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Systematic failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) using Fuzzy Linguistic Modelling

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IJQRM

22,9 Systematic failure mode effect

analysis (FMEA) using fuzzy

linguistic modelling

986

Rajiv Kumar Sharma, Dinesh Kumar and Pradeep Kumar

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Roorkee, India

Received 25 September 2004

Revised 8 January 2005

Accepted 27 January 2005

Abstract

Purpose – To permit the system safety and reliability analysts to evaluate the criticality or risk

associated with item failure modes.

Design/methodology/approach – The factors considered in traditional failure mode and effect

analysis (FMEA) for risk assessment are frequency of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) and detectability

(Sd) of an item failure mode. Because of the subjective and qualitative nature of the information and to

make the analysis more consistent and logical, an approach using fuzzy logic is proposed. In the

proposed approach, these parameters are represented as members of a fuzzy set fuzzified by using

appropriate membership functions and are evaluated in fuzzy inference engine, which makes use of

well-defined rule base and fuzzy logic operations to determine the criticality/riskiness level of the

failure. The fuzzy conclusion is then defuzzified to get risk priority number. The higher the value of

RPN, the greater will be the risk and lower the value of RPN, and the lesser will be the risk. The fuzzy

linguistic assessment model was developed using toolbox platform of MATLAB 6.5 R.13.

Findings – The applicability of the proposed approach is investigated with the help of an illustrative

case study from the paper industry. Fuzzy risk assessment is carried out for prioritizing failure causes of

the hydraulic system, a primary element of the feeding system. The results provide an alternate ranking

to that obtained by the traditional method. It is concluded from the study that the fuzzy logic-based

approach not only resolves the limitations associated with traditional methodology for RPN evaluation

but also permits the experts to combine probability of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) and detectability (Sd) of

failure modes in a more flexible and realistic manner by using their judgement, experience and expertise.

Originality/value – The paper integrates the use of fuzzy logic and expert database with FMEA and

may prove helpful to system safety and reliability analysts while conducting failure mode and effect

analysis to prioritize failures for taking corrective or remedial actions.

Keywords Failure modes and effects analysis, Reliability management, Systems and control theory,

Fuzzy logic

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a structured, bottom-up approach that

starts with known potential failure modes at one level and investigates the effect on the

next subsystem level. All complex mechanical systems are composed of several

subsystems which can be further broken down up to a component level (Wang et al.,

1996). A complete FMEA analyses of a system therefore span all the levels in the

International Journal of Quality & hierarchy from bottom to top (Figure 1). FMEA as a formal design methodology was

Reliability Management

Vol. 22 No. 9, 2005

pp. 986-1004 The authors are grateful to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their constructive

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited

0265-671X

suggestions, which have been incorporated substantially to improve the quality and readability

DOI 10.1108/02656710510625248 of the paper.

Fuzzy linguistic

modelling

987

Figure 1.

Hierarchical structure of

system

first proposed by NASA in year 1963 for their obvious reliability requirements. Since

then, it has been extensively used as a powerful tool for safety and reliability analysis

of products and processes in a wide range of industries particularly, aerospace, nuclear

and automotive industries (Gilchrist, 1993; O’Connor, 2000; Ebeling, 2000). In 1977, it

was adopted and promoted by Ford Motor Company. The Ford procedure extended

FMEA methodology in automotive sector to assess and prioritize potential process and

design- related failures. The main objective of FMEA is to discover and correct the

potential failure problems during the stages of design and production. There are two

phases in FMEA. The first phase is concerned with identification of the potential

failure modes and their effects. It includes defining the potential failures of product’s

component, subassemblies, final assembly and its manufacturing processes and the

second phase is concerned with performing criticality analysis to determine the

severity of failure modes by evaluating and ranking (RPN) the criticality level of each

failure. Figure 2 shows the flow chart revealing general procedure for carrying out

FMEA process. In brief, the ten steps involved are as described as follows:

(1) Identify the system to be analysed. Divide the system into subsystems and /or

assemblies in order to localize the search for components and develop a list of

components for each assembly.

