Checklist of Cases in CIVREV1 under Atty.

Rabuya

1. Morigo vs People
2. Republic vs. Olaybar
3. Silverio vs. Republic
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004
4. Republic vs. Cagandahan
5. Republic vs. Albios
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
6. Republic vs. Dayot
vs.
7. De Castro vs. Assidao De Castro
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
8. Ninal vs. Bayadog
9. Enrico vs. Heirs of Spouses Medinacelli
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21,
10. Garcia Quaison vs. Belen
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
11. Juliano-Llave vs. Republic judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch
12. Fujiki vs. Marinay 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
13. Marcos vs. Marcos Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term
14. Antonio vs. Reyes of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
15. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of
16. Odayat vs. Amante the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
17. Wigel vs. Sempio –Dy reconsideration.
18. Castillo vs. De Leon Castillo
19. Mercado vs. Tan The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
1 CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
20. Marbella Bobis vs. Bobis
21. Abunado vs People Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
22. Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
23. Santiago vs. People (4) years (from 1974-1978).
24. Tenebro vs. CA
25. Santos vs. Santos After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact
26. SSS vs. Jarque Vda De Baylon with each other.
27. Manuel vs. People
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
- Voidable Marriages from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
- Legal Separation became sweethearts.
- Marriage Settlement and Donations Propter Nuptias
1. Dino vs. Dino In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
2. Valdez vs. RTC
3. Heirs of Protacio Go vs. Servacio
4. Domingo vs. Molina In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
5. Dewara vs. Lamela
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at
6. Pana vs. Heirs of Juanite Sr.
Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
7. Boado vs. CA
8. Kelley Jr. vs. Planter Products Inc.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
9. Fulogio vs. Bell Sr. appellant Lucio behind.
 On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division)
a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the
declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question
in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which
2 was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case
No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused
Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense
in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows: CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant
to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy
in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public
policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending
that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of
law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in
the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as
the first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage
to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN
INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT
3 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
[THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not
be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other
felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there
is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the
act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith
in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies
upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
4019 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may
re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account
as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s
contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent,
we must first determine whetherCIVIL
all the
LAWelements
REVIEWof bigamy
1 CASESareunder
present in this
Atty. case.
Rabuya
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further
directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation
of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to
begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
4 The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not
married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein
that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized
not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly
issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of
the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition CIVIL isLAW
GRANTED.
REVIEW The assailed
1 CASES decision,
under Atty. dated
Rabuya
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on
the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Regional Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated
August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted
 respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's
marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries
in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion
thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as
her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
5 time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working
as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels
Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who
owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga,
an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune
was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to
cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her
record and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion
of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court beingCIVIL LAW REVIEW
the appropriate 1 CASES
adversary under Atty.
proceeding Rabuya
required.
Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN
THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR
CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
 Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones
provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar
and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of
the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect,
declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by
respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of
a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are
raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the
probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner
raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of
6 entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either
case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary.
If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108,
with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have
been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in
Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar
and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
 court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that
her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into
or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
7 was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were
also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the
trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued
identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s
signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly,
it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming
evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While
we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
CIVIL LAW REVIEW is DENIED for lackAtty.
1 CASES under of merit. The
Rabuya
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009
in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice.
All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human
beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
 "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
8 childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto"
to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more
in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the CIVIL LAW
petition REVIEW
would 1 CASES
bring the under Atty.
much-awaited Rabuya
happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
 No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
9 CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change
of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of
first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
 In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be
legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong
venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where
his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true
and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of
Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
10 Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx       xxx       xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed
in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference
to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor;CIVIL
andLAW
(16)REVIEW 1 CASES
changes of name. under Atty. Rabuya
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first
name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned
 in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation,
adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
11 shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant;
(c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not
known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the
infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the
regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
36
sense unless the context compels to the
CIVIL LAWcontrary."
REVIEW Since the statutory
1 CASES language
under Atty. of
Rabuya
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
 the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
Republic of the Philippines
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
SUPREME COURT
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
Manila
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws SECOND DIVISION
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. G.R. No. 166676
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall Present:
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the Petitioner,
law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,
duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. - versus -
Carpio Morales,
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex Tinga,
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
Respondent.
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
VELASCO, JR., and

12 To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASESBRION,
under Atty. Rabuya
JJ.
for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex Promulgated:
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn September 12, 2008
governing the conferment of that privilege. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The
Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at
least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which
granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by
Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan’s birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed
to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."
The facts are as follows.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

 On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at
age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small
ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as
in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
13 court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating
that respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male.
He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly
period. He further testified that respondent’s condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005
which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the
Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was
medically proven that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, and first his
body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be
male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a
male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is
hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of
Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN;
and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal
certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with
the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the
CIVIL LAW Solicitor
REVIEWGeneral (OSG)
1 CASES underseeking a
Atty. Rabuya
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENT’S MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE."4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
 gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the
local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent’s petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil
registrar.5 The OSG further contends respondent’s petition is fatally defective
since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such
filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.6 The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar
of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction
of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy
14 of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings,
orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,8 respondent is actually a
male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,10 and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.11
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
Section 1. Venue. – A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in
the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. – A petition for change of name shall be signed and
verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his
behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. – If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order
be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive
weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as
the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty
(30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last
publication of the notice.
Sec. 4. Hearing. – Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose
the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall
appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
Sec. 5. Judgment. – Upon satisfactory
CIVIL LAW proof in open
REVIEW court on
1 CASES the date
under Atty.fixed in
Rabuya
the order that such order has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable
cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name
be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Sec. 6. Service of judgment. – Judgments or orders rendered in connection with
this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the
civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
Section 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded
in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
 where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
Sec. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
15
Sec. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication
of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary
injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
Sec. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent’s petition did
not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local
civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction
of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no
final determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as
falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.13 The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to
the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
CIVIL
Together with Article 376[16] of theLAW
CivilREVIEW 1 CASES
Code, this under
provision wasAtty. Rabuya
amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.18
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
 marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
"inappropriate" appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child
grows older, some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice,
facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
16 CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is
now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality "is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.
[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a
"disorder" which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as
neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. "It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor
truly ‘female’."[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels
that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine,
based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent
to be other than female, then a change in the
subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition.
Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system
naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
CIVIL LAW
individual, like respondent, having REVIEW
reached 1 CASES
the age underwith
of majority, Atty.good
Rabuya
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.
Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification
at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,
[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo

treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the
one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right
to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent"[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words,
we respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect
how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
17 in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
[28] The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
WHEREFORE, the Republic’s petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780               October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage,
they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had
any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer CIVIL LAW
but he didREVIEW 1 CASES
not file his answer.under Atty. Rabuya
On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning.
As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
 xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7
dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
18
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married
and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live
as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily
for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage
and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential
to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from
the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
CIVIL
The resolution of this case hinges LAWsole
on this REVIEW 1 CASES
question of law:under Atty. Rabuya
Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits.
In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose"
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of
the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
 In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate
that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration
laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of
a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent
for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to
stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to
obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled
19 that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may
go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent,
which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage
in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake
of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never
really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to
gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided
"merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980
immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham
marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC,
the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As
in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties onlyCIVIL
entered
LAW into the marriage
REVIEW for the
1 CASES acquisition
under of
Atty. Rabuya
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must
be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both
the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
 nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage,
legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter
into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way
or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
20 jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to
create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application
for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of
the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment
of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or
deceit shall constitute fraud as aCIVIL
ground forREVIEW
LAW an action1toCASES
annul under
a marriage.
Atty.Entering
Rabuya
into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify
under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground
of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case,
there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the
sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this
inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits,
or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No.
1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175581               March 28, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
21
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are
Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa
void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of
a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24
November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that
he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately
thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house, the latter being his
landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the
Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a
man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose
needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted
marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the
table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it
was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity
of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man
and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had
deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5 In her
pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990.
On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension
from service for one year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by
both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed
Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him
or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something
 was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but
it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact
that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
"taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he
acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.
[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.
This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully
wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she
signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate
22 (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November
29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed
that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony
of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through
fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It
cited Article 8711 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment
of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa]
through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when
he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal
to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa
as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between
the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground
of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of
Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action
for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of AppealsCIVIL
did not accept
LAW Jose’s1assertion
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Rabuya
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 7616 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to
the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The
appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage,
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil
Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must
belong to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was
established only in Article 718 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties’
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for
 the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of
the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the
legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in
Niñal v. Bayadog,20 and reasoned that:
23 In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without
a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law
would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of
the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not
comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who
is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio
because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581,
praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended
Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in
the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution.23 CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF
THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24
 Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied
Niñal.25 She differentiates the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain
in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the
annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative
case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a
considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26 To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republic’s position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect
the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied
with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the
24
said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so
must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage contract
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also
bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a
primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces
the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification
dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of
Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a
false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is
in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil
Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
(Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28 Article 80(3)29 of the
Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is
in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character
of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into
their capacity to contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in
articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
 shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity
attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state
of cohabitation from legalizing their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without
a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether
the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
25 statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly38 but
reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency
but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under
Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous
terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other
reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts42 in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years
at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.43 The Court of Appeals
also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution.44 The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only
in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there
is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45,
factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review.47 It is already well-
settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on
this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the
trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply
CIVIL in every
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under of Appeals
Atty. Rabuya
and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court
of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and
Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond
question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in
the parties’ affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential
and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit.
Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was
celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the
same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in
 apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.
There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage
on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or
fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and
Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent
and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.52 The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take
the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this
Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of
deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
26
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the
parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and
not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit
at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on
equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and
cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must
be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.54 There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It
is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990,
and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and
Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void
marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period
computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.57 It covers the years
immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.58 CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage
of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV.
No. 69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of
the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid
 until properly nullified by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get
married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation
sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the
couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage
license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on
the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De
Castro. Since the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her
income as a government dentist and from her private practice.
27
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent
alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his
responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as
his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage
is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was
merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state;
and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that
he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
5
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,  the trial court ruled that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a
marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child,
and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child
when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is
presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the
appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of
the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s
refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his
refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him
of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was
improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as
null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between the
parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner,
but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in
the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been
limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of
the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000,
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region,
Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid
until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose. Costs against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court
of Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with
respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the
marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit
they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, the
truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife. The
false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence
of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action
for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
 marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral
attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of another
case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be
presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming
for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts.12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous
denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in
declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition.13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic
to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings
and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage
cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she
28 pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner
was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court,
petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
filiation.15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was
improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and
respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states
that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action for support, since
the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a
marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years)
was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings
of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of
petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with
sufficient authority to pass uponCIVIL
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being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass
upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence
presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had
been living together for more than five years.24 However, respondent herself in effect
admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q     But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you
signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A     Yes, sir.25
 The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a
man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before
the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name
for a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner
and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage
license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter,
and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
29 instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition,
petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent,
admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro
Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s
own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a
motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier
ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the
marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise
(Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2,"
"E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H,"
"H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"),
defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner’s finger and in
another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the act of
kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16
October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 133778             March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent,
obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
 (1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare
null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for
review with this Court grounded on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the
basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
30 under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to
Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from
the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage
license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping
and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from
the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing
a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been
for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years
and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation
is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
 marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
31 thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of
the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition
to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows
"the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either
party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who
can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code
is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable
and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
21 
considered as having never to haveCIVILtaken
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The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those
declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article
43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed
as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.
 Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that
the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will
be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted
during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death
32 of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173614               September 28, 2007
LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD CATLI-
MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its
Order,2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents’ Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio)
and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio and Trinidad were
married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.3 They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and
Joseph Lloyd.4 On 1 May 2004,CIVIL LAWdied.
