CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
Garcia 7 s 95
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997.
He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to
the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid
their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to
BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional
documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000.
CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC.
Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a
leap year, the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the
decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD:
Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative
Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable.
Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.
Aznar vs.
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he
resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to
1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered
himself as a citizen of California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under
Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to
the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must
be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On
the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of
the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply
internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs
and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion.
Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen
Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there
is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is
ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with
instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER, GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000
FACTS:
Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular
examination in Practice Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was
able to remove the incomplete mark when the Dean of his college approved his application
to take a removal examination.
In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for
the Decree of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and
Commencement Ceremonies, the plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the
investiture ceremonies and graduated.
On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the
pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred
a deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.
He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the
latter’s negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral
damages. On account of suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the
bar exam.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral
damages cannot be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock,
trauma, and pain.
Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he
should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those
appertaining to his academics, are in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his
failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements. While the Court held the University of the East negligent and therefore liable
for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for negligence thereby no
moral damages can be awarded in his favor.
The decision was affirmed with modification.
Wassmer vs. Velez 12 scra 648
Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez
left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother
opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in
default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual
damages P25, 000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2, 500 as attorney’s fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed,
thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this
case.
Held:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But
formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only
to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is
palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21
on the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and
exemplary damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly acted
in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
 But Carrascoso should still be liable under Article 32(6) which states “rights against
deprivation of property without due process of law”.
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. There was a violation of Cojuangco’s constitutional right even if done in good faith since no
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE writ for the sequestration of his racehorse winnings. Therefore, Cojuangco’s petition was
and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR. granted and Carrasco is obliged to pay nominal damages worth P/ 50,000.00.
G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999

FACTS:

Eduardo Cojuangco, a businessman and a sportsman, was the owner of several racehorces,
which he entered in the sweepstakes races from March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. The
said racehorses won first, second and third places which granted Cojuangco with prizes from
PCSO.

Cojuangco sent PCSO demand letters claiming the prizes but Carracoso replied stating that
he was advised by the PCGG to withhold the prizes in the mean time. The RTC held that
PCSO and Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since no writ of
sequestration was issued by the PCGG. The trial court also said that Carrascoso’s initiative of
not issuing the prizes were manifestations of Bad Faith. The Court of Appeals, however, held
that Carrascoso was merely carrying out the instructions of PCGG backed by the intention to
protect public interest. The appellate court said that Carrascoso was in good faith since he
replied to demand letters, he released the winnings upon PCGG’s advice nad he had no
objection to the partial execution.

ISSUE: Whether the award for damages against Carrascoso is warranted by evidence and
the law.

RULING:

The Court ruled that Carrascoso acted in good faith. Bad faith, to be recognized by court,
should be constituted by dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, and conscious doing of a
wrong.

The Court further stated that a public official shall not be liable by way of moral and
exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of their official duties unless there is
no clear showing of bad faith, malice and gross negligence.