Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Turkey’s Role in the Changing Middle Eastern Dynamics

Challenges and Prospects

Dr. Nazir Hussain and Abrar Hussain

Turkey is an ancient civilization having strong cultural, political and economic relations with
Middle East and Central Asia. Turkey’s location at the juncture of Europe and Asia enhances its
geostrategic importance in the region. Its fast economic growth, political stability and military
strength make Turkey a regional power having potential to influence the global politics.
Moreover, the changes taking place in Middle East have relegated the traditional regional powers
from their position of Arab leadership, paving way for other regional/extra-regional powers to
fill the vacuum. Turkey is one such state with its historical, religious and cultural linkages to
dominate the regional dynamics.

Turkey has been asserting its role in the regional dynamics of Middle East through supporting
the Palestinian cause, trying to mediate in Iranian nuclear controversy, showing its concerns over
NATO attacks against Libya, working out a solution to the Syrian civil war and opposing the
growing phenomenon of Islamic State (IS). Therefore, Turkey would continue to play its role in
the region as power shift continues from Euro-Atlantic region to Asia. However, it is debatable
whether Turkey is able to play a leading role in the Muslim world and working to reconstitute
the Ottoman Empire or it is working to enhance its power position in Middle East to present
itself as an alternate model for the regional states.

Therefore, this paper endeavors to analyze the growing Turkish role in the changing Middle
Eastern dynamics through historical involvement, democratic experience and economic progress.
It also focuses on Turkish role during the ‘Arab Spring’ and the new security dynamics
unfolding in Iraq and Syria in the guise of Islamic State, the challenges it pose and future
prospects.


Dr. Nazir Hussain is Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad and Abrar Hussain is Doctoral Scholar at Department of International Relations, National
University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Theoretical Context
Security complexes have different agendas with regard to the question of how a particular
regional security complex is formed. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver1 have depicted the Middle
East security complex as ‘perennial conflict formation.’ The region is also termed as a ‘conflict-
driven complex’ by Coşkun.2 In terms of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), Middle
East is an example of turning the decolonization process into conflict formation. It remained as a
region of conflict and instability, and accordingly a regional security structure is still being
evolved.3 As Mohammad Ayoob points that ‘Negative security dependency is at stake in the case
of Middle East region, since hostile ventures dominate interactions in the region and interactions
based on enmity dominates the system.’4 Regional security regimes remained limited and the
ability of outside actors to impose a regional security structure was constrained by the
complexity of intra-regional relations.

In understanding the Middle Eastern security complex, the role of history, religion, ethnicity, and
natural resources along with internal power structure, regional political/ideological rivalries and
great power interests play important variables. The concept of enmity rather than amity is more
persuasive in the region, where each crisis whirls around local to regional to global issue. The
complexity of regional security complex is further compounded with ever increase actors and
factors in the strategic calculations of the regional security environment. Therefore, Turkey is
situated in a region that can be described as a complex region in all terms and RSCT is an
important way to understand Turkey’s role through the complex scenario of the region.

The Ottoman Legacy and Modern Turkey

During the last decade of 13th century, Osman-I managed to establish the Ottoman Empire,
which later became one of the great empires in the history. It managed to control large areas of

1
Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 4th ed., (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 187.
2
B.B. Coşkun, ‘Regionalism and Securitization: The Case of the Middle East’ in C. Harders and M. Legrenzi, ed.,
Beyond Regionalism: Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East, (Hampshire:
Ashgate, 2008), 89.
3
Ibid.
4
M. Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional
Order”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 53:3, (1999), 247-259.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Middle East, North Africa, and a major part of Europe.5 Osman-I was the first in a long line of
Sultans who started ruling the empire, which continued for over six centuries.6 Like so many
other Empires, the Ottoman also went through incredible heights and declines. Ultimately, it
disintegrated as a consequence of World War I and a new state emerged out of the Ottoman
Empire; Republic of Turkey.7 The modern Turkey had emerged on the face of the earth with new
emissions. Quickly, after the emergence of Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal introduced new
political, social and cultural reforms.

