CHAPTER IV

THE BANGLADESH CRISIS OF 1971: MRS. GANDHI AS STATESMAN

Through the better part of 1971 India was confronted with the

Bangladesh crisis which ultimately led to the third Indo-Pak war in

December 1971. The Bangladesh crisis was perhaps one of the most

difficult and challenging moments in India’s foreign policy since

independence. While India had been involved in two previous wars

with Pakistan - one in 1948 and the other in 1965 - the 1971 war

assumed greater significance in view of the changing international

environment. For India this environment was marked by hostility,

since the United States had decided to utilize Pakistan as a mediator

in its diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with China. Hence in

the event of Pakistan’s war with India the U.S. could not have come to

India’s support. It could probably not even remain neutral or a peace

maker. China too evolved into a more self-confident actor after the

Cultural Revolution and in its conflict with Soviet Union, found it

expedient to respond positively to U.S. overtures of rapprochement.

China was already explicitly on Pakistan’s side. Thus India was up

against a US-China-Pak axis. Besides, the issue this time involved

Pakistan’s continuity as a state as it was defined by the Partition

Settlement of 1947. India thus had to contend with unprecedented

mobilization of adversarial forces.

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the nature and

evolution of the Indian response to the crisis under Mrs. Gandhi’s

194
leadership in such circumstances. This chapter is organized into four

sections: the first looks at the context of the crisis, the second and

third tiy to understand Mrs. Gandhi’s perception of the crisis and her

handling of it and the last section analyses the aftermath of the war

and its consequences for Mrs. Gandhi’s position as leader.

THE CONTEXT OF THE CRISIS

While the East Pakistan crisis of 1971 grew out of an immediate

political dispute, namely, the decision of the Pakistan army to reverse

negotiations on a constitutional transition and a democratic transfer

of power to East Pakistan after the December 1970 elections, the roots

could be traced to the political, social and economic policies of the

Government of Pakistan since independence. The systematic

subordination of economic and political interests of East Pakistan to

those of West Pakistan increasingly led to the autonomy movement,

particularly after the Indo-Pak war of 1965. The war exposed to the

people of East Pakistan the practical difficulties of Ayub Khan’s (West

Pakistan) centralised administration.1 The defence of East Pakistan

relied entirely on the defense force stationed in West Pakistan. Hie

former was cut off from the world during most of the war and saw

itself as entirely defenseless and vulnerable to Indian invasion. Hence

the establishment of a defense force in East Pakistan was one of the

earliest and persistent demands of East Pakistan. The other grounds

1 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Bangladesh Liberation Movement (Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1987),
20-25. Ian Talbott, Pakistan: A Modem History (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 1988), 188-189. Also
see, Talukdar Maniruzzaman, “National Integration and Political Development in Pakistan,” in Asian
Survey (December, 1967), 884-885.

195
of deep discontent amongst Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan were

denial of their full role in the decision-making process; denial of a

national status for Bengali language; the absurd denigration of the

piousness of the Muslims in the eastern wing by those in the west

(Bengali Muslims were said to be half Muslims) and the gross

economic disparities that rendered them to abject misery and

impoverishment.2

It will be in order to briefly recount the political developments

during the first two decades after 1947 that precipitated the

constitutional crisis in Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh

in 1971.

The failure of democratic experiments during 1947-1958 led to

two successive military regimes in Pakistan - the Ayub Khan period

(1958-1969) and the Yahya Khan period (1969- 1971). The Ayub

regime had substantial support from the rural landed elite in the

Punjab and the eastern NWFP districts that provided most of the

officer corps, but it was endured rather than supported by the more

politicized public in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Karachi, Baluchistan, rural

Sind, western NWFP and particularly East Pakistan. Thus a return to

some form of civilian government, in which the various component

parts of the country would regain a voice in its governance, was a

political necessity.

2 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dhaka: The University Press
Limited, 1980), 19-33. Also see Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1971), 14. W. H. Morris Jones, “Pakistan Post-mortem and die Roots of Bangladesh” in
Political Quarterly, 43, No. 2 (April-June, 1971), 187-200.

196
 But ever since President Ayub Khan seized power in October

1958 he had argued consistently and vehemently that the western

democratic system was unsuitable for Pakistan.3 According to Khalid

B. Sayeed, Ayub Khan defended the political system he established

under the Constitution of 1962 on the grounds that it ensured

political stability and strong central government essential for

maintaining Pakistan’s national integrity and a rapid rate of economic

growth. Ayub Khan justified his moves by pointing out that there was

neither adequate national cohesion nor political maturity among the

people to produce a system under which organized and disciplined

political parties may compete against each other for winning political

support and forming a national government. Under such

circumstances a system in which a president like him arrogated to

himself the task of formulating major policies with complete

independence and initiative and without the control of parliament,

was characterized by Sayeed as “constitutional autocracy.” Ayub Khan

often dismissed the doctrine of popular sovereignty as emotional and

unrealistic in the context of developing areas and was disdainful of the

idea of executive being accountable to parliament.4

The 1962 constitution disregarded public opinion that strongly

favoured a parliamentary system, a decentralised federal structure

and direct elections. Hence the Ayub regime encountered opposition

3 Khalid B. Sayeed, “Pakistan: New Challenges to the Political System” in Asian Survey (February,
1968), 97-104.
4 Ibid, 98. For a detailed analysis of “constitutional autocracy” see Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political
System ofPakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), 101-126.

197
from the outset. There were protests in both East and West Pakistan

against the 1962 Constitution amidst growing demands for the

creation of another Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution.

In the East a movement for autonomy had existed among the

middle classes. The peasants and workers became attracted to it

particularly after 1965. East Pakistani peasants had been strong

supporters of an independent Pakistan because it had meant freedom

from the domination of British and Hindu landlords.

The end of the Indo-Pak war of 1965 brought home more starkly

the reality and the inevitability of the autonomy movement in East

Pakistan. The economic impact of the 1965 war was far more serious.

The war had caused untold economic hardship on account of East

Pakistan’s complete subordination to West Pakistan’s wealth process.

They realized the economic difficulties of being dependent on the

centre. The war fully underscored the demand for autonomy and it

took shape immediately after the war in the form of the Six-Point

Charter enunciated by the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman.

At a national conference of opposition political parties held in

Lahore on February 5-6, 1966 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced

his famous Six-Point Charter of “survival programme” for East

Pakistan, which would become the political battle cry of the Awami

League in the elections of December 1970 and the constitutional

negotiations of 1971. The Awami League’s six-point platform for

autonomy sought to transfer control over foreign trade, foreign aid

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allocation and taxation power to the states so that no province could

be dominated through disproportionate control of the central

government’s powers and resource allocation.*5 1 2 3 4

Sheikh Mujib believed that East Pakistan’s sense of isolation

could serve to ignite a nationalist explosion among the politically

discontented and economically frustrated Bengalees. He was supposed

to have stated at a press conference on February 14, 1966, “The

question of autonomy appears to be more important after the war. The

time has come to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects.”6

Thus in the post 1965 Indo-Pak war, political uprisings marked

the rest of Ayub’s tenure. His proposed efforts to create a durable

constitutional order did not take off in the wake of massive anti-

regime movements that emerged in both the wings. In both the wings

5 Bangladesh Documents, Vol 1 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,
1971), 13-14.
The six points are:-
(1) Establishment of a federation “on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary
framework of government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of adult
franchise.”
(2) Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, that is defense and foreign affairs and
all other residuary subjects should rest in the federating states.
(3) There should be either two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings or one
currency for the whole country provided that effective constitutional provisions were made to
stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan .There should be separate banking
reserves and a separate fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.
(4) Denial to central government of the right of taxation, vesting of tax provisions in the hands of
foe federating states with foe Central Government receiving fixed share.
(5) Foreign trade: Five steps shall be taken :-
(a) There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings.
(b) Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under foe control of East Pakistan and the same
for West Pakistan.
(c) Foreign exchange requirements of a federal government shall be met by foe two
wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed.
(d) Indigenous products shall move free of duty within foe two wings.
(e) The Constitution shall empower foe unit government to establish trade and
commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with
foreign countries.
(6) Set up a militia or para-military force by East Pakistan.
6 Cited in Talukdar Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath, 24.

199
movements were spearheaded by students and a young urban middle

class alienated by a sense of participation-crisis in the indirect

election process of Ayub’s constitution, led by populist civilian leaders

like Z.A. Bhutto in the western wing and Sheikh Mujib in the eastern

wing of the Pakistan. In East Pakistan the revolt was driven by a

desire to redress the acute political and economical disadvantaged

position of the province in the country. The sense of alienation of East

Pakistanis was aggravated by what was called the “Agartala

Conspiracy” in which Sheikh Mujib was charged, along with some

Bengalee members of the civil service and some Bengalee junior

officers, with collaborating with India to bring about the secession of

East Pakistan. In West Pakistan popular uprising against Ayub Khan

began in district towns with comparatively large refugee populations

that had been bypassed by the “economic miracle” in the west during

the Ayub decade.

According to Shahid Javed Buriri, the economic development

during the Ayub era though impressive on many counts was in effect

the result of unequal distribution of wealth between certain privileged

classes and regions.7 As the economy grew, inter-regional as well as

inter-personal income inequalities grew with it. Since the rate of

growth of the economy was far swifter in the West than in East

Pakistan, the accompanying economic disparities seemed to be

sharper in the West than in the East. The people and the areas

7 Shahid Javed Burki, “Ayub’s Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation” in Asian Survey (March, 1972X
201-212. Also Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dhaka: University Press
Limited, 1980), 1-26.