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 On 26 August under Atty. Rabuya
2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on
10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same
was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article
348 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not
have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s
death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage
of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband
and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born
Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and
30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the marriage ceremony
was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
 Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action
on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7
March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court
which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which states that
such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is clear and
unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to
bring such petition is exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently,
the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the
action to declare the marriage null and void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
33
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the
answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents]
is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by
petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3
May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog,15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased
spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where
one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a petition to
declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a
deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death.
The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs.
Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has
rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic)
the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage
and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the
parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog
and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case
of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine
[the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a person who
entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with respect to their
successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the
parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed
to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent
his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left by the parent. Such
vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure such as the Rule.
Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then,
have a legal standing in Court.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent,
especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give
premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for
the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a semblance of
validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death of the
parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void
marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the void
marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage void, but the
Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall be the
ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated
October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order;
however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new
matter was raised therein.19
 Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the
sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to
the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within
their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.20 Instead, they
should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort,
this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts.21 However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for
34 its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed
to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of
the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that
the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity
of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a different
milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s
marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to
wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of
the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with
the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When
the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
 cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all
is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without
any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
35 the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED
without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to
Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife
and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-
Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children,
Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each
other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with
her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and
not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
 improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that
the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the
position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in
the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November
2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
36 venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED
TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes exCIVIL LAW"actual
vi termini REVIEW 1 CASESasunder
residence" Atty. Rabuya
distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during
his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
 Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in
the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry
in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist
his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered
proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof,
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact
that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is
void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud
with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive
and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
37 declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in
no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father,
by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and
it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be
questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory
heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for
being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating
priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the
National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the first marriage was celebrated more REVIEW
CIVIL LAW than 50 years ago, thus,
1 CASES undertheAtty.
possibility
Rabuya
that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has
not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons
who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
 (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known
to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
38
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo,
the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the
decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as
a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of
the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169766               March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO
and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the
protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent
Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-
Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void
ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City3 and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang,
Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil
status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen.
Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
 On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in
behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint6 alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The
complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage
entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has
no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise
39 known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from
the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of which the
court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on
February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the
latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case
for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995
a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss.
On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14 which was docketed
thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case
since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial
while her opposing parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to
adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her
instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in view
of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it
from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its
Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the appellate court’s
judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to
present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita
22
again asked for a postponement.CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to
submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the
case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she
still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25 stating as
one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083,
the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming
jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied
Estrellita’s motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void
ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never
severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab
 initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and
under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence
of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from
the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as
"divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the second marriage
because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially,
where the subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family
Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have
required her to file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She
maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
40 subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she
highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage
to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA held that
Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample
opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements.
She never filed her answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than
what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s marriage to
Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for
an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites,
while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then,
according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s
wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the
additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public
prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48 of the Family Code35 will not invalidate
the trial court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had been
adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not
been joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court
erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of the records
of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of
the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellita’s marriage to
Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA
erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving
her of the opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the
allegations against the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v.
Macias36 laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality.
CIVIL LAW REVIEWShe maintains
1 CASES thatAtty.
under she merely
Rabuya
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s assurance that the
proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court will take on
her petition questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this
commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before
the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11,
1998.37 She also questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a
finding of whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid
as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her.
She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the
deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties
are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out
that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the
affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit
because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
 Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s reasoning
and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that
filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main
action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the
Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of
Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also
supports private respondents’ legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellita’s
purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party
may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such
right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was
41 rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her
certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer
and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not even
conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer;
and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of
the motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial
proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process.
She was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to
defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the period to
file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition
for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has
been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the
CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of
filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for
her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the
hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued
its Order denying the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance
of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five
(5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent
Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the
trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss
that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the
motion to dismiss be raised before theLAW
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court
CIVIL REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because
after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even
when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an answer. In the
instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she filed
motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly
ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings
before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an independent action which is
not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment
complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the trial court
respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered
judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
 Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never
issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action.
With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it was her turn to do so,
insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603.
Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable
only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics
to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have
waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower court wait
for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it
wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves
strictly the propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of
marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
42 Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the
participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month after receipt
of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments
on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the
report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to
submit the required report,45 which we find to have been sufficiently complied with
by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March
30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no collusion between the parties
and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the
private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that
there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public
prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47 the lack of participation
of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that
collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that
evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity
of the proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under
the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal
laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights
on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
 Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the effectivity of
this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and
nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the
general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and
implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the
Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s
enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which
states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in
accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under
43 Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual
consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides,
as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their
subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application
and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita relies on
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under
Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano
may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the
petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders
explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions
cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and hence can onlyCIVIL LAWthe
question REVIEW
validity1of
CASES under Atty.
the marriage of theRabuya
spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed,
the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what
the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
 Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have
legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution
governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in
application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place
and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply,
Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.
44
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent
Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2
March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of
petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his
wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.3
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The
RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
 (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months
prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may
be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation"
of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently,
the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
45 foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or
a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in
the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family
Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and
was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage
declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413
of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of
the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation
or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
"gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue.
Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept
of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a
case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved CIVIL to
LAWdeny petitioner’s
REVIEW motion
1 CASES for reconsideration.
under Atty. Rabuya
In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial
court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now
seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not
explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza
v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in
Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
 ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the
petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
46 cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and
especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they
would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in
the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal
v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
 recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more
specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as
a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country
such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
47 judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions,
including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the
judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute
their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who
is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize
the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48
of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule
on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. CheongCIVIL Gee,63REVIEW
Seng LAW  Philippine courts have
1 CASES underrecognized
Atty. Rabuya
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of
a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
 Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to
rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil
Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition
of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
48 Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of
the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public
record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under
Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the
substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity
of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in
the public interest of prosecuting and LAW
CIVIL preventing
REVIEWcrimes, he is under
1 CASES also personally
Atty. Rabuya
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly
an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the
prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established,
there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition
 for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
49
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen
of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects
of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying
a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in
the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to
marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in
the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in
the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the groundCIVIL
of bigamy. The principle
LAW REVIEW in the
1 CASES second
under paragraph
Atty. Rabuyaof
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
 In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to G.R. No. 136490               October 19, 2000
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot
decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts vs.
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a
citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its DECISION
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize
the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the The Case
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a
right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
50 right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment parties is hereby declared valid."2
and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is Motion for Reconsideration.
without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised
Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
the Philippine archipelago." Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if
any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody
Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon
of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
action consistent with this Decision.
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
 The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized
by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973.
Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang
during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined
the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the
Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard
of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became
acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
51
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street,
Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of
her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in
any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would
hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake
and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their
cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in
the morning before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was
so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on
her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17,
1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing
them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran
after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
CIVIL
described their father as cruel and LAW REVIEW
physically abusive1toCASES underUU,
them (Exh. Atty. Rabuya
Records, pp.
85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on
the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his
family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
 essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to
225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be
alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee.
Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if
only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill
to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial
evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of
his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically
identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly,
there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an
incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he
could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."4
Hence, this Petition.5
52 Issues
In her Memorandum,6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the
findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a
respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply
because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition."7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the
obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals,
simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the
CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely
on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,8 the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code9 were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the
nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be 'protected' by the state.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
x x x           x x x          x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
53 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x           x x x          x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095."10
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:11 "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children,
petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception
CIVIL LAW REVIEWof the1marriage or thatAtty.
CASES under they are
Rabuya
incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi
driver.1âwphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
 moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like.12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner
refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however,
has not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
54 MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled
many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no
matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in
the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of
certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got
married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a
subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig,
Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April
1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.11
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape
and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she
postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting
her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2
million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote
and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
 imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a
public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture
dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation
but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November
1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent’s
55 persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there
was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was
no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head
to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract
with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She
claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village
Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for
chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budgetCIVIL LAW REVIEW
of P7,000.00. 31 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not
sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes
testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together with the
screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale
(CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He
postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of
disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted
by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted
respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument
called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such
test.35
 After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established.
According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made
her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground
of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed
with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held
instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding
that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of
56 Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient
to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements
in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case
to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because
the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving
testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the
evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such
evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented
by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid
down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as
the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in
reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the
Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there
was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court
definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme
Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set
of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the
declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of CIVIL
marriage,
LAWshall likewise
REVIEW be voidunder
1 CASES even ifAtty.
suchRabuya
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of
laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who
are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class
as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A
party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of
1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its
celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under
the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the
Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was
classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for
declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of
unsound mind.58
 Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent.
Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision
committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a
vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary
consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and
obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries
on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential
marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased
by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to
comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which
makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and
thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same
time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to
understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack
57 of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning
with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was
further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now
Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological
incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates
from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee
was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding
specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was
for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for thatLAW
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The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards,
taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and
even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate
ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in
providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are
not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of
each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina,
of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
 marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil
law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the
Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized
that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its
incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in
wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological
incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in
the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too
frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have
favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively
state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions
highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to
58 the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the
province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the
strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences
it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions
that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for
legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage,
such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of
nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement
of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the
foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family,
as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will,
are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
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continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
 psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related
to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
59 party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve
such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates
that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this
case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before
the trial court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings
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Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts,
and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such,
it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material
aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern
of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with
Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior, and certifications from
Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event,
both courts below considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with
petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
 evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter
between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code
likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney,
fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and
to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner
is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant
evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such
proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically
or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and
clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that
respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities
and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying
about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist
who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major
60
hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say
that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There
are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the
affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the
"respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack
of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that
endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and
feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected
to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to
happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask
him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6)
of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means
that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair
with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not
abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then;
but everything that is carried outCIVIL LAW REVIEW
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is abnormal under Atty.
or pathological. If Rabuya
there is
no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman
and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different
women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He
concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and]
she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be
declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly,
 Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true
set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has
been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling
lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories
and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her
therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying
is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87
61 Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed
at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and
made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner.
Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child’s real parentage as
she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove
her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately
discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before
the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the
degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent’s
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate
a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide
by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s
inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which
according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal
nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her
best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her
marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological
condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent’s ability to
even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to
the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded
much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states
that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the
previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character,
health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the
spouse who is lied to, and does CIVIL
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Atty. RabuyaIn
this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope
with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult
to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the
fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The
appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference
was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina,
which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should
be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing
the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was
 affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman
Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered
so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited
by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty
with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the
conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral
significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of
the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option
in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to
the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that
seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its
62 deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse
action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a
judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the
trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of
the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are
drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner’s
allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s version as correct,
and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church
on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are
accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s
condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and
maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite
grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized respondent’s condition as incurable.
Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or
incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began
its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then
the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s
opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is
incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be
characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court
came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate
that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the
trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of
evidence.
 We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a
law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we
approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in
this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the
psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as
such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article
36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to
63 mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the
time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality
of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s
psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably
consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to
the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled,
and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate
court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to remain in the
marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of
a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10
August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey
over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has
been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the
annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV
No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February
14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by
the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the
Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage
Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
 There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one
side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened
on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can
enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to
Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother
and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was
no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair
located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that
she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
64
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January
20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant
using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to
acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall
be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his
wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no
defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to
him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be
cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until
their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between
them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always
avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have
sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff
filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will
be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they
are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether
he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's
Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out
whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original
size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection,
the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
 In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at
the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
65 I The foregoing provision pertainsCIVIL
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is
totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by
the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since
there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission
of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and
should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the
course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and
that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
to a LAW REVIEW
judgment 1 pleadings.
on the CASES under Atty.