The basic objective of the Kemalist Reforms in his own words was ‘the attainment of
contemporary level of civilization’ which was referred to the Western civilization. He tried to
break with the Ottoman past and bring Turkey at par with modern European state system.
Consequently, in October 1923, the Grand National Assembly proclaimed Turkey a Republic
and elected Mustafa Kemal as its first President. In March 1924, ‘the Assembly abolished the
Caliphate and suspended all members of the Ottoman House from Turkish territory.’8

Atatürk abolished the office of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Ministry of Shariah (Islamic
jurisprudence) and closed religious schools (madrasas) and colleges. All religious and mystic
orders were banned. Then he closed all sacred tombs as places of worship and retreat. ‘In
November 1925, a law was passed which required all men to wear Western style hats and made
the wearing of fez a criminal offence.’9 In 1937, Article 2 of the Constitution was further
amended to; ‘The Turkish State is Republican (Cumhuriyetci), Nationalist (Milliyetci), Populist
(Halkci), Statist (Devletci), Secularist (Laik), and Revolutionary (Inkilapci).’ In the post-Ataturk
era these six principles became the basis of Kemalism.10

Evolution of Democracy in Modern Turkey

The Republican People's Party (RPP) had been in power for a long time since early 1920s. Now
combination of internal and external factors was compelling for a more participative and board

5
A.L. MecFie, The End of Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923, (London: Longman Publishers, 1998), 178-182.
6
Marian Kenet, The Great Powers and the End of Ottoman Empire, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 25.
7
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 125-135.
8
Douglas A. Howard, The History of Turkey, (New York: Greenwood Press, 2001), 112.
9
Dr. Halil Erdemir, Why Turks Turned Their Faces to the West?, Izmir: Manisa Ofset, 2006.
10
Ibid.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

based democratic political setup. Mustafa Ismet Inonu, who became 2nd Turkish President after
Atatürk, a die-hard Kemalist, was not only intelligent enough to realize the need for change, but
actually brought it about. This was another futuristic turning point in the history of Turkey.
However, Inonu soon found himself in a political crisis, as opposition within RPP grew into an
open revolt.

In January, 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) headed by Celal Bayar was registered.11 All the four
founding members, namely Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Professor Fuad
Koprulu, were former members of the RPP. The DP swept the elections held on May 14, 1950.
The Democrats won 408 seats in a House of 487 with RPP reduced to 69 seats from 390 seats in
the previous Assembly. Celal Bayar was elected the first civilian President of the Republic and
Adnan Menderes took over as Prime Minister. However, in the next elections in 1957, the DP
had gone down to 48% of votes with 424 seats out of 610, while the RPP went up to 41% from
the previous 31% of votes, and won 178 seats. By the beginning of 1958 the government had
become totally isolated from virtually all the institutions of the state. This led to a general
discontentment and the much feared, long expected military coup, on May 27, 1960, which was
the first in the history of Republic of Turkey.12 Unfortunately, these military interventions
continued till 1990s.

However, the emergence of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 under the leadership
of Abdullah Gul and Reccep Tayyep Ergogan, completely changed the Turkish politics and
changing the regional approaches from Europe towards Middle East introducing the ‘Zero
Problem Policy’ (ZPP), with neighboring countries. It was believed that ‘At a time when many
neighboring countries are struggling for democracy and getting rid of monarchs, Turkey under
the rule of Justice and Development Party (AKP) got an important assertive role to play in the
region.’13

11
Ibid., 280.
12
Talip Kucukcan, State, Islam, and Religious liberty in Modern Turkey: Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public
Sphere, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2003, 490.
13
Fadi Hakura, Lale Kemal, Fuat Keyman and Taha Özhan, Transcript: Turkey and the Arab World: Ambition and
Evolution, London: Chatham House, June 27, 2012.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Since coming to power in 2002, Erdogan has faced notable challenges with success during his
leadership. Another such challenge emerged in May 2013, with turmoil in the country as a result
of public demonstrations that resulted in the most disturbing dissonance of the decade. People
came out on the roads in Istanbul and began demonstrations against government’s decision to
build an Ottoman building and shopping center in Gaze Park uprooting the park’s trees. These
demonstrations later spread into many other cities of the country. The government decided to
suppress the protesters with brutal force. Obviously, these events affected Erdogan’s position in
Turkey, but he was able to win the presidential election in 2014 with direct popular vote. He
further consolidated his position by sidelining Abdullah Gul and appointing former Foreign
Minister Davot Oglu as the new Prime Minister by AKP.