(2) Construct the block diagram of the system. Use structural, (hardware),

functional, combined, master logic diagram and cause and effect diagram to

identify relations among components (Figure 3).

(3) Determine all potential failure modes of each component, their causes and the

effects of failure modes on the immediate function or item, on sub-systems and

the entire system.

(4) Evaluate each failure mode in terms of worst potential consequence (severity).

(5) Identify failure detection methods and compensating provision(s) for each

failure mode.

(6) Estimate the probability of occurrence (Sf) using both qualitative and

quantitative techniques.

IJQRM

22,9

988

Figure 2.

FMEA process flow chart

Figure 3.

Functional block diagram

(7) Calculate the risk priority number (RPN), using relation RPN ¼ S f.S. Sd.

(8) Determine whether corrective action is required or not depending upon the

RPN. If required than identify corrective design or other actions required to

eliminate the causes of failure. The actions may be:

.

Compensatory to minimize the loss in event of failure occurrence.

.

Preventive to avoid a failure situation.

(9) Develop recommendations to enhance the system performance. Fuzzy linguistic

(10) Prepare FMEA report by summarizing the analysis in tabular form (Table I). modelling

Traditional methodology of risk assessment in FMEA

Traditionally, criticality or risk assessment in failure mode, effects and criticality

analysis (FMECA) is executed in two ways (Bowles and Pelaez, 1995; Xu and Tang,

2002; Sharma, 2004): 989

(1) By calculating a criticality number (CN).

(2) By developing a risk priority number (RPN).

effects and criticality analysis” (MIL-STD 1629, 1980). Criticality number technique is

used mostly in the high-risk plants, such as nuclear and aerospace industries and RPN

technique is used in consumer goods, manufacturing and process industries.

Equation (1) is used for calculating criticality number CN number for each item failure

mode i:

CN i ¼ ai bi I i t ð1Þ

where the terms: ai: failure mode ratio; bi: failure-effect probability, li: part failure rate;

and t: operating time.

Equation (2) is used to calculate risk priority number (RPN):

where the terms: Sf: frequency of occurrence; S: severity of its failure effects and SD:

chance of the failure being undetected.

Both the approaches are widely used for risk/criticality assessment in aerospace,

nuclear, automotive and process industries, but they have several

shortcomings/drawbacks in ways in which calculations are made and results are

interpreted.

In the CN calculation, the item criticality number may be underestimated when a

failure mode has multiple effects in different severity categories since only the most

severe effect is used in the calculation.

In RPN analysis, various sets of Sf, S and Sd may produce an identical value,

however, the risk implication may be totally different For instance, consider two

different events having values of Sf ¼ 3, S ¼ 4, Sd ¼ 5 and Sf ¼ 1, S ¼ 10, Sd ¼ 6

respectively. Both these events will have a total RPN value of 60; however, the risk

implications of these two events may not necessarily be the same, which may result in

high-risk events going unnoticed. The other disadvantage of the RPN ranking method

is that it neglects the relative importance among Sf, S and Sd. The three factors are

assumed to have the same importance but in real practical applications the relative

22,9

990

Table I.

IJQRM

System FMEA No.

Subsystem Page.

Component Prepared by

Core team FMEA Date (org.)

Action

results (Rev)

Item/ failure effects of causes of design Recommend Actions

function mode failure Severity failure Occurrence controls Detect actions taken Severity Occurrence Detect RPN

importance among the factors exists. For instance, a failure mode with a very high Fuzzy linguistic

severity, low rate of occurrence, and moderate detectability (say 9, 3, and 5 modelling

respectively) may have a lower RPN (135) than one with all parameters moderate (say

5, 6, and 6 yielding an RPN of 180), even though it should have a higher priority for

corrective action.

