Dunnja Larise Mafiotic State Structures

HUMSEC Journal, Issue 3
Corrupted Political Elites or Mafiotic State Structures? The Case of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Corrupted Political Elites or Mafiotic State

Structures? The Case of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina
Dunja Larise1
The current trial of Muhamed Ali Gashi2, a well-known figure in the Bosnian criminal milieu,
reveals once again the complex structure of criminal organizations in post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The political and economical interconnections of mafiotic and political
structures in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina seem to take the form of a “chain of
command” reaching into the most powerful political institutions of the state. They seem to
revolve around one of the ruling nationalist political parties: Stranka demokratske akcije
(SDA; Party of Democtaric Action).The connection between criminal organisations and
nationalist political parties and the infiltration of the fragile state apparatus by criminal
structures started in the years of the civil war3 1992 – 1995 and has continued to intensify in
the years following the Dayton Peace Agreement. Criminal activities were at this time
primarily connected to the transfer of arms and the abuse of humanitarian aid, which required
logistical support provided by the institutions of the state.4
During that time institutions like diplomatic missions, ministries, army, police and
courts were directly commanded from Sarajevo and were saturated by the players loyal to the
ruling national party, SDA, and above all loyal to its elites.
The expectations of the international community notwithstanding, these structures were
consolidated in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The nationalist political elites on all
1
Dunja Larise is political scientist and philosopher. She teaches political theory and international politics at the
Institute for Political Science in Vienna.
2
In a different trial, Muhamed Ali Gashi was sentenced to six months for assault. The trial for heading a
criminal enterprise is still ongoing.
3
There are still many disputes over the characterisation of the Bosnian War (1992-1995). They primarily
concern the debate over its characterisation as a “civil war” or as an “aggression”. This debate has a strong
political context, which cannot be dealt with within the scope of this contribution. The present author would
argue that that the Bosnian War of 1992-1995 began as an aggression of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic
against Bosnia and Herzegovina which occurred in a broader context of the wars following the dissolution of
former Yugoslavia. Through its course, however, a conflict between two sides developed into a civil war
involving more players than just two homogenous political or military parties. Let us recall the conflicts
between Muslims and Croats, Croats and Croats (between HVO (Hrvatsko vijece obrane) and HOS
(Hrvatske oruzane snage)) and Muslims and Muslims (between the 5th corps of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and forces fighting for the autonomy of Cazin Krajina, loyal to Fikret Abdic), as well as the
increase of war-lordism throughout the country. These developments make a designation of Bosnian War as
an aggression only, more than questionable, even deliberately inaccurate.
4
See: Fazlic, Mirsad, Tajna dvije i po miliarde: Dokazi o bosnjackim ratnim profiterima, Slobodna Bosna, 16. 11. 2007, and
Selimbegovic, Vildana, Ko je sve u lancu sverca oruzja u BiH, BH Dani, 131.
1
three sides strengthened their power in the regions controlled by the ethnic communities they
claimed to represent by establishing, first, their economic supremacy by transferring the
wealth accumulated throughout the war in more legal forms of businesses and,
simultaneously, outsourcing illegal business activities to a “classical mafia”. Second, they
built up their political legitimation in the eyes of the international community by formally
establishing the rule of law and, finally, they enforced the ideological hegemony of nationalist
rhetoric within the country. Most international protagonists dealing with West –Balkan
countries and, more specifically, with Bosnia and Herzegovina locate the problem of
organized crime in a weakness of the post-Dayton state and in a flourishing corruption,
paradigmatic for so called ‘states in transition’, but generally postulate a clear distinction
between criminal organizations operating in Bosnia (as well as outside of it) and the super-
structures of the Bosnian state.
I will argue, however, that in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina we deal with a
complex constellation in which political and criminal elites are identical This situation is the
result of a specific historical condition, which has directly impacted the organization of the
structures of the state. The emergence and the effects of this situation have not yet been
analysed sufficiently. This makes it necessary to inquire into the basic premises of state
theory.
