SABERON VS.

LARONG

Petitioner Jose C. Saberon charged respondent Atty. Fernando T. Larong of grave misconduct for allegedly
using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual arguments and to anchor
his case on the legal merits of his clients claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,

Moreover, he noted that in espousing a clients cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as
to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were unnecessary and irrelevant to
the case, respondent went overboard and crossed the line of professional conduct. In view thereof, he
recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice
of law for 30 days.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Larong is guilty of grave misconduct.

HELD: the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

Respecting Larong’s argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were
privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, should not
trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently
been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as
they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.

Thus, while Larong is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous
character as to merit Larong’s disbarment. In light of Larong’s apologies, the Court finds it best to temper
the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather than grave,
misconduct.

SOLIDON vs. MACALALAD

In a verified complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP Commission on Bar Discipline), Atty. Elmer C. Solidon (Atty. Solidon) sought the disbarment of Atty.
Ramil E. Macalalad (Atty. Macalalad) for violations of Rule 16.01,Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04[4] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence in handling a case.
While on official visit to Eastern Samar in October 2005, Atty. Macalalad was introduced to Atty. Solidon
by a mutual acquaintance, Flordeliz Cabo-Borata (Ms. Cabo-Borata). Atty. Solidon asked Atty. Macalalad
to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land located in Borongan, Eastern Samar and owned by Atty.
Solidons relatives. For a consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), Atty. Macalalad accepted
the task to be completed within a period of eight (8) months. Atty. Macalalad received Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) was
to be paid when Atty. Solidon received the certificate of title to the property. Atty. Macalalad has not
filed any petition for registration over the property sought to be titled up to the present time.

complainant submitted in his position paper the affidavit of Flordeliz Cabo-Borata, the mutual
acquaintance of both complainant and respondent. In the said affidavit, Mrs. Cabo-Borata described how
she repeatedly followed-up the matter with respondent and how respondent turned a deaf ear towards
the same. There is nothing on record which would prompt this Office to view the allegations therein with
caution. In fact, considering that the allegations corroborate the undisputed facts of the instant case...

As respondent has failed to duly present any reasonable excuse for the non-filing of the application
despite the lapse of about a year from the time his services were engaged, it is plain that his negligence
in filing the application remains uncontroverted. And such negligence is contrary to the mandate
prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which enjoins a lawyer not
to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. In fact, Rule 18.03 even provides that his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the respondent’s excuse is exculpatory.

RULING:

(1) No. Respondent’s excuse is not exculpatory. He was imposed the (modified) penalty of suspension
for six (6) months from the practice of law and was ordered to return to the complainant the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of the Decision until the full amount is returned.

The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform
the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.

In addition to the above finding of negligence, [Court] also [found] respondent guilty of violating Rule
16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the money
received from the client. In this case, respondent did not immediately account for and promptly return
the money he received from complainant even after he failed to render any legal service within the
contracted time of the engagement.

CARIAGA vs PEOPLE
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was charged before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of malversation of public
funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal the trial
courts decision to the Court of Appeals. By Resolution of May 28, 2007,[4] the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon. Petitioner, admitting the procedural error committed by her
former counsel, implores the Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her
appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the
Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER] WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BE

DISMISSED OUTRIGHT OR BE ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE
APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.

HELD:

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty due to a
procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for
a relaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that any rigid
and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must
always be avoided.

The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent ignorance of the law
effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.[11]

While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto,
especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or
where the interests of justice so require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall
under any of these exceptions.

Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defense as
well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayan would
do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

CHUA vs. TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (TOPROS) INC.

On December 28, 1999, respondent Total Office Products and Services, Inc., (TOPROS) lodged a
complaint for annulment of contracts of loan and real estate mortgage against herein petitioner Antonio
T. Chua before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 67736 and
was raffled to the sala of Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.

The said suit sought to annul a loan contract allegedly extended by petitioner to respondent TOPROS in
the amount of ten million four hundred thousand pesos (P10,400,000) and the accessory real estate
mortgage contract covering two parcels of land situated in Quezon City as collateral.

On February 28, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He
contended that the action filed by TOPROS affects title to or possession of the parcels of land subject of
the real estate mortgage. He argued that it should thus have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City where the encumbered real properties are located, instead of Pasig City where the parties
reside

ISSUE: WHETHER AN ACTION TO ANNUL A LOAN AND MORTGAGE CONTRACT DULY ALLEGED AS
FICTITIOUS FOR BEING WITH ABSOLUTELY NO CONSIDERATION IS A PERSONAL ACTION OR REAL ACTION

RULING: Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate
mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property,
the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages.[12] In contrast, in a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the then Rules of Court, a
real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.

The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. provides the proper precedent in
this case. In Hernandez, appellants contended that the action of the Hernandez spouses for the
cancellation of the mortgage on their lots was a real action affecting title to real property, which should
have been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were situated.

The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule on real actions only
mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the
cancellation of a real estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls under the
catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of Rule 4 Sec. 2.

Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject loan
and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the
orders of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioners motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue.

CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION

vs. BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION

Petitioner instituted a Complaint for Unfair Competition and/or Copyright Infringement and Claim for
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (trial court).

On February 14, 2005, the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner. 4
On November 15, 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Admit Appellant’s Brief. It ruled that one of the grounds by which the Court of Appeals may, on its
own motion or that of the appellee, dismiss the appeal is the failure on the part of the appellant to serve
and file the required number of copies of his brief within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court5the
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief is perforce DENIED.5

Accordingly, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court questioning the August
19, 2005 and November 15, 2005 Resolutions of the appellate court.

ISSUE: the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file the appellant’s brief
within the reglementary period.5

RULING: this Court has emphasized that procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and
due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. From time to time,
however, we have recognized exceptions to the Rules, but only for the most compelling reasons where
stubborn obedience to the Rules would defeat rather than serve the ends of justice.

It bears stressing at this point then that the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel binds the
client, may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the
client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. In rendering justice, procedural
infirmities take a backseat against substantive rights of litigants . 5

Also, it must be stressed that petitioner had no participatory negligence in the dismissal of its appeal.
Hence, the ensuing dismissal of its appeal was completely attributable to the gross negligence of its
counsel. For said reason, the Court is not averse to suspending its own rules in the pursuit of justice.
Where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the
interests of justice so require, relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross
or palpable mistake or negligence. All told, petitioner should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the

proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Nevertheless,
considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, the appropriate action to take is to remand the case to
the appellate court for further proceedings, for it to thoroughly examine the factual and legal issues that
still need to be threshed out.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, insofar as this case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, subject to the payment of the
corresponding docket fees within fifteen (15) days from notice of this Decision.5