1.) Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No.
160351, 10 April 2006, 487 SCRA 42 defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
Facts:
On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning in the Municipality
of Tarlac, two utility men came to complainant’s office, bringing with them
the application for monetized leave of petitioner (Villanueva). The
application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by
complainant (Castro) as she was then busy dictating some important
matters to her secretary.
Petitioner then personally carried his application to complainant’s office. At
that time, complainant was dictating something to the Secretary and as he
was about to give the copy to the Secretary, complainant got up and
grabbed the paper from him and placed it on the right side of her table.
Accused, being angered by this act, then said “I will lift you from there and I
will throw you out of the window and I don’t care if I will go to jail” and “You
are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you
are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and
extremely dirty.” Then the accused went out of the office and before
leaving, he pointed a "dirty finger" at complainant, prompting the latter to
stand and get an empty bottle of coke to throw at petitioner which hit a
Barngay Captain instead.
The incident was witnessed by so many people numbering about 20 to 30
who were then at the municipal hall.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioner is liable for grave oral defamation
2. Whether the petitioner is liable for serious slander by deed
Ruling:
1. Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in
writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the
expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case. Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding
the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an
exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language
particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor.
However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such scathing
words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the
fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused,
without valid justification to approve the monetization of accrued
leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the
wind that reaped the storm
2. Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by
performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or
contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the
offender performs any act not included in any other crime
against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of
other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a
certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious
nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended
party, the circumstances under which the act was committed,
the occasion, etc.  It is libel committed by actions rather than
words. The most common examples are slapping someone or
spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view
of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon
the person of another.

Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that,

which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from
petitioner. But, it was, likewise, her moral obligation
springing from such position to act in a manner that is
worthy of respect. In the case at bar, complainant’s
demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of
petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political
discord smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a
Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it appears that she had,
indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which
actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down to
petitioner’s level.
 2.) Loney vs. People, G.R. No. 152644, 10 February 2006, 482 SCRA 194

Facts:
Ruling:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining 1. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or
Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of
of Marinduque. Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of
or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
2. In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a
single Information charges more than one offense.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in

the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of
Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the
Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section
108 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA
7942"), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and
Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
3. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a
ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of
such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each
petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging
only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score
alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there is there duplicity of charges and thus all

charges except Reckless Imprudence should be quashed?

3.) People vs. Delmindo, G.R. No. 146810, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 546
Facts:
Due to being scolded by their boss due to problems at work, at around 2:00
p.m. of May 21, 1993, Delmindo put a shotgun on his shoulder and walked
towards the victim’s house. Shortly afterwards, gunshots were heard
coming from the house of Felix Albaladejo. Jolampong and his companions
ran towards the victim’s house. They were about to reach the house, when
they saw appellant with the shotgun run from the victim’s house and cross
the bridge to Barangay Binantucan, Pontevedra. They heard the victim’s
wife, Amelou Albaladejo, shouting for help.
Delmindo admitted shooting the victim but claimed the killing was in self-
defense. On the day of the incident accused went inside the victims house.
He had barely entered it when victim confronted him for allegedly spreading
stories about victim being a thief. Appellant denied the accusation. This only
enraged Felix. An altercation broke out between them. Suddenly, according
to appellant, Felix stood up and grabbed the shotgun by his side, cocked it
and shouted, "If I lose my job, I would rather kill you.” Appellant then yelled
back, "What is this, Felix?" and grabbed the barrel of the shotgun. While
they were grappling for possession of the firearm, appellant somehow
squeezed the trigger and the gun went off, hitting Felix.Appellant then left
Felix’s house and went to his own sister’s place in Brgy. Esperanza,
Pontevedra, where he stayed for four days. On hearing reports that Atty.
Azarraga wanted him killed, appellant and his wife left for Mindanao.
Issues:
1. Whether there is valid ground for self defense
2. Whether there is Treachery
3. Whether there is premeditation
Ruling:
1. Well established is the rule that once the justifying circumstance of
self-defense is invoked, the onus probandi of proving its elements
shifts to him who invokes it. Thus, even if the prosecution evidence
is weak, the charge cannot be readily dismissed, considering that
the accused had openly admitted authorship of the killing. Having
admitted killing the victim, in this case, appellant must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense by
establishing: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
The element of unlawful aggression is indispensable, a condition
sine qua non, to the successful plea of self-defense. Otherwise
stated, there can be no self-defense, unless the victim committed
unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. Was
there unlawful aggression on the victim’s part? That, in brief, is the
crucial question upon which turns the issue of appellant’s guilt or
innocence.
There is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts
in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual
use of a weapon by the victim himself.
2. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
the aggressor against the unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on the latter’s part, thus depriving the latter of any real
chance of defending himself. Otherwise stated, there is treachery
when the following conditions concur: (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted.
In our view, treachery has been adequately proved in the present
case. The records show that appellant obtained a firearm from his
co-workers, proceeded to the victim’s house, roused him from his
sleep by calling out his name, and without hesitation, barged into
the sala of the newly awakened victim and shot him without
warning or provocation. That the victim and his assailant come face
to face at the time of the shooting would not negate treachery, in
our view, where it appears that the attack was not preceded by a
dispute and the offended party was unable to prepare for his
defense.
3. As to evident premeditation, however, we find that the evidence on
record fails to bear out the following elements: (1) the time when
the offender determined or conceived to commit the crime; (2) an
act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution, to allow the accused time to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. Stated differently, the
prosecution failed to establish clearly that the victim’s killing was a
preconceived plan. Hence, evident premeditation should be ruled
out in the present case.
 4.) People vs. Calago, G.R. No. 141122, 22 April 2002, 381 SCRA 448
Facts:
The prosecution evidence show that on December 20, 1997, at about 3:30
a.m., Sotero Tewan was awakened by a commotion coming from the road,
about thirty (30) to thirty-five (35) arm's length from his house in Lamak,
Dumanjug, Cebu. He checked out the source of the commotion. From a
distance of about five (5) arm's length, he saw the appellant, Rogelio Calago,
and the victim, Arnulfo Lonzaga. The appellant was holding a knife, locally
known as plamingko, while the victim was crying for help. The appellant
then stabbed the victim who slumped on the ground. Thereafter, the
appellant fled. Tewan rushed to the victim and asked him if he recognized
the person who stabbed him to be sure if the victim could identify his
assailant. The victim named the appellant.Tewan recognized the appellant
and the victim as the crime scene was well-lighted by the new moon. He
also personally knew them for a long time as they were residents of
adjacent barangays. Appellant is even his kumpadre.
The crime was allegedly committed with treachery and evident
premeditation.
testimony on his part whether the attack was sudden and unexpected that it
afforded the victim no chance to defend himself.
We have held that for treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing
that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the
culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend
himself or retaliate. Considering that the eyewitness did not see the onset of
the assault, it cannot be said that the appellant had deliberately adopted a
method or mode that deprived the victim of an opportunity to retaliate.
Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as clearly as the
crime itself. Otherwise, it cannot be appreciated.
The trial court also erred in appreciating the circumstance of evident
premeditation. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following
must be proven: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the
crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
None of these elements has been established in the case at bar.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused is liable for murder and if
treachery and premeditation can be appreciated.

Ruling:

There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in

the execution of the crime which tends directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.18