The aim of this contribution is not to reveal or unfold any unknown facts or details
about criminal activities of specific political players in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The case
examples given below are widely known, have been publicly debated and covered by
different Bosnian print media. The aim of this short study, inspired by a ‘symptomatic
reading’ of the historical and current political, economic and ideological situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, is rather to raise the questions of the relationship between formal and
informal state structures. The research will focus on the way in which the rule of law,
guaranteed formally in the shape of apparently autonomous institutions of the state, can serve
as an institutional window dressing for the informal, and insufficiently researched parallel
structures of ruling by political-economical elites. The latter system ‘governs’ by relying
mainly on personal debt and personal loyalties of individuals, which constitute the abstract
entities we shall call “superstructures of the state”. These parallel structures5 are often
underrepresented in the political analysis.
I shall focus my analysis on the political party SDA, the ruling political party of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war 1992-1995, which still is one of the most
5
Under parallel structures in this particular case I understand informal structures.
2
powerful political players in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will focus at this party
for two reasons: First, because SDA was the hegemonial power block representing the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the international community during the first
four years of its existence as a sovereign state and, second, because its economical, political,
ideological, intelligence-related and diplomatic power structures and criminal alliances,
developed during this time, still play a considerable role in the superstructures of this state.
I. The Emergence of the Bosnian state: Politicians, Diplomats and

Warlords
The first multiparty parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, at that time still a
republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1990, resulted in the
hegemony of three ethnic parties: the Muslim SDA, the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS,
Serb Democratic Party) and the Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ; Croat democratic
party). In the capital Sarajevo, alone, these three ethnic-nationalist parties together won 75%
of the mandates, and, countrywide, around 85%. The distribution of the votes corresponded to
the ethnic pattern of domination throughout the electoral municipalities. In Sarajevo, a
traditionally ethnically mixed area, the distribution of the mandates of ethnic-national parties
corresponded to the ethnic groups: SDA won 30%, SDS 28% and HDZ 17% of the votes.
Some 20% of votes were won by the two parties of the reformed Socialist block, and 4% by
all other parties. For comparison, according to the last census of 1991, the municipality of
Sarajevo was inhabited by 43,47% Muslims, 31,21% Serbs, 17,38% Croats and 7,94%
others.6
The new presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of seven members, two less
than the former presidency. It was built out of the two members of each of the three dominant
ethnic groups and one of the others. The president of the presidency was to be elected for a
specific time period from among the members of the presidency. On 5 April 1992, Bosnia and
Herzegovina proclaimed its sovereignty from Yugoslavia. The Serb SDS, which was opposed
to this act of sovereignty, abandoned the collective presidency. Thereafter, Serb armed forces
began the military aggression by bombarding civilian targets and besieging the capital city of
Sarajevo. On 6 April 1992, SDA president Alija Izetbegovic issued the call for the general
mobilisation of the armed forces and war-related activities started in the rest of the Republic.
6
Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine: Demografija, Tematski bilten 02/2007, Sarajevo 2007.
3
Faced with this situation, the remaining members of the presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – located in the besieged Sarajevo with Alija Izetbegovic presiding – began to
work on three different lines: first, they developed vivid diplomatic activities aiming at the
international recognition of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well receiving
international aid; second, the organized the defence of the country and the production and
distribution of goods between the areas under control of the police forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina loyal to the presidency; third, they consolidated the internal power structures.
The last task proved to be the hardest, since the presidency itself was far away from
being homogenous and sharing common interests. Even less homogenous were the interests
of the different political blocks within Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time. The only
connection between SDA and HDZ, the two most powerful ethno-political blocks in the
remaining presidency, was the common enemy; but even this led to an alliance that was only
temporary. Alija Izebegovic did not hide his strategy to centralise the new state power in the
hands of his party, in which his absolute power was stabilized by the start of the war. The
beginning of the war consolidated his image and power within the Muslim ethnic group, with
the exception of the followers of his main rival from the early days of the SDA: Fikret Abdic
from Velika Kladusa in Western Bosnia. HDZ on the other hand, especially under its leader
Mate Boban and under the influence of the Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, concentrated
mainly to the defense of the dominantly Croat-inhabited regions of Herzegovina, following
the policy of the political division in three regions dominated by different ethnic groups. Their
military arm was the Hrvatsko vijece obrane (HVO; Croatian Defence Forces).