Though suitable weights can be assigned to the parameters, in order to make the

assessment more precise and more reliable there is a need to handle the subjective or 991

qualitative information associated with the analysis in consistent and logical manner.

Therefore to address the above listed limitations, an approach using fuzzy linguistic

modeling is proposed.

The fuzzy risk assessment methodology based on fuzzy sets theory (propounded by

Zadeh (1965)) provides a more flexible and meaningful way to assess risk associated

with component/item failure modes. The parameters, i.e. Sf, S and Sd which are used in

FMEA are fuzzified using appropriate membership functions to determine degree of

membership in each input class. The resulting fuzzy inputs are evaluated in fuzzy

inference engine, which makes use of well-defined rule base consisting of If-Then rules

and fuzzy logic operations to determine criticality/riskiness level of the failure. The

fuzzy conclusion is then defuzzified to get risk priority number. Higher the value of

RPN, greater will be the risk and lower the value of RPN, lesser will be the risk. The

Fuzzy Linguistic assessment model was developed using toolbox platform of

MATLAB 6.5 R.13. The basic system architecture consists of three main modules, i.e.

knowledge base module and user input/output interface module as shown in Figure 4.

The main components associated with the model are: Fuzzification; Fuzzy rule base;

Fuzzy inference system; and Defuzzification. The following paragraphs briefly discuss

each of them.

Fuzzification

Fuzzification refers to transformation of crisp inputs into a membership degree, which

expresses how well the input belongs to the linguistically defined terms. Using the

toolbox simulator of Matlab (2000) membership functions are developed for both

Figure 4.

System architecture of

fuzzy linguistic model

IJQRM inputs and output. To represent input variables (Sf, S and Sd) graphically, trapezoidal

22,9 membership functions (Figure 5) are used which are consistent with the definitions of

probability of failure occurrence, severity and non-detectability used in the study as

depicted in Tables II-IV. The interpretation of descriptive terms Remote (R), Low (L),

Moderate (M), High (H) and Very high (VH) used to describe occurrence, the severity

and the non-detectability is presented in Table V (Klir and Yuan, 1995).

992

Figure 5.

Fuzzy membership

function for linguistic

variables (Sf.S. Sd)

Descriptive assessment of

probability of failure Mean time between failures (MTBF) Score Occurrence rate (%)

Table II. Low 2-5 years 2-3 0.01-0.1

Scales used to measure Moderate 1-2 years 4-6 0.1-0.5

probability of failure High 3-6 months 7-8 0.5-1

occurrence Very high , 3 months 9-10 .1

Remote 1 0-5

Low 2 6-15

3 16-25

Moderate 4 26-35

5 36-45

6 46-55

High 7 56-65

Table III.

8 66-75

Scale used to determine

9 76-85

probability of

non-detection Very high 10 86-100

2-3 Low MTTR .1 day

Table IV. 4-5-6 Moderate MTTR 1-4 days

Scale used for severity 7-8 High External intervention for repairs

assessment 9-10 Very high Line shut down or production loss

Fuzzy linguistic

Descriptive

term Probability of occurrence (Sf) Severity (S) Non-detectability (Sd) modelling

Remote It would be very unlikely for A failure that has no effect Defect remains undetected

these failures to be observed on the system performance, until the system

once the operator probably will performance degrades to the

not notice extent that the task will not 993

be completed

Low Likely to occur once but A failure that would cause Defect remains undetected

unlikely to occur more slight annoyance to the until the system

frequently operator, but would cause performance is severely

no deterioration to the reduced

system

Moderate Likely to occur more than A failure that would cause Defect remains undetected

once high degree of operator until the system

dissatisfaction, or that performance is affected

causes noticeable but slight

deterioration in system

performance

High Near certain to occur at least A failure that causes Defect remains undetected

once deterioration in system until inspection or test is

performance and/or leads to carried out.

minor injuries. Table V.