What saidRabuya
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath
before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and
101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1,
Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be
annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual
contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
 The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence
on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his
wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly
demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family
Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4,
1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged
refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the
trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity
and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily
due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons,
— i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March
66 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a
finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual
contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus
between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who
refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of
the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he
wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's
refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private
respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him
everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least,
there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what
the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but
perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent
upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In
the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that
CIVIL LAW
the wife did not want carnal REVIEW
intercourse with1 him
CASES
doesunder Atty. belief.
not inspire Rabuya
Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her
feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras,
Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was
suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and
seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted
by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by
her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public
scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary
to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife
whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes
 psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction
therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness.
Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in
each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
67 consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977
PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant,
vs.
DEMETRIO AMANTE, respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10, 1973,1 Pedro Odayat charged
Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX,
Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and falsification of a public document. 2
Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a
portion of complainant's land, and, when this latter resented, the former arrogantly
challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that respondent is
cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while
his spouse Filomena Abella is still alive; and (3) that respondent, although married,
falsely represented his status as single in the information sheet be submitted in
connection with his appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.
After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted his letter-comment dated April 24,
1973, 3 which was considered as his answer to the amended complaint, this Court, in
its minute resolution of July 16, 1974, 4 referred this Administrative Matter No. P-58
to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar,
for investigation, report and recommendation, and the matter was docketed therein as
Administrative Case No. 264. The charges were investigated by District Judge
Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. After appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa
submitted to this Court his Report and Recommendation dated December 3,1974. 5
1. Oppression. — In the courseCIVIL
of formal
LAWinvestigation on August
REVIEW 1 CASES under26,Atty.
1974 Rabuya
before
Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced to the dropping of this charge of oppression
against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a boundary
dispute between the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more
properly a cause for a civil action. 6 Hence, the scope of the investigation by Judge
Zosa is limited to the other two charges.
2. Immorality. — To prove this charge of immorality against respondent,
complainant Pedro Odayat testified and presented Exhibits "A" to "E", to the effect
that respondent and Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City on October 16,
1948 before Judge Eugenio Brillo (then Justice of the Peace of Tacloban, Leyte; 7 )
that they had one son, who was born on August 23, 1949 and baptized on October 1,
1949 by the name of Romeo Amante, in the Sto. Nino Church, Tacloban City, by
Rev. Fr. Magdaleno Agnes;8 that he came to know Filomena Abella, who is a native
of Sta. Rita, Samar, only after her marriage to the respondent when they took up their
residence for five years in Basey, Samar; that he did not know if Filomena Abella
was still single when she married the respondent; that long before he filed his
complaint against respondent on March 10, 1973, he came to know that the
respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were living as husband and wife in Basey,
Samar; that they had several children, two of whom are Maria Felisa J. Amante, who
was born on April 12, 1967, as per certified true copy of the Certificate of Birth of
said child, 9 duly signed and issued on May 7, 1973 by Perfecto Cabuquit, the Local
Civil Registrar, 10 and Alma Amante y Jornada, who was born on April 8, 1965 and
 baptized on July 5, 1965, as per Certificate of Baptism, duly signed and issued on
March 6, 1973 by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Jose M. Lentejas; 11 and that one of the
reasons why he filed his complaint against the respondent was because of their land
dispute.
On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and
presented Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as well as Exhibits "1" and "2". Respondent
admits his marriage with Filomena Abella on October 16, 1948.12 He also admits that
he has been living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April 4, 1964 during a
religious revival in Almagro, Samar, before Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan
Missionary, 13 and with whom he begot six (6) children.14 Respondent, however,
claims he was coerced into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already
married to another man, and they separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him
of her previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the respondent did not hear or
received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her
whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the certification
dated September 12, 1974 of David C. Jacobe, the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros,
Rizal 15 attesting that, in accordance with the Register of Marriages in his office,
Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948.
Respondent's contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab
68
initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales.
The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration from this
charge. Indeed, there is no question that Filomena Abella's marriage with the
respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil code, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 16
3. Falsification of a This document. — The Investigator found that the complainant
failed to prove this charge. Contrary to the allegation of the complainant, the
document in question, 17 shows that the respondent actually placed in "Item 6. Civil
Status" therein the word "Married". 18
In view of the foregoing, We find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in
accordance with law and the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges
filed against him by complainant. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his
personal record,
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff
therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978
at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila)
with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on
the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church
CIVIL LAW
in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting REVIEW of
the existence 1 CASES under
said prior Atty. Rabuya
subsisting marriage
claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that
ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior
marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first
husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of
force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit
the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
 (2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force
committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not
be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled.
Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent
she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to
respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel);
accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders
69 complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153
and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23
March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the
parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she
married petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not
prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely
nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the
first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in
holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the
second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin
Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato
A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of
psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while
unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition,CIVIL
andLAW REVIEW
contended 1 CASES
among othersunder Atty.
that her Rabuya
marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither
of them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer
belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to
Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was
indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of
Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the
proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of
their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner
countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and
regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration
of nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him,
her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied
respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
 In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a
bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-
CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church,
San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on
bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need
not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior
subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists,
the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the
first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled,
since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista
before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14
70
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties
were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated
6 September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their
respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the
RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979,
or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the
applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated,
and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not
state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in
the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage
to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses
during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner
reiterated the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance
with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at
the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the
parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and
1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first
paragraph);29 and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second
paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the
following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from
the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a
competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage
can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
CIVIL LAW
collaterally attacked, while a voidable REVIEW
marriage 1 CASES
cannot under Atty.
be collaterally Rabuya
attacked; (4) in
a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural
children by legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and
(5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,  34 People v. Aragon,  35 and Odayat v. Amante,  36 that the
Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949.
The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead,
while the third marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court
ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second
marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the
second marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need
of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the
same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court
 likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings
in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August
1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required
where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this
declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court
of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by
the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As
a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect
71 to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure
and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social
institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse
and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially
significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an
open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of
Appeals,  42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages
that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court
clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first
marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he
got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity
of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of
petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case,
that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x.
(Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this
case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is
valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence
of a marriage license. That thereCIVIL
was LAW
no judicial
REVIEWdeclaration
1 CASESthat the first
under Atty.marriage
Rabuya
was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is
not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the
RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason
to disturb its ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 137110               August 1, 2000
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
 PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999
Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which
convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby
renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4)
months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor,
72 as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court’s judgment, as
follows: "From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused
Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27,
1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez [by reason of]
which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered
in said document, the status of accused was ‘single’. There is no dispute either that at
the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a
married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br.
XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which
matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in
religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on
June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of
Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium,
Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was
sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted
[in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in
the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva was declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for
having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage
having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused,
all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has
been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the
essential requisites for validity.CIVIL
x x x LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the
defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and
that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accused’s prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no
declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his
second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such
second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly
married to his first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.’ But here, the final judgment declaring null
and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the celebration of the second
 marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in
court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall
contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and
40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
73
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt."6
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy
were present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10,
1976 in Cebu City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second
marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the
Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab
initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a
competent court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place
CIVILisLAW
at all.8 Thus, he concludes that there REVIEW
no first 1 CASES
marriage under
to speak Atty. Rabuya
of. Petitioner also
9 
quotes the commentaries of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is now settled that if
the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But
if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration
came only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had
already been consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage has been characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v.
Mendoza,11 a bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court
ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted
a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he
married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy.
Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it
had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second
marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a
 judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when
he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People v.
Aragon,12 which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time
while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one
half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to
the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second
marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his
Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife
then filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled
in favor of the first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he contracted with
private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the
beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
74
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that
case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage.
After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among
others, that her first husband had previously been married to another woman. In
holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: "x x x There is
likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza,
holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
17 
In Domingo v. CA, the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was
still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses.
Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has settled once and
for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was
not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision
of the Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage
Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
CIVIL
absentee being alive, or LAW REVIEW
the absentee 1 CASES under
being generally Atty.asRabuya
considered dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950
Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family
Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such
marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the
earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code
Revision Commitee has observed:
 "[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the
marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration
of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will
also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda. De
Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon – that there
is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast
aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before
one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be
charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,21 which
involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In
rejecting the lawyer’s argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage
because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled: "for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court
further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the
75
Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted
without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and
criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited
by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family
Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not
a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code Commission believes that
the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void,
even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-
complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the
first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by
then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy
cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court
of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney’s fees.23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence,
she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason
to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote
hereunder:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that
Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of
the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason
to doubt said testimonies.
x x x           x x x          x x x
"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage
does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2)
children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the
fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then
already living with another man.
"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully
conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that she would
suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to
her reputation, they are of her own willful making."25
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 138509             July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the
same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-
Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal
76 case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to
suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.1 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should
have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before
entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question
justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to
Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil
action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4 It must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative
of the criminal case.5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.6 Its two essential
elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order
to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a
prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering
that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the
ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
CIVIL LAW
marriage before a party may remarry. REVIEW
The clear 1 CASES
implication ofunder Atty.it Rabuya
this is that is not for
the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the
marriage.8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter
of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the
second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can
successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not
been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to
prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the
Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even
enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage
license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:10
 (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question.
A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to
respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More
specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained
the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years.11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and
we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may,
suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated,
provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."12 [] Hence, parties should not be permitted
to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted
to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent
the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted
to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which
77 only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14 he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration
of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.15 This ruling
applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse.16 The contracting of a marriage knowing that the
requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in
disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.17 The
legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the
law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered
into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial
declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by
his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during
the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second
marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,18 but that is a matter that can be
raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not
every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to
obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in
suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared
indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent,
therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential
prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal
prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to
have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry
again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.19 The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.20 Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal
action against him.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal
Case No. Q98-75611.
G.R. No. 159218             March 30, 2004
SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIÑAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the
 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case
No. 2803 convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceño at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to
work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was
having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe
Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a
second marriage with a certain Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos
Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On
May 18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a
municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior
to their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their
1955 marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of
their son for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in
78 the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Biñas
was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty
imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating
circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous
marriage was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption
of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the
definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a
subsequent marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of
CIVILthe
San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within LAW REVIEWof1 this
jurisdiction CASES under Atty.
Honorable Court,Rabuya
the
above-named accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado
on September 16, 1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida
Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and
sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for
the same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage
to Zenaida Biñas Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioner’s submission, therefore,
that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of
conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection
appears to have been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur – two of which are a
previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which possesses all the requisites for
validity.13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the prosecution during
the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the Information
 during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court
of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which
had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he
entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and
convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime
of Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person
affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the
same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of
marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case
should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner,
in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa
on October 29, 1999.15
79
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view
of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for
bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would
be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.
The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of
the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.20
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in
its minimum period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years, while the minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of
its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,
JJ.
Concurring Opinion
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding
appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married
Narcisa Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado
married Zenaida Biñas on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999,
Abunado obtained from the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy.
80 The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Biñas on 10 January
1989 constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code.
More precisely, the issue turns on whether Abunado’s first marriage to Arceno was
still subsisting at the time Abunado married Biñas.
Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of
nullity of the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first
marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of
Abunado on 10 January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of
nullity of the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the
previous marriage. If subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared
void, the subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the
previous marriage could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for
bigamy,2 although the person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy"3 should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the
Family Code has changed this.
Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous
marriage. If he fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second
marriage, then the second marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in
Domingo v. Court of Appeals4 in explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for
the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity
of his previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous
marriage to subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is
judicially declared void by final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the
previous marriage subsists because of the absence of judicial declaration of its
CIVIL LAWduring
nullity, the second marriage is contracted REVIEW
the 1 CASES under
existence Atty.marriage
of the first Rabuya
resulting in the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage
that is void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other
than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity.
As the Court held in Cariño v. Cariño:5
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. x x x . (Emphasis supplied)
Cariño, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the
statement in her present ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding." I believe the ruling in Cariño is correct and should not be disturbed. As
Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):
 The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages,
like void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way
of exception that the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without
need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception7 under
existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is
deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration
of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous
marriage suffers from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40,
what requires a judicial declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the
subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage
does not suffer from any defect while the second is void.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.