The Bosnian Croats oscillated between feeling left behind by the Herzegovina strands of
HDZ and their wishes for a region for themselves. They thus organized their self-defence
partly under the wing of HVO and partly under Hrvatske oruzane snage (HOS; Croatian
Armed Forces), a mixed Croat-Muslim army which, unlike HVO, recognised the ultimate
authority of President Alija Izetbegovic. He also commanded, since autumn 19927 estabished
Armija BiH (army of Bosnia and Herzegovina). At the beginning of the war it was still
constituted on multiethnic fundaments, developing through the course of the war into an
7
The exact date of the official constitution of Armija BiH is an issue of political controversy. Territorial defence
and special police forces gave the first organised military response to Serb aggression. The officials of
Armija BiH have a vested interest in claiming the earliest possible date for the constitution of the army as
well as its role as an early defender of the country. For those Armija BiH officials, who represent the position
of the SDA, Armija BiH was the only legitimate army in the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
SDA, with Alija Izetbegovic at its head, considered the HVO, which were organized at same time as the
Armija BiH by HDZ, as illegitimate because it was not under the President’s command. It has to be noted,
however, that the presidency was, by the summer of 1992, already abandoned by two other ruling national
parties of the ruling block, first the Serb SDS and then the Croat HDZ. This resulted in a serious lack of
legitimacy for what was left of the presidency.
4
overwhelmingly Muslim army. The political and military alliances from the early days of
1992, however, were very fragile and, as we are going to see, did not last long.
II. Diplomatic Activity

Throughout the war, being seen as the preservers and defenders of a multiethnic Bosnia and
Herzegovina from by the international community was of central importance for the SDA.
The international sympathies for the new state and its political leadership were directly
connected to their policy of a multicultural, multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the
beginning of the war Alija Izetbegovic and his cabinet played this role very successfully. The
first diplomatic missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the world were expressions of this
multiethnic image: the first ambassadors of the new republic were neither ethnical nor
politically bound to the ruling party. This situation changed rapidly, however, from the
beginning of 1993 onwards.
In a light of a common threat, Alija Izetbegovic consolidated his hold over the party,
which he now ruled uncontested and his personal power as a charismatic father of the Bosniak
nation8 over the territories under the control of the Armija BiH, thus marginalising every
other political organisation. The structure of the SDA developed into a firm pyramidal
hierarchy, the top of which consisted of Izetbegovic’s own family and of the members of the
families affiliated with him from the times of his engagement in the Organisation Mladi
Muslimani in the late 70s and early 80s.
The key personnel of diplomatic missions was increasingly made up of players whose
professional references were more than questionable, but whose loyalty to Izetbegovic clans
were beyond any doubt.
Two ambassadorial appointments from this time are especially interesting in light of our
subject: those for Zagreb and Vienna. These were the diplomatic missions through which the
money collected by the notorious Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) from different Arab
and/or Islamic countries and organizations for the help for Bosnia and Herzegovina was
transferred. The chief of TWRA and the person in charge for collecting and transferring
money to Bosnia and Herzegovina was Elfatih Hassanein, a member of the Sudanese ruling
party, the National Islamic Front. The money came mostly from Saudi Arabia, but also from
8
The name was officially adopted at the so called ‘Obnoviteljski sabor’, the renewal congress of Bosnian
Muslims, of 1993, at which the representatives of different Muslim secular and religious institutions agreed
to the official name ‘Bosniak’ for the Bosnian Muslim Nation, instead of just Muslim (with a majuscule M)
as being its official name in the former Yugoslavia since 1971.
