destination. The liability for which he is
made responsible, i.e.,  for the death of
the passenger, may not be considered
as arising from a quasi-delict. As the
registered owner Tamayo and his
transferee Rayos may not be held
guilty of tort or a quasi-delict; their
responsibility is not solidary as held by
the Court of Appeals.
The question that poses, therefore,
is how should the holder of the certificate of
 public convenience, Tamayo, participate
with his transferee, operator Rayos, in the
damages recoverable by the heirs of the
deceased passenger, if their liability is not
that of Joint tortfeasors in accordance with
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.The following
considerations must be borne in mind in
determining this question. As Tamayo is the
registered owner of the truck, his
responsibility to the public or to any
passenger riding in the vehicle or truck
must be direct, for the reasons given in our
decision in the case of Erezo vs. Jepte,
supra, as quoted above. But as the
transferee, who operated the vehicle when
the passenger died, is the one directly
responsible for the accident and death he
should in turn be made responsible to the
registered owner for what the latter may
have been adjudged to pay. In operating the
truck without transfer thereof having been
approved by the Public Service Commission,
the transferee acted merely as agent of the
registered owner and should be responsible
to him (the registered owner), for any
damages that he may cause the latter by
his negligence. 24
However, it must be noted that the case at hand does
not involve a breach of contract of carnage, as in Tamayo, but a
tort or quasi-delict under Article 2176, 25 in relation to Article
2180 26 of the New Civil Code. As such, the liability for which
petitioner is being made responsible actually arises not from a
pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner and the
deceased, but from a damage caused by the negligence of its
employee. Petitioner cannot, therefore, rely on our ruling
in Tamayo and escape its solidary liability for the liability of the
employer for the negligent conduct of its subordinate is direct
and primary, subject only to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. 27
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view
that it is for the better protection of the public for both the
owner of record and the actual operator to be adjudged jointly
and severally liable with the driver. 28 As aptly stated by the
appellate court, "the principle of holding the registered owner
liable for damages notwithstanding that ownership of the
offending vehicle has already been transferred to another is
designed to protect the public and not as a shield on the part of
unscrupulous transferees of the vehicle to take refuge in,
inorder to free itself from liability arising from its own negligent
act." 29
Hence, considering that the negligence of driver
Gimena was sufficiently proven by the records of the case, and
that no evidence of whatever nature was presented by
petitioner to support its defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the employer of
Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the death
of respondent Yu's wife.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated
September 9, 2005 and August 8, 2006, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84175 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. SDIaCT
Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo,   Villarama, Jr. and Reyes,
*
JJ., concur.
|||  (R Transport Corp. v. Yu, G.R. No. 174161, [February
18, 2015], 754 PHIL 110-123)
(5) Ylarde et al. vs. Aquino, et al., GR No. L-33722, 29
July 1988
FIRST DIVISION
Page 14 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
[G.R. No. L-33722. July 29, 1988.]
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA
DORONIO, petitioners, vs. EDGARDO AQUINO,
MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Buenaventura C. Evangelista for petitioners.
Modesto V. Cabanela for respondent Edgardo
Aquino.
Manuel P. Pastor for respondent Mauro Soriano.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; ART. 2180, CIVIL
CODE; ONLY TEACHERS OF ACADEMIC SCHOOLS SHOULD
BE ANSWERABLE FOR TORTS COMMITTED BY THEIR
STUDENTS; RULING IN AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — As regards the principal,
We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death
of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line
with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein
this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not
the head of an academic school who should be answerable
for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to
say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable. Hence, applying the said
doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent
Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason
that the school he heads is an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by
private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did
not give any instruction regarding the digging. From the
foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent
Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being
negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to
take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on
their persons.
2. ID.; ID.; ART. 2176, CIVIL CODE; THE ACTS AND
OMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT AMOUNTED TO FAULT AND
GROSS NEGLIGENCE WHICH HAVE DIRECT CAUSAL
RELATION TO THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. — However, as
earlier pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of
private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 which is
separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this:
Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which
have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that
private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross
negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of
adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged
ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton
concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after
they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was
lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by
any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3)
ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when
it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of
falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to
check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children
close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The negligent
act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in
such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the
death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but
natural for the children to play around. Tired from the
strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were
facing, three of them jumped into the hole while the other
one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and
the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural
 consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside
it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its
heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and
probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent
Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have
died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private
respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
concerned to real danger.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED OF
MINOR CHILDREN; CASE AT BAR. — In ruling that the child
Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did
not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the
case. The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of
care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot
charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DILIGENCE OF A VERY CAUTIOUS
PERSON AS A DEFENSE TO ART. 2176, CIVIL CODE; ABSENT
IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The contention that private
respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A
reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that
bringing children to an excavation site, and more so,
leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not
assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to
the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco
parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the
children are protected from all harm in his company.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT FOR DAMAGES ORDERED
BY THE COURT. — We close by categorically stating that a
truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all
contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it
not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would
not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be
alive today, a grown-man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to
take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard,
Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years. In
view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted and
the questioned judgment of the respondent court is
reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby
rendered ordering private respondent Edgardo Aquino to
pay petitioners the following: (1) Indemnity for the death of
Child Ylarde — P30,000.00; (2) Exemplary damages —
10,000.00; (3) Moral damages — 20,000.00.
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J p:
In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 36390-R entitled "Federico Ylarde, et al. vs. Edgardo
Aquino, et al.," a case which originated from the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, We are again called upon to
determine the responsibility of the principals and teachers
towards their students or pupils.
In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was
the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public
educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan.
Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein.
At that time, the school was littered with several concrete
blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones
were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher
by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them one by
Page 15 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
one as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten of
these blocks all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent
Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged
ten to eleven, after class dismissal on October 7, 1963.
Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig
beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left
unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private
respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen
pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils —
Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and
Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter
and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private
respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils
remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was
brought about by the digging.
When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, private respondent
Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said
private respondent left the children to level the loose soil
around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was
about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to
borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where
he could get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent
Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left,
three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde,
playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at
all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete
block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso
and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation
on time but unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block
caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall
in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained
the following injuries:
"1. Contusion with hematoma, left
inguinal region and suprapublic region.
2. Contusion with occhymosis,
entire acrotal region. prLL
3. Lacerated wound, left lateral
aspect of penile skin with phimosis.
4. Abrasion, gluteal region,
bilateral.
5. Intraperitoneal and
extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and
urine about 2 liters.
6. Fracture, simple, symphesis
pubis.
7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary
bladder with body of bladder almost entirely
separated from its neck.
REMARKS:
1. Above were incurred by crushing
injury.
2. Prognosis very poor.
 (Sgd.) MELQUIADES A. BRAVO
 Physician on Duty." 1
Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a
suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino
and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2)
that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due
to his own reckless imprudence. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the lower court.
Petitioners base their action against private
respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his
alleged negligence that caused their son's death while the
complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school
is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter."
On the other hand, the applicable provision of
Article 2180 states:
"Art. 2180. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody." 3
The issue to be resolved is whether or not under
the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held
liable for damages. llcd
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot
be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he
being the head of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora
vs. Court of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly
discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an
academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say that
in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the
school who can be held liable. In the same case, We
explained:
"After an exhaustive examination
of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well
as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This
is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held
liable as an exception to the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in
which case it is the head thereof who shall
be answerable. Following the canon
of reddendo singula sinquilis, 'teachers'
should apply to the words 'pupils and
students' and 'heads of establishments of
arts and trades' to the word 'apprentices.'"
Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We
rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be
held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
Page 16 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
academic school and not a school of arts and trades.
Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino,
private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction
regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that
private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the
children for being negligent in his supervision over them
and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent
any injury on their persons. However, as earlier pointed out,
petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent
Aquino on Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from
that provided for in Article 2180.
With this in mind, the question We need to answer
is this: Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which
have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.
From a review of the record of this case, it is very
clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and
gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of
services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his
pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the
one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside
the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that
the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed
or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the
perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the
excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone
was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he
would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5)
left the children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in
leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct
causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by
themselves, it was but natural for the children to play
around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to
amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by
their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the
risk they were facing, three of them jumped into the hole
while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone
was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it
was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall
into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate
child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred
was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of
private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde
would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation
created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the
lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. LexLib
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower
court that the injuries which resulted in the death of the
child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence. It
should be remembered that he was only ten years old at
the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to be
playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his
age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the
three of them who jumped into the hole while the remaining
boy jumped on the block. From this, it is clear that he only
did what any other ten-year old child would do in the same
situation.
In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is
evident that the lower court did not consider his age and
maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not
be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his
conduct should be judged according to the average conduct
of persons of his age and experience. 5 The standard of
conduct to which a child must conform for his own
protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by
children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge
and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge
the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done
by the pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A
single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the
huge concrete block 7 would reveal a dangerous site
requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not
ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why
the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent
Aquino himself admitted that there were no instructions
from the principal requiring what the pupils were told to do.
Nor was there any showing that it was included in the
lesson plan for their Work Education. Even the Court of
Appeals made mention of the fact that respondent Aquino
decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the
concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore,
the excavation should not be placed in the category of
school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these
undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that
could result in death or physical injuries.
The contention that private respondent Aquino
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is
certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person
would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation
site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves,
may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human
being would not assume that a simple warning "not to
touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious
danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a
teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have
made sure that the children are protected from all harm in
his company.
We close by categorically stating that a truly
careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast
to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for
his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not
have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive
today, a grown-man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take
the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's
parents suffered great anguish all these years.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is hereby GRANTED and the questioned judgment of the
respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another
judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondent
Edgardo Aquino to pay petitioners the following:

1 Indemnity for the death of Child P30,000.00

Ylarde
2 Exemplary damages 10,000.00
3 Moral damages 20,000.00
SO ORDERED.

Page 17 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)

 (6) Phil Hawk Corp v Vivian Tan Lee, GR No. 166869, 16
February 2010
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166869. February 16, 2010.]
PHILIPPINE HAWK
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN
TAN LEE, respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70860,
promulgated on August 17, 2004, affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 102, dated March 16, 2001, in Civil
Case No. Q-91-9191, ordering petitioner Philippine Hawk
Corporation and Margarito Avila to jointly and severally pay
respondent Vivian Tan Lee damages as a result of a
vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee
filed before the RTC of Quezon City a Complaint 2 against
petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant
Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising
from a vehicular accident that occurred on March 17, 1991
in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon. The accident
resulted in the death of respondent's husband, Silvino Tan,
and caused respondent physical injuries.
On June 18, 1992, respondent filed an Amended
Complaint, 3 in her own behalf and in behalf of her children,
in the civil case for damages against petitioner. Respondent
sought the payment of indemnity for the death of Silvino
Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment
expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of
the motorcycle's repair, attorney's fees, and other just and
equitable reliefs.
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger
jeep, and a bus with Body No. 119. The bus was owned by
petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila.
In its Answer, 4 petitioner denied liability for the
vehicular accident, alleging that the immediate and
proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness or
lack of caution of Silvino Tan. Petitioner asserted that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, including
Margarito Avila. CcaDHT
On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued a Pre-trial
Order 5 stating that the parties manifested that there was
no possibility of amicable settlement between them.
However, they agreed to stipulate on the following facts:
1. On March 17, 1991, in Bgy. Buensoceso,
Gumaca, Quezon, plaintiff Vivian
Lee Tan and her husband Silvino
Tan, while on board a motorcycle
with [P]late No. DA-5480 driven by
the latter, and a Metro Bus with
[P]late No. NXR-262 driven by
Margarito Avila, were involved in
an accident;
2. As a result of the accident, Silvino Tan
died on the spot while plaintiff
Vivian Lee Tan suffered physical
injuries which necessitated medical
attention and hospitalization;
3. The deceased Silvino Tan is survived by
his wife, plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan
and four children, three of whom
are now residents of the United
States; and
Page 18 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
4. Defendant Margarito Avila is an employee
of defendant Philippine Hawk. 6
The parties also agreed on the following issues:
1. Whether or not the proximate cause of
the accident causing physical
injuries upon the plaintiff Vivian
Lee Tan and resulting in the death
of the latter's husband was the
recklessness and negligence of
Margarito Avila or the deceased
Silvino Tan; and
2. Whether or not defendant Philippine
Hawk Transport Corporation
exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection
and supervision of its driver
Margarito Avila. 7
Respondent testified that on March 17, 1991, she
was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband,
who was on the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline
station in Barangay Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon on the
way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from the Pasumbal
Machine Shop, where they inquired about the repair of their
tanker. They were on a stop position at the side of the
highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she
saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and
then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their
motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought
to the hospital in Gumaca, Quezon, where she was confined
for a week. She was later transferred to St. Luke's Hospital
in Quezon City, Manila. She suffered a fracture on her left
chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt pain in her
bones, and had high blood pressure. 8
Respondent's husband died due to the vehicular
accident. The immediate cause of his death was massive
cerebral hemorrhage. 9
Respondent further testified that her husband was
leasing 10 and operating a Caltex gasoline station in
Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one million pesos a year in
revenue. They also had a copra business, which gave them
an income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year. 11
Ernest Ovial, the driver of the passenger jeep
involved in the accident, testified that in the afternoon of
March 17, 1991, his jeep was parked on the left side of the
highway near the Pasumbal Machine Shop. He did not
notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the
bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and then
the bus bumped his jeep and sped away. 12
For the defense, Margarito Avila, the driver of
petitioner's bus, testified that on March 17, 1999, at about
4:30 p.m., he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour
on the Maharlika Highway. When they were at Barangay
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, a motorcycle ran from his
left side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the
motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he turned
the bus to the right. He heard a loud banging sound. From
his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned
turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear for
his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He
denied that he bumped the motorcycle. 13
Avila further testified that he had previously been
involved in sideswiping incidents, but he forgot how many
times. 14
Rodolfo Ilagan, the bus conductor, testified that
the motorcycle bumped the left side of the bus that was
running at 40 kilometers per hour. 15
Domingo S. Sisperes, operations officer of
petitioner, testified that, like their other drivers, Avila was
subjected to and passed the following
requirements: TcHDIA
(1) Submission of NBI clearance;
(2) Certification from his previous employer
that he had no bad record;
(3) Physical examination to determine his
fitness to drive;
(4) Test of his driving ability, particularly his
defensive skill; and
(5) Review of his driving skill every six
months. 16
Efren Delantar, a Barangay Kagawad in
Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, testified that the bus was
running on the highway on a straight path when a
motorcycle, with a woman behind its driver, suddenly
emerged from the left side of the road from a machine
shop. The motorcycle crossed the highway in a zigzag
manner and bumped the side of the bus. 17
In its Decision dated March 16, 2001, the trial
court rendered judgment against petitioner and defendant
Margarito Avila, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, MARGARITO AVILA
is adjudged guilty of simple negligence, and
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff Vivian Lee Tan and h[er] husband's
heirs ordering the defendants Philippine
Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila to
pay them jointly and solidarily the sum of
P745,575.00 representing loss of earnings
and actual damages plus P50,000.00 as
moral damages. 18
The trial court found that before the collision, the
motorcycle was on the left side of the road, just as the
passenger jeep was. Prior to the accident, the motorcycle
was in a running position moving toward the right side of
the highway. The trial court agreed with the bus driver that
the motorcycle was moving ahead of the bus from the left
side of the road toward the right side of the road, but
disagreed that the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus
while the bus was running on the right side of the road. 19
The trial court held that if the bus were on the
right side of the highway, and Margarito Avila turned his
bus to the right in an attempt to avoid hitting the
motorcyle, then the bus would not have hit the passenger
jeep, which was then parked on the left side of the road.
The fact that the bus also hit the passenger jeep showed
that the bus must have been running from the right lane to
the left lane of the highway, which caused the collision with
the motorcycle and the passenger jeep parked on the left
side of the road. The trial court stated that since Avila saw
the motorcycle before the collision, he should have stepped
on the brakes and slowed down, but he just maintained his
speed and veered to the left. 20 The trial court found
Margarito Avila guilty of simple negligence.
The trial court held petitioner bus company liable
for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of Avila, having
failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct
behavior on the road. 21 DaAISH
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification in the award of
damages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
assailed decision dated March 16, 2001 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Philippine Hawk and Avila are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
Page 19 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
appellee the following amount: (a)
P168,019.55 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as temperate damages; (c)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d)
P590,000.00 as unearned income; and (e)
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 22
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the following
issues:
1) The Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in passing upon
an issue, which had not been
raised on appeal, and which had,
therefore, attained finality, in total
disregard of the doctrine laid down
by this Court in Abubakar v.
Abubakar, G.R. No. 134622,
October 22, 1999. 
2) The Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in its finding that
the petitioner's bus driver saw the
motorcycle of private respondent
executing a U-turn on the highway
"about fifteen (15) meters away"
and thereafter held that the
Doctrine of Last Clear was
applicable to the instant case. This
was a palpable error for the simple
reason that the aforesaid distance
was the distance of the witness to
the bus and not the distance of the
bus to the respondent's
motorcycle, as clearly borne out by
the records.
3) The Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in awarding
damages in total disregard of the
established doctrine laid down
in Danao v. Court of Appeals, 154
SCRA 447 and Viron Transportation
Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, G.R. No.
138296, November 22, 2000. 23
In short, the issues raised by petitioner are: (1)
whether or not negligence may be attributed to petitioner's
driver, and whether negligence on his part was the
proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of
Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent; (2)
whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for
damages; and (3) whether or not the damages awarded by
respondent Court of Appeals are proper.
Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of
the trial court, which were sustained by the Court of
Appeals, that petitioner's driver was negligent in driving the
bus, which caused physical injuries to respondent and the
death of respondent's husband.
The rule is settled that the findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence
on record. 24 The Court has carefully reviewed the records
of this case, and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court, thus: DACaTI
The Court agree[s] with the bus
driver Margarito that the motorcycle was
moving ahead of the bus towards the right
side from the left side of the road, but
disagrees with him that it crossed the path
of the bus while the bus was running on the
right side of the highway.
If the bus were on the right side of
the highway and Margarito turned his bus to
 the right in an attempt to avoid hitting it,
then the bus would not have hit the
passenger jeep vehicle which was then
parked on the left side of the road. The fact
that the bus hit the jeep too, shows that the
bus must have been running to the left lane
of the highway from right to the left, that
the collision between it and the parked jeep
and the moving rightways cycle became
inevitable. Besides, Margarito said he saw
the motorcycle before the collision ahead of
the bus; that being so, an extra-cautious
public utility driver should have stepped on
his brakes and slowed down. Here, the bus
never slowed down, it simply maintained its
highway speed and veered to the left. This
is negligence indeed. 25
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals was
mistaken in stating that the bus driver saw respondent's
motorcycle "about 15 meters away" before the collision,
because the said distance, as testified to by its witness
Efren Delantar Ong, was Ong's distance from the bus, and
not the distance of the bus from the motorcycle. Petitioner
asserts that this mistaken assumption of the Court of
Appeals made it conclude that the bus driver, Margarito
Avila, had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, which
was the basis for the conclusion that Avila was guilty of
simple negligence.
A review of the records showed that it was
petitioner's witness, Efren Delantar Ong, who was about 15
meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular
accident. 26 Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the
finding of the trial court that petitioner's bus driver,
Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed
by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the fundamental
test of negligence. 27 To be negligent, a defendant must
have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests
of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a
general but definite class of risks. 28
In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the
right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the
left side of the road before the collision. However, he did
not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove
on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger
jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the
bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to
hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or
supervision of its employees. 29 To avoid liability for
a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing
proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. 30 SacTCA
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent,
since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver,
Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in
him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed,
petitioner's tests were concentrated on the ability to drive
and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila
had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
As regards the issue on the damages awarded,
petitioner contends that it was the only one that appealed
the decision of the trial court with respect to the award of
actual and moral damages; hence, the Court of Appeals
erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of
Page 20 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
respondent, who did not appeal from the trial court's
decision.
Petitioner's contention is unmeritorious.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be
decided. — No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or
the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be
considered unless stated in the assignment
of errors, or closely related to or dependent
on an assigned error and properly argued in
the brief, save as the court pass upon plain
errors and clerical errors.
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat 31 cited the
book 32 of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to explain the
section above, thus:
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado commented on this section, thus:
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment
of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now
includes some substantial changes in the
rules on assignment of errors. The basic
procedural rule is that only errors claimed
and assigned by a party will be considered
by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this
exception has now been added errors
affecting the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained
of by a party is not expressly stated in his
assignment of errors but the same is closely
related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in his brief, such
error may now be considered by the court.
These changes are of jurisprudential
origin. CEDScA
2. The procedure in the
Supreme Court being generally the
same as that in the Court of Appeals,
unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2
and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that
the latter is clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even if
they are not assigned as errors on
appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just decision of the case. Also, an
unassigned error closely related to an error
properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-
34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the
determination of the question raised by
error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court
notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German
Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs.
Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28,
1983).
It may also be observed that under
Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is
authorized to consider a plain error,
although it was not specifically assigned by
the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of
Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it
would be sacrificing substance for
technicalities. 33
 In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the
trial court awarded respondent the sum of P745,575.00,
representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and
actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses), plus
P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, petitioner assigned as error the award of damages
by the trial court on the ground that it was based merely on
suppositions and surmises, not the admissions made by
respondent during the trial.
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the
award by the trial court for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and
actual damages, although the amount of the latter award
was modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil
Code.34 Compensation of this nature is awarded not for
loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. 35
As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity. 36 By way of exception, damages for loss
of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. 37   has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
In this case, the records show that respondent's
husband was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline
station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her
husband earned an annual income of one million pesos.
Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of
Creditable Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year
1990, 38 which showed that respondent's husband earned
a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to
use the Certificate and respondent's testimony as bases for
fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one
million pesos before respondent's husband died on March
17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence was
presented regarding the income derived from their copra
business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards
such income cannot be considered. HDTSIE
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only
net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that
is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the
creation of such earnings or income, less living and other
incidental expenses. 39 In the absence of documentary
evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for
the lease and operation of the gasoline station at 80
percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50
percent of the net income (gross income less necessary
expenses). ECcTaH
In this case, the computation for loss of earning
capacity is as follows:
Net Gross Annual Reasonable
= Life Expectancyx -
Earning Income and
[2/3 (80-age at
Capacity     (GAI)   Necessary
the
    time of death)       Expenses
            (80% of GAI)
             