In the case at bar, witness Tewan did not give any testimony on how the
attack started. He only related that when he arrived at the crime scene, he
saw the appellant stab the victim. Before that, he recalled that he was
awakened because he heard a commotion and when he went outside his
house to check it out, he heard the victim shouting for help. There was no
5.) People vs. Magbanua, G.R. No. 133004, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 617
Facts:
Appellant, together with his more than ten companions,
approached and congratulated Balucos for having been chosen
as Purok Leader. Shortly thereafter, appellant talked with hostility to
the victim concerning the "killing in Lacson, Davao City," a case
which involved appellant and the victim’s cousins. Suddenly,
appellant pulled out a handgun from his waist and fired a shot at
the creek. Seconds after, while face to face with each other,
appellant shot the victim twice in the face, first at the left cheek,
then at the forehead. Balucos recalled that the muzzle of the gun
was only about five inches away from the face of the victim, who
was then standing an arm’s length away from appellant. He further
narrated that after the gunshots, he and Rellin ran away out of fear
for their lives.
The witnesses presented had slightly different versions of what
transpired however for the description of the gun shot wounds to
the victim is not consistent with the reports of the medico legal.
It was later learned that the medico legal assigned erred in his
findings since the Necropsy Report was only made after the
subpoena was given.
Issues:
1. Whether the Testimonies are incredible
2. Whether or not there is Treachery
Ruling:
1. In comparison to the strong testimonial evidence of the
prosecution, appellant’s defense of denial miserably pales. The trial
court found it unnatural for appellant, who was a Civilian Home
Defense Force leader, to scamper away from the commotion
without even looking back. In its Decision, the court a quo  stated
that: "It is apparent that the accused made up such incredible
version because he could not point to anyone else on the bridge
who shot Diaz as only he did it, as testified to positively by two
eyewitnesses who were very near them on the bridge at the
time." It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
In the end, the rule is settled that where the conviction of an
accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the veracity
of their testimonies, the findings of the trial court are given a high
degree of respect. This is so because the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is best made by the trial court given its
untrammeled opportunity to observe their demeanor on the
witness stand. Hence, unless some fact of weight and substance has
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, the trial
court’s findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on
appellate courts. In this case, none of the arguments raised by
appellant presents any compelling reason for the Court to disregard
the evaluation of the court a quo.
2. Time and again, the Court has stated that treachery cannot be
presumed; it must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. It is
present when two elements concur, namely: (1) that the means,
methods, forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such
means, method or forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person.
In the present case, the first element was sufficiently shown by the
suddenness of the attack, giving the victim no opportunity to repel
it or defend himself. The prosecution established that appellant,
while conversing with the victim, suddenly pulled out a concealed
gun from his waist, shot at the creek and, seconds after, shot the
victim at the face. While it may be true that, as the defense points
out, appellant talked to the victim with hostility shortly before the
shooting, there was no evidence that the confrontation was heated
or intense, or that appellant was provoked to shoot the victim.

It must be noted, however, that mere suddenness of the attack

would not, by itself, constitute treachery. There is a further need to
prove that appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode
of attack to insure execution without risk to himself. The
circumstances surrounding the case negate the presence of this
second element. It was established that the shooting occurred in
broad daylight, in an open area, with more than ten people around.
The victim then was in the company of two of his friends, who could
have come to his aid at anytime. Verily, if appellant wanted to
insure that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen
another time and place to shoot the victim.

For failure of the prosecution to prove treachery or any other

circumstance that would qualify the killing to murder, the Court
finds that appellant should only be held liable for homicide

6.) People vs. Tadeo, G.R. No. 127660 and 144011-12, 17 September
2002, 389 SCRA 20
Facts:
On 4 November 1993, around 11:30 in the morning, Accused-
appellant Michael Tadeo was drinking with the deceased Mayolito
Cabatu and several others in a party hosted by Nicomedes
Cabacungan in Sto. Domingo, Quirino, Isabela, to celebrate the
successful installation of a water pump that would supply potable
water to their barangay. Around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, after
five (5) hours of imbibing alcohol, Mayolito was so dead drunk that
he excused himself and proceeded to the pavement adjacent to
Nicomedes Cabacungan’s house where he sat wobbly on the gutter.
Ricky Cardona, one of the carousers, and Florencia Cabatu,
Mayolito’s mother, approached Mayolito and assisted him in going
home. But, before they could leave, Mayolito shouted "barako,"
apparently to tease accused-appellant and titillate him into a "fight"
who, true enough, took offense against the mocking remark. 1  1. In Crim. Case No. 23-498 and Crim. Case No. 23-494
Drunk and wobbly too, Accused-appellant Michael Tadeo
instantaneously grabbed a beer bottle and tried to whack Mayolito
with it on the head. But Ricky Cardona and Florencia Cabatu quickly
intervened to prevent accused-appellant from inflicting harm upon
Mayolito. Accused-appellant briskly went home exclaiming, "Aguray
kadta a!" which means "Wait, I will come back!" Then he hastily
returned clutching a .38 cal. revolver and confronted Mayolito,
Ricky and Florencia why they were intervening. 2 Mayolito vainly
tried to grapple with accused-appellant who lost no time in shooting
Mayolito six (6) times, some bullets piercing his head. Accused-
appellant then trained his gun on Florencia, but unfortunately, the
pistol did not fire as it was already empty. So he approached her
instead and whipped her on the face with the butt of his revolver.
Rogelio Cabatu, who had just arrived from his farm, scurried to
rescue his brother Mayolito and mother Florencia, and with a bolo
on hand, hacked accused-appellant on the head. With blood oozing
from his head, Accused-appellant retreated towards his house to
reload his gun, and upon his return, immediately shot Florencia on
her left buttock, while Rogelio sought cover in the house of
Nicomedes Cabacungan. As Florencia limped to the detachment of
the barangay civilian security force, Accused-appellant darted away
from the crime scene.
Accused-appelant later surrenderd after the police dame to his
house.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case should be homicide and frustrated
homicide only
2. Whether voluntary surrender can be appreciated.
Ruling:
accused-appellant Michael Tadeo and the deceased
Mayolito Cabatu were both drunk and the fight was
preceded by rising tempers. Invariably, Accused-appellant
was not in full possession of his faculties which would have
been necessary for him to kill Mayolito Cabatu, or try to kill
Florencia Cabatu with the attendant evident premeditation,
i.e., the execution of the criminal act must come with sober
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment. 7 In turn, because of accused-
appellant’s mental and moral stupor at the time of the
perpetration of the criminal acts, the prosecution could not
have proved the requisites of this qualifying circumstance:
(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has
clung to his determination; and, (c) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his act and for his
conscience to overcome his will.
In the same vein, having been inebriated and overtaken by
anger immediately prior to the assault, Accused-appellant
cannot be accused of treachery. Under this state, he did not
have the time nor the proper disposition to reflect on the
means or mode of attack for it to be said that he
deliberately and consciously pulled out his gun and fired at
the deceased to insure the commission of the crime without
risk to himself. 8 Furthermore, the heated exchanges
between him and the deceased prior to the attack must
have placed the latter on his guard, hence, we cannot rule
that Mayolito Cabatu was caught completely by surprise
when accused-appellant took up arms against him.
For there to be treachery by reason of the suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack, there must have been no
warning of any sort to the deceased or offended party. 9
Verily, the statement of accused-appellant to Mayolito
Cabatu, viz, "Aguray kadta a!" meaning "Wait, I will come
back!" which the deceased took seriously, as he did
confront Michael Tadeo when he returned, shows
convincingly that the victim was not unprepared nor
stunned to see accused-appellant wielding a gun and firing
at him. The element of a sudden unprovoked attack
indicative of treachery was therefore missing.
Similarly, we reverse the finding of the trial court that. the
attack against Florencia Cabatu was sudden and
unforeseen. It bears stressing that the crime against her
happened when accused-appellant was highly intoxicated
and seething with anger against his perceived tormentor,
and immediately after he had gunned down Mayolito
Cabatu, after the same gun was aimed at her but did not
fire for being empty, and after accused-appellant returned
to his house to reload his gun. Evidently, these
contemporaneous and preceding events must have already
placed the victim on heightened alert and sufficient
forewarning that a reprisal was in the offing. This crime
which has been erroneously labeled as "frustrated murder"
lacks the twin elements of aleviosa: (a) that at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and, (b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him.
2. The trial court also erred in not crediting accused-appellant
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As
can be gleaned from the testimony of SPO3 Victoriano
Ramos who was one of the arresting police officers, at 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day of the shooting of
Mayolito Cabatu and her mother Florencia Cabatu, the
policemen converged at the house of the barangay kapitan
where they met accused-appellant’s father who assured
them that his son would surrender and in good faith led
them to his house where accused-appellant had gone after
the shooting episodes. There the father yielded to the
policemen a gun which he said was the weapon used in the
criminal acts while accused-appellant on the same occasion
and without hesitation turned himself in.
Clearly, the act of accused-appellant in surrendering to the
authorities showed his intent to submit himself
unconditionally to them and save them the trouble and
expense that would have to be incurred in his capture. For
this reason he complied with the requisites of voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance, namely: (a) the
offender was not actually arrested; (b) he surrendered to a
person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority;
and, (c) his surrender was voluntary. The spontaneity of his
surrender cannot also be denied because even the weapon
used in the crimes was yielded by his father to the
policemen in his presence without objecting to its surrender
nor denying his participation in the deadly clashes.