5
different other Muslim countries, organisations and private persons among which the US
State Department suspected even Osama bin Laden.9
Besides Hassanein, TWRA was composed of Hasan Cengic, Irfan Ljevakovic, Husein
Zivalj and Dervis Djurdjevic. All but Irfan Ljevakovic, were the co-defendants with
Izetbegovic at the trial against the Mladi Muslimani Organisation of 1983. Most payments
required the approval of the five members, except amounts higher than $500.000 in which
case Izetbegovic himself had to give his approval. TWRA opened seven accounts in the
Austrian Erste Bank that very soon came under observation by Austrian authorities for
suspicions of money laundering.10 Haris Silajdjic was to give guarantees that the money
transferred through these accounts would only to be used in humanitarian purposes. This
guarantees turned out to be a lie, because almost half of the money was spent on the
acquisition of arms for the Armija BiH.11 No documentation exists in relation to the half of
the 350 million of dollars which have passed through the accounts of the Erste Bank. The
control over the money was under the jurisdiction of the commission appointed personally by
Alija Izetbegovic, with Hasan Cengic, at its head. At no time was the commission the subject
to any control form the part of the Bosnian presidency or any other form of public control.
The other diplomatic mission through which the TWRA money was channeled was the
Bosnian embassy in Zagreb, with Bisera Turkovic as the ambassador who was later to
become Bosnian Ambassador in the United States.
III. Organisation of Defence and Consolidation of Power from

Within
As already mentioned the organisation of the defence against the aggression of the Bosnian
Serb forces loyal to the SDS took different forms and shapes according to the local
circumstances. At the beginning of the war, the armed force loyal to the president of the
presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, was the largely multiethnic Armija BiH. This picture of the
Bosnian army was especially true for the capital Sarajevo.
9
See: Pomfret, John, Bosnia’s Muslim Dodged Embargo, Washington Post, 22 September 1996, at p. A01.
10
Pomfret, John, Bosnian Officials Involved in Arms Trade Tied to Radical States, The Washington Post, 22
September 1996; The Center for Peace in Balkan, Bosnia 1 Degree of Separation from Al-Qaeda, July 2003;
Dzafic, Nijaz, Sta sve veze SDA i Agenciju za pranje opljackanog novca, BH Dani, 1 October 1999.
11
Sheik al Hassanein himself falsified this statement of Haris Silajdzic. In his interview for Gazi-Husrefbeg
Magazin in 1994 he claimed that TWRA main objective in Bosnia was not humanitarian aid but financial
help in establishing an Islamic state. See: Schindler, John R., Unholy terror: Bosnia, Al-Quaida, and the Rise
of Global Jihad, Zenith Press, New York, 2007.
6
Throughout 1993 however, things began to change. The police, army, courts, leading
positions in the administration and finally also universities and cultural institutions were more
and more saturated with persons loyal to the party. These loyalties could be traced back to the
dramatic raise of career options that corresponded to the allegiance to the Party and to debts
for favours, which were important in light of the humanitarian catastrophe in the city.
During the four years of the war almost 80%12 of the pre-war inhabitants of Sarajevo left
the city, the overwhelming majority of which were Serbs and Croats, but also other minorities
as well as many Muslims. This tendency continued also after the war. The gap, which was
opened by this exodus, made it possible to re-appointment the majority of administrative
functions within civil and military institutions, which was done primarily according to certain
political loyalties. For the Muslim immigrants from other parts of the country that came to
Sarajevo during the war, the political affiliation with the SDA party meant the unique and
only opportunity of establishing their position in the power hierarchy of the new state.
The ideology of the SDA was based on patriotic sentiments of Bosniak nationalism with
additions from political Islam. The coherence between nationalist and religious aspects of the
ideology was ensured by the close relationship between Reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Ceric and the
Izetbegovic clan. Mustafa Ceric, one of the founding members of the SDA was installed as
Reis-ul-ulema, the head and spiritual leader of Muslim community in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with help of the SDA nationalists. From the beginning he vehemently opposed
political pluralism among Bosnian Muslims preaching the unity of SDA and Bosnian
Muslims.13 He presented SDA as the only nation-building force for Bosnian Muslims,
identifying patriotism itself with the allegiance to the SDA.