81 G.R. No. 201061               July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973,
he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children,
namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sally’s
father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered
in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
CIVIL LAW REVIEW
(3) properties under Condominium 1 CASES
Certificate of Titleunder
(CCT)Atty.
Nos.Rabuya
8782 and
8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial
court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally
named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
 denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial
court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court
gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10
July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The
trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local
Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series
Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the
purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and
Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
82 The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did
not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they
were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support
because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for
Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37
properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the
properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles
were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go"
was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by
Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution
of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was
a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and
253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial
court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena,
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a
separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share reverted
to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S.
GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL
and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties
under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in
Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631,
194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,CIVIL LAW REVIEW
194636, 1 CASES194639,
194637, 194638, under Atty. Rabuya
198651,
206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
"Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are
directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are
properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently,
petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to
turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are
under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley
Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership
with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
 properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of
March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’
children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the
motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
83
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for
decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all
made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly
warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the
second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled
that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof
of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally
shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would
justify his inhibition from the case.
CIVILofLAW
The dispositive portion of the Court REVIEW
Appeals’ 1 CASES
decision under Atty. Rabuya
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely
owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be
owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the
share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14
March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
 Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations
of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling that
84 she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to
present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its
duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case,
Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2
and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned
Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted
for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate
on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial court’s prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she
had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the
case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence,
she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the
case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting
for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the
trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial
court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same
time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present
her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her
marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that
he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names
of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant
in the birth certificates of his children with REVIEW
CIVIL LAW Azucena.1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract.
At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982,
the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that
only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of
February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for
the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not
issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license
and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered
into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
 Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated
marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant
in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married
on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982
which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
85
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and
non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the
decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it
can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of
the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion
that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial
court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first
or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime
of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held
that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not
under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the
marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage
license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
 The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before
the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number
of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x
x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with
the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
86 "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for
inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s continued
refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that
would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G.
Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner
pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela
Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-
year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her
brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose
someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an
accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos
was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the
prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack
of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang,
testified for the prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early
as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the
 legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met
Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the
subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang
that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April
1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not
known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person
like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was
celebrated without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the
celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as
87 minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was
void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the
Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that
she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to
their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively
rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and
void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that
theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to
accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument
would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these
proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on
proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted
that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses'
narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a
marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt
to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA
affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant
case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she
argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
13
Citing People v. De Lara,   she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because
of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall
under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not
previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She
alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four
years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she
posits that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent
advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising
factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's
denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that
credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that
petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
 In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as
follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;
(b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were
it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v.
Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
88
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who
marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the
accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had
knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be
included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's
marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first
marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos
was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed
their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the
legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the
factual findings of the R TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were
affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe
firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling
that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower
courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA
affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as
minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second
spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In
referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law,
writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to
be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in
the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal
in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor,
CIVIL LAWwhich has a1duration
REVIEW of six years
CASES under Atty.and one
Rabuya
day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that of an
accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in
degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to six
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to
four years and two months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day
to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the
second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If
the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter
of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal
case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her
marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential
requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28
 Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that
it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that
the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and
facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for
review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and
Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is
purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union
was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in
89 February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July
1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had
frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However,
he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and
her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first
met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known
each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could
not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
Although the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as
required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before
the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at
least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie
was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the
misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage
without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be
acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a
marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage,
such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and
sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy
should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a
marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so
would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x
one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which
the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi
causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left
unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground
that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this
criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been
secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves
perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had
already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In
violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height
of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
 Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for
bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license.
In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his second wife,
Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their
marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one
day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in
order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently
secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as
basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in
De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It
must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in
keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of
petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
90 G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correctional as
maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
G.R. No. 150758             February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration
that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten
letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.
4
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint
CIVILfor
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5
Information,  which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been
previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it
not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-
1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes
were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to
enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil
Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.9
 On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND
THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)
THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB
91 INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy
are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)
denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of
bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to
prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen
on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres,
a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12,
1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification
issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules
of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to
the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner
and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
 Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a
positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and
Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that
the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary
evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence
as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the
invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to
the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be
given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record
of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the
law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage
exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart
from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that petitioner informed her of
the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would
92 all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of
the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported
non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National
Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the
accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent
judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not
committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void
ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument
for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990,
during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason forunder
distinguishing
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES Atty. Rabuya
between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or
subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground
of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and
punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special
bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage
are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting
parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under
Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may
contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they
 voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at
least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and
allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are
present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
93 As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for
purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard
for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.
Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence.
When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime
of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the
same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636,
convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being
married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately
been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he
should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which
would have been binding were CIVIL LAW
it not for its REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its
judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for
bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity
of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so
hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored
the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in
Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can
be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound
by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable
marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense
in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment
of bigamy.
 It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be
convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio
if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this
ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute
nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that
under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge
Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior
void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a
judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement
has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the
Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of
remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered
void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or
94 intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The
provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of
marriage under civil law with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity
to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct
from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites
of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting
parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the
parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void,
marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus,
Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void
marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule
on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the
spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would
continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage
is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity,
a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches
neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second,
unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the
parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of
relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental
state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would have been logical for the Family
Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not
for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and
nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ
from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either
cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533,
further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of
marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could
prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial
provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness
by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be
inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void"
marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be
binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage
having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage
could constitute bigamy. Thus, CIVIL
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Rabuya
marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case
assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a
prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the
first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is
committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it
must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the
essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union.
Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without
the necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter
into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy
can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements
required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection
of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant,
the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an
infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid
marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to
that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for
bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
 psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not
negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of
nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense
on the part of the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17
95
July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel
Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now
invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the
Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the
Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal
Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and
he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was
bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's
parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would
express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone.
She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent
a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from
01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional
trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the
complaint and denied its allegations,
CIVIL claiming,
LAW REVIEWin main, that it under
1 CASES was theAtty.
petitioner
Rabuyawho
had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the
court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating
that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular
28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show
 her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words,
Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because
respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to
communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to
inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has
drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
96
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice
(Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient
use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in
the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that
they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but
that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia
Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than
insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the
marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice
Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in
sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential
nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but
lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a
psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply,
Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance
of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to
the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the
word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred.
Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
CIVIL
Justice Caguioa LAW REVIEW
remarked 1 CASES under
that subparagraph Atty.
(7) refers to Rabuya
psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but
not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact
that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the
Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law,
there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage
cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a
ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals,
while psychological incapacity is not.
 On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read
"even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage,
it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the
phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first
one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological
incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will
encourage one who really understood the consequences of
marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of
97 providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of
incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is
less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is
clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for
the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases
when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do
with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero
inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of
consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not
principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He
objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage
celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but
in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable
of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect
has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the
issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is
no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of
marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation
be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing
of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that
psychological incapacity has been cured.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity
of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a
psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa,
however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in
the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage,
and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid
interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is
an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes
and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological
incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to
copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes
commented that in some instances the impotence that in some
instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a
 different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa,
however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is
enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he
can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is
still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce,
the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage.
He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is
possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity
become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice
Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
98
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such
incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with
"although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the
clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed
out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of
abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical
incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological
incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical
incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is
not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the
minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that
the phrase "psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental"
precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that
"psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
CIVIL LAWtheREVIEW
Justice Puno reminded members 1 CASES under
that, at the last Atty. Rabuya
meeting, they
have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological
incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been
annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity,
Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a
new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in
Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in
the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared
void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is
automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be
retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is
their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages,
 which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand,
Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the
Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for
prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and
Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period
of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the
marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the
suggestion.7
99
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so
designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia
V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994);
thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding
on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and
accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing
at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent
for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third
paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt
that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and
narrow norm was proposed first:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Those who cannot assume the essential
obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem
anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the
pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae
psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly,
then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be,
 however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after
all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the
ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius
Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual
disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This
particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the
incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the
crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
100 mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute
incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John
Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be
proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological
defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being
bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese
of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages
in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the
Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of theCIVIL
FamilyLAWCodeREVIEW 1 CASES children
which considers under Atty. Rabuya
conceived
prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they
become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity
of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
 Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be
reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now
still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between
a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided
by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
101 (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws
on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably,
Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither
law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot
see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of
living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has
not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife,
herein private respondent.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is
evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well
pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this
case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that
she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to
writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States
to call up her husband.
 b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in
July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that
she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in
the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia;
there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no
similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner
or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her
answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible
and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.
102 A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as,
for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would,
in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact
with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to
know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting
with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new
leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced
the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
 of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
103 concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition
that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce
and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
CIVILshall
LAWnotREVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy
of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground
of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
 upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed
in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing
the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was
the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be
treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration
of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case
basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
104 psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it
is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one
of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
 
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice
Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot
see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of
living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has
not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife,
herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies
precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is
evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well
pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this
case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to
abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are,
however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the
intervention by the State, through the LAW
CIVIL publicREVIEW
prosecutor, to guard
1 CASES against
under collusion
Atty. Rabuya
between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that
she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to
writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States
to call up her husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in
July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that
she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in
the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the
Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia;
there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no
similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
 d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had
elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner
or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her
answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible
and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit
evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic
ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as,
for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one
partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and
practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond
between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would,
in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the
other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
105 has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact
with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to
know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting
with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable
indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of
the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too
restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be
married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all
practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court
makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation
of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with
another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply
because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and
conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for
absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its
evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new
leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's
psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between
petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his
marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private
respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP
Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of
then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code
Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced
the background of the inclusionCIVIL
of theLAW REVIEW
present Article136
CASES
in theunder
FamilyAtty.
Code.Rabuya
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought
of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new
Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by
the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members
of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for
an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based
on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between
the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree
of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is
one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even
the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee
and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the
preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and
formulated the definition of marriage as —
 "a special contract of permanent partnership
between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional
concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent,
inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family
and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition
that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom
the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in
their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce
and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an
acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging
106 problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not
recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for
celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the
present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial
declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the
Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint
Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to
consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the
proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an
additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void
marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or
was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may
be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country
today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed
by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law
unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy
of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic
Church has beenCIVIL LAW REVIEW
declaring 1 CASES
marriages null andunder
void Atty.
on theRabuya
ground
of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions,
would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature
marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality
disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal
person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her
husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also
informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their
sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence
upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision
Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed
in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing
the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was
the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be
treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration
of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the
 principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the
time of marriage although it be manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision
of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case
basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was
taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar
which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article
36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it
is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one
of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its
enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is
107
addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some
members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not
interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
G.R. No. 165545             March 24, 2006
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated
September 28, 20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated
June 4, 20035 of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01
are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted
marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding
the publication of the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the
country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except
for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August
8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran,
Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System
(SSS) since 1960 and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was
granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits13 which
was also granted by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa
Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and
funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime,
the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent,
all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailon’s medical
and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in
support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma)
submitted an Affidavit dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine
children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958;
and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest the
marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still
very much alive."16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the
brother and guardian of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death
 benefits accruing from Bailon’s death,17 he further attesting in a sworn
statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as
Bailon’s beneficiaries before the SSS.20
Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City
recommended the cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent
and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to her from February
1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the
ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and
the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the
amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of
the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by
misrepresentation in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as
presumptively dead.
xxxx
108
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz
Presumptively Dead," did not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz,
is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He,
being in bad faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being
bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who
remarried, thus his marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it
was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate the second marriage
is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a
voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised
respondent that as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral
expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the
cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion
rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was
contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become
final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus
requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount
of monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by
letter to the SSS dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27,
199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension,
asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice
as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents
and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the
denial of her claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It
advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the
SSC.
