Civrev Cases 1-120

1. G.R. No.
184823 October 6, 2010
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.,

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of a statute expressly granting such right,
privilege, or incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio indebiti requiring the return of
taxes erroneously or illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement
to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the
prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the
denial of his claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July
30, 2008 Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the manufacturing, producing, and
processing of steel and its by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as
a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its products, "close impression die steel forgings" and "tool and
dies," are registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a pioneer status. 5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1,
2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of ₱3,891,123.82 with the petitioner Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. 6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review 7 with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same
input VAT. The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was raffled to the Second Division of
the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002, it generated and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of ₱131,791,399.00, 8 which was
paid pursuant to Section 106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 (NIRC);9 that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT amounting to ₱3,912,088.14
from purchases and importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10and that in its application for
refund/credit filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center,
it only claimed the amount of ₱3,891,123.82. 11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the

Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated under Sections 106(A)
(2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of 1997;
7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2) year period prescribed in
Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to
refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for the same partake of the
nature of exemption from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision
partially granting respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of
the NIRC of 1997, as amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax
has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with the following requisites: (1) the
taxpayer is engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is VAT-
registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
such sales were made; and (4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such
sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
the output tax.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices
(Exhibits "II" to "II-262," "JJ" to "JJ-431," "KK" to "KK-394" and "LL") shows that it is engaged in sales
which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The Certificate of Registration with OCN
1RC0000148499 (Exhibit "C") with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on September
30, 2004 (Exhibit "N") and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004, both within the
two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
which is from September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there are some documents and claims of
petitioner that are baseless and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
xxxx
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit
certificate representing unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated sales for the same period, but in the
reduced amount of ₱3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82

Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45

Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS (₱3,239,119.25),
representing the unutilized input VAT incurred for the months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,15 insisting that the administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-
year period to claim a tax refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. He
reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. 16 He
cited as basis Article 13 of the Civil Code,17 which provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner argued that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of the NIRC. 18 According to
the petitioner, a prior filing of an administrative claim is a "condition precedent" 19 before a judicial
claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact that the CTA is an appellate body which
exercises the power of judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for
lack of merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax
refund/credit in favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for counting the two-year
period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims were filed beyond the period allowed by
law and hence, the honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition, petitioner further
contends that respondent's filing of the administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the
authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.

Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty five (25) days from the close of each
taxable quarter within which to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts. In
the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of July 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002. Applying Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which to
file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with] which it complied when it filed its VAT
Quarterly Return on October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC
should start from the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above, respondent filed its
VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of 2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent's
administrative and judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed on time because
AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner's contention that the 1997 NIRC requires the
previous filing of an administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This should not be the
case as the law does not prohibit the simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for
refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund must be filed within the two-year prescriptive
period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to disturb the findings and conclusion spelled
out in the assailed January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the CTA Second
Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the Court En Banc to view and appreciate the
evidence in their own perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been considered and
passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the
CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065 entitled, "AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc.
petitioner vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent" are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes the issue of whether respondent’s judicial
and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of
the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were
filed in violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the
Civil Code,26 since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on
September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on September 29, 2004. 27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
determining the start of the two-year period as the said provision pertains to the compliance
requirements in the payment of VAT.28 He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the same
Code that should apply because it specifically provides for the period within which a claim for tax
refund/ credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial
claim with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He opines that the simultaneous filing of the
administrative and the judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which requires the prior
filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such procedural requirement is based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the CIR. 32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because it has substantially complied
with all the requirements provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA En Banc in
applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in computing the prescriptive period for the claim for tax
refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of the NIRC must be read together with
Section 114(A) of the same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its administrative and judicial claims, respondent contends
that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty
Drawback Center of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35 To prove this, respondent
points out that its Claimant Information Sheet No. 49702 36 and BIR Form No. 1914 for the third
quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF, were attached as Annexes "M" and "N,"
respectively, to the Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38 Respondent further contends that the
non-observance of the 120-day period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax refund/credit in
Section 112(D) is not fatal because what is important is that both claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that "[i]f, however, the [CIR] takes time in deciding the
claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the
[CTA] before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the [CIR]." 41 Lastly,
respondent argues that even if the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of
equity considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement. 42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.

Unutilized input VAT must be claimed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the
Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the NIRC, which states:
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-
rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax
has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales
under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign
currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is
engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or
properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and
entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of
the volume of sales. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC,
which read:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –
(A) In General. – Every person liable to pay the value-added tax imposed under this Title shall file a
quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-five (25) days following the
close of each taxable quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-registered
persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in accordance with Section 236, shall file a
return and pay the tax due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of cancellation of
registration: Provided, That only one consolidated return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his
principal place of business or head office and all branches.
xxxx
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal
revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such
tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the two-year period for filing a claim for
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT should start from the date of payment of tax and not from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. 43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has
already been resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 44 where
we ruled that Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the
two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and
229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as "both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment
or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes."45 We explained that:
The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms
that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the
taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax
was paid or not. As the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A),
"[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made
and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued." Thus,
when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said
taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT.
The reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction
was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last
creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the
third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input VAT
refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise,
on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10,
1999 had already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under

Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which,
for the purpose of refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for
the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. – The
Commissioner may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority,
refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the
purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit
for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties
shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit or
refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return
filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after
payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such
payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of
payment of the tax or penalty, for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal
revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be
shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the
taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client,
resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone, deprive the
taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal,
or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112 (A) of the NIRC, providing a two-
year prescriptive period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant
sales or transactions were made pertaining to the creditable input VAT, applies to the instant
case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of taxes. 46 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229
of the NIRC in computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized
input VAT. To be clear, Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of
input VAT. Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when
the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine whether the administrative claim was timely
filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and
taking into account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year, petitioner submits that the two-year
period to file a claim for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired
on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as between
the Civil Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the Administrative Code of
1987, which states that a year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. 50 Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter – the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a
year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason,
we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more
recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-
year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14,
1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within
the reglementary period.51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to file a claim for tax refund/credit for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004. Hence, respondent’s
administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we
are constrained to deny respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of
Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that:
xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. – In proper cases, the
Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected
may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration
of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has "120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within
which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s recourse
is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if
after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the
taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously filed on September 30,
2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day
period. For this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the 120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a
judicial claim as long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are filed within the two-year
prescriptive period52 has no legal basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said
provision states that "any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply
for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to
such sales." The phrase "within two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund" refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.
This is apparent in the first paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which states that the
CIR has "120 days from the submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)" within which to decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the
NIRC, which already provides for a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the
decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC envisions two
scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2)
when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both instances, the taxpayer has 30 days
within which to file an appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in filing
an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by
respondent, we find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in that case is Section 306,
now Section 229 of the NIRC. And as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA
warrants a dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the
October 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Court of Tax Appeals Second Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for having
been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented
by ELIZABETH UY,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
2 3
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
4
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set aside the Orders
dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
5 6
50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:

Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the MeTC
Branch. 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules). Uy received a copy of the June9, 2003 Order on July
7
2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through
8
counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases. Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of
9
the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling the
10
criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005. The cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC
11
Branch 50 of Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases. It was, however,
12
dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently,
13
denied on December 16, 2005. Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before
14
the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096. We dismissed the petition per
15
Resolution dated February 13, 2006. There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal
16
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. 17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-
raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" on July 13,
2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved
18
with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an
19
Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion. When the court subsequently denied Uy’s
20
motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of
21
Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121
acted favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal
cases. Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the
22
petition and denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for
TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST

PETITIONER ONTHE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE

CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND
OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY

DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED

FROM ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR

COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES AGAINST PETITIONER
ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE
CASES. 23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to
speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial
trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, which is in
violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) and Section 2, Paragraph 2,
24
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should
25
not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the
MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a
mere motion because its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice
to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court’s
issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly, even assuming
that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the
June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap
year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in this petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Co’s previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed per Resolution dated
February 13, 2006. Such dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the first
petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that
"[i]n any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case." Hence, upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in
G.R. No. 171096, the same already constitutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground
alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly raised in the present petition, Co’s
arguments are nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to
show any evidence that the alleged "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the part
of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that "‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and necessarily a
flexible concept." In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
26
should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the
27
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it;
and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
28
would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which,
after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. "While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial
29
and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the
trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial." 30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule
117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, it is apparent from the records that there is no notice
31
of any motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days
before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. The fact is that it was only in
32
open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records, complainant
had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint." The importance of a prior notice to the
33
offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly explained in People v. Lacson: 34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the
offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended
party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public
prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such
service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule
will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of
a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the
accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or
loss of the prosecution’s physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party
to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property
or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property. 35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the
cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice
to the offended party. When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become permanent
one year after the issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally
interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of due process;
thus, said in one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision
should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without
the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the
timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. 36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is represented by a private counsel the better rule
is that the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually
notified of the order of provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all
kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address. Section 2, Rule
37
13 of the Rules analogously provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the
former shall be made upon the latter. 38
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving
it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable. Such interpretation is
not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended party at the
mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken
of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition
to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on
all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the prescribed period of time. It is
likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill-will or malice, may simply exercise their whims
and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s
motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is
represented by a private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3,
2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a
motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it
necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the private
counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.
And Sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a leap
year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of
the order of provisional dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the criminal cases
against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year. Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a yearis composed of 12
39
calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of
40
Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., thus: 41
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31.Legal Periods.- "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty
days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to
the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night"
from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain." It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to,
but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month." To illustrate,
one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008. 42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-
year period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of dismissal on July2, 2003 consisted of
24 calendar months, computed as follows:
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003
2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003

3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004
12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed as a dilatory
tactic to prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634. As correctly pointed out
by Uy since the time when the "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" was filed, the issues raised herein
were already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the
guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious
legal maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court proceedings. It appears that Atty.
Maglaque’s conduct contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to
observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03,
Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12).
The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients x x x. 1âwphi1
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that the need for the prompt termination of
litigation is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice. In Spouses Aguilar v.
Manila Banking Corporation, We said: 43
The Court reminds petitioners' counsel of the duty of lawyers who, as officers of the court, must see
to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel
to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack
of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s
oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed
the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling
and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate
Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by
GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
1
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City. The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
2
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married
ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10,
1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit)
at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share
of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold
to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her
½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her
share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the
¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts, disposing thusly:
4
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS
is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA. 6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE

TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE

OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES;
and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE

INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL. 8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, holding and ruling:
9
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS
is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry
of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of
the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.
SO ORDERED. 11
On March 13, 2006, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
12 13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit;
and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books. 14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late
Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines
on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil
Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant
15
to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even 16
if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
17
unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against
such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the
annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
18
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
19
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-
20
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at
the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the
Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. With
21
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
22
not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A bigamous
23
marriage is considered void ab initio. 24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
1âwphi1
her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in
Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
1âwphi1
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; and that such aggregate contributions of
27
₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00. The 28
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; that she had the financial capacity to make
29
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due
to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144
of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable
to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in
any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article
148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to
be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of
the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in
bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties
were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in
the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No.
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that
the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit
"7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P"
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty.
Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also
for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated
December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not
established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY.
LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee
or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of
proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In
31
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner vs. VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning
certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails and
seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September
2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot
staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25, 2004
Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in
the said case.
Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate 6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or
Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First
Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to an
Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal
property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa." 11
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96,
Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment 15 stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a
child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal
Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix.
Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix
in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss 17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action
and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed
and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced
several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints
against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss

and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094
and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.19
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted, via
a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing
the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction
bond in the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the
meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ 25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action. 27 Applying said rule in the
light of the essential elements of a cause of action, 28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared
void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the foreign
divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also
doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of
her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life,
such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning
the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was
denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. 29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the
RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING INTO
CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S
FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE

PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD
ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE. 30
We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success or
failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction. 32
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the propriety
of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first,
whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the
Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if
so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from
Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such
citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she
was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting
American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as
an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the
birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may
be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to
show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however,
that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner
Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and

thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,

Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1)
Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2)
the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition;
and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the
PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau on
October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No
explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance
of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the
Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any
Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or
five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which,
to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a
Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have
been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. Logically, therefore,
the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1 st Indorsement
issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of
Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original
petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she
could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that,
while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a
month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question.
Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents
appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A")
and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly
issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be appended to
form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-094,
like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What
were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce
Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001) 36 did
Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss
and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of
cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of
the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, 40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by
both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of
its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to
have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal
property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do
so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign

country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title
to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the
judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a
party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. 41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente
was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things
stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning
point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained. 42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond
of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As
the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after
completing the legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second paragraph
of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente and
Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists onlyof the real property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No.
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in
the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x. 46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its
second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the
agreement entered into between the parties dated 14 th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines
shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped by
her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was
not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence,
the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved
as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what
Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall have
finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support
hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and
effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 190755 November 24, 2010
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO ONG, Respondent.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the October 20, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
CV No. 84445 entitled Alfredo Ong v. Land Bank of the Philippines, which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17 in Tabaco City.
The Facts
On March 18, 1996, spouses Johnson and Evangeline Sy secured a loan from Land Bank Legazpi
City in the amount of PhP 16 million. The loan was secured by three (3) residential lots, five (5)
cargo trucks, and a warehouse. Under the loan agreement, PhP 6 million of the loan would be short-
term and would mature on February 28, 1997, while the balance of PhP 10 million would be payable
in seven (7) years. The Notice of Loan Approval dated February 22, 1996 contained an acceleration
clause wherein any default in payment of amortizations or other charges would accelerate the
maturity of the loan.1
Subsequently, however, the Spouses Sy found they could no longer pay their loan. On December 9,
1996, they sold three (3) of their mortgaged parcels of land for PhP 150,000 to Angelina Gloria Ong,
Evangeline’s mother, under a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. The relevant portion of the
document2 is quoted as follows:
WHEREAS, we are no longer in a position to settle our obligation with the bank;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P150,000.00) Philippine Currency, we hereby these presents SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER
and CONVEY, by way of sale unto ANGELINA GLORIA ONG, also of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Alfredo Ong, and also a resident of Tabaco, Albay, Philippines, their heirs and assigns,
the above-mentioned debt with the said LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, and by reason hereof
they can make the necessary representation with the bank for the proper restructuring of the loan
with the said bank in their favor;
That as soon as our obligation has been duly settled, the bank is authorized to release the mortgage
in favor of the vendees and for this purpose VENDEES can register this instrument with the Register
of Deeds for the issuance of the titles already in their names.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signatures this 9th day of December 1996
at Tabaco, Albay, Philippines.
(signed) (signed)
EVANGELINE O. SY JOHNSON B. SY
Vendor Vendor
Evangeline’s father, petitioner Alfredo Ong, later went to Land Bank to inform it about the sale and
assumption of mortgage.3 Atty. Edna Hingco, the Legazpi City Land Bank Branch Head, told Alfredo
and his counsel Atty. Ireneo de Lumen that there was nothing wrong with the agreement with the
Spouses Sy but provided them with requirements for the assumption of mortgage. They were also
told that Alfredo should pay part of the principal which was computed at PhP 750,000 and to update
due or accrued interests on the promissory notes so that Atty. Hingco could easily approve the
assumption of mortgage. Two weeks later, Alfredo issued a check for PhP 750,000 and personally
gave it to Atty. Hingco. A receipt was issued for his payment. He also submitted the other documents
required by Land Bank, such as financial statements for 1994 and 1995. Atty. Hingco then informed
Alfredo that the certificate of title of the Spouses Sy would be transferred in his name but this never
materialized. No notice of transfer was sent to him.4
Alfredo later found out that his application for assumption of mortgage was not approved by Land
Bank. The bank learned from its credit investigation report that the Ongs had a real estate mortgage
in the amount of PhP 18,300,000 with another bank that was past due. Alfredo claimed that this was
fully paid later on. Nonetheless, Land Bank foreclosed the mortgage of the Spouses Sy after several
months. Alfredo only learned of the foreclosure when he saw the subject mortgage properties
included in a Notice of Foreclosure of Mortgage and Auction Sale at the RTC in Tabaco, Albay.
Alfredo’s other counsel, Atty. Madrilejos, subsequently talked to Land Bank’s lawyer and was told
that the PhP 750,000 he paid would be returned to him. 5
On December 12, 1997, Alfredo initiated an action for recovery of sum of money with damages
against Land Bank in Civil Case No. T-1941, as Alfredo’s payment was not returned by Land Bank.
Alfredo maintained that Land Bank’s foreclosure without informing him of the denial of his
assumption of the mortgage was done in bad faith. He argued that he was lured into believing that
his payment of PhP 750,000 would cause Land Bank to approve his assumption of the loan of the
Spouses Sy and the transfer of the mortgaged properties in his and his wife’s name. 6 He also
claimed incurring expenses for attorney’s fees of PhP 150,000, filing fee of PhP 15,000, and PhP
250,000 in moral damages.7
Testifying for Land Bank, Atty. Hingco claimed during trial that as branch manager she had no
authority to approve loans and could not assure anybody that their assumption of mortgage would
be approved. She testified that the breakdown of Alfredo’s payment was as follows:
PhP 101,409.59 applied to principal

216,246.56 accrued interests receivable
396,571.77 interests
18,766.10 penalties
16,805.98 accounts receivable
----------------
Total: 750,000.00
According to Atty. Hingco, the bank processes an assumption of mortgage as a new loan, since the
new borrower is considered a new client. They used character, capacity, capital, collateral, and
conditions in determining who can qualify to assume a loan. Alfredo’s proposal to assume the loan,
she explained, was referred to a separate office, the Lending Center. 8
During cross-examination, Atty. Hingco testified that several months after Alfredo made the tender of
payment, she received word that the Lending Center rejected Alfredo’s loan application. She stated
that it was the Lending Center and not her that should have informed Alfredo about the denial of his
and his wife’s assumption of mortgage. She added that although she told Alfredo that the agreement
between the spouses Sy and Alfredo was valid between them and that the bank would accept
payments from him, Alfredo did not pay any further amount so the foreclosure of the loan collaterals
ensued. She admitted that Alfredo demanded the return of the PhP 750,000 but said that there was
no written demand before the case against the bank was filed in court. She said that Alfredo had
made the payment of PhP 750,000 even before he applied for the assumption of mortgage and that
the bank received the said amount because the subject account was past due and demandable; and
the Deed of Assumption of Mortgage was not used as the basis for the payment. 9
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC held that the contract approving the assumption of mortgage was not perfected as a result
of the credit investigation conducted on Alfredo. It noted that Alfredo was not even informed of the
disapproval of the assumption of mortgage but was just told that the accounts of the spouses Sy had
matured and gone unpaid. It ruled that under the principle of equity and justice, the bank should
return the amount Alfredo had paid with interest at 12% per annum computed from the filing of the
complaint. The RTC further held that Alfredo was entitled to attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
for being compelled to litigate. 10
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is rendered, ordering defendant bank to pay