Very high Near certain to occur several A failure that would Failure remains undetected, Interpretation of

times seriously affect the ability to such a defect would almost descriptive terms used for

complete the task or cause certainly be detected during graphical representation

damage, serious injuries or inspection or test of fuzzy membership

death function

triangular and trapezoidal membership functions are used. Multiple experts with

different degree of competencies “C” are used to construct the membership function. The

descriptive terms describing the output membership function are Not important, Minor,

Low, Moderate, Important and Very important. (In Appendix 2, the procedure which

makes use of expertise judgment in designing membership functions is discussed).

Skilled human analysts often have good, intitutive knowledge of behavior of system

and the risks involved in various types of failures. To express this knowledge fuzzy

Figure 6.

Graphical representation

of fuzzy priority

membership function

IJQRM rules provide a natural platform for abstracting information based on expert’s

22,9 judgement and engineering knowledge. Expert’s knowledge and expertise about the

interaction between various failure modes and their effects is represented in form of

fuzzy “If-Then” rules. “If” refers to an antecedent that is compared to the inputs, and

“Then” refers to a consequent, which is the result/output (Ross, 1995; Terano et al.,

1987; Zimmermann, 1996).

994 For instance:

RI ; if x is M i then y is N i i ¼ 1; 2; 3 . . . K ð3Þ

where:

. x is the input (antecedent) linguistic variable.

.

Mi are the antecedent linguistic constants (qualitatively defined functions).

.

y is the output (consequent) linguistic variable.

.

Ni are the consequent linguistic constants.

All the rules that have any truth in their antecedent will fire and contributes towards

the fuzzy conclusion set. The format of rules framed in the study is shown in Figure 7.

Fuzzy inference mechanism is based on the compositional rule of inference proposed

by Zadeh. By using the inference mechanism an output fuzzy set is obtained from

the rules and the input variables. For instance, a fuzzy rule expressed by equation

(3) is represented by a fuzzy relation R: (X x Y), which is computed by using

equation (4):

mR ðx; yÞ ¼ I ½mA ðxÞ; mB ÞyÞ ð4Þ

where the operator I can be either an implication or a conjunction operator (a t-norm).

From the literature (Zimmermann, 1996) it is observed that there are two most common

types of inference systems frequently used; the max-min inference and the max-prod

inference method. Examples of t-norms are the minimum, oftenly called “mamdani

implication” and the product, called the Larsen implication. In the study mamdani’s

max-min inference method is used. The min operator is used for the conjunction of the

Figure 7.

Format of rules framed on

fuzzy inference system

rule and for the implication function and the max operator is used for the aggregation Fuzzy linguistic

of the fuzzy sets. The compositional rule of inference proposed by Zadeh results in

equation (5):

modelling

995

where:

.

bk ¼ minai;k

.

ai;k ¼ sup min (mA0 ðxi Þ; mA ðxÞÞ

For instance, in Figure 8, schematic representation of the fuzzy reasoning

mechanism with two rules is presented. First, the numerical input variables

(occurence, severity) are fuzzifed using appropriate membership functions.Then the

min operator is used for the conjunction and for the implication operations. The

outputs (individual fuzzy sets) are aggregated by using the max operator and

finally, the aggregated output is defuzzifed to obtain a crisp value. In the study the

Mamdani’s fuzzy inference method is used because it is typically used in modeling

human expert knowledge. All the parameters adopted in mamdani model to

generate FIS system are presented in Table VI. (In Appendix 1 the algorithm used

in Mamdani’s inference method is presented (Tsoukalas and Uhrig, 1997; Terano

et al., 1987)).

Figure 8.