200
bypassed by economic growth grew increasingly resentful. Ayub

sensed that there prevailed an atmosphere of rebelliousness and

uncertainty and in a bid tot contain the revolt, he announced his

decision to withdraw as a candidate from the presidential elections

scheduled for March 1970 and agreed to the release of political

prisoners, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. While Ayub Khan

conceded the opposition demands for a return to parliamentary

democracy based on universal franchise, the ruling oligarchy was

firmly opposed to the demands for greater autonomy and the

democratic aspirations of the people in East Pakistan.8 Ayub was

unable to quieten the unrest and the military, referring to the broad-

based party and regional demands for Ayub’s overthrow, reinstalled a

martial law regime under the commanding general, Yahya Khan, with

commitments to democratic reforms.

On assuming power General Yahya Khan realized that some

concessions had to be made to the autonomists of East Pakistan if the

slender fabric of Pakistan unity was to be maintained.9 He began by

applying some basic democratic principles. First, he eliminated the

fifty-fifty distribution of seats between East and West Pakistan; he

introduced the “one man one vote” principle thus allocating a majority

of seats in the new Constituent Assembly to East Pakistan. In doing

this, Yahya Khan had addressed the chief grievance of the East

8 Ibid. Also, Pran Chopra (Ed.), The Challenge ofBangladesh (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971),
2-3.
9 Mohammad Ayoob and CMhers, Bangladesh: A Struggle for Nationhood (New Delhi: Vikas
Publications, 1971), 29-30.

201
Pakistanis that is the principle of inter-wing parity had been

discarded. Second, he abolished the unified state in West Pakistan in

response to regional demands, and restored the four constituent

states of Punjab, Sind, NWPF and Baluchistan, thereby providing East

Pakistan with an advantageous bargaining position in the new

assembly. The December 1970 elections were held on schedule.

The election results were unexpected both in the eastern and

western wings. The elections were virtually a referendum on the

Awami League’s six-point charter of autonomy. It won 160 seats out of

162 that were reserved for East Pakistan in the National Assembly. By

virtue of this massive victory in East Pakistan, the Awami League had

secured an absolute majority in the National Assembly as well, which

had 300 elected seats. Its tally of 160 seats gave the Awami League

53.3 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. It was widely

believed that it was this absolute majority secured by the Awami

League in the Constituent-cum-National Assembly that triggered the

constitutional crisis.10 Such a view was also reported in The

Statesman, New Delhi.*11 It reported that Pakistan appeared to be on

the threshold of a new phase of political conflict with the general

election to the National Assembly throwing up two different sets of

leadership in the eastern and western wings. This proved to be true,

for the Pakistan’s People’s Party presented itself as a major obstacle to

what had seemed to be an orderly and coherent formulation of a new

10 Ibid. Also Anthony Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971)
Chapter 3,25-33.
11 The Statesman, New Delhi, December 9,1970.

202
constitution post December 1970 elections. Z.A. Bhutto, the leader of

the Pakistan People’s Party, which controlled only about one - third of

the seats in the National Assembly, was not prepared to accept the

status of an opposition party leader. His demand for a coalition with

the Awami League, with himself as Deputy Prime Minister, was

rejected by the Awami League and the stage was set for a momentous

phase of bitter conflict and a crisis of gigantic proportions. Yahya

Khan first attempted to obtain a compromise with the Awami League

on the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan. By March 1971 demands

for complete independence of East Pakistan grew within the province

and the Pakistani Government ordered the army to reassert its control

over the population who had by then become openly rebellious.12

With the military crackdown civil war in the eastern wing of Pakistan

was a reality and this crisis was to eventually culminate in the third

Indo-Pak war and the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.

THE CRISIS AND THE INDIAN RESPONSE UNDER MRS. GANDHI’S

LEADERSHIP

With a view to facilitate an analysis of the period of study

(April - November 1971), we have divided the span of the crisis into

two principal phases: (a) April-July 1971: from initial reaction to the

crisis up to the eve of the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty and (b)

12 Sheikh Mujibur Rahaman, the Awami League leader had appealed to die U.N. Secretary General, U.
Thant to heed the crying human need of 75 million people of East Pakistan and declared that the
struggle in East Pakistan would continue until such time as “the people of Bangladesh get their rights
and can live as free citizens of a free country”. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, March 12,1971; March
15,1971; March 27, 1971.

203
August-November 1971: from the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty to

the completion of war preparations.

The evolution of India’s role in the 1971 crisis followed the

gradual accentuation and aggravation of the crisis. On the face of it,

the civil war in the west was an internal affair of Pakistan. The

Pakistani generals claimed as much, but it was to have serious spill­

over effects whereby India’s involvement was to become inevitable. The

first stage was marked by a general sense of solidarity on the part of

the people of India with the victims of the Pakistan army’s brutalities

and a vague realisation by India that it had a long-term and

fundamental identity of interests with the people of East Pakistan. So

the first major Indian action consisted of a parliamentary resolution

against the repression of what India saw as spontaneous resistance of

the people of East Pakistan against West Pakistan’s military regime

led by Yahya Khan. The resolution moved on March 31, 1971 while

expressing its “profound sympathy for and solidarity with the people

of East Bengal, in their struggle for democratic way of life” also “called

upon all peoples and governments of the world to take urgent and

constructive steps to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to put

an end immediately to the systematic decimation of people which

amounts to genocide.” The house recorded its “profound conviction

that the historic upsurge of the seventy-five million people of East

Bengal will triumph. The House wished the East Bengal people that

their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy

204
and support to the people of India."13 The resolution carefully avoided

committing India to an active role in bringing about a settlement in

East Pakistan or suggesting in any way what that settlement could be:

reconciliation between the two wings of Pakistan or secession. Instead

it asked for international pressure to achieve that end. So during this

phase, India expressed its solidarity with the people of East Bengal

and established an “identity of interests” with the struggling masses in

East Pakistan. Even as early as in March, the Indian Resolution

addressed the place of conflict as “East Bengal" and not as East

Pakistan.14 Subsequently, Mrs. Gandhi also decided to withhold

recognition despite pressures from various quarters to the fledgling

Bangladeshi govemment-in-exile until the Bangla leaders had

demonstrated their capacity to retain mass support and either

negotiated or fought Pakistani army out of East Bengal without

depending too heavily on Indian “armed assistance."15

By the middle of April, the inflow of refuges touched 1,00,000

and about 60,000 refuges were entering India eveiy day since June

13 Selected Speeches and Writings ofIndira Gandhi: August1969-August1972: The Years ofEndeavour
(New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India),
524-525.
14 This Parliamentary Resolution, according to Robert Jackson, was the foundation of a new East
Bengal Policy. It implied a “reversal of the doctrine upon which Indian policy towards East Pakistan
had been based since 1947: that the defense of Indian unity against fissiparousness implied that India
should herself respect the unity of Pakistan. By arguing that the secession of East Bengal was now
inevitable, the Indian Government was by implication asserting that whatever the political
consequences for die unity of India, ha efforts to respect Pakistani unity could no longer be sustained.”
See Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: A Political and Historical
Analysis of the 1971 War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 36-37.
1J Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policyl966-1982 (New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 1984), 215-218. Also, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan,
India and the Creation ofBangladesh (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1990), 142-144.

205
1971.16 The Indian strategy in the light of what was perceived as an

unmanageable crisis became somewhat evident in a remarkable

address by Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the Lok Sabha on

May 24, 1971.*7

In that address Mrs. Gandhi mentioned the threat that the

massive migration, unprecedented in recorded history, of more than

3.5 million people of every religious persuasion, was posing to India’s

economic, security and political interests. She was convinced that

unless some hard measures were taken, the political situation could

move out of control in the east, given its vital security interest. In the

same address Mrs. Gandhi hinted at the possibility of using defensive

military action to arrest further erosion of India’s vital interests. She

said “we are proud of our tradition of tolerance... our nation; our

people are dedicated to peace and are not given to talking in terms of

war or threat of war. But I should like to caution our people that we

may be called upon to bear still heavier burdens.”18 This “heavier

burden” probably alluded to a possible moment of intolerance, a

distinct possibility of war. It is relevant to note here that Mrs. Gandhi

was for the first time referring to an entity called Bangladesh which

was still juridically very much East Pakistan.19 She began her
statement in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1971 thus, “In the seven weeks

16 Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971” in Asian Survey (June,
1975) 490. Also The Times of India, New Delhi, May 18,1971; The UNHCR Deputy High
Commissioner Mr. Charles Mace had accepted the Indian Government’s assessment that there were 2.8
million refugees from East Pakistan by that time.
17 Selected Speeches and Writings ofIndira Gandhi: August 1969 - August 1972, 525-528.
18 Ibid, 527.
19 Ibid, 525.

206
since Parliament recessed, the attention of the entire country has

been focused on the continuing tragedy in Bangladesh.”