plaintiff, Alfredo Ong the amount of P750,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum computed from
Dec. 12, 1997 and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of P50,000.00.
Costs against defendant bank.
SO ORDERED.11
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, Land Bank faulted the trial court for (1) holding that the payment of PhP 750,000 made
by Ong was one of the requirements for the approval of his proposal to assume the mortgage of the
Sy spouses; (2) erroneously ordering Land Bank to return the amount of PhP 750,000 to Ong on the
ground of its failure to effect novation; and (3) erroneously affirming the award of PhP 50,000 to Ong
as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.12 It held that Alfredo’s recourse is not against the Sy spouses.
According to the appellate court, the payment of PhP 750,000 was for the approval of his
assumption of mortgage and not for payment of arrears incurred by the Sy spouses. As such, it ruled
that it would be incorrect to consider Alfredo a third person with no interest in the fulfillment of the
obligation under Article 1236 of the Civil Code. Although Land Bank was not bound by the Deed
between Alfredo and the Spouses Sy, the appellate court found that Alfredo and Land Bank’s active
preparations for Alfredo’s assumption of mortgage essentially novated the agreement.
On January 5, 2010, the CA denied Land Bank’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence,
Land Bank appealed to us.
The Issues
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code does not apply
and in finding that there is no novation.
II
Whether the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence and the law when it affirmed the
trial court decision’s ordering Land Bank to pay Ong the amount of Php750,000.00 with
interest at 12% annum.
III
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it affirmed the award of
Php50,000.00 to Ong as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
The Ruling of this Court
We affirm with modification the appealed decision.
Recourse is against Land Bank
Land Bank contends that Art. 1236 of the Civil Code backs their claim that Alfredo should have
sought recourse against the Spouses Sy instead of Land Bank. Art. 1236 provides:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in
the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid
without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment
has been beneficial to the debtor.1avvphi1
We agree with Land Bank on this point as to the first part of paragraph 1 of Art. 1236. Land Bank
was not bound to accept Alfredo’s payment, since as far as the former was concerned, he did not
have an interest in the payment of the loan of the Spouses Sy. However, in the context of the
second part of said paragraph, Alfredo was not making payment to fulfill the obligation of the
Spouses Sy. Alfredo made a conditional payment so that the properties subject of the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage would be titled in his name. It is clear from the records that Land Bank
required Alfredo to make payment before his assumption of mortgage would be approved. He was
informed that the certificate of title would be transferred accordingly. He, thus, made payment not as
a debtor but as a prospective mortgagor. But the trial court stated:
[T]he contract was not perfected or consummated because of the adverse finding in the credit
investigation which led to the disapproval of the proposed assumption. There was no evidence
presented that plaintiff was informed of the disapproval. What he received was a letter dated May
22, 1997 informing him that the account of spouses Sy had matured but there [were] no payments.
This was sent even before the conduct of the credit investigation on June 20, 1997 which led to the
disapproval of the proposed assumption of the loans of spouses Sy.13
Alfredo, as a third person, did not, therefore, have an interest in the fulfillment of the obligation of the
Spouses Sy, since his interest hinged on Land Bank’s approval of his application, which was denied.
The circumstances of the instant case show that the second paragraph of Art. 1236 does not apply.
As Alfredo made the payment for his own interest and not on behalf of the Spouses Sy, recourse is
not against the latter. And as Alfredo was not paying for another, he cannot demand from the
debtors, the Spouses Sy, what he has paid.
Novation of the loan agreement
Land Bank also faults the CA for finding that novation applies to the instant case. It reasons that a
substitution of debtors was made without its consent; thus, it was not bound to recognize the
substitution under the rules on novation.
On the matter of novation, Spouses Benjamin and Agrifina Lim v. M.B. Finance
Corporation14 provides the following discussion:
Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old
obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former; it is
merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the
amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal
conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). Under this mode, novation would have
dual functions ─ one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its
place ─ requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation;
and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation. x x x
In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same, it is
imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on
every point incompatible with each other. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two
obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Furthermore, Art. 1293 of the Civil Code states:
Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made
even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the
creditor. Payment by the new debtor gives him rights mentioned in articles 1236 and 1237.
We do not agree, then, with the CA in holding that there was a novation in the contract between the
parties. Not all the elements of novation were present. Novation must be expressly consented to.
Moreover, the conflicting intention and acts of the parties underscore the absence of any express
disclosure or circumstances with which to deduce a clear and unequivocal intent by the parties to
novate the old agreement.15 Land Bank is thus correct when it argues that there was no novation in
the following:
[W]hether or not Alfredo Ong has an interest in the obligation and payment was made with the
knowledge or consent of Spouses Sy, he may still pay the obligation for the reason that even before
he paid the amount of P750,000.00 on January 31, 1997, the substitution of debtors was already
perfected by and between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong as evidenced by a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage executed by them on December 9, 1996. And since the substitution of
debtors was made without the consent of Land Bank – a requirement which is indispensable in order
to effect a novation of the obligation, it is therefore not bound to recognize the substitution of
debtors. Land Bank did not intervene in the contract between Spouses Sy and Spouses Ong and did
not expressly give its consent to this substitution. 16
Unjust enrichment
Land Bank maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the principle of equity and justice in
ordering it to return the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo. Alfredo was allegedly in bad faith and in
estoppel. Land Bank contends that it enjoyed the presumption of regularity and was in good faith
when it accepted Alfredo’s tender of PhP 750,000. It reasons that it did not unduly enrich itself at
Alfredo’s expense during the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by
subtracting PhP 750,000 from the Spouses Sy’s outstanding loan obligation. Alfredo’s recourse then,
according to Land Bank, is to have his payment reimbursed by the Spouses Sy.
We rule that Land Bank is still liable for the return of the PhP 750,000 based on the principle of
unjust enrichment. Land Bank is correct in arguing that it has no obligation as creditor to recognize
Alfredo as a person with interest in the fulfillment of the obligation. But while Land Bank is not bound
to accept the substitution of debtors in the subject real estate mortgage, it is estopped by its action of
accepting Alfredo’s payment from arguing that it does not have to recognize Alfredo as the new
debtor. The elements of estoppel are:
First, the actor who usually must have knowledge, notice or suspicion of the true facts,
communicates something to another in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence;
second, the other in fact relies, and relies reasonably or justifiably, upon that communication; third,
the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent
with his earlier conduct; and fourth, the actor knows, expects or foresees that the other would act
upon the information given or that a reasonable person in the actor’s position would expect or
foresee such action.17
By accepting Alfredo’s payment and keeping silent on the status of Alfredo’s application, Land Bank
misled Alfredo to believe that he had for all intents and purposes stepped into the shoes of the
Spouses Sy.
The defense of Land Bank Legazpi City Branch Manager Atty. Hingco that it was the bank’s Lending
Center that should have notified Alfredo of his assumption of mortgage disapproval is unavailing.
The Lending Center’s lack of notice of disapproval, the Tabaco Branch’s silence on the disapproval,
and the bank’s subsequent actions show a failure of the bank as a whole, first, to notify Alfredo that
he is not a recognized debtor in the eyes of the bank; and second, to apprise him of how and when
he could collect on the payment that the bank no longer had a right to keep.
We turn then on the principle upon which Land Bank must return Alfredo’s payment. Unjust
enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."18 There is unjust enrichment under Art. 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. 19
Additionally, unjust enrichment has been applied to actions called accion in rem verso. In order that
the accion in rem verso may prosper, the following conditions must concur: (1) that the defendant
has been enriched; (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss; (3) that the enrichment of the defendant
is without just or legal ground; and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-
contract, crime, or quasi-delict.20 The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates
payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it.21
The principle applies to the parties in the instant case, as, Alfredo, having been deemed disqualified
from assuming the loan, had no duty to pay petitioner bank and the latter had no right to receive it.
Moreover, the Civil Code likewise requires under Art. 19 that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." Land Bank, however, did not even bother to inform Alfredo that it was no
longer approving his assumption of the Spouses Sy’s mortgage. Yet it acknowledged his interest in
the loan when the branch head of the bank wrote to tell him that his daughter’s loan had not been
paid.22 Land Bank made Alfredo believe that with the payment of PhP 750,000, he would be able to
assume the mortgage of the Spouses Sy. The act of receiving payment without returning it when
demanded is contrary to the adage of giving someone what is due to him. The outcome of the
application would have been different had Land Bank first conducted the credit investigation before
accepting Alfredo’s payment. He would have been notified that his assumption of mortgage had
been disapproved; and he would not have taken the futile action of paying PhP 750,000. The
procedure Land Bank took in acting on Alfredo’s application cannot be said to have been fair and
proper.
As to the claim that the trial court erred in applying equity to Alfredo’s case, we hold that Alfredo had
no other remedy to recover from Land Bank and the lower court properly exercised its equity
jurisdiction in resolving the collection suit. As we have held in one case:
Equity, as the complement of legal jurisdiction, seeks to reach and complete justice where courts of
law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by
different courts.23
Another claim made by Land Bank is the presumption of regularity it enjoys and that it was in good
faith when it accepted Alfredo’s tender of PhP 750,000.
The defense of good faith fails to convince given Land Bank’s actions. Alfredo was not treated as a
mere prospective borrower. After he had paid PhP 750,000, he was made to sign bank documents
including a promissory note and real estate mortgage. He was assured by Atty. Hingco that the titles
to the properties covered by the Spouses Sy’s real estate mortgage would be transferred in his
name, and upon payment of the PhP 750,000, the account would be considered current and
renewed in his name.24
Land Bank posits as a defense that it did not unduly enrich itself at Alfredo’s expense during the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, since it tendered its bid by subtracting PhP 750,000 from
the Spouses Sy’s outstanding loan obligation. It is observed that this is the first time Land Bank is
revealing this defense. However, issues, arguments, theories, and causes not raised below may no
longer be posed on appeal.25 Land Bank’s contention, thus, cannot be entertained at this point. 1avvphi1
Land Bank further questions the lower court’s decision on the basis of the inconsistencies made by
Alfredo on the witness stand. It argues that Alfredo was not a credible witness and his testimony
failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of regular duties on the part of
Land Bank.
This claim, however, touches on factual findings by the trial court, and we defer to these findings of
the trial court as sustained by the appellate court. These are generally binding on us. While there are
exceptions to this rule, Land Bank has not satisfactorily shown that any of them is applicable to this
issue.26 Hence, the rule that the trial court is in a unique position to observe the demeanor of
witnesses should be applied and respected 27 in the instant case.
In sum, we hold that Land Bank may not keep the PhP 750,000 paid by Alfredo as it had already
foreclosed on the mortgaged lands.
Interest and attorney’s fees
As to the applicable interest rate, we reiterate the guidelines found in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:28
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time
it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an

interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at
the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
No evidence was presented by Alfredo that he had sent a written demand to Land Bank before he
filed the collection suit. Only the verbal agreement between the lawyers of the parties on the return
of the payment was mentioned.29Consequently, the obligation of Land Bank to return the payment
made by Alfredo upon the former’s denial of the latter’s application for assumption of mortgage must
be reckoned from the date of judicial demand on December 12, 1997, as correctly determined by the
trial court and affirmed by the appellate court.
The next question is the propriety of the imposition of interest and the proper imposable rate of
applicable interest. The RTC granted the rate of 12% per annum which was affirmed by the CA.
From the above-quoted guidelines, however, the proper imposable interest rate is 6% per annum
pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code. Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals is illuminating in this regard:
In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central
Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of
money. And for transactions involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages
arising from default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money judgment not
involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides:
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs
in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment
of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per
cent per annum.
The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual
obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower
or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest, if proper, and the
applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to
loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
applies "when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the concept of damage
arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of obligations in general," with the
application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount
is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the
legal interest shall be subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion, depending
on the equities of each case, on the award of interest." 30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on our ruling above, forbearance of money refers to the contractual obligation of the lender or
creditor to desist for a fixed period from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt
then due and for which 12% per annum is imposed as interest in the absence of a stipulated rate. In
the instant case, Alfredo’s conditional payment to Land Bank does not constitute forbearance of
money, since there was no agreement or obligation for Alfredo to pay Land Bank the amount of PhP
750,000, and the obligation of Land Bank to return what Alfredo has conditionally paid is still in
dispute and has not yet been determined. Thus, it cannot be said that Land Bank’s alleged obligation
has become a forbearance of money.
On the award of attorney’s fees, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation were awarded because
Alfredo was compelled to litigate due to the unjust refusal of Land Bank to refund the amount he
paid. There are instances when it is just and equitable to award attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.31 Art. 2208 of the Civil Code pertinently states:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
xxxx
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Given that Alfredo was indeed compelled to litigate against Land Bank and incur expenses to protect
his interest, we find that the award falls under the exception above and is, thus, proper given the
circumstances.
On a final note. The instant case would not have been litigated had Land Bank been more
circumspect in dealing with Alfredo. The bank chose to accept payment from Alfredo even before a
credit investigation was underway, a procedure worsened by the failure to even inform him of his
credit standing’s impact on his assumption of mortgage. It was, therefore, negligent to a certain
degree in handling the transaction with Alfredo. It should be remembered that the business of a bank
is affected with public interest and it should observe a higher standard of diligence when dealing with
the public.32
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-CV No. 84445 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the amount of PhP 750,000 will earn interest at 6% per
annum reckoned from December 12, 1997, and the total aggregate monetary awards will in turn
earn 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 44209, as well as its Resolution 2 denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration
thereof. Themo1 mo2 Court of Appeals set aside the Decision 3 of Branch 150 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, which dismissed the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for sum
of money and damages.
The Facts of the Case
Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated system
of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory
equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baños. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation
(FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the
fabrication thereof.
Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a
corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy
Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the
laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the
account of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the
fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project
to FEMF for its approval.
On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and
downpayment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project, thus:
1 Supply and Installation of Laboratory furniture for the BIOTECH Building