Schematic representation

of the fuzzy reasoning

mechanism

IJQRM

[Output1]

22,9 [System] Name ¼ ‘FRP’

Name ¼ ‘FMEA Range ¼ [0 1]

Type ¼ ‘mamdani’ NumMFs ¼ 6

Version ¼ 2.0 MF1 ¼ ‘N.Imp’:‘trapmf’, 0 0 0.10.2]

NumInputs ¼ 3 MF2 ¼ ‘Minor’:‘trimf’, [0.1 0.22 0.40]

996 NumOutputs ¼ 1 MF3 ¼ ‘Low’:‘trimf’, [0.258 0.39 0.544]

NumRules ¼ 27 MF4 ¼ ‘Moderate’:‘trimf’,[0.433 0.591 0.77]

And Method ¼ ‘min’ MF5 ¼ ‘Imp’:‘trimf’,[0.647 0.758 0.898]

Or Method ¼ ‘max’ MF6 ¼ ‘V.Imp’:‘trapmf’,[0.80 0.90 1.0 1.0]

Imp Method ¼ ‘min’ [Rules]

AggMethod ¼ ‘max’ 4 5 5, 6 (1):1

DefuzzMethod ¼ ‘centroid’ 4 4 5, 4 (1):1

[Input1] 4 5 4, 5 (1):1

Name ¼ ‘Occurrence’ 4 4 3, 5 (1):1

Range ¼ [0 10] 4 5 3, 5 (1):1

NumMFs ¼ 5 5 5 5, 6 (1):1

MF1 ¼ ‘Remote’:‘trapmf’, 0 0 1.0 2.0] 5 4 4, 5 (1):1

MF2 ¼ ‘Low’:‘trapmf’, [1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0] 5 3 5, 5 (1):1

MF3 ¼ ‘Moderate’:‘trapmf’, [3.0 4.0 6.0 7.0] 5 2 5, 5 (1):1

MF4 ¼ ‘High’:‘trapmf’, [6.0 7.0 8 9.0] 5 1 4, 3 (1):1

MF5 ¼ ‘V.High’:‘trapmf’, [8.0 9.0 10.010.0] 3 4 4, 5 (1):1

[Input2] 3 5 5, 5 (1):1

Name ¼ ‘Non Detectability’ 3 4 4, 4 (1):1

Range ¼ [0 10] 3 4 5, 4 (1):1

NumMFs ¼ 5 3 3 4, 4 (1):1

MF1 ¼ ‘Remote’:‘trapmf’, [0 0 1.0 2.0] 3 4 3, 3 (1):1

MF2 ¼ ‘Low’:‘trapmf’, [1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0] 3 3 3, 2 (1):1

MF3 ¼ ‘Moderate’:‘trapmf’, [3.0 4.0 6.0 7.0] 2 4 3, 2 (1):1

MF4 ¼ ‘High’:‘trapmf’, [6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0] 2 3 3, 2 (1):1

MF5 ¼ ‘V.High’:‘trapmf’, [8.0 9.0 10.0 10.0] 2 2 3, 1 (1):1

[Input3] 2 2 2, 1 (1):1

Name ¼ ‘Severity’ 2 4 4, 4 (1):1

Range ¼ [0 10] 2 3 4, 2 (1):1

NumMFs ¼ 5 1 2 3, 1 (1):1

MF1 ¼ ‘Remote’:‘trapmf’, 0 0 1.0 2.0] 1 3 3, 1 (1):1

MF2 ¼ ‘Low’:‘trapmf’, [1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0] 1 1 1, 1 (1):1

Table VI. MF3 ¼ ‘Moderate’:‘trapmf’, [3.0 4.0 6.0 7.0] 1 2 2, 1 (1):1

Listing of information on MF4 ¼ ‘High’:‘trapmf’, [6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0]

FIS MF5 ¼ ‘V.High’:‘trapmf’, [8.0 9.0 10.0 10.0]

Defuzzification

Finally, defuzzification is done to obtain crisp ranking from the fuzzy conclusion set,

which is used to express the riskiness/criticality level of the failure so that corrective or

remedial actions can be prioritized accordingly. There are many defuzzification

methods available in literature but most commonly used are Chen’s ranking (1985),

Yager’s centroidal (1980) and Tran and Duckstein (2002) methods. The criteria used to

select suitable defuzzification method are disambiguity (result in unique value),

plausibility (lie approximately in the middle of the area), and computational simplicity

(Ross, 1995). In the study, Yager’s centroidal method is used for defuzzification which Fuzzy linguistic

is given by equation (6): modelling

R

mB 0 ð yÞy:dy

y

Defuzzified value ¼ R ð6Þ

mB 0 ð yÞdy

y

997

where B0 is the output fuzzy set, and mB0 i is the membership function.