7.) People vs. Ladjaalam, G.R. No. 136149-51, 19 September
2000, 340 SCRA 617
Facts:
A group of at least 30 police men came into the residence of the
accused appellant with a search warrant. After seeing the group of
police, they were fired upon by the accused appellant from the
second story of his home with an M14 rifle. He was positively
identified by the police men that it was indeed accused appellant
who was the one who opend fired at them.
When the police entered into the home they were able to seize
various high caliber weapons as well as various drugs and
paraphernalia.
He was later caught after police saw him jumping out of his house.
Issues:
1. Whether there was a denial of the request for ocular inspection
2. Whether there is credibility of the prosecution witnesses
3. Whether there the defense of frame-up can be appreciated
Ruling:
1. Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying
his request for an ocular inspection of the Ladjaalam
residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would
have afforded the lower court "a better perspective
and an idea with respect to the scene of the
crime." We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this
case, especially in the light of the clear testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. We note in particular that
the defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol
Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower
court a fairly good idea of appellant’s house.  Viewing
the site of the raid would have only delayed the
proceedings. Moreover, the question whether to view
the setting of a relevant event has long been
recognized to be within the discretion of the trial
judge. Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise
of that discretion.
2. Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. Suffice it to state that the trial
court’s assessment of their credibility is generally
accorded respect, even finality. After carefully
examining the records and finding no material
inconsistencies to support appellant’s claim, we
cannot exempt this case from the general rule.Quite
the contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses
positively showed that appellant had fired upon the
approaching police elements, and that he had
subsequently attempted to escape.
3. This Court has invariably held that the defense of
frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.  Absent any
showing of an improper motive on the part of the
police officers, coupled with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duty, such
defense cannot be given much credence.Indeed, after
examining the records of this case, we conclude that
appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the
contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.
 Issues:

Whether there was treachery

8.) People vs. Bernal, G.R. No. 132791 and 140465-66, 2 Ruling:
September 2002, 388 SCRA 211
The death of the victim was accomplished with treachery.
Facts:
The characteristic and unmistakable manifestation of alevosia is the
Accused-appellant, victim Pedrito, prosecution witnesses Fernando deliberate, sudden and unexpected attack of the victim from behind,
and Felix Bernal, and one Rey Bernal together went to Benedisco without any warning and without giving him an opportunity to defend
pub located at Bangued Abra. Accused-appellant, Pedrito, and Rey himself or repel the initial assault. If the attack is sudden, unexpected, not
were already sleeping inside the pub after dancing and drinking
preceded by any provocation and the deceased is not in a situation to
heavily.
defend himself, treachery must be considered as a qualifying circumstance
Fernando decided to go home, brought out Pedrito first and seated of murder.
him inside the tricycle then Fernando took out accused-appellant
who was roused from sleep and led him to the tricycle thereafter. The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery
attended the killing of the victim by Accused-Appellant. The attack on the
Fernando went inside again to fetch Rey on their way out, Fernando
victim was sudden and unexpected, and this was evident in the manner
heard a gunshot and he saw accused-appellant holding a gun.
accused-appellant shot his victim — from behind and while asleep, giving
Fernando rushed to the tricycle where Pedrito was and it was then
that he heard another gunshot consequently, Fernando grappled his victim no opportunity to defend himself or repel accused-appellant’s
with accused-appellant for the possession of the gun. Felix Bernal attack.
testified that while Fernando fetched Rey inside the pub, he turned
on the engine of the tricycle while doing so, he heard two gunshots It has been held by this Court in a long line of cases that the qualifying
when he looked at Pedrito, who was supposedly sleeping inside the circumstance of treachery exists when one takes the life of a person who is
tricycle, he saw blood oozing from his head he saw accused-
asleep because in such a case, the victim was not in a position to put up any
appellant holding a gun.
defense. 
It was later found out that when accused-appellant was only 2 years
old, his father was killed by victim Pedrito Beralas. This he learned
from his mother and other relatives. Accused-appellant admitted
that, on February 6, 1995, he joined the victim and his group in their
drinking spree. It was at that time that the alleged killing of the
father of accused-appellant by victim Pedrito was brought up.
Accused-appellant maintained that Pedrito confessed to killing his
father.
 Ruling:
9.) People vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 123939, 28 May 2004, 430
SCRA 52
Facts:
After an altercation caused by family affairs of the accused
appellant, Luis and Geronimo walked side by side on the right side
of Lapu-Lapu Street at Urduja Village. With them were their cousins,
Raymund Luable, Angelo Luable and Orlando Desca. As they were
nearing a Meralco lamp post at the corner of Lapu-Lapu and Magat
Salamat Streets, he saw a blue-colored passenger jeep with a white-
colored rear door and with its front lights on, driven by Roel’s uncle,
Domingo Vasquez, who was with Roel’s brother, Ramon, and five
others. The jeep, which was coming from the opposite direction,
going towards the Vicas supermarket, sped towards them. They
dived to the ground near a grassy area, to avoid being hit. The
vehicle sped past Luis and Geronimo and stopped in front of the
lamp post on the left side of the street. Domingo and Ramon
Vasquez, each armed with a bolo, with five others, alighted from
the jeepney and proceeded to where Luis and Geronimo were.
Afraid for their lives, the two fled towards the direction of Mary
Homes at North Olympus Street. Luis ran ahead, and when he
looked back towards Geronimo, he saw the latter fleeing towards
the direction of Sumakwel Street with three persons, including
Domingo and Ramon, in hot pursuit. By the time he reached Datu
Puti Street, only one man was pursuing him. Luis finally arrived at
their house. He then mounted his bicycle and pedaled to the police
station to report the incident, only to learn that his half-brother,
Geronimo, was already dead. He and some policemen proceeded to
Bagong Silang Funeral Parlor where they saw Geronimo’s body.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is conspiracy
2. Whether or not this is murder or homicide
1. Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased
with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or whether
the accused merely incited his companions in the
jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa
Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of
his liability because a conspiracy among the
occupants of the jeepney has been established.
In the case of People vs. Cortez, 57 SCRA 308 cited
in Luis B. Reyes Revised Penal Code with
Annotations, Book I, 12th edition, 1981, p. 493, it
was clarified, "In order to hold an accused guilty
as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be
established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively
participating in [the] actual commission of the
crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the
crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy." (Underscoring
supplied).
The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed in the case
of People vs. Bernardo, 222 SCRA 502, "where
there are several accused and conspiracy has
been established, the prosecution need not
pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the
fatal wound."
And in the case of People vs. Magalang, 217 SCRA
571, it was held, "where conspiracy has been
established, evidence as to who among the
 accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary.
All the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the intent and character of their
participation because the act of one is the act of
all."
the crime to murder. The appellant is guilty only
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, punishable by reclusion temporal.

In the case at bar, the appellant drove the passenger

jeepney with his cohorts on board looking for Luable
and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going
in the opposite direction, the appellant drove the
vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo. And when
Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo,
pursued him. When the appellant failed to overtake
the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney and
drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim.
The appellant urged them on to kill Geronimo.
Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts,
leaving the hapless Geronimo mortally wounded. All
the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of
conspiracy between the appellant and the principals
by direct participation. The appellant is, thus,
criminally liable for the death of the victim, although
there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the
latter.

2. The trial court convicted the appellant of murder

qualified by treachery. However, the trial court
failed to state in its decision the factual basis for
such a finding. From all indications, the cohorts of
the appellant managed to overtake Geronimo
along Sumakwel Street, as he ran for dear life
after being hit earlier by Ramil Gonzales on the
head. Geronimo was, thus, aware of the peril to
his life. The assailants of Geronimo took
advantage of their superior strength when they
ganged up on him, armed with bolos and hacked
him to death. However, the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is not
alleged in the Information; hence, cannot qualify
 10.) People vs. Roche, G.R. No. 115182, 6 April 2000, 330 SCRA
91
Facts:
Around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992, Roderick and
Rodel Ferol were having drinks with a friend named Bobot inside
the Ferol compound at Block 4, Lot 40, Bagong Silang, Kaloocan City.
Without any warning, accused-appellant Restituto Roche and
Francisco Gregorio barged into the compound. Francisco tried to hit
Rodel Ferol with an empty beer bottle marked "Beer Grande" but
failed because his common-law wife, Helen Amarille, pulled him
away on time. Roderick Ferol was not as lucky as his brother.
Roderick was stabbed on the back with an ice pick by accused-
appellant. Roderick ran towards the house of his friend Bobot  but,
outside the compound, Dorico Caballes caught up with him.
Roderick fell to the ground and was repeatedly stabbed with a knife
by Dorico. Rogelio Rossel tried to stop Dorico but he was chased by
the latter. A brother of the victim, Jon-Jon, threw bottles at Dorico,
forcing the latter to run away, and leave his victim behind. Roderick
was then taken to his house by Rogelio and Jon-Jon.  But at the time,
Roderick was already dead.
Testimonies presented were not consistent.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the physical evidence is appreciated
2. Whether or not there is conspiracy
Ruling:
1. Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical
evidence over biased and uncorroborated testimony of
witnesses. We have held:
. . . Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent
manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or
rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found
guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally
upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People
v.  Vasquez, where the physical evidence on record ran
counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should
prevail.
2. Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant,
together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack
Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on Roderick
Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of
the desire to get even with him for the offense committed
against his brother. In no way can such act be attributed to
accused-appellant.
Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an
accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites
must concur in order that a person may be considered an
accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design
of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. 
There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant
performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico
Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has not been
proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes' plan to attack
and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the
moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we
cannot uphold the trial court's finding of guilt. "Our legal
culture demands the presentation of proof beyond
reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of
any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the
facts proved and must be consistent with all of them."  This
is certainly not the case here.