Turkish Economic Progress under AKP

Turkey has witnessed a healthy turnaround in economy since 2001. ‘It has recorded a remarkable
GDP growth rate of almost 6% in average during the period 2002-2011. Thus, per capita income
increased up to $10,500 in 2011, from the modest figure of $3,500 recorded in 2002. Today,
Turkey is the 17th largest economy in the world with a GDP of about $800 billion in 2012.’14
According to the Turkish Central Bank, ‘it played a crucial role in securing macroeconomic
balances and reining in inflation over the last decade. CPI inflation was 6.16% in 2013 and
forecasted to settle down around 5% in 2014.’15

According to the Central Bank ‘international reserves reached up to $1003 billion by the end of
2012.’16 The Ministry of Economics puts ‘the volume of Turkish exports to $1526 billion in
2012 from $36 billion in 2002. The total trade volume accounted for $389.1 billion in 2012.
Exports increased by 13.9% on an annual basis up to $1526 billion. Imports shrank by 1.6%
decreasing to $236.5 billion.’17 ‘Turkish Direct Investment stood at $130 billion by 2012 and
Privatization revenues reached to $44 billion in the same period.’18

14
Taşkın Temel, Central Bank Review, 14 (May 2014), 33.
15
Monthly Bulletin, October 2014, 11, available at www.ecb.europa.eu
16
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey
17
Ministry of Economy, Republic of Turkey.
18
Economic out Look of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at www.mfa.gov.tr
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Therefore, the remarkable progress and growth of Turkish economy presents a viable model for
other countries of the region to emulate the Turkish Model for economic stability, putting people
to the road of prosperity thereby reducing the chances of unrest and revolt against the
governments.

Turkish Policy in the Changing Regional Security Dynamics

Middle East is a ‘conflict prone’ region with ever presence of political, ideological and military
rivalries. Turkish policy of ‘zero problems with neighbors’ was a wise option to enter into the
region with a positive approach.19 It helped Turkey to mend its relations with many states in the
region, including Iraq and Syria. However, the dramatic changes of socio-political landscape in
the region put Turkey in an awkward position to earn goodwill of the Arab people or autocratic
leaders. Turkey supported the people and opposed the authoritarian states like Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya and Syria to fully blossom the ‘Arab Spring.’

The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring was a manifestation of Arab people for a change; a social, economic and
political change, and a yearning for Arab identity with democracy and populism.20 Therefore,
when people came out on streets for their demands in many parts of the Arab world, the western
world was taken by surprise. The unprecedented changes brought about by the people on streets
put the decades old authoritarian regimes on the defensive; the resolve, resilience and
determination shown by the people surpassed that of the western world’s cherished values of
liberty, justice and equality. The people just wanted a participatory and accountable government
looking for the people welfare; they wanted transition to democracy, end to monarchies and
change of regimes.21

In this backdrop, Turkish experience with democracy and free market economy was seen as an
alternate model. Many in the Arab world were inspired by the Turkish successes as inspirational

19
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Depth: Turkey's International
Position], (İstanbul: Küre, 2001), 85.
20
Nazir Hussain, ‘Unrest and Revolt in the Arab World: Impact on Regional Security’ Pakistan Horizon, 64:3, July
2011.
21
F. Ajami, “The Arab Spring: What We Know Now?” Hoover Digest, 2, April 6, 2012.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

for their movements to replicate.22 “Despite Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's
popularity on the Arab street, both old and emerging new elites expressed reservations about the
Turkish model. It is instructive that the Muslim Brotherhood criticized Erdoğan's lauding of
secularism during his visit to Egypt.”23 However, the ‘Arab Spring’ was a blessing in disguise
for Turkey to present itself as an alternate to the decaying state structure in the Arab world.
Therefore, Turkey stressed that “this Tunisian revolt is not a nation revolt, is not a revolt of one
country. It is a widespread regional revolt because now it is time for change.”24

Turkey considered the popular uprising as a natural desire of the people for change and thus
sided with the Arab people. Erdogan, then Prime Minster even asked Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak to step down to the popular demand of the Egyptians.25 However, the dynamics of
popular change began to reverse; Hosni Mubarak was replaced with Mohammad Morsi of
Muslim Brotherhood and he was replaced with General Sisi, who had support of traditional
regional powers. The civil war in Syria, turmoil in Iraq, Kurdish Issue and rise of Islamic State
(IS), began to reshape the regional dynamics and pose challenges to the assertive Turkey policy
in the Middle East.