. Project
Amount : P2,934,068.90
Supplier : Philippine Laboratory Furniture Co.,
College, Laguna
Attention : Mr. Hector C. Navasero
President
Downpayment : 40% or ₱1,173,627.56
2 Fabrication and Supply of office furniture for the BIOTECH Building Project
.
Amount : P573,375.00
Supplier : Trans-Oriental Woodworks, Inc.
1st Avenue, Bagumbayan Tanyag, Taguig, Metro
Manila
Downpayment : 50% or ₱286,687.504
Padolina assured Lirio that the contract would be prepared as soon as possible before the issuance
of the purchase orders and the downpayment for the goods, and would be transmitted to the FEMF
as soon as possible.
In a Letter dated July 23, 1982, Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to
proceed with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant
Lirio. Padolina also requested for copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract 5 for the project,
and that such contract and drawings had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted
to the PHILAB the following week. However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after
having been duly inspected by their representatives and FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio.
On August 24, 1982, FEMF remitted ₱600,000 to PHILAB as downpayment for the laboratory
furniture for the BIOTECH project, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 253 to FEMF. On
October 22, 1982, FEMF made another partial payment of ₱800,000 to PHILAB, for which the latter
issued Official Receipt No. 256 to FEMF. The remittances were in the form of checks drawn by
FEMF and delivered to PHILAB, through Padolina.
On October 16, 1982, UP, through Emil Q. Javier, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños and FEMF,
represented by its Executive Officer, Rolando Gapud, executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) in which FEMF agreed to grant financial support and donate sums of money to UP for the
construction of buildings, installation of laboratory and other capitalization for the project, not to
exceed ₱29,000,000.00. The obligations of FEMF under the MOA are the following:
ARTICLE II
OBLIGATIONS OF THE FOUNDATION
2.1. The FOUNDATION, in carrying out its principal objectives of promoting philantrophic and
scientific projects through financial support to such projects that will contribute to the
country’s economic development, shall grant such financial support and donate such sums
of money to the RESEARCH COMPLEX as may be necessary for the construction of
buildings, installation of laboratories, setting up of offices and physical plants and facilities
and other capital investment of the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of its component
Research Institutes not to exceed ₱29 Million. For this purpose, the FOUNDATION shall:
(a) Acquire and donate to the UNIVERSITY the site for the RESEARCH COMPLEX;
and
(b) Donate or cause to be donated to the UNIVERSITY the sum of TWENTY-NINE

MILLION PESOS (₱29,000,000.00) for the construction of the buildings of the
National Institutes of Biotechnology and Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH) and the
installation of their laboratories and their physical plants and other facilities to enable
them to commence operations.
2.2. In addition, the FOUNDATION shall, subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees of
the FOUNDATION, continue to support the activities of the RESEARCH COMPLEX by way
of recurrent additional grants and donations for specific research and development projects
which may be mutually agreed upon and, from time to time, additional grants and donations
of such amounts as may be necessary to provide the RESEARCH COMPLEX and/or any of
its Research Institutes with operational flexibility especially with regard to incentives to staff
purchase of equipment/facilities, travel abroad, recruitment of local and expatriate staff and
such other activities and inputs which are difficult to obtain under usual government rules
and regulations.6
The Board of Regents of the UP approved the MOA on November 25, 1982. 7
In the meantime, Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory furniture
to BIOTECH, by January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1,
1983, BIOTECH reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted
to FEMF for its evaluation and approval.8Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted
to BIOTECH an accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested
payment thereon.9 By May 1983, PHILAB had completed 78% of the project, amounting to
₱2,288,573.74 out of the total cost of ₱2,934,068.90. The FEMF had already paid forty percent
(40%) of the total cost of the project. On May 12, 1983, Padolina wrote Lirio and furnished him the
progress billing from PHILAB.10 On August 11, 1983, the FEMF made another partial payment of
₱836,119.52 representing the already delivered laboratory and office furniture after the requisite
inspection and verification thereof by representatives from the BIOTECH, FEMF, and PHILAB. The
payment was made in the form of a check, for which PHILAB issued Official Receipt No. 202 to
FEMF through Padolina.11
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in the amount of ₱702,939.40
for the final payment of laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for
the FEMF, conducted a verification of the accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same.
BIOTECH forwarded the invoice to Lirio on December 18, 1984 for its payment. 12 Lirio, in turn,
forwarded the invoice to Gapud, presumably sometime in the early part of 1985. However, the FEMF
failed to pay the bill. PHILAB reiterated its request for payment through a letter on May 9,
1985.13 BIOTECH again wrote Lirio on March 21, 1985, requesting the payment of PHILAB’s bill. 14It
sent another letter to Gapud, on November 22, 1985, again appealing for the payment of PHILAB’s
bill.15 In a Letter to BIOTECH dated December 5, 1985, PHILAB requested payment of ₱702,939.40
plus interest thereon of ₱224,940.61. 16 There was, however, no response from the FEMF. On
February 24, 1986, PHILAB wrote BIOTECH, appealing for the payment of its bill even on
installment basis.17
President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution. On March 26,
1986, Navasero wrote BIOTECH requesting for its much-needed assistance for the payment of the
balance already due plus interest of ₱295,234.55 for its fabrication and supply of laboratory
furniture.18
On April 22, 1986, PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the
payment of the amount due from the FEMF.19 The letter was referred to then Budget Minister Alberto
Romulo, who referred the letter to then UP President Edgardo Angara on June 9, 1986. On
September 30, 1986, Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baños, wrote then Chairman of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILAB’s
claim to be officially entered as "accounts payable" as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated
by the PCGG.20
In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for
its perusal.21
Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between
PHILAB and FEMF. In a Letter dated October 20, 1987, Navasero informed De Guzman that
PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory
furniture to BIOTECH.
Exasperated, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP. In the
complaint, PHILAB prayed that it be paid the following:
(1) PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY NINE &
40/100 (₱702,939.40) plus an additional amount (as shall be determined during the hearing)
to cover the actual cost of money which at the time of transaction the value of the peso was
eleven to a dollar (₱11.00:$1) and twenty seven (27%) percent interest on the total amount
from August 1982 until fully paid;
(2) PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages;
(3) FIFTY THOUSAND [PESOS] (₱50,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) Cost of suit.22
PHILAB alleged, inter alia, that:
3. Sometime in August 1982, defendant, through its officials, particularly MR. WILLIAM
PADOLINA, Director, asked plaintiff to supply and install several laboratory furnitures and
equipment at BIOTECH, a research laboratory of herein defendant located at its campus in
College, Laguna, for a total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-NINE THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90);
4. After the completion of the delivery and installation of said laboratory furnitures and
equipment at defendant’s BIOTECH Laboratory, defendant paid three (3) times on
installment basis:
a) ₱600,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 253 dated August 24, 1982;
b) ₱800,000.00 as per Official Receipt No. 256 dated October 22, 1982;
c) ₱836,119.52 as per Official Receipt No. 202 dated August 11, 1983;
thus leaving a balance of PESOS: SEVEN HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY-NINE & 40/100 (₱702,939.40).
5. That notwithstanding repeated demands for the past eight years, defendant arrogantly and
maliciously made plaintiff believe that it was going to pay the balance aforestated, that was
why plaintiff’s President and General Manager himself, HECTOR C. NAVASERO, personally
went to and from UP Los Baños to talk with defendant’s responsible officers in the hope of
expecting payment, when, in truth and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay whatsoever
right from the start on a misplaced ground of technicalities. Some of plaintiff’s demand letters
since year 1983 up to the present are hereto attached as Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H
hereof;
6. That by reason of defendant’s malicious, evil and unnecessary misrepresentations that it

was going to pay its obligation and asking plaintiff so many red tapes and requirements to
submit, compliance of all of which took plaintiff almost eight (8) years to finish, when, in truth
and in fact, defendant had no intention to pay, defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff
no less than PESOS: ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (₱100,000.00) exemplary damages, so
that other government institutions may be warned that they must not unjustly enrich
themselves at the expense of the people they serve. 23
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that PHILAB had no cause of action against it because
it was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF,
which funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the purchase price of the laboratory furniture.
UP specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice
to PHILAB’s recourse against the FEMF. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit without prejudice to
plaintiff's recourse to the assets of the Marcos Foundation for the unpaid balance of
₱792,939.49.
SO ORDERED.24
Undaunted, PHILAB appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) alleging that the trial court erred in
finding that:
1. the contract for the supply and installation of subject laboratory furniture and equipment
was between PHILAB and the Marcos Foundation; and,
2. the Marcos Foundation, not the University of the Philippines, is liable to pay the
respondent the balance of the purchase price.25
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract
between FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the
FEMF and UP since it was never a party thereto. The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not
bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim:
"No one should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
The Present Petition
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, UP, now the
petitioner, filed its petition for review contending that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW ON