Also in this address, Mrs. Gandhi described the problem as

“national” when she said, “What was claimed to be an internal

problem of Pakistan has also become an internal problem for India,”

but added, “Indeed the basic problem is an international one.” With

India reeling under the crushing pressure of the inflow of refugees,

Mrs. Gandhi emphatically asserted, with what amounted to a veiled

threat of war that, “we are convinced that there can be no military

solution to the problem: a political solution must be brought about by

those who have the power to do so. The great powers have a special

responsibility. If they exercise their powers rightly and expeditiously

then only we can look forward to durable peace. But if they fail - and I

sincerely hope they will not -then this suppression of human rights,

the uprooting of people and the continued homelessness of vast

numbers of human beings will threaten peace.”20

The Indian position as stated by Mrs. Gandhi could thus be

summed up. First, there could be no military solution to the problem

in East Pakistan. Second, the flow of refugees into India from East

Pakistan had to be immediately stopped. Third, conditions had to be

created in East Pakistan to enable the refugees to return to their

homes in peace and security. Fourth, a political solution acceptable to

the East Pakistanis was the only way of ensuring a return to

normalcy. Finally, the present situation was grave and fraught with

20 Ibid, 528.

207
serious dangers for the peace and security of the region. Mrs. Gandhi

explained that the crisis was neither an Indo-Pakistan dispute, nor an

internal affair of Pakistan. By stressing that it was an international

problem Mrs. Gandhi had already stated her stand. Her decision of

discouraging projections of a major Indian role in the resolution of the

crisis in the initial months was regarded as politically and strategically

appropriate.21 It was felt that the Indian army was neither prepared for

direct intervention in East Pakistan nor for managing counter thrust

from West Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi probably considered it prudent

though not publicly, to assist in the creation of a resistance movement

in East Pakistan as the political and military basis for direct Indian

intervention. If military action was unavoidable, India preferred that

its moves be viewed as supportive of a Muslim led East Pakistani

freedom movement rather than just another Indo-Pak conflict.

In this phase of the crisis therefore, Mrs. Gandhi placed great

emphasis on the responsibility of the international community to

bring pressure on Pakistan for a political solution that would facilitate

the return of the refugees. It was clear that Mrs. Gandhi wanted to

internationalise the East Pakistani crisis but she was realistic enough

to accept certain constraints in her efforts to do so, as no other

country had been adversely affected by the course of events there.

Moreover she had to take into account the unpleasant fact that in
view of the long history of Indo-Pakistani conflict, a bold Indian

21 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and. Secession, 151.

208
initiative to internationalise the problem could appear to many to be

another manifestation of the same malady. In the long run, Mrs.

Gandhi’s strategy of dealing with Bangladesh issue and the refugee

problem seemed to hinge on her assessment of two related questions:

(a) the willingness or unwillingness of the great powers to put effective

pressure on Pakistan and (b) the military regime’s ability to defy them

with or without the support of China. The role of international actors,

in the context of bipolar confrontation between the two super powers

USA and USSR, and an ongoing process of strategic partnership

between China and Pakistan, created a deep sense of uncertainty and

ambiguity about the international environment. It was difficult for

India to organise her expectations about the possible roles of USA and

China.

It is therefore important first to say a few words about the

international system that prevailed during the crisis of 1971 and

which to a large extent, could explain the courses of action that Mrs.

Gandhi contemplated and actually took. The international political

system in 1971 was marked by bipolarity, with the United States and

Soviet Union as global super powers. In Asia this bipolar balance

became complicated with the U.S. decision to normalise its relations

with China. This move towards Sino-U.S. normalisation or detente

was corresponded by a remarkable deterioration in Sino - Soviet

relations. A notable feature of this period was the beginning of

209
relaxation of tensions between the USA and USSR, but not altogether

bereft of its competitive dimensions.22

The U.S. policy during the 1971 crisis was to safeguard the

pivotal significance of a united Pakistan as a geo-political entity to

American strategic interests. Pakistan was an ally and the U.S. was

bound by the U.S. - Pakistan Accord announced in October 1970,

under which Pakistan could purchase some weapons and

unsophisticated militaiy equipment.23 It is in the light of this that the

U.S. Administration, particularly President Nixon and his National

Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, decided upon a policy of tilt

towards Pakistan, complicating India’s threat perception further. This

tilt was ominously evident in Kissinger’s interpretation of the Indo-

Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 9, 1971.24 This tilt took on a

virulent anti-Indian stand during Mrs. Gandhi’s disastrous trip to

Washington later on November 4-5, 1971 discussed later on in this

chapter. So during the crisis, the U.S. under the Nixon-Kissinger geo­

political approach actively promoted its alliance with Pakistan possibly

to demonstrate to China the credibility of U.S. commitment to an ally

when the crunch came.

On another front India faced a hostile and formidable adversary,

China. By 1971 China and Pakistan had developed a very close and

22 Shibashis Chatterjee, “The Role of Structure and Agency in Indian Foreign Policy. Some Case
Studies” Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2006), 253.
23 Abdul Kalam, “War of Liberation: Great Power Response,” in Sirajul Islam (Ed.), History of
Bangladesh: 1704-1971, Vol.l (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987), 684-686.
24 Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geo-politics and South Asia”
in Asian Survey (April, 1980), 347. Also Bangladesh Documents, Vol. H (New Delhi: Ministry of
External Affairs, Government of India, 1971), 5.

210
strategic relationship. For most of the 1960s, China had nursed a

steadily growing friendship with Pakistan, while for a number of

reasons, Sino-Indian relations, subsequent to the 1962 border

conflict, had undergone a process of deterioration and virtual

collapse.25 China was deeply involved in South Asia in one way or

another throughout the preceding decade and was swift in revealing

its stand on the issue and as in the case of the Indo-Pakistani war of

1965 the PRC had once again come forth in support of the Pakistani

position.

The most important official document relating to the Chinese

position on the 1971 crisis was Premier Chou En-lai’s message to the

Pakistani President General Yahya Khan, which came around the

second week of April 1971. In this message, the Chinese Premier

assured Pakistan of China’s support against any Indian military

move.26 These initial Sino-U.S. responses and their decision to work in

tandem in supporting the Yahya Khan regime constituted the major

source of tension in India.

Meanwhile, India’s relations with the U.S. continued to

deteriorate. While Indian hostility to the U.S. role in Vietnam was

escalating, the U.S.-China thaw raised the real question about

whether U.S.A. would assist New Delhi as it had in 1962, if another

25 Mohammad Habib Sidky, “Chinese World Strategy and South Asia: The China Factor in Indo-
Pakistani Relations” in Asian Survey (October, 1976), 965.
26 Ibid, 968. Also Robert La Porte Jr., “Pakistan in 1971: The Disintegration of a Nation” in Asian
Survey (February, 1972) 103. The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, April 12, 1971.

211
war with China broke out.27 Though the U.S. had placed an embargo

on arms sales to Pakistan in March 1971, American arms still reached

Pakistan.28 There was an obvious contradiction between U.S. attitude

regarding the arms supplies and the public posture it adopted in June

to endorse the World Bank view that Islamabad would not get fresh

aid till Yahya Khan arrived at a credible political solution with the

elected representatives of East Pakistan.29 Mrs. Gandhi’s policy of

eliciting international response with regard to East Pakistan did not

deliver the expected result and there was plea for a more activist

policy. The logic was that if USA found nothing wrong in continuing to

supply arms to the Islamabad junta, then India at the very least was i

justified in giving arms aid to the Mukti Bahini to fight their

oppressors and also in India’s own interests to stem the tide of

refugees. It was believed that India at this time was primarily

concerned with the serious implications of the massive inflow of

refugees on peace and security in the region. According to Satish

Kumar, “So far the thought that India might have to defend itself

militarily against a Pakistan attack had not occurred to India. The

primary question was how to stop military action and find a political

solution to the problem so that refugees could go home ....”30 He

27 Robert H. Donaldson, “India: The Soviet Stake in Stability” in Asian Survey (June, 1972) 483.
Kissinger reportedly warned Mrs. Gandhi in the summer of 1971 that China might not remain aloof
from a war in the sub-continent and the U.S. might not give its support as it had in 1962, The New York
Times, November 30,1971.
28 Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971,” in Asian Survey (June,
1975), 491.
29 The Times of India, New Delhi, July 13, 1971. The importance of the report lies in the feet that this
was the first completely objective finding submitted by a team of experts who made extensive on-the-
spot in queries in twelve districts of East Pakistan.
3° Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of India’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971,” 491.

212
believed that the emergence of Bangladesh as a separate state as a

consequence of the struggle going on at that time had not yet been

perceived as a serious possibility in India.

But it is true that certain significant developments in India’s

international environment made Mrs. Gandhi consider a different

strategy. The most significant of these developments which took place

in the first week of July 1971 was the visit to India of Heniy A.

Kissinger, the National Security Advisor to President Nixon. He was in

India ostensibly to discuss the question of arms supply to Pakistan

but used the sub-continental visit to make a secret dash from

Rawalpindi to Peking to commence the process of detente between the

U.S. and China. This was a crucial development and one that was to

have critical repercussions on the politics of the subcontinent. A Sino-

US-Pakistan nexus seemed a very real possibility. The difficulty of

pursuing her policy of handling the Bangladesh crisis without the

support of one of the great power was now clear to Mrs. Gandhi. While

this dramatic development was regarded as a major diplomatic

success for Pakistan it was regarded as a decisive deterrent to any

Indian adventures in East Pakistan.31 Pressure on Mrs. Gandhi to act

more decisively was mounting every day, but Mrs. Gandhi refused to

take recourse to any adventure.32

31 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 65.