Civil War in Syria

The armed rebellion in Syria operating and coordinating in a more organized manner initially
started as a protest movement against the government. But this opposition soon evolved across
multiple fronts and became full stakeholders of Syrian civil war. As a result Syria has
experienced worst security situation with growing civil war.26 In the beginning, the opposition
struggled hard to bring rural areas under control and carve out “de facto safe zone” as the
provincial level military structures were under Free Syrian Army’s (FSA) control.27

22
T. B. Park Kucukcan, M. Ayoob and T. Ozhan, “The New Middle East and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Müjge
Küçükkeleş ed., Policy Debate Series, 2 (October 13, 2011), 22.
23
I. Afacan, “Abant Platform: the Arab Spring and Turkey's Role”, Turkish Review, 2:1 (Jan-Feb 2012), 122-127.
24
A. Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey's Foreign Policy Objectives in a Changing World’ Speech on February 10, 2012,
Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
25
S. Cornell, ‘Changes in Turkey: What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?’ Middle East Quarterly, 19:1, (Winter,
2012), 13-24.
26
Nazir Hussain, ‘Syrian Crisis and Regional Order in the Middle East’ Pakistan Horizon, 66:4, October 2013.
27
Joseph Holliday, “Syria’s Maturing Insurgency” Institute for the Study of War, June 2012.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

In April-May 2012, the UN intervened to make a ceasefire but failed to do so. After this failure
the rebels took control of a large territory in the North as well as some urban areas. In 2012
Assad had insufficient forces to counter the strong and organized opposition so he decided to
focus the areas which were near to the city of Homs. In 2013 with the help of Hezbollah, the
Shiite militia in Lebanon, Syrian forces got al-Qusyr back from the opposition. From here on the
Syrian regime started targeting the strategic areas that allowed the flow of weapons from
Lebanon.28 However, the civil war is still on with millions refugees and country in shambles.

The Syrian crisis has serious implication for the region as this crisis carries the drivers of
regional destabilization with it. Because as Assad lost control over Syria, a large number of other
actors entered into the civil war and this war shaped up into large sectarian war. The important
players involved in this civil war have defined their roles and justified their involvement. Assad
portrayed himself as the defender of Arab nationalism as well as secular Syria with protected
minorities including Druze, Christians and others.29 Iran and Hezbollah are supporting Syria due
to religious affiliations and Assad has defined his opponents as “jihadists and takfiris” referring
to Sunni extremists who has links with al-Qaeda, and he warned horrible outcomes if his regime
falls; “The regime’s message to the Alawi community is simple: ‘If we die, you will die with
us.”30 Therefore, Turkey bordering Syria would be directly affected by the civil war. Turkey has
amended its policy in Syria; it now plays somewhat neutral role due to Iranian and Russian
support to Bashar regime. Also on the face of other regional challenges, Turkey cannot afford to
isolate itself in the region.

Turmoil in Iraq
Iraq is a Shi’a majority state; taking this fact into account, the Sunni Arabs were lacking their
confidence in the new state in the aftermath of US invasion of Iraq. In different ways, sectarian
identity was institutionalized in the rebirth of Iraqi politics after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s
Baathist dictatorial regime. In the Baathist regime, most of the Shi’a Arab were left out of the
politics by Saddam Hussein, rather they were crushed by him with brutality many times, the

28
Elizabeth O’Bagy, “The Fall of al-Qusayr” Institute for the Study of War, June 6, 2013, available at
www.understandingwar.org
29
“President al-Assad gives interview to the German Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper” SANA News, June
17, 2013.
30
Jackson Diehl, “Lines in the Sand: Assad Plays the Sectarian Card” World Affairs Journal, May/June 2012.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