27
Respondent thus filed a petitionCIVIL
 against
LAWthe SSS before
REVIEW the SSC
1 CASES for the
under restoration
Atty. Rabuya
to her of her entitlement to monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest,
the amount of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging
that Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending
any amount during Bailon’s wake."28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their
respective Position Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14,
2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had
only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her
presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily
located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after
she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit
her even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to
Bailon was void and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it
disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
 WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita
Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member
Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount
of P24,000.00 representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period
February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral
benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate
death benefit arising from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in
accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS Law, as
amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of
its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the
inevitable conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased
109 member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of
the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as
the deceased member represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to
the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9,
1999,32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after
her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member
using artifice and by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never
had the effect of giving the deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is
clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage on
April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise
dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined through the
investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse,
not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a
common-law wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not
entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latter’s death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving
spouse and primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the
total amount of death benefit she received from the SSS for the period from February
1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the
wake and burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount
of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
benefit.33 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4,
2003, she filed a petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003
Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay
CIVIL
respondent all the pension benefits LAW
due her.REVIEW
Held the 1CA:
CASES under Atty. Rabuya
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the
decision of the then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has
attained finality but, more importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and
Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare
the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS
and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the second
marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never
attains finality as the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a
presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by a person with an
absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify
the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the
reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be
filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS
may validly declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own
investigation and declare that the decision of the RTC declaring one to be
presumptively dead is without basis.
 Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of
the regular courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries
of its members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the
RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to
declare the decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was
offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality
considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present
evidence for and her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no
more first marriage to restore as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente
Bailon was already terminated upon the latter’s death. Neither is there a second
marriage to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the
death of Clemente Bailon.
110 However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit
of Reappearance with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage
reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the authority to review the
decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and
void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration37 which
were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following
grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY
TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39
The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of
the SSC on the prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in
disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom, between Alice and
respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 540 of the
Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings
are of no moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only
as obiter dicta in view of the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting
marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to the
death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage,
benefits and contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however,
it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in
the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained
through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with
respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand and the
invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage
CIVIL LAW on the1other.
REVIEW CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an
appellate court. The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with
orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries
of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
 than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior
marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three
exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these
exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive
years45 when Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial
declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
111 Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in
favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking
the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been
dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that
it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in
favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of
his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of
the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first
spouse.47 (Underscoring supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by
final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears
or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is
necessary. Thus Article 42 thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in
the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-
quoted provision of the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in
court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of
dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if
made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such
marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption
that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as
legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of
reappearance or by judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case
at bar, Tolentino submits: CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse,
the effects of dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of
either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable or voidable
marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for
annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable
under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had
been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive
years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties
involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might
have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as expressly provided in Section 2 of
the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.54 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s
and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is
rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been
rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
112
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to RUBYLUS
[GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of
the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to
Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel
where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her.
Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was
assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract
that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their
joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City.
However, starting 1999, ManuelCIVILstarted
LAWmaking himself
REVIEW scarceunder
1 CASES and went to Rabuya
Atty. their
house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money
from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his
clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been
previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she
worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her.
He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless
agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when
he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo
further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage contract with Tina
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she
threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in
 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never
saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was
no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as
maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the
amount of ₱200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared
that Eduardo’s belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because of his first
wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial court further ruled that
even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously
married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
113 married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no
longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not
motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out
of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court
should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his
view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States v.
Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo’s defense of good
faith and reliance on the Court’s ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were
misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code,
there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to
enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the
marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG
maintained, the private complainant’s knowledge of the first marriage would not
afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just against the
private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with
modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article
41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña’s presumptive
death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court
in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31,
2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.17
CIVIL
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed theLAW REVIEW
instant petition1for
CASES under
review Atty. Rabuya
on certiorari,
insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER’S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY
PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS THERE
WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS
PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of
the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil
Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for
21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as
 a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the
Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to
succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse’s reasonable belief that the absentee is dead.
He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since
1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still
alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaña
had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil
Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the
crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article
390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and
effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate
114 courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO"
before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He genuinely
loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that
she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner’s conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the
evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legítimamente disuelto
el anterior, será castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical
tie of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the
law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for
the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial
declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent
marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage
must be entered into with fraudulent
CIVIL intent (intencion
LAW REVIEW 1fraudulente)
CASES under which
Atty.isRabuya
an
essential element of a felony by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the
view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that
has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does
not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages
have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent
jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v.
Tan,27 under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada
and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved
marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony of
the act.28 He explained that:
… This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by
very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to
constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable
and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that
 have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors
to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy,
a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony
cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional
felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice" do not appear in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word
"voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or
omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the
accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of
his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.34
115 For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of
both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in
1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is
presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the
private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married
the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial
declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would
negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner,
however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for
a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the
spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the
defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of
the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require
that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance
only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating
civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the
validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the
community. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses
and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other
and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The consequences of
an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious
that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most
positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent
marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men
readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a
second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to
be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the
subjective condition of individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as
so dissolved as to permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal
belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
 The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide –
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years,
an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
116
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for
four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises
without any necessity of judicial declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee
spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for
four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The Court rejects petitioner’s contention that the requirement of instituting a petition
for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed
merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second marriage and not for
the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize
civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion
spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on
Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage.
It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach
the stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
 presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a
judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been
heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of
the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption
is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a
declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
The Court stated that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took note that a petition for a
declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in
collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper
proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those
authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the
administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of
the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that,
under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the
presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated
its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
117 Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of
Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should be
considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior
marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been
declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage
is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is
bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the
Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the
view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of dissolution or judicial
declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good faith
will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it
be annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the
other hand, was of the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged
and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage;
thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy:
… Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of
the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death of
the absentee, without prejudice to the latter’s reappearance. This provision is
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under
Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the
missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice)
who wrote that things are now clarified.
CIVIL LAWHeREVIEW
says judicial declaration
1 CASES underof presumptive
Atty. Rabuya
death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial
will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations
of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
"before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law,
there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent
authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be
dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could then be
made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60 Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if
done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views because
of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which,
however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which
 requires a summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under
Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner
maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts
that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,63 where an
award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner
maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral
damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding
that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while
bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The
appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
118
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente
porque el articulo 2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de
daños morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y
otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe,
por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquí los daños de ₱5,000.00 arriba
mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and
the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People
v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or Article 2220 of
the Civil Code.66
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases
enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and
analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of
this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action
mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases
where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not
have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and
analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance,
 corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion,
relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The standards are
the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good
faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in
119 damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the
other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision
is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims
of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of
moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in
the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other
applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the
house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance
– that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner,
who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the
petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that
he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to
another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s chicanery
and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a
continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium,
attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured
mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her
lawful husband.72
The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during
and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries
is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New
Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the
actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts,
1031 (1956). But the authoritiesCIVIL
all recognize that where
LAW REVIEW the wrong
1 CASES underisAtty.
willful rather
Rabuya
than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate
consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833
(App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant’s conduct was not
merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was bound to result
in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did
ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive
damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts,"
70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendant’s
bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed
and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn’t sleep" but "couldn’t eat," had terrific
headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial
interference with the jury’s reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the
first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App.
Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest
and general welfare of society.
 Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy,
she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of
public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v.
Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act
which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor
immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the
person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having
done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147
Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation
by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been
assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently
committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no bar to the action, but rather
that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was
said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a
wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and
condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were
held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley,
106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
120
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant’s misrepresentation.
The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the
incidental results of the defendant’s fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage
relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich.
388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170
P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt.
1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent
recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no
moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant’s
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any
transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the
enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of
₱200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 164201               December 10, 2012
EFREN PANA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE JUANITE, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where
one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil
indemnities to the victims' heirs.
The Facts and the Case
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others
of murder before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City in Criminal Cases
4232 and 4233.1
On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the
charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as
charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found
guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual
damages.
On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused
but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards,
the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted
the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the
Court made an award of P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition,
the Court awarded P50,000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily
by them.3 The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001.4
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in
 the names of Efren and Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a notice of sale
on execution8 were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the
motion.10 The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on
March 6, 2003.11
Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders,
Efren filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January
29, 2004 the CA dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed orders.12 It also denied Efren’s
motion for reconsideration,13 prompting him to file the present petition for review
on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that
the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
121
Ruling of the Court
To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the
spouses’ property relations.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.14 Although the
heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the
Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system of
absolute community of property that applied to Efren and Melecia. The reasoning
goes:
Admittedly, the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. But
that fact does not prevent the application of [A]rt. 94, last paragraph, of the Family
Code because their property regime is precisely governed by the law on absolute
community. This finds support in Art. 256 of the Family Code which states:
"This code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
None of the spouses is dead. Therefore, no vested rights have been acquired by each
over the properties of the community. Hence, the liabilities imposed on the accused-
spouse may properly be charged against the community as heretofore discussed.15
The RTC applied the same reasoning as above.16 Efren and Melecia’s property
relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory
provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or
acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between the couple was changed
when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article
75 absolute community of property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a
prenuptial agreement. As it happens, Efren and Melecia had no prenuptial
agreement. The CA agreed with this position.17
Both the RTC and the CA are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal
stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be
said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of
the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into
absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself providesCIVIL
in Article
LAW 76 that marriage
REVIEW 1 CASES settlements cannot
under Atty. be
Rabuya
modified except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it
must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of
Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified
except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the
absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a
decree of legal separation;18 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled
and agreed to revive their former property regime;19 (c) judicial separation of
property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just
cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;20 (d) there was judicial
separation of property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for
the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains.21 None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
 What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate
property and incomes from their work or industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place
in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of
ownership over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the
marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into absolute
community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to
impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’ loose admission that absolute
community of property governed their property relation since the record shows that
they had been insistent that their property regime is one of conjugal partnership of
gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial agreement between them has been presented.
122 What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still
the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the
contrary, is that they were married under the regime of the conjugal partnership of
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code thus provides:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Of course, the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains
that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code states:
"x x x x
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256."23
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding
whether or not the conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer
for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122
provides:
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties
partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive
property of her own,24 the aboveCIVIL LAW
applies. REVIEW
The 1 CASESthat
civil indemnity under Atty. Rabuya
the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.25 Those responsibilities are as follows:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall
be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs
upon the conjugal partnership property;
 (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of
their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-
improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be
groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties.1âwphi1
123
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be enforced against
the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article
have been covered."[26] No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not
altogether unfair since Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of the
partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned."
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14,
2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that,
in enforcing the writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on
the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
G.R. No. 145222               April 24, 2009
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and ROMULO
NICOL, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint
for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 84-33. Said action
originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of
slander filed against her by petitioners.
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages.
The dispositive portion reads:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and against
defendant ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of thirty thousand
(₱30,000.00) pesos as moral damages, five thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses, another five thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages and the cost of suit.2
Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this Court. It
became final and executory on 5 March 1992.
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of which
provides:
Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the defendant
Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the sum in the amount of
forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00), Philippine Currency, representing the moral
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses and exemplary damages and the
cost of suit of the plaintiff aside from your lawful fees on this execution and do
likewise return this writ into court within sixty (60) days from date, with your
proceedings endorsed hereon.
 But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this execution
and lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the lands and buildings of
said defendant you make the said sum of money in the manner required by the Rules
of Court, and make return of your proceedings with this writ within sixty (60) days
from date.3
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the
Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy was annotated on the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-125322.