32 The Times of India, New Delhi, June 30, 1971. It was being argued that looking after 7million
refugees hampered development and was more expensive than war which appeared to be the only
solution to settle the Bangladesh problem. See V. S. Budhraj, “Moscow and (he Birth of Bangladesh”
in Asian Survey (May, 1973), 487. Also J. Bhattacharya, “Case for Indian Military Intervention” in
Economic and Political Weekly (July 3, 1971), 1323-1324. Balraj Puri, “Bangladesh Bungled?” in
Economic and Political Weekly, Special November (July 17,1971), 1517-1520.

213
 Moreover throughout July 1971, the activities of the U.N. in

East Pakistan continued to expand. The U.N. Secretary General U.

Thant’s latest suggestion for stationing of U.N. observers on both sides

of the Indo-Pakistan border to facilitate the repatriation of refugees,

met with negative Indian response. The Indian Foreign Office had

rejected the proposal on the ground that it could not create the

‘necessary feeling of confidence’ among the refugees and what was

needed was immediate stoppage of military atrocities and a political

solution acceptable to the people of Bangladesh and their elected

representatives. India particularly objected to any United Nations

action which could allow Pakistan to shirk her responsibility in the

creation of the crisis, by making it an Indo-Pak issue. For this stand of

hers Mrs. Gandhi needed support in the United Nations Security

Council. It was against the background of the prospect of diplomatic

isolation, anxiety and uncertainty over the extension of the U.N. role

in East Pakistan, an inexplicable international passivity about the

crisis and political restlessness and impatience at home that

prompted Mrs. Gandhi to review her options. It was here that Mrs.

Gandhi made masterful use of her Soviet card.

Hie Soviet position in 1971 crisis had evolved from cautious

observance to active support for India in response to systemic and

circumstantial compulsions. At the outset of the crisis, the Soviet

Union sought to stay away from entanglement in the sub-continental

affairs and urged for a political settlement of the crisis but when the

Indian Parliament urged all countries to restrain Pakistan from

214
perpetuating “the systematic decimation of people which amounts to

genocide,” Moscow was one of the few states to respond immediately.33

On April 2, 1971 the Soviet President Podgomy appealed to the

President of Pakistan, “for the adoption of the most urgent measures

to stop the bloodshed and repressions against the population in East

Pakistan and for turning to methods of a peaceful political settlement.

We are convinced that this would meet the interest of the entire people

of Pakistan, and the interest of preserving peace in the area”34

Podgomy’s advice stressed Moscow’s concern for it revealed that it did

not favour Pakistan’s disintegration. The reference to “peace in the

area” showed that Soviet Union felt that strife within Pakistan could

extend to a conflict between Pakistan and India, a possibility that

Kremlin was anxious to avoid.35

The Soviets were spurred to review their policy to the crisis by

the revelation of President Nixon that his National Security Advisor

had flown secretly to China to meet Chinese leaders for laying the

ground work for a presidential visit the following year. USSR saw in

the crisis a threat to the balance in the sub-continental structure. A

Pakistan-China-U.S. axis directed against India required a

counterforce, that is, the Soviet Union. Thus it was primarily this

circumstance in July 1971, and Pakistan’s overt and growing

proximity to both U.S. and China, that made policy-makers in Moscow

33 Bangladesh Documents Vol. /(New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1971),
672.
34 Soviet President Podgomy’s Message to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan, April 2, 1971 in R. K.
Jain (Ed.), Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978, Vol.I (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), 105.
35 V. S. Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” 484.

215
revert to the policy of the 1950s when Moscow saw a friendly India as

a counter-weight to China.36 So the diplomatic situation in the sub­

continent and in Asia lent credence to the argument that a treaty

between India and Soviet Union would be a response to the

announcement of the secret Kissinger-Chou talks which were held in

Peking during July 9-11, 1971. The timing and the effect of the

announcement of the treaty in the context of India’s position on

Bangladesh reflected the need for a diplomatic counter-weight against

the U.S. and China. Similar calculations seemed to have induced

Moscow to seek a firmer, legal and political basis for Indo-Soviet

co-operation in Asia.

Having been on the agenda of Indo-Soviet relations since 1969,

the conclusion of the “Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

Co-operation” for a period of twenty years marked a convergence of

interest and a coincidence of perception.37 Much of the twelve-article

treaty covered obvious ground, putting India and the Soviet Union in

agreement on matters they would already seem to agree on. It

committed the two nations for example, to non-interference in each

other’s internal affairs, to non-aggression against each other, to efforts

to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world and to an

expansion of Indo-Soviet contact and co-operation in all fields. The

key clause was, however, Article 9, which as the operative part of the

36 S. P. Seth, “Russia’s Role in Indo-Pak Politics” in Asian Survey (August, 1969), 614-624. Also R. C.
Horn, Soviet India Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 64-66.
37 The Text the Treaty can be found in R. K. Jain (Ed.), Soviet -South Asian Relations: 1947-1978, Vol.
I, 113-116. Two view's on the Treaty can be found in G. P. Deshpande, “The Indo-Soviet Treaty” in
Economic and Political Weekly (August 21, 1971), 1802-1803, and Mohit Sen, “The Indo-Soviet
Teaty,” in Economic and Political Weekly (September 25, 1971), 2047-2048.

216
treaty, stipulated that the “two sides will abstain from providing any

assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the

other party. In the event of either party being subjected to attack or

threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter

into mutual consultations in order to remove such a threat and to

take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of

their countries.”38 From the Soviet point of view, the treaty’s main

purpose was to formalise and extend Russian influence for the

immediate end of stabilising the situation in South Asia, both by

deterring the Pakistanis and their Chinese patrons and by providing a

psychological support to the Indians designed to forestall a drift

towards war.39 Moreover, the treaty formalised the identity of political

and diplomatic interests into s specific policy content and linked it to

the evolving great power equations in Asia.

For Mrs. Gandhi the treaty with Soviet Union constituted a very

important aspect of her handling of the East Pakistan crisis. Mrs.

Gandhi did have some presentiment that a war with Pakistan may

become inevitable though it was difficult to explain if she had actually

decided upon a war.40 Militarily India could take on Pakistan but it

was vitally important to keep China out of any confrontation. In the

event of the U.S. taking sides in favour of Pakistan and China, it was

38 Ibid. Also Ashok K. Kapur, “Indo-Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance” in Asian Survey
(June, 1972), 463-468.
39 Robert H. Donaldson, “India: The Soviet Stake in stability” in Asian Survey (June, 1972), 483-484.
Also Ashok Kr. Kapur, “Indo-Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance,” in Asian Survey (June,
1972),465-474. See Shirin Tahir-Kheli, “Chinese Objectives in South Asia: ‘Anti-hegemony’ vs.
‘Collective Security” in Asian Survey (October, 1978), 996-1012.
40 Selected Speeches and Writing ofIndira Gandhi: August 1969- August 1972, 525.

217
imperative for India to strengthen her strategic position. It was here

that Mrs. Gandhi deemed a friendship treaty with the USSR as

essential to insure India’s position. It was also seen as a useful form of

public reassurance against possible Chinese intervention in the event

of hostilities. In domestic political terms the treaty provided an

opportunity for Mrs. Gandhi to counter opposition and party pressure

to act decisively.41 Thus Mrs. Gandhi had dexterously utilised the

China factor to activate USSR to acquiesce in the treaty. Jackson

noted, “Although the Russians thus indicated that they now accepted

the Indian view that the crisis in Pakistan could not be resolved

without a political settlement in East Bengal, the signing of the Indo-

Soviet Treaty did not mean a total commitment by the Soviet Union to

the Indian position, or the end of Russian attempt to bring about a

peaceful solution.”42

While acknowledging the importance of Soviet support for India

in the ensuing crisis, Mrs. Gandhi sought to delink her Soviet policy

from that of the Chinese. She tried to dispel the notion of an overt

influence of Moscow and tried to effectively demonstrate India’s

independence in foreign affairs. In July 1971 Mrs. Gandhi wrote an

open letter to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, explaining India’s position

on Bangladesh and offering discussions at any level acceptable to

China and without any preconditions. This was a well-timed move.

41 LokSabha Debates, Second Session of Fifth Lok Sabha, Vols.2-3, I4.06.’71. Also Richard Sisson
and Leo Rose, War and Secession, 200.
42 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis, 72. The Soviet Union opposed a Security Council meeting on
Indo-Pak tensions. The rejection of U. Thant’s proposal by Soviet Union meant some kind of a triumph
for India. The Statesman, New Delhi, August 20,1971.

218
The New York Times reported on August 8, 1971 that diplomatic

reports reaching Washington indicated that Peking, which in July had

publicly proclaimed its determination to help and defend West

Pakistan, was privately advising Yahya Khan to act “with prudence.” It

was a different matter that the Chinese Premier had not replied to

Mrs. Gandhi’s letter till September 1971.43

Therefore, by concluding the treaty with Soviet Union, Mrs.

Gandhi had created a conducive situation by stressing the essentials

of a central issue that the holocaust in East Pakistan was the

handiwork of the Pakistani militaiy rulers. Despite Pakistani

provocation and domestic pressure Mrs. Gandhi had relentlessly

sought to explain that it was a crisis with which India had nothing to

do; it was a crisis which had spilled over into India in the shape of

millions of refugees and that Pakistan had almost succeeded in

converting an indefensible position into something of a diplomatic

victory by presenting the issue to the West and the U.N. as an Indo-

Pak problem.