The raise of the Izetbegovic clans to the position of absolute power also met with some
resistance from Bosnian Muslims. The abovementioned fraction of Fikret Abdic was not the
only opposition to the Izetbegovic clan. The “purification” of the institutions of the state, did
not only concern other ethnicities (although they were first), but also all other civil and
12
As of now, no census of the post-war population of Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken place due to the refusal
of all national parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate the internal and
external displacement of the Bosnian population during and after the by using the data collected by Federal
Office of Statistic and other governmental, as well as non-governmental organizations. Sources include the
Report on the State of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina issued by the German Commission for
Justice and Peace, as well as police records. It is possible to estimate that in the city of Sarajevo, which does
not correspond to the post-Dayton canton of Sarajevo but the municipal unit comparable with the city of
Sarajevo from before the war, around 80% left. In 2003, the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina had 27%
less inhabitants than in 1991. The percentage internally displaced persons is estimated at 40%. The higher
number for Sarajevo, are primarily due to the dramatic humanitarian situation during the siege.
13
See: Hecimovic, Esad, Politischer Islam mit bosnischem Migrationshintergrund, in: Schmidinger, Thomas and
Dunja Larise, Zwischen Gottesstaat und Demokratie – Handbuch des politischen Islam, Deutike, Wien,
2008.
7
military functionaries who opposed the policies of the Izetbegovic clans or posed a threat to
their obscure financial transactions.
From mid-1992 onwards, the Izetbegovic clans worked at establishing parallel power
structures in the territories militarily controlled by Armija BiH. Towards the international
community and a broader public within the country, the SDA oligarchy did its best to sustain
the illusion of a multiethnic Presidency controlling the institutions of the state. In reality, the
Presidency had only formal, but no real power – neither over political decision-making nor
over the institutions of the state. As Nijaz Durakovic, at the time president of the Socijalno-
Demokratska Partija (SDP; Social Democratic Party) and one of five members of the
Presidency along with Mirko Pejanovic, Ivo Komsic, Tatjana Ljujic-Mijatovic and Stjepan
Kljujic, stated in an interview with the critical weekly journal Slobodna Bosna, the Presidency
did not have any influence over institutions of state nor did it have any relevant information
except mundane analytical reports and comments made during daily press releases. Only Alija
Izebegovic had the real information and precise analyses.14
The first step in establishing of parallel structures was the “purification” of police and
army personnel. In the autumn of 1992 the organisational board of the SDA accepted general
criteria to be applied informally for the selection of personnel working in the structures of the
institutions of the executive. The following four criteria were to play the decisive role: nation,
religion, party affiliation and martial status (one-national marriage). These criteria should
have been applied gradually and without official notification.15
During the war an intelligence agency was established as well as a unit for special tasks,
both under the direct control of Alija Izetbegovic. The Agencija za istrazivanje i
dokumentaciju (AID; Agency for Investigation and Documentation) consisted of the most
loyal Izetbegovic players, some of which were members of the former Yugoslav intelligence
agency Kontra obavjestajna sluzba (KOS; Counter-information Bureau). Its first head was
Bakir Alispahic who was, at the time, SDA minister of police, and later dismissed from this
position by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) under pressure by the USA, for his
involvement in the organisation of a terrorist camp Pogorelica. In connection with the same
activities, OHR also dismissed Hasan Cengic from his post as minister of defence. Alispahic’s
successor as AID chief was Kemal Ademovic. With regard to personnel, AID overlapped
with the special unit “Seve”, which was founded in Mai 1992 by Alija Delimustafic, another
14
See Delalic, Milena and Jelena Stamenkovic, Kako je Izetbegovic stitio kriminal I zlocin(c)e, Slobodna Bosna,
spec izd, 1999.
15
Ibid.
8
SDA minister of police who was convicted, after international pressure, on 19 February 2003
in Sarajevo, for kidnapping Kasim Bjelavac in Munich 1996 and sentenced to four years in
prison. The unit was under immediate command of Nedjad Ugljen, who was killed in 1996,
und whose murder was never solved. ‘Seve’ were tasked, inter alia, with executions of
political enemies within. One of the most famous cases was the attempted execution of Sefer
Halilovic in 1993, a general and commanding officer of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, during which his wife and brother in law were killed.16 Other prominent
activities of “Seve” during the war were sniper executions of political enemies in Sarajevo,
transfer of undocumented money and drug trafficking.17 After Munir Alibabic, the main
competitor of Bakir Alispahic for the seat of the chief of police, sent documentation about
‘Seve’ to the Presidency, he was accused of treason by Izetbegovic. This act nevertheless
forced Izetbegovic to appoint a commission to investigate the issue. He appointed Niaz
Durakovic, the chief of opposition, to lead this commission. Although Durakovic knew that
the commission he led had no chance for an independent work he accepted to lead it because,
as he put it, “If I were against Izebegovic then, I too would have been judged by a ‘Cetnik’
sniper”18. This alluded to the practise of executing political enemies of Izetbegovic by ‘Seve’
sniper activity. These incidents were never investigated, because in light of strong sniper
activity from Serb positions, it was easy to attribute killings to the enemy.