On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-
party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting
petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with
petitioners as the highest bidder.
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of
124 Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages
with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as
plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties
of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and
posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property
which was valued at ₱500,000.00 was only sold at a "very low price" of ₱51,685.00,
whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only ₱40,000.00. The case
was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing
De Leon v. Salvador,4 petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case
with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of
execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s sale.
In an Order5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint and
ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the implementation of the
writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must be brought before the court
issuing the writ of execution. Besides, there are two (2) remedies open to the
plaintiff, if he feels that the property being levied on belongs to him and not to the
judgment debtor. The first remedy is to file a third-party claim. If he fails to do this,
a right is reserved to him to vindicate his claim over the property by any proper
action. But certainly, this is not the proper action reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate
his claim over the property in question to be ventilated before this court. As earlier
stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC Bacoor as it was that
court which issued the writ of execution.6
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has
jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000. Hence, the
instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact
which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an
independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.8
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
was questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of the judgment debtor
may file an independent action to protect the conjugal property subject to execution.
The alleged error therefore is an error of judgment which is a proper subject of an
appeal.
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the case should
still be dismissed on substantive grounds.
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its judgment to the
exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, in
line with De Leon v. Salvador. Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the husband
 of the judgment debtor, is not the "third party" contemplated in Section 17 (now
Section 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence a separate action need not be filed.
Furthermore, petitioners assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and cited authorities to the effect that the husband
is liable for the tort committed by his wife.
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court of Appeals
is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law and jurisprudence.9
Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper interpretation
of Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or
his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same
upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on
demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party
claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of
125 disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the
writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property
may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property,
to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property
in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the
same or a separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
plainly spurious claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or
any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in
case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for damages as a result of the levy, he shall
be represented by the Solicitor General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages
adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as
may be appropriated for the purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a stranger
to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on
him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-
party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of which
is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a
separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of
competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court
that issued the writ.101awphi1.zw+
A third-party claim must be filed a person other than the judgment debtor or his
agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the suit but
whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other spouse being the
judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the
property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court of Appeals,11 which was
later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held that the
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.13 On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of
Appeals14 and Sy v. Discaya,15 the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to
the action wherein the writ of execution
CIVIL LAWwasREVIEW
issued and is therefore
1 CASES underjustified in
Atty. Rabuya
bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive
or paraphernal property.lawphil.net
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the
Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community
of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of
gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for
the liability of the debtor-spouse.
 Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued
to the conjugal partnership.17
In Guadalupe v. Tronco,18 this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third
party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce "a
judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is
proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the
conjugal property but on his separate property.
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus
vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case to Branch 21 for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
126
G.R. No. 172263               July 9, 2008
SPOUSES AUTHER G. KELLEY, JR. and DORIS A. KELLEY, Complainants,
vs.
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. and JORGE A. RAGUTANA,1 Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. (Auther) acquired agricultural chemical products on
consignment from respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther’s
failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC Makati City). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 91-904.
After trial on the merits, the RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a
writ of execution. Pursuant thereto, respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on
execution real property covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. A
certificate of sale was issued in favor of PPI as the highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the said sale, petitioners Auther and his wife Doris
A. Kelley (Doris) filed a motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy in the RTC
Makati City on the ground that the subject property was their family home which
was exempt from execution. Petitioners’ motion was denied for failure to comply
with the three-day notice requirement.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale
of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 (RTC Naga City). This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2000-0188. The case was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
lack of cause of action. The dismissal was upheld by the CA.
Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review on certiorari contending that
the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2000-0188 by the RTC
Naga City. They claim that Doris was a stranger2 to Civil Case No. 91-904 (in the
RTC Makati City) who could not be forced to litigate therein.
Petitioners anchor their action in Civil Case No. 2000-0188 on their contention that
TCT No. 15079 is the Kelley family home. No doubt, a family home is generally
exempt from execution3 provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be
proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife
CIVIL4LAW
or by an unmarried head of a family.  It must be the house
REVIEW where
1 CASES theyAtty.
under and their
Rabuya
family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated.5 The family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent, or on the property of
the unmarried head of the family.6 The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of ₱300,000 in urban areas and
₱200,000 in rural areas.7
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
(August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family
residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.8
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as
such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.9 Moreover,
the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for
the following exceptions:
 Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen
and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article
155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article
157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing
the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
127
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of
the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by
the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We grant the petition only to the extent of allowing petitioners to adduce evidence in
the trial court that TCT No. 15079 is in fact their family home as constituted in
accordance with the requirements of law. This is in consonance with our ruling
in Gomez v. Sta. Ines10 where we held:
[The husband and children] were not parties to the Pasig RTC case and are third-
party claimants who became such only after trial in the previous case had been
terminated and the judgment therein had become final and executory. Neither were
they indispensable nor necessary parties in the Pasig RTC case, and they could not
therefore intervene in said case. As strangers to the original case, respondents cannot
be compelled to present their claim with the Pasig RTC which issued the writ of
execution.xxx
In said case, the alleged family home was sold on execution by the sheriff of the
Pasig RTC.1avvphi1 The husband and children of the judgment debtor filed a
complaint for annulment of sale of the levied property in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya where the alleged family home was situated. As they were considered
strangers to the action filed in the Pasig RTC, we ruled that the Nueva Vizcaya RTC
had jurisdiction over the complaint and that they could vindicate their alleged claim
to the levied property there.11
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 2000-0188 captioned Spouses Auther G. Kelley, Jr.
and Doris A. Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc. and Jorge A. Ragutana is
hereby REINSTATED and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not the property covered
by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from
execution.
G.R. No. 186322               July 8, 2015
ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL, PATERNO
WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA BELL, PATERNO
FERDINAND BELL III, and CIVIL
PATERNO BENERAÑO BELL IV, Respondents.
LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531 which granted the Petition for Certiorari filed
by respondents and enjoined the execution sale of their family home for the
satisfaction of the money judgment awarded to petitioners in Civil Case No. 4581,
and the Resolution2 which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno
Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried
children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell
(Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell sibling lodged a Complaint for annulment of
documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioner Enrico S.
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was docketed as Civil Case No.
4581 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 84. The complaint
sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their
 329-square-meter residential house and lot, as well the as the cancellation of the title
obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents’ prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to
petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest per annum. The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated 15 July 1998 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares:
1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of Sale marked as
Exhibit "F" is only an equitable mortgage in favor of the defendants Enrico
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio. However, the mortgage cannot bind the
property in question for being violative of Chapter 2, Title 4 of the Family
Code, its encumbrance not having been consented to in writing by a
majority of the beneficiaries who are the plaintiffs herein;
2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an unsecured mortgage [sic]
for which the Spouses Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell as
mortgagors are liable to the defendants-spouses Enrico Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio in the amount of 1,000,000 plus interest of 12% per
annum. However, under the Fourth Party Complaint Sps. Paterno C. Bell,
128 Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell have the right of reimbursement from
fourth party defendants Nicolas Morana and Julieta Morana for whom their
loan of 1,000,000 was secured by Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia
Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the fourth party defendants Nicolas Morana
and Julieta Morana are hereby ordered to reimburse Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell the loan of 1,000,00 plus interest of 12% per
annum to be paid by the latter to defendants Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;
3. The house and lot in question free from any and all encumbrances by
virtue of said equitable mortgage or the purported sale; and
4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being contrary to law
and public policy.
Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the name of defendants Enrico S.
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to re-constitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-680-(5997) as "family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C.
Bell, Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno Benerano C.
Bell IV and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell;
or in the alternative to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;
2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax declaration
covering the said subject property as family home for the said plaintiffs and fourth
party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and
3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to pay the plaintiffs
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of 35,000.00 as the plaintiffs have been
compelled to litigate to protect their property right, and costs,3
Both petitioners and respondent appealed to the CA, but the trial court’s Decision
was affirmed en too. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question
their liability to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus interest. The Court,
however, dismissed their Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed
by the CA.4 Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.5
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution as a result of which
respondents’ property covered by the newly reconstituted Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied on execution. Upon
motion by respondents, trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ
of the execution on the ground that the property was a family home.6
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution.
CIVILCode,
Invoking Article 160 of the Family LAWthey
REVIEW 1 CASES
posited that theunder
currentAtty. Rabuya
market value
of the property exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 considering that it was
located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for
1million.7
The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present
value of the family hoe of respondents. It also appointed a Board of Appraisers to
conduct a study on the prevailing market value of their house and lot.8
Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the RTC to
cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-shopping.9 they argued that
petitioners’ bid to determine the present value of the subject property was just a ploy
to re-litigate an issue that had long been settled with finality.
The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration10 of respondents and
directed the commissioners to canvass prospective buyers of their house and lot.11
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction
before the CA.12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 87531.
Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order13 dispensing with the
valuation report of the commissioners and directing the issuance of a writ of
 execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition
with an urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.14
The CA eventually enjoined.15 the execution sale set on 22 December 200416 by the
RTC.
On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered it Decision granting respondent’s Petition for
Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata had already set in.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and
executory, only declared respondents’ house and lot as a family home. Since the
issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the
aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no res judicata.
Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the execution sale of the subject family home after finding its present value
exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under
Article 160, according to the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its
constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court’s order was
contrary to law.17
129 On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping;
(2) whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents’ family home for
purposes of execution under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the
principle of res judicata; and (3) whether respondents’ family home may be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways; (1) by filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers, or by splitting of causes of action (where the ground for dismissal
is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).19
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment through means other than by appeal or
certiorari.20 Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise from an initiatory or
original action that has been elevated by way of appeal or certiorari to higher or
appellate courts or authorities. This is so because the issues in the appellate courts
necessarily differ from those in the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a
continuation of the original case and treated as only one case.21
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581, which declared that
property in dispute was a family home, had long attained finality. Accordingly,
respondents maintain that petitioners’ bid to re-litigate the present value of the
property in the course of the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata, and that
petitioners should be cited for contempt of court because of forum-shopping.22
Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale over respondents’
family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a written consent from its
23
beneficiaries as required under CIVIL
ArticleLAW
158 REVIEW
of the Family Code,under
1 CASES  the court
Atty.still
Rabuya
recognized the validity of the transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared
Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest per
annum.
Petitioners’ bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered an act of forum
shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is just the fruit and end of a suit and is
very aptly called the life of the law.24 It is not separate from the main case. Similarly,
the filing of the instant Petitions as a continuation of the execution proceedings does
not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an adverse judgment or order by
appeal or certiorari does not constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are
sanctioned and provided for the rules.25
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the main proceedings
in Civil Case No. 4581 and the consequent execution proceedings are identical.
Suffice it to say, however, that the danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the
same cause of action, which the judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to
prevent, does not exist in this case.
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents’ family home is barred by res
judicata.
 Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental principle of law that
precludes parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior
and final judgment.26 Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res
judicata, namely: bar by prior judgment.27 and conclusiveness of judgment.28
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which the
judgment has been rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
an identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the
judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The
judgment or decree on the merits of the court of competent jurisdiction concludes the
litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action before same or any other tribunal.29
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an identity
of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Under this
rule, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the
130 claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.30
In this case, the trial court’s final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners’
move to have the property is dispute levied on execution.
There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the
subsequent execution proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent
execution proceedings involved the same parties31 and subject matter.32 for these
reasons, respondents argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under
Article 170 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the trial court has
already determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory limit.
The CA held that the trial court’s Decision which is indisputably final, only settled
the issue of whether the property in dispute was a family home. The CA ruled thus:
We rule that there is no res judicata.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial court dated July 15,
1998, which has become final and executor, only declared the subject property as a
family home. As a matter of fact, private respondents never questioned that such
property is a family home, and consequently, the issue as to whether or not the
property is family home is settled and res judicata lies only with respect to this issue.
But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the subject of an execution
sale was not resolved by the trial court. This issue[was] raised only when the writ of
execution was issued and hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue
before this Court is whether or not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners under the facts
and circumstances of the case could be the subject of a writ execution sold at public
auction.33
The Court disagrees with the CA.