11.) People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 133489 and 143970, 15
January
Facts:
Attorney Tioleco was jogging when he was stopped by two men
who alighted from a car and forced him to get inside said car.
He was brought into an undisclosed location blindfolded and told
him of their intent to release him once their ransom is paid.
The family was able to come up with P71,000 which the kidnappers
agreed to accept for attorney Tioleco to be released. They met in an
agreed spot where the money was given to an individual named
“Romy” in which the police were able to follow the vehicle he was
using and intercepted him.
After the police was able to intercept,”Romy” was able to tell them
where they were keeping attorney Tioleco, in which the police were
able to find the venue along with 2 of the kidnappers, a .357 caliber
pistol and Attorrney Tioleco. The last kidnapper was eventually
apprehended.
Issues:
1. Whether or not kidnaping for ransom is committed
2. Whether or not there is conspiracy
Ruling:
1. We do not find any quantum of merit in the
contention that kidnapping for ransom is committed
only when the victim is released as a result of the
payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago we ruled -
No specific form of ransom is required to
consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom so
long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in
exchange for the victim's freedom. In municipal
criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases
from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be
committed. It is enough if the crime was committed
"for the purpose of extorting ransom." Considering
therefore, that the kidnapping was committed for
such purpose, it is not necessary that one or any of
the four circumstances be present.
So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American
jurisprudence from which was derived the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, is "not the forcible or secret
confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or
kidnapping without lawful authority, but x x x the
felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a
ransom the person so kidnapped, confined,
imprisoned, inveigled, etc."
It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the
case at bar, kidnapping for ransom is already
committed. Any other interpretation of the role of
ransom, particularly the one advanced by accused-
appellants, is certainly absurd since it ironically
penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by law
enforcers and in turn rewards kidnappers for the
success of police efforts in such rescue operations.
Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete with cases,
e.g., People v. Chua Huy, People v. Ocampo and People
v. Pingol, wherein botched ransom payments and
effective recovery of the victim did not deter us from
finding culpability for kidnapping for
ransom.1âwphi1.nêt
2. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-
appellant. There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and
Ronald Garcia are principals by direct participation
and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of
Atty. Tioleco. Their respective participation in
perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards
their liability as co-conspirators, we find the same to
have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it for which liability is
joint.Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties before,
during, and after the commission of the crime
disclosing a common understanding between them
relative to its commission. The acts of Valler and
Garcia in coordinating the abduction, collection of
ransom and detention of their victim indubitably
prove such conspiracy.

12.) People vs. Ilo, G.R. No. 140731, 21 November 2002, 392
SCRA 326
Facts:
On July 23, 1997, at about 10:00 p.m., appellant had a drinking
spree in the latter’s house. Moments later, appellant and his live-in
partner Virginia had a heated argument. Appellant kicked her
several times. Amadeo tried to pacify appellant but to no avail.
Appellant rushed to the kitchen, got hold of an old frying pan and
struck Virginia with it. She fell on the floor. Amadeo tried to placate
his friend but was rebuffed anew. Appellant got hold of a stone
used as tripod in cooking and smashed Virginia’s head with it.
Amadeo rushed to her aid and wiped off the blood oozing from her
head. Amadeo wanted to seek police assistance but was afraid to
venture into the neighborhood late at night. He and appellant
continued their drinking spree until 4:00 a.m. when Amadeo left
and went home.
the killing was premeditated or that the assailant chose a method or mode
of attack directly and especially to facilitate and insure the killing without
danger to himself. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate
and without warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist
or escape. There is no treachery where the attack is neither sudden nor
preconceived and deliberately adopted but just triggered by the sudden
infuriation on the part of the offender.To establish treachery, the evidence
must show that the offender made some preparation to kill the victim in
such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it
impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself. The mode
of attack must be planned by the offender and must not spring from the
unexpected turn of events. There is no treachery when the killing results
from a verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant such that the
victim was forewarned of the impending danger. 

Appellant was charged with murder.

Issues:

Whether or not there is treachery

Ruling:

To constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, namely: (1) the

employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious
adoption of the means of execution. The Court held that treachery cannot
be appreciated if the assailant did not make any preparation to kill the
victim in such a manner as to insure the killing or to make it impossible or
difficult for the victim to defend herself. The prosecution must prove that
 13.) People vs. Caratao, G.R. No. 126281, 10 June 2003, 403
SCRA 482
1. To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and
Facts:
Around 4:00 p.m., appellant and his wife entered the commissary canteen
of NALCO. Appellants wife approached Sugala and told him that her
husband was angry. Sugala asked appellant about this. Appellant replied,
saying that he was not given additional rice vale by the victim Edgardo Tado
Bulawin, NALCOs rice vale issuer. After checking that there was extra rice
available, Sugala assured appellant that he would give him an additional 25
kilos.
Shortly thereafter, Sugala saw the victim walk out of the canteen. Sensing
that appellant was about to rush to the victim, the witness restrained him
and said, Do not do anything harsh because we are all brothers here,
anyway I am giving you [an] additional 25 kilos of rice. He placed his arm
around appellant and accompanied him to the issuing area for the
additional rice. Upon reaching the issuing area, he first checked the rice
being issued to two employees. After this, he noticed that appellant was no
longer near him. Through the canteens screened windows, he next saw
appellant standing one meter behind the victim, who was then already
astride his motorbike. About 5 meters from Sugalas position, the victims
motorbike was facing towards the exit gate, with its engine already
running.4 At that moment, he saw appellant attack the victim.
The accused appellant thrust his knife to the right side of the victim while
holding the left shoulder. Victim died because of his wound,
Accused appellant later surrendered to the police station.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is self defense
2. Whether or or not there is treachery
Ruling:
convincing evidence: (1) that the victim committed unlawful
aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and
limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there was
reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at
least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-
defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims
aggression. cräläwvirtualibräry
At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the presence of an
unlawful aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful
aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if
the other elements are present. Unlawful aggression refers to an
attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb
of the person claiming self-defense. The admission of appellant in
his testimony that he stabbed the victim makes it incumbent upon
him convincingly to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force. In the
case at bar, appellant tried to prove that the unlawful aggression
emanated from the victim, who punched him in the face and hit him
in the thigh with his motorbike, without provocation on his part.
This the trial court found unconvincing, thus:
Under the situation where Tado Bulawin was in a riding position on
his motorcycle, holding its handle bars, ready to start the engine,
the court finds it incredible for him to be the unlawful aggressor.
Instead, Sergio Carataos being made to wait and make repeated
requests or pleas for his vale of rice must have moved him to be the
unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting stab wounds on the victim
Tado Bulawin. For the circumstance of self-defense to be
appreciated, it must be shown that the compulsion is of such
 character that the accused is left with no opportunity to escape or
self-defense [sic] in equal combat (People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71).
And this is not the set-up in the case at bar. The prosecution version
merits belief and credence beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that

the means, methods and forms of execution employed gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were
deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person.62 In the case at bar, the first element was
established by the fact that appellant suddenly attacked from
behind the unsuspecting and unarmed victim who was then astride
his motorcycle. However, we find the prosecutions evidence
insufficient to sustain the finding of the presence of the second
element, namely, that appellant deliberately adopted the mode of
attack.