CONTRACTS BETWEEN PHILAB AND THE MARCOS FOUNDATION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS
FOUNDATION, IS LIABLE TO PHILAB.26
Prefatorily, the doctrinal rule is that pure questions of facts may not be the subject of appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as this mode of appeal is generally
restricted to questions of law.27However, this rule is not absolute. The Court may review the factual
findings of the CA should they be contrary to those of the trial court. 28 Correspondingly, this Court
may review findings of facts when the judgment of the CA is premised on a misapprehension of
facts.29
On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the CA overlooked the evidentiary effect and
substance of the corresponding letters and communications which support the statements of the
witnesses showing affirmatively that an implied contract of sale existed between PHILAB and the
FEMF. The petitioner furthermore asserts that no contract existed between it and the respondent as
it could not have entered into any agreement without the requisite public bidding and a formal written
contract.
The respondent, on the other hand, submits that the CA did not err in not applying the law on
contracts between the respondent and the FEMF. It, likewise, attests that it was never privy to the
MOA entered into between the petitioner and the FEMF. The respondent adds that what the FEMF
donated was a sum of money equivalent to ₱29,000,000, and not the laboratory equipment supplied
by it to the petitioner. The respondent submits that the petitioner, being the recipient of the laboratory
furniture, should not enrich itself at the expense of the respondent.
The petition is meritorious.
It bears stressing that the respondent’s cause of action is one for sum of money predicated on the
alleged promise of the petitioner to pay for the purchase price of the furniture, which, despite
demands, the petitioner failed to do. However, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioner ever
obliged itself to pay for the laboratory furniture supplied by it. Hence, the respondent is not entitled to
its claim against the petitioner.
There is no dispute that the respondent is not privy to the MOA executed by the petitioner and
FEMF; hence, it is not bound by the said agreement. Contracts take effect only between the parties
and their assigns.30 A contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is
not a party to it, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof.31 Likewise admitted by the parties, is the fact that there was no written contract executed by
the petitioner, the respondent and FEMF relating to the fabrication and delivery of office and
laboratory furniture to the BIOTECH. Even the CA failed to specifically declare that the petitioner and
the respondent entered into a contract of sale over the said laboratory furniture. The parties are in
accord that the FEMF had remitted to the respondent partial payments via checks drawn and issued
by the FEMF to the respondent, through Padolina, in the total amount of ₱2,288,573.74 out of the
total cost of the project of ₱2,934,068.90 and that the respondent received the said checks and
issued receipts therefor to the FEMF. There is also no controversy that the petitioner did not pay a
single centavo for the said furniture delivered by the respondent that the petitioner had been using
ever since.
We agree with the petitioner that, based on the records, an implied-in-fact contract of sale was
entered into between the respondent and FEMF. A contract implied in fact is one implied from facts
and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. It arises where the intention of the parties
is not expressed, but an agreement in fact creating an obligation. It is a contract, the existence and
terms of which are manifested by conduct and not by direct or explicit words between parties but is
to be deduced from conduct of the parties, language used, or things done by them, or other pertinent
circumstances attending the transaction. To create contracts implied in fact, circumstances must
warrant inference that one expected compensation and the other to pay. 32 An implied-in-fact contract
requires the parties’ intent to enter into a contract; it is a true contract. 33 The conduct of the parties is
to be viewed as a reasonable man would view it, to determine the existence or not of an implied-in-
fact contract.34 The totality of the acts/conducts of the parties must be considered to determine their
intention. An implied-in-fact contract will not arise unless the meeting of minds is indicated by some
intelligent conduct, act or sign.35
In this case, the respondent was aware, from the time Padolina contacted it for the fabrication and
supply of the laboratory furniture until the go-signal was given to it to fabricate and deliver the
furniture to BIOTECH as beneficiary, that the FEMF was to pay for the same. Indeed, Padolina
asked the respondent to prepare the draft of the contract to be received by the FEMF prior to the
execution of the parties (the respondent and FEMF), but somehow, the respondent failed to prepare
one. The respondent knew that the petitioner was merely the donee-beneficiary of the laboratory
furniture and not the buyer; nor was it liable for the payment of the purchase price thereof. From the
inception, the FEMF paid for the bills and statement of accounts of the respondent, for which the
latter unconditionally issued receipts to and under the name of the FEMF. Indeed, witness Lirio
testified:
Q: Now, did you know, Mr. Witness, if PHILAB Industries was aware that it was the Marcos
Foundation who would be paying for this particular transaction for the completion of this
particular transaction?
A: I think they are fully aware.
Q: What is your basis for saying so?
A: First, I think they were appraised by Dr. Padolina. Secondly, there were occasions during
our inspection in Los Baños, at the installation site, there were occasions, two or three
occasions, when we met with Mr. Navasero who is the President, I think, or manager of
PHILAB, and we appraised him that it was really between the foundation and him to which
includes (sic) the construction company constructing the building. He is fully aware that it is
the foundation who (sic) engaged them and issued the payments. 36
The respondent, in its Letter dated March 26, 1986, informed the petitioner and sought its assistance
for the collection of the amount due from the FEMF:
Dear Dr. Padolina:
May we request for your much-needed assistance in the payment of the balance still due us
on the laboratory furniture we supplied and installed two years ago?
Business is still slow and we will appreciate having these funds as soon as possible to keep
up our operations.
We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.
Very truly yours,
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC.37
The respondent even wrote former President Aquino seeking her assistance for the payment of the
amount due, in which the respondent admitted it tried to collect from her predecessor, namely, the
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos:
YOUR EXCELLENCY:
At the instance of the national government, subject laboratory furnitures were supplied by
our company to the National Institute of Biotechnology & Applied Microbiology (BIOTECH),
University of the Philippines, Los Baños, Laguna, in 1984.
Out of the total contract price of PESOS: TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIFTY-EIGHT & 90/100 (₱2,939,058.90), the previous administration had so far
paid us the sum of ₱2,236,119.52 thus leaving a balance of PESOS: ONE MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT & 61/100
(₱1,412.748.61) inclusive of interest of 24% per annum and 30% exchange rate adjustment.
On several occasions, we have tried to collect this amount from your predecessor, the latest
of which was subject invoice (01643) we submitted to DR. W. PADOLINA, deputy director of
BIOTECH. But this, notwithstanding, our claim has remained unacted upon up to now. Copy
of said invoice is hereto attached for easy reference.
Now that your excellency is the head of our government, we sincerely hope that payment of
this obligation will soon be made as this is one project the Republic of the Philippines has
use of and derives benefit from.38
Admittedly, the respondent sent to the petitioner its bills and statements of accounts for the
payments of the laboratory furniture it delivered to the petitioner which the petitioner, through
Padolina, transmitted to the FEMF for its payment. However, the FEMF failed to pay the last
statement of account of the respondent because of the onset of the EDSA upheaval. It was only
when the respondent lost all hope of collecting its claim from the government and/or the PCGG did it
file the complaint against the petitioner for the collection of the payment of its last delivery of
laboratory furniture.
We reject the ruling of the CA holding the petitioner liable for the claim of the respondent based on
the maxim that no one should enrich itself at the expense of another.
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations
of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term
unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.39
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that
another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state
of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. 40 Unjust enrichment is a
term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits
received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be
entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. 41 Unjust
enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.42
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:
Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)
In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the
defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.43
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion
in rem verso will not lie.44
The essential requisites for the application of Article 22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this
case. The respondent had a remedy against the FEMF via an action based on an implied-in-fact
contract with the FEMF for the payment of its claim. The petitioner legally acquired the laboratory
furniture under the MOA with FEMF; hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory furniture.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
Branch 150, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the
1 2
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744.
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:
[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint
for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner]
Willaware Products Corporation ([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-
made automotive parts similar to those of [respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of plastic and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan,
Caloocan City. Since its registration in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan
plant and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the
other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of
plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged that in view of
the physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent’s] office, and in view of the fact that some
of the [respondent’s] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity
with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing
and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but
was selling these products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.
[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture
ofautomotive underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock
absorberbushing, center bearing cushions, among others. [Petitioner’s] manufacture of the same
automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from [respondent’s] idea of using plastic for
automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondent’s] products all of which acts
constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and
have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO
MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondent’s] complaint.
Furthermore, [petitioner’s] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and
thereby to incur expenses in the way of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses in the amount
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱500,000.00).
In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts:
that it is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal
and that there’s physical proximity of [petitioner’s] office to [respondent]’s office, and that someof
[respondent’s] employees had transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had
developed familiarity with [respondent’s] products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.
As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-
made automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and
composition merely conforms to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend
to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive
parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these
plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these as it has no
patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer of
these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly
selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded
the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair
competition. The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s
property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive
parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the sameproducts to respondent’s customers,
which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million
(₱2,000,000.00) Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos as
attorney’s fees and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The
court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts
as those manufactured by plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 4
Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.
On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to
another,the copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as
competition is promoted by law to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure
away respondent’s employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by
respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these can be done by simplybuying a
sample for a mold to be made.
Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair
competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of
unfair competition are present in the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s acts
are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former
employees.
In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC.
Relevant portions of said decision read:
Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest
against Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages.
One is entitled to actual damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was
engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy
between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q,"
which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-2002, it shows the decline
of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this pertains to
the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.
In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that
prejudiced Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris’ rights. The
RTC’s award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is also maintained.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two
Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos nominal damages is awarded.
SO ORDERED. 5
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit
by the CA in a Resolution dated February 10, 2011.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our
resolution:
(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not
competitors and there is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?
(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and
attorney’s fees?
(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been
established?
(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be
considered in the light of the said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this
Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?
(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has
established "goodwill?" 6
In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to
unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
humanrelations, and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as the present suit is a
7
damage suit and the products are not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of
patent registration is immaterial in the present case.
The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair
competition" in American jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a
competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment
of a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business. 8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting
tounfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby
suffers damage."
From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut
the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to
engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means usedare fair and legitimate.
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an
injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary
to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of
our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter
appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. 9
Here, both characteristics are present.
First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-
made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience"
as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s formeremployees, deliberately copied
respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s
customers. 10
To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees of
respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to
unfair competition, viz.:
The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the
business of [respondent]. [Petitioner’s] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous
1âwphi1
subtle calculation. To illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that
[petitioner] is engaged in the production of plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of
plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the then mold setter and maintenance
operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De Guzman was hired
by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were not
being made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance
operator to remedy its problem. [Petitioner’s] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking
on his experience gained from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of
[respondent], was fired because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this
accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same
position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of events relating to his employment by
[petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.
11
Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly
shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the
employees of the respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the
respondent. 12
Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself,
but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later
on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong. As 13
aptly observed by the courta quo, the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses indicate that it acted in bad
faith in competing with the business of respondent, to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager,
William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the business of plastic-made automotive
parts until recently, year 2000:
Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not?
Manufacturer of kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty.
Bautista: And you said you have known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have
known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty.
Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with these products, plastic
automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and
composition as those sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris’
employees to Willaware.
Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?
Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.
Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I don’t know the exact
date.
Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your
company, is it not?
Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.
Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?
Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).
Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?
Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.
Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?
Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one
month ago.
That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony
of [petitioner’s] witness, Joel Torres:
Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?
A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.
Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court
what unusual even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What is that?
A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the
place where they were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?
A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.
Q: And who else was there?
A: William Salinas, sir.
Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?
A: Jun Molina called me, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas
uttered something, sir.
Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?
A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"
Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?
A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko
na siya."
Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to
as your "amo"?
A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir. 14
In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.
However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been
deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) in nominal damages is
awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and
Resolution dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental

Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between
Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay
to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is
single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.5 According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite
the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to
file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a Submission
Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary
arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and
Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan
was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died
during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed
the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of
Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate
dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the
unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same
line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery
was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never
acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent,
since it never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither
of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were
deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have
qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to
the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its
claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the
loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s
"dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented. 18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner

Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of
₱16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had
occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of
the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a
fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention
was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no
such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used
in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which
the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is
no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature
delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance
to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death
benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of
"death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be
equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this
light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is
for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point. 20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. 21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with
juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites
for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the
death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to
prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define
the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the
CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the
general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by
death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and
born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. 1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him
to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his
unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the
CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of
a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29 In the same way, the CBA
and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor
Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that
"when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same
must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight
of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and
justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
9. G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I.
Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made
in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed
a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her
to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the
motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed
to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that
the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS
DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being
bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being
inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground
of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they
were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard
is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity
or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to
every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the
contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true
that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding
that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood,
and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration,
the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage
for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter
into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence
of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial
or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to
fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as
a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real
and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but
for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
1âwphi1
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if
it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to
live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause
for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by
the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already
misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to
again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
10. G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging
1
the April 3, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed
2
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry
3
each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest,
to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that
they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests. 4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
performing an illegal marriage ceremony. 5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary
Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their
wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the petitioner instructing the
6
principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to
her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony
that they take each other as husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
8
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was
given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law. 10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed
on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of
giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife. It further ruled that in performing a marriage
11
ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44
of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter
law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00. 12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of
the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired.
It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence
than the petitioner’s negative statements. The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should
13
be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must
appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age. According to the
14
CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350
of the same Code. 16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the
Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities
such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming
that a marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and
Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take
each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing
which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. The
17
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Second, under the principle of
18
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony." 19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes
of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as
amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against him. 21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not
covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions
nor a regulation promulgated thereafter. 22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by
the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority
of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to
be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of
an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and
what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these
matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was
23
copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family
24 25
Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they
take each other as husband and wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code
26 27
and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear
that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However,
as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that
they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact
was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to
persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position
taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely
register this bars it from belatedly invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding
the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the
declaration by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces
of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary
Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State
precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the
petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital
rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
29
social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this
end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of
marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may
view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article
3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony
was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of
a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential
and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore,
was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of
good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal
liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been
conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the
petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The
penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without
being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing
marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or
parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or
minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that
the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of
the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case. As correctly
1âwphi1
found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the
Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3,
2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.
11. Imbong V. Ochoa, Jr., 721 Scra 146 (2014)
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed
country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While
governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning
dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member
of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose,
that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and
policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully
implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan
dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental
body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate.
Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty
to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society
together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the
subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television
debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
2 3
by members of the clergy - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
4
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce,
the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
5
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on
behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition, filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
6
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche and several others in their personal
7 8
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
9
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
10
Inc., Rosevale Foundation, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and

11 12
several others, in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

13
(5) Petition, filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
14
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
15
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
16
(Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians
17
Inc., and several others in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
18 19
(8) Petition, filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, in their capacities as
20 21
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C.
22
Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of
those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the
Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc. and
23 24
several others, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
25
who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., Attys. Ramon
26 27
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
28
others, in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

29
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
30
several others, in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

31
(14) Petition for Prohibition filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in
32
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen

33
and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention, filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited

34
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would
authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables
which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives
which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH
Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public
funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for
purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional
mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs
and convictions. 38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR), provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,
39
Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health
physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue
that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest
test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the
petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to
be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of
PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail
of the practitioners services. 44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH
Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management
47
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their
own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way
of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution.
It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.
49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same
breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.