Illustrative case

To demonstrate the application of proposed approach for carrying out system FMEA,

an industrial case study from a paper mill is proposed. There are many functional units

in a paper mill such as feeding, pulp preparation, pulp washing, screening, bleaching

and preparation of paper. Due to high level of saturation and increase in number of

breakdown maintenance interventions, it is decided to conduct failure mode analysis of

sub-systems in one of the main functioning unit i.e. feeding system. The feeding

system consists of three sub systems (Kumar et al., 1988), namely:

Sub system 1. the Blower, for pushing the wood chips through pipe;

Sub system 2. the chain conveyor and bucket conveyor for transporting and lifting

the chips to feed the digester;

Sub system 3. the stand-by unit (for sub system 2) when there is a failure in sub

system 2 stand-by unit is switched on which feeds the digester.

The effect of each possible cause of failure of sub system 2, which consists of chain,

conveyor and bucket conveyor, is evaluated in terms of probability of occurrence (Sf),

probability of non-detection (Sd) and severity of failure (S). The brief description of

methodology used to calculate the scores related to failure of occurrence, likelihood of

non-detection of failure and severity of failure of SS2 is as followed.

Probability of occurrence of failure is evaluated as a function of mean time between

failures. The data related to mean time between failures of SS2 is obtained from previous

historical records, maintenance log-books and is then integrated with the experience of

maintenance personnel. For instance, if MTBF of component is between three to six

months then probability of occurrence of failure is high (occurrence rate 0.5-1 per cent)

with the score ranging between 7-8. Table II presents the descriptive assessment of

probability of failure occurrence with corresponding MTBF and scores assigned.

The chance of detecting a failure cause or mechanism depends on various factors such

as ability of operator or maintenance personnel to detect failure through naked eye or

by periodical inspection or with the help of machine diagnostic aids such as automatic

controls, alarms and sensors. For instance, probability of non-detection of failure of a

component through naked eye is say, 0-5 per cent is ranked 1 with non-detectability

remote. The values of Sd for various failure causes reported in the study are evaluated

according to the score reported in Table III.

IJQRM Severity of failure (S)

22,9 Severity of failure is assessed by the possible outcome of failure effect on the system

performance. The severity of effect may be regarded as remote, moderate or very high.

In the study the data related to mean time to repair (MTTR) obtained from historical

records, supported with the experience of maintenance personnel is used to obtain

score for severity. For instance, if MTTR of facility/component is less than, say one

998 hour, effect may be regarded as remote. If external intervention is required for repairs,

or MTTR exceeds four days, then effect may be regarded as high and if system

degrades resulting in line shut down/production stoppage, then the severity may be

regarded as very high. Apart from the parameters listed in Table IV, the economics

(associated with maintenance, spares and manpower) and safety aspects can also be

used to obtain more reliable score.

Table VII presents the traditional FMEA analysis for the hydraulic system. The

numerical values of FMEA parameters, i.e. Sf, S and Sd are obtained by using the

methodology discussed above (this makes use of maintenance records integrated with

the knowledge of maintenance people/experts). Then RPN number for each failure

cause is evaluated by multiplying the factor scores using equation (2) The resulting

RPN number and priority ranking is presented in the last two columns of Table VII.