The treaty undoubtedly marked the beginning of a decisive

phase in the evolution of the crisis. What was significant about the

pact was its timing and the psychological impact on an Indian public
aroused against Pakistan. The treaty conveyed to the Western powers

India’s long-standing resentment at being treated at par with

43 The Statesman, New Delhi, September 2,1971. At a much later date the Chinese Premier confirmed
his position. In an interview on December 5,1971 he said, ‘You know; what our attitude will be if a war
breaks out between India and Pakistan. We firmly support Pakistan against India’s subversive and
aggressive activities.’ Cited in RJLJain (Ed.), China-South Asian Relations: 1947-1980, Vol.l: India
(New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), 417-418.

219
Pakistan.44 It conveyed to the Indian public that India was after all not

alone in a hostile world and they were ready to give Mrs. Gandhi the

sole credit for this. She, however, did not give up exploring

possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and continued in

her efforts to create world opinion. From August 1971 onwards she

undertook diplomatic initiatives herself in a bid to (a) dispel

misunderstandings about the treaty and (b) to acquaint the

governments of the West with the problems arising out of the

Bangladesh liberation struggle.45

An important aspect in the evolving situation was the

implication that the Indo-Soviet treaty posed for great power politics in

South Asia and Mrs. Gandhi’s moves in consistently holding her

ground despite the constraints of international structure.

By and large, till the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, the U.S.

was pursuing an ambiguous policy with the U.S. Administration

emitting confusing signals to the crisis in the sub-continent - by

giving sizable relief aid for the East Bengali refugees in India but at

the same time continuing shipments of arms to Pakistan.46 After the

Indo-Soviet treaty was signed fears began to be expressed in

44 David H. Bailey, “War and Political Assertion,” in Asian Survey (February, 1972) 87-96. Also
Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 273. In an
interview on B. B. C., on November 1,1971, Mrs. Gandhi, on being asked why India would not accept
U.N. presence in the refugee camps as Pakistan had suggested, had categorically replied, “It is only a
device of Pakistan to show that India and Pakistan are on the same level. This is what we resent ....
What we resent is the two countries being put on par” See Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira
Gandhi: August 1969 - August 1972, 539. Also, Bangladesh Documents, VoL U (New Delhi: Ministry
of External Affairs, Government of India, 1971), 4-5.
45 The Statesman, New Delhi, August 19,1971.
46 The New York Times, August 10, 1971. Also The Times ofIndia, ‘The Old Nixon’, New Delhi, July
12, 1971.There was no doubt that Nixon was too deeply committed to the Cold War cliches and there
was no way he could extricate himself from it Despite ddtente with Soviet Union he could not come
around to accept India’s strategic dependence on Moscow.

220
Washington that an isolated Pakistan would be a war-like Pakistan.47

Whether or not the Pakistani government would issue a pre-emptive

strike against India was unknown at that point of time. What seemed

more likely was that Washington feared that India, backed

diplomatically and materially by the Soviet Union, would manoeuvre

Pakistan into a situation where war should seem the only course.

Heruy Kissinger took a less positive view of the treaty. He

described it as a “bomb shell” and charged that “Moscow threw a

lighted match in a powder keg” by playing “a highly inflammatory

role.”48 A sense of insecurity and distrust stemmed from the American

perception of Soviet aim being to demonstrating to India and Pakistan

the futility of reliance on either China or the U.S. as an ally. So from

September 1971 the Nixon Administration followed an increasingly

anti-Indian line.49 It was unwilling to discuss the issue publicly,

preferring to rely on “quiet diplomacy,” that is, on discussions between

the leaders of the major external powers with interest in the region.

At about the same time, Mrs. Gandhi’s goals became more

precise and her co-ordination of diplomatic and military activity

sharper. The focus of her objectives also shifted from the refugee issue

(India’s direct concern) and Pak repression to Bangladesh nationalism.

She believed Bangladesh nationalism was a “just cause” that deserved

international support. So from a “preventive” stance India’s focus

47 The New York Times, September 6, 1971. Initially, the Indo-Soviet Treaty was regarded, publicly at
least, as an attempt to maintain peace in tbe sub-continent This was the opinion of the Secretary of
State, William P. Rodgers.
48 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicoison and Michael Joseph,
1979), 866-867; 874.
49 The New York Times, September 6,1971.

221
became “supportive” of Bangladesh nationalism. Continuing threats to

India’s security posed by the crisis in Pakistan gave New Delhi the

right to resolve the situation by any means it deemed effective to

ensure that refugees returned to a situation which they found

satisfactory. Mrs. Gandhi rejected the suggestion of U.N. Secretary

General U. Thant that he help relieve tensions between India and

Pakistan.50 In a letter sent to the Secretary General, Mrs. Gandhi

accused the international conmiunity of trying to save the military

regime of Yahya Khan. In the letter Mrs. Gandhi categorically

indicated the basic problem and then justified the massing of troops

along her borders. She wrote, “The root problem is the fate of the 75

million people of East Bengal and their inalienable rights ... This is

what must be kept in mind instead of the present attempt to save the

military regime. To sidetrack this main problem and to convert it into

an Indo-Pakistan dispute can only aggravate tensions. Pakistan is

seriously preparing to launch a large-scale armed conflict with India

and we have therefore to take all necessary defence measures.”51

Mrs. Gandhi’s hard line position was getting through slowly. So

in September 1971, when she visited Moscow to seek Soviet help to

settle the refugee issue, she could bring about a shift in Moscow’s
position on Bangladesh even while the Soviets preferred a policy of

neutrality to engagement. A perceptible change did occur in the

terminology of the Joint Statement that was issued on September 29,

50 The New York Times, November 19, 1971.

51 Ibid.

222
1971: “The two sides expressed their concern over the grave situation

that has arisen on the Indian subcontinent as a result of the recent

events in East Bengal and declared their determination to continue

efforts aimed at the preservation peace in that region.”52 The use of

the phrase ‘East Bengal’ over “East Pakistan’ indicated a departure

from the earlier insistence on the expression East Pakistan. It is

reasonable to believe that Mrs. Gandhi not only managed to obtain

Soviet assurance of active support to alleviate the burden of the

refugee problem on India, but she was also largely successful in

making the Soviets recognize that the only political solution to the

crisis would be one that paid “regard to the wishes, the inalienable

rights and lawful interests of the people of East Bengal.”53 By the time

Mrs. Gandhi left Moscow the Soviet Government had concluded that

India intended to use military force in East Pakistan.54 Moscow had

been cautioning India against seeking a military solution of the crisis

and continued to press for a “peaceful political solution.” The Soviets

even at that stage were non-committal over any military support for

the liberation movement for it seemed that Moscow was vacillating

between the Indian interpretation of the case and its desire to keep

open a line of communication with Islamabad.55

Mrs. Gandhi’s hard-line stand represented a shift from a

position of patience and restraint in the face of provocation to one of

deterrence. This shift had come after seven months of bitter

52 R. K. Jain (Ed.), Soviet-South Asian Relations, 1947-1978, Vol. /, 126.

53 Ibid, 127.
54 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose, War and Secession, 242-243.
55 V. S. Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” 489.

223
experience of the failure of the Big Powers in compelling the Pakistan

military regime to negotiate a settlement with the Awami League and

end repression in East Pakistan. At a news conference in New Delhi

on October 19, 1971 when Mrs. Gandhi was asked about the urgings

of the great powers for restraint, she said, “It seems very simple and

plausible to say Pakistan troops will withdraw, but Pakistan has been

escalating the situation by putting troops all along the border, by their

hate- India campaign and by their call for a jihad. This is not a one­

sided matter. You cannot shake hands with a clenched first.”56 Mrs.

Gandhi was obviously alluding to Pakistan’s obduracy in persisting

with its efforts to create a volatile environment by projecting the whole

crisis as an Indo-Pak one despite all the restraint and moderation that

India had been showing under her leadership. Mrs. Gandhi had earlier

stated in unequivocal terms that India would not entertain any

proposal for withdrawal of her troops from the India-Pakistan borders

in the absence of any indication from Pakistan of its willingness to

solve the Bangladeshi problem through a political settlement.57 She

further added that India reserved the right to devise ways and means

in her national interest if the international community failed to

persuade Pakistan to create conditions for the return of refugees. Mrs.

Gandhi’s image as a tough-minded leader who made her own

decisions no matter what the clamours and pressures was confirmed.

As a leader, Mrs. Gandhi showed her skill in manipulating an

56 The New York Times, October 20,1971.

57 The Statesman, New Delhi, October 7, 1971.

224
unfavorable situation to her advantage and put Pakistan on the

defensive.

In a final bid to win world opinion Mrs. Gandhi undertook a

tour of major western capitals at the end of October 1971. Her tour to

the West had a three-fold purpose: (a) to explain the development of

India’s policy on Bangladesh (b) to ensure acceptance or appreciation

of the Indian policy and (c) to demonstrate that the Indo-Soviet Treaty

would not necessarily jeopardize India’s relation with the West. She

sought to do this by acquainting western public opinion with the

enormity of the refugee problem and the justifiability of India’s resolve

that it should be relieved from her shoulders.58

Mrs. Gandhi had been able to clarify the purpose of her visit to

most of the Western world which in turn appreciated India’s policy on

Bangladesh and lauded her efforts towards the refugees.59 But if

measured against the objective of persuading the international

community to pressurise the Pakistani military junta to accept the

political realities of East Bengal, the visit fell far short of her own

expectations. During her trip to London she expressed disgust and

anger at the inertia of will on the part of the great powers to end the

crisis through peaceful means. In an impassioned address to the India

League on October 31, she said, “Everybody today is busy telling us

that we must show restraint. I do not think any people or any

government could have shown greater restraint than we have in the

58 Robert Jackson, The South Asian Crisis, 92.

59 The Times of India, New Delhi, October 26; October 27; November 9; November 11, 1971. Also
The Statesman, New Delhi, November 9-12, 1971.