IV. Post-Dayton situation

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 21 November 1995 resulted in new political constellations:
Bosnia and Herzegovina became a state with two widely autonomous entities: the Muslim-
Croat Federation and the Republic of Srpska. The birth of the Muslim-Croat federation was a
very difficult one. The Croat part aimed at achieving the greatest political autonomy possible,
knowing that within such a federation they would be a significantly weaker part and
consequently be under the threat of being outvoted. The Bosnian Muslim part with Alija
Izetbegovic, which was in a position of power, tended to favour centralization, which fitted
their strategic position.
16
See: Halilovic, Semir, Drzavna tajna, Matica, Sarajevo, 2007.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid., in the original: “Da sam tada bio protiv Izetbegovica, presudio bi mi ‘cetnicki’ snajper.”
9
The compromises found between all (de facto) three units were very problematic and
they still have an inhibiting effect on the functioning of political decision-making in the
country.19
Now, more than 13 years after Dayton we do only not see radical improvement of the de
facto democratisation process of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but we are also faced with its
uncertain future – even more uncertain than at the time immediately following the DPA. The
reasons for that are multiple and will be elaborated elsewhere.
What is interesting for the purposes of this study is the form and structure of the
connection between organized crime and the superstructures of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The first post-war event, which brought this to light was the assassination of Nedjad
Ugljen. Ugljen was executed in 1996. At the time of his murder he was second in command
of the AID, after Kemal Ademovic,20 and special envoy for the cooperation with the ICTY in
relation to war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily the war crimes against civilians
committed by the Armija BiH in the besiged Sarajevo during the war.21 The case of Ugljen
was re-opened in 2003, as well as the related case of kidnapping and attempted murder of
Nedjad Herenda, one of the executors of the ‘Seve’ unit, who miraculously survived his own
execution. Herenda admitted having committed several executions, among others also the
unsuccessful assassination of Ismet Bajramovic, called Celo, the commander of the military
police of Armija BiH in Sarajevo and famous criminal boss after the war.22 Herenda was
kidnapped and prosecuted by Edin Garaplija, an AID official, who claimed to have acted
under orders. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Apart from him, no other person was
prosecuted in connection with the Herenda case. Nedjad Ugljen was executed a few months
after the Herenda case. The case of his murder was never resolved; or, rather, no person was
ever convicted for this murder.
The one to bring to light this case was no other than Ramiz Delalic, also called Celo, the
war commander of the 9th mountain brigade of the Armija BiH, another famous criminal boss
of post-war time. In an interview, he gave to Slobodna Bosna just a few days before he was
assassinated in July 2007, he said following:
“Given the fact that I did some things for Bakir Alispahic and Kemo Ademovic I
said: `If you need something I’m here!` Kemo sad that its still early for it, but he
19
This complex subject deserves a study of its own, for which not enough space is allowed here.
20
They both were, of course, high-ranked SDA members.
21
Until now, the SDA blocks parliamentary investigations concerning these war crimes.
22
Delalic, Kako je Izetbegovic stitio kriminal I zlocin(c)e, 1999.
10
repeated that Ugljen made a great problems to President Izetbegovic and to the
state, because he had given some papers to the tribunal in The Hague. He said
that these papers relate to the cases Grabovica23, Kazani24, as well as at the case
of the murders on the solders of JNA in the Dobrovoljacka street during their
retreat from the Second army district. So, according to his opinion all of this was
cooked by Nedjad Ugljen.”25
Responding to the question whether he was surprised by these words from Ademovic, Delalic
said: “I know these people, their mentality and the way they work […] I asked Kemo if the top
of the state is familiar with what he is suggesting me and he said: ‘Ramiz, it is!’.”26
Delalic additionally said that he didn’t assassin Ugljen, although he was thinking about
it.