In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the

crime committed is Homicide, not Murder. 70 The penalty therefor,
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal.  Considering the attendant mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum
period, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the aforesaid Code.
 14.) People vs. Loterono, G.R. No. 146100, 13 November 2002,
391 SCRA 593
Facts:
on August 25, 1998 at around 10:00 p.m., Jonel Daprinal, a laborer at the
Sta. Ana Construction Company located at Gen. Luna Street, Iloilo City, was
at the company's compound together with his co-workers, herein accused-
appellant and Rex Penduday. They were drinking liquor when two of their
co-workers, Esmar Dato-on and Larry Anota, passed by. Accused-appellant
asked Esmar and Larry to join them but the two declined saying they were
going to sleep. Esmar and Larry then went to the second floor of the Sarabia
Manor Hotel, a building project of Sta. Ana Construction.
During the drinking session, Jonel heard accused-appellant say "I have a
plan." He then took out a knife tucked in his waist and showed it to Jonel
and Rex. They finished drinking around 11:00 p.m. Accused-appellant, Jonel
and Rex then proceeded to the Sarabia Manor Hotel to sleep. Rex slept on
the first floor while accused-appellant and Jonel went to their quarters on
the third floor. When they were on the third floor, accused-appellant told
Jonel he wanted to take a walk. Accused-appellant went to the fourth floor
where Eric Cacho and the victim, Roie Babagonio, were supposed to be
sleeping.
At 12:10 in the morning of August 26, 1998, Eric Cacho was awakened by
the sound of a person crying for help. He rose from his bed and went to the
other side of the floor where the shout was coming from. There, Eric saw
accused-appellant stabbing the victim Roie Babagonio twice on the chest.
Eric testified that he was about three (3) to four (4) meters away from
accused-appellant, whom he recognized because the room was lighted. Eric
saw the victim lying on his back on a makeshift bed while he was being
stabbed by accused-appellant. When Eric admonished accused-appellant,
the latter turned upon him and chased him. Out of fear, Eric ran home and
narrated the whole incident to his wife.
Issues:
1. Whether the witness is credible
2. Whether or not there is treachery
Ruling:
1. Contrary to accused-appellant's claim that prosecution eyewitness
Eric Cacho failed to mention the victim's name to his wife, he in fact
specifically told her that Roie, the victim, was stabbed. His failure to
immediately report the incident to the police was sufficiently
explained. He was afraid. It has been time and again held that fear
of reprisal and death threats are accepted as adequate explanations
for the delay in reporting crimes.
The further allegation of accused-appellant that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Esmar Dato-on, Larry Anota and Jonel
Daprinal are biased because they are related to the victim and to
each other is likewise unpersuasive. As we pointed out in People v.
Gallarde, "[m]ere relationship of a witness to a party, without more,
cannot impair the witness' credibility. On the contrary, a witness'
relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or her
testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who
is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other
than the real culprit. It is settled that in the absence of a showing of
improper motive on the part of the witnesses, their testimonies are
not affected by their relationship with the victim and must be
accorded full faith and credence.
Given the prevailing facts of the case, the trial court erred in holding
that the killing of Roie Babagonio was attended by alevosia. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The qualifying circumstance of treachery did not
attend the killing as the two conditions for the same are not
present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed
by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack
on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part
of the victim."

For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the

witness right at the inception of the attack.Where no particulars are
known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery
cannot merely be supposed. In the case at bar, there was neither a
description of how the attack was commenced – whether it was
sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught totally
unaware – nor a showing that the method of execution in the
commission of the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by
the malefactor. Indeed, eyewitness Eric Cacho never saw the
inception of the attack because he was fast asleep and roused from
his slumber by the cries of the victim. 

Verily - It is a fundamental rule of long standing that for treachery to

be appreciated, that circumstances must be present at the inception
of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, treachery,
even if present at a subsequent stage is not to be considered. That
final fatal blows may have in truth been delivered under conditions
exhibiting some features of treachery does not remedy the fact that
the prosecution failed to prove the existence of treachery at the
onset of the attack.

15.) People vs. Escote, 140756, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 603
Facts:
on September 28, 1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a
Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in
Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or so
later, when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel,
Bulacan, along the North Espressway, the accused with guns in hand
suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with
the announcement of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards.
Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back. Both
then went on to take the money and valuables of the passengers,
including the bus conductors collections in the amount of
P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the back
telling him in the vernacular Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka
namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo. They pointed their guns at
him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their
victim. After the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two
(2) then went back at the front portion of the bus behind the drivers
seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how
easy it was to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25
minutes. Upon reaching the Mexico overpass of the Expressway in
Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver drove the bus to
the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the
investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the
slain passenger was a policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the
Caloocan City Police Department
Issues:
Whether or robbery with homicide is established
Ruling:
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crimeof
robbery with homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal Code,
p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the
accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also
held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident
(Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July
14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result  obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal,
p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or
on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery will also be held guilty as principals of robbery with homicide
although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.50cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and
Victor conspired and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of
the Five Star Bus of their money and valuables and Romulo of his collections
of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity
on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as
principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide
under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
 2. Whether robbery with homicide is established
16.) People vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 143935, 4 June 2004, 431
SCRA 42
Facts:
Between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. of March 20, 1987, he was in his
farm in Manggahan, Rizal, Nueva Ecija to thresh palay. With him at
that time were Marjun Roca, Benita Roca, Febe Roca and daughter
Virgilita Roca-Laureaga. He, Benita and Febe were about to take
their lunch inside his hut. Marjun and Virgilita were done eating and
were standing outside. At this point, Alfredo noticed the arrival of
an owner-type jeep with trailer which stopped at a spot not far from
his hut. He recognized the occupants as accused Antos Dacanay,
Edgardo "Liling" Areola, William Ancheta, Lito de la Cruz, Ely
Calacala and appellant Felipe "Boy" Ulep who all alighted from the
jeep. Dacanay, Areola and Ancheta stood on one side of the
irrigation canal facing Marjun Roca who was standing on the other
side. From a distance of 10 to 12 meters, Alfredo saw Dacanay
suddenly pull out a gun and shoot Marjun on the head, causing the
latter to fall to the ground. As he lay on the ground, Marjun was
again shot, this time by Areola and Ancheta. Thereafter, Ulep, de la
Cruz and Calacala started firing at Alfredo’s hut. Alfredo was not hit,
however, because he was able to get out of the hut and dive into
the irrigation canal in the nick of time. However, Benita and Febe
were fatally hit by the initial volley of gunfire. The assailants fired at
Alfredo in the canal but they did not hit him. Ancheta then hurled a
grenade which exploded near the hut. When the group ran out of
bullets, Alfredo emerged from the canal and hid inside his hut. He
saw the group load onto the trailer 35 sacks of palay, each
containing an average of 50 kilos valued at ₱4.50 per kilo. Alfredo
owned the stolen palay. Appellant Ulep and his companions then
boarded their jeep and left.
Issues:
1. Whether treachery is established
Ruling:
1. There was treachery as the events narrated by the eyewitnesses
pointed to the fact that the victims could not have possibly
been aware that they would be attacked by appellant and his
companions. There was no opportunity for the victims to
defend themselves as the assailants, suddenly and without
provocation, almost simultaneously fired their guns at them.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked.
2. There is robbery with homicide when there is a direct relation
or an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing,
whether the killing takes place prior or subsequent to the
robbery or whether both crimes are committed at the same
time.
Based on the facts established, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution adequately proved the direct relation between the
robbery and the killing. Immediately after shooting the victims,
the assailants loaded the sacks of palayonto the trailer of the
jeep. As they did so, no conversation took place and there was
no hesitation on their part, indicating that they were proceeding
from a common, preconceived plan. In fact, why would they
bring a trailer if their only purpose was to massacre the Roca
family? The series of overt acts executed by appellant and his
companions, in their totality, showed that their intention was
not only to kill but to rob as well. The group tried to kill all the
members of the Roca family to ensure lack of resistance to their
plan to take Alfredo’s palay. Whenever homicide is perpetrated
with the sole purpose of removing opposition to the robbery or
suppressing evidence thereof, the crime committed is robbery
with homicide.
Further, in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself. A review
of the entire records of this case leads us to conclude that robbery
was established beyond reasonable doubt. As long as the killing is
perpetrated as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is committed.