The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI
of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government
Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention
in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents, Congressman Edcel C.
55
Lagman, former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan,
56
and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), Ana
57 58
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, and Atty. Joan De Venecia also filed their respective Comments-in-
59 60
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano
was also granted leave to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status
Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a
period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these
issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13,
and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered
extended until further orders of the Court.
63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60)
days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the
parties.
64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted
R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."
65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921, approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing
66
of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was

provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing
conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which
recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term
economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to
mitigate population growth. Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August
67
16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on
Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a
broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space
or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential
Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a
68
part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health
care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino
citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from
being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health. Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely
69
choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. Thus, on 70
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for
women, including family planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of
the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. The executive and
72
the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH
Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education.
To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current
laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence
of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to
the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained." It explains:
73
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners
find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the
entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas
of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest
extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of
family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread
dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized
and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to
the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of
the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" and "characterized by an
75
inordinate amount of transparency." The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
76
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress. It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
77
Terrorism Council, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper
78
to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.

79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet
to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due
respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To
be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. 81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines; (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; and
82 83
(c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the
84
allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers
which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the
Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution. 86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In
87
order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a
co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it
to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether
the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
88
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of

discretion results. The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
89
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny,
be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they
have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has
no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1
90
of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara, the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition
91
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in
Macalintal v. COMELEC, Aldaba v. COMELEC, Magallona v. Ermita, and countless others. In
92 93 94
Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of
powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of
the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority
to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case. 96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or
controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They claim that the questions raised
97
by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been
adversely affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
98
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
99
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite

and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A 101
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, where the
103
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-

AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being
not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render
the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is
ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom
106
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
107
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
108
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The
109
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our
110
Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these
petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It
contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and the government has yet to distribute
111
reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
113
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one
from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing. 115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount
117
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and
118
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-
applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement.
It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material
interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance
is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on
more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not
have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski
v. PAGCOR: 119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the
issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is
in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the
bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion
and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away
before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her
child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are
120
praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section
26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them,
122
being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control
measure. 123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
124
interrelated as they are inseparable. 125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full
range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or
modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in
the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A
large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access
to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. Indeed, remove the
126
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
127
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive
tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where,
as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education
and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act." 129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which
bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under
its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the
public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child
under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH
Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection
to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the
State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the
assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that
the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and
supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not
be used for abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate
the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care
services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public. 134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to
various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in
the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination
and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive. 135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of
the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law
specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized
ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life. 137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is
not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing
rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male
138
vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the
139
country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however,
the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and
the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or
"The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna
Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely
141
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the
Court could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of
Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact
that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization"
of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
142
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second,
because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in
whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to
prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation
of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like
its parents.
145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under
normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, it was written:
147
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of
the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the
148
State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to,
or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding
the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it
clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is
alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins
doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it
multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are
vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from
the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A
chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized
ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is
human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before
with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we
want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it
was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a
Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's
own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define
life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is
now determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of
the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed
already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the
sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-
called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred,
the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach
the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives
should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and,
therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now
proposed, they are already considered abortifacient. 154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized
that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress
from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of
whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the
courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed
an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I
would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the
world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised
some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner
Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception"
we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no
unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such
as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking
route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of
these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing
here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing,
and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be
the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical schools in
161
the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization
with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after
the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization
(conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of
a human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although
163
life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary

circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a
genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the
Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its
strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human
life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new
lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and
human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point
along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be
posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life
of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This
conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical,
moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is
that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and
165
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." Citing a
166
letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized
ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does
not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation
168
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To
adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device
that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and
further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion.
It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception,
explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress
or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court. 169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that
the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As
pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the
law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal
Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and
supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-
related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and
personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to
make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have
the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential
decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation
contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392,
otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with
the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any
drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to
that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any
drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean
at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare
either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest.
Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life,
and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it
reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the
RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization,
not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained
but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized
ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an
abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product
and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty
as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the
contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition
that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the
second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other
forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their
office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis
supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as

"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they
pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR must be
173
struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed
ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.
There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears
to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect
is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives
which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives
cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that
do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but
also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary
effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners
176
posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use
oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is
decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of
combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk
of myocardial infarction. Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under
177
Sections 4(p) and (w) of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks
178 179
to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it
being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the
OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women. 181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's
health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation,
self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the
provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila
182
Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:

183
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when,
or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No.
184
5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are
dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained. 185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements
are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman
that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since
the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards
to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed
and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other
Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with
the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or
otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless
such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company
and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished
with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or
more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or
drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or
hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes,
the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. [Emphases in the
186
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which
provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure,
distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The
DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this
procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among
others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their
children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by
Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.
187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available
to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the
attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must
first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by
the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from
the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first
be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of
contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital
chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the
spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."
188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3)
the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is
afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously
object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers
involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public
schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize. 191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to
refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those
objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will
violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that
they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive
effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person
seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion
as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public. 193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It
does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable
human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to
religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being
threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend
family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They
claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if
it contravenes their religious beliefs. As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
195
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode
or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any
religion or belief. They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by
196
providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child
health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the
Constitution, and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others
197
of their right to reproductive health. They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee
198
informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against
his free will. 199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right
they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. In other words, by seeking the
200
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize
only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.
201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer
-and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the
health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely
exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is
limited in duration, location and impact. 203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information
they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention
of the State. 204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the
only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys
on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout
the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in
planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people
of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote
the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity,
the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in
so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the
205
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach
into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was,
thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally, the
1âwphi1
State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers
to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the
State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in
Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
206
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from
207
unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. Explaining the concept of
208
religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union wrote:
209
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or
the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but
also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It
has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may
be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct.
1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its
purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes.
They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest
terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties
for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion
clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence
individual religious beliefs and practices.
210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of
religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's
belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education: 211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought.
So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe
in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom
of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.
212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be
enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."
213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the
doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor,
(Escritor) where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
214
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution." In the same
215
case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose
of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion." "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
216
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."
217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
218
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. In Escritor, it was written:
219
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first
case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and
present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine
that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag
then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case
of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as
this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and
German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of
society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by
Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni
Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were
appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German
doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality
approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where
conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A
test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate
or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of
Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an
acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing
of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise
would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty
while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test
used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the
"compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect
the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief.
For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which
are outside the province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
220
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his
religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting
religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to
equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right
to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family
which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical
research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern
natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the
needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their
religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's

organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial
to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs
will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to
determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according
to their own family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)]
(Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To
some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema.
Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion,
it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay
his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and
State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things
that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects
diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be
reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that
a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services
under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based
on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to
religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of
an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption
from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom
has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious
belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will,
refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the
basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false
compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that
they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot
do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech,
it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be
silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be
afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply
being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and
the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice
223
through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.
224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand,
and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number
and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, that the midwives claiming to
225
be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions. The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
226
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they
could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the
RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the
freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service
providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary it
228
was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to
be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a
law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs
of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection
clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The
protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to
believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of
human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious
sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other
candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such
concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and
freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law
itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned
RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious
convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have
read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected
the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it
says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of
hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules,
cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree
with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the
subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof
that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the
curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The
Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is
an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free
exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and
their patients.
231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of
the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom.
If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act
or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to
act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief. 233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the
mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether
she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who
object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on
reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to
religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means. Other
234
than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of
referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious
freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the
State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive
health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is
forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard
of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and
programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of
women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services,
due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood,
and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and
infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services
without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually

transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical
cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims
and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to

ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women

and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted
through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors
with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated
aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the
following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and
the development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest
was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives
changed, x x x." He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from
235
reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino
maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, although there was still no RH
236
Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal
deaths constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for
Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on
religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the
right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a
mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested:
"the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally
obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the
life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles
are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore,
unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted
against the child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the
child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
239
license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A
cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at
all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning
methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they
find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention
of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of
the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity
and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a
parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following
instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision
of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy
which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and
the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the
Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section
3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute
authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the
population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family
because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision
whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as
one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right.
Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to
it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their
children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the
absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and
such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, where
243
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection." Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
244
Connecticut, where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