Another prominent criminal case, that showed the structural unity of the mafiotic and
state structures, was the assassination of Jozo Leutar in October 1999. For the murder of the
Croat vice-minister of police, who was investigating connections between mafiotic structures
and Bosniak political elites in Sarajevo, was assassinate by a car bomb. The only person
accused of connections with the crime was his driver, who was himself heavily injured in the
explosion. The defense managed to get the driver off, but the case remained unsolved until
now.
The investigation ignored completely the statement given by Arman Jasarevic, a
criminal who confessed being a member of the criminal group, who executed Jozo Leutar.
Jasarevic first confessed made in front of International Police Task Force (IPTF) Operatives
Charlene Barton and Patrick Tully. He said that the group of which he was a member
conducted assassinations and kidnappings for ransom. He said he was afraid for his life,
because he was the most recent member of the group and had impression that he was to get
sacrificed. The other members of the group, according to Jasarevic, were very well known
criminals – among them Selver Lekic, the Sandzak-born war commander of Armija BiH for
Sarajevo who was assassinated in April 2007, and, the abovementioned Ismet Bajramovic
(Celo) who died in December 2008, officially from suicide.
Jasarevic stated that the murder was ordered by Bakir Izetbegovic for 500 000 German
Marks. To prove it, Bajramovic allegedly turned on the microphone on his cellular phone as
23
The case of war-crimes of Armija BiH on the Croat civilainas in Herzegovina.
24
The case of war-crimes of Armija BiH on the civilians in Sarajevo.
25
Fazlic, Mirsad and Senad Avdic: Kako smo ubili Nedjada Ugljena, intervju sa Ramizom Delalicem, Slobodna
Bosna 31, 14.08.2007.
26
Ibid.
11
he contacted Izetbegovic for confirm the order.27 He repeated his statement in front of the
SFOR investigators Mike Flanagan and Gary Yamashiroya. After that, Jasarevic was
investigated by the officials of the Federal Ministry of Police in Sarajevo – Mustafa
Hajdurovic and Ivo Sako. Although his identity was to be handled confidentially, it leaked out
few days after the investigation. Jasarevic refused police protection offered to him stating that
the police could not defend itself.28 The murder on Jozo Leutar was never solved, because the
investigators focused at the Leutar driver. After he was set free of charges the investigation
reached a dead end.
The political elites of both national parties from the war, SDA and HDZ, focused their
activities after the war primarily on the (formal and informal) economic sector, but foremost
on the process of ‘privatisation’ of public goods. In Bosnia this process was not subjected to
any public control, and took the form of robbery.
The smuggling of arms and drugs and human trafficking flourished unhindered. The
sporadic media scandals in which the direct involvement of the national political elites, key
politicians and high representatives of judicative or executive in the criminal activities met
with a lethargic and politically increasingly more disinterested public that was convinced that
voting would not change the situation.
Although the parliamentary power relations from 2006 onwards seem to change in favor
of new political parties, the political clans of the SDA party, still informally rules the
institutions of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina through the parallel structures
constructed during the war. The political elites of both nationalist parties, SDA and HDZ in
Western Herzegovina rule the country through the enormous financial and economical power
they acquired in the war, as well as in the process of the neoliberal privatisation of public
goods after it. The institutions of the executive were mostly affected by the construction of
parallel power structures during the war and immediately after. Those who are loyal to the
structures now have both: political influence and enormous economic power. Everybody in
Bosnia knows that some people in Bosnia are simply untouchable. This applies to both
entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The very difficult police reform supported by OHR is just one of the symptoms for the
resistance of the police structures to any kind of change of the status quo. The list of cases of
involvement of high-ranked police officials in the mafiotic activities, or simply in the
obstruction of every possible investigation against politically powerful criminals, and
27
Zoric, Tomislav, Iskazi Armana Jasarevica, Slobodna Dalmacija, 29.03.2002.