225
face of such tremendous provocation and threat to our safety and to

our stability. But where has the restraint taken us? With all our

restraint we are not getting any nearer to a solution. On the contrary,

the military confrontation as the other confrontations which I

mentioned, political, economic, social, administrative is steadily

getting worse. People have asked me how long can India manage?

Actually that date has long since passed. I feel I am sitting on the top

of a volcano and I honestly do not know when it is going to erupt.”60

Mrs. Gandhi’s Washington trip was a disaster for there she had

to encounter the intransigence of the Kissinger-Nixon combine in their

virulent anti-India stand. Kissinger accused Mrs. Gandhi of

“hegemonic ambitions on the sub-continent”, squarely blamed her for

the crisis and aggressively defended US-Pakistan position on it.61

According to him, “Thus Mrs. Gandhi’s US visit ended without

progress on any outstanding issue or even on a procedure by which

progress could be sought.”62 Mr. Nixon too displayed the same

insensitivity to the political reality on the ground and bias against

India when he commented in his memoir, “.... I was disturbed by the

fact that although Mrs. Gandhi professed her devotion to peace, she

would not make any concrete offers for de-escalating the tension.

Yahya Khan had agreed to move his troops away from the border if

60 Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, 259.

61 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, 873-885.
62 Ibid, 882.

226
India would do the same, but she would not make a similar

commitment.”63

Mrs. Gandhi’s objective in the U.S. was to convince President

Nixon that unless he persuaded Pakistan to change its present course

it would not be possible to avert war. President Nixon had failed to see

India’s view point in pursuance of Washington’s short-term goal: that

was to prevent the crisis in the sub-continent from upsetting his

global plans for improving relations with China. Baldev Raj Nayar and

T.V. Paul rightly summed up the intransigence of the U.S. in the

following words, “The U.S. rationale for its intervention on Pakistan’s

side in the conflict was that, its credibility was at stake, with China

essential to the larger U.S. strategic design for the containment of the

Soviet Union. That the U.S. chose to side with the military

dictatorship in Pakistan and the Communists in China against the

democratic government in India in a bid to restructure the world,

hardened Indian perceptions into cynicism about U.S. attitudes to

Indian interests.”64

Despite American relations with India plunging to a new low

after this encounter, most Indian observers regarded her three week

foreign visit a “personal triumph.”65 Mrs. Gandhi’s forceful advocacy of

India’s cause revealed her self-confidence and capacity for

63 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs ofRichard Nixon, VoLl (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 651.
64 Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status
(U.K.:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 178.
” S. Viswam, “Political Commentary” in The Statesman New Delhi, November 12, 1971. Also Aswini
K. Ray, “Indira’s Ostopolitik and Brandt’s,” in Economic and Political Weekly (November 27, 1971),
2384-2385. There was general acceptance of Mrs. Gandhi’s stand vis-i-vis the current crisis in the
House. Lok Sabha Debates, Third Session of Fifth Lok Sabha, Vols.2-3, 18.11.’71.

227
outspokenness. It helped her to project India as a victim of U.S.

pressure and this was able to generate more public support

domestically. She had already been able to turn the international

spotlight on the crisis in a way that had not been attempted before.

She had galvanised all Indian diplomatic missions into highlighting

the international dimension of the problem while simultaneously

making contingency planning for a possible eventuality. Personally

she invested her time and political energies to stating India’s case on

the Bangladesh issue in a manner that was at once firm and

persuasive. She had been able to emphasise the view that to dismiss

the present crisis as an Indo-Pak imbroglio would be harmful for the

stability of the sub-continent. Mrs. Gandhi countered America’s

growing “irritation” over India’s position and approach by declaring

that she had a responsibility to look after the country’s security and at

that stage that was of paramount importance.66

In the given situation, Indian response had hardened, and the

reformulated Indian response recognised the “determination and

effectiveness” of the Bangladesh freedom fighters and therefore

acknowledged India’s active assistance to the liberation army.67 India,

under Mrs. Gandhi’s steely resolve and resilience, took the decision

that it had to use force in self-defense no matter what the great

66 The New York Times, November 3, 1971. America’s increasing “irritation’’ with India’s position
included (a) refusal to U.N. observers (b) refusal to withdraw Indian troops from the borders until the
Pakistanis halted the flow of refugees into India by stopping their atrocities in East Pakistan and (c)
refusal to accept mediation either by the U.N. or a third country on the ground that were is nothing to
negotiate until Pakistan reaches a political settlement with the elected leaders of the autonomy
movement in East Pakistan. Also, The Statesman, November 19, 1971.
67 Statement of the India Foreign Minister, Bangladesh Docutnents, VoL /, 709-710. The Foreign
Minister conceded that India’s readiness for battle arose out of Pakistan’s aggression.

228
powers thought or did about it. Mrs. Gandhi’s disillusionment with

the international community has been recounted earlier. Even the

Soviet Union, despite the Treaty of Friendship, wanted a political

solution of the conflict and gave no guarantee of any military

assistance if India contemplated war. Despite such a difficult

international setting Mrs. Gandhi came to the decision that the

conflict could not but be resolved by war, since Yahya’s regime was

incapable of creating conditions conducive to normalcy and peace in

the area.

In the meantime a decisive change in the Soviet perspective was

noticed during November 1971. Two immediate factors could be

identified for such a change. One was the visit by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

the leader of Pakistan Peoples’ Party and an aspirant for power, to

China. The Chinese assurance to Pakistan forced the issue with the

Soviet Union. The second was Mrs. Gandhi’s unsuccessful trip to

Washington wherein she was unable to obtain any assurance from

President Nixon regarding American pressure on Pakistan to achieve a

political settlement to the impasse. Yet a more significant factor in the

change in Soviet standpoint was the Soviet perception of the balance

of power implications of the sub-continental crisis, with clear

indications of active Chinese and American support for Yahya Khan.68

A Tass Statement spelt out the changed Soviet position: “Since the

Pakistan Government did not take measures for a political settlement

in East Pakistan and continued to build up military preparations

6S V.S. Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” 491.

229
against India, the Soviet Union informed President Yahya Khan that

Pakistan’s armed attack against India, under whatever pretext, would

evoke the most resolute condemnation in the Soviet Union.”69 On

November 24, Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi made a statement in

Parliament which implied that Indian troops had been ordered to

cross the border in self-defense.70 Mrs. Gandhi’s stand was

domestically endorsed when the Jana Sangh President, Atal Behari

Vajpayee pledged unreserved and total support to the government in

case of war which seemed imminent.71 It was an acknowledgement

that Mrs. Gandhi at such a critical juncture had proved herself as a

leader devoid of panic, hysteria and confusion. She had provided a

direction to the efforts of the government in the resolution of the

conflict by steadfastly rejecting fresh U.N. initiatives and latest U.S.

proposals for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the border at

Pakistan’s behest, and finally she had counselled patience, courage

and sacrifice to her emotionally aroused 550 million people for the

moment of reckoning. In a broadcast to the nation on October 24,

1971 Mrs. Gandhi had said, “It is time for alertness not only for our

defense forces but for all our people. In the last few months the world

has witnessed the courage, dignity and self-restraint with which we

69 Tass Statement cited in R.K. Jain (Ed.), Soviet-South Asian Relations: 1947-1978, Vol. I, 133-134.
70 The Times of India, New Delhi, November 24, 1971. The Statesman, New Delhi, November 25,
1971.
71 The Statesman, New Delhi, November, 1971.

230
have faced this challenge. I am sure that you will meet future dangers

in the same spirit. We need unity and discipline.”72

On December 3, 1971 Pakistan launched a series of air attacks

on the western borders of India. India recognised the Republic of

Bangladesh on December 6, 1971 and acceded to its request for

military intervention into the crisis. The outcome of the war resulted

in the creation of the new sovereign state of Bangladesh on December

16, 1971. The end of the war came surprisingly quickly. Pakistan’s

military force surrendered to the Indian forces in East Pakistan. On

December 17, 1971 with the support of all political parties, Mrs.

Gandhi ordered unilateral ceasefire on the western front to begin in

the following evening.73

A CLOSER LOOK OF MRS. GANDHI SPEECHES DURING THE

BANGLADESH CRISIS

The success of a leader in the chessboard of international

politics can sometimes blind the historian about the complexity and

the incomprehensibility of the situation in which he/she had to act;

the hesitancies and uncertainties with which one had to proceed and

the ambiguities in distinguishing the friend from the foe that one had
to suffer. Instead, the historian may be led to believe the outcome to

be a matter of a well-laid plan, thought out well in advance and

executed with dexterity.

72 Cited in Satish Kumar, “The Evolution of Indian’s Policy towards Bangladesh in 1971”, 496. The
Statesman, New Delhi, October 24,1971.
73 The Times ofIndia, New Delhi, December 17,1971.