17.) People vs. Costales, G.R. 141154-56, 15 January 2002, 373
SCRA 269
Facts:
Around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of 27 November 1997, she and her
sisters Donabel and Erlinda together with their parents Miguel and Crispina
had taken their own corners of their small house to prepare for the night.
Miguel laid in a folding bed beside the door while the others occupied a
bamboo bed with the exception of Jessie who for want of available space
settled instead on the concrete floor. Jessie and Erlinda had just watched tv
when two (2) persons suddenly barged into their house passing through the
door kept ajar by sacks of palay and strangled her father Miguel. Jessie
readily recognized the two (2) intruders because the entire room was
illuminated by a nightlamp which the family kept burning overnight.
Jessie narrated that Fernando "Ando" Costales, one of the assailants, poked
a gun at the head of her father and shot him once in cold blood. Thereafter
the other assailant Fernando Ramirez sprayed on their faces what she
described as "something hot and pungent," and with his firearm pumped a
bullet on her mother's chest.
Erlinda Marcelo was also awakened when the two (2) accused suddenly
entered their house and strangled their father after which Fernando
Costales shot him point blank in the head. According to Erlinda, when tear
gas was sprayed by Ramirez, she ducked and almost simultaneously she
heard a gunshot towards the direction of her mother. When she opened her
eyes, she saw her mother Crispina clutching her breast, reeling from the
blow and collapsing on the floor in a heap. In her testimony Crispina herself
confirmed that Ramirez shot her once on the right chest which caused her
to bleed and lose consciousness.
Both Jessie and Erlinda affirmed that they were familiar with the two (2)
accused because, like the rest of the family, they were members of the
"Baro a Cristiano" also known as Lamplighter, of which Fernando "Ando"
Costales and Fernando Ramirez were the high priests in their respective
areas. According to Jessie, her parents decided to quit the brotherhood
because Ramirez warned them not to sever their ties with the sect if they
did not want any harm to befall them. In fact, according to her, a month
earlier Ramirez even threatened her sister Erlinda with bodily harm.
Issues:
1. Whether or not alibi can be appreciated
2. Whether or not there is conspiracy
3. Whether or not voluntary surrender is appreciated
Ruling:
1. Accused-appellant cannot insist on his alibi, especially so since he and his
co-accused were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses. More so
when it is undisputed that the proximity of their place to the scene of the
crimes did not preclude the possibility that they were in fact present at the
time of their commission.
2. While we yield to the trial court's finding of treachery, we take exception
to its view that evident premeditation and nighttime also aggravated the
offenses. Without doubt, treachery has been established by the prosecution
evidence which showed that accused-appellant Fernando Costales and his
confederate Fernando Ramirez swiftly and unexpectedly barged into the
Marcelo residence in the middle of the night, shot Miguel Marcelo to death
as well as his wife Crispina who almost lost her life, and sprayed a substance
which temporarily blinded the other occupants of the house. The
suddenness of the attack gave the victims no opportunity whatsoever to
resist or parry the assault thereby ensuring the accomplishment of their
dastardly deed without risk to themselves. Since the attack on the victims
was synchronal, sudden and unexpected, treachery must be properly
appreciated.
We cannot however give our assent to the view that nighttime and evident
premeditation accompanied the commission of the crimes. The aggravating
circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery, while evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated in the absence of proof of the
planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived. irtualibräry
The convergence of the wills of the two (2) executioners amply justifies the
imputation that they acted in concert and in unity in their unlawful
objective when in the stillness of the night they both crashed into the
Marcelo residence, strangulated the victim Miguel, then one of them shot
him in the head while the other sprayed tear gas on the other members of
the family obviously to disable them, and thereafter pumped a bullet at the
horrified Crispina. This series of actions betrays a concerted design and
concurrence of sentiments to cause mayhem and murder. Accordingly,
conspiracy was properly appreciated by the trial court.

3.Neither can we sympathize with accused-appellant's misplaced sentiment

that he had been denied the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. As found by the trial court, his alleged surrender was made too
late, and in a place too distant from the crime site as well as his place of
residence.

18.) People vs. Catapang, G.R. No. 128126, 25 June 2001, 359
SCRA 459
Facts:
At around 9:30 in the evening of July 2, 1994, Rictorino Aventurado boarded
a tricycle parked along Cabunyag Street, Candelaria, Quezon. The tricycle
driver, Jonathan Garcia, started revving the motor of the tricycle. Suddenly,
Garcia heard gunshots coming from the passenger side of the tricycle. He
turned his head and saw a person pointing a .45 caliber gun at his
passenger, Rictorino Aventurado. Frightened, Garcia sprang from his tricycle
and ran towards the other side of the street, near a restaurant. When he
was around six (6) meters from the tricycle, he looked back and saw the
gunman shoot successively at Rictorino Aventurado. The area was
sufficiently illuminated by a Meralco post located about one (1) meter from
the tricycle.  of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
After shooting at least seven times, the assailant left the scene, still holding
his gun. Garcia cautiously returned to his tricycle and noticed that
Aventurado was seriously wounded. Thus, Garcia lost no time in bringing
the victim to Bolanos Hospital. However, the victim was pronounced dead
on arrival.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The
essence of treachery is swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed
victim. In this case, the accused-appellant shot the unsuspecting victim
while the latter was on board a tricycle. While inside the tricycle, the victim
could not put up any defense against the unexpected attack on his person.
Undoubtedly, treachery attended the commission of the offense.
The aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be appreciated
separately as it is absorbed in treachery. Nighttime was evidently an integral
part of the peculiarly treacherous means and manner adopted to ensure the
execution of the crime, or that it facilitated the treacherous character of the
attack.
The existence of treachery qualifies the killing to murder. Under Article 248
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied. 

Accused Rafael Catapag was brought in to be identified by Aventurado

which he did and paraffin tests shows that Accused did have gun powder
residue on his hand. Accused Rafael Catapang denied the charge against
him. He alleged that at the time of the killing, he was sleeping at home. He
admitted testing positive for paraffin but explained that it was because he
fired the gun of one of the guests at a baptismal party he attended that
morning.