28
Ibid.
12
especially in obscuring their affiliations with politico-economic elites of the country is long.
One of the last examples for this was the arrest of Asim Fazlic, deputy chief of INTERPOL in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the accusation of misusing his position in the case of the
investigation of the murder of the key figures of the mafiotic milieu in Sarajevo. The process
stalled after few months due to lack of evidence.
The structures of the notorious AID found their way into the new established common
police structures by the reform pushed through by Ramo Maslesa, SDA Minister of Internal
Affairs in 2001 and himself one of the heads of AID. Through this reform, members of AID
structures also received primacy in building the organization of privatised security forces. The
most powerful private security companies in the Muslim dominated territories of the
Federation of BiH are in the hands of members of this organization.
The current process against Muhamed Ali Gashi, a criminal with strong connection to
Kosovo Albanian mafiotic circles, was made possible by middle ranked police officer Edin
Vranj, who arrested Gashi in spite of the permanent threats he was exposed to. It also revealed
that one of the closest friends of Bakir Izetbegovic, and one of the most trusted friends of
former president Alija Izetbegovic, Senad Sahinpasic,29 threatened police officer Vranj with
finding someone to rape his four year-old daughter if he testified against Gashi, without
having to face any personal consequences for this actions.
Senad Sahinpasic is a very well-known figure in European Interpol circles. The Federal
Court of Munich issued a warrant of arrest for Sahinpasic on 25 November 1993 in
connection with his activities related to international terrorism. Belgian Interpol issued
another warrant for the arrest of Sahinpasic for the murder on Juka Prazina in 1993, a famous
Sarajevo war commander and criminal whose was also mentioned in the Munich court’s
documents.30
In Sarajevo, no one seemed to have noticed the Interpol arrest warrant for Sahinpasic
(and many others) for years. This may be related to the activities for which Asim Fazlic, SDA
vice-director of Bosnian Interpol was arrested in February 2004. Beside other, he was accused
also for hiding Interpol warrants for the arrest of criminals loyal to the political elites for
years.31
29
At the funeral of Alija Izetbegovic at the cemetery Kovaci, the following people made up the first row around
Bakir Izetbegivc: Ramiz Delalic-Celo, Senad Sahinpasic, Taib Torlakovic and Muhamed Ali Gashi.
30
Bundesgerich München, Akt Nr. 114 Js 4074/93.
31
Avdic, Senad, Fazlic optuzen da je skrivao medjunarodne potjernice za bosanskim kriminalcima, Slobodna
Bosna 46, 5 February 2004.
13
In light of these events it is not at all surprising that not even one of the numerous
political murders in Bosnia after the war was ever solved, nor are they likely to be solved in
the future.
V. Conclusions
The histories and cases listed above are only symptoms of the complexity of the Bosnian
situation concerning the problem of the structures of organized crime, which are impossible to
distinguish, neither in structure nor at the level of individual players from the political,
economical and above all institutional superstructures of the Bosnian state. An analysis of the
specificity of the development of the Bosnian state after 1992 would allow a more
differentiated approach to the subject of organized crime in this part of Europe. In my study, I
concentrated only on a small fragment of this complex situation. Its profound analysis would
help us establish the theoretical apparatus for the analysis of post-modern state structures, for
which the apparatus developed for the analysis of the modern state is hopelessly insufficient.
We are used to seeing the state in the terms of modern states, and in fixed categories of
territories, state apparatus, political institutions etc. We are also used to seeing mafiotic
structures in forms and structures that correspond to a modern state. In reality, this picture has
changed in many states of the world in the last two decades. The borders between political,
economic and criminal organizations have shifted and are unrecognisable for the theoretical
apparatus of the political science which continues to be tuned to modern states. A profound
analysis of these developments may help us improve the theoretical framework.
14

Dunnja Larise Mafiotic State Structures

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HUMSEC Journal, Issue 3

Corrupted Political Elites or Mafiotic State

I. The Emergence of the Bosnian state: Politicians, Diplomats and

II. Diplomatic Activity

III. Organisation of Defence and Consolidation of Power from

IV. Post-Dayton situation

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