231
 A close analysis of the leader’s expressions over time might help

one to develop a better understanding of the way the leader’s mind

worked and perceptions transformed, leading him/her to alternative

courses of action. Such an analysis of Mrs. Gandhi’s pronouncements

is intended to complement our discussion of the preceding section as

also to understand Mrs. Gandhi’s changing perception of the nature of

the crisis and the solutions to the crisis. As the crisis unfolded Mrs.

Gandhi was called upon to take decisions keeping in mind national

interest and freedom and integrity of India in a fast changing context

of international power equations. An analysis of the speeches will help

us indicate why she had responded in the way that she did and how

was she able to change the tide of events in India’s favour.

In this short section we have attempted to take a closer look of

Mrs. Gandhi’s speeches during the Bangladesh crisis from March -

December 1971. Mrs. Gandhi’s pronouncements on the crisis were an

assortment of statements in Parliament, replies to discussions in

Parliament, addresses to the public and select audiences in India and

abroad, press conferences and public speeches.

Our sample of Mrs. Gandhi’s pronouncements have been taken

from (a) those that are grouped under “Events on the Sub-continent”

as they appear in the volume. Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira

Gandhi: (August 1969 - August 1972\ and (b)those that are grouped

under “India’s Response” in Bangladesh Documents : Volume K The

first collection of speeches consists of those that were delivered mainly

in India, within parliament and in public places within India. The

232
latter collection consists of speeches delivered during her trip to the

Soviet Union in September and her six nation European tour in

October - November 1971. It is relevant to point out here that the

sampled speeches are important in terms of the occasion and the

audience of the speech. As has already been noted above, these

speeches covered both her domestic political space as well as the

international one. Her speeches in India were first made in

Parliament. She addressed the first public meeting in August 1971,

when she felt the crisis had become serious enough and she owed the

people an overview of the events leading to the crisis and to indicate

the direction in which India would attempt to handle it if and when

her interests were involved. Mrs. Gandhi performed the duty of a

leader not only by spelling out the problem but also by diagnosing it

and chalking out possible solutions.

The speeches that she made during September - November

1971 were almost entirely on foreign soil where her audience included

academicians and students, heads of states, opinion makers and

policy-makers. These speeches reflected her resolve to impress upon

world opinion the severity of the situation, the international

community’s responsibility towards seeking its solution and finally to

set the record straight on India’s involvement in the crisis.

233
 TABLES

FREQUENCY OF MRS. GANDHI’S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE

CRISIS fMARCH 1971 - DECEMBER 19711

MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
No. of 2 _ 2 1 - 1 2 4 8 7
speeches

Source:

(a) From March to August 1971: Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi: August

1969-August 1972, 523-537.

(b) Between September - December 1971. Ibid, 549-618 and Bangladesh

Documents: Volume n, 237-241, 255-264, 283-291.

From the above table, it is evident that the maximum number of

pronouncements on the issue by Mrs. Gandhi was made in November

and December 1971.

Just after the outbreak of hostilities in East Pakistan Mrs.

Gandhi made a statement in the Lok Sabha on March 27, on the

developments there and again on the same day intervened in a debate

in the Rajya Sabha. On May 24, Mrs. Gandhi made a statement in the

Lok Sabha on the magnitude of the problem. She also used

“Bangladesh” for the first time to refer to East Pakistan. It may be

mentioned here that a provisional Bangladeshi govemment-in-exile

was set up in Calcutta on April 14, 1971. On May 26, Mrs. Gandhi

summed up a discussion in the Lok Sabha on the influx of refugees

from across the border. On August 9, Mrs. Gandhi made her first

speech at a public meeting at India Gate, New Delhi, where she

234
explained the nature of the crisis, its long-term implications and

cautioned the people regarding their duty and the hardship that may

follow as a consequence of resolving the crisis.

During September-November 1971, Mrs. Gandhi’s speeches

were mainly made before select foreign audiences as mentioned

earlier. These were crucial months of diplomatic and military

engagements and also were final moments in India’s preparation for

war which broke out on December 3, 1971.

In September Mrs. Gandhi’s speeches were addressed to Soviet

leaders and in October the four speeches were made in London. In

November Mrs. Gandhi’s pronouncements included (i) speech at a

banquet by President Nixon in Washington DC on November 4,

(ii)Press Meet at Washington DC on November 5, (iii) Address at

Columbia University, New York on November 6, (iv) Speech at

Beethoven Hall, Bonn on November 11, (v) Speech at German Society

for Foreign Policy, Bonn November 11, (vi) Statement in Parliament on

her impressions of her tour abroad on November 15, (vii) Statement in

Parliament over border situation on November 24, (viii) Public meeting

at Jaipur on November 28.

On the night that Pakistan attacked several Indian airfields that

is on December 3, Mrs. Gandhi addressed her last public meeting

before the outbreak of war in Calcutta.

235
 g. ii. m in u i i—
DOMESTIC/INDIAN
1) We have been ensrulfed bv a new and
gigantic Droblem not of our making .... I visited
Assam, Tripura and West Bengal to share the of South-East Asia.
suffering of the refugees from Bangladesh to
convey to them the sympathy and support of
this House and the people of India.
.... W hat was claimed to be an internal
problem of Pakistan baa also become an
internal nroblem for India. We are therefore
entitled to ask Pakistan to desist immediately
from all activities which it is taking in the
nam e of domestic jurisdiction and which vitally
affect the nee or and well-being of millions of
our own citizens.
SaONVXSNI
21 It is an Indian Droblem.
3) .... (the problem) is a real threat to our
independence, to our stability, to our integrity.
So India is facing a real threat.
1) Statem ent in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1971.
2) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May 26, 1971.
3) Address a t Columbia University, New York
5Q
s
on November 6, 1971
i
SOUTH-ASIAN INTERNATIONAL
1) It is a problem th at threatens the 1) Indeed the basic Droblem is an
Deace and security of India and indeed international one.
2 ) .... It is a world wide a Droblem.
The international community m ust
appreciate the very character of the
situation th at h as now developed.
3) This not an Indo-Pak dispute. The
Droblem is an international one.
4) The events, which were an “internal
problem* of a neighbouring country,
have become very m uch “our
Droblem.* infact an “international
oroblem."
5) This a very grave problem for us. It
does not concern merely India - it
concerns Asia and it concerns the
world-
1) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May 26, 1) Statem ent in Lok Sabha on May
1971. 24, 1971.
2) Discussion in Lok Sabha on May
26, 1971.
3) Speech at luncheon given by
Chairm an Kosygin in Moscow on
September 28, 1971.
4) Speech a t dinner to Soviet leaders
in Moscow, on September 28, 1971.
5) Address to the India League,
London, on October 31, 1971.
ANALYSIS OF FIGURE 2

During the entire period of post-electoral negotiations in

Pakistan, India had maintained a detached silence on the

developments in that country. But after military action was launched

in East Pakistan there was a massive exodus of evacuees from across

the border. Though India’s first reaction was in the form of a

parliamentary resolution (see Figure 2) expressing sympathy and

solidarity for the East Pakistan people in their struggle for democracy,

it had condemned the military action. Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister

and leader of the nation, in her statement in the Lok Sabha on May

24, 1971 for the first time, spelt out her perception of the East

Pakistan crisis. By this time the mammoth and desperate flow of

refugees had propelled India into the picture. The refugee influx

imposed an enormous burden on its socio-economic system, the

administrative establishment, law and order machinery, as well as its

health care facilities. This is what she meant when she described the

problem as “a new and gigantic problem not of our making.” The

refugee issue and its attendant problems seemed to be India’s direct

responsibility which in Mrs. Gandhi’s perception was unfair, as she

pointed out that what “was claimed to be an internal problem of

Pakistan has also become an internal problem for India.”

Mrs. Gandhi stridently repeated that the problem posed a threat

to India’s independence and stability. She was referring to the

increasing vulnerability of the border areas, the possibility of

237
communal violence between Hindus and Muslims and the simmering

social unrest in the volatile eastern region.

The refugees were concentrated in some of the trouble-ridden

regions of India: West Bengal, Assam and the ‘tribal’ hill area of north­

eastern states of Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland. West

Bengal had just gone through several years of political upheaval and

violence with two coalition governments being replaced by “President’s

rule” in a span of four years during November 1967 to June 1971. The

growing controversy in the state over the refugees and the Indian

government’s policy toward East Pakistan were major factors in the

decision to dismiss the West Bengal coalition government in June

1971. It is important to remember that all this was taking place

during the instabilities created by the Naxalite movement, which had

launched a militant campaign against local elites and government

officials perceived to be “class enemies” of the poor and landless.

In the states of Tripura and Meghalaya the sudden influx of so

many refugees threatened the internal stability of complex tribal

political systems by upsetting the tribal-non-tribal population ratio to

the former’s disadvantage and in the process raising new issues and

problems in the already sensitive areas. These were worrisome

problems for Mrs. Gandhi with potentially serious consequences for

her party, government and country. In this sense, it was an “Indian

problem.”

Even as she was describing the problem as an Indian one, she

continued to consistently reiterate its global ramifications. From a

f.'

238
perusal of the table, it would appear that there was an ambiguity on

the part of Mrs. Gandhi regarding how to view or make others view the

problem. In the same time frame, (e.g. May end), the problem was

described as an “Indian”, a “South-East Asian” and an “international”

or “world-wide” problem. Over time the Indian problem became a

threat to Indian independence, stability and integrity and therefore

was demanding Asian as well as international attention.