X = [2/3 (80-65) x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 - P100,000.00
(Living
Expenses)
X = 30/3 x P100,000.00    
X = 10 x P100,000.00    
X = P1,000,000.00         Tan: (a) civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand
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The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages
for the expenses incurred in connection with the death,
wake, and interment of respondent's husband in the
amount of P154,575.30, and the medical expenses of
respondent in the amount of P168,019.55.
Actual damages must be substantiated by
documentary evidence, such as receipts, in order to prove
expenses incurred as a result of the death of the
victim 40 or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. A
review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed
that the funeral and related expenses amounted only to
P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent
amounted only to P12,244.25, yielding a total of
P127,192.85 in actual damages.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly sustained
the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for the death of respondent's husband. Moral damages are
not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. 41 They are awarded to allow the plaintiff to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone due to
the defendant's culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted. 42
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded
temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00 for the
damage caused on respondent's motorcycle. Under Art.
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
the case, be proved with certainty." The cost of the repair of
the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her
Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a
job estimate 43 of the cost of the motorcycle's repair
amounting to P17,829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held
that there was no doubt that the damage caused on the
motorcycle was due to the negligence of petitioner's driver.
In the absence of competent proof of the actual damage
caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair,
the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in
the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the
circumstances. 44
The Court of Appeals also correctly awarded
respondent moral damages for the physical injuries she
sustained due to the vehicular accident. Under Art. 2219 of
the Civil Code, 45 moral damages may be recovered in
quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. However, the award
of P50,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 46 SCDaHc
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded
respondent civil indemnity for the death of her husband,
which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at
P50,000.00. 47 The award is proper under Art. 2206 of
the Civil Code.48
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil
indemnity for the death of respondent's husband,
temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical
injuries sustained by respondent in addition to the damages
granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were
prayed for by respondent in her Amended Complaint. The
appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case. 49
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 17, 2004 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 70860 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila are hereby
ordered to pay jointly and severally respondent Vivian Lee
Pesos (P50,000.00); (b) actual damages in the amount of
 One Hundred Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-
Two Pesos and Eighty-Five Centavos (P127,192.85); (c)
moral damages in the amount of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00); (d) indemnity for loss of earning capacity in
the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00); and (e)
temperate damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00).
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
|||  (Philippine Hawk Corporation v. Lee, G.R. No. 166869,
[February 16, 2010], 626 PHIL 483-501)
(7) Pacis v Morales, GR No. 169467, 25 February 2010
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169467. February 25, 2010.]
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D.
PACIS, petitioners, vs. JEROME JOVANNE
MORALES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This petition for review 1 assails the 11 May 2005
Decision 2 and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669.
The Facts
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis
and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the trial court
a civil case for damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne
Morales (respondent). Petitioners are the parents of Alfred
Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in
a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Respondent
is the owner of the gun store.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis
Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year
student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation
taking up BS Computer Science, died due to
a gunshot wound in the head which he
sustained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located
at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun
store was owned and operated by
defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the
shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason
Herbolario. They were sales agents of the
defendant, and at that particular time, the
caretakers of the gun store.
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The bullet which killed Alfred
Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought
in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal.
22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-
H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was left by defendant
Morales in a drawer of a table located inside
the gun store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at
the time. His employee Armando Jarnague,
who was the regular caretaker of the gun
store was also not around. He left earlier
and requested sales agents Matibag and
Herbolario to look after the gun store while
he and defendant Morales were away.
Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and
Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun
store which included the key to the drawer
where the fatal gun was kept. aEcDTC
It appears that Matibag and
Herbolario later brought out the gun from
the drawer and placed it on top of the table.
Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young
Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return
the gun. The latter followed and handed the
gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting
the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was
filed against Matibag before branch VII of
this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted
of the charge against him because of the
exempting circumstance of "accident" under
Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
By agreement of the parties, the
evidence adduced in the criminal case for
homicide against Matibag was reproduced
and adopted by them as part of their
evidence in the instant case. 3
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its
decision in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo P. Pacis and
Cleopatra D. Pacis] and against the
defendant [Jerome Jovanne Morales]
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs —
(1) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of Alfred Pacis;
(2) P29,437.65 as actual damages
for the hospitalization and
burial expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs;
(3) P100,000.00 as compensatory
damages;
(4) P100,000.00 as moral
damages;
(5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 4
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
its Decision 5 dated 11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's Decision and absolved respondent
from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 6
 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, place which is properly secured in order that
which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated the persons coming into the gun store
19 August 2005. would not be able to take hold of it unless it
is done intentionally, such as when a
Hence, this petition. customer is interested to purchase any of
the firearms, ammunitions and other related
The Trial Court's Ruling items, in which case, he may be allowed to
handle the same.
The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the We agree. Much as We sympathize
death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 with the family of the deceased, defendant-
of the Civil Code.7 The trial court held that the accidental appellant is not to be blamed. He exercised
shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partly due to due diligence in keeping his loaded gun
the negligence of respondent's employee Aristedes Matibag while he was on a business trip in Manila.
(Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were He placed it inside the drawer and locked it.
employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a It was taken away without his knowledge
commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable and authority. Whatever happened to the
for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the deceased was purely accidental. 8 AIHDcC
performance of his duties, unless respondent proved that
he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The trial court held that respondent The Issues
failed to observe the required diligence when he left the
key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun Petitioners raise the following issues:
without instructing his employees to be careful in handling
the loaded gun. EcSCHD I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING
THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE BY
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE
be held civilly liable since there was no employer-employee REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH
relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of 59) OF BAGUIO CITY
Appeals found that Matibag was not under the control of NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR,
respondent with respect to the means and methods in the AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND
performance of his work. There can be no employer- TESTIMONIES PRESENTED DURING
employee relationship where the element of control is THE TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND
absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even GRAVE, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
if respondent is considered an employer of Matibag, still RENDERING THE DECISION AND
respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY
be attributed to him. As explained by the Court of Appeals: DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED
AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
Granting arguendo that an
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING
employer-employee relationship existed
THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
between Aristedes Matibag and the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH
defendant-appellant, we find that no
59) OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING
negligence can be attributed to him.
PETITIONER'S CLEAR RIGHTS TO
Negligence is best exemplified in THE AWARD OF DAMAGES. 9
the case of Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809).
The test of negligence is this: The Ruling of the Court
". . . . Could a prudent
man, in the position of the person We find the petition meritorious.
to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured This case for damages arose out of the accidental
as a reasonable consequence of shooting of petitioners' son. Under Article 1161 10 of
the course about to be pursued? If the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
so, the law imposes a duty on the damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime
actor to refrain from that course or under Article 100 11 of the Revised Penal Code or they may
take precaution against its opt to file an independent civil action for damages under
mischievous results, and the failure the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim
to do so constitutes negligence. . . . for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag,
." petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was
Defendant-appellant maintains that Matibag's employer. Petitioners based their claim for
he is not guilty of negligence and lack of damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
due care as he did not fail to observe the
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer
diligence of a good father of a family. He
under Article 103 12 of the Revised Penal Code, 13 the
submits that he kept the firearm in one of
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter,
his table drawers, which he locked and such
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
is already an indication that he took the
based on a person's own negligence. Article 2176 states:
necessary diligence and care that the said
gun would not be accessible to anyone. He Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
puts [sic] that his store is engaged in selling omission causes damage to another, there
firearms and ammunitions. Such items being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
which are per se dangerous are kept in a

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 for the damage done. Such fault or ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, petitioner, vs.
negligence, if there is no pre-existing PEOPLE OF THE
contractual relation between the parties, is PHILIPPINES, respondent.
called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a [G.R. No. 154954. December 1, 2014.]
firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the "Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair," a person who is in the business of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
suspended or canceled. 14 CAaEDH  ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
someone who has in his possession or under his control an III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II,
being done thereby. 15 Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D.
business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS,
with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
degree of care. BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN,
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to respondents.
be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent
has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not [G.R. No. 155101. December 1, 2014.]
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
ready-access defensive use. 16 With more reason, guns FIDELITO DIZON, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
precisely because they are defective and may cause an
accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the [G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080. December 1, 2014.]
gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without
ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before GERARDA H. VILLA, petitioner, vs.
accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II,
have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS,
untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is ANSELMO ADRIANO, respondents.
open and he has personally checked that the weapon is
completely unloaded. 17 For failing to insure that the gun
was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
RESOLUTION
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to
repair defective firearms to restore its original composition
or enhance or upgrade firearms. 18
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of SERENO, C.J p:
care and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the degree of care required of someone dealing
with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case
liability in this case. involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to fraternity
hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or
ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005 Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. clarified and resolved. Some of these matters include the effect
We REINSTATE the trial court's Decision dated 8 April of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments
1998. insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda), Junel
Anthony D. Ama (Ama), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and
SO ORDERED. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are
eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the
Brion, Del Castillo, Abad and Perez, JJ., concur.
probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court
  that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.

Before the Court are the respective Motions for

(8) Villareal vs People, GR No. 151258, 1 February 2012
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151258. December 1, 2014.]
Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the
Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012. 1 The Court
modified the assailed judgments 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon
(Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond

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reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the
criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while
aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight
physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the
Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of
homicide. 3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision 4 in a separate
but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153
and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr.
(Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that
their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the
dispositive portion of our Decision: 5
WHEREFORE, the appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding
petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is
hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN
PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954 — finding Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and
Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries — is
also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART.
Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug,
Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are
ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the
heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of P50,000, and moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus
legal interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 12% from the date of the finality
of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de
oficio. caIACE
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No.
154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed
Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are
likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against
Artemio Villareal
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for
possible consideration of the amendment of
the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-
resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances
that would increase the applicable
penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual
antecedents surrounding the present case: 6
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In February 1991, seven freshmen
law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their
intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were
Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam"
Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III,
Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo
"Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991,
the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the
lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufo's Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who
briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were
informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any
time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to
last for three days. After their "briefing,"
they were brought to the Almeda Compound
in Caloocan City for the commencement of
their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off
the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as
the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to
traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the
"Bicol Express," which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs
outstretched while the Aquilans walked,
jumped, or ran over their legs; the
"Rounds," in which the neophytes were held
at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the
duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or
with knee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the "Auxies' Privilege Round,"
in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes. During this time, the neophytes
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of
initiation.
On the morning of their second day
— 9 February 1991 — the neophytes were
made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required
to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternity's principles. Whenever they would
give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were
subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of
initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for
the day officially ended.
 After a while, accused non-resident 5. Reynaldo Concepcion
or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Concepcion)
(Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino 8. Stanley Fernandez (S.
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the Fernandez)
insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
he reopened the initiation rites. The Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans
fraternity members, including Dizon in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes jointly tried. On the other hand, the trial
to "paddling" and to additional rounds of against the remaining nine accused in
physical pain. Lenny received several Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
paddle blows, one of which was so strong it abeyance due to certain matters that had to
sent him sprawling to the ground. The be resolved first.
neophytes heard him complaining of intense
pain and difficulty in breathing. After their On 8 November 1993, the trial
last session of physical beatings, Lenny court rendered judgment in Criminal Case
could no longer walk. He had to be carried No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused
by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
initiation for the day was officially ended, the crime of homicide, penalized
and the neophytes started eating dinner. with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of
They then slept at the carport. DEcSaI the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after
the trial court rendered its judgment, or on
After an hour of sleep, the 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-
neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny's 38340 against the remaining nine accused
shivering and incoherent mumblings. commenced anew. acADIT
Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-
overacting. When they realized, though, G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal
the Aquilans started helping him. They Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
removed his clothes and helped him criminal liability of each of the
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. accused according to individual
When his condition worsened, the Aquilans participation. Accused De Leon had by
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was then passed away, so the following Decision
pronounced dead on arrival. applied only to the remaining 25
accused, viz.:
Consequently, a criminal case for
homicide was filed against the following 35 1. Nineteen of the accused-
Aquilans: appellants — Victorino,
Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) Musngi, Perez, De
Guzman, Santos, General,
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) Ranada, Mendoza,
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) Verdadero, Purisima,
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) Fernandez, Abas, and
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) Brigola (Victorino et al.)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda — were acquitted, as
(Almeda) their individual guilt was
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) not established by proof
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) beyond reasonable doubt.
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) 2. Four of the accused-
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) appellants — Vincent
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) Tecson, Junel Anthony
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) Ama, Antonio Mariano
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) Almeda, and Renato
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et
Guzman) al.) — were found guilty
16. Antonio General (General) of the crime of slight
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores) physical injuries and
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) sentenced to 20 days
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo of arresto menor. They
(Montecillo) were also ordered to
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) jointly pay the heirs of the
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) victim the sum of P30,000
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) as indemnity.
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) 3. Two of the accused-
25. Adel Abas (Abas) appellants — Fidelito
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola) Dizon and Artemio Villa
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 real — were found guilty
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) beyond reasonable doubt
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca) of the crime
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) of homicide under Article
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos) 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no

Page 26 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)

 mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of
10 years of prision
mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal.
They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of
Lenny Villa in the sum of
P50,000 and to pay the
additional amount of
P1,000,000 by way of
moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the
ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the
trial court's Orders and dismissed the
criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation
of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned
Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions
were individually brought before this Court.
(Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial
Reconsideration 7 in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 &
178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano (collectively,
Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution. 8 Villa
reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial
of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert
that right within a reasonable period of time. She stresses that,
unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents
Escalona et al. did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial
during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence
were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution
cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the
arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of
incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused
the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the
balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy trial
of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration 9 of G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused
Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill
(animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus
iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in
which the accused committed the crime was through fault
(culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should
have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article
249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the
nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable
to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction
between dolo and culpa by considering the act as one
Page 27 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused
conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless
manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and
was thus equivalent to malice aforethought. ETDHaC
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et
al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be reversed
despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-
G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should
have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon,
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also
participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions
contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al., 10 filed their respective
motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of
our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of
sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they
immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered its
Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability
from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable
sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a
probationable sentence. Tecson et al. contend that, as a result,
they have already been discharged from their criminal liability
and the cases against them closed and terminated. This
outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for
Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known
as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan
City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October
2002 12 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions
thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April
2003. 13
To support their claims, respondents
attached 14 certified true copies of their respective Applications
for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal
case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality,
insofar as they were concerned, when they waived their right to
appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right
to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on
Tecson et al. should have
corresponded to that for intentional
felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et
al. of the terms and conditions of
their probation discharged them
from their criminal liability, and
closed and terminated the cases
against them
DISCUSSION
 Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual
circumstances and legal assertions raised by petitioner Villa in
her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and
passed upon in our deliberations, which led to our Decision
dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding
of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the
CA's dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an
acquittal, 15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof
would result in a violation of their right against double
jeopardy. 16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of
the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave
abuse of discretion, 17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CA's Decision dismissing the case was
attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the
assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant
abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply
because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence. 19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the
CA Decision, and petitioner's arguments and found no basis to
rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that
the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings
were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and
grounded in law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa
with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R. Nos.
155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a
mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition
for Certiorari. HEDSCc
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG's theory
that even if the act complained of was born of imprudence or
negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account
of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that
the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally
inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable
felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal
Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and
Negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prisión correccional in
its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall commit an
act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have
Page 28 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
Reckless imprudence consists
in voluntary, but without malice, doing
or falling to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the
lack of precaution displayed in those cases
in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those
wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do an unlawful
act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the
matter: 20
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to
the classical school of thought. . . . The
identity of mens rea — defined as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent — is the predominant
consideration. Thus, it is not enough to
do what the law prohibits. In order for
an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed
by means of dolo or "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a
complex idea involving the elements
of freedom, intelligence, and intent. . . . .
The element of intent — on which this Court
shall focus — is described as the state of
mind accompanying an act, especially a
forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of
the mind and the resolve with which a
person proceeds. It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
while intent concerns the result of the act.
While motive is the "moving power" that
impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the "purpose" of using a
particular means to produce the
result. On the other hand, the
term "felonious" means, inter
alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose. With these elements taken
together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and
malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the
existence of dolus malus — that the act or
omission be done "willfully," "maliciously,"
"with deliberate evil intent," and "with
malice aforethought." The maxim is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime
is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is
innocent. As is required of the other
elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
 xxx xxx xxx
The presence of
an initial malicious intent to commit a
felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the
intentional felony of
homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice
or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries. Intent to kill — or animus
interficendi — cannot and should not
be inferred, unless there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent. Furthermore, the victim's death
must not have been the product of accident,
natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted
from an act executed without malice or
criminal intent — but with lack of
foresight, carelessness, or negligence
— the act must be qualified as reckless
or simple negligence or imprudence
resulting in homicide.
xxx xxx xxx
In order to be found guilty of any of
the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266
of the Revised Penal Code, the
employment of physical injuries must
be coupled with dolus malus. As an act
that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer
— iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If
there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional
felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries
under the Revised Penal Code, there must
be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong
against the physical integrity or well-
being of a person, so as to incapacitate
and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the
required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per
se merely satisfies the elements of
freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the
act does not, in itself, make a man guilty
unless his intentions are. aAHTDS
Thus, we have ruled in a number of
instances that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious
intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional
felony. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of malicious intent
does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are
ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there
is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or
negligence consists of a voluntary act
done without malice, from which an
Page 29 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution or advertence on the part
of the person committing it. In this case,
the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor. In
contrast, simple imprudence or
negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material
damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of
foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm
is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
The test for determining whether
or not a person is negligent in doing an act
is as follows: Would a prudent man in
the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm
to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the
doer the duty to take precaution
against the mischievous results of the
act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a
person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and
diligence required varies with the degree of
the danger involved. If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great,
the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be
very careful, in order to prevent or avoid
damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger
is minor, not much care is required. It is
thus possible that there are countless
degrees of precaution or diligence that may
be required of an individual, "from a
transitory glance of care to the most vigilant
effort." The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend
upon the circumstances of each particular
case. (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent or dolus
malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing
an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a
felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the argument of
the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional
felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground
that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused
was so gross that the felony already amounted to malice.
The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpa on
the one hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on the
other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between
them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and
Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person
occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another.
Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261
(Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was
a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a
malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory,
mandatory, and not subject to the discretion of the court. We
have already resolved — and the OSG agrees — that the
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus
interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is
applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or
Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light
of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions, 21 respondents insist that
the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of slight
physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of
their respective availments of the probation program and their
ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can
no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. 22 Respondents allude to our
Decision in Tan v. People 23 to support their contention that the
CA judgment can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this
Court. aIcTCS
The OSG counters 24 that the CA judgment could not
have attained finality, as the former had timely filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is
analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorari also prevents the
case from becoming final and executory until after the matter is
ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the
finality of a criminal judgment once the accused applies for
probation, viz.:
SECTION 7.  Modification of
judgment. — A judgment of
conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served,
or when the accused has waived in writing
his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 25 and Section 1 of
Rule 122, 26 it can be culled from the foregoing provisions that
only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal
case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or
review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order
to give life to the constitutional edict 27 against putting a
person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It
is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to
double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in
order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal
liability. Thus, the accused's waiver of the right to appeal — as
when applying for probation — makes the criminal judgment
immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v.
Nazareno is worth reiterating: 28
Further prosecution via an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal is
likewise barred because the government
has already been afforded a complete
opportunity to prove the criminal
defendant's culpability; after failing to
persuade the court to enter a final judgment
of conviction, the underlying reasons
Page 30 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes
compelling. The reason is not only the
defendant's already established
innocence at the first trial where he
had been placed in peril of conviction,
but also the same untoward and
prejudicial consequences of a second
trial initiated by a government who has
at its disposal all the powers and
resources of the State. Unfairness and
prejudice would necessarily result, as
the government would then be allowed
another opportunity to persuade a
second trier of the defendant's guilt
while strengthening any weaknesses
that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the government's power and
resources are once again employed against
the defendant's individual means. That the
second opportunity comes via an appeal
does not make the effects any less
prejudicial by the standards of reason,
justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of
judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not confer
blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already
explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the
state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the
criminal judgment. 29 The reasoning behind the exception is
articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote: 30
In such instance, however, no
review of facts and law on the merits,
in the manner done in an appeal,
actually takes place; the focus of the
review is on whether the judgment
is per se void on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was
rendered by a court that had no
jurisdiction; or where the court has
appropriate jurisdiction, whether it
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, the review
is on the question of whether there has
been a validly rendered decision, not
on the question of the decision's error
or correctness. Under the exceptional
nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a
very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the
party asking for the review to show the
presence of a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.
(Emphases supplied, citations
omitted) SADECI
While this Court's Decision in Tan may have created an
impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon
as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the
state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the
penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a
special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main
case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the
accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a
Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in
excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly
speaking, there is no modification of judgment in a petition
for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation
of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate
criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any
resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a
consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation
of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is inapplicable and
irrelevant where the court's jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the
modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought
before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule
41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal
would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no
irregularity in the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-
G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for
Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the
court to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction
refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and
decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That power and
capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment,
impose a punishment, 32 and enforce or suspend 33 the
execution of a sentence in accordance with law.
The OSG questions 34 the entire proceedings involving
the probation applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have
competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering
that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG
points out that the trial court that originally rendered the
Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340 (91) was Branch 121 of
the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby
quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. —
Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from
the judgment of conviction. . . . . (Emphases
supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law
requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial
court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the
court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of homicide was Branch
121 — not Branch 130 — of the Caloocan City RTC. 35 Neither
the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al. in their
pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation
had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City
RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the
CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case
No. C-38340 (91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to
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the trial of petitioners therein, i.e., accused Concepcion, Ampil,
Adriano, and S. Fernandez. 36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they
filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch
130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not
at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation,
as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is
substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore,
that the probation proceedings were premised on an
unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Second, the records of the case were still with
the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the
probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with
the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted. 37 If a party appeals the trial court's judgment or
final order, 38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court.
The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the
appealing party is concerned. 39 The court of origin then loses
jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other party's
time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease — including the authority to order
execution pending appeal — the moment the complete records
of the case are transmitted to the appellate
court. 41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have
the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the
case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions
appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with
the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case.
Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if
the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first place. CTcSIA
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment."
A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of
the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
conditions among others: 42 after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to
appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the
sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or
served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the
decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in
the book of entries of judgments. 43 If the case was previously
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final
older must be attached to the original record, which shall then
be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal
was taken. 44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction
over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that
the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of
penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, 45 including
the convicts' applications for probation. 46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had
not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications 47 while a motion for reconsideration
was still pending before the CA 48 and the records were still
with that court. 49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing
the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the
trial court. 50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting
the probation applications, 51 the OSG had filed Manifestations
of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA 52 and this
Court. 53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by
filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002. 54 We noted the petition and then required respondents
to file a comment thereon. 55 After their submission of further
pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file
their consolidated memoranda. 56 The records of the case
remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in
2008. 57
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130
had no jurisdiction to act on the probation applications of
Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their
final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pas is a clear
evidence of either gross ignorance of the law or an underhanded
one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al.,
or both — to which this Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to
seek probation at the time they applied for
it. Probation 58 is a special privilege granted by the state to
penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their
liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their
acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the
state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration record by making them undergo rehabilitation
outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to
help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-
abiding and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them
in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right
enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or
clemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of
Appeals, 59 this Court explained thus:
It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or
group of persons not enjoyed by others
or by all. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of
the court which is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused. The Probation Law should not
therefore be permitted to divest the
state or its government of any of the
latter's prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly
expressed, and no person should
benefit from the terms of the law who
is not clearly within them. (Emphases
supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the
probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out that when
they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC,
they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation
pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
968 (the Probation Law). CAHaST
We refer again to the full text of Section 4 of
the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. —
Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant
within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best;
Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether
the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application
for probation shall be filed with the trial
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court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying
probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is
that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. 61 In
the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 62 this Court was
faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for
probation even after the trial court has imposed a non-
probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In
that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum
term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was beyond the
coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for
probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the
penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning
in Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligible for
probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA.
In Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation
Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any
distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of
their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from
seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated
in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from availing
themselves of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine
opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of
the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders
discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa,
however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court
since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of
Appeals 63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC
Branch 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We
recall that respondents were originally found guilty of homicide
and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA
later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and
sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the
sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the
RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation
at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as
an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it
divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from
their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we
declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of
Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan 64 applicable, viz.:
A void judgment is, in legal
effect, no judgment at all. By it no
rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless,
all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts performed under it and all claims
 flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis
supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson  et
al.  from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts 65 that, in any event, their
criminal liability has already been extinguished as a result of
their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of
the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch
130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of
the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability
is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as
to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when
the death of the offender
occurs before final
judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty
and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended
woman, as provided in
article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the
source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no judgment
had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the
Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the
probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that
technically do not exist.
In any event; Tecson et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable to this case.
One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to
"suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to replace
the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our
discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is
rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a
conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the
supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation
are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if the
conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et
al. remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People, 68 we revisited
our ruling in Francisco and modified our pronouncements insofar
Page 33 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their
conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the
Court En Banc in effect abandoned Lagrosa and settled the
following once and for all: 69 ECSaAc
Secondly, it is true that under the
probation law the accused who appeals
"from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the
benefits of probation. But, as it happens,
two judgments of conviction have been
meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial
court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction
for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the
dissenting opinion's hard position, it will
apply the probation law on Arnel based on
the trial court's annulled judgment against
him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the
Supreme Court's judgment of conviction for
a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court's
judgment — even if this has been found in
error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be
made to pay for the trial court's erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to
apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the
horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).
Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also
expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel
to apply for probation would dilute the
ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of
Appeals that the probation law requires that
an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference
between Francisco and this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Here, however, Arnel did not
appeal from a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. He was not
in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I
choose not to apply for probation." The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him
denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling
that would allow Arnel to now seek
probation under this Court's greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the
sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they
have the option to try for probation,
forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
xxx xxx xxx
In a real sense, the Court's
finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time
imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from
the start, it would have found him guilty of
the correct offense and imposed on him the
 right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel
the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never
intended to deny an accused his right
to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation
is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by
a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
the Probation Law must not be
regarded as a mere privilege to be
given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard
the teaching in many cases that the
Probation Law should be applied in
favor of the accused not because it is a
criminal law but to achieve its
beneficent purpose.
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, what is clear is
that, had the RTC done what was right
and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right
to apply for probation. No one could say
with certainty that he would have availed
himself of the right had the RTC done right
by him. The idea may not even have
crossed his mind precisely since the penalty
he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is
ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to
deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that
the Court imposes on him is, unlike the
one erroneously imposed by the trial
court, subject to probation? (Emphases
supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA
judgments and found Tecson et al. ultimately liable for the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable
by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1
day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its medium period
(from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to
Tecson et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for
probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the
same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for
probation.
While we cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of
RTC Branch. 130, which granted the Applications for Probation,
we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the
terms and conditions of their previous probation program and
have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they
reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether
to place them under probation at this time and in determining
the terms, conditions, and period thereof. AcHCED
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an
unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the
penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this
Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motu in
Page 34 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth
sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the
maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), 70 the phrase "and one (1)
day," which had been inadvertently added, must be removed.
Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion,
the fourth sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prisión correccional, as maximum.
In this instance, we further find it important to clarify
the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised
Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty automatically
attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty
outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. 71 The applicable
accessory penalty is determined by using as reference
the principal penalty imposed by the court before the
prison sentence is computed in accordance with the
ISL. 72 This determination is made in spite of the two classes of
penalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be
emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" 73 imposed,
not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court. We believe that
the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the
convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the salve
offense. 75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as
setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after
which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the
shortening of the prison term. 76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium
period. As this provision grants courts the discretion to lay
down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, the imposable
penalty must also be within the aforementioned
range. 77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately
imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight)
penalty 78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional. 79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically
carries with it 80 the following accessory penalties:
ARTICLE 43. Prisión
Correccional — Its accessory penalties. —
The penalty of prisión correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if
the duration of said imprisonment shall
exceed eighteen months. The offender shall
suffer the disqualification provided in this
article although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.
 The duration of their suspension shall be the same as
that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is, for four years
and two months 81 or until they have served their sentence in
accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately,
once the judgment of conviction becomes final. 82
We further point out that if the length of their
imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer
a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, if this accessory
penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of
their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public
office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public
office. 83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes
vacant upon finality of the judgment. 84 The aforementioned
accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted
in a pardon. 85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are
without prejudice to a grant of probation, should the trial court
find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon, 86 the
grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal
penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory
penalties. We have reiterated this point in Moreno v.
Commission on Elections: 87
likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned
Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire
probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or
judgments issued in connection thereto. We,
however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon
are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our
recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines, 88 without
prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any. aIDHET
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the
dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012 and
hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth
sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now
read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum."
SO ORDERED.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court