"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.34 It may be argued that the cause of action the main proceedings was the sale
of the property in dispute, while in the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness
of Spouses Bell to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought.35 The test to determine whether
the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether is an identity of the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the
two actions considered the same, and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to
the subsequent action. Hence, party
CIVILcannot, by varying
LAW REVIEW the form
1 CASES of action
under Atty.orRabuya
adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between
the same parties or their privies.36
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or
common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and
sustain both the first and the second causes of action and (2) whether the defenses in
one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is
the test for determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the
time of the filing of the first complaint.37
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of Civil Case No.
4581 – including the bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to
them by the trial court – is founded on a common cause of action. Records show that
the sole evidence submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the
Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main proceedings.
Concomitantly, the very sane defense raised by petitioners in the main proceedings,
i.e., that they had bought the property from Spouses Bell for 1 million – was utilized
to substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents’ family home was
actually 1 million. In fact, the trial court’s order for respondent’s family home to be
levied on execution was solely based on the price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.
 Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same
property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners
to substantiate their claim over respondents’ family home have already been used to
support their arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to
rest by the trial court’s discussion of the nature and alienability of the property in
dispute, to wit;
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family home which
has been constituted on the house and lot in question is exempt from alienation and
that its value does not exceed 300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey
house was built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He inherited it in
1976 from his parents and has been living there with his family. In 1976, when an
extra- judicial settlement was made of the estate of his parents, the fair market value
of the house was 70,000.
City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax Declaration and others,
(Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047) beginning 1985 showing that the subject
lot with an area of 329 sq. m. had a fair market value of 76,000.00 and the residential
house located thereon of 50,000.00, for a total value of 126,000.00. She testified that
131 during the prior years the assessed values were lower. This shows that the limit of
the value of 300,000.00 under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been
exceeded. The testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr.
and Rogela Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that house together with their
said parents. The Court therefore concludes that the said house is a family home
under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses
without the written consent of the majority of the children/plaintiffs is null and void
for being contrary to law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family
Code.38 [underscoring supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute
exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 has already been determined with finality by
the trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt from
execution. Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main
proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different, the parties are still barred
from litigating the issue of whether respondents’ family home may be sold on
execution sale under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of Family
Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for
in Article 153 of the Family Code.39
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment.40 The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution
is the protection or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A
houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of
the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can
befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered
and sheltered.41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special
cases.42
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt,
however, are determined by the exemption statute. The exemption is limited to the
particular kind of property of the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the
exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit.43
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article
153, to wit:
ARTICLE 155. the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except;
1. For nonpayment of taxes;
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
2. For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3. For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
4. For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen
and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. when a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in
Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in
Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds
that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by
law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the
maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by
the owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
 At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be
considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article
157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, is any,
shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 157. the actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the same
time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas,
and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be
fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the
value most favorable for the constitutions of a family home shall be the basis of
evaluation.
For purposes of the Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and
municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered
cities. All others are deemed to be rural area. [underscoring supplied]
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article 160 are
132 enlightening, to wit:
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In reply, Judge Diy
opined that the above Article is intended to cover a situation where the family home
is already worth 500,000 or IM.
Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home, originally valued at
300,000, later appreciated to almost IM because of improvements made, like roads
and plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value of the family home exceeded
the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by the one establishing
the family home, the Article will apply; but if it is through an involuntary
improvement, like conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads
and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by
making his home liable to creditors. He suggested that the matter be clarified in the
provision.
Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the
family home is worth more than the maximum amount at the time it was constituted,
they will avoid the suit because the creditor will be given proper warning. Justice
Puno opined that this is a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that, under the
second sentence, there will be a preliminary determination as to whether the family
home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by the law.
Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:
If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to subsequent
voluntary improvements by the person or persons constituting the family home or by
the owner or owners of the property, the same rules and procedure shall apply.
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the
owner for improving the family home. On the other hand, Justice Puno opined that
the provision covers only the excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge
Diy added that the owner may improve the family home up to 300,000. Justice
Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can borrow money, put it all on
improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of a family home
and, thereby, exempt it from levy on the part of the creditor. He added that anyway,
if one voluntarily improves his family home out of his money, nobody can complain
because there are no creditors.
Justice Puno posed the question: what is "due to the subsequent improvement?" is it
the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the "increase", which constitutes the
"excess"? in reply, Justice Reyes CIVIL LAW
opined REVIEW
that it is the 1"increase"
CASES under
whichAtty. Rabuyathe
constituted
"excess". Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last sentence
as follows:
If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same
rule and procedure shall apply.
Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include
the original value. Justice Puno suggested that they just say "increased actual value",
which the Committee approved.44
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or
attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and 200,000 in rural areas, unless
those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those
amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations,
the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied
to the payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
 Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons
constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in
an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home
can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is
applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home
with immunities from levy do not include the intent to enable debtors to thwart the
just claims of their creditors.46
Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the
family home from execution or forced sale. They claim that the actual value of
respondents’ family home exceeds the 300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is
supposedly shown by the Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell
the property for 1 million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly
ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money
judgment awarded to them in Civil Case No. 4581.47
133 As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property
in dispute is a family home, and that its value at the time of its constitution was
within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption
of the property from execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the
money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article 160.
Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment,
however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of respondents’ rights
over their family home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an
exception from an exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms of the
exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its enforcement.49
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160,
petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual
value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its
beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged – much less
proven – by petitioners.1âwphi1 The sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale,
but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and
that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners
and Spouses Bells executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not
the actual value of the property in dispute.
The court thus agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute under
Article 160. The trial court had already determined with finality that the property
was a family home, and there was no proof that is value had increased beyond the
statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it ordered the
execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one’s
judgment, as in this case in which the assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal
justification.50
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GG.R SP No.
87531, enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the sale of the family home of
respondents, is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 200274
MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner,
vs. CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA and ELENA B. MOLINA, substituted by
ESTER MOLINA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioner Melecio
Domingo (Melecio) assailing the August 9, 2011 decision2 and January 10, 2012
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160.
THE FACTS
In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in
Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square
meter parcel of land. The sale was annotated on the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 16354 covering the subject property.
During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the respondent spouses Genaro
and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years after
Flora’s death4, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to
 answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the
subject property.5 In 1986, Anastacio died.6
In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest was registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272967[[7 ]]and transferred the entire one-half
undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina.
Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed
a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against
the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999.8
Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to
serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed. Anastacio could not have
validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora’s consent, as Flora
was already dead at the time of the sale.
Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document
transferring Anastacio and Flora’s one-half undivided interest over the land. Finally,
Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from the time of Anastacio’s
death up to the time he filed the Complaint.9
134 Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac, and of Melecio’s nephew, George Domingo (George).10
The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that documents
the transfer of the subject property ownership from Anastacio to the spouses Molina.
The Records Officer also testified that the alleged sale was annotated at the time
when Genaro Molina’s brother was the Register of Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.11
George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property
owned by Anastacio since 1986. George testified, however, that aside from himself,
there were also four other occupants on the subject property, namely Jaime Garlitos,
Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.12
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject
property to answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina that they already own
half of the land. The spouses Molina have been in possession of the subject property
before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the
property’s real estate taxes.
The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he
accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last loan was even used
to pay for Melecio’s wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio
built his nipa hut on the subject property only in 1999, without their knowledge and
consent.13
The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who
is one of the occupants of the subject lot.
Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject
property in 1993. Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees
on the subject property and gave portions of their harvest to Elena Molina without
any complaint from Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio never lived on the
subject property and that only George Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses
Molina, has a hut on the property.
Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were
substituted by their adopted son, Cornelio Molina.14
THE RTC RULING
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed15 the case because Melecio failed to
establish his claim that Anastacio did not sell the property to the spouses Molina.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The RTC also held that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s
consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities.
The RTC denied Melecio’s motion for reconsideration of the RTC ruling. From this
ruling, Melecio proceeded with his appeal to the CA.
THE CA RULING
In a decision dated August 9, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
The CA held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that there was
fraud in the conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. The CA gave
credence to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale.
The CA also held that Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only sold his
rights, excluding Flora’s interest, over the lot to the spouses Molina.1âwphi1 The CA
explained that "[t]here is no prohibition against the sale by the widower of real
property formerly belonging to the conjugal partnership of gains"16.
Finally, the CA held that Melecio’s action has prescribed. According to the CA,
Melecio failed to file the action within one year after entry of the decree of
registration.
 Melecio filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision. The CA denied
Melecio’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.17
THE PETITION
Melecio filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA
ruling.
Melecio principally argues that the sale of land belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent is invalid.
Melecio also claims that fraud attended the conveyance of the subject property and
the absence of any document evidencing the alleged sale made the transfer null and
void. Finally, Melecio claims that the action has not yet prescribed.
The respondents, on the other hand, submitted and adopted their arguments in their
Appeal Brief18.
First, Melecio’s counsel admitted that Anastacio had given the lot title in payment of
the debt amounting to Php30,000.00. The delivery of the title is constructive delivery
of the lot itself based on Article 1498, paragraph 2 of
135
the Civil Code.
Second, the constructive delivery of the title coupled with the spouses Molina’s
exercise of attributes of ownership over the subject property, perfected the sale and
completed the transfer of ownership.
THE ISSUES
The core issues of the petition are as follows: (1) whether the sale of a conjugal
property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal; and (2)
whether fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition.
It is well settled that when the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the
CA, the findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court and may no
longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions.19 While there are exceptions20 to this rule,
the Court finds no applicable exception with respect to the lower courts’ finding that
the subject property was Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal property. Records before the
Court show that the parties did not dispute the conjugal nature of the property.
Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void
without Flora’s consent.
We do not find Melecio’s argument meritorious.
Anastacio and Flora’s
conjugal partnership was
dissolved upon Flora’s death.
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family
Code’s effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property relation is a conjugal
partnership.21
Conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the effectivity of the
Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of
Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband and Wife) of the Family
Code. This is clear from Article 105 of the Family Code which states:
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256.
The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved when Flora died
in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code22 (now Article 126 (1) of the
Family Code).
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
upon death of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property prior to the conjugal partnership liquidation, to quote:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal
partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
 partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x (emphases
supplied)
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the
conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule
does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."23
An implied co-ownership
among Flora’s heirs governed
the conjugal properties
pending liquidation and
partition.
In the case of Taningco v. Register of Deeds of Laguna,24 we held that the properties
of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
spouse until final liquidation and partition. The surviving spouse, however, has an
actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist
of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation
136
and partition of the conjugal partnership.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora’s surviving heirs, including
Anastacio, with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership until final
liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns one-half of the original
conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399) (emphases supplied)
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the
conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement
or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose
of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became
co-owners of the subject
property to the extent of
Anastacio’s interest.
The OCT annotation of the sale to the spouses Molina reads that "[o]nly the rights,
interests and participation of Anastacio Domingo, married to Flora Dela Cruz, is
hereby sold, transferred, and conveyed unto the said vendees for the sum of ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) which pertains to an undivided one-half (1/2)
portion and subject to all other conditions specified in the document x x
x"25 (emphases supplied). At the time of the sale, Anastacio’s undivided interest in
the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the entire conjugal properties;
and (2) his share as Flora’s heir on the conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the
spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for
Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making
the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s
interest. This result conforms with the well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando
res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum
CIVIL valere potest).261 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
LAW REVIEW
The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in
respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after liquidation and
partition. The observations of Justice Paras cited in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go,
Sr. V. Servacio27 are instructive:
x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to
the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that
there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole
transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated
or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and
half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is
valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined
only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by
the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of
conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal
requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of
course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of
said portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said
heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches.
 Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject
property, is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As
held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now settled that the appropriate
recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the
entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-
owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."28
The sale of the subject
property to the spouses Molina
was not attended with fraud.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the
disputed property to the spouses Molina.