From September to November 1971, Mrs. Gandhi speeches were

addressed to an international audience, hence the emphasis was on

the fact that the issue was not an Indo-Pak one but a problem that

had a very crucial international dimension. Mrs. Gandhi was probably

trying to draw the attention of both the U.S. and Soviet Russia to the

situation and play a pro-active role in appreciating the character of

the evolving problem. With tremendous conviction and passion, Mrs.

Gandhi tried to convey that what was going on was not at all an Indo-

Pak dispute but a severe global, political and human crisis for which

the international community would have to account.

239
 FIGURE 3: SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

LABELS WITHIN PAK PAK FRAMEWORK THROUGH INTERVENTION WAR

FRAMEWORK INADEQUATE
11 A political solution 11 A political settlement 1) World opinion is a great force. It can 1) In the meantime, I cannot avoid
m ust be brought would have been possible influence even the most powerful. The the responsibility or my duty to
1 1
about bv those who at an earlier stage. Now Great powers have a special safeguard the future of my people.
1

I
■S

S
£
have the power to do with each passing day,

SI
this possibility has become 2) .... Certainly India will do nothing
remote. 21 .... this is an international to provoke a weir or conflict. But
responsibility and we are not coiner to India is determined to safeguard her
21 It is essential that the let the international community to get 1national interest. 1

1
basic cause of the crisis be awav with it. They cannot avoid their
1
immediately removed bv a responsibility. 3) I m ust make it clear that we
1 political solution cannot depend on the international

S a O N
1

p
8

V
G

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u

3
1
3
1

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00
8

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a
concerned. to trv to remove the root cause of the visited, to solve our problems for us.
3

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31 Obviouslv the best wav.
1 the most humane way is to
have a political settlement.
and that a political
trouble.
concerned, we m ust be prepared -
41 The world should take interest to trv and we are prepared to the last man
and see that a political settlement is and woman to safeguard our freedom
reached which will be lasting and and territorial integrity.

r ^L S N I
settlement can only be nothing will be lasting unless it is
with the elected leader of accepted by the people of East Bengal 4) We may have to take steps which
the people of Bangladesh and their elected representatives. are necessary to safeguard our
and with the elected and freedom and our stability.
accepted representatives of
that country.
'
1) Statement in Lok 1) Discussion in the Rajya 1) Statement in Lok Sabha on May 24, 1) Speech at a banquet by President
Sabha on May 24, Sabha on June 15, 1971. 1971. Nixon in Washington, November 4,
1971. 1971.
2) Address at the Moscow 2) Discussion in the Rajya Sabha on
University on September June 15, 1971. 2) Address at Columbia University,
DATES 29, 1971. New York, November 6, 1971.
3) Speech at a banquet by President
3) Address to the India Nixon at Washington on November 4, 3) Address at Columbia University,
League, London on 1971. New York, November 6, 1971.
October 31, 1971.
4) Speech at Beethoven Hall, Bonn, 4) Speechat Beethoven Hall, Bonn,
November 11, 1971. November 11, 1971.

240
ANALYSIS OF FIGURE 3

The Bangladesh crisis involved two overlapping dimensions -

one political the other humanitarian. The Pakistani military junta’s

refusal to accept the logical consequences of the overwhelming

electoral victory of the Awami League and the adoption of barbaric

methods to overrun the electoral verdict was a political matter in

which India was not involved at all. But the massive refugee influx

into India following the military crackdown in East Pakistan

unwittingly made India a party to the crisis - and this was the

humanitarian dimension in which India got involved.

From a reading of the Figure 3, Mrs. Gandhi’s statements of

May 24, 1971 would appear inconsistent, for she spoke of a solution

to the problem both within Pak framework as well as through great

power intervention. It must be remembered that this statement was

made almost two months after the Pakistani military crackdown on

East Pakistan on March 25, 1971. In these two months she had

probably expected the Pakistani leaders to work out a political

solution to the problem and the big powers to pressurize Pakistan to

do so. The refugee influx to India, which was almost 3 million by this

time, had become a serious burden on India’s resources and polity.

This in Mrs. Gandhi’s perception (see Figure 2) made the problem an

international one. Hence she talked about international intervention.

By the middle of June, Mrs. Gandhi realized that a solution through

the Pak framework was no longer possible: she seemed to have sensed

that the indifference of the big powers had emboldened Pakistan to a

241
course of action that was reprehensible and hence wholly unsuitable

for solution of the prevailing crisis. With a sense of urgency, not

evident in the statement of May 24, 1971 she held that the great

powers (meaning U.S.A. and expecting it to take a stand) “could not

avoid their responsibility.”

Mrs. Gandhi’s statements during October-November 1971

should be viewed keeping in mind the developments in the fast

changing international situation then. Throughout July-September

1971, intense political activity took place around this crisis. The U.S.-

China-Pakistan axis became a potent threat to what was perceived to

be India’s insularity. Even while continuing with her international

diplomacy, Mrs. Gandhi understood that the support of Soviet Russia

had to be enlisted if she desired a bargaining position in the resolution

of the crisis in which India unwittingly got involved. In August 1971,

the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was

signed. The treaty underscored the imperatives of bilateral agreements

with a great power in a bipolar international world order. The

continued turbulence in East Pakistan brought the great powers into

the conflict, upsetting the balance of power in South Asia and

dragging India into cold war confrontation. There was a confidence

and forthrightness in her speeches about her position on the problem.

She had already made her stand clear that a political settlement

through international intervention was the only way to solve the

problem, but at the same time, had hinted at a veiled threat of a war.

So Mrs. Gandhi kept her options open.

242
 Dining November 1971 all her pronouncements were addressed

to a foreign audience. These may be viewed as a warning or an

ultimatum. Mrs. Gandhi had been preparing for war as a measure of

last resort since July 1971. By November, in her last attempt at

international diplomacy, she had made it clear in no uncertain terms

that steps to safeguard India's freedom and stability would have to be

taken - that is she reserved the right to use the military option of

going to war.

CONCLUSION

The story of any war underlines the importance of political

leadership. In responding to an unfolding crisis, a leader is called

upon to relate it to broader national interests, to establish objectives

and assess the nation’s capacity to achieve them. It is in the light of

these observations that we have tried to relate Mrs. Gandhi’s quality of

leadership in the preceding three sections of this chapter.

The Bangladesh crisis was an emphatic demonstration of Mrs.

Gandhi’s leadership skills in navigating through an extremely delicate

and hostile international setting and turning it around to her

advantage. She was compelled to take decisions under international

circumstances which were beyond her control. She had to renovate

and reorient India’s non-alignment policy - the bedrock of India’s

foreign policy - broadening its interpretation and practicing greater

243
manoeuverability at the operational level.74 By adroitly playing the

Soviet card Mrs. Gandhi had proved to be more than a match to the

“closed” Nixon-Kissinger combine. At the same time she had also

demonstrated during the crisis that India had in no way played a

subordinate role to USSR.

Despite Nixon-Kissinger’s policy of tilt, Chinese threat and

partisanship, India had to go to war to safeguard its vital national

interests. In delivering such a military victory Mrs. Gandhi had

restored the national pride in India so damaged by the 1962 Sino-

Indian debacle. She had single-handedly resurrected India’s position

as a pre-eminent power in South Asia which had been countermanded

by the U.S. and China through their alliances with Pakistan in an

effort to push their regional containment agenda vis-a-vis India and

Soviet Union. As Nayar and Paul observed, “India refused to have any

external power, whether the U.S. or Soviet Union, preside again over

the settlement of the war, as had occurred in 1966, because it wanted

to see the international affairs of the region develop as an autonomous

system in which it was the system-builder.”75 This perception was the

foundation of a plank in India’s foreign policy during the seventies

which Stephen Cohen described as the Indira Doctrine’ and which

“represented a tough, uncompromising attitude towards neighbours,

large and small. Two principles were laid down: no foreign power

should be allowed to cross the crest of the Himalayas, and India would

74 The Statesman, Non-alignment in a melting pot', August 10, 1971. Also Ashok K. Kapur, ‘Indo-
Soviet Treaty and die Emerging Asian Balance,” 465-466.
75 Balder Raj Nayar and T.V Paul, India in the World Order, 180.

244
consider the presence or influence of an external power in the region

as adverse to its interest, unless that power recognised its

predominance.”76 The Bangladesh operation was the most significant

development. Taking a nation to war is perhaps the ultimate test of

political leadership. At its best, a leader can provide imagination and

creative direction by relating the war to fundamental national values

and to the vision of a better world. Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in

achieving all this, in a way that no other leader before her had.

India’s decisive victory had given Mrs. Gandhi an unassailable

position during that period. Kaviraj commented that, “Her (Mrs.

Gandhi’s) position seemed literally invincible, because it was based on

a combination of radicalism and patriotism - for those who would not

support her in her promise of removal of poverty, could do so for the

liberation of Bangladesh and those who would not support the

strength of India, would for the eradication of poverty.”77 Mrs. Gandhi

may have lacked Nehru’s moral or intellectual stature but the power

and prestige she enjoyed at the end of 1971 was remarkable. If the

fifth general elections in 1971 had established her as an undisputed

national leader, then her victory in the Bangladesh crisis made her the

tallest leader in South-Asia.

76 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, 137-138.

77 Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics,” 1701.

245