Sunni Arabs initially fear they would also be treated in the same way. This image emerged as a
result of De-Baathication that referred to an attempt to eliminate those who had been actively
involved in Saddam’s regime.31 This image has been further strengthened by the constitution
which was ratified by a national referendum despite the fact that the Sunni majority areas of
Anbar and Salah ad-Din provinces voted against it. During 2006 Iraq saw intense sectarian
violence, but after that non-sectarian parties made ground and seemed to have an advantage. As a
result, Iraqi National Movement (Iraqiyya) under the leadership of Ayad Allavi emerged as a
viable cross-sectarian party to contest the election in which many popular Sunni Arab leaders
were included. But Maliki using his position constituted a de-baathification commission;
Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) to harass and arrest his political rivals before the
2010 elections, which disqualified around 500 candidates, majority of them were Sunnis.32

Moreover, Maliki established a high degree of influence over state institutions like Central Bank
of Iraq, Judiciary, Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), and the Integrity Commission and
appointed loyalists to ensure checking his political rivals and support his political allies.33
Therefore, marginalizing Sunni leaders and targeting Sunnis by Maliki is more like in Syria that
is why in May 2013, a renowned protest leader, Said al-Lafi said in a meeting in Qatar that “our
revolution in Iraq is an extension of that in Syria” and declared that “Sunni blood is one.”34 The
recent Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) seem to be an extension of the same sectarian
conflicts. Though Maliki has been replaced with a moderate Haider al-Abadi but the political
turmoil with sectarian germs is posing severe challenge to the regional security and Turkish role.

Kurdish Issue
The AK Party committed to solve the Kurdish Issue since it came into power in 2002 elections.
However, the old structures of state in Turkey posed serious threats to the progress. For example,
the military in Turkey has a key role in politics and that is one of the main features of old
structures. But today, the AK party government, according to its claims, is in full control of all
31
Eric Davis, “The Question of Sectarian Identities in Iraq” International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 4:
3, (2010), 232.
32
Stephen Wicken, “The Hashemi Verdict and the Health of Democracy in Iraq” Political Update, Institute for the
Study of War, September 11, 2012.
33
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2013.
34
Stephen Wicken and Jessica Lewis, “From Protest Movement to Armed Resistance: 2013 Iraq Update, 24”
Institute for the Study of War, June 14, 2013.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

the state institutions including army. Thus, the Kurdish Question can be hoped to be solved in
coming few years at least, if not less than that.35 Some steps have been taken by AK Party
government in the right direction with regard to solve the issue such as inclusion of Kurds in
political, economic and social structure as well as allowing Kurdish language in national media
to be broadcasted.

In 2009 a proposal was initiated as a main step towards the solution of the issue that centered a
new more democratic constitution ensuring the protection of minorities and promoting civil
liberties and human rights.36 Keeping the old structure in mind, this proposal was a significant
landmark initiated by government towards the Kurdish Question as well as the most progressive
outcome of any change; importantly it was the official recognition of Kurdish Question in
Turkey. This initiative by the AKP government was warmly welcomed and supported by all the
political forces and civil society throughout the country. The September 12, 2010 referendum
was clear evidence of this support in which 58 percent of the Turkish voted for the proposal of
constitutional changes and democratic steps.37 During the last decade socio-political and
economic conditions have been considerably changed and AKP government made significant
positive changes for Kurdish issue. However, the reconciliation between different groups and
stakeholders and the government will be central to facilitate the solution of Kurdish Question;
this will also ensure the political solution to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Failure to do so
would pose additional challenges to Turkey not only inside its borders, as street demonstrations
have begun against government decision not to support the Kurds against the Islamic State, but
also to its policy in the region.