Issues:
Whether or not treachery can be appreciated

Ruling:
 19.) People vs. Parreno, G.R. No. 14434, 07 July 2004, 433
SCRA 591
Facts:
Twenty-year-old Simplicio Genova, Jr. and nineteen-year-old Frederick
Sabangan were Anthony's neighbors and "gangmates." At around 12:30
a.m. of November 2, 1997, Simplicio and Frederick were with Anthony and
two of their other friends, Agripino Santos and Ricardo Deocareza. They
wanted to buy food from a nearby store. As they were walking in front of
the Rizal High School in Katarungan Street, they saw six persons on the
other side of the street. Appellants Parreno and Quindo were in front, while
the four other members of the group were right behind them. Appellant
Quindo then challenged them to a fight.
Unsure if they were only speaking in jest, Frederick, Anthony and Simplicio
looked at the six men before them, but did not recognize the latter. One of
the men had a slingshot (tirador). Anthony said, "Pabayaan na lang
natin," while Simplicio told the group, "Hindi kami lalaban." They turned
and started to walk away, but when they saw that two male persons had
started running after them, they also ran. Anthony and Simplicio ran ahead
of their friends, towards an alley in Katarungan Street. Agripino followed.
When Anthony noticed that Frederick and Ricardo had been left behind, he
told Simplicio and Agripino to go back to where their two other companions
were. Anthony had then gone a little further ahead.
Suddenly, Anthony was cornered by two persons. Outside an alley in
Katarungan Street, four others also appeared from the nearby Rizal High
School. Anthony was surrounded. Three of the men ran towards the school,
while three others remained: appellant Parreno who was then wearing a
white shirt, appellant Quindo who had on a blue shirt, and another who was
wearing a red jacket. The three "circled" upon Anthony who was facing the
man in the red jacket.  Appellant Parreno, who was then standing behind
Anthony, suddenly stabbed the latter with his right hand.
Simplicio, who was about ten meters away from the scene, saw all this, but
in his shock, failed to recognize what weapon appellant Parreno used to
stab his friend. The three culprits fled from the scene, and ran towards the
direction of the Rizal High School.
Issues:
1. Whether or not abuse of superior strength
2. Whether or not there is treachery
Ruling:
1. As regards the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
what should be considered is not that there were three, four, or more
assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage
of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. While it is
true that superiority in number does not per se  mean superiority in
strength, the appellants in this case did not only enjoy superiority in
number, but were armed with a weapon, while the victim had no means
with which to defend himself. Thus, there was obvious physical disparity
between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength on the part of the
appellants. Abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the
offenders took advantage of their combined strength in order to
consummate the offense. However, the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being necessarily absorbed in
treachery.
2. The trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery against the appellants. The elements for treachery to be
appreciated as qualifying circumstance are (a) the employment of means of
execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or retaliate; and (b) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously
adopted. Even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when sudden
and unexpected, and employed on an unarmed victim who would not be in
a position to repel the attack or to avoid it. The essence of treachery is the
swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack on the unarmed victim.
In the case at bar, Anthony and his friends had merely gone out to buy some
food. The appellants and their companions chanced upon the victim's
group, and without warning, threatened the latter. A game of "cat and
mouse" ensued, with the appellants on the winning end, as they were
armed with a tirador  and a knife. The chase ended with the unarmed victim,
Anthony, being cornered and trapped, and thereafter, stabbed fatally on the
back. With the allegation of treachery in the information having been
proven, the same is treated as a circumstance that qualified the killing to
murder, pursuant to Article 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code
 20.) People vs. Enguito, G.R. No. 128812, 28 February 2000,
326 SCRA 508
Facts:
Rosita Requerme was riding along with her husband and she
noticed that when they were near the Sacred Heart of Jesus
Montessori School their motorela was bumped by a white motor
vehicle. She observed that the face of the driver of the vehicle
bumping them was bloody. Mrs. Requerme shouted and waved her
hand signalling the driver to stop but the driver kept pushing the
motorela violently. The push was so fast and strong that the
motorela was already uncontrolled and running very fast. Their
passenger jumped out when they were already at the Marcos
bridge near the Wheels Marketing. Then the motorela made a 180
degrees turn facing the direction where they came from and fell on
its right side. Struggling out of the motorela she noticed that the
white vehicle went up the elevated catwalk or pathway pursuing
Achumbre who was hit when he was already at the railing
(barandilla). Then she observed that the white vehicle drove across
the bridge towards Iligan City. At the OKK she saw the accused
brought by policemen and she asked him why he bumped them and
the accused answered "I have to do it Manang because look at me
now" (TSN, Dec. 16, 1991). She also observed that the face of the
accused was bleeding. She identified the accused in court, as the
same person she saw at the OKK. She was treated at the hospital
and was issued a medical certificate (Exh. "C"). Together with her
husband, they spent P1,000.00 for medicines.
Issues:
1. The Honorable Third Division of the Court of Appeals committed error in
finding that accused is guilty of less serious physical injuries suffered by
Felipe Requerme. Whether there was less serious physical injuries suffered
2. Whether the conviction of accused for the Crime of Murder with the use
of motor vehicle is valid
Ruling:
1. The argument is devoid of merit. The defense disregards the basic
rule in criminal law that a person is responsible for all the
consequences of his unlawful or wrongful act although such
consequences were different from those which he originally
intended.8 Even if it be assumed that the real intention of accused-
appellant was to surrender the victim to the police for mauling him,
his act of pursuing the victim, who was a passenger of the motorela,
resulted in the injuries of the driver and the other passenger of the
motorela. Appellant himself testified that when he followed the
motorela, he was "very near" and that he saw the deceased
Achumbre jump out on the right side of the motorela but he went
ahead; he allegedly "tried to evade, but he was so near." Upon
seeing that Achumbre was trying to jump out of the motorela,
accused-appellant should have known that by closely following,
pushing and bumping the motorela, he could injure the passengers,
which is what happened in this case. Moreover, accused-appellant
ignored the pleas of Rosita Requerme, the other passenger and wife
of the driver of the motorela, for him to stop bumping and pushing
the motorela. Instead, he persisted resulting in the motorela turning
on its side and in the opposite direction. Verily, the act of accused-
appellant in relentlessly pursuing the motorela is a manifestation of
his intention to perpetrate the crime.
2. The indictment against accused-appellant is murder attended by the
use of motor vehicle. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing
to murder if the same was perpetrated by means
thereof. Appellant's claim that he merely used the motor vehicle,
Kia Ceres van, to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his
actuations. By his own admission, he testified that there was a
police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused-appellant could
have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the
law into his own hands. Moreover, accused-appellant already
noticed the deceased trying to jump out of the motorela but he still
continued his pursuit. He did not stop the vehicle after hitting the
deceased who was hit when he (Achumbre) was at the railing of the
Marcos bridge.Accused-appellant further used the vehicle in his
attempt to escape. He was already more than one (1) kilometer
away from the place of the incident that he stopped his vehicle
upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was following him.
 21.) People vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 145993, 17 June 2003, 404
SCRA 170
Facts:
On 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., Joseph admonished Rufino and his
brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by Joseph’s
house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered, challenged
Joseph to a fight. The latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and
his own brothers Radi and Manny asked apology from Rufino.
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball
game at the barangay basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were
then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but
Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with
him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court
and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which
caused his instantaneous death.
Issues:
(1) Whether there was criminal intent and malice on the part of the
accused
(2) Wheteher use of motor vehicle is qualifying circumstance
(3) Is voluntary surrender appreciated as mitigating
Ruling:
1. We note that the testimonies of Liza and Edgar were
consistent with their respective sworn statements, 17 which
they gave to the police investigator in the morning of 8 July
1996. Considering that less than twenty-four hours had
elapsed from the time of the bumping incident, Liza and
Edgar could not have concocted a story to pin down Rufino
for the death of Joseph. Thus, there is no reason to doubt
the veracity of the sworn statements and the testimonies of
Liza and Edgar.
Moreover, the defense has not shown any reason why
Edgar, who corroborated Liza’s testimony about the
incident, would perjure himself to pin down Rufino. Absent
any evidence showing any reason or motive for the
prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies
are thus worthy of full faith and credit. 18
In comparison, Rufino and Myrna gave inconsistent
testimonies. Myrna wanted the court to believe that her
husband was in no way at fault by stating that Rufino was
driving at a slow pace,19 while Rufino himself declared that
he was driving at a speed of eighty kilometers per
hour.20 Myrna’s attempt to cover up the misdeed of her
husband is obvious; hence, the integrity of her declarations
becomes questionable.
2. The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck
in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit
him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died
instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means
used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muñoz27 cited by Rufino finds no
application to the present case. In the said case, the police
patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in
looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim
to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot
the victim, which caused the latter’s death. In the present
case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running
over him.1âwphi1
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of

evident premeditation and treachery, which were alleged in
the information, were not proved. What was proved was
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender through
the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not
rebutted by the prosecution.

We have held that for voluntary surrender to be

appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the offender had not been
actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary.29 A surrender is
considered voluntary if it is spontaneous and shows the
intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally
to the authorities because he either acknowledges his guilt
or wishes to save the government the trouble and expense
necessarily included for his search and capture. 30 All these
requisites are present in this case.

In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the

presence of one mitigating circumstance, reclusion perpetua,
not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
 22.) People vs. Catian, G.R. No. 139693, 24 January 2002, 374
SCRA 514
Facts:
Acting on an earlier report that Willy Ondo was missing since 27 December
1996 and was already believed to be dead, Barangay Captain Admir
Sabado sounded the alarm on his tanods on 2 January 1997 and called them
to search for Willy. Their efforts would have been futile had it not been for
the chance discovery on 7 January 1997 of Willy's skeletal remains by a child
who was pasturing his cow near a peanut plantation in Barangay Poo, Lazi,
Siquijor. Upon hearing the information, Barangay Captain Sabado
immediately notified the police and went to the site where the cadaver was
found. With a throng of onlookers, Sabado saw the disjoined bones of Willy
scattered around. Sabado also noticed marks of a recent bonfire near the
vicinity. Those who knew the victim, particularly his uncle Feliciano Duque,
recognized the remains as those of Willy because of a stainless steel found
on his leg which was surgically inserted to support a fractured leg as a result
of an accident.
Jeofrey Abe4 narrated that on 27 December 1996 at 9:00 o'clock in the
evening he went out of his house to watch a television show at the
residence of a certain Anselmo Ymbol. A couple of hours later or at about
11:00 o'clock that evening Jeofrey returned home traversing the same route
he took earlier. On the way home, he chanced upon a group of three (3)
persons whom he readily recognized as Freddie Catian, Samuel Sumalpong
and Rogelio Calunod. The three (3) were "ganging up" on a man whom he
also identified as Willy Ondo. Jeofrey easily recognized them as they were
all his barriomates and the road was not that dark despite the lateness of
the hour because it was a moonlit night.
From a distance of about twelve (12) meters, Jeofrey saw Catian repeatedly
striking Willy with a "chako" on the head, causing Willy to fall on his knees.
Calunod seconded by striking the victim with a piece of wood on the face.
When Willy finally collapsed, Sumalpong picked him up, carried him over his
shoulder, and walked away carrying him to an undisclosed destination.
Overcome with fear, Jeofrey went running towards home.
Jeofrey admitted that he did not inform anybody about the startling
occurrence that he witnessed for fear that the news would spread around
and the assailants would hunt him down. In fact, he did not dare divulge
anything to the police or to his relatives even when he knew that the
barangay tanods  were looking for the victim. Actually, according to him, he
was waiting for a more opportune time to tell the family of the deceased,
which opportunity came when the victim's sister Myrna Ondo and her
husband arrived from Iligan to attend the wake of their departed kin. At the
wake, Jeofrey intimated to Myrna that he had something to tell her but
would do so only at the police station because Sumalpong, one of the
accused, kept on following him. Jeofrey waited until Sumalpong had gone
home before he and Myrna went to the Lazi police station to execute an
affidavit. That affidavit which was dated 10 January 1997 contained an
eyewitness account of the dreadful event of 27 December 1996.
Issues:
(1) Whether the testimony of Jeofrey Abe is credible considering he
didn’t immediately notify the authorities
(2) Whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation as well as cruelty and ignominy were present
Ruling:
1. Accused-appellants' quibbling over inconsequential matters should
not be countenanced. It is of common knowledge that the initial
reluctance and vacillation of a witness to volunteer information is
more telling of his fear of being embroiled in a criminal investigation
and expose himself and his family to reprisal than an intent to
suppress the truth or muddle an investigation. Delay in reporting
the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness, especially where such witness
gives a sufficient explanation. For the Court to unreasonably
discredit a witness' account for the reason that it was delayed is to
permanently seal the lips of reluctant and timorous witnesses.
2. However, the trial court went far astray in its reasoning when it objective. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of
ruled that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and
cruelty and ignominy were also attendant in the commission of the circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties
crime. To authorize the finding of evident premeditation, the cooperated and labored to the same end. It must be shown to exist
prosecution must establish (a) the time when accused-appellants as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
determined to commit the crime; (b) the act showing that they
clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time The evidence clearly shows that the three (3) accused-appellants
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow conspired when they acted in concert to perpetrate the ghastly
them to reflect upon the consequences of their act.  Other than a incident. Catian and Calunod dealt the fatal blows while Sumalpong
chance encounter between the witness Jeofrey and the principal watched in stolid silence, with nary a whimper of protest even when
antagonists in this case, there is a dearth of information to show his two (2) companions smashed their deadly weapons into the
that accused-appellants had deliberately planned to commit the body of their defenseless victim. Not content with his inaction,
crime and had persistently and consciously followed it Sumalpong then carelessly slung the body of their fallen victim over
notwithstanding that they had ample and sufficient time to allow his shoulder and walked away to an undisclosed location. Inferable
their conscience to overcome the determination of their will, if they from the acts of accused-appellants themselves was a common
had desired it, after meditation and reflection. design, a community of purpose to attain their evil objective.
Pertinent is the testimony of Jeofrey Abe on direct examination
Neither does it appear that the murder of the victim was attended
by cruelty and ignominy. Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to
the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material
injury caused by the crime. The mere fact that accused-appellants
burned the body of the deceased is not sufficient to show that the
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects
of the act. Nor may we consider the circumstance of cruelty as
found by the trial court because there is no showing that the victim
was burned while he was still alive. For cruelty to exist, there must
be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim
suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and
moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. No proof was
presented that would show that accused-appellants deliberately
and wantonly augmented the suffering of their victim.