The issue of fraud would require the Court to inquire into the weight of evidentiary
matters to determine the merits of the petition and is essentially factual in nature. It is
basic that factual questions cannot be cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition,
unless it falls under any of the recognized exceptions29 found in jurisprudence. The
present petition does not show that it falls under any of the exceptions allowing
factual review.
137 The CA and RTC conclusion that there is no fraud in the sale is supported by the
evidence on record.
Melecio' s argument that no document was executed for the sale is negated by the
CA finding that there was a notarized deed of conveyance executed between
Anastacio and the spouses Molina, as annotated on the OCT of the disputed property.
Furthermore, Melecio's belief that Anastacio could not have sold the property
without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the
spouses Molina's registered title over the subject property.30
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon t his court. 31
Considering these findings, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised by
Melecio.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The
decision dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160
is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 179010               April 11, 2011
ELENITA M. DEWARA, epresented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FERDINAND
MAGALLANES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RONNIE AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE
ALVERO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision1 dated November 6, 2006 and the Resolution2 dated
July 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64936, which
reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated September 2, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 93-7942.
The Facts
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were
married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed
their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita
CIVIL
went to work in California, United LAWofREVIEW
States America,1 while
CASESEduardo
under Atty.
stayedRabuya
in
Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of
Elenita,4 hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence5 against Eduardo before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The MTCC
found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil
indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy
Centavos (₱62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTC6 affirmed the decision of the MTCC7 and it
became final and executory.8
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was
returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the
City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square
meters (sq m), under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of
"ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and
resident of Bacolod City," to satisfy the judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo.
The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers
 other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and
Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the decision against Eduardo.9 Ronnie
then caused the consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC,
which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.10
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and
cancellation of title of the lot in the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was
working in California.11 Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand
Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent
spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City.
Petitioner claimed that the levy on execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because
the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to
answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner
of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the
annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in the name
of respondent spouses.12
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal
property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was
acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired
138 with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the property,
Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered
in the name of petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending
the levy on execution of the property.13
On September 2, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the fallo
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and against
the [respondents]:
1. The levy on execution on Lot No. 234-C of the Bacolod Cadastre covered
by TCT No. 80054 in the name of [petitioner] Elenita M. Dewara, the
public auction of the property, and the consolidation of the title and
issuance of new TCT No. 167403 in the name of [respondent] Ronnie
Lamela, are hereby declared null and void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Bacolod City is ordered to cancel TCT No.
167403 in the name of [respondent] Ronnie Lamela and TCT No. 80054 be
reinstated or a new one issued in the name of [petitioner] Elenita M.
Dewara;
3. There is no pronouncement on damages with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this
conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the
documentary evidence submitted, Elenita’s grandfather, Exequiel Magallanes,
originally owned Lot No. 234-C. Upon his demise, his children, Jesus (Elenita’s
father), Salud, and Concepcion, inherited the property, each entitled to a share equal
to one-third (1/3) of the total area of the land. They were issued a new title (TCT No.
T-17541) for the property. On July 6, 1966, petitioner’s aunt, Salud, executed a
waiver of rights duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds under Entry
No. 76392, thereby waiving her rights and participation over her 1/3 share of the
property in favor of her siblings, Jesus and Concepcion. The two siblings then
became the owners of the property, each owning one-half (1/2) of the property. Jesus
subsequently sold his share to his daughter, Elenita, for the sum of Five Thousand
Pesos (₱5,000.00), based on the deed of sale dated March 26, 1975. The deed of sale
was duly registered with the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76393. Concepcion
also sold her share to her niece, Elenita, for the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00), based on the deed of sale dated April 29, 1975, which was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76394. By virtue of the sale
transactions, TCT No. T-17541 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. T-80054,
was issued in the name of Elenita.15
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the property. First, it was sold to her by her father and her
aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the minimal and inadequate
consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her expand
her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and
was therefore gratuitous in character.16
Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC
ruled that the civil liability of Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be
charged to the exclusive property of his wife.17
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 54, dated
September 2, 1999, in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new Decision is entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental [which] is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-80054 or any transfer certificate of title covering Lot No.
234-C issued in the name of Elenita M. Dewara, and reinstate Transfer Certificate of
 Title No. 167403 or issue a new transfer certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C in
the name of Ronnie Lamela. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.18
In reversing the decision of the RTC, the CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of
the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect
in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. Except for the assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in the records that
would indicate a defect in Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes’ consent to the
sale.19 The CA ruled that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title
during their marriage through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal
partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities adjudged
against Eduardo.20
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita
139 and Eduardo.
The answer to this question will define whether the property may be subject to levy
and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in the
criminal case for serious physical injuries, which judgment had already attained
finality.
The Ruling of the Court
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.21 Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy
this presumption.22 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.23 Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.24
There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are
governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the
enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial agreement as
to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal
property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence
—there must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the
burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.25
Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her
aunt was in the nature of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between
the actual value of the property and the monetary consideration for the sale, there is
no other evidence that would convince this Court of the paraphernal character of the
property. Elenita proffered no evidence of the market value or assessed value of the
subject property in 1975. Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not
sufficiently proven that the prices involved in the sales in question were so
inadequate for the Court to reach a conclusion that the transfers were in the nature of
a donation rather than a sale.
Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except
as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract.26 The records are bereft of proof that the
consent of petitioner’s father and her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality, they
intended the sale to be a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of the price per
se will not rule out the transaction as one
CIVIL LAWofREVIEW
sale; the 1price
CASESmust be grossly
under Atty. Rabuya
inadequate or shocking to the conscience, such that the mind would revolt at it and
such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly consent to it.27
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of
spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically
be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities
of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the
conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the
debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife,
as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the
fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical
injuries he suffered. It should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit
Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she was not made a party in the said
criminal case. Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardo’s liability.
Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it
since Eduardo has no property in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by
the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155 in favor of Ronnie may be
 enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after the
responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
This remedy is provided for under Article 163 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership.1âwphi1
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to
the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the
marriage, and that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced
against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.28
Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the conjugal
partnership may be held answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
140
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which
constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon
the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall
not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both
the husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or
other course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal
partnership may be held to answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.
Finally, the indemnity imposed against Eduardo shall earn an interest at the rate of
twelve percent per annum, in accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals.29
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 6, 2006 and
the Resolution dated July 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
64936 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated September 2,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is
hereby REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATION that the conjugal properties of
spouses Elenita Dewara and Eduardo Dewara shall be held to answer for the
judgment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos and Seventy
Centavos (₱72,598.70), plus an interest rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from
the date of finality of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 7155, after complying with the provisions of Article 161 of the
Civil Code.
G.R. No. 157537               September 7, 2011
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA, namely:
LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO, BEVERLY ANN
LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA and ASUNCION, all
surnamed GO, represented byCIVIL
LEONORA B. GO, Petitioners,
LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse
without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of
17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.).
Twenty three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver,1 whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father,
Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land
(the property).
 On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and
mother of the petitioners.2 On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B.
Go (joined by Rito’s wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of
5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for ₱5,686,768.00.3 On March 2,
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property,4 but Servacio refused to
heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,5 they
sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte
(RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.’s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was
null and void.6
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property
because he had purchased it with his own money.7
On October 3, 2002,8 the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property
of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there
were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina);
that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had been by virtue of their being
141 heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect
when the property was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired
pertained exclusively to the husband or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.’s
renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.9
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property, holding that:
"xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be allotted to the
other heirs in the final partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other heirs, it is
valid."10 Quoting Tolentino’s commentary on the matter as authority,11 the RTC
opined:
In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo Tolentino, says" [sic]
"Alienation by the survivor. — After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is
necessary to sell any portion of the community property in order to pay outstanding
obligation of the partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the
formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the property of the
deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property
affected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion
that belongs to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition. Pending the
liquidation, the disposition must be considered as limited only to the contingent share
or interest of the vendor in the particular property involved, but not to the corpus of
the property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or
disposal of the conjugal property without the required formality, is not however, null
ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity so long as they do not exceed the
portion which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse
who made the contract." [underlining supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino on the provisions of
the New Civil Code and the Family Code on the alienation by the surviving spouse
of the community property that jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation
made by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is not wholly
void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code, and shall be valid to the extent
of what will be allotted, in the final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because
why invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community
property that will eventually be his/her share in the final partition? Practically there
is no reason for that view and it would be absurd.
Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of the 17,140 square-
meter conjugal lot is certainly mush
CIVIL(sic)
LAWless than what
REVIEW vendors
1 CASES Protacio
under Atty.Go and his
Rabuya
son Rito B. Go will eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property.
So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC’s denial of their motion for reconsideration13 prompted the petitioners to
appeal directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law; and
that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior
liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments, Servacio and Rito both
argue that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid
to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and
 that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering
that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the
vendors were entitled to as heirs.14
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate
the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year
from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal
partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with
142
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before and after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the rules found in Chapter 4
(Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title IV (Property Relations Between Husband
And Wife) of the Family Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be
subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no dispute
that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of
conjugal partnership governed by the Civil Code. Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the
conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil
Code,15 and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the
other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation.16 The ensuing implied ordinary co-
ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,17 to wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s
share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion of Marta’s share without an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree.
CIVIL LAWUntil then,1all
REVIEW that heunder
CASES had was an Rabuya
Atty. ideal or
abstract quota in Marta’s share.18 Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners.19 Consequently, the sale by Protacio,
Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share.20 This result
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest).21
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision
gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of
Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,22 the respondents aver that each of the heirs had already
received "a certain allotted portion" at the time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and
Rito sold only the portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did not
present any public document on the allocation among her heirs, including
themselves, of specific shares in Marta’s estate. Neither did they aver that the
 conjugal properties had already been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly,
pending a partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether
the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of the petitioners
might not yet be properly decided with finality. The appropriate recourse to bring
that about is to commence an action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-
Casilao v. Court of Appeals,23 to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However,
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-
owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION
of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-
owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].1avvphi1
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
143 consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of
the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. xxx24
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following
observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to
the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that
there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole
transaction is null and void.1âwphi1 But if it turns out that half of the property thus
alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal
partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to
the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be
determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal
made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale
of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal
requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of
course as to that portion of the husband’s share inherited by her as the surviving
spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of
said portion for the benefit of the husband’s other heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said
heirs shall not be barred by prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez,
et al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)25
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error
committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner
avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the
disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten
during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 102). After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court,1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
 Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children
who are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on
the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and
52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing
of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain
with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
144
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal
shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all their
properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling,
the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by
the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure
for the liquidation of the absolute community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30
October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same
may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children
wish to stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of
the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases;6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
 be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of
this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share
in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of
the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the
145 termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and
wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37 and 38"7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."8 Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in
the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has
clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides
that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-
ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation;
and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share
in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver
by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of
nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when
they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property
or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall
accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed. 11
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise
clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it
commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the
"family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and
52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first
paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration
of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from
the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In
now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do
 away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not
then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of
the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro
hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code,
remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of
the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 178044               January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
146 DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
Before the Court is a petition for review  assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood
friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to
separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again.
On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas
City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing
instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the
family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would
at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of
the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite
receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no
indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the
merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological
report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years.
Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature,
incurable.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground
that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even
without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the allegations in the complaint,
substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts
which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and that respondent
failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of
the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner
when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
 1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified
its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
147
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects
under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of
Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the
Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
CIVIL
capacitated and not barred by any LAW REVIEW
impediment 1 CASES
to contract underbut
marriage, Atty. Rabuya
whose
8
marriage is nonetheless void,  such as petitioner and respondent in the case before
the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
 When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
148
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall
declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be
issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way
prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their
legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
CIVIL LAW
only to marriages which are declared REVIEW
void ab initio or1 annulled
CASES under Atty. Rabuya
by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the
Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous
marriage was contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a
previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages,
meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a
competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and
45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or
conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
 relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the
properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules
on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties
of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary
to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of
nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with

the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation,
149 partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASES under Atty. Rabuya
Code.

SO ORDERED.