The Salafist Threat and Islamic State (IS)

The rise of Salafism in the region poses another daunting challenge to the state structure and
existing regional order in the Middle East. The Salafism did not arise due to the poverty or
corrupt political practices; it rose because of its strong ideological following in a sectarian-

35
Fadi Hakura, Lale Kemal, Fuat Keyman and Taha Özhan, Transcript: Turkey and the Arab World: Ambition and
Evolution, London: Chatham House, June 27, 2012.
36
Fuat Keyman, “Turkey’s New Constitution: Transformation, Democratization, and Living Together” e-
International Relations (July 25, 2012), retrieved from http://www.e-ir. Also see Ömer Taşpınar, “Will AKP’s
Victory Finally Lead to a New Constitution in Turkey?” Washington DC., The Brookings Institution, June 2011.
37
Hakura, Kemal, Keyman and Özhan, Transcript: Turkey and the Arab World.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

stricken region through public sermons, TV talk shows and persuasive preaching by educated
middle class zealots.38 It is believed that so far Turkey was insulated from the regional
undercurrents due to Kurdish population on its borders and the Syrian regimes’ fight against the
Salafist threat. Now as Turkey has entered into the political/security dynamics of the region, it
cannot avoid the fast emerging religious radicalism coming onto its doorsteps. Moreover, the
rapid rise of Islamic State with its global agenda of a ‘Caliphate’ and its forceful advances in
Iraq, Syria and even in Turkey constitute the most formidable threat to regional order and
statism.39

Prospects
When Turkey initiated its policy of ‘Zero-Problem’ in 2009 to mend fences with the regional
states, the political environment was smooth and functioning. The Turkish assertiveness through
Palestinian Flotilla in 2010 earned goodwill from the Arab masses and Turkey was perceived as
an alternate political model to replace the traditional power structure at the state and regional
levels. However, the regional political turmoil took the Turkish leadership by surprise; the Arab
Spring, crises in Syria and Iraq, Kurdish Issue and the rise of IS along with the resistance of
traditional players to let Turkey play an over-extended role in Middle East put Turkish
assertiveness to challenge. Moreover, the political unrest within Turkey, its double speak on IS,
and non-resolution of Kurdish issue points bleak prospects for an assertive Turkish policy in the
‘perennial conflict formation’ region, where every crisis lead to another crisis. However, Turkey
is likely to remain involved in the regional politics to keep its relevance intact.

The “Turkish Model” depicts the Turkish values of modernity, democracy, and Islam in Turkey.
This model had been under doubts mainly for two reasons. Firstly because of the authoritarian
behavior of Erdogan and secondly, because the geo-strategic location of Turkey as a result of the
revolution carried out by Ataturk, in addition with the deep relations with the west being the
NATO member and Turkish interest to join the European Union, there are very limited chances
for other countries in the region to emulate the “Turkish Model.”

38
Zachary Laub, “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, available at www.cfr.org accessed
on October 14, 2014.
39
Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement” The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Number 20, June 2014.
 Journal of European Studies, Vol.31, No.2, July 2015, pp.42-54.

The political unrest on the Republic Day in 2014 depict that Turkey still fights with its past and
is struggling to keep balance between religion and democracy. It cannot play a leading role until
and unless Turkey chalks out a clear direction for its identity as a western-oriented country
aspiring to become a member of the European Union (EU) or a country, which has its own brand
of ‘religious secularism’ to present itself as an alternate model in the Middle East. Till then
Turkey needs to further consolidate internally, politically and economically, to play a more
assertive role in the regional politics in future.

Conclusion
Turkey has historical roots with the Middle East region, its culture and religion along with strong
economic progress and political stability presents it a viable political alternate in a falling-state
structure of the region. However, Turkish internal dynamics and regional security issues pose
severe challenges to Turkish assertive role in the region. As defined through Regional Security
Complex Theory, the regional problems are complex involving many regional and extra-regional
actors and their strategic interests, thus making their solutions more and more difficult. Turkish
involvement in the regional security issues not only complicate them further but also put Turkey
in a more delicate position to take sides at the cost of its national security interests; putting
strains on Turkish regional role.

Therefore, Turkey should better put its own house in order before it asserts itself in an ever-
increasing conflict prone region. It must safeguard its democratic stability, economic growth and
religious moderation before it fully presents itself as an ‘Alternate Model.’ Turkey has to take a
leading role in order to challenge the Salafist/IS threat seriously for its own people and the region
at large; because if this threat is not tackled, sooner or later it would knock at the doors of
Turkey.