The trial court also found conspiracy "as can be shown by the unity
of purpose displayed by the three (3) accused in ganging up their
victim Willy Ondo." Conspiracy in the statutory language "exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it."  Conspiracy need
not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. It is sufficient
that the malefactors acted in concert to attain the same criminal
 23.) People vs. Baroy, G.R. No. 137520-22, 9 May 2002
Facts:
In a Decision promulgated on May 9, 2002, this Court affirmed the
conviction of both appellants for three counts of rape with the use of a
deadly weapon. The penalty imposed upon them by the trial court was,
however, reduced from death to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape,
because aggravating circumstances had neither been alleged in the
Information nor sufficiently proven during the trial.
Appellant Alfredo Baroy has since then filed a Motion  for a partial
reconsideration of the Court’s Decision. He claims that he is entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and, hence, to a penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. While he presented various pieces
of conflicting documentary and testimonial evidence during the trial, he
now prays that this Court consider and give weight to his Birth Certificate--
attached as Annex "A" of his Motion -- as the best evidence of his age. His
Birth Certificate shows that he was born on January 19, 1984, while the
crimes in question were committed on March 2, 1998.
In its August 30, 2002 Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
said that it was not in a position to state whether the Certificate of Live Birth
attached as Annex "A" to appellant’s Motion was authentic or not. It
pointed out the necessity of requiring the National Statistics Office (NSO),
which appeared to have certified Annex "A" as a true copy, to comment on
the existence of the document in their files. The OSG further manifested
that on the basis of the NSO’s comment, it is leaving to the sound discretion
of the Court whether to appreciate the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority in favor of Baroy.
In its Comment, the NSO confirmed that Annex "A" was a true copy of the
Certificate of Live Birth of one Alfredo Gorre Baroy. It further confirmed the
existence in its archives of his record of birth.
Issues:
Whether or not Certificate of Live Birth given after trial can be
appreciated as a Privileged Mitigating Circumstance
Ruling:
At the outset, we stress that the verification of the authenticity of the birth
certificate of the accused should normally be done during the trial.
However, due to (1) the gravity of the penalty imposed in this case; (2) the
existence in the records of weighty evidence proving Baroy’s minority at the
time of the commission of the crime; and (3) the simple and straightforward
method of verification recommended by the OSG, the Court -- in the
interest of justice -- went the extra mile to ascertain the authenticity of the
evidence submitted. This move was in line with the particular zealousness of
the law in criminal cases in which the transcendental matter of life or liberty
of an individual is at stake.
Baroy’s Birth Certificate -- the authenticity of which was confirmed by the
NSO -- outweighs the other evidence submitted to prove his date of birth.
"A birth certificate is the best evidence of a person’s date of birth."
The earlier evidence submitted by appellant during the trial did not
conclusively prove his age. However, since the OSG did not object to the
belated appreciation of Annex "A" and left the matter to the sound
discretion of this Court, we resolve to rule in favor of the accused.
Based on his Birth Certificate, it is clear that Baroy was only fourteen (14)
years old when he committed the crime of rape. Hence, a reconsideration of
the Court’s May 9, 2002 Decision is proper.1âwphi1
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "when the offender is a
minor x x x under fifteen years x x x a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by
law for the crime which he committed." The penalty prescribed by law for
the crime committed by Baroy is reclusion perpetua to death.  The penalty
two degrees lower is prision mayor. Additionally, Baroy is entitled to the
benefits granted by the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
 24.) Brillante vs. C.A., G.R. Nos. 118757 and 121571, 19
October 2004, 440 SCRA 541
Facts:
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor
in Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was
attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of the press conference,
Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco. He further
accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati
electorate. Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open
letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail his charges against
Binay.
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles
about the same. Angel Gonong, a writer for the People’s Journal, wrote a
news article entitled "Binay Accused of Plotting Slays of Rivals." It was
cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis Camino (Camino),
Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the People’s Journal. Gloria
Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled "Binay Slay Plan on
Syjuco" which was cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva
(Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor,
respectively, of the News Today.
As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati
fiscal’s office four complaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the
letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for writing and publishing the news article
on Brillante’s accusations against him in the People’s Journal; Hernandez,
Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar news article in
the News Today; and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino of
the People’s Journal9  and Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison
and Associates, an advertising agency.
Issues:
(1) Whether the offense of libel had already prescribed when
the Informations were filed with the RTC-Manila and RTC-
Makati;
(2) Whether Brillante is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of libel;
(3) Whether Brillante was denied the equal protection of the
laws
(4) Whether the penalty imposed upon him is excessive.
Ruling:
1. With respect to the issue of prescription, the fourth paragraph of
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the "crime of libel
or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." In determining
when the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned,
reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets
forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of
offenses:
Computation of prescription of offenses.—The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.
The aforequoted provision expressly states that prescriptive period
shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information.
The meaning of the phrase "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" in Article 91 has been settled in the
landmark case of People v. Olarte, where the Court settled
divergent views as to the effect of filing a complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation on
the prescriptive period of the offense. The Court therein held that
the filing of the complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation
interrupts the period of prescription of criminal responsibility. 
2. Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as "a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt
 of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead."
To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a)
the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice
There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three
elements of libel in the cases at bar.
statements. Accordingly, the award of moral damages in favor of
private complainant Prudente is reduced to a total of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 89-69614, 89-
69615, 89-69616 and 89-69617; and the award of moral damages to
private complainant Binay is reduced to Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00) in Criminal Cases No. 88-1410, 88-1411, 88-
1412 and 89-721. The award of moral damages to private
complainant Baloloy in Criminal Case No. 88-3060 is likewise
reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00).

3. The equal protection clause is not absolute; rather, it permits of

reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real
and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently
from another. It is sufficient that the law operates equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed.

As mentioned earlier, the cases against some of some of Brillante’s

co-accused were dismissed during the pendency of the cases before
the trial courts. Still, some of his co-accused remained at
large, leaving the trial courts with no option but to archive the case
as against them. Brillante’s other co-accused were acquitted since,
unlike Brillante, their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

The foregoing clearly shows that Brillante was in a situation

different from his co-accused. The prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt his liability for libel, as the author of the
open letter and the source of the defamatory statements uttered
against Binay, et al.  during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
As such, his conviction for libel was not violative of the equal
protection clause.

4. The Court however agrees with Brillante that the awards of moral
damages in the two cases to private complainants Binay, Prudente
and Baloloy are excessive considering the circumstances
surrounding the making and the publication of the defamatory