To investigate the applicability of proposed approach for prioritizing failure causes

of hydraulic system, Fuzzy risk assessment is carried out by adopting a four-step

procedure (i.e. fuzzification, rule formation and evaluation and defuzzification)

discussed previously in detail. The results so obtained are presented in Table VIII. It is

depicted in Table VIII that the ranking of priority of various failure causes obtained

from the traditional FMEA is altered (CauseG . CauseE . CauseA . CauseF .

CauseD . CauseB . CauseC). For instance, Cause G turned out to be one of the most

critical failure causes in terms of RPN, while, after conducting fuzzy criticality

assessment using FIS it ranks only at the second place, with a score of 0.653. At the

same time, Cause F becomes the most critical one, with an overall score of 0.766. The

order of failure causes obtained by fuzzy critical assessment approach (FCAM) is

(CauseF . CauseG . CauseB . CauseD . CauseE . CauseA . CauseC.)

For instance, the FCAM output for failure Cause A (with inputs S f ¼ 7, S ¼ 7 and

S d ¼ 6) is 0.543. And cause C (with inputs S f ¼ 3, S ¼ 5 and S d ¼ 5) is 0.247, as

shown in Figure 9 (a) and (b). The mapping of inputs (Sf), (Sd) and (S) to the output

(FRPN) through the linguistic If-Then rules adopted in the study is represented using a

control surface plots (Figure 10 (a)(b) and (c)). The plots help to examine the

consistency of the rules framed in FIS. The surface displays the dependency of the

output as a function of the inputs – that is, it illustrates the entire span of the output set

based on the entire span of the input(s) set. These three-dimensional plots represent

very well a two-input and one-output system. Since in the study we have used three

inputs, i.e. (Sf), (S) and (Sd) so the surface plot can be represented with a group of

surfaces keeping one of the input variables stable.

Thus, the uncertainty in the traditional assessment is solved using fuzzy linguistic

modeling. The use of fuzzy set approach, confirms that how fuzzy linguistic

assessment methodology which makes use of membership functions, a well defined

fuzzy rule base and an inference system can enhance and improve the understanding of

Potential Potential cause of

Component Function failure mode Potential effect of failure failure *S

f

*S *S

d RPN R

Solenoid valve Act as energizer, i.e. to control Breaking Piston fails to execute the Burning of magnet 7 6 7 294 3

piston stroke movement (Cause A)

Pressure regulator Control or regulate pressure Breaking Pressure out of range Mechanical stresses 5 4 7 140 6

(Cause B)

Hydraulic pistons To carry out movements Blow-by Loss of fluid Breaking of seal 3 5 5 75 7

(Cause C)

Breaking Piston fails to execute the Breaking of piston rod 3 7 8 168 5

movement (Cause D)

Hydraulic gear case Maintain the fluid pressure Breaking, Lack of adequate oil pressure Pump wear (Cause E) 8 7 7 392 2

clogging for movement

Leakage Loss of fluid Blow-by (Cause F) 4 6 10 240 4

Pressure tubes Breaking Lack of adequate oil pressure Corrosion (Cause G) 6 9 10 540 1

Notes: *(Sf): probability of occurrence; *(S): severity; *(SD): non-detectability

Fuzzy linguistic

element: hydraulic

modelling

system)

(System: feeding; Primary

subsystem2 (SS2)

primary element of

Traditional FMEA of

Table VII.

999

IJQRM the dynamics of a complex problems in which decisions are to be made from imprecise,

22,9 vague and subjective information. It is concluded from the study that fuzzy logic-based

approach not only resolves the limitations associated with traditional methodology for

RPN evaluation of failure causes in reliability analysis of system but also offers added

advantages such as:

.

Both quantitative data and, vague or imprecisely defined qualitative

1000 information, can be used in criticality/risk assessment in a consistent manner.

cause output (traditional) output Ranking (fuzzy)

Cause B 140 6 0.620 3

Table VIII. Cause C 75 7 0.247 7

Comparison of fuzzy (FIS) Cause D 168 5 0.603 4

output and traditional Cause E 392 2 0.596 5

RPN output for various Cause F 240 4 0.766 1

failure causes Cause G 540 1 0.653 2

Figure 9.