245
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than
our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a
criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy
of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or
artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning
without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with
regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off
just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance
of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family.
It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government." In this regard, Commissioner Bernas
247
wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State. [Emphases supplied]
248
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their
minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very
purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-
held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State
affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation
of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only
a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph
of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be
made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services,
on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception
in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and
that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to
protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable
a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health,
access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has
already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack
of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be struck down. By effectively
249
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the
parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if
they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. Citing various studies
250
conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that
the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the
aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the
content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether
they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance
on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing
the youth and their important role in nation building. Considering that Section 14 provides not only
253
for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy;
physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights;
responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule
10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among
adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education
program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school
officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious
beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners'
contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit. 254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in
the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground
that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case
be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service
provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health
care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It
is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information
under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
255
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to
other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service
provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly
licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for
health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from
illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing
care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker
who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who
voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to
function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they
are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to
render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be
exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as
follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or
with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or
propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means
257
with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
258
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that
health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health,
their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves
no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with
the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the law.
259 260
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept
261
of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It
"requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."
"The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue
or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It
is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members,
as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude"
those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the
people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law
admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1)
explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the
assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a
truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive
health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of
those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial
distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation
requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours
of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have
the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out
that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners
with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions
263
or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety;
and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. A reading of the
265
assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and nongovernment
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation
with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of
health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all.
Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also
the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall
be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations
issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products
standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of
container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations
regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug
outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of
appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,

retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any
incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death,
serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health
products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for
sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found
to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to
be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all
concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance
of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to
enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of
the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
267
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature
cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may
not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code.
Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to
them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on
the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services. Thus:
268
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders,
and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this
Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services.
[Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU
is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act,
even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A
269
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of
health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
271 272
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
273
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH
Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by
the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally
applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner
Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the
policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which
can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation
that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM,
the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium
et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. Except for the
274
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that the Court
276
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is
the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
277
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the
278
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not
allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive
healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious
freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to
achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be
allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough
room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that
peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it
seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said
that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of
wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European
and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with
ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their
economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them
invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their
programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino
Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would
happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the
law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or
what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look
into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a
particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and
mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must
confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the
prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the
Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No.
6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna
Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the
same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning
method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No.
10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated
July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been
herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing
the Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner’s appeal and affirming the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for
annulment of marriage.
The antecedent facts are:
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage
license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.
Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. 4They got married on the same
day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the
San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988,
they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be
issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract5 and its entry on file.6
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner’s representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to
another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. 7 Petitioner has a mistress with
whom he has three children. 8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays
that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as
follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties’
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the
Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that
there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered
as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face
of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the
ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and
dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. 15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila
City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. 21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182
was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion
is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of
a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar
that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between
the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in
that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the
parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8,
1982.
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. 27 The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 31
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. 34
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.
lavvphi1
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner’s testimony as follows—
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de
Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don’t remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don’t
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already
a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place
at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the
officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has
fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. 38
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with
another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous
of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to
be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers
himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert’s
position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution
of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases,
the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van
Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse]
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her
to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in
a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides
the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the
foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves
as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by
its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry
of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature,
not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in
which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status
of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The
law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally
out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition
of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. 3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." 10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case." 20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x." 26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
15. A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 February 24, 2014
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ]
REX M. TUPAL, Complainant, vs. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a complaint against Judge Remegio V.
Rojo for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross ignorance of the law. 1
Judge Remegio V. Rojo presides Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. Judge Rojo allegedly solemnized marriages without the required marriage license. He
instead notarized affidavits of cohabitation and issued them to the contracting parties. He notarized
2 3
these affidavits on the day of the parties’ marriage. These "package marriages" are allegedly
4
common in Bacolod City. 5
Rex annexed to his complaint-affidavit nine affidavits of cohabitation all notarized by Judge Rojo. All
affidavits were notarized on the day of the contracting parties’ marriages. The affidavits contained
6
the following jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this [date] at Bacolod City, Philippines.
(sgd.)
HON. REMEGIO V. ROJO
Judge 7
For notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized, Judge Rojo
allegedly violated Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1-90 allows municipal trial
8
court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their
official functions and duties. Rex argues that affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a
judge’s official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. Thus, Judge Rojo cannot notarize ex
9
officio affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage he solemnized.
Also, according to Rex, Judge Rojo allegedly violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Judge
Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without affixing his judicial seal on the affidavits. He also did
not require the parties to present their competent pieces of evidence of identity as required by law.
These omissions allegedly constituted gross ignorance of the law as notarial rules "[are] x x x simple
and elementary to ignore." 10
Judge Rojo commented on the complaint. He argued that Rex was only harassing him. Rex is the
11
father of Frialyn Tupal. Frialyn has a pending perjury case in Branch 5 for allegedly making false
statements in her affidavit of cohabitation. Rex only filed a complaint against Judge Rojo to delay
Frialyn’s case.12
Judge Rojo did not deny notarizing the affidavits of cohabitation. He argued that notarizing affidavits
of cohabitation was connected with his official functions and duties as a judge. The Guidelines on
13
the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary does not prohibit judges from
14
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize. Thus, Judge
15
Rojo did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also argued that he did not violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He is a judge,
not a notary public. Thus, he was not required to affix a notarial seal on the affidavits he notarized. 16
Also, Judge Rojo argued that he need not notarize the affidavits with the parties presenting their
competent pieces of evidence of identity. Since he interviewed the parties as to the contents of their
affidavits, he personally knew them to be the same persons who executed the affidavit. The parties’
17
identities are "unquestionable."18
Judge Rojo alleged that other judges in Bacolod City and Talisay City also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation of parties whose marriage they solemnized. He pleaded "not to make him [complainant
19
Tupal’s] doormat, punching bag and chopping block" since other judges also notarized affidavits of
20
cohabitation.
In its report dated July 30, 2013, the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge Rojo violated
Circular No. 1-90. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Rojo be fined
₱9,000.00 and sternly warned that repeating the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator ruled that affidavits of cohabitation are documents not
connected with municipal trial court judges’ official functions and duties. Under the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, a judge’s duty is to personally examine
21
the allegations in the affidavit of cohabitation before performing the marriage ceremony. Nothing in
22
the Guidelines authorizes judges to notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they
will solemnize.
Since Judge Rojo notarized without authority nine affidavits of cohabitation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended a fine of ₱1,000.00 per affidavit of cohabitation notarized. 23
The issue is whether Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law.
This court finds Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries public. However, they
may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may notarize documents, contracts, and other
conveyances only in the exercise of their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated
February 26, 1990 provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are empowered to
perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this
power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization of documents
connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties x x x. They may not, as notaries
public ex officio, undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts
and other acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial
activities in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from
engaging in the private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
They may also act as notaries public ex officio only if lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their
courts’ territorial jurisdiction. They must certify as to the lack of lawyers or notaries public when
notarizing documents ex officio:
However, the Court, taking judicial notice of the fact that there are still municipalities which have
neither lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or
circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex officio, perform
any act within the competency of a regular notary public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged
be for the account of the Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer (Lapena, Jr. vs.
Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and, (2) certification be made in
the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit.
24
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the
exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of
cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial
jurisdiction. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview the contracting
parties and examine the requirements they submitted. The parties must have complied with all the
25
essential and formal requisites of marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license. 26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and
none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage. Before performing the marriage ceremony,
27
the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented. 28
If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no
legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement. Instead, the
29
parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of
30
cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other. The judge must also execute a sworn
31
statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage. Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
32
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also
provides:
Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal
ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the
solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their
qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of
having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal
impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a)
and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,
the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who
will solemnize the parties’ marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine
whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to
marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.
Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and
duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to
examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of
cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing
the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of
cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite
the irregularity or false allegation.
Thus, judges cannot notarize the affidavits of cohabitation of the parties whose marriage they will
solemnize. Affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with their official function and
duty to solemnize marriages.
Judge Rojo admitted that he notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties "on the same day [he
solemnized their marriages]." He notarized documents not connected with his official function and
33
duty to solemnize marriages. Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the
Judiciary does not expressly prohibit judges from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation. Thus, he
cannot be prohibited from notarizing affidavits of cohabitation.
To accept Judge Rojo’s argument will render the solemnizing officer’s duties to examine the affidavit
of cohabitation and to issue a sworn statement that the requirements have been complied with
redundant. As discussed, a judge cannot objectively examine a document he himself notarized.
Article 34 of the Family Code and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary assume that "the person authorized by law to administer oaths" who notarizes the
affidavit of cohabitation and the "solemnizing officer" who performs the marriage ceremony are two
different persons.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90 only prohibits municipal trial court judges from notarizing
"private documents x x x [bearing] no direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges." Since a marriage license is a public document, its "counterpart," the affidavit of
34
cohabitation, is also a public document. Thus, when he notarizes an affidavit of cohabitation, he

notarizes a public document. He did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
An affidavit of cohabitation remains a private document until notarized. Notarization converts a

private document into a public document, "[rendering the document] admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity." The affidavit of cohabitation, even if it serves a "public purpose,"
35
remains a private document until notarized.

Thus, when Judge Rojo notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he notarized nine private documents.
As discussed, affidavits of cohabitation are not connected with a judge’s official duty to solemnize
marriages. Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo argued that Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is to "eliminate competition between judges and
private lawyers in transacting legal conveyancing business." He cited Borre v. Judge Moya where
36 37
this court found City Judge Arcilla guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90 for notarizing a deed of sale.
Judge Rojo argued that when he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation, he did "not compete with
private law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business." Thus, he
38
did not violate Circular No. 1-90.
In Borre, Judge Arcilla notarized a deed of sale. This is the context in which this court stated that
"[judges] should not compete with private [lawyers] or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business." 39
At any rate, Circular No. 1-90’s purpose is not limited to documents used to transact "legal
conveyancing business." So long as a judge notarizes a document not connected with his official
functions and duties, he violates Circular No. 1-90.
Thus, in Mayor Quiñones v. Judge Lopez, Jr., this court fined Judge Lopez for notarizing a
40
certificate of candidacy. In Ellert v. Judge Galapon, Jr., this court fined Judge Galapon for notarizing
41
the verification page of an answer filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The documents involved in these cases were not used to transact "legal conveyancing business."
Nevertheless, this court found Judge Lopez and Judge Galapon guilty of violating Circular No. 1-90.
Since Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were not connected with his official
function and duty to solemnize marriages, he violated Circular No. 1-90.
Also, Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public
are lacking in Bacolod City. Failure to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in the
municipality or circuit of the judge’s court constitutes violation of Circular No. 1-90.
42
That other judges have notarized affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriages they
solemnized does not make the practice legal. Violations of laws are not excused by practice to the
contrary.43
All told, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section 2, paragraph (b) of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary public from notarizing documents if the
signatory is not personally known to him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to
present a competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. – x x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before the notary public is
the signatory to the instrument or document to be notarized. If the notary public does not personally
know the signatory, he must require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated that the parties
subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo did not state that the parties were
personally known to him or that the parties presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Judge Rojo argued that he personally knew the parties to the affidavits of cohabitation. They
personally appeared before him to subscribe to their affidavits of cohabitation. He also interviewed
them on their qualifications to contract marriage. Thus, the parties to the affidavit of cohabitation
need not present their competent pieces of evidence of identity. 44
That the parties appeared before Judge Rojo and that he interviewed them do not make the parties
personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with
them. Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary
45
public.
For violating Circular No. 1-90 and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice nine times, Judge Rojo is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo argued that he notarized the affidavits of cohabitation in good faith. He cited Santos v.
Judge How where this court held that "[g]ood faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
46
improper considerations x x x" were defenses against gross ignorance of the law charges. His good
47
faith in notarizing affidavits of cohabitation should not hold him administratively liable.
However, this court also held in Santos that "good faith in situations of fallible discretion [inheres]
only within the parameters of tolerable judgment x x x." Good faith "does not apply where the issues
48
are so simple and the applicable legal principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins
of error." 49
Circular No. 1-90 requires judges to certify that lawyers or notaries public are lacking in their courts’
territorial jurisdiction before notarizing documents. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice requires
notaries public to personally know the signatory to the document they will notarize or require the
signatory to present a competent evidence of identity. These are basic legal principles and
procedure Judge Rojo violated. Failure to comply with these basic requirements nine times is not
good faith.
Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct on integrity, "[j]udges shall ensure that not only is their
50
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer." If 51
the law involved is basic, ignorance constitutes "lack of integrity." Violating basic legal principles
52
and procedure nine times is gross ignorance of the law.
This court may impose the following sanctions for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it being a
serious charge: 53
a. dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations; 54
b. suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
55
c. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. 56
This court does not condone violations of law. Judges have been dismissed from the service for
gross ignorance of the law. However, Judge Rojo may have been misled by other judges’ practice of
notarizing affidavits of cohabitation in Bacolod City and Talisay City. Thus, this court finds
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for six (6) months sufficient sanction.
Trial court judges are advised to strictly comply with the requirements of the law. They should act
1âwphi1
with caution with respect to affidavits of cohabitation. Similar breach of the ethical requirements as in
this case will be dealt with strictly.
WHEREFORE, Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 5, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental is SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE without salary and other
benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS. His suspension is effective upon service on him of a copy of this
resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to all municipal trial courts in Bacolod City and Talisay City.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot
(Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and
Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The
marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2 In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa
executed a sworn affidavit,3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the
age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn
affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his
consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to
Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisa’s house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany
her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi
Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces
of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package
could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that
his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in
February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw
a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he perused the same, he
discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter
feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.
She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage
in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their
age difference.5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting,
the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint
against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one
year without emolument.7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this
Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose
and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose’s version of the story as implausible, and
rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank
sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at
Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for
the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the
fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he
signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose’s] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisa’s] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities
he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to
be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse
because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name
of his sister.
When [Jose’s] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996)
and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of
his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa
Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose’s action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711
of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud,
trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the
earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision
dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive
portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614 of the Civil
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of
Appeals struck down Jose’s appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent
to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of
the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a
party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4)
years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until
February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7,
1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616 of the
Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between
man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of
Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing
that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court
of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the
affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Jose’s argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617 of the Civil Code
did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officer’s church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718 of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties’ marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof.1avvphi1 His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case
at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that
the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose’s Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Niñal v. Bayadog,20
and reasoned that:
In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license
on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court
ruled as follows:
"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the
date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the
same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no
exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are
about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa’s motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals’ Amended
Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate court’s Amended Decision. On 1 August
2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to
wit:
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO

FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO
PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICEN[S]E.24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Niñal.25 She differentiates
the case at bar from Niñal by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only
sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had
been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling
on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a
valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court’s ruling in Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals.26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and
Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republic’s position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether
the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as
husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties’ marriage
contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose’s notarized Statement
of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa’s name as his wife; (2) Certification
dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose’s company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisa’s name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit
under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 5827 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by
the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.28
Article 80(3)29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law,31 whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising
Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death
during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,33 (3) ratification of marital
cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications
of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a
marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing
their status.36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license.
In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that
being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because
of this union, they desire to marry each other."37 One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus:
whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly38 but reasonably construed.39 They extend only so far as their language
fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.40 Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail
the former or add to the latter by implication.41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua
non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law
as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil
Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No
other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite
of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the
law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to
mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts42 in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.44 The
appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
falsehood of the alleged facts.46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s
review.47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual
findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt
them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit
will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with.
The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and
Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa
meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners’ reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with
reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.49 Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.50 The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code51 that every intendment of law or fact leans towards
the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage
license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or
could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.52 The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.53 To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal
measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is
not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required
by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license,
and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a
mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose
should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration
of nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing
the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31
August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.56 Jose and Felisa’s marriage was
celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In
this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot
void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
17. G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166,2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2)
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September
1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license
had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C.
Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes
and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since
the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband
and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when
the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation,
as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent,
saying that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated
7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of
the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the
trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it
that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon
petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the
instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation
of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily
entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March
1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals.9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the
absence of a marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support
and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner
argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several
authorities,11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus,
there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same
evidence and parties would be presented would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be
time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner
claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s
paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate
court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony,
petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters.
Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly
objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support.
Citing the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid
marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that
the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and
that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held
that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid. 17 In addition, the OSG agrees with
the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to
support.18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and
second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority
to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an
affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. 24 However, respondent
herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination,
thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife
for the last five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for
a marriage license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact,
there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they
could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. 27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on

November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by
the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his
testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were
sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go
to a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant
which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent
claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of
the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-1" and
"D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3").
In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is
seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
18. G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative
husband escaped the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June
1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos
on 29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to
remarry, she should choose someone who was "without responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She
also averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven
valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage was void due to the lack of a
marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which
occasions the former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and
averred that she met Galang only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married
Santos.
THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his
marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced
herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative
defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it was incredible for
a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without
a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission
that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court
convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for
having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an
exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner
asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for five years prior to their
marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their marriage
null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to
pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The
best support to her argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their
marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of
the previous marriage of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise
disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply
stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in question.
Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she
was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a
marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt
from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and
wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or
only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits
that their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument
that the instant Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's
subsequent marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage,
respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports the conclusion of the courts a quo
that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated
on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it
not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16
instructs that she should have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17
likewise states that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage
constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of bigamy, which makes her responsible as
an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other
while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the
circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused
could she be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang.
Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the
following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness
compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R
TC, less so in the present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity
to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly
charged with bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of
prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted
in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an
eminent authority in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly
consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice
in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the
criminal participation of petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a duration of six months and one day to
six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in
its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum
term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one
month and one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of
the marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial
proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner has consistently27 questioned below the validity
of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a
marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass
judgment on the validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack
her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that
an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to
correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place
without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate
of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The
provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and
that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the
prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior
to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was residing in the house of her in-
laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On cross examination, respondent
did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who
sold her piglets.36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only
less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years
prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the
records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the
Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented
that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other. Unfortunately,
subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an
anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of
(1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not satisfied the
cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage
contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an
effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's
deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between
spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal
laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in
the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the
sanctity of marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded."
41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive
law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants shall be denied relief on the
ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy,
is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as
elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that
they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against
illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that they had not yet complied
with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be
the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal
conviction.
The applicability of People v. De Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground
that the second marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when
Domingo de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar
had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one
day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a
second marriage. In contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and
petitioner later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our
treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.
No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims
and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court
affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision correctional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

LOLITA D. ENRICO, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI, REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. ARTICULO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assails the
Order,1 dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil
Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration of its Order, 2 dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating
respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio) and Trinidad
Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of
Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. 3 They begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. 4 On 1
May 2004, Trinidad died.5 On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor
of Lal-lo, Cagayan.6 Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away. 7
In impugning petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 348 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because
they could not have lived together under the circumstances required by said provision. Respondents
posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latter’s death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony
due to Eulogio’s serious illness which made its performance impossible.
In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a
marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed
Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further contended that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground
that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,9 granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of
cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,10 dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme
Court En Banc as basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
The Complaint should be dismissed.
1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on
March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)11 that a petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a
Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and
simple which states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The rule is
clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is
exclusive and this right solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse
cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
void.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs
de officio. 13
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by petitioner of her
Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order14 dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of
11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed
Order ignored the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog, 15 which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of
a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, applies only where
both parties to a void marriage are still living.16 Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC
held that the heirs may file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its
stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000)
in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The Order subject of this motion for
reconsideration held that the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the
Supreme Court has rejected the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife who is (sic) the only parties
allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely personal
and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.
It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and Section
2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Niñal vs. Bayadog and the
Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the
legitimate heirs of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with
respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an
inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of the parent, it would
be proper that it should solely be the parent who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his
marriage void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over
whatever property left by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive law.
The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.
If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by their parent, especially
when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such union because
the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage
will be given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the death
of the parent.
For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage is applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the
death of anyone of the guilty party to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the
(sic) marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It shall
be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable. 17
Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:
In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and
reinstate this case.18
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order; however, on 1 June
2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that no new matter was raised therein. 19
Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the sole question
of whether the case law as embodied in Niñal, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the
Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.
At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court, countenancing the
hierarchy of courts.
We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse
to this Court.20 Instead, they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of
last resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle of hierarchy of courts. 21However, it
cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction.22 Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its
failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case
grounded as it is on a pure question of law.
Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A contrario, respondents
posit that it is Niñal which is applicable, whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the
right to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.
We grant the Petition.
In reinstating respondents’ Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we
cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration.23 What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the
marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As
can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004. 1âwphi1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:
Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3
August 1988.24
Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to
reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Niñal, because they vary in scope
and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which
provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the
sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for
respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the
validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the latter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S.
VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE
CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of
money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of
Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand
Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd.
project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE,
point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by
Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate;
on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1,
by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el
SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla
a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto
de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW,
con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at
S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan
y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a
partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining
land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of
title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo
II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or
legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00
together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint
until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion
adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register
of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval
null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in
the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and
defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and
defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on
June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in
lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary
to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a
declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a
marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the
disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of
Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment
of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally
been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and
that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage
herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad
Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their
marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in
the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in
the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,

or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to
the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage
license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the
failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although
irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to
the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage
license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have
overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view
that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not
proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the
subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a
particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's
prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the
answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether
foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same
or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare
allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a
minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it
may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the
fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use
of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in
the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the
issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A
hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F
hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101
of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that
contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering
another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for
judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering
another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are
other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the
case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for
appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be

proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall
be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We

excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of
its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney
to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for
the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence.
(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable

Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 20 is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24 But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog, the Court held
that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved
that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and
void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00
and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved
that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same. 29 (Underscoring
supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives. 32 Conversely,
if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-
party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate
son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner
has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void
from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the
matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's
bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to
support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation
of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring
supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that
is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born
or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and
void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status
and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of

the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Civrev Cases 1-120

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Civrev Cases 1-120

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

1. G.R. No.

184823 October 6, 2010

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.,

Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA

4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation by the

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

Amount of Claimed Input VAT ₱ 3,891,123.82

Net Creditable Input VAT ₱ 3,850,103.45

Ruling of the CTA En Banc

We are not persuaded.

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. –

The petition has merit.

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax. –

SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected. –

Reckoning for prescriptive period under

MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid

The administrative claim was timely filed

There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of

2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998

6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998

7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998

8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998

9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999

10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999

19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999

20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999

22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

The filing of the judicial claim was premature

However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. –

2. G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014

The facts are simple and undisputed:

became final and executory on March 20, 2006. 17

According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved in this petition:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE

3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTITHE CASES WERE ONLY PROVISIONALLY

a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIMEBAR OF THEIR REVIVAL IS COMPUTED

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR IS THE BASIS FOR

The petition is unmeritorious.

Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., thus: 41

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003

4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003

5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003

6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004

7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004

8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004

9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004

10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004

This is to certify that MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT whose photograph and