ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary

This entry was posted in Bills must originate exclusively from Congress Constitutional
Law 1 Equal Protection Clause Legislative Branch undue delegation of legislative power
doctrine and tagged Political Law 1 on November 3, 2014 by Morrie26
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary
Bills Must Originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of Representatives; Undue Delegation
of Legislative Power; Equal Protection Clause

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA

and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform
proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to
raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions
have been satisfied, to wit:

. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after
any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by

Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of
tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that
any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the
President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

Issues:

Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and
Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article
VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under
Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Discussions:

Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives,
but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own
version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in
the House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it
is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when
it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other
appointee or delegate of the legislature.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings:

R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in
the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily,
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on
the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House
revenue bill.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make
reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to
be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary
will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon

recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec
28(2) of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the
Constitution.

Ruling:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate
was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill
when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a
delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval,
and Cirilio M. Zanoria

Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and
Cirilio M. Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers). The respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and
prohibition with preliminary injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch
VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the
correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670)
prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of
imprisonment is unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being
solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of
the Government.

On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent
Judge, Judge Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for
its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power by vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment
of imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes
punishable by fine of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of
municipal courts.

Decision:

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents
herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte
for trial on the merits.

Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary

December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong,
filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law,
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill
provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of
congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second,
it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond
that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5.
Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that
the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of
rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?

Rulings: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards
to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its
conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

Over a cup of Coffee and a pint of Insanity

CASE DIGEST: ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS. COMELEC
9:41 AM
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the
2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents,
arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list
elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the
availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is
the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be

disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political
parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the
COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit
applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion

of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations
was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled
from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered
that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Lozada vs COMELEC (G.R. No. L-59068)

Admin Noona
8 years ago
FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the
COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa
(IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution which
provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more
before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be
held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the
unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1)
petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to
institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3)
Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the
New Constitution which reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as
provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring
jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where
vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa
(BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP
may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the
BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of
special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would
seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even
when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the
sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be
compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2),
Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)

Admin Noona
8 years ago
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the
Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members
of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec.
10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in
1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on
December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all
the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers
to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence,
as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of
the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form
and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word
“term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the
Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec.
10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the
Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in
compensation can become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134
is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate
and House that approved it will have expired.

PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, GR Nos. 132875-76, 2000-02-03

Facts:

Issues:

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general?

Ruling:

the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done
prior

Principles:

The immunity from arrest or detention... privilege has always been granted in a...
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest.

For relatively minor... offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done
prior... the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment... arising from
the enforcement of criminal law.

llowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for

five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an... aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.

by Mars Barrameda

ROMEO P. GEROCHI v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, GR NO. 159796, 2007-07-17

Facts:
EPIRA

Universal Charge... respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner
Romeo P. Gerochi and all other... end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in
their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.[17]

The power to tax is strictly a... legislative function and as such, the delegation of said
power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, giving
the same unlimited authority

The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be determined,
fixed and... approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary
legislative authority.

Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations
of the NPC.

unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public purposes, such as support of
the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the... assailed
Universal Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the
viability of the country's electric power industry.

Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal Charge is not a tax
because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of
the country's electric... power industry, and is, therefore, an exaction in the exercise of
the State's police power

Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in
accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a Distribution Code which shall include,
but not limited to the followin

Issues:

Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax... undue delegation of
legislative power to tax... power of taxation from the police power.

Ruling:

In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police
power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked.

it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the
exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.
The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
sufficient standards.

the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not
one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative

Principles:

The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,

acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be
found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency that is to pay... it.

police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.

, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens
patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.[

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose
for which the charge is made

If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax... but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact... that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.[36]... it is a well-established
doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power.