(a) and (b) Representation

of fuzzy critical system

output for failure Cause A

and Cause C

Fuzzy linguistic

modelling

1001

Figure 10.

Control surface plots

IJQRM .

It permits the experts to combine probability of occurrence (Sf), severity (S) and

22,9 detectability (Sd) of failure modes in more flexible and realistic manner by using

their judgment, experience and expertise.

References

1002 Bowles, J.B. and Pelaez, C.E. (1995), “Application of fuzzy logic to reliability engineering”,

Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 83 No. 3, pp. 435-49.

Chen, S.H. (1985), “Ranking fuzzy numbers with maximizing and minimizing set”, Fuzzy Sets and

Systems, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 113-29.

Ebeling, C. (2000), An Introduction to Reliability and Maintainability Engineering, Tata

McGraw-Hill Company Ltd, New York, NY.

Gilchrist, W. (1993), “Modeling failure mode and effect analysis”, International Journal of Quality

& Reliability Management, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 16-23.

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Ben-Daya, M. and Raouf, A. (1996), “A revised failure mode and effect analysis model”,

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FMECA) and for manufacturing and assembly process (process FMECA): instruction

manual”, internal report, September, Ford Motor Company, Detroit, MI. modelling

Kara-Zatri, C., Keller, A.Z. and Fleming, P.V. (1992), “A smart failure mode and effect analysis

package”, Proceedings of Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, pp. 414-21.

Kruse, R., Gebhardt, J. and Klawonn, F. (1994), Foundations of Fuzzy Systems, John Wiley &

Sons, Chichester. 1003

Kumar, D., Singh, I.P. and Singh, J. (1988), “Reliability analysis of feeding system in paper

industry”, Microelectronics and Reliability, Vol. 2 No. 28, pp. 213-15.

Stamatis, D.H. (1995), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis – FMEA from Theory to Execution,

ASQC Quality Press, New York, NY.

Teng, S.H. and Ho, S.Y. (1996), “Failure mode and effects analysis: an integrated approach for

product design and process control”, International Journal of Quality & Reliability

Management, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 8-26.

Appendix 1

Fuzzy inference system (Mamdani type.) Max-min inference algorithm

k ¼ number of rules

For (i ¼ 1; i ¼ k; iþ þ) {/ * Calculate the degree of fulfillment bi of the antecedent part of the

rules */

/ * Derive the output fuzzy set b0i using the minimum t-norm */

mB0 i ð yÞ ¼ bi ^ mBi ð yÞ

/ * Compute the aggregated output fuzzy set by taking the maximum of the individual conclusion

mB0 i */

Appendix 2

Assume that n experts are asked for some x[ X to evaluate the proposition “x belongs to A” as

either true or false where (A is a fuzzy set on X that represents a linguistic term associated with

linguistic variable).

Given a particular element x[ X,

Let ai(x) denote the answer of expert i (i[ N n ).

Let us assume that

ai(x) ¼ 1, when the proposition valued by expert i is true; and

ai(x) ¼ 0, when the proposition valued by expert i is false.

Then probabilistic interpretation of constructed membership function is given by equation as:

X

N

ai ðxÞ

i¼1

AðxÞ ¼

n

IJQRM When the experts have different degree of competencies, Ci, with regard to the model being

constructed, Equation is modified as:

22,9

X

n

AðxÞ ¼ C i ai ðxÞ

i¼1

X

n

where C i ¼ 1 and the value of Ci depends upon the knowledge of expert and their expertise in

1004 i¼1

the relevant field.

Acronyms

FMEA Failure mode effect analysis

RPN Risk priority number

FRPN Fuzzy risk priority number

MTBF Mean time between failures

MTTR Mean time to repair.

Sf Frequency of occurrence

S Severity of failure

Sd Non-detectability of failure

CN Criticality number