declared that an order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in
effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the
order granting probation the paragraph
which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.

Applying this doctrine to the

instant case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from the
right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of
probation.

It appears then that during the

period of probation, the probationer is
not even disqualified from running for
a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation. . . . . During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with
all the conditions prescribed in the
probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for

Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in
connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is
also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or

Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D.
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are

Page 35 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)

(9) Regala v Carin, GR No. 188715, 6 April 2011
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 188715. April 6, 2011.]
RODOLFO N. REGALA, petitioner, vs. FEDERICO
P. CARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Assailed via this petition for review of petitioner Rodolfo N.
Regala is the May 26, 2009 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed with modification the May 29, 2006
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City,
Br. 255 in Civil Case No. LP-99-0058, ordering petitioner to
pay respondent Federico P. Carin moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees. EICScD
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig
Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City. When petitioner
decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing
a second floor, he under the guise of merely building an
extension to his residence, approached respondent sometime
in May 1998 for permission to bore a hole through a perimeter
wall shared by both their respective properties, to which
respondent verbally consented on condition that petitioner
would clean the area affected by the work.
As earlier indicated, petitioner's real intention was to build a
second floor, in fact with a terrace atop the dividing wall. In
the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent
and his wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell
on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem
to respondent's satisfaction, respondent filed a letter-
complaint 3 with the Office of the City Engineer and Building
Official of Las Piñas City on June 9, 1998.
In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the
lack of a building permit for the construction of a second floor,
petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the
debris falling therefrom, allowed his laborers to come in and
out of his (respondent's) property without permission by
simply jumping over the wall, and trampled on his vegetable
garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner
persisted in proceeding with the construction, he claiming to
be the owner of the perimeter wall.
Several "sumbongs" 4 (complaints) were soon lodged by
respondent before the Office of Barangay Talon Dos against
petitioner for encroachment, rampant invasion of privacy and
damages arising from the construction, and for illegal
construction of scaffoldings inside his (respondent's) property.
As no satisfactory agreement was reached at the last
barangay conciliation proceedings in December 1998, and
petitioner having continued the construction work despite
issuance of several stop-work notices from the City Engineer's
Office for lack of building permit, respondent filed on March
1999 a complaint 5 for damages against petitioner before the
RTC of Las Piñas City.
In his complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead
of boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner demolished
the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into five parts
for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace;
and that debris and dust piled up on respondent's property
ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things,
shut some of the windows of his house. Respondent thus
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prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages. ASDTEa
Petitioner, denying respondent's allegations, claimed in his
Answer 6 that he was the sole and exclusive owner of the wall
referred to as a perimeter wall, the same having been built
within the confines of his property and being part and parcel
of the house and lot package he purchased from the
developer, BF Homes, Inc., in 1981; that the issue of its
ownership has never been raised by respondent or his
predecessor; and that securing the consent of respondent and
his neighbors was a mere formality in compliance with the
requirements of the Building Official to facilitate the issuance
of a building permit, hence, it should not be taken to mean
that he (petitioner) acknowledges respondent to be a co-
owner of the wall. He added that he eventually secured the
requisite building permit 7 in March 1999 and had duly paid
the administrative fine. 8
Further, petitioner, denying that a demolition of the whole
length of the wall took place, claimed that he and his
contractor's laborers had been diligently cleaning
respondent's area after every day's work until respondent
arrogantly demanded the dismantling of the scaffoldings, and
barred the workforce from, and threatening to shoot anyone
entering the premises; and that the complaint was instituted
by respondent as leverage to force him to withdraw the
criminal case for slander and light threats 9 which he had
earlier filed against respondent for uttering threats and
obscenities against him in connection with the construction
work.
At the trial, after respondent and his wife confirmed the
material allegations of the complaint, petitioner took the
witness stand and presented his witnesses.
Architect Antonio Punzalan III 10 testified that he installed GI
sheets to prevent debris from falling onto respondent's
property and had instructed his workers to clean the affected
area after every work day at 5:00 p.m., but they were later
barred by respondent from entering his property.
Engineer Crisostomo Chan 11 from the Office of the Building
Official of Las Piñas City testified, among other things, on the
circumstances surrounding the complaint for illegal
construction filed by respondent and that a building permit
was eventually issued to petitioner on March 15, 1999.
Engineer Sonia Haduca 12 declared that upon a joint survey
conducted on the properties of both petitioner and
respondent in December 1998 to determine their exact
boundaries, she found an encroachment by petitioner of six
centimeters at the lower portion of the existing wall
negligible, since the Land Survey Law permits an
encroachment of up to ten centimeters.
By Decision of May 29, 2006, Branch 255 of the Las Piñas City
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent whom it
awarded moral damages in the sum of P100,000, exemplary
damages of P100,000 and attorney's fees of P50,000 plus
costs of suit. 13 ETCcSa
In finding for respondent, the trial court declared that, apart
from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the
renovation of his house without the requisite building permit
from the City Engineer's Office, he misrepresented to
respondent his true intent of introducing renovations. For, it
found that instead of just boring a hole in the perimeter wall
as originally proposed, petitioner divided the wall into several
sections to serve as a foundation for his firewall (which ended
up higher than the perimeter wall) and the second storey of
his house.
The trial court further declared that respondent and his family
had thus to contend with the noise, dust and debris
occasioned by the construction, which petitioner and his work
crew failed to address despite respondent's protestations, by
refusing to clean the mess or install the necessary safety
devices.
Applying Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, the
trial court ruled that petitioner was at fault and negligent for
failing to undertake sufficient safety measures to prevent
inconvenience and damage to respondent to thus entitle
respondent to moral and exemplary damages.
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision with modification by reducing the award
of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000 and P25,000,
respectively. The appellate court anchored its affirmance on
Article 19 of the New Civil Code which directs every person to,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, and observe honesty and good faith.
By Resolution 14 of July 10, 2009, the appellate court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration as well as respondent's
prayer in his Comment that the original awards made by the
trial court be restored.
Hence, petitioner's present petition faulting the appellate
court in
Affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court. . . .considering the absence of any competent
proof to warrant the grant of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees. 15 (underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner maintains that since moral and exemplary damages
are compensatory in nature, being meant neither to punish
nor enrich, the claimant must establish that not only did he
sustain injury but also that the other party had acted in bad
faith or was motivated by ill will. To petitioner, respondents
failed to discharge this burden. He adds that the trial court did
not delve into whether petitioner's renovations were the
primary cause of respondent's claimed injuries, viz. violation
of privacy, sleepless nights and mental anguish, among other
things, as it instead focused on the lack of a building permit
as basis for the awards.
Rebutting the testimony of respondent's wife as to the alleged
unauthorized intrusion of petitioner's workers into
respondent's property in order to erect scaffoldings, petitioner
points out that such an undertaking would take a considerable
length of time and could not have gone unnoticed had
consent not been given by respondent. DaACIH
Moreover, petitioner posits, if consent had truly been
withheld, there was nothing to prevent respondent from
dismantling or immediately removing the offending structures
— a course of action he did not even attempt.
In his Comment 16 to the petition, respondent quotes heavily
from the appellate and trial court's findings that fault and
negligence attended petitioner's renovation, thus justifying
the award of damages. He goes on to reiterate his plea that
the awards given by the trial court in its decision of May 29,
2006 should be reinstated.
The petition is partly impressed with merit.
The trial court's award of moral and exemplary damages, as
affirmed by the appellate court, was premised on the damage
and suffering sustained by respondent arising from quasi-
delict under Article 2176 17 of the Civil Code.Thus the trial
court explained:  the area before leaving at 5:00 p.m; 25 and that the workers
Indeed, there was fault or negligence on the part of the
defendant when he did not provide sufficient safety
measures to prevent causing a lot of inconvenience
and disturbance to the plaintiff and his family. The
evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding the dirt or
debris, as well as the absence of devices or safety
measures to prevent the same from falling inside
plaintiff's property, were duly established. It did not
help the cause of the defendant that he made a lot of
misrepresentations regarding the renovations on his
house and he did not initially have a building permit for
the same. In fact, it was only after the construction
works were completed that the said permit was issued
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and upon payment of an administrative fine by the
defendant. 18
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant
to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To
be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily
prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury
causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 19 and 2220 20 of the Civil Code.Moreover, the
damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish
the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the
acts of the defendant.
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation
of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a
culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant;
and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code.21 HICEca
In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were
the proximate effect of petitioner's act or omission. It thus
becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which
petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether
this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may
have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal
act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained
by the claimant.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful
exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his
abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and
may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially
sought respondent's consent, the lack of the permit was
inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to
administrative sanctions or penalties.
The testimony of petitioner and his witnesses, specifically
Architect Punzalan, demonstrates that they had actually taken
measures to prevent, or at the very least, minimize the
damage to respondent's property occasioned by the
construction work. Architect Punzalan details how upon
reaching an agreement with petitioner for the construction of
the second floor, he (Punzalan) surveyed petitioner's property
based on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and Tax
Declarations 22 and found that the perimeter wall was within
the confines of petitioner's property; that he, together with
petitioner, secured the consent of the neighbors (including
respondent) prior to the start of the renovation as reflected in
a Neighbor's Consent 23 dated June 12, 1998; before the
construction began, he undertook measures to prevent debris
from falling into respondent's property such as the installation
of GI sheet strainers, the construction of scaffoldings 24 on
respondent's property, the instructions to his workers to clean
conducted daily clean-up of respondent's property with his
consent, until animosity developed between the parties. 26
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. 27 While
the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise
to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to
respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon
respondent's property was malicious or willful, an element
crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article
2220 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary
damages. 28
Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability
whatsoever. Respondent and his family's rights to the
peaceful enjoyment of their property have, at the very least,
been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioner's
construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage suffered by
respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of
any factual evidence to establish the same. Nominal damages
may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
respondent herein, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 29 caTIDE
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 26, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals is VACATED. The Court orders
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P25,000 as nominal
damages.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.

||| (Regala v. Carin, G.R. No. 188715, [April 6, 2011], 662 PHIL

782-793)

Page 38 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)

B. Causal Relation Between the Act or Omission and the
Damage; Doctrine of Proximate Cause
(1) Tison et al. v Sps. Pomasin, GR No. 173180, 24
August 2011
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173180. August 24, 2011.]
ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L.
JABON, petitioners, vs. SPS. GREGORIO
POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE
POMASIN, DIANNE POMASIN
PAGUNSAN, CYNTHIA POMASIN, SONIA
PEROL, ANTONIO SESISTA, GINA
SESISTA, and REYNALDO
SESISTA, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a
jitney, 1 figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika
Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August
1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney
towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-
trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the
opposite lane going towards Naga City. 2
The opposing parties gave two different versions of
the incident.
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was
on board the jitney and seated on the passenger's side. He
testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve
going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the
opposite direction and encroaching on the jitney's lane. The
jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged
further causing death and injuries to its passengers. 3
On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he
was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the
opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road.
Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and
heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to
the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay.
Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the
tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The
tractor-trailer was likewise damaged. 4
Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney
resulted.
Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay
Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea
Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and
Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His other daughter
Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane
Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His wife,
Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin
Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista,
Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained
injuries. 5 On the other hand, Jabon and one of the
passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured. 6
Albert Tison (Tison), the owner of the truck,
extended financial assistance to respondents by giving
them P1,000.00 each immediately after the accident and
Page 39 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorio'
s daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of
Desistance. HCITAS
On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence,
imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents
prayed for indemnification for the heirs of those who
perished in the accident at P50,000.00 each; P500,000.00
for hospitalization, medical and burial expenses;
P350,000.00 for continuous hospitalization and medical
expenses of Spouses Pomasin; P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P30,000.00
for loss of income of Cynthia; P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees plus P1,000.00 per court appearance; P50,000.00 for
litigation expenses; and cost of suit. 7
In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was
Laarni' s negligence which proximately caused the accident.
They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by
Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by
executing an Affidavit of Desistance. Notwithstanding the
affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents filed the
instant complaint to harass them and profit from the
recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed for
damages.
Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint in view of the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Cynthia. The motion was denied for lack of
merit. 8
On 7 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the
complaint for damages, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants and
against plaintiffs hereby DISMISSING the
instant complaint considering that plaintiffs
have authorized Cynthia Pomasin to settle
the case amicably for P200,000.00; and that
the proximate cause of the accident did not
arise from the fault or negligence of
defendants' driver/employee but from
plaintiff's driver. 9
The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon
regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than
that of Gregorio' s, a mere passenger, whose observation
and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the
driver. The trial court concluded that Laarni caused the
collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court
likewise upheld the Affidavit of Desistance as having been
executed with the tacit consent of respondents.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the
vehicular collision. In support of such finding, the Court of
Appeals relied heavily on Gregorio' s testimony that Jabon
was driving the tractor-trailer downward too fast and it
encroached the lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of
the impact and the damage caused to the jitney resulting in
the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals
inferred that Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court
noted that the restriction in Jabon's driver's license was
violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was
negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was likewise
held liable for damages for his failure to prove due diligence
in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the
truck. Finally, the appellate court disregarded the Affidavit
of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had
no written power of attorney from respondents and that she
was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit
that she did not read its content.
 The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
states:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is
granted, and the trial court's Decision dated
February 7, 2003 is set aside. Defendants-
appellees are ordered to pay plaintiffs-
appellants or their heirs the following:
a) Actual damages of P136,000.00
as above computed, to be offset with the
P200,000.00 received by plaintiff-appellant
Cynthia Pomasin;
b) Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for
the death of each victim, to be offset with
the balance of P64,000.00 from the
aforementioned P200,000.00 of civil
indemnity received by plaintiff-appellant
Cynthia Pomasin. Hence, the net amount is
computed at P37,200.00 each, as follows:
P37,200.0
Narcisa Pomasin
0 defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the
P37,200.0
Laarni Pomasin
0 the plaintiff. 15 These requisites must be proved by a
P37,200.0
Andrea P. Pagunsan
0 this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of
P37,200.0
Dionisio Perol
0 greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
P37,200.0
Annie Jane P. Pagunsan
0
c) Moral damages of P50,000.00 to
each of the victims; and
d) Attorney' s fees of 10% of the
total award.[10]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was, however, denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution 11 dated 19 July 2006.
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact
and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial
court: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. 12 And the
rule, and the exceptions, is that factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1)
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference made by
the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) the appellate court, in
making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
premised on a misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of
Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner
are not disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but are contradicted by the evidence on record. 13 aAEIHC
The exceptions to the rule underscore the substance
and weight of the findings of the trial court. They render
inconclusive contrary findings by the appellate court. The
reason is now a fundamental principle:
[A]ppellate courts do not disturb
the findings of the trial courts with regard to
the assessment of the credibility of
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witnesses. The reason for this is that trial
courts have the ' unique opportunity to
observe the witneses first hand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination.
The exceptions to this rule are
when the trial court's findings of facts and
conclusions are not supported by the
evidence on record, or when certain facts of
substance and value, likely to change the
outcome of the case, have been overlooked
by the trial court, or when the assailed
decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts. 14
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more
pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which, according to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based
on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
preponderance of evidence. 16 The claimants, respondents in
action by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is of
opposition to it. 17  
The trial court found that the jitney driver was
negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the
opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the
driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.
One reason why the trial court found credible the
version of Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more
focused than that of a mere passenger. The trial court
expounded, thus:
In the appreciation of the
testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding
consideration is their opportunity for
observation in getting to know or actually
seeing or observing the matter they testify
to. This most particularly holds true in
vehicular collision or accident cases which
oftentimes happen merely momentarily or
in the split of a second. In the case of a
running or travelling vehicle, especially in
highway travel which doubtless involves
faster speed than in ordinary roads, the
driver is concentrated on his driving
continuously from moment to moment even
in long trips. While in the case of a mere
passenger, he does not have to direct his
attention to the safe conduct of the
travelling vehicle, as in fact he may
converse with other passengers and pay no
attention to the driving or safe conduct of
the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze
off to sleep if he wants to, rendering his
opportunity for observation on the precise
cause of the accident or collision or
immediately preceding thereto not as much
as that of the driver whose attention is
continuously focused on his driving. So that
as between the respective versions of the
plaintiffs thru their passenger and that of
the defendants thru their driver as to the
cause or antecedent causes that led to the
vehicular collision in this case, the version
of the driver of defendant should ordinarily
be more reliable than the version of a mere
passenger of Plaintiffs' vehicle, simply
because the attention of the passenger is
 not as much concentrated on the driving as
that of the driver, consequently the capacity
for observation of the latter of the latter on
the matter testified to which is the precise
point of inquiry — the proximate cause of
the accident — is more reasonably reliable.
Moreover, the passenger's vision is not as
good as that of the driver from the vantage
point of the driver's seat especially in
nighttime, thus rendering a passenger's
opportunity for observation on the
antecedent causes of the collision lesser
than that of the driver. This being so, this
Court is more inclined to believe the story of
defendant's driver Claudio Jabon that the
jitney driven by Laarni Pomasin fell off the
shoulder of the curved road causing it to run
thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the
process the two vehicles approaching each
other from opposite directions at highway
speed came in contact with each other, the
zigzagging jeep hitting the left fender of the
truck all the way to the fuel tank, the violent
impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the
jitney, being thrown away due to the
disparate size of the truck. 18 aTADCE
The appellate court labelled the trial court's
rationalization as a "sweeping conjecture" 19 and countered
that Gregorio was actually occupying the front seat of the jitney
and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact
that he was not driving.
While it is logical that a driver's attention to the road
travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger, it should also
be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly
circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does not
necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a
driver and a passenger, the former is more credible. The factual
setting of the event testified on must certainly be considered.
proceeded going on its way on a
zigzag direction.
Q: Could you describe to the Court what was
the kind of vehicle you saw running
in zigzag direction?
A: A Toyota-jitney loaded with passengers
with top-load.
Q: You said that the top[-]load of the jeep is
loaded?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could you please tell the Court what was
your speed at the time when you
saw that jeepney with top[-]load
running on a zigzag manner?
A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per
hour because I was ascending
plain. (Emphasis supplied). 20
In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that
he was ascending, viz.:
Q: Could you please describe the condition
in the area at the time of the
incident, was it dark or day time?
A: It was still bright.
COURT:But it was not approaching sunset?
A: Yes, sir. TAIaHE
Q: Was there any rain at that time?
A: None sir.
Q: So the road was dry?

The trial court did just that in the instant case. Contrary A: Yes sir.
to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions
Q: You said you were ascending
of a driver and a passenger in a vehicle was not the only basis
towards the direction of Liboro,
of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon's alleged
Camarines Sur, is that correct
vantage point to clearly observe the incident, the trial court also
at the time the incident
took into consideration Gregorio's admission that prior to the
happened?
accident, the jitney was running on the "curving and downward"
portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into A: Yes sir. 21 (Emphasis supplied).
account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it
was their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct
reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and examination described the road condition where the collision
encroaching the jitney's lane. took place as "curving and downward," thus:
We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and Q: Could you please describe the place
found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when it where the incident happened in so
collided with the descending jitney. far as the road condition is
concerned?
During the direct examination, Jabon narrated that the
tractor-trailer was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers A: The road was curving and downward.
per hour when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in
a zigzag manner, thus: Q: And the road was of course clear from
traffic, is that correct?
Q: Now, when you passed by the
municipality of Polangui, Albay at A: Yes sir.
about 5:00 of August 12, 1994,
could you tell the Court if there was Q: And practically, your jitney was the only
any untoward incident that car running at that time?
happened?
A: Yes sir. 22 (Emphasis supplied).
A: There was sir.
Significantly, this is a confirmation of the testimony of
Q: Could you please tell the Court? Jabon.

A: While on my way to Liboro coming from However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and
Sorsogon, I met on my way a stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw the
vehicle going on a zigzag direction tractor-trailer running down very fact and encroaching on
and it even fell on the shoulder and their lane, to wit:

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 Q: Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer
truck that collided with your owner
jeepney that you were riding
testified in open Court on July 24,
1997 which I quote, 'while on my
way to Liboro coming to Sorsogon I
met a vehicle going on a zig-zag
direction and it even fell on the
shoulder and proceeded going on
its way on zig-zag direction', what
can you say about this statement
of this witness?
A: We were no[t] zigzagging but because
we were going uphill and about
to reach a curved (sic) we saw the
on-coming vehicle going down very
fast and encroaching on our lane
so our driver swerved our vehicle
to the right but still we were hit by
the on-coming
vehicle. 23 (Emphasis supplied).
The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road
condition was straightforward and consistent. The
recollection of Gregorio veered from "curving and
downward" to uphill. 24 On this point, Jabon and his
testimony is more credible.
The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road
shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial court's
conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which,
it may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio
that the road was "curving and downward." 25 It is this
conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorio's
testimony, that gives credence to the further testimony of
Jabon that the herein respondent's jitney, "loaded with
passengers with top-load" "was running in a zigzag
manner." 26
Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to
accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result
in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was
running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer.
There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was
speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the
tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size
and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be
more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running
downhill in a zigzagging manner.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent.
In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have
swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging
before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though,
happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case,
leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to
maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and
away from collision with the jitney oncoming
downhill. IEAacS
Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio's daughter,
Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of
the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck
due to the restriction imposed on his driver's
license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact,
Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to
reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code
8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court
of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a
traffic regulation at the time of the collision.  Carpio, Velasco Jr., * Brion and Mendoza, ** JJ., concur.
Driving without a proper license is a violation of
traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the
legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the
mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation.
However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of
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Appeals, 27 we held that a causal connection must exist
between the injury received and the violation of the traffic
regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or
that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence,
consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury. 28 Likewise controlling is
our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals 29 where we
reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere
violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself
in establishing liability for damages. In said
case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to
establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself.
Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these
violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence
appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus
on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the
violations and the accident, we can deem him as having
failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the
cyclist' s own liability." 30We took the occasion to state
that:
The rule on negligence per se must
admit qualifications that may arise from the
logical consequences of the facts leading to
the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185,
for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it
seeks to impute culpability arising from the
failure of the actor to perform up to a
standard established by a legal fiat. But the
doctrine should not be rendered inflexible
so as to deny relief when in fact there is no
causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are
not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal
rooted in fact. After all, tort law is
remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide
compensation for the harm suffered by
those whose interests have been invaded
owing to the conduct of other. 31
In the instant case, no causal connection was
established between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions
on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon
was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation
Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his
license.
Petitioners presented the Affidavit of Desistance
executed by Cynthia to exonerate them from any liability.
An affidavit of desistance is usually frowned upon by courts.
Little or no persuasive value is often attached to a
desistance. 32 The subject affidavit does not deserve a
second look more so that it appears that Cynthia was not
armed with a special power of attorney to enter into a
settlement with petitioners. At any rate, it is an exercise of
futility to delve into the effects of the affidavit of desistance
executed by one of the respondents since it has already
been established that petitioners are not negligent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 94-3418
lodged before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 74, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tison v. Spouses Pomasin, G.R. No. 173180, [August
24, 2011], 671 PHIL 686-704)
2 Ocean Builders v Sps. Cubacub, GR No. 150898, 13
April 2011
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150898. April 13, 2011.]
OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION
CORP., and/or DENNIS
HAO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO
and ANICIA CUBACUB, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as
maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City.
By Decision of April 14, 1997, 1 Branch 66 of the
Tarlac RTC at Capas dismissed the complaint, holding that
Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was not under any
obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals, and
assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by
pneumonia or some other complications due to lack of
adequate facilities at the hospital, the same cannot be
attributed to Hao.
On respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals, by
Decision of June 22, 2001, reversed  the trial court's
decision, holding that by Hao's failure to bring Bladimir to a
better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of
the Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have
foreseen that Bladimir, an adult, could suffer complications
from chicken pox and, had he been brought to hospitals like
St. Luke's, Capitol Medical Center, Philippine General
Hospital and the like, Bladimir could have been saved.
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated April
14, 1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the
defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-
appellants for the following:

On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with 1. P50,000.00 for the life of
chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao Bladimir Cubacub;
(Hao), the company's general manager, to rest for three
days which he did at the company's "barracks" where he 2. P584,630.00 for loss of
lives free of charge. Bladimir's earning
capacity;
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir
went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the 3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of
company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. expenses incurred at
Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Quezon City General
Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house Hospital as evidenced by
in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Exhibits "E" to "E-14"
Bladimir's intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and inclusive; CSIHDA
ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest
hospital. 4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of
expenses for the 5-day
Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, wake covered by Exhibits
Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community "F" to "F-17";
Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around
one kilometer away from the office of the company. 5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses
at Prudential Funeral
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the Homes covered by Exhibit
hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping watch "I";
over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the
hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk to 6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of
Bladimir's parents, hence, on Silangga's request, their co- memorial lot at Sto.
workers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimir's Rosario Memorial Park
parents from Tarlac. AIcaDC covered by Exhibit "J";
At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, 7. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
April 13, 1995, Bladimir's parents-respondent spouses
Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), 8. P20,000.00 as exemplary
arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to damages;
the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was
placed in the intensive care unit and died the following 9. P15,000.00 as attorney's fees;
day, April 14, 1995. and
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded 10. Cost of suit.
Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardio-respiratory
arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the SO ORDERED. 2
other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias
recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple The motion for reconsideration was denied by
organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox. Resolution 3 of November 26, 2001, hence this petition.

Bladimir's parents-herein respondents later filed on Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence
August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court more than what the law requires, hence, they are not liable for
(RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against damages.
petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence which
resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir's condition leading The petition is meritorious.
to his death.
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case
is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee

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relationship being merely incidental. To successfully
prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must
be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and
proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate
court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide
adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art.
161 of the Labor Code,failing which a breach is committed.
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of
employer. — It shall be the duty of any
employer to provide all the necessary
assistance to ensure the adequate and
immediate medical and dental attendance
and treatment to an injured or sick
employee in case of emergency. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what
the phrase "adequate and immediate" medical attendance
means in relation to an "emergency." It would thus appear
that the determination of what it means is left to the
employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or
physician are available on-site as required, also under
the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides: CSTDIE
Article 157. Emergency Medical
and Dental Services. — It shall be the duty
of every employer to furnish his employees
in any locality with free medical and dental
attendance and facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time
registered nurse when the
number of employees
exceeds fifty (50) but not
more than two hundred
(200) except when the
employer does not
maintain hazardous
workplaces, in which case,
the services of a graduate
first-aider shall be
provided for the
protection of workers,
where no registered nurse
is available. The Secretary
of Labor and Employment
shall provide by
appropriate regulations,
the services that shall be
required where the
number of employees
does not exceed fifty (50)
and shall determine by
appropriate order,
hazardous workplaces for
purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time
registered nurse, a part-
time physician and
dentist, and an
emergency clinic, when
the number of employees
exceeds two hundred
(200) but not more than
three hundred (300); and
(c) The services of a full-time
physician, dentist and a
full-time registered nurse
as well as a dental clinic
and an infirmary or
emergency hospital with
one bed capacity for every
Page 44 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
one hundred (100)
employees when the
number of employees
exceeds three hundred
(300). (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is no allegation that the
company premises are hazardous. Neither is there any
allegation on the number of employees the company has. If
Hao's testimony 4 would be believed, the company had
only seven regular employees and 20 contractual
employees — still short of the minimum 50 workers that an
establishment must have for it to be required to have a full-
time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the
actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill
amounted to the "necessary assistance" to ensure
"adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance" to
Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the
records, petitioner Hao's advice for Bladimir to, as he did,
take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the
nearest hospital constituted "adequate and immediate
medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161,
to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear
to have a medical background. He may not be thus
expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be
brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga
Hospital, contrary to appellate court's ruling. aDSAEI
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao
cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death
of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would
not have occurred. 5 An injury or damage is proximately
caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from
the evidence in the case that the act or omission played
a substantial  part in bringing about or actually causing the
injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either
a direct result  or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission. 6
Verily, the issue in this case is
essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from
adopting the appellate court's findings, finds that Bladimir
contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was
negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest
physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not,
however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate
court's or even the trial court's decision is there any such
definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a
co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee
being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that
he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of
another worker, without reference, however, as to when it
happened. 7
On the issue of which of the two death certificates
is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended
to Bladimir during his "last illness," holds that the certificate
which he issued — citing chicken pox as antecedent cause
— deserves more credence. 
There appears, however, to be no conflict in the
two death certificates on the immediate cause of Bladimir's
death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to
complications — from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia
and chicken pox per Dr. Frias'. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted
that the causes of death in both certificates were the
same. 8
Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered
as Bladimir's attending physician, he having merely ordered
Bladimir's transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the
 Caybiga Hospital. He thereafter left Bladimir to the care of
doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 o'clock the
following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As
he himself testified upon cross-examination, he
did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the
latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH. 9
It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death
certificate is considered a public document and the entries
therein are presumed correct, unless the party who
contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence
establishing otherwise. 10 The QCGH death certificate was
received by the City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not
only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be
inaccurate. Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr.
Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of the
fact that he was not around at the time of death. DHTECc
IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner
manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
Brion, Villarama, Jr. and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Bersamin, J., I dissent.
(Ocean Builders Construction Corp. v. Spouses Cubacub,
G.R. No. 150898, [April 13, 2011], 664 PHIL 36-67)
3 Dyteban v Jose Ching, GR No. 161803, 4 February 2008
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161803. February 4, 2008.]
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., petitioner, vs.
JOSE CHING AND/OR LIBERTY FOREST,
INC. and CRESILITO M.
LIMBAGA, respondents.
to nearby barangays and municipalities. A Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards
the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime
mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. 3
The night before, at around 10:00 p.m., the prime
mover with trailer suffered a tire blowout. The driver,
private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime
mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the
national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He
parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the
road with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and
the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway. 4 The prime mover was not equipped with
triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates, the early warning
device required under Letter of Instruction No. 229. As
substitute, Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on
the front and the rear portion of the prime mover to warn
incoming motorists. It is alleged that Limbaga likewise
placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the
trailer. 5
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying
its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right,
onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two
bright and glaring headlights and the approaching
passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of
the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear
of the prime mover. 6
Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries.
The Nissan van, however, became inoperable as a result of
the incident. After the collision, SPO4 Teofilo Pame
conducted an investigation and submitted a police traffic
incident investigation report. 7
On October 31, 1995, petitioner Nissan van owner
filed a complaint for damages 8 against private
respondents prime mover owner and driver with the RTC in
Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not
impleaded as defendant in the complaint.
RTC Disposition

On August 7, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in

DECISION favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered directing, ordaining and
REYES, R.T., J p: ordering:
a) That defendants Liberty Forest,
THE vehicular collision resulting in damages and Inc. and Cresilito M.
injuries in this case could have been avoided if the stalled Limbaga pay, jointly and
prime mover with trailer were parked properly and solidarily, plaintiff Dy
equipped with an early warning device. It is high time We Teban Trading, Inc. the
sounded the call for strict enforcement of the law and amounts of P279,832.00
regulation on traffic and vehicle registration. Panahon na as actual and
para mahigpit na ipatupad ang batas at regulasyon compensatory damages,
sa trapiko at pagpapatala ng sasakyan. P30,000.00 as attorney's
fees and P5,000.00 as
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of
expenses of litigation;
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) modifying
that 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Butuan City b) That all money claims of plaintiff
finding private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Rogelio C. Ortiz are
Limbaga liable to petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. for dismissed;
damages.
c) That defendant Jose Ching is
Facts absolved from any civil
liability or the case
against him dismissed;
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Rogelio Ortiz,
with helper Romeo Catamora, was driving a Nissan van d) That the counterclaim of all the
owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the defendants is dismissed;
National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, and
going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice

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 e) That defendants Liberty Forest,
Inc. and Cresilito M.
Limbaga to pay, jointly
and solidarily, the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
The RTC held that the proximate cause of the
three-way vehicular collision was improper parking of the
prime mover on the national highway and the absence of
an early warning device on the vehicle, thus:
The court finds that the
proximate cause of the incidents is the
negligence and carelessness attributable
to the defendants. When the trailer being
pulled by the prime mover suffered two
(2) flat tires at Sumilihon, the prime
mover and trailer were parked
haphazardly, as the right tires of the
prime mover were the only ones on the
sand and gravel shoulder of the highway
while the left tires and all the tires of the
trailer were on the cemented pavement of
the highway, occupying almost the whole
of the right lane on the direction the
prime mover and trailer were traveling.
The statement of Limbaga that he could
not park the prime mover and trailer
deeper into the sand and gravel shoulder
of the highway to his right because there
were banana plants is contradicted by the
picture marked Exhibit "F." The picture
shows that there was ample space on the
shoulder. If defendant Limbaga was
careful and prudent enough, he should
have the prime mover and trailer traveled
more distance forward so that the bodies
of the prime mover and trailer would be
far more on the shoulder rather than on
the cemented highway when they were
parked. . . . The court has some doubts on
the statement of witness-driver Limbaga
that there were banana trunks with leaves
and lighted tin cans with crude oil placed
3 strides in front of the prime mover and
behind the trailer because the testimonies
of witnesses Rogelio C. Ortiz, driver of the
ice van, Romeo D. Catamora, helper of
the ice van, and Police Traffic Investigator
SPO3 Teofilo M. Pame show that there
were no banana trunks with leaves and
lighted tin cans at the scene of the
incident. But even assuming that there
were banana trunks with leaves but they
were placed close to the prime mover and
trailer as they were placed 3 strides away
which to the mind of the court is
equivalent approximately to 3 meters and
with this distance, approaching vehicles
would have no sufficient time and space
to make a complete stop, especially if the
vehicles are heavy and loaded. If there
were lighted tin cans, it was not explained
by the defendants why the driver,
especially driver witness Ortiz, did not see
them.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. did
not exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in managing and running its
business. The evidence on record shows
that it failed to provide its prime mover
and trailer with the required "early
warning devices" with reflectors and it did
not keep proper maintenance and
Page 46 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
condition of the prime mover and the
trailer. The circumstances show that the
trailer were provided with wornout tires
and with only one (1) piece of spare tire.
The pictures marked Exhibit "3" and "4"
show that two (2) flat tires suffered by the
trailer and these two (2) tires were
attached to one of the two (2) I-beams or
axles attached to the rear of the trailer
which axle is very near but behind the
other axle and with the location of the 2 I-
beams, it would have the other I-beam
that would have suffered the flat tires as
it has to bear the brunt of weight of the D-
8 bulldozer. The bulldozer was not loaded
directly above the two (2) I-beams as 2 I-
beams, as a pair, were attached at the far
rear end of the trailer.
xxx xxx xxx
However, defendant Jose Ching
should be absolved of any liability as there
is no showing that he is the manager or CEO
of defendant Liberty Forest, Inc. Although in
the answer, it is admitted that he is an
officer of the defendant corporation, but it is
not clarified what kind of position he is
holding, as he could be an officer as one of
the members of the Board of Directors or a
cashier and treasurer of the corporation.
Witness Limbaga in his testimony
mentioned a certain Boy Ching as the
Manager but it was never clarified whether
or not Boy Ching and defendant Jose Ching
is one and the same person. 10
Private respondents appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 28, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the decision dated August 7,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
2, Butuan City in Civil Case No. 4360 is
hereby PARTLY MODIFIED by absolving
the defendants-appellants/appellees of
any liability to plaintiffs-
appellants/appellees by reason of the
incident on July 4, 1995.
The dismissal of the case against
Jose Ching, the counterclaim of
defendants-appellants/appellees and the
money claim of Rogelio Ortiz STANDS.
SO ORDERED. 11
In partly reversing or partly modifying the RTC
decision, the CA held that the proximate cause of the
vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give
way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus, thus:
It was stated that the Joana
Paula bus in trying to avoid a head-on
collision with the truck, sideswept the
parked trailer loaded with bulldozer.
Evidently, the driver of the Joana
Paula bus was aware of the presence on
its lane of the parked trailer with
bulldozer. For this reason, it proceeded to
occupy what was left of its lane and part
of the opposite lane. The truck occupying
the opposite lane failed to give way or
yield the right of way to the oncoming bus
 by proceeding with the same speed. The Appeals, 13 may act as substitute early warning device.
two vehicles were, in effect, trying to beat The CA stated:
each other in occupying a single lane. The
bus was the first to occupy the said lane Likewise, it was incorrect for the
but upon realizing that the truck refused lower court to state that there was no
to give way or yield the right of way, the warning sign of danger of any kind, most
bus, as a precaution, geared to its right probably referring to the absence of the
where the trailer was parked. triangular reflectorized plates. The police
Unfortunately, the bus miscalculated its sketch clearly indicated the stack of
distance from the parked trailer and its banana leaves placed at the rear of the
rear right side hit the protruding blade of parked trailer. The trailer's driver testified
the bulldozer then on the top of the that they placed kerosene lighted tin can
parked trailer. The impact of the collision at the back of the parked trailer.
on its right rear side with the blade of the A pair of triangular reflectorized
bulldozer threw the bus further to the plates is not the only early warning device
opposite lane, landing its rear portion on allowed by law. The Supreme Court
the shoulder of the opposite lane. (in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
xxx xxx xxx Appeals) held that:
". . . Col. dela Cruz and
Facts of the case reveal that
Romano testified that they did not
when Ortiz, the driver of the truck, failed
see any early warning device at the
to give the Joana Paula bus the space on
scene of the accident. They were
the road it needed, the latter vehicle
referring to the triangular
scraped its rear right side on the
reflectorized plates in red and
protruded bulldozer blade and the impact
yellow issued by the Land
threw the bus directly on the path of the
Transportation Office. However, the
oncoming truck. This made plaintiffs-
evidence shows that Recontique
appellants/appellees conclude that the
and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp
Joana Paula bus occupied its lane which
or torch at the edge of the road,
forced Ortiz, the driver of the truck, to
near the rear portion of the truck to
swerve to its left and ram the front of the
serve as an early warning device.
parked trailer.
This substantially complies with
xxx xxx xxx Section 34 (g) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code . . .
The trailer was parked because
its two (2) rear-left tires were blown Baliwag's argument that
out. With a bulldozer on top of the trailer the kerosene lamp or torch does
and two (2) busted tires, it would be not substantially comply with the
dangerous and quite impossible for the law is untenable. The aforequoted
trailer to further park on the graveled law clearly allows the use not only
shoulder of the road. To do so will cause of an early warning device of the
the flat car to tilt and may cause the triangular reflectorized plates'
bulldozer to fall from where it was variety but also parking lights or
mounted. In fact, it appeared that the flares visible one hundred meters
driver of the trailer tried its best to park away. . . . ."
on the graveled shoulder since the right-
front tires were on the graveled shoulder This Court holds that the
of the road. defendants-appellants/appellees were not
negligent in parking the trailer on the
The lower court erred in stating scene of the accident. It would have been
that the Joana Paula bus swerved to the different if there was only one flat tire and
left of the truck because it did not see the defendant-appellant/appellee Limbaga
parked trailer due to lack of warning sign failed to change the same and left
of danger of any kind that can be seen immediately.
from a distance. The damage suffered by
the Joana Paula bus belied this As such, defendants-
assessment. As stated before, the Joana appellants/appellees are not liable for the
Paula bus, with the intention of passing damages suffered by plaintiffs-
first which it did, first approached the appellants/appellees. Whatever damage
space beside the parked trailer, veered plaintiffs-appellants/appellees suffered,
too close to the parked trailer thereby they alone must bear them. 14
hitting its rear right side on the protruding
bulldozer blade. Since the damage was on Issues
the rear right most of the bus, it was
clearly on the space which was wide
enough for a single passing vehicle but Petitioner raises two issues 15 for Our
not sufficient for two (2) passing vehicles. consideration, to wit:
The bus was thrown right to the path of I.
the truck by the impact of the collision of
its rear right side with the bulldozer THE HONORABLE COURT OF
blade. 12 APPEALS, WITHOUT ANY AVAILABLE
CONCRETE EVIDENCE, ERRONEOUSLY
The CA disagreed with the RTC that the prime
DETERMINED THAT THERE WERE EARLY
mover did not have an early warning device. The appellate
WARNING DEVICES PLACED IN FRONT OF
court accepted the claim of private respondent that
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS/APPELLEES'
Limbaga placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and
TRUCK AND FLAT CAR TO WARN
rear of the trailer which, in Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Page 47 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT/APPELLEE ROGELIO
ORTIZ OF THEIR PRESENCE.
II.
WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS HIGH TIME
TO ENFORCE THE LAW ON EARLY WARNING
DEVICES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The meat of the petition is whether or not the
prime mover is liable for the damages suffered by the
Nissan van. The RTC ruled in the affirmative holding that
the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
negligence of Limbaga in parking the prime mover on the
national highway without an early warning device on the
vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC decision, holding that the
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Ortiz
in not yielding to the right of way of the passenger bus.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
plaintiff. 16
There is no dispute that the Nissan van suffered
damage. That is borne by the records and conceded by the
parties. The outstanding issues are negligence and
proximate cause. Tersely put, the twin issues are: (a)
whether or not prime mover driver Limbaga was negligent
in parking the vehicle; and (b) whether or not his
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
Limbaga was negligent in parking
the prime mover on the national
highway; he failed to prevent or
minimize the risk to oncoming
motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for
the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury. 17 The Supreme Court stated the test of
negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith 18 as
follows:
The test by which to determine
the existence or negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinary person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence. The law here in
effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that. (Underscoring supplied)
Page 48 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
The test of negligence is objective. We measure
the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary
reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as
applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the
prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the
same situation.
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in
parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the
national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial
portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger
bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left
wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels
on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is
common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover
on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming
motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some
measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.
We are unable to agree with the CA conclusion "it
would have been dangerous and quite impossible to further
park the prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road
because the prime mover may tilt and the bulldozer may
fall off." The photographs taken after the incident show that
it could have been possible for Limbaga to park the prime
mover completely on the shoulder of the national road
without risk to oncoming motorists. We agree with the RTC
observation on this point, thus:
. . . The statement of Limbaga
that he could not park the prime mover
and trailer deeper into the sand and
gravel shoulder of the highway to his right
because there were banana plants is
contradicted by the picture marked
Exhibit "F." The picture shows that there
was ample space on the shoulder. If
defendant Limbaga was careful and
prudent enough, he should have the
prime mover and trailer traveled more
distance forward so that the bodies of the
prime mover and trailer would be far
more on the shoulder rather than on the
cemented highway when they were
parked. Although at the time of the
incident, it was about 4:45 in the morning
and it was drizzling but there is showing
that it was pitch dark that whoever
travels along the highway must be extra
careful. If the Joana Paula bus swerved to
the lane on which the "Nissan" ice van
was properly traveling, as prescribed by
Traffic Rules and Regulations, it is
because the driver of the bus did not see
at a distance the parked prime mover and
trailer on the bus' proper lane because
there was no warning signs of danger of
any kind that can be seen from a
distance. 19
Limbaga also failed to take proper steps to
minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime
mover. He did not immediately inform his employer, private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc., that the prime mover
suffered two tire blowouts and that he could not have them
fixed because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling
for help, Limbaga took it upon himself to simply place
banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to
serve as warning to oncoming motorists. Worse, Limbaga
slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside
the vehicle. By his own account, Limbaga was sleeping on
the prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was
only awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the
passenger bus on the prime mover. 20
Limbaga also admitted on cross-examination that
it was his first time to drive the prime mover with trailer
loaded with a D-8 caterpillar bulldozer. 21 We find that
private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was utterly negligent
in allowing a novice driver, like Limbaga, to operate a
vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which
required highly specialized driving skills. Respondent
employer clearly failed to properly supervise Limbaga in
driving the prime mover.
The RTC noted that private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. also failed to keep the prime mover in proper
condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had
worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare tire. It
was for this reason that Limbaga was unable to change the
two blown out tires because he had only one spare. The
bulldozer was not even loaded properly on the prime
mover, which caused the tire blowouts.
All told, We agree with the RTC that private
respondent Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime
mover on the national highway. Private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise
Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in
proper condition.
The case of Baliwag Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals is inapplicable;
Limbaga did not put lighted kerosene
tin cans on the front and rear of the
prime mover.
Anent the absence of an early warning device on
the prime mover, the CA erred in accepting the bare
testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin
cans on the front and rear of the prime mover. The
evidence on records belies such claim. The CA reliance
on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 22 as authority
for the proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act
as substitute early warning device is misplaced.
First, the traffic incident report did not mention
any lighted tin cans on the prime mover or within the
immediate vicinity of the accident. Only banana leaves
were placed on the prime mover. The report reads:
VIII — RESULT OF
INVESTIGATION: A Joana Paula Bus, with
Body No. 7788, with Plate No. LVA-137,
driven by one Temestocles Relova v.
Antero, of legal age, married and a
resident of San Roque, Kitcharao, Agusan
del Norte, while traveling along the
National Highway, coming from the east
going to the west direction, as it moves
along the way and upon reaching Brgy.
Sumilihon, Butuan City to evade bumping
to the approaching Nissan Ice Van with
Plate No. PNT-247, driven by one Rogelio
Cortez y Ceneza. As the result, the Joana
Paula Bus accidentally busideswept ( sic)
to the parked Prime Mover with Trailer
loaded with Bulldozer without early
warning device, instead placing only dry
banana leaves three (3) meters at the
rear portion of the Trailer, while failure to
place at the front portion, and the said
vehicle occupied the whole lane. As the
result, the Joana Paula Bus hit to the left
edge blade of the Bulldozer. Thus,
causing the said bus swept to the narrow
shouldering, removing the rear four (4)
wheels including the differential and
injuring the above-stated twelve (12)
passengers and damaged to the right side
fender above the rear wheel. Thus,
causing damage on it. While the Nissan
Ice Van in evading, accidentally swerved
to the left lane and accidentally bumped
to the front bumper of the parked Prime
Page 49 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
Mover with Trailer loaded with Bulldozer.
Thus, causing heavy damage to said
Nissan Ice Van including the cargoes of
the said van. 23
Second, SPO4 Pame, who investigated the
collision, testified 24 that only banana leaves were placed
on the front and rear of the prime mover. He did not see
any lighted tin cans in the immediate vicinity of the
collision.
Third, the claim of Limbaga that he placed lighted
tin cans on the front and rear of the prime mover belatedly
surfaced only during his direct examination. No allegation
to this effect was made by private respondents in their
Answer to the complaint for damages. Petitioner's counsel
promptly objected to the testimony of Limbaga, thus:
ATTY. ROSALES:
Q. Now you mentioned about placing
some word signs in front and at
the rear of the prime mover with
trailer, will you please describe to
us what this word signs are?
A. We placed a piece of cloth on tin
cans and filled them with crude oil.
And these tin cans were lighted
and they are like torches. These
two lights or torches were placed in
front and at the rear side of the
prime mover with trailer. After
each torch, we placed banana
trunk. The banana trunk is placed
between the two (2) torches and
the prime mover, both on the rear
and on the front portion of the
prime mover.
Q. How far was the lighted tin cans with
wick placed in front of the prime
mover.
ATTY. ASIS:
At this point, we will be objecting to
questions particularly referring to
the alleged tin cans as some of the
warning-sign devices, considering
that there is no allegation to that
effect in the answer of the
defendants. The answer was just
limited to the numbers 4 & 5 of the
answer. And, therefore, if we follow
the rule of the binding effect of an
allegation in the complaint, then
the party will not be allowed to
introduce evidence to attack jointly
or rather the same, paragraph 5
states, warning device consisting of
3 banana trunks, banana items and
leaves were filed. He can be cross-
examined in the point, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q. Put that on record that as far as this tin
cans are concerned, the plaintiffs
are interposing continuing
objections. But the Court will allow
the question. 25
We thus agree with the RTC that Limbaga did not
place lighted tin cans on the front and rear of the prime
mover. We give more credence to the traffic incident report
and the testimony of SPO4 Pame that only banana leaves
were placed on the vehicle. Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals 26 thus finds no application to the case at bar.
The skewed parking of the prime
mover was the proximate cause of
the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively,
proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom. 27
There is no exact mathematical formula to
determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. 28 Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient
link between the act or omission and the damage or injury.
That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no
liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural
and probable result of the act or omission. In the precedent-
setting Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, 29 this Court discussed
the necessary link that must be established between the
act or omission and the damage or injury, viz.:
It may be that ordinarily, when a
passenger bus overturns, and pins down a
passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event,
unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after
looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the
passenger is burned to death, one might
still contend that the proximate cause of
his death was the fire and not the
overturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case and under the
circumstances obtaining in the same, we
do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on
its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was
not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch
was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was very
dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them;
and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not
available, they had to use a torch, the
most handy and available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers
should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with
the torch was to be expected and was
natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers' bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside
help.
Page 50 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in
subsequent cases as authority for the proposition that the
damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the
act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the
damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and
probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover
with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime
mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga
failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking
of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to
the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus
and the Nissan van.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and
Limbaga are liable for all damages that resulted from the
skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes
those damages resulting from precautionary measures
taken by other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the
parked prime mover. As We see it, the passenger bus
swerved to the right, onto the lane of the Nissan van, to
avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover.
The driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz, reacted swiftly by
swerving to the left, onto the lane of the passenger bus,
hitting the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously would not
have swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly
occupying his van's lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would
not have swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the
prime mover improperly parked on its lane. The skewed
parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan
van.
In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 30 this Court held that a similar vehicular
collision was caused by the skewed parking of a dump truck
on the national road, thus:
The conclusion we draw from the
factual circumstances outlined above is
that private respondent Dionisio was
negligent the night of the accident. He
was hurrying home that night and driving
faster than he should have been. Worse,
he extinguished his headlights at or near
the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets and thus did not
see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road
lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the
Court of First Instance and the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful
or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked — in other words, the
negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship
between petitioner Carbonel's negligence
on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is
quite clear. Put in a slightly different
manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with
the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck
driver's negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
We believe, secondly, that the
truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather
an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the
private respondent's car would in all
probability not have occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew
without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the
 dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General
Lacuna Street and for having so created
this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and,
therefore, closer to the accident, was not
an efficient intervening or independent
cause. What the Petitioner describes as
an "intervening cause" was no more than
a foreseeable consequence of the risk
created by the negligent manner in which
the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not
to impose upon them the very risk the
truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the
dump truck and the accident, nor to sever
the juris vinculum of liability. . . .
(Underscoring supplied)
We cannot rule on the proportionate
or contributory liability of the
passenger bus, if any, because it
was not a party to the case; joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable.
The CA also faults the passenger bus for the
vehicular collision. The appellate court noted that the
passenger bus was "aware" of the presence of the prime
mover on its lane, but it still proceeded to occupy the lane
of the Nissan van. The passenger bus also miscalculated its
distance from the prime mover when it hit the vehicle.
We cannot definitively rule on the proportionate or
contributory liability of the Joana Paula passenger bus vis-à-
vis the prime mover because it was not a party to the
complaint for damages. Due process dictates that the
passenger bus must be given an opportunity to present its
own version of events before it can be held liable. Any
contributory or proportionate liability of the passenger bus
must be litigated in a separate action, barring any defense
of prescription or laches. Insofar as petitioner is concerned,
the proximate cause of the collision was the improper
parking of the prime mover. It was the improper parking of
the prime mover which set in motion the series of events
that led to the vehicular collision.
Even granting that the passenger bus was at fault,
it's fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents
from liability. If at fault, the passenger bus will be a joint
tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of
joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that
petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages from
the collision. In Philippine National Construction Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 31 this Court held:
According to the great weight of
authority, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omission of
two or more persons, although acting
independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person
and it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury,
either is responsible for the whole injury,
even though his act alone might not have
caused the entire injury, or the same
damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor . . . .
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In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals, the Court declared that the liability of joint
tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit:
It may be said, as a general rule,
that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause
of an injury. It is sufficient that his
negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is
the proximate cause of the injury.
Accordingly, where several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is
not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it being
sufficient that the negligence of the
person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not
have resulted to as great an extent, and
that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of
the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury
would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence
or wrongful acts of the other concurrent
tortfeasors. Where several causes
producing an injury are concurrent and
each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the
injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible
persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was more culpable, and
that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actor's
negligence ceases to be a proximate
cause merely because it does not exceed
the negligence of other actors. Each
wrongdoer is responsible for the entire
result and is liable as though his acts
were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between
joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary
since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of
two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination with
the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury and either of
them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and
are solidarily liable for the resulting
damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code. (Underscoring supplied)
All told, all the elements of quasi delict have been
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The CA erred in
absolving private respondents from liability for the
vehicular collision.
Final Note
It is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this
case could have been easily avoided by following basic
traffic rules and regulations and road safety standards. In
hindsight, private respondent Limbaga could have
prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he had
properly parked the prime mover on the shoulder of the
national road. The improper parking of vehicles, most
 especially along the national highways, poses a serious and
unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists
and passengers. Drivers owe a duty of care to follow basic
traffic rules and regulations and to observe road safety
standards. They owe that duty not only for their own safety,
but also for that of other motorists. We can prevent most
vehicular accidents by simply following basic traffic rules
and regulations.
We also note a failure of implementation of basic
safety standards, particularly the law on early warning
devices. This applies even more to trucks and big vehicles,
which are prone to mechanical breakdown on the national
highway. The law, as crafted, requires vehicles to be
equipped with triangular reflectorized plates. 32 Vehicles
without the required early warning devices are ineligible for
registration. 33 Vehicle owners may also be arrested and
fined for non-compliance with the law. 34
The Land Transportation Office (LTO) owes a duty
to the public to ensure that all vehicles on the road meet
basic and minimum safety features, including that of early
warning devices. It is most unfortunate that We still see
dilapidated and rundown vehicles on the road with
substandard safety features. These vehicles not only pose a
hazard to the safety of their occupants but that of other
motorists. The prime mover truck in this case should not
have been granted registration because it failed to comply
with the minimum safety features required for vehicles on
the road.
It is, indeed, time for traffic enforcement agencies
and the LTO to strictly enforce all pertinent laws and
regulations within their mandate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court
of Appeals decision dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The RTC decision dated August 7, 2001 is
REINSTATED IN FULL.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez,
Corona * and Nachura, JJ., concur.
|||  (Dy Teban Trading, Inc. v. Ching, G.R. No. 161803,
[February 4, 2008], 567 PHIL 531-554)
4 Taylor v Manila Electric, GR No. 4977, 22 March 1910
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 4977. March 22, 1910.]
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE
MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND
LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W.H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W.L. Wright, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES; CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE. — When the immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which
contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover damages for the
injury.
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DECISION
CARSON, J p:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an
eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor,
by his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in
the operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at
the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within
the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power
plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge,
impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time
when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of
age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than
the average boy of his age, and having considerable
aptitude and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a
boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age,
crossed the footbridge of the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant, who had promised to make them a cylinder for a
miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was
not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by
youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest
which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some
time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit
made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that
they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house
where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the traveling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across
the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires
by means of which it may be discharged by the use of
electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves
considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to
the ownership of caps, and their right to take them, the
boys picked up all they could find, hung them of a stick, of
which each took one end, and carried them home. After
crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the
home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of
experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the
wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result.
They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed.
Manuel looked for a hammer, but could not find one. They
then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it
was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less
serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the boys
proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and
wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right
eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the
surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
 The evidence does not definitely and conclusively
disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's
premises, not how long they had been there when the boys
found them. It appeared, however, that some months
before the accident, during the construction of the
defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same kind as
those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the
power plant near the place where the caps were found; and
it also appears that at or about the time when these caps
were found, similar caps were in use in the construction of
an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William
McKinley. The caps when found appeared to the boys who
picked them up to have been lying there for a considerable
time, and from the place where they were found would
seem to have been discarded as defective or worthless and
fir only to be thrown upon the rubbish heap.
No measures seem to have been adapted by the
defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended, when
they felt disposed as to do. As admitted in defendant
counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their
play sometimes crossed the footbridge to the island;" and,
we may add, roamed about at will on the unenclosed
premises of the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place
where the caps were found. There is no evidence that any
effort ever was made to forbid these children from visiting
the defendant company's premises, although it must be
assumed that the company or its employees were aware of
the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four
months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. later he took upon work in his father's office
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering.
About a month after his accident he obtained employment
as a mechanical draftsman and continued in the
employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and
it appears that he was a boy of more than average
intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set our in the foregoing statement are to
our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence
of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The
only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are
plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by
plaintiff on defendant company's premises were the
property of the defendant, or that they had come from its
possession and control, and that the company or some
of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the
point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is
meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on
the rule of law which places the burden of proof of such
allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in
rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We
think, however, the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to
sustain a findings in accord with his allegations in this
regard.
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by
the plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the
McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that
some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the
company's premises a few months before the accident; that
not far from the place where the caps were found the
company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies, and
so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and
a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the
neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being
used by the company as a short of dumping ground for
ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the
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discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are
not articles in common use by the average citizen, and
under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all
evidence to the contrary, we thing that the discovery of
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies
the inference that the defendant company was either the
owner of the caps in question or had these caps under its
possession and control. We think also that the
evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators
were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its
employees at the spot where they were found, with the
expectations that they would be buried out of sight by the
ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and,
however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is
sufficient to sustained a finding that the company or some
of employees either willfully or through an oversight left
them exposed at a point on its premises which the general
public including children at play, were not prohibited from
visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to
have known that young boys were likely to roam abound in
pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or
destroy the probative value of the facts on which these
conclusions are based by intimating or rather assuming that
the blasting worked on the company's well and on its
McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was
conclusively proven, however, that while the workman
employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by
J.G. White & Co., a firm of contractors, he did the work on
the well directly and immediately under the supervision and
control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there
is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the
McKinley extension was done by independent contractors.
Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he
stated that he understood that a part of this work was done
by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and
knew nothing of the terms and conditions of the alleged
contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the
defendant company. The fact having been proven that
detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on
work done by the defendant company's directions and on
its behalf, we think that the company should have
introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention
if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference that it
was the owner of the material used in these operations and
that it was responsible for tortious of negligent acts of the
agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had
been intrusted to independent contractors as to whose acts
the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the
company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as
those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was
a very simple matter for it to prove that fact, and in the
absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in
the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies
the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps
found on its premises were its property, and were left
where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the
trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together
with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that Code.
"ART. 1089. Obligations are
created by law, by contracts, by quasi—
contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions
or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs."
"ART. 1902. Any person who by an
act or omission causes damage to another
 when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
"ART. 1903. The obligation
imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and
omission, but also for those of the persons
for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or
incapacity the mother, is liable for the
damages caused by the minors who alive
with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an
establishment or enterprises are equally
liable for the damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this
article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to avoid the damage."
"ART. 1908. The owners shall be
also be liable for the damages caused —
"1. By the explosion of machines
which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substance which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place."
Counsel for defendant and appellant rests his
appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at
the trial do not establish the liability of the defendant
company under the provisions of these articles, and since
we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for
us to consider the various questions as to the form and the
right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359),
which would perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming
the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the
Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the
United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery,
must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which
defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it
must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between
the negligence and the damage.
The propositions are, or course, elementary, and
do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts
developed in the case under consideration.
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It is clear that the accident could not have
happened had not the fulminating caps been left exposed
at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in a appropriate place;
but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
entered upon defendant's premised, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant,
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of
the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he
not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and
applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of
plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company's premises, and the intervention of his action
between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in
his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise
accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of
defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the
pace where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter
the proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the
injuries sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff
relied on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of
last result in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.
In the typical cases, the question involved has
been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury
received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle
curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad
company's premises, at a place where the railroad company
knew, or had a good reason to suppose, children who would
likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes
left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of
which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and
injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises
a dangerous machine, such as a turntable left in such
condition as to make it probable that children in playing
with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom
and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with
such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases,
the great weight of authority holds the owner of the
premises liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84
U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for an injury received by an
infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for
purposed of amusement, if such injury was, under the
circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the
company), the principles on which these cases turn are that
"while railroad company is not bound to the same degree of
care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon
its premises that it owes to passengers conveyed by it, it is
not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries
arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and
that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be
judged by the same rule which governs that of an adult.
While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another he must himself have
been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a
child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this
is to be determined in such case by the circumstances of
the case."
 The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs.
Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in
severally state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in
the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally
repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable
cased, especially that laid down in Railroad Company vs.
Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the
language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of land is not
liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them,
not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception
to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by
dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them
to the premises; (3) that an invitation of license to cross the
premises of another can not be predicated on the mere fact
that no steps have been taken to interfere with such
practice; (4) that there is no difference between children
and adults of an invitation or a license to enter upon
another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of
Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts
in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co.,
53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been
questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire,
and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts
of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the
doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch
vs. Nurding (1 Q.B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these
cases in accord with that announced in Railroad Company
vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme Court of the United
States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan
in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonald (152
U.S, 262) on the 5th of March, 1894, reexamined and
reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs.
Stout, and after an exhaustive and critical analysis and
review of may of the adjudged cases, both English and
America, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles
announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.
McDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a
boy 12 years of age, our of curiosity and for his own
pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's
premises, without defendant's express permission or
invitation, and, while there, was by an accident injured by
failing into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had
knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its
premises without any fence around it or anything to give
warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant
knew or had reason to believe that it was in a place where
it would attract the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On
these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not be
regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and
protection while on the premises in question, against the
unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no
obligation to make provision.
We quote at length from the discussion by the
court of the application of the principles involved to the
facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly
applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of
defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being
a trespasser, the defendant's company owed him no duty,
and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would
not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on
defendant's premises.
"We adhere to the principle
announced in Railroad Co., vs. Stout (supra).
supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs.
Applied to the case now before us, they
Marlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
require us to hold that the defendant was
guilty of negligence in leaving unguarded
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the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of
its depot building. It could have forbidden all
the persons from coming to its coal mine for
purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure.
But it did not do so. On the contrary, it
permitted all, without regard to age, to visit
its mine, and witness its operation. It knew
that the usual approach to the mine was by
a narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to
its depot building, at which the people of
the village, old and young, would often
assemble. It knew that children were in the
habit of frequenting that locality and playing
around the shaft house in the immediate
vicinity of the slack pit. The slightest regard
for the safety of these children would have
suggested that they were in danger from
being so near a pit, beneath the surface of
which was concealed (except when snow,
wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning
coals into which a child might accidentally
fall and be burned to death. Under all the
circumstances, the railroad company ought
not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a
mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the
mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a
trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for
whose protection it was under no obligation
to make provisions.
"In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East.,
277, 281) it was held that if a man place
dangerous traps, baited with flesh, in his
own ground, so near to a highway, or to the
premises of another, that dogs passing
along the highway, or kept in his neighbors
premises, would probably be attracted by
their instinct into the traps, and in
consequence of such act his neighbor's dog
be so attracted and thereby injured, an
action on the case would lie. 'What
difference,' said Lord Ellenborough, C.J., 'is
there a reason between drawing the animal
into the trap by means of his instinct which
he can not resist, and putting him there by
manual force?' What difference, in reason
we may observe in this case, is there
between an express license to the children
of this village to visit the defendant's coal
mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an
implied license, resulting from the habit of
the defendant to permit them, without
objection or warning, to do so at will, for
purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring
to the case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge
Thompson, in his work on the Law of
negligence, volume 1, page 305, note, well
ways: "It would be a barbarous rule of law
that would make the owner of land liable for
setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking
meat, so that his neighbor's dog attracted
by his natural instincts, might run into it and
be killed, and which would exempt him from
liability for the consequences of leaving
exposed and unguarded on his land a
dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's
child attracted to it and tempted to
intermeddle with it by instincts equally
strong, might thereby be killed of maimed
for life."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the
 "Children, wherever they go, must right to do what he will with his own property of that
be expected to act upon childlike instincts children should be kept under the care of the parents or
and impulses; and others who are guardian, so as to prevent their entering on the premises of
chargeable with a duty of care and caution others is of sufficient weight to put it in doubt. In this
toward them must calculate upon this, and jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private
take precautions accordingly. If they leave property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that
exposed to the observation of children it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others
anything which would be tempting to them, or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the
and which they in their immature judgment community (see U.S. vs. Toribio, 1 No. 5060, decided
might naturally suppose they were at liberty January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender
to handle or play with, they should expect years it would be absurd and unreasonable in community
that liberty to be taken." organized as is that in which we live to hold that parents or
guardians are guilty of negligence or imprudence in every
case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave
And the same eminent jurist in his treaties on
the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of
torts, alluding to the doctrines of implied invitations to visit
accident to the child the negligence of the parents could in
the premises of another, says:
any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it of a
right to recover in such cases — a point which we neither
"In the case of young children, and discuss not decide.
other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff
would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving
upon defendant's property without defendant's express
a tempting thing for children to play with
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant
exposed, where they would be likely to
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by the
gather for that purpose, may be equivalent
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were
to an invitation to them to make use of it;
attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
and, perhaps if one were to throw away
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
upon his premises, near the common way,
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
things tempting to children, the same
its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
implication should arise." (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant,"
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiff's
United States to its conclusions in the cases of Railroad Co., action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a
vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
jurisdiction than in that than in that wherein those cases plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly
originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by
the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the
usually be found wherever the public permitted to
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's
congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed
youth the intervention of his action between the negligent
anything which arouses the attention of the young and
act of the defendant leaving the caps exposed on its
inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as
premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury
inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes
should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of
accident; and it is because we can not agree with this
premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children
proposition, although we accept the doctrine on the
are exposed, or upon which the public are expressively or
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought of
impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the owner
proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in
knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about
this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout
for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
(supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the
that entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
premises can not be heard to say that because the child
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself
has entered upon his premises without his express
have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to
permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no
an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of
duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
reasonable precautions to prevent the child form entering
and this is to be determined in each case by the
premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that
circumstance of the case." As we think we have shown,
children are accustomed to roam about or to which their
under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the
childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is
Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve
at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where
defendant of responsibility for injuries resulting from
the child does not enter under such conditions the owner's
negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown
failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the child
boy of 15 years of age, because of his entry upon
against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed
defendant's uninclosed premises without express
upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of
permission or invitation; but it is a wholly different question
duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be
whether such a youth can be said to have been free from
held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
fault when he willfully and deliberately cut upon the
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents,
premises of a stranger without his express invitation or
knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result
permission. To hold otherwise would be expose to all the
in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by
children in the community to unknown perils and
"the particular circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid
unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or
down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct
occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the
reasonably be expected to enter.
"Torpedo" and analogous cases to which our attention has
been directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, is
This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such
necessary, and neither the contention that a man has a tender years that they were held not to have the capacity

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to understand the nature or character of the explosive We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had
instruments which fell into their hands. sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible to the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match
to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the
that his age and his experience qualified him to understand
accident was well—grown youth of 15, more mature both
and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he
of caution which would have avoided the injury which
had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury
day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury
incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence
while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials
incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in
on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive character
leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of
plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of
experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
the accident which inflicted the injury.
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present,
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur damnum sentire.
of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a (Digest, book 50, tit. 17, rule 203.)
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt
The partidas contain the following provisions:
that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years
of age, who was with him at the time when he put the "The just thing is that a man should
match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and suffer the damage which comes to him
ran away. through his own fault, and that he can not
demand reparation therefore from another."
(Law 25, tit. 5 Partida 3.)
True, he may not have known and probably did not
know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and "And they even said that when a
of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which man received an injury through his own
he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous negligence he should blame himself for it."
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he (Rule 22, tit. 34 Partida 7.)
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion.
It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity
"According to ancient sages, when
and capacity" he exercised such "care and caution" as
a man received an injury through his own
might reasonably be required of him, or that the defendant
acts the grievance should be against himself
or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries
and not against another." (Law 2, tit.
incurred by him under such circumstances.
7 Partida 2.)

The law fixed no arbitrary age at which a minor

And while there does not appear to be anything in
can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand
the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching
and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own
contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless,
acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the
exercise with due care an precaution in the commission of
supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of
such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., (7 Phil. Rep., 359),
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things
clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to
the question of negligence necessarily depends on the
recover damages from the defendant, in whole or in part,
ability of the minor to understand the character of his own
for the injuries sustained by him.
acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor
can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the
acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurispredencia Civil, 391), is directly
presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in in point. In that case the court said:
these Islands may be gathered from an examination of the
varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are
"According to the doctrine
conclusively presumed to be capable to exercising certain
expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
rights and incurring certain responsibilities, through it can
fault or negligence is a source of obligation
not be said that these provisions of law are of much
when between such negligence and the
practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so
injury there exists, the relation of cause and
far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to
effect: but if the injury produced should not
become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying
be the result of acts or omissions of a third
circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of the
party, the latter has no obligation to repair
Penal code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to
the same, although such acts or omissions
be capable of committing a crime and is to be held
were imprudent or unlawful, and much less
criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is
when it is shown that the immediate cause
less than eighteen years of age will be taken into
of the injury was the negligence of the
consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal code,
injured party himself."
arts, 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may, under certain
circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 it may petition for The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900,
the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence is
consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave
of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting of legal rise to the damage."
marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G.O., No., 68, sec. 1).

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 See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish
writer, writing under that title in his Jurisprudencia del
Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the
decision of March 7, 1902, says that "in accordance with the
doctrine expressed by article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence gives rise to an obligation when between it and
the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect'
but if the damage caused does not arise from acts or
omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to make
good upon the latter, even though such acts or omissions
be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown
that the immediate cause of the damage has been the
recklessness the injured party himself."
And again —
"In accordance with the
fundamental principle of proof, that the
burden thereof is upon the plaintiff, it is
apparent that it is the duty of him who shall
claim damages to establish their existence.
The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March
18, July 6, and September 27, 1898, have
especially supported the principle, the first
setting forth in detail the necessary points
of the proof, which are two: An act or
omission on the part of the person who is to
be charged with the liability, and the
production of the damage by said act or
omission.
"This includes, by inference, the
establishment of a relation of cause or
effect between the act or the omission and
the damage; the latter must be direct result
of one of the first two. As the decision of
March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that
damages result immediately and directly
from an act performed culpably and
wrongfully' 'necessarily presupposing a
legal ground for imputability.'" (Decision of
October 29, 1877.)
"Negligence is not presumed, but
be proven by him who alleges it." (Scaevola,
Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp.
551, 552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12,
1900. and June 23, 1900.)
Finally, we think the doctrine is in this jurisdiction
applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this
court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while
"There are many cases (personal injury cases) in the
supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was
exonerated." on the ground that "the negligence of the
plaintiff was immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of
the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of
March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none
of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain "define
the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff which
contributed to his injury as one of its causes, though not the
principal one, and we left to seek the theory of the civil law
in the law in the practice of another countries;" and in such
cases we declared the law in this jurisdiction to require the
application of 'the principle of proportional damages," but
expressly and definitely denied the right of recovery when
the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of
the accident.
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The doctrine as laid down in that case as follows: 
"Difficulty seems to be
apprehended in deciding which acts of the
injured party shall be considered immediate
causes of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the
accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been
no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independence of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For
instance, the cause of the accident under
review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This
produced the event giving occasion for
damages — that is, sinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails. To this event,
the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side
of the car did not contribute, although it was
an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had the crosspiece been out of
place wholly or partly through this act or
omission of duty, that would have been one
of the determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence."
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine
thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the
accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own act
of putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that
having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of
its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the
effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premises the detonating caps, the property of the
defendant, and carrying them sway to the home of his
friend, as interrupting the relation of cause and effect
between the negligent act or omission of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries
inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these
caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action
on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no
effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether
in view of the well known facts admitted in defendant's brief
that "boys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth
of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed
without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the
circumstances of this case, we neither discuss not decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let
judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court
below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten
days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where judgment will be entered in
favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the
complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Moreland, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., concurs in the result.
|||  (Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., G.R.
No. 4977, [March 22, 1910], 16 PHIL 8-30)
5 Bataclan v Medina, 102 Phil 181
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10126. October 22, 1957.]
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN and the minors NORMA,
LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR and
ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by
their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE
BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R.
Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; CARRIER'S LIABILITY; WORDS AND
PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED. — "The proximate
legal cause is that the acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might be probably result therefrom."
2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF DEATH. — When a vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with the lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but
most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where the lanterns
and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch
the most handy and available; and what was more natural,
that said rescuers should innocently approached the
overtuned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. Held: That the proximate cause of
the death of B was overturning of the vehicle thru the
negligence of defendant and his agent.
3. ID.; ID.; CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF
THE BUS. — The burning of the bus wherein some of the
passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor
who were on the road walking back and forth. They should
and must have known that in the position in which the
overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around
the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled,
especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver
and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn
the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus,
constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the
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carrier under the provisions of the Civil Code, particularly,
Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J p:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952,
bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of
public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including
the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe
Lara, seated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger
apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses
just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated
on the left side of the driver, and a woman named Natalia
Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2 :00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was
running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell
into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus
the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled
out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver,
named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of
the overturned bus. Some of the passengers, after they had
clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from
inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan
and Lara, who said that they could not get out of the bus.
There, is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not
the passengers already free from the wreck, including the
driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the
vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the
houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about
ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of
bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with
petroleum. These men presumably approached the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including
the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that
as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape
from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading
over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by
one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four
doomed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified, specially that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his
death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in
behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount
of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite
awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney's
fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried
by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the
fire. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision
to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in
the complaint.
Our New Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of a common carrier to its passengers and
their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing
the pertinent codal provisions:
 "ART. 1733. Common carriers, from
the nature of their business and for reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according
to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is
further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756."
"ART. 1755. A common carrier is
bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances."
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"ART. 1759. Common carriers are
liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or wilful
acts of the former's employees, although
such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common
carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees."
"ART. 1763. A common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could
have prevented or stopped the act or
omission."
We agree with the trial court that the case involves
a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely
to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial
court that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is
evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus
was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and
as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the
witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point
where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the
bus overturned after zig-zagging, there was a distance of
about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must
have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but
because of the velocity at which the bus must have been
running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150
meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances,
the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what
degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the
bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started,
Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries,
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries
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suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
". . . 'that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal
cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible
for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment
of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom."
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns,
and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical
injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one
might still contend that the proximate cause of his death
was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in
the present case and under the circumstances obtaining in
the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the
bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of
the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted
torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had
to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the
coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part
be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its
driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back
and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must
have known that in the position in which the overturned bus
was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
come under the codal provisions above- reproduced,
particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regards the damages to which plaintiffs are
entitled, considering the earning capacity of the deceased,
as well as the other elements entering into a damage
award, we are satisfied that the amount of SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory
 compensation, this to include compensatory, moral, and
other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled
to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services
rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in the trial court,
but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of
the able briefs prepared by them, the attorney's fees may
well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS. The award
made by the trial court of ONE HUNDRED (P100) PESOS for
the loss of the merchandise carried by the deceased in the
bus, is adequate and will not be disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it
does not shock us. According to the evidence, one of the
passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her,
was hospitalized, and while in the hospital, she was visited
by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of his
visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus
inspectors, telling said inspector to have the tires of the bus
changed immediately because they were already old, and
that as a matter of fact, he had been telling the driver to
change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver
had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary
precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he
changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones,
as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite his
speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would
not have occurred. All in all, there is reason to believe that
the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently,
resulting in the death of four of his passengers, physical
injuries to others, and the complete loss and destruction of
their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on
motion of the fiscal and with his consent, was provisionally
dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on
whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint,
either failed to appear or were reluctant to testify. But the
record of the case before us shows that several witnesses,
passengers in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified
in court to the effect that the said driver was negligent. In
the public interest, the prosecution of said erring driver
should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but
for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public
utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Department of Justice and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that
the damages awarded by the trial court are increased from
ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS to SIX THOUSAND (P6,000)
PESOS, and from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED
(P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan and for attorney's
fees, respectively, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista
Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion., Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
||| (Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No. L-10126, [October 22,
1957], 102 PHIL 181-189)
6 Mercury Drug v Baking, GR No. 156037, 15 May 2007
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156037. May 25, 2007.]
MERCURY DRUG
CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.SEBASTIAN
M. BAKING, respondent.
DECISION
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated May 30, 2002 and
Resolution dated November 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57435, entitled "Sebastian M. Baking, plaintiff-
appellee, versus Mercury Drug Co. Inc.,defendant-
appellant." CHaDIT
The facts are:
On November 25, 1993, Sebastian M. Baking,
respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical
check-up. On the following day, after undergoing an ECG, blood,
and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that
respondent's blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal
levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions —
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride.
Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug
Corporation (Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribed medicines.
However, the saleslady misread the prescription
for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum.Thus, what was
sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong
medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three
consecutive days — November 6, 1993 at 9:00 p.m.,November 7
at 6:00 a.m.,and November 8 at 7:30 a.m.
On November 8 or on the third day he took the
medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he
was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta.
Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember
anything about the collision nor felt its impact. aSECAD
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing
on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision,
respondent returned to Dr. Sy's clinic. Upon being shown the
medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to
respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Thus, on April 14, 1994, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 80 of Quezon City a complaint
for damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-
20193.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision
dated March 18, 1997 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
by preponderance of evidence, the Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the latter to pay mitigated damages as
follows:
1. P250,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees
and litigation expenses;
3. plus 1/2% of the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision,
affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
November 5, 2002.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is not in accord with law or prevailing jurisprudence.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the
petition lacks merit and, therefore, should be denied.
 The issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether
such negligence was the proximate cause of respondent's
accident; and
2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: HCSEIT
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. 3
There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is
imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people
will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise
the highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we
defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. AHaETS
Obviously, petitioner's employee was grossly negligent
in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of
life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should
have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should
have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was
indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands. 4
Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the
accident was respondent's negligence in driving his car.
We disagree.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy, and precedent. 5
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred
had petitioner's employee been careful in reading Dr. Sy's
prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping
tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while
driving his car, resulting in a collision.
Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the
same Code which states:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in
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which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions. aACEID
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
It is thus clear that the employer of a negligent
employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When
an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been
negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of
his employee or in the supervision over him, after such
selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a
clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. 6 Here, petitioner's
failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by
the latter.
As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the
same to be in order. Moral damages may be awarded whenever
the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.7
Respondent has adequately established the factual
basis for the award of moral damages when he testified that he
suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident
caused by the negligence of petitioner's employee.
There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However,
it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered. 8 Taking
into consideration the attending circumstances here, we are
convinced that the amount awarded by the trial court is
exorbitant. Thus, we reduce the amount of moral damages from
P250,000.00 to P50,000.00 only.
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award
exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the grant of exemplary
damages by way of example or correction for the public good.
As mentioned earlier, the drugstore business is affected with
public interest. Petitioner should have exerted utmost diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees. On the part of
the employee concerned, she should have been extremely
cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the
sensitive nature of its business, petitioner must at all times
maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is in
order. SADECI
On the matter of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for the award
thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. 9 Since
the trial court's decision did not give the basis of the award, the
same must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v.
Manila Electric Company, 10 we held:
Likewise, the award for attorney's
fees and litigation expenses should be
deleted. Well-enshrined is that "an award
 for attorney's fees must be stated in the
text of the court's decision and not in the
dispositive portion only" (Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court
of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng
Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]).This is also
true with the litigation expenses where the
body of the decision discussed nothing for
its basis.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 57435 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a)
the award of moral damages to respondent is reduced from
P250,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) petitioner is likewise ordered to
pay said respondent exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses is deleted.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J.,Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., is on leave.
|||  (Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, G.R. No.
156037, [May 25, 2007], 551 PHIL 182-191)
7 Fernando v Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 714
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 92087. May 8, 1992.]
SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as
the legal guardian of her minor
children, namely: ALBERTO &
ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO,
ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO,
ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and
as the legal guardian of her minor
children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO,
DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed
BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her
behalf and as legal guardian of her
minor children, namely: GILBERT,
GLEN, JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all
surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA
LIAGOSO, in her behalf and as guardian
ad litem, of her minor grandchildren,
namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE
and GERRY, all surnamed
LIAGOSO, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE; TEST TO DETERMINE
EXISTENCE OF NEGLIGENCE. — Negligence has been defined as
the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-
21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a
person who by his omission causes damage to another, there
being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done (Article
2176, New Civil Code). As to what would constitute a negligent
act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809,
Page 63 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
813) provides Us the answer, to wit: "The test by which to
determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE MUST BE THE
IMMEDIATE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY. — To be entitled
to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the
omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of
the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause
has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil.
181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an
arduous one if the claimant did not in any way contribute to the
negligence of the defendant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION
WHERE INJURY RESULTS FROM NEGLIGENCE OF BOTH PARTIES.
— where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence
of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts
shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. In
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-
30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the
situation: "Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which
acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes
of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of
the accident under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track
and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the
plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to
himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of
the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he
would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can
not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such
injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own
imprudence."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF PERSON HOLDING OUT AS HAVING
PROFESSIONAL SKILL. — Considering the nature of the task of
emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should
undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind
of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His
failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co., v. Phil. Motors
Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do (emphasis Ours). The
fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the
victims' negligence.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROXIMATE AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF
DEATH IN CASE AT BAR IS VICTIM'S NEGLIGENCE; NO DAMAGES
CAN BE DEMANDED. — Considering that there was yet no award
and order to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the
market master or his security guards to supervise the work
could not have started. Also, the victims could not have been
seen working in the area because the septic tank was hidden by
a garbage storage which is more or less ten (10) meters away
from the comfort room itself. The surreptitious way in which the
victims did their job without clearance from the market master
or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even
their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank. The herein circumstances lead Us to no
other conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause
of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.
Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the
public respondent.
6. ID.; NUISANCE; TOILETS AND SEPTIC TANKS ARE NOT
NUISANCE PER SE. — Toilets and septic tanks are not
nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the
public. While the construction of these public facilities demands
utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the
putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari praying that the
amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 11,
1990 in CA-G.R. No. C.V. 04846, entitled "Sofia Fernando, etc.,
et al. v. The City of Davao," be reversed and that its original
decision dated January 31, 1986 be reinstated subject to the
modification sought by the petitioners in their motion for partial
reconsideration dated March 6, 1986.
The antecedent facts are briefly narrated by the trial court, as
follows:
"From the evidence presented we see the
following facts: On November 7, 1975,
Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao
Public Market filed a requisition request with
the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank
in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano
Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr.
Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975
Bascon was notified and he signed the
purchase order. However, before such date,
specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder
Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso,
Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were
found dead inside the septic tank. The
bodies were removed by a fireman. One
body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out
by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the
Regional Hospital but he expired there. The
City Engineer's office investigated the case
and learned that the five victims entered
the septic tank without clearance from it nor
with the knowledge and consent of the
market master. In fact, the septic tank was
found to be almost empty and the victims
were presumed to be the ones who did the
re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City
Health Office autopsied the bodies and in
his reports, put the cause of death of all five
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victims as `asphyxia' caused by the
diminution of oxygen supply in the body
working below normal conditions. The lungs
of the five victims burst, swelled in
hemorrhagic areas and this was due to their
intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was
sulfide gas produced from the waste matter
inside the septic tank." (p. 177, Records).
On August 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this case is
hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement
as to costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Records, p. 181)
From the said decision, the petitioners appealed to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). On January
3, 1986, the appellate court issued a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the facts fully
established and in the liberal interpretation
of what the Constitution and the law
intended to protect the plight of the poor
and the needy, the ignorant and the
indigent — more entitled to social justice for
having, in the unforgettable words of
Magsaysay, 'less in life,' We hereby reverse
and get aside the appealed judgment and
render another one:
 
"1. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs Dionisio Fernando, Sofia Fernando
and her minor children the following sums of
money:
a) Compensatory damages for his
death P30,000.00
b) Moral damages P20,000.00.
"2. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs David Garcia and Anita Garcia the
following sums of money:
a) Compensatory damages for his
death P30,000.00
b) Moral damages P20,000.00
"3. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff Rosalia Bertulado (sic) and her
minor children the following sums of money.
a) Compensatory damages for his
death P30,000.00
b) Moral damages P20,000.00
"4. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff Primitiva Fajardo and her minor
children the following sums of money:
a) Compensatory damages for his
death P30,000.00
b) Moral damages P20,000.00
"5. Ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiffs Norma Liagoso, Nicolas Liagoso
and Emeteria Liagoso and her minor
grandchildren the following sums of money:
a) Compensatory damages for his
death P30,000.00
 b) Moral damages P20,000.00
The death compensation is fixed at
P30,000.00 in accordance with the rulings of
the Supreme Court starting with People vs.
De la Fuente Nos. L-63251-32, December
29, 1983, 126 SCRA 518 reiterated in the
recent case of People vs. Nepomuceno, No.
L-41412, May 27, 1985. Attorney's fees in
the amount of P10,000.00 for the handling
of the case for the 5 victims is also
awarded. LLjur
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 33-34).
Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. On
January 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding merit in the motion
for reconsideration of the defendant-
appellee Davao City, the same is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of this Court dated
January 31, 1986 is reversed and set aside
and another one is hereby rendered
dismissing the case. No pronouncement as
to costs.
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 25).
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for resolution:
"1. Is the respondent Davao City guilty of
negligence in the case at bar?
"2. If so, is such negligence the immediate
and proximate cause of deaths of the
victims hereof?" (p. 73, Rollo)
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v.
Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
674, 680). Under the law, a person who by his omission causes
damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what
would constitute a negligent act in a given situation, the case of
Picart v. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the answer, to
wit:
can be profitably said: Reasonable men
govern their conduct by the circumstances
which are before them or known to them.
They are not, and are not supposed to be;
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn
of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion
born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence
in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing the conduct or guarding against
its consequences."(Emphasis supplied)
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must prove
under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v.
Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and
effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in any way
contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where
the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both
parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be
considered the proximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this
Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the situation:

"The test by which to determine the

existence or negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts
the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the
man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.

"The question as to what would constitute

the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculation
cannot here be of much value but this much

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 "Difficulty seems to be apprehended in "Q And to be able to go to the market place,
deciding which acts of the injured party where you claim you have a stall,
shall be considered immediate causes of the you have to pass on the septic
accident. The test is simple. Distinction tank?
must be made between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without "A Yes, sir.
which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering "Q Day in and day out, you pass on top of
into it, independent of it, but contributing to the septic tank?
his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause "A Yes, sir.
of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure "Q Is it not a fact that everybody living
to replace it. This produced the event giving along the creek passes on top of
occasion for damages — that is, the sinking this septic tank as they go out from
of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. the place and return to their place
To this event, the act of the plaintiff in of residence, is that correct?
walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of And this septic tank, rather the
the damage which came to himself. Had the whole of the septic tank, is covered
crosspiece been out of place wholly or by a lead?
partly through his act or omission of duty,
that would have been one of the "A Yes, sir. there is a cover.
determining causes of the event or
accident, for which he would have been "Q And there were three (3) of these lead
responsible. Where he contributes to the covering the septic tank?
principal occurrence, as one of its
"A Yes, sir.
determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, "Q And this has always been closed?
he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant "A Yes, sir." (TSN, November 26, 1979, pp.
responsible for the event should pay for 21-23, Emphasis supplied).
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence." "ATTY. JOVER, counsel for the plaintiffs:
(emphasis Ours)
"Q You said you are residing at Davao City,
Applying all these established doctrines in the case at bar and is it not?
after a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no compelling
reason to grant the petition. We affirm. llcd "DAVID SEJOYA:

Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to  

clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an
"A Yes, sir.
accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers.
They contend that such failure was compounded by the fact that "Q How long have you been a resident of
there was no warning sign of the existing danger and no efforts Agdao?
exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or render
harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the "A Since 1953.
public respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause
of the fatal incident. "Q Where specifically in Agdao are you
residing?
We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the
public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the "A At the Public Market.
septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one.
Upon learning from the report of the market master about the "Q Which part of the Agdao Public Market is
need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public your house located?
Market, the public respondent immediately responded by
"A Inside the market in front of the fish
issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded
section.
the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon (TSN, May 24,
1983, pp. 22-25). The public respondent, therefore, lost no time "Q Do you know where the Agdao septic
in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is tank is located?
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's
failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the "A Yes, sir.
market have been using the public toilet for their personal
necessities but have remained unscathed. The testimonies of "Q How far is that septic tank located from
Messrs. Danilo Garcia and David Secoja (plaintiffs'-petitioners' your house?
witnesses) on this point are relevant, to wit:
"A Around thirty (30) meters.
"Atty. Mojica, counsel for defendant Davao
City. "Q Have you ever had a chance to use that
septic tank (public toilet)?
xxx xxx xxx
"A Yes, sir.
The place where you live is right
along the Agdao creek, is that "Q How many times, if you could
correct? remember?

DANILO GARCIA: "A Many times, maybe more than 1,000

times.
"A Yes, sir.

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 "Q Prior to November 22, 1975, have you still they have to have a building
ever used that septic tank (public permit.
toilet)?
"Q But just the same, including the sanitary
"A Yes, sir. plans, it requires your approval?

"Q How many times have you gone to that "A Yes, it requires also.
septic tank (public toilet) prior to
that date, November 22, 1975? "Q Therefore, under the National Building
Code, you are empowered not to
"A Almost 1,000 times." (TSN, February 9, approve sanitary plans if they are
1983, pp. 1-2). not in conformity with the sanitary
requirements?
The absence of any accident was due to the public
respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing "A Yes.
specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank
(TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic gas from "Q Now, in private or public buildings, do
the waste matter could not have leaked out because the you see any warning signs in the
septic tank was air-tight (TSN, ibid. p. 49). The only vicinity of septic tanks?
indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full
and needed emptying was when water came out from it "A There is no warning sign.
(TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 41). Yet, even when the "Q In residential buildings do you see any
septic tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of warning sign?
gas poisoning despite the presence of people living near it
or passing on top of it or using the public toilet for their "A There is none.
personal necessities.
"ATTY. AMPIG:
Petitioners made a lot of fuss over the lack of any ventilation
pipe in the toilet to emphasize the negligence of the city We submit that the matter is
government and presented witnesses to attest on this lack. irrelevant and immaterial, Your
However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses Honor.
were not expert witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer
Demetrio Alindada of the city government testified and "ATTY. ALBAY:
demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements like
emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and septic But that is in consonance with their
tank have been complied with. He stated that the ventilation cross-examination, your Honor.
pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could
also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in "COURT:
residential buildings (TSN, November 4, 1983, pp. 50-51). The
Anyway it is already answered.
petitioners submitted no competent evidence to corroborate
their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. "ATTY. ALBAY:
Alindada. LexLib
"Q These warning signs, are these required
We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that under the preparation of the plans?
warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the
toilet in addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already in "A It is not required.
place in that area. Toilets and septic tanks are not
nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code "Q I will just reiterate, Mr. Witness. In
which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the residences, for example like the
public. While the construction of these public facilities demands residence of Atty. Ampig or the
utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the residence of the honorable Judge,
putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements. would you say that the same
The testimony of Engr. Alindada on this matter is elucidative: principle of the septic tank, from
the water closet to the vault, is
"ATTY. ALBAY: being followed?
"Q Mr. Witness, you mentioned the several "A Yes.
aspects of the approval of the
building permit which include the "ATTY. ALBAY:
plans of an architect, sanitary
engineer and electrical plans. All of That will be all, Your Honor." (TSN,
these still pass your approval as December 6, 1983, pp. 62-63).
building official, is that correct?
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident
"DEMETRIO ALINDADA: such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to
happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case
"A Yes. at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without
authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank.
"Q So there is the sanitary plan submitted to Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
and will not be approved by you especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an
unless the same is in conformance ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the
with the provisions of the building attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
code or sanitary requirements? Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed
to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of
"A Yes, for private building constructions. his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident. In Culion Ice, Fish and Elect.
"Q How about public buildings?
Co., v. Phil. Motors Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that
"A For public buildings, they are exempted when a person holds himself out as being competent to do
for payment of building permits but things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for

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negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to
do (emphasis Ours). The fatal accident in this case would not
have happened but for the victims' negligence. Thus, the
appellate court was correct to observe that:
". . . Could the victims have died if they did
not open the septic tank which they were
not in the first place authorized to open?
Who between the passive object (septic
tank) and the active subject (the victims
herein) who, having no authority therefore,
arrogated unto themselves, the task of
opening the septic tank which caused their
own deaths should be responsible for such
deaths. How could the septic tank which has
been in existence since the 1950's be the
proximate cause of an accident that
occurred only on November 22, 1975? The
stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to
occurrence of the accident in 1975 no injury
nor death was caused by the septic tank.
The only reasonable conclusion that could
be drawn from the above is that the victims'
death was caused by their own negligence
in opening the septic tank . . ." (Rollo, p. 23)
Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market master
to supervise the area where the septic tank is located is a
reflection of the negligence of the public respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92087, [May 8,
1992], 284-A PHIL 218-232)
8 Sanitary Steam Laundry v CA, 300 SCRA 2
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119092. December 10, 1998.]
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY,
INC., petitioner, vs.
THE COURT  OF  APPEALS, NICANOR
BERNABE III, JOSEFINA BERNABE, in
their individual capacities and as
HEIRS  OF  JASON BERNABE, JOHN
JOSEPH BERNABE, VICTOR IGNACIO,
JULIETA ENRIQUEZ and RAMON
ENRIQUEZ, RENE TABLANTE, LEOMAR
MACASPAC, JR., CHARITO ESTOLANO,
NENITA SALUNOY, in their individual
capacities and as HEIRS OF DALMACIO
SALUNOY, respondents.

We do not think so. The market master knew that work on the
septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be remembered that
the bidding had just been conducted. Although the winning
bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be
made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the
accident which befell the victims who are not in any way
connected with the winning bidder happened before the award
could be given. Considering that there was yet no award and
order to commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the
market master or his security guards to supervise the work
could not have started (TSN, September 13, 1983, p. 40). Also,
the victims could not have been seen working in the area
because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage which
is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room
itself (TSN, ibid, pp. 38-39). The surreptitious way in which the
victims did their job without clearance from the market master
or any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even
their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank.
Finally, petitioners insistence on the applicability of Article 24 of
the New Civil Code cannot be sustained. Said law states: prLL
"ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at
a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his
protection."
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICTS; NEGLIGENCE
CONSISTING OF VIOLATION OF LAW IS WITHOUT LEGAL
CONSEQUENCE UNLESS IT IS THE CONTRIBUTING
CAUSE OF THE INJURY. — First of all it has not been shown
how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed,
petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
violation of the statute was the proximate or legal
cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in
part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is
without legal consequence unless it is a contributing
cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight
during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,"
that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there
was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle
was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased
[its] maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as
these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving
clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing
cause of the injury. cdasia

We approve of the appellate court's ruling that "(w)hile one

of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not
win the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of
contractual relations between the victims and the City
Government of Davao City that could give rise to any
contractual obligation, much less, any liability on the part of
Davao City." (Rollo, p. 24. The accident was indeed tragic
and We empathize with the petitioners. However, the herein
circumstances lead Us to no other conclusion than that the
proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims
was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.
ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 11, 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

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 2. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT OF PASSING
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL TESTS PRIOR TO
EMPLOYMENT, A RELIABLE INDICATOR OF EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE. — The petitioner's contention has no merit.
The Court of Appeals did not say that petitioner's failure to
submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof that
petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection of its employees. What the Court of Appeals said
was that petitioner's policy of requiring prospective
employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have
at least two (2) years experience as driver prior to
employment was not enough to prove the exercise of due
diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed to prove
by its failure to present the driver's NBI and police records
during the trial. With respect to the requirement of passing
psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would
certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence.
3. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYERS MUST EXERT EXTRA CARE
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THEIR EMPLOYEE
DRIVER. — Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on
the senses. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert
extra care in the selection and supervision of their-
employees. They must go beyond the minimum
requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the
office manager of petitioner in its Dasmariñas plant, said
that petitioner has a policy of requiring job applicants to
submit clearances from the police and the NBI. In the
case of the applicants for the position of driver they are
required to have at least two (2) years driving experience
and to be holders of a professional driver's license for at
least two years. But the supposed company policies on
employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista show in
what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they
drove their vehicles in a safe way.
4. ID.; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; COMPETENT
PROOF OF THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF LOSS, REQUIRED TO
JUSTIFY AWARD THEREOF. — With respect to the
question of damages, we find no reversible error committed
in the award of actual damages to private respondents. To
justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can
be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts. Here, the actual damages claimed by private
respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear to
have been really incurred.
5. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARDED TO
ALLEVIATE MORAL SUFFERING UNDERGONE DUE TO
DEFENDANT'S CULPABLE ACTION. — As to the moral
damages awarded, we find them to be reasonable and
necessary in view of the circumstances of this case. Moral
damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain means,
diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering
they had undergone due to the defendants culpable action.
In this case, private respondents doubtless suffered some
ordeal because some of them lost their loved ones, while
others lost their future. Within the meaning of Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, they suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. An
award of moral damages in their favor is thus
justified. TEcHCA
6. ID.; ID.; INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY, COMPUTATION THEREOF; P50,000.00 DEATH
INDEMNITY, PROPER IN CASE AT BAR. — The
award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jason Bernabe as death
indemnity is likewise in accordance with law. However, the
award of P100,000 to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy,
denominated in the decision of the trial court as "moral
damages and unearned income" cannot be upheld. The
heirs were already included among those awarded moral
damages. Marilyn Salunoy was ordered to be paid P10,000.
Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and their mother Nenita Salunoy,
P20,000, as moral damages. The amount of P100,000 was
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presumably awarded primarily for loss of earning capacity
but even then the amount must be modified. In accordance
with our cases on this question, the formula for determining
the life expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be
determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80
minus the age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46
years of age at the time of his death, as stated in his death
certificate, then his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to
68 years old. Next, his net earnings must be computed. At
the time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more
than P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that
his annual gross earnings was about P11,000.00. From this
amount, about 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
necessary living expenses because it seems his wife
occasionally finds work and thus helps in the household
expenses. Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity
was P124,300.00 computed as follows:
net earning   life   Gross   reasonable/
capacity (x) = expectancy x annual less necessary
        income   living
            expenses
             
x = [2/3(80-46)] x   [P11,00-P5,500]
  = 22.6 x   5,500  
  = P124,300.00.        
In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should
be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
7. ID.; ID.; ATTORNEY'S FEES; AWARD THEREOF
MUST BE BASED ON FINDINGS OF FACT AND LAW. — The
award of attorney's fees should be disallowed as the
trial court did not give any justification for granting it in its
decision. It is now settled that awards of attorney's fees
must be based on findings of fact and law, stated in the
decision of the trial court. EcHIAC
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes
Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and
a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and
the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the
Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All
the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who
died was the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati
found petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular
accident and accordingly held petitioner liable to private
respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney's
fees. Its decision was affirmed in toto by
the Court of Appeals. It is here for a review of the
appellate court's decision. LLphil
The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly
employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). They had just visited the construction site of a
company project at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers
were family members and friends whom they invited to an
excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction
site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when
they decided to go back to Manila. LLjur
The Cimarron, with Plate No. 840-4J, was owned by
Salvador Salenga, father of one of the employees of PMCI.
Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that
at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo
Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the
Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's panel
truck, bearing Plate No. 581 XM, which was traveling in the
opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to
petitioner's plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after delivering
some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver, As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to which
Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front of him the decision of the trial court was appealed, affirmed the
suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to decision on January 26, 1995. Hence, this appeal. prcd
avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite First. Petitioner contends that the driver of the
lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and,
on the north-bound lane. therefore, its liability should be mitigated, if not totally
extinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron was
The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations at the
and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art.
Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be negligent.
passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to
various hospitals. According to petitioner, the negligence
consisted of the following:
On December 4, 1980, private respondents filed
this civil case for damages before the then Court of First 1. The Cimarron was overloaded because there
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against petitioner. cdll were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when the passenger
capacity of the vehicle was only 17.
On November 23, 1990, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, to which the case was transferred 2. The front seat of the Cimarron was occupied by
following the reorganization of the judiciary, rendered four adults, including the driver.
judgment for private respondents. The dispositive 3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on (its
portion of its decision reads: right headlight) as its left headlight was not functioning.
It is for the reasons stated above Petitioner cites Art. III, § 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known
that the court is persuaded to award the as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as that "No person operating any vehicle shall allow more
proved in the trial as follows: passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its
Actual or compensatory registered carry capacity" and Art. IV, § 3(e) which states
expenses: LexLib that "Every motor vehicle of more than one
meter of projected width, while in use on any public
a. Charito Estolano P35,813.87 (Exh. J) highway shall bear two headlights . . . which not later than
b. Nicanor Bernabe III 20,024.94 one-half hour after sunset and until at least one-half hour
  & Josefina C. Bernabe   before sunrise and whenever weather conditions so require,
c. Julieta, Ailyn & 45,830.45 (Exh. QQ) shall both be lighted." cda
  Josefina Enriquez  
  and Josefina Valerio   Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck
d. Leonor Macaspac 2,740.00 encroached on a portion of the lane of the Cimarron does
e. Victor Rey Ignacio 14,820.64 (Exh. EEE) not show that its driver was negligent. Petitioner cites the
f. Rene Tablante 10,032.40 (Exh. QQQ) case of Bayasen v. Court of Appeals 1 which allegedly held
g. Nenita Salonoy, widow; 20,000.00 that the sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver
  and Jack & Manilyn,  LexLib  stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. Petitioner
  children   further claims that even if petitioner's swerving to the
lane of respondents were considered proof of negligence,
Moral damages should also be this fact would not negate the presumption of negligence
awarded as follows: on the part of the other driver arising from his
violations of traffic rules and regulations.
For the injuries sustained by:
Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling
a. Charito Estolano P10,000.00 (Exh. F) in Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 in which a
b. Julieta P. Enriquez 15,000.00 (Exh. MM) driver who invaded the opposite lane and caused a collision
c. Ailyn C. Enriquez 8,000.00 (Exh. NN) between his car and a truck coming from the opposite lane,
d. Josefina R. Enriquez 10,000.00 (Exh. OO) was exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear chance,
e. Josefina P. Valerio 2,000.00 (Exh. PP) which states that a person who has the last clear chance or
f. Nenita Salonoy 20,000.00 (Exh. DD) opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
g. Nicanor Bernabe III 8,000.00 (Exh. Q) negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the
h. Josephine Bernabe 2,000.00 (Exh. R) consequences of the accident. LLphil
i. John Joseph Bernabe 10,000.00
j. Manilyn G. Salonoy 10,000.00 (Exh. EE) Petitioner contends that the ruling in that case
k. Jack Salonoy 10,000.00 (Exh. JJ) should be applied to the present case. According to
l. Leonor C. Macaspac 2,000.00 (Exh. AAA) petitioner, although the driver of the panel truck was
m. Victor Ignacio 8,000.00 (Exh. DDD) initially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had the last
n. Rene Tablante 8,000.00 (Exh. FFF) opportunity to avoid the accident. However, because of his
negligence (i.e., the aforementioned violations of traffic
and finally the heirs of Jason rules and regulations such as the use of only one headlight
Bernabe should be awarded the at night and the overcrowding at the front seat of the
sum of P50,000.00 for the latter's death. vehicle), he was not able to avoid a collision with the panel
The heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should be truck. cdll
given the sum of P100,000.00 for moral
damages and unearned income. prcd We find the foregoing contention to be without
merit.
The foregoing considered,
judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged
ordering defendant to pay the amounts negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the
aforecited and to pay the further collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the
sum of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees and burden of showing a causal connection between the injury
the costs. received and the violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute
SO ORDERED. was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in

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whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other A: Based on information I received, the light
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a came from the headlights of a
contributing cause of the injury. 3 Petitioner says that certain panel owned
"driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning by Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc.
headlight during nighttime certainly increases the
risk of accident," 4 that because the Cimarron had only one xxx xxx xxx
headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact
that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat Q: You said that the lights were going
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuverability." 5 However, towards you. Now, at what pace
mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to did these lights come toward
discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged you? LexLib
negligence was the contributing cause of the injury. cdll A: Fast pace."
Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case,
there was no way either driver could have avoided the Charito Estolano, another passenger who was
collision. The panel truck driver testified: 6 seated in front of the Cimarron, similarly testified that they
just saw the panel truck hurtling toward them. She said: 8
Q. You stated you were following a jeepney
along the highway in Imus, Cavite, Q Now, you said earlier that you were
what happened afterwards, if any? involved in an accident. What was
that accident?
A. The passenger jeepney I was following
made a sudden stop so I stepped A An approaching vehicle hit us.
on the brakes. Q Now, why do you know that there was the
Q. Upon stepping on your brakes, what approaching vehicle?
happened if any? A There was a light which glared us and I
A. The Mercedes Benz (panel) suddenly knew that it came from a vehicle.
swerved to the left, sir. We were blinded.

Q. How big was the swerving to the left? Q Where was this vehicle headed
for? LibLex
A. The distance which my vehicle swerved
beyond the middle line or center A Headed for Cavite.
line to the left was about this Q Coming from?
distance, sir (witness
demonstrating by using both hands A Coming from Manila, I think.
the distance). prLL
Q So that, actually, in relation to your
ATTY. ALILING vehicle, it was coming from the
opposite direction?
Can we stipulate that it is 1 foot.
Your Honor. A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GONZALES: Q Now, you said that the light headed
towards your vehicle. On which
A little more, 1 1/2 feet. side of the highway was your
ATTY. ALILING: Tamaraw vehicle travelling at that
time?
1 1/4 feet.
A We were on the right lane.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Q Did you actually see this light from the
Between 1 1/4 and 1 1/2 feet. vehicle coming from the opposite
direction heading towards your
The panel truck driver's testimony is consistent vehicle?
with the testimonies of private respondents that the panel
truck went out of control and simply smashed into the A Yes. sir. LLjur
Cimarron in which they were riding. Thus, Nicanor Bernabe
III testified: 7 Q And what happened after that?

Q: And did you see how the accident A After that, that was an impact.
happened?
Q All right. Will you tell the Court which
A: I just saw a glare of light. That is all and bumped which?
then the impact.
A We were bumped by the vehicle which
Q: Where did you see that was coming from the opposite
glare of light? cdphil direction.

A: Coming in front ahead of us. The foregoing testimonies show that the

driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and
Q: When you say ahead of you, was it . . . ? bumped the Cimarron. Hence, even if both headlights of the
Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped just the
A: Towards us. same because the driver of the panel truck could not stop
despite the fact that he applied the brakes. Petitioner's
xxx xxx xxx contention that because of "decreased visibility," caused by
the fact that the Cimarron allegedly had only one headlight
Q: And from what did those glare of light
on, its driver failed to see the Cimarron is without any basis
come from?
in fact. Only its driver claimed that the Cimarron had only

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one headlight on. The police investigator did not state in his
report or in his testimony that the Cimarron had only one
headlight on.
Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioner's
contention that because of overcrowding in the front
seat of the Cimarron there was "decreased
maneuverability" which prevented the Cimarron driver from
avoiding the panel truck. There is absolutely no basis for
this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the
passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano,
who was seated in front, which suggest that the driver had
no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle. To the
contrary, from the testimony of some of the witnesses, 9 it
appears that the driver of the Cimarron tried to avoid the
collision but because of the emergency created by the
speeding panel truck coming from the opposite direction he
was not able to fully move his Cimarron away from the
path of the oncoming vehicle. We are convinced that no
"maneuvering" which the Cimarron driver could have done
would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given
the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in
the front seat was immaterial. Cdpr
All these point to the fact that the proximate
cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's
driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's
panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that
petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a very high
speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney
ahead of it as well.
Petitioner's driver claimed that the distance
between the panel truck and the passenger jeepney in front
was about 12 meters. 10 If this was so, he would have had
no difficulty bringing his panel truck to a stop. It is very
probable that the driver did not really apply his brakes
(which is why there were no skid marks) but that finding the
jeepney in front of him to be in close proximity, he tried to
avoid hitting it by swerving his vehicle to the left. In the
process, however, he invaded a portion of the opposite lane
and consequently hit the Cimarron. Indeed, the panel truck
driver testified that his vehicle was running at the
speed of 60 miles per hour. 11 He tried to correct himself
when asked by petitioner's counsel whether the panel truck
speedometer indicated miles or kilometers by saying that
the speedometer measured kilometers and not miles, but
on cross examination his testimony got muddled. 12
Be that as it may, whether the driver meant 60
miles per hour (which could be 96.77 kilometers per hour)
or 60 kilometers per hour, the fact remains that the panel
truck was overspeeding because the maximum allowable
speed for trucks and buses on open country roads, such as
the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite, is only 50
kilometers per hour. 13
The case of Bayasen, which petitioner invokes,
cannot apply to this case. There was no swerving of the
vehicle in that case but skidding, and it was caused by the
fact that the road was wet and slippery. In this case, the
road was dry and safe. There was no reason for the vehicle
to swerve because of road condition. The only explanation
for this occurrence was human error.
Petitioner's reliance on the McKee case is also
misplaced. In that case, the driver of the vehicle at fault, a
truck, had an opportunity to avoid the collision but he
ignored the signals from the other vehicle, a car, to slow
down and allow it to safely pass the bridge. In this case,
there was no such opportunity given the Cimarron on the
night of the mishap. Everything happened so quickly that
before the passengers of the Cimarron knew it, the vehicle
had been bumped by the truck. cdll
Second. On its liability as employer of the
negligent driver, petitioner contends that the non-
submission of the NBI clearance and police clearance of its
driver does not mean that it failed to exercise the
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diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. It argues that there is no law
requiring employees to submit NBI and police clearance
prior to their employment. Hence, petitioner's failure to
require submission of these documents does not mean that
it did not exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. On the other hand, it asserts
that its employment of Herman Hernandez as a driver
means that he had passed the screening tests of the
company, including submission of the aforementioned
documents. Petitioner maintains that the presumption is
that the said driver submitted NBI and police clearance.
Petitioner likewise contends that
the Court of Appeal's position that it failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
by not requiring its prospective employees to undergo
psychological and physical tests before employment has no
basis in law because there is no law requiring such tests
prior to hiring employees. llcd
The petitioner's contention has no merit.
The Court of Appeals did not say that petitioner's failure to
submit NBI and police clearances of its driver was proof that
petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection of its employees. What the Court of Appeals said
was that petitioner's policy of requiring prospective
employees to submit NBI and police clearance and to have
at least two (2) years experience as driver prior to
employment was not enough to prove the exercise of due
diligence and that even this policy petitioner failed to prove
by its failure to present the driver's NBI and police records
during the trial. prcd
With respect to the requirement of passing
psychological and physical tests prior to his employment,
although no law requires it, such circumstance would
certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said: 14
. . . No tests of skill, physical as
well as mental and emotional, were
conducted on their would-be employees.
No on-the-job training and seminars
reminding employees, especially
drivers, of road courtesies and road rules
and regulations were done. There were no
instructions given to defendant's driver's
as to how to react in cases of emergency
nor what to do after an emergency
occurs. There was even failure on the
part of defendant to present its concerned
employee's 204 file. All these could only
mean failure on the part of defendant to
exercise the diligence required of it of a
good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. 15 Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert
extra care in the selection and supervision of their
employees. They must go beyond the minimum
requirements fixed by law. In this case, David Bautista, the
office manager of petitioner in its Dasmariñas plant, said
that petitioner has a policy of requiring job applicants to
submit clearances from the police and the NBI. In the
case of applicants for the position of driver they are
required to have at least two (2) years driving experience
and to be holders of a professional driver's license for at
least two years. But the supposed company policies on
employment were not in writing. Nor did Bautista show in
what manner he supervised the drivers to ensure that they
drove their vehicles in a safe way.
Third. With respect to the question of damages, we
find no reversible error committed in the award of actual
damages to private respondents. To justify an
 award of actual damages, there must be competent the further amount of P50,000.00 for death indemnity are
proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given awarded to the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy and the
only to claims which are duly supported by award of P50,000.00 for attorney's fees is disallowed. In all
receipts. 16 Here, the actual damages claimed by private other respects the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. LLjur
respondents were duly supported by receipts and appear to
have been really incurred. cda SO ORDERED.

As to the moral damages awarded, we find them to Bellosillo, Puno and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

be reasonable and necessary in view of the ||| (Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
circumstances of this case. Moral damages are awarded to G.R. No. 119092, [December 10, 1998], 360 PHIL 199-
allow the victims to obtain means, diversion, or amusement 217)
to alleviate the moral suffering they had undergone due to
the defendant's culpable action. 17 In this case, private 9 Vallacar Transit v Catubig, GR No. 175512, 30 May
respondents doubtless suffered some ordeal because 2011
some of them lost their loved ones, while others lost their
future. Within the meaning of Art. 2217 of the Civil Code,
they suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings. An award of moral damages
in their favor is thus justified. FIRST DIVISION

The award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Jason

Bernabe as death indemnity is likewise in accordance with [G.R. No. 175512. May 30, 2011.]
law. 18 However, the award of P100,000 to the
heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy, denominated in the
decision of the trial court as "moral damages and unearned VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., petitioner, vs.
income" cannot be upheld. The heirs were already included JOCELYN CATUBIG, respondent.
among those awarded moral damages. Marilyn Salunoy was
ordered to be paid P10,000, Jack Salunoy, P10,000, and
their mother Nenita Salunoy, P20,000, as moral damages.
The amount of P100,000 was presumably awarded primarily DECISION
for loss of earning capacity but even then the amount must
be modified. In accordance with our cases 19 on this
question, the formula for determining the life
expectancy of Dalmacio Salunoy must be determined by
applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
age of the deceased). Since Salunoy was 46 years of age at
the time of his death, as stated in his death certificate, then For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
his life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years the Decision 1 dated November 17, 2005 and the
old. LLphil Resolution 2 dated November 16, 2006 of the Court
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815, which modified the
Next, his net earnings must be computed. At the
Decision 3 dated January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial
time of his death, Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more than
Court (RTC), Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, in Civil Case No.
P900.00 a month as bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his
11360, an action for recovery of damages based on Article
annual gross earnings was about P11,000.00. From this
2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code, filed by
amount, about 50% should be deducted as reasonable and
respondent Jocelyn Catubig against petitioner Vallacar
necessary living expenses because it seems his wife
Transit, Inc. While the RTC dismissed respondent's claim for
occasionally finds work and thus helps in the household
damages, the Court of Appeals granted the same.
expenses.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Based on the foregoing, his net earning capacity
was P124,300.00 computed as follows: 20 Petitioner is engaged in the business of
transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus
reasonable
net earning   life   Gross   with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla)
&
is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner.
capacity (x) =
x     annual less necessary
expectancy On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband,
        income   living Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from
            expenses Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his
[P11,000 — employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the
x = [2 (80-46)] x  
P5,500] one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at
    ——         kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow
    3         moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the
  = 22.6 x 5,500     opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres
P124,300.0 Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite
  =        
0 direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and
Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died
In addition, the heirs of Dalmacio Salunoy should
on the spot where he was thrown, while Emperado died
be paid P50,000.00 as death indemnity. prcd
while being rushed to the hospital.
Finally, the award of attorney's fees should be
On February 1, 1994, Cabanilla was charged with
disallowed as the trial court did not give any justification for
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide in
granting it in its decision. It is now settled that
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the Municipal Circuit Trial
awards of attorney's fees must be based on findings of fact
Court (MCTC) of Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province
and law, stated in the decision of the trial court. 21
of Negros Oriental. After preliminary investigation, the
WHEREFORE, the MCTC issued a Resolution on December 22, 1994,
decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in the sense dismissing the criminal charge against Cabanilla. It found
that the award of P10,000.00 denominated "for moral that Cabanilla was not criminally liable for the deaths of
damages and unearned income" is deleted, and lieu thereof Catubig and Emperado, because there was no negligence,
the amount of P124,300.00 for loss of earning capacity and not even contributory, on Cabanilla's part.

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 Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC on July
19, 1995 a Complaint for Damages against petitioner,
seeking actual, moral, and exemplary damages, in the total
amount of P484,000.00, for the death of her husband,
Catubig, based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176,
of the Civil Code.Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly
liable because the latter's employee driver, Cabanilla, was
reckless and negligent in driving the bus which collided with
Catubig's motorcycle.
Petitioner, in its Answer with Counterclaim,
contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular
collision, which resulted in the deaths of Catubig and
Emperado, was the sole negligence of Catubig when he
imprudently overtook another vehicle at a curve and
traversed the opposite lane of the road. As a special and
affirmative defense, petitioner asked for the dismissal of
respondent's complaint for not being verified and/or for
failure to state a cause of action, as there was no allegation
that petitioner was negligent in the selection or supervision
of its employee driver.
In the Pre-Trial Order 4 dated June 10, 1997, the
parties stipulated that the primary issue for trial was
whether or not petitioner should be held liable for Catubig's
death. Trial then ensued.
Police Officer (PO) 2 Robert B. Elnas
(Elnas), 5 Emilio Espiritu (Espiritu), 6 Dr. Norberto Baldado,
Jr. (Dr. Baldado), 7 Peter Cadimas (Cadimas), 8 and
respondent 9 herself testified in support of respondent's
complaint.
PO2 Elnas conducted an investigation of the
collision incident. According to PO2 Elnas, the bus was
running fast, at a speed of 100 kilometers per hour, when it
collided with the motorcycle which was trying to overtake a
truck. The collision occurred on the lane of the bus. Catubig
was flung 21 meters away, and Emperado, 11 meters away,
from the point of impact. The motorcycle was totaled; the
chassis broke into three parts, and the front wheel and the
steering wheel with the shock absorbers were found 26
meters and 38 meters, respectively, from the collision
point. In contrast, only the front bumper of the bus suffered
damage.
Cadimas personally witnessed the collision of the
bus and the motorcycle. He recalled that he was then
waiting for a ride to Dumaguete City and saw the Ceres
Bulilit bus making a turn at a curve. Cadimas signaled the
said bus to halt but it was running fast. Cadimas also
recollected that there was a cargo truck running slow in the
opposite direction of the bus. Cadimas next heard a thud
and saw that the bus already collided with a motorcycle.
Espiritu was the photographer who took
photographs of the scene of the accident. He identified the
five photographs which he had taken of Catubig lying on
the ground, bloodied; broken parts of the motorcycle; and
the truck which Catubig tried to overtake.
Dr. Baldado was the medico-legal doctor who
conducted the post-mortem examination of Catubig's body.
He reported that Catubig suffered from the following
injuries: laceration and fracture of the right leg; laceration
and fracture of the left elbow; multiple abrasions in the
abdominal area, left anterior chest wall, posterior right arm,
and at the back of the left scapular area; and contusion-
hematoma just above the neck. Dr. Baldado confirmed that
Catubig was already dead when the latter was brought to
the hospital, and that the vehicular accident could have
caused Catubig's instantaneous death.
Respondent herself testified to substantiate the
amount of damages she was trying to recover from
petitioner for Catubig's death, such as Catubig's earning
capacity; expenses incurred for the wake and burial of
Catubig, as well as of Emperado; the cost of the motorcycle;
and the costs of the legal services and fees respondent had
incurred.
Page 74 of 78 | TORTS 2nd Reading Assignment (2019-2020)
Respondent's documentary exhibits consisted of
her and Catubig's Marriage Contract dated August 21, 1982,
their two children's Certificate of Live Births, Catubig's
College Diploma dated March 24, 1983, the list and receipts
of the expenses for Catubig's burial, the sketch of the
collision site prepared by PO2 Elnas, the excerpts from the
police blotter, the photographs of the collision, 10 and the
Post Mortem Report 11 on Catubig's cadaver prepared by
Dr. Baldado.
In an Order 12 dated October 6, 1998, the RTC
admitted all of respondent's aforementioned evidence.
On the other hand, Rosie C. Amahit
(Amahit) 13 and Nunally Maypa (Maypa) 14 took the
witness stand for petitioner.
Amahit was a Court Stenographer at the MCTC who
took the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal
Case No. M-15-94 against Cabanilla. Amahit verified that
the document being presented by the defense in the
present case was a true and correct copy of the TSN of the
preliminary investigation held in Criminal Case No. M-15-94
on May 25, 1994, and another document was a duplicate
original of the MCTC Resolution dated December 22, 1994
dismissing Criminal Case No. M-15-94.
Maypa is the Administrative and Personnel
Manager at the Dumaguete branch of petitioner. He started
working for petitioner on September 22, 1990 as a clerk at
the Human Resources Development Department at the
Central Office of petitioner in Bacolod City. Sometime in
November 1993, he became an Administrative Assistant at
the Dumaguete branch of petitioner; and in August 1995,
he was promoted to his current position at the same
branch.
While he was still an Administrative Assistant,
Maypa was responsible for the hiring of personnel including
drivers and conductors. Maypa explained that to be hired as
a driver, an applicant should be 35 to 45 years old, have at
least five years experience in driving big trucks, submit
police, court, and medical clearances, and possess all the
necessary requirements for driving a motor vehicle of more
than 4,500 kilograms in gross weight such as a professional
driver's license with a restriction code of 3. The applicant
should also pass the initial interview, the actual driving and
maintenance skills tests, and a written psychological
examination involving defensive driving techniques. Upon
passing these examinations, the applicant still had to go
through a 15-day familiarization of the bus and road
conditions before being deployed for work. Maypa,
however, admitted that at the time of his appointment as
Administrative Assistant at the Dumaguete branch,
Cabanilla was already an employee driver of petitioner.
Maypa further explained the investigation and
grievance procedure followed by petitioner in cases of
vehicular accidents involving the latter's employee drivers.
Maypa related that Cabanilla had been put on preventive
suspension following the vehicular accident on January 27,
1994 involving the bus Cabanilla was driving and the
motorcycle carrying Catubig and Emperado. Following an
internal investigation of said accident conducted by
petitioner, Cabanilla was declared not guilty of causing the
same, for he had not been negligent.
Lastly, Maypa recounted the expenses petitioner
incurred as a result of the present litigation.
The documentary exhibits of petitioner consisted
of the TSN of the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case
No. M-15-94 held on May 25, 1994 before the MCTC of
Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros
Oriental; Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC
in the same case; and the Minutes dated February 17, 1994
of the Grievance Proceeding conducted by petitioner
involving Cabanilla. 15
 The RTC, in its Order 16 dated November 12,
1999, admitted all the evidence presented by petitioner.
On January 26, 2000, the RTC promulgated its
Decision favoring petitioner. Based on the sketch prepared
by PO2 Elnas, which showed that "the point of impact . . .
occurred beyond the center lane near a curve within the
lane of the Ceres bus[;]"17 plus, the testimonies of PO2
Elnas and Cadimas that the motorcycle recklessly tried to
overtake a truck near a curve and encroached the opposite
lane of the road, the RTC ruled that the proximate cause of
the collision of the bus and motorcycle was the negligence
of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig. The RTC,
moreover, was convinced through the testimony of Maypa,
the Administrative and Personnel Manager of the
Dumaguete branch of petitioner, that petitioner had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employee drivers, including Cabanilla.  P250,000.00 as total death indemnity lacks factual and
After trial, the RTC concluded:
WHEREFORE, finding
preponderance of evidence in favor of the
[herein petitioner] that the [herein
respondent's] husband is the reckless and
negligent driver and not the driver of the
[petitioner], the above-entitled case is
hereby ordered dismissed.
[Petitioner's] counterclaim is also
dismissed for lack of merit. 18
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In
its Decision dated November 17, 2005, the appellate court
held that both Catubig and Cabanilla were negligent in
driving their respective vehicles. Catubig, on one hand,
failed to use reasonable care for his own safety and ignored
the hazard when he tried to overtake a truck at a curve.
Cabanilla, on the other hand, was running his vehicle at a
high speed of 100 kilometers per hour. The Court of Appeals
also brushed aside the defense of petitioner that it
exercised the degree of diligence exacted by law in the
conduct of its business. Maypa was not in a position to
testify on the procedures followed by petitioner in hiring
Cabanilla as an employee driver considering that Cabanilla
was hired a year before Maypa assumed his post at the
Dumaguete branch of petitioner.
Thus, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, based on the
foregoing, the assailed decision of the trial
court is modified. We rule that [herein
petitioner] is equally liable for the accident
in question which led to the deaths of
Quintin Catubig, Jr. and Teddy Emperado
and hereby award to the heirs of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. the amount [of] P250,000.00 as
full compensation for the death of the
latter. 19
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner in a Resolution dated
November 16, 2006.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review.
Petitioner asserts that respondent's complaint for
damages should be dismissed for the latter's failure to
verify the same. The certification against forum shopping
attached to the complaint, signed by respondent, is not a
valid substitute for respondent's verification that she "has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true
and correct of her personal knowledge or based on
authentic records." 20 Petitioner cited jurisprudence in
which the Court ruled that a pleading lacking proper
verification is treated as an unsigned pleading, which
produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court.
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Petitioner also denies any vicarious or imputed
liability under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of
the Civil Code.According to petitioner, respondent failed to
prove the culpability of Cabanilla, the employee driver of
petitioner. There are already two trial court decisions (i.e.,
the Resolution dated December 22, 1994 of the MCTC of
Manjuyod-Bindoy-Ayungon of the Province of Negros
Oriental in Criminal Case No. M-15-94 and the Decision
dated January 26, 2000 of the RTC in the instant civil suit)
explicitly ruling that the proximate cause of the collision
was Catubig's reckless and negligent act. Thus, without the
fault or negligence of its employee driver, no liability at all
could be imputed upon petitioner.
Petitioner additionally argues, without conceding
any fault or liability, that the award by the Court of Appeals
in respondent's favor of the lump sum amount of
legal basis. Respondent's evidence to prove actual or
compensatory damages are all self-serving, which are
either inadmissible in evidence or devoid of probative
value. The award of moral and exemplary damages is
likewise contrary to the ruling of the appellate court that
Catubig should be equally held liable for his own death.
Respondent maintains that the Court of Appeals
correctly adjudged petitioner to be liable for Catubig's
death and that the appellate court had already duly passed
upon all the issues raised in the petition at bar.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, we find no procedural defect that
would have warranted the outright dismissal of
respondent's complaint.
Respondent filed her complaint for damages
against petitioner on July 19, 1995, when the 1964 Rules of
Court was still in effect. Rule 7, Section 6 of the 1964 Rules
of Court provided:
SEC. 6. Verification. — A pleading
is verified only by an affidavit stating that
the person verifying has read the pleading
and that the allegations thereof are true of
his own knowledge.
Verifications based on "information
and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," shall be deemed
insufficient.
On July 1, 1997, the new rules on civil procedure
took effect. The foregoing provision was carried on, with a
few amendments, as Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, viz:
SEC. 4. Verification. — Except
when otherwise specifically required by law
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his knowledge and
belief.
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based on
"information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated
as an unsigned pleading."
The same provision was again amended by A.M.
No. 00-2-10, which became effective on May 1, 2000. It now
reads:
SEC. 4. Verification. — Except
when otherwise specifically required by law
 or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge
or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified
which contains a verification based on
"information and belief" or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated
as an unsigned pleading.
The 1997 Rules of Court, even prior to its
amendment by A.M. No. 00-2-10, clearly provides that a
pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect. However,
it also just as clearly states that "[e]xcept when otherwise
specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit." No such
law or rule specifically requires that respondent's complaint
for damages should have been verified.
Although parties would often submit a joint
verification and certificate against forum shopping, the two
are different.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, 21 we already
pointed out that:
A party's failure to sign the
certification against forum shopping is
different from the party's failure to sign
personally the verification. The certificate of
non-forum shopping must be signed by the
party, and not by counsel. The certification
of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the
requirement on verification of a pleading is
a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite. It
is intended simply to secure an assurance
that what are alleged in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The
party need not sign the verification. A
party's representative, lawyer or any person
who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the
verification. 22
In the case before us, we stress that as a general
rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law
or rule specifically requiring the same. Examples of
pleadings that require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed
in civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure; (2) petition for review from the Regional Trial
Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law
under Rule 41, Section 2; (3) petition for review of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-
judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43,
Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45, Section 1; (6) petition for annulment of
judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47,
Section 4; (7) complaint for injunction under Rule 58,
Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9)
application for appointment of a receiver under Rule 59,
Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under
Rule 61, Section 1; (11) petition for certiorari against the
judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional
commissions under Rule 64, Section 2; (12) petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65,
Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto under Rule
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66, Section 1; (14) complaint for expropriation under Rule
67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule
71, Section 4, all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all
complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate
controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-
Corporate Controversies; (17) complaint or petition for
rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim
Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for
summary proceedings under the Family Code.
In contrast, all complaints, petitions, applications,
and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a
certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed
by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which took effect on
April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Court. It is not disputed herein that respondent's
complaint for damages was accompanied by such a
certificate.
In addition, verification, like in most cases required
by the rules of procedure, is a formal, not jurisdictional,
requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance
that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not of mere speculation. When
circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive
strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served. 23  
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that
respondent was unable to prove imputable negligence on
the part of petitioner.
Prefatorily, we restate the time honored principle
that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of
law may be raised. It is not our function to analyze or weigh
all over again evidence already considered in the
proceedings below, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
only errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower court. The resolution of factual issues is the function
of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect. A question of law which we may pass
upon must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants. 24
The above rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
generally conclusive but may be reviewed when: (1) the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory; (2) the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (3) the inference
made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (4) there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5)
the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the
issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts; (7) the Court of Appeals fails to
notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; and (8) the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are
not disputed by respondent, or where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on
record. 25
The issue of negligence is basically
factual. 26 Evidently, in this case, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals have contradictory factual findings: the former
found that Catubig alone was negligent, while the latter
adjudged that both Catubig and petitioner were negligent.
 Respondent based her claim for damages on
Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code,
which read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed
by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this
article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
There is merit in the argument of the petitioner
that Article 2180 of the Civil Code — imputing fault or
negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or
negligence of its employee — does not apply to petitioner
since the fault or negligence of its employee driver,
Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never
been established by respondent. To the contrary, the
totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that
the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and
motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the
driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom. 27
The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded
that Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of
him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the
immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to
his own death, to wit:
Based on the evidence on
record, it is crystal clear that the
immediate and proximate cause of the
collision is the reckless and negligent
act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not
because the Ceres Bus was running
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very fast. Even if the Ceres Bus is
running very fast on its lane, it could
not have caused the collision if not for
the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried
to overtake a cargo truck and
encroached on the lane traversed by
the Ceres Bus while approaching a
curve. As the driver of the motorcycle,
Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed
reasonable care and caution in driving his
motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver
would have done under the circumstances.
Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig,
Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a
cargo truck while approaching a curve in
Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental. Overtaking is not allowed
while approaching a curve in the highway
(Section 41(b), Republic Act [No.] 4136, as
amended). Passing another vehicle
proceeding on the same direction should
only be resorted to by a driver if the
highway is free from incoming vehicle to
permit such overtaking to be made in safety
(Section 41(a), Republic Act [No.]
4136). The collision happened because
of the recklessness and carelessness of
[herein respondent's] husband who
was overtaking a cargo truck while
approaching a curve. Overtaking another
vehicle while approaching a curve constitute
reckless driving penalized not only under
Section 48 of Republic Act [No.] 4136 but
also under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The Court commiserate with the
[respondent] for the untimely death of her
husband. However, the Court as dispenser
of justice has to apply the law based on the
facts of the case. Not having proved by
preponderance of evidence that the
proximate cause of the collision is the
negligence of the driver of the Ceres bus,
this Court has no other option but to dismiss
this case. 28 (Emphases supplied.)
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas
and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus at a
reckless speed when the collision occurred lack probative
value.
We are unable to establish the actual speed of the
bus from Cadimas's testimony for he merely stated that the
bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it
was "running very fast." 29
PO2 Elnas, on the other hand, made inconsistent
statements as to the actual speed of the bus at the time of
the collision. During the preliminary investigation in
Criminal Case No. M-15-94 before the MCTC, PO2 Elnas
refused to give testimony as to the speed of either the bus
or the motorcycle at the time of the collision and an opinion
as to who was at fault. 30 But during the trial of the present
case before the RTC, PO2 Elnas claimed that he was told by
Cabanilla that the latter was driving the bus at the speed of
around 100 kilometers per hour. 31
As the RTC noted, Cadimas and PO2 Elnas both
pointed out that the motorcycle encroached the lane of the
bus when it tried to overtake, while nearing a curve, a truck
ahead of it, consistent with the fact that the point of impact
actually happened within the lane traversed by the bus. It
would be more reasonable to assume then that it was
Catubig who was driving his motorcycle at high speed
because to overtake the truck ahead of him, he necessarily
had to drive faster than the truck. Catubig should have also
avoided overtaking the vehicle ahead of him as the
 curvature on the road could have obstructed his vision of
the oncoming vehicles from the opposite lane.
The evidence shows that the driver of the bus,
Cabanilla, was driving his vehicle along the proper lane,
while the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig, had overtaken a
vehicle ahead of him as he was approaching a curvature on
the road, in disregard of the provision of the law on reckless
driving, at the risk of his life and that of his employee,
Emperado.
The presumption that employers are negligent
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the
negligence of their employees. 32 Having adjudged that
the immediate and proximate cause of the collision
resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and
there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then
such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of
petitioner, as Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise.
Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of
petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 17, 2005 and
Resolution dated November 16, 2006 of the Court Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66815 are SET ASIDE and the Decision
dated January 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
30 of Dumaguete City, dismissing Civil Case No. 11360
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 

Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta * , and Perez,

J.J., concur.

||| (Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, [May 30,

2011], 664 PHIL